Text

Submittal of Revision 106, Appendix C to Central Emergency Control Center, Radiological Emergency Plan
	ML15169B117
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	06/15/2015
From:	James Shea; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	CNL-15-104 L44 150615 003
	Download: ML15169B117 (213)
	v • d • e

L44 150615 003 Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 CNL-15-104 June 15, 2015 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) 10 CFR 72.44(f)

ATTN : Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 Facility Construction Permit No. CPPR-92 NRC Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391

Subject:

Central Emergency Control Center - Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix C, Revision 106 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV and 10 CFR 72.44(f), this submittal provides the revised Central Emergency Control Center (CECC)

Radiological Emergency Plan (REP), Appendix C as listed below.

REP Revision Title Effective Date CECC REP, Appendix C 106 Radiological Emergency Plan Appendix C 5/28/2015 provides a summary of the changes and the analysis performed that concluded the changes do not constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the REP. The CECC REP continues to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. Enclosure 2 provides a copy of the revised REP, Appendix C.

There are no new regulatory commitments in this letter. If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Edward D. Schrull at (423) 751 -3850.

Enclosures:

cc: See Page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNL-15-104 Page2 June 15, 2015

Enclosures:

1. Central Emergency Control Center- Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision - Summary of Changes and Analysis

2. CECC REP Appendix C, "Radiological Emergency Plan," Revision 106 cc (Enclosures):

NRC Regional Administrator- Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 NRC Project Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 NRC Project Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

Enclosure 1 Central Emergency Control Center- Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix C- Revision 106 Summary of Changes and Analysis The following table provides a specific discussion of the changes to Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) Appendix C, Revision 106. Following implementation of the changes, the CECC REP continues to comply with the requirements of 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. The revisions are a change to the REP (includes describing the programmatic methods for maintaining preparedness or responding to an emergency) for WBN.

CNL-15-104 E1-1

Enclosure 1 Central Emergency Control Center - Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix C - Revision 106 Summary of Changes and Analysis

Plan Affected I Description Analysis

1. Changes to REP, Appendix C, in 1. These changes conform to the corresponding FSAR changes, which were approved 1 REP Appendix C, Revision 106 to modify the Stage I by the NRC by letter dated January 28, 2015 [ML15005A314]. The proposed activity Rev. 106 and Stage II Flood Warning levels increases the level at which the Winter Stage I flood warning is issued and decreases specified in EAL 5.4 for WBN. the level at which the Summer Stage I flood warning is issued, thereby changing the threshold for the EAL. There is no change to the value for the Stage II flood warning.

Due to errors discovered in the previous hydrologic analysis, TVA has updated the hydrologic analysis for Watts Bar. As a result of the re-analysis, several changes have been made which represent an improvement in the accuracy of the calculated flood levels.

Within the TVA flood warning plan, Stage I is intended to provide sufficient time to make preparations for operating in flood mode while minimizing cost and other economic consequences. The second stage, Stage II, is intended to achieve safe plant shutdown.

This warning plan is based, in part, on observed rainfall on the ground at gauge stations located throughout the watershed. The observed rainfall is used to forecast water levels in the reservoir system.

Although the proposed activity changes the trigger levels for Stage I in the EAL scheme, the amount of time provided or needed to implement the warning plan has not changed.

The arrival of the probable maximum flood, or the flood wave, due to seismic failure of upstream dams for inundation at WBN would be greater than or equal to 27 hours3.125e-4 days 0.0075 hours 4.464286e-5 weeks 1.02735e-5 months .

These changes maintain the 27 -hour warning time.

NUMARC/NESP-007 suggests an EAL that "covers other (site-specific) phenomena such as flood." No explicit flooding threshold is provided in NUMARC/NESP-007 because the values related to flooding would be highly dependent on the site location, normal water levels, terrain, precipitation rates, runoff rates, etc. Therefore, the change does not deviate from the approved scheme as documented in NUREG-0847, SSER 13, which was evaluated against NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2. The full spectrum of emergency conditions previously evaluated continues to be evaluated with this change to the EALs.

The change to the thresholds for Stage I flooding resulted from updates to the hydrologic analysis which were completed in order to correct inaccuracies in the model. Because the changes to the Stage I levels were a result of the updated analysis, the changes to the EAL values represent an improvement in the accuracy of the EAL.

(Continued on next page)

CNL-15-104 E1-2

Enclosure 1 Central Emergency Control Center - Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix C - Revision 106 Summary of Changes and Analysis

Plan Affected I Description Analysis REP Appendix C, 1. (Continued) TVA uses reservoir operating guides to make decisions about moving water through the Rev. 106 Tennessee River system. These guides show typical reservoir elevations throughout the year, as well as when the spring fill and winter drawdown are scheduled to occur. They help ensure sufficient flood storage in the reservoirs while also providing for hydropower generation, navigation, water quality, and other benefits. The operating guide for the Chickamauga Reservoir is available for review. It should be noted that reservoir levels fluctuate based on rainfall, runoff amounts, and other factors. Fill and drawdown periods are also impacted by forecast weather, existing reservoir levels, runoff amounts, and other factors.

Operating guides are based on many decades of operating experience. They take into consideration all the features that influence a reservoir's ability to store and release water, e.g., the size and shape of the surrounding watershed, the reservoir's surface area, and the average rainfall and runoff, as well as historical demands for water use and flood storage space at different times of the year.

Although the specific date range for the summer and winter periods has been eliminated (See item 2 below}, the determination of the Stage I and II flood warnings continues to be made using the same reservoir operations policy. Use of the Summer and Winter periods in lieu of specific date ranges allows river operations to make a determination based on current reservoir levels and meteorological conditions instead of preset calendar dates. See FSAR Section 2.4.14.9 for additional information.

Operators in the control room continue to rely on River Operations to provide notice of the Stage I or II flood warning. Additionally, they will rely on River Operations for determining actual river reservoir level and whether pools are being maintained at Winter or Summer levels. Although the change requires the control room to receive additional information from River Operations, this does not place additional responsibilities on the control room. The control room does not have readily available indication of water level above approximately elevation 709', and therefore, must already confer with River Operations to determine if the EAL threshold has been reached (real-time). Therefore, the timeliness of EAL declaration continues to be maintained. The corresponding change to the FSAR recognizes the dependency of the operations staff on TVA River Operations in implementing the warning plan and declaring the appropriate emergency classification. The change to the EAL does not change the responsibilities of the control room staff or River Operations.

(Continued on next page)

CNL-15-104 E1-3

Enclosure 1 Central Emergency Control Center- Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix C- Revision 106 Summary of Changes and Analysis

Plan Affected ] Description Analysis REP Appendix C, 1. (Continued} The addition of the NRC-issued Safety Evaluation in the references section of the EAL Rev. 106 Bases has no effect on the effectiveness of the plan and will not affect compliance with any of the applicable functions, elements, or commitments.

2 REP Appendix C, 2. Elimination of the date range for As part of the change, a specific time frame is no longer assigned to the Summer or Rev. 106 Summer and Winter periods Winter seasons. The removal of the specific seasonal time frame provides additional consistent with the change to the operational flexibility in the reservoir system.

FSAR. Reference to the NRC Safety TVA's reservoir operations policy provides the framework for overall operation of the Evaluation has been added to the system. Day-to-day decisions on actual release schedules are based on existing and references section of the EAL. forecasted weather conditions, immediate and projected needs for river flows, and special operation requirements. This change does not affect compliance with any of the functions, elements, or commitments.

CNL-15-104 E1-4

Enclosure 2 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN APPENDIXC REVISION 106

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-1 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 APPENDIX C WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-2 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-3 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.1 Introduction The following information provides a site specific list of Initiating Conditions (IC), site specific instrument parameters (when required), and a basis for classifying and declaring Emergency Events at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).

Guidance for determining these Emergency Events was taken from REG GUIDE 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors which allows Licensees to use NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

For the purposes of declaring an emergency, WBN utilized the following Emergency classifications: General Emergency, Site Area Emergency, Alert, and Unusual Event.

For a General Emergency to be declared, events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

For a Site Area Emergency to be declared, events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

For an Alert to be declared, events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

For an Unusual Event to be declared, events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The goal of these Emergency classification levels is to have offsite emergency response authorities prepared to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-4 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.2 Emergency Event Methodology The WBN methodology for event classification and declaration has 36 emergency events broken down into the following seven categories.

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1 - 4)

WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 1.1 Fuel Clad FC 1,2,3,4,5,7 1.2 RCS RCS 1,2,3,5,6 1.3 Containment CNTMT 1,2,3,4,5,8 SYSTEM DEGRADATION WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation SU3, SA4, SS6 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication SU6, SA3 (expanded), SS4 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection SA2, SS2, SG2 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation SU4 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage SU5 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage SU5 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down HU5 2.8 Turbine Failure HU1, HA1 2.9 Technical Specification SU2 2.10 Safety Limit SU2 LOSS OF POWER WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) SU1, SA5, SS1, SG1 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) SU1, SA1 3.3 Loss of DC SU7, SS3

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-5 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 4.1 Fire HU2, HA2 4.2 Explosion HU1, HA1 4.3 Flammable Gas HU3, HA3 4.4 Toxic Gas HU3, HA3 4.5 Control Room Evacuation HA5, HS-2 4.6 Security HU4, HA4, HS4, HG1 (NEI 99-01 R5) 4.7 SED Judgment HU5, HA6, HS3, HG2 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 5.1 Earthquake HU1, HA1 5.2 Tornado HU1, HA1 5.3 Aircraft Crash HU1, HA1 5.4 River Level High HU1, HA1 5.5 River Level Low HU1, HA1 5.6 Watercraft Crash HU1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems SA3, SS5 (expanded) 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) SU1, SA1 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) SU7

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-6 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 RADIOLOGICAL WBN Reference NUMARC/NESP-007 Reference 7.1 Gaseous Effluent AU1, AA1, AS1, AG1 7.2 Liquid Effluent AU1, AA1 7.3 Radiation Levels AU2, AA3 7.4 Fuel Handling AU2, AA2 In each event there exists a set of Initiating Conditions and associated emergency action levels (where required) which trigger the declaration of the emergency and the level of onsite and offsite emergency response.

In the WBN Methodology, the following operating modes were utilized in the declaratory scheme:

Power operations (1)

Start up (2)

Hot Standby (3)

Hot Shutdown (4)

Cold Shutdown (5)

Refueling (6)

Defueled C.3 Responsibility The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance provided in this section belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties can not be delegated.

C.4 Classification Determination To determine the classification of the emergency, the SED reviews the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in WBN Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP 1) with the known or suspected conditions.

If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition, the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart in the procedure.

The highest classification for which an emergency action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

After an event classification, if the followup investigation shows that initiating conditions were met that dictate a higher event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-7 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.4 Classification Determination (continued)

If an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred shall be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

If the parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition can not be reasonably discounted (i.e., spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered met and the SM/SED shall follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

For monitors that read out in mr/hr, it is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr. For monitors that read out in R/hr, it is assumed that this is equivalent to rem/hr.

If an EAL was exceeded but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency class that was appropriate shall Not be declared, but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.

References 10 CFR 50 Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities REG GUIDE-1.101, Rev. 2 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels Department Of Transportation Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials ANSI Standard N.18.7-1976 Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan To Support the Emergency Classification Flow Chart.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-8 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-9 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Emergency Classification and Declaration Methodology BASIS

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-10 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-11 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.1 FUEL CLAD BARRIER IC 1.1.1 Critical Safety Function Status Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Core Cooling Red Potential LOSS:

Core Cooling Orange OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC addresses the condition of inadequate Core Cooling.

If the Emergency Operating Procedure status trees indicate a red path the condition must be considered to be an extreme challenge to the safety function needed to ensure protection of the public.

Core Cooling - Red indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate a "Loss" of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC addresses the condition where an inadequate Core Cooling situation can develop. If the Emergency Operating Procedure status trees indicate an orange path the conditions must be considered to be a severe challenge to the safety function.

Core Cooling - Orange indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur.

Heat Sink - Red indicates the heat sink function is under extreme challenge. It should be noted that this EAL for "Potential Loss" is not applicable if actions of FR-H.1 are not implemented due to Operator ability to control Aux Feedwater >410 gpm.

Either of these two items indicates a "Potential Loss" of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-C.1 Inadequate Core Cooling FR-C.2 Degraded Core Cooling FR-H.1 Loss of Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-12 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.1 FUEL CLAD BARRIER IC 1.1.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent Iodine

-131 Potential LOSS:

Not Applicable Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC addresses the Condition of high RCS activity. If the reading of RCS activity is > 300 µCi/gm it is well above expected iodine spikes and corresponds to about 1% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates that significant clad heating has occurred.

Potential LOSS:

There is no "Potential Loss" IC associated with this item.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 NUREG 1465 Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants WBN, Radiation Monitor Readings for REP Response of the Primary Containment High Range Radiation Monitors, TI-RPS-162 R14.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-13 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.1 FUEL CLAD BARRIER IC 1.1.3 Incore Tcs Hi Quad Average Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Greater Than 1200ºF Potential LOSS:

Greater Than 727ºF Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC uses a reading of 1200ºF which corresponds to a Core Cooling Red condition on the EOP status trees. A reading of this magnitude corresponds to significant superheating of the reactor coolant and clad heating which results in a "Loss" of Fuel Clad Barrier (TCs is in reference to Incore Thermocouples.)

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC uses a reading of 727ºF which corresponds to a Core cooling Orange Condition on the EOP status trees. A reading of this magnitude corresponds to a loss of RCS subcooling.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-C.1 Inadequate Core Cooling FR-C.2 Degraded Core Cooling WBN-OSG4-188, (I-01)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-14 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.1 FUEL CLAD BARRIER IC 1.1.4 Reactor Vessel Water Level Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Not Applicable Potential LOSS:

VALID RVLIS Level <33% (No RCP running)

Basis LOSS:

There is no "Loss" IC corresponding to this item because it is covered by the other Fuel Clad Barrier "Loss".

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC is defined by an Orange Path on the Core Cooling status tree. The numeric value used is 33% level with no reactor coolant pumps running. This condition indicates that considerable Clad heating and loss of RCS subcooling has occurred.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-C.2 Degraded Core Cooling WBN-OSG4-188, (K-01)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-15 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.1 FUEL CLAD BARRIER IC 1.1.5 Containment Radiation Monitors Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

VALID reading of :

332 R/hr On RM-90-271 and 272 or 265 R/hr On RM-90-273 and 274 Potential LOSS:

Not Applicable Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC is defined by a VALID reading of 332 R/hr on the upper Containment Hi Rad monitors or 265 R/hr on the lower containment Hi Rad monitors. The level of radiation in the Containment is indicative of a loss of Coolant accident (LOCA) in the Containment in conjunction with fuel damage.

The reading assumes the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with a concentration of 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 into the containment atmosphere. Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 1% clad failure depending on core inventory and RCS volume). TI-RPS-162 values are based on a tritium core. Thus, this IC indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of the RCS barrier.

Potential LOSS:

There is no "Potential Loss" IC associated with this item.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 NUREG 1465 Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants WBN, Radiation Monitor Readings for REP Response of the Primary Containment High Range Radiation Monitors, TI-RPS-162 R14.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-16 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.1 FUEL CLAD BARRIER IC 1.1.6 Site Emergency Director Judgment Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM/SED, indicates a Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

Basis This IC gives the SED the latitude to use his/her judgment in determining if the fuel clad barrier is or will be in a "Loss" or "Potential Loss" condition. This situation is usually considered when plant conditions are present that require the monitoring of CSFs or performance of EOP corrective actions. Specific cases where SED judgment may be required are the loss of instrumentation needed to monitor the CSFs and the loss of all AC power.

Although the majority of the ICs provide very specific thresholds, the Site Emergency Director must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the IC threshold is imminent. If, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the thresholds have been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher emergency classes (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all emergency classes.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-17 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.2 RCS BARRIER IC 1.2.1 Critical Safety Function Status Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Not Applicable Potential LOSS:

Pressurized Thermal Shock Red OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

Basis LOSS:

There is no "Loss" IC associated with this item.

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC is defined by a Red path on Pressurized Thermal Shock or a Red path on the Heat Sink CSF status trees. In the case of PTS, consideration is given to a failure of the reactor vessel resulting in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Heat Sink Red is identified since an inability to remove core heat could lead to a vessel or RCS failure. Also, in the case of loss of heat sink, it may become necessary to cool the core by bleed and feed with safety injection. Although this is a deliberate action, the open PORV is a breech of the RCS Barrier that would allow fission products to be released to containment. It should be noted that this (Heat Sink) EAL for "Potential Loss" is not applicable if actions of FR-H.1 are not implemented due to Operator ability to control Aux Feedwater >410 gpm.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-P.1 Pressurized Thermal Shock FR-H.1 Loss of Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-18 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.2 RCS BARRIER IC 1.2.2 RCS Leakage/LOCA Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

RCS Leak results in Loss of subcooling ( <65ºF Indicated), [85ºF ADV]

Potential LOSS:

Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity Of One Charging Pump in the Normal Charging Alignment OR RCS Leakage Results in Entry into E-1 Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC addresses conditions where leakage from the RCS is greater than available inventory control capacity such that a loss of subcooling has occurred. The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory control systems are inadequate in maintaining RCS pressure and inventory against the mass loss through the leak.

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC is based on the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header and letdown in service. This assures that any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage or loss (e.g., events leading to reactor scram and ECCS actuation) will result in no lower than an "Alert" emergency classification.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant WBN-OSG4-188, (H-13)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-19 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.2 RCS BARRIER IC 1.2.3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

SGTR that results in a safety injection actuation OR Entry into E-3 Potential LOSS:

Not Applicable Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC addresses conditions where the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) exists and the RCS flow into the steam generator is such that pressurizer level and pressure cannot be maintained. The inability to maintain level via the normal charging header, with CVCS letdown in service requires a safety injection by procedure. If a manual safety injection is not initiated an auto SI will occur due to a low pressurizer pressure.

Any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage or loss (e.g., events leading to reactor scram and ECCS actuation) will result in no lower than an "Alert" emergency classification.

This IC also addresses the entry into EOP, E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, under any circumstance.

This "Loss" IC in conjunction with the Containment Barrier "Loss" IC #4 addresses the situation where the S/G that is ruptured is also Faulted.

This "Loss" of two barriers requires an Event classification of Site Area Emergency.

Potential LOSS:

There is no "Potential Loss" IC associated with this item.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 AOI-33 Steam Generator Tube Leak E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-20 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.2 RCS BARRIER IC 1.2.4 Reactor Vessel Water Level Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

VALID RVLIS level < 33% (No RCP Running)

Potential LOSS:

Not Applicable Basis LOSS:

The "Loss" IC is defined by an Orange path on the Core cooling status tree (CSF). The numeric value used is 33% level with no reactor coolant pumps running. Inability to maintain reactor vessel water level is the fundamental indication that the RCS barrier has been lost.

This "Loss" EAL in conjunction with the Fuel Clad Barrier "Potential Loss" IC #4 requires an event classification of Site Area Emergency.

Potential LOSS:

There is no "Potential Loss" IC associated with this item.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-C.2 Degraded Core Cooling WBN-OSG4-188, (K-01)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-21 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.2 RCS BARRIER IC 1.2.5 Site Emergency Director Judgment Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Any Condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, indicates a Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions Listed Above.

Basis This IC gives the SED the latitude to use his/her judgment in determining if the RCS barrier is or will be in a "Loss or Potential Loss" condition. This situation is usually considered when plant conditions are present that require the monitoring of CSFs or performance of EOP corrective actions. Specific cases where SED judgment may be required are the loss of instrumentation needed to monitor the CSFs and the loss of all AC power.

Although the majority of the EALs provide very specific thresholds, the SED must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL threshold is imminent. If, in the judgment of the SED, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the thresholds have been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher emergency classes (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all emergency classes.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-22 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-23 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.1 Critical Safety Function Status Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS:

Containment (FR-Z.1) Red OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE Basis LOSS:

There is no "Loss" IC associated with this item.

Potential LOSS:

The first "Potential Loss" IC is defined by a Red Path on the Containment status tree. A Red Path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function derived from appropriate instrument readings and/or sampling results, and thus represents a potential loss of containment. Conditions leading to a containment Red Path result from RCS barrier and/or Fuel Clad Barrier Loss. Thus, this IC is primarily a discriminator between the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency representing a potential loss of the third barrier.

The second "Potential Loss" IC is defined by a Red Path on the core cooling status tree with FR-C.1 ineffective. In this IC, the functional restoration procedures are those emergency operating procedures that address the recovery of the core cooling critical safety functions. The procedure is considered ineffective if the temperature is not decreasing or if the vessel water level is not increasing.

The conditions identified in this potential loss IC represent an imminent melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. In conjunction with the core exit thermocouple ICs in the Fuel and RCS barrier columns, this IC would result in the declaration of a General Emergency -- loss of two barriers and the potential loss of a third. If the functional restoration procedures are ineffective, there is no "success" path.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-Z.1 High Containment Pressure FR-C.1 Inadequate Core Cooling

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-24 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.2 Containment Pressure/Hydrogen Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Rapid unexplained pressure decrease following initial pressure increase OR Containment pressure or Sump Level Not increasing (with LOCA in progress)

Potential LOSS:

Containment Hydrogen increases to >4% by volume OR Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < one full train of Containment spray Basis LOSS:

This first "Loss" IC address a rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicating a loss of containment integrity.

The second "Loss" IC addresses the situation where the containment pressure or sump level are not increasing with a LOCA in progress. This could indicate containment bypass and loss of containment integrity.

This IC, in conjunction with RCS barrier IC #2, results in an Event Classification of Site Area Emergency.

Potential LOSS:

The condition of high containment pressure, greater than 13.5 PSIG, is addressed by the CSF, Containment Red, "Potential Loss", IC #1.3.1 The first "Potential Loss" IC addresses the existence of an explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the containment, which if ignited, would be a challenge to the Containment Barrier.

The second "Potential Loss" IC represents a potential loss of containment in that the containment heat removal/depressurization system (e.g., containment sprays, ice condenser, etc.) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner, as indicated by containment pressure greater than the setpoint, B (2.8 PSIG), at which the equipment was supposed to have actuated.

These "Potential Loss" ICs are primarily a discrimination between the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency representing a potential loss of the third barrier.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-25 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.2 Containment Pressure/Hydrogen (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4 Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 FR-Z.1 High Containment Pressure Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.3 Containment Isolation Status Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Containment Isolation (when required) is Incomplete and a Release Path to the Environment Exists Potential LOSS:

Not Applicable Basis LOSS:

The Loss IC is intended to address incomplete containment isolation that allows a direct release to the environment. It represents a loss of the Containment Barrier.

Potential LOSS:

There is no "Potential Loss" IC associated with this item.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-26 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.4 Containment Bypass Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside of CNTMT OR Prolonged (> 4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits POTENTIAL LOSS:

Unexplained VALID increase in area or Ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress)

Basis LOSS:

The first "Loss" IC addresses a non-isolatable secondary side release from a ruptured steam generator that is also faulted outside containment.

This allows a direct release of radioactive fission and activation products to the environment. Resultant offsite dose rates are a function of many variables. Examples include: Coolant Activity, Actual Leak Rate, SG Carry Over, Iodine Partitioning, and Meteorology. Therefore, dose assessment in accordance with event Gaseous Effluent (7.1) General Emergency, "Site Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release", is required when there is indication that the Fuel Clad Barrier is potentially lost.

This IC would exist in conjunction with the RCS barrier "Loss" IC #3 and results in an Event classification of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to General Emergency would be based on "Potential Loss" of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

The second "Loss" IC addresses a prolonged, greater than four (4) hour, secondary side release outside of the Containment from a steam generator having primary to secondary leakage greater than Tech. Spec.

limits, (LCO 3.4.13). This IC results in an Event classification of Unusual Event. This indicator's intent addresses nonisolable main stream line breaks (MSLB) outside containment, feedwater line breaks, failed open relief valves or atmospheric dump valves, or plant cooldown via atmospheric steam dump due to loss of offsite power or main condenser.

However, it is not the intent of this indicator to address transient events such as (1) MSLB downstream of the MSIV if the MSIV isolate the break,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-27 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.4 Containment Bypass (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4 Basis (continued) LOSS: (continued) or (2) affected S/G isolation occurs in accordance with plant procedures, or for other similar events. Prolonged steam releases via the main condenser air ejectors or steam-driven auxiliary feed pump exhaust should be classified on the basis of dose assessments rather than the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC addresses an increase in area or ventilation radiation monitors, with a LOCA in progress, which is indicative of a potential loss of the Containment Barrier. This IC in conjunction with the RCS barrier IC #2 results in an Event classification of Site Area Emergency.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-28 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.5 Significant Radioactivity in Containment Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS:

Not Applicable Potential LOSS VALID reading increase of Greater Than :

5600 R/hr On RM-90-271 and RM-90-272 or 4470 R/hr On RM-90-273 and RM-90-274 Basis LOSS; There is no "Loss: IC associated with this item.

Potential LOSS:

The "Potential Loss" IC is defined by a VALID reading of 5600 R/hr on the upper Containment Hi Rad monitors or 4470 R/hr on the lower containment Hi Rad monitors.

This reading indicates significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS barriers.

A major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions from core damage is not possible unless a major failure of fuel cladding allows radioactive material to be released from the core into the reactor coolant. Regardless of whether containment is challenged, this amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment, such that a General Emergency declaration is warranted.

NUREG-1228, "Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents", indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%.

TI RPS-162 values are based on a tritium core.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101 NUREG 1465 Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants NUREG-1228, Source Estimates During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents WBN, Radiation Monitor Readings for REP Response of the Primary Containment High Range Radiation Monitors, TI-RPS-162 R14.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-29 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event 1.3 CNTMT BARRIER IC 1.3.6 Site Emergency Director Judgment Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM/SED, indicates a Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

Basis This IC gives the SED the latitude to use his/her judgment in determining if the Containment Barrier is a "Potential Loss" or "Loss". This situation is usually considered when plant conditions are present that require the monitoring of CSFs or performance of EOP corrective actions. Specific cases where SED judgment may be required are the loss of instrumentation needed to monitor the CSFs and the loss of all AC power.

Although the majority of the ICs provide very specific thresholds, the SED must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL threshold is imminent. If, in the judgment of the SED, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the thresholds have been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher emergency classes (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all emergency classes.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-30 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-31 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER UTILIZATION in EMERGENCY EVENT CLASSIFICATION

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-32 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-33 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event Not Applicable Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY IC FG1 Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier Basis Definition:

Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

The main differentiation between the Site Area and General Emergency classification is whether or not the EPA PAG plume exposure levels are expected to be exceeded outside the site boundary. This threshold, in addition to dynamic dose assessment considerations, addresses NRC and offsite emergency response agency concerns as to timely declaration of a General Emergency.

The main objective of the General Emergency is to determine whether evacuation or sheltering of the general public is indicated based on EPA PAGs, and therefore should be interpreted to include radionuclide release regardless of cause. Consideration must be given to failures of systems and or structures that provide fission product barrier integrity which is the primary method of preventing uncontrolled radionuclide releases. In terms of fission product barriers, the loss of two barriers with potential loss of the third barrier constitutes a General Emergency.

In utilizing the Fission Product Barrier sub-sections (i.e., Fuel Clad, RCS Barrier and CNTMT Barrier) the Site Emergency Director (SED) will use the instructions in EPIP 1, to determine the General Emergency. These instructions provide clear guidance on the proper use of the classification charts and a correct classification of a General Emergency.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-34 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-35 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event Not Applicable Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY IC FS1 Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers Basis Definition:

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the like failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

It is considered to be a challenge to plant functions necessary for the protection of the public if the integrity of any two of the three fission product barriers has or has the potential of being degraded. This approach is more conservative than REG GUIDE 1.101 in that the containment barrier is not weighted less significant than the other two barriers. Thus a "Loss" or "Potential Loss" of any two barriers is a Site Area Emergency.

This approach also simplifies the Site Area Emergency classification from the fission product barrier matrix.

In utilizing the Fission Product Barrier sub-sections (i.e., Fuel Clad, RCS Barrier and CNTMT Barrier) the Site Emergency Director (SED) will use the instructions in EPIP 1, to determine the Site Area Emergency. These instructions provide clear guidance on the proper use of the classification charts and a correct classification of a Site Area Emergency.

Escalation Escalation would be based on Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-36 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-37 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event Not Applicable Classification ALERT IC FA1 Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad Barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier Basis Definition:

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The "Loss" or "Potential Loss" of either the Fuel Clad Barrier or RCS barrier is considered to be an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The Alert classification resulting from potential degradation of the fuel clad or RCS integrity also addresses the operation staff's need for help by staffing the Technical Support Center (TSC), independent of whether an actual decrease in plant safety is determined.

This increased monitoring can then be used to better determine the actual plant safety state, whether escalation to a higher emergency class is warranted, or termination of the emergency class declaration is warranted. Dose consequences from these events are small fractions of the EPA PAG plume exposure levels, i.e.,

about 10 millirem (mR) to 100 millirem (mR).

In utilizing the Fission Product Barrier sub-sections (i.e., Fuel Clad, RCS Barrier and CNTMT Barrier) the Site Emergency Director (SED) will use the instructions in EPIP 1, to determine the Alert. These instructions provide clear guidance on the proper use of the classification charts and a correct classification of an Alert.

Escalation Escalation would be based on Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-38 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-39 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 1.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Event Not Applicable Classification UNUSUAL EVENT IC FU1 Mode 1,2,3,4 Description LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier Basis Definition:

Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant is indicated primarily by exceeding a plant technical specification Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) allowable action statement time for achieving required mode change. Precursors of more serious events are also included because precursors do represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Minor releases of radioactive materials are included. In this emergency class, however, releases do not require monitoring or offsite response (e.g., dose consequences of less than 10 millirem) (mR).

The event classification of Unusual Event from the barrier matrix is only from a "Loss" or "Potential Loss" of the containment barrier. This is consistent with the NUMARC/NESP-007 statement, "The fuel clad barrier and the RCS barrier are weighted more heavily than the containment barrier." The "Loss or "Potential Loss" of the containment barrier alone is not considered to be substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant when the other two fission product barriers are intact. Thus the (UE) classification is justified.

In utilizing the Fission Product Barrier sub-sections (i.e., Fuel Clad, RCS Barrier and CNTMT Barrier) the Site Emergency Director (SED) will use the instructions in EPIP 1, to determine the Unusual Event. These instructions provide clear guidance on the proper use of the classification charts and a correct classification of an Unusual Event.

Escalation Escalation would be based on Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 per REG GUIDE 1.101

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-40 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-41 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode All Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)

Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected, or Radiological Effluents.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-42 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications.

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3. Loss of Integrated Computer System (ICS) and SPDS

4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory Basis This IC is intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient.

When the loss of safety system annunciators is complicated with an unplanned power change as well as loss of SPDS, ICS, and Control Room indications needed to monitor Plant Critical Safety Functions, a Site Area Emergency exists.

This declaration is prudent because the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

For the purposes of quantification of MOST it is estimated that if 75% of the annunciators are lost there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that a detailed count of the instrumentation be performed but only a rough approximation be used to determine the severity of the condition.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT involves an UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown and refueling modes, no initiating conditions are indicated during these modes of operation.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-43 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4 Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SS6, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.2 Engineering Safety Features Activation System Instrumentation (ESFAS)

T.S. 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation AOI-26 Loss of Main Control Room Annunciators

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-44 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification ALERT Mode 1,2,3,4 Description UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 Minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or Integrated Computer System (ICS) and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 Minutes

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift complement)

3. (a or b)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

b. Loss of ICS and SPDS Basis This IC indicates that when the loss of safety system annunciators is complicated with the loss of SPDS and ICS, or a plant transient, a deterioration of the level of plant safety has occurred and an Alert should be declared.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold value to exclude momentary power losses or transients.

The declaration will ensure that adequate resources are available to monitor and control plant systems so that any further degraded condition can be detected and responded to.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT involves an UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

Unplanned loss of annunciators excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-45 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification ALERT (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4 Basis (continued) For the purposes of quantification of MOST it is estimated that if 75% of the annunciators are lost there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that a detailed count of the instrumentation be performed but only a rough approximation be used to determine the severity of the condition.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown and refueling modes, no initiating conditions are indicated during these modes of operation.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on the inability of the operating crew to monitor a transient in progress.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SA4, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.2 Engineering Safety Features Activation System Instrumentation (ESFAS)

T.S. 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation AOI-26 Loss of Main Control Room Annunciators

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-46 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4 Description UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Unplanned loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 Minutes

2. SM/SED Judgement that increased surveillance is required to safely operate the unit (beyond Shift complement)

3. Integrated Computer System (ICS) or SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested Basis For this IC, if annunciators are partially or completely lost it is still possible to use other systems to indicate plant conditions (e.g., SPDS or ICS). However, it is prudent to declare an Unusual Event since there is a greater risk that a degraded condition could go undetected.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold value to exclude momentary power losses or transients.

For the purposes of quantification of MOST it is estimated that if 75% of the annunciators are lost there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that a detailed count of the instrumentation be performed but only a rough approximation be used to determine the severity of the condition.

Unplanned loss of annunciators excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

The declaration will ensure that adequate resources are available to monitor and control plant systems.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueling modes, no initiating conditions are indicated during these modes of operation.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-47 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.1 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION Classification UNUSUAL EVENT (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4 Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on loss of annunciators complicated by the loss of SPDS and plant computer or a transient in progress.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU3, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.2 Engineering Safety Features Activation System Instrumentation (ESFAS)

T.S. 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation AOI-26 Loss of Main Control Room Annunciators

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-48 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-49 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.2 LOSS OF FUNCTION Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.2 LOSS OF FUNCTION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red

2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service)

Note: Also refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3)

Basis This IC addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

Heat Sink - Red indicates the heat sink function is under extreme challenge. It should be noted that this EAL is not applicable if actions of FR-H.1 are not implemented due to Operator ability to control Aux Feedwater >410 gpm.

If RHR cooling is in service then the CSF status tree for Heat Sink Red is not applicable. Therefore, this comment has been added to the EAL.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SS4, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.4 RCS Loops Mode 1-4 FR-C.1 Inadequate Core Cooling FR-H.1 Loss of Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-50 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.2 LOSS OF FUNCTION Classification ALERT Mode 4 Description Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Shutdown is required

2. Loss of RHR capability

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser Basis For this IC the inability to achieve Cold Shutdown when it is required refers to unplanned actions resulting in either equipment malfunctions or operator error that prevents achievement of Cold Shutdown This condition could result from a loss of RHR capability service water to the RHR, heat exchange or equipment failure with the RHR system, or AC/DC power loss to the RHR and/or service water components (i.e., CCS, ERCW)

The combination of this and the loss of the secondary heat sink for cooldown indicates a degradation of the level of plant safety and warrants the declaration of an Alert.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on complete loss of functions needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SA3 (expanded)

T.S. 3.4 RCS Loops Mode 1-4 FR-C.1 Inadequate Core Cooling FR-H.1 Loss of Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-51 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.2 LOSS OF FUNCTION Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description A. UNPLANNED loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones

3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system Basis The purpose of this IC is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff's ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities.

The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than those addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

Onsite communications loss must encompass the loss of all means of routine communications (i.e., phones, page party system, and radio/walkie talkies).

Offsite communications loss must encompass the loss of all means of communications with offsite authorities. This IC is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (i.e.,

individuals being sent to offsite locations).

Escalation Escalation of this event will involve the loss of other plant functions.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU6, Rev. 2, 1/92 10 CFR 50.72 NUREG 0654

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-52 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-53 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.3 FAILURE OF RX PROTECTION Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode 1,2 Description Loss of Core Cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (1 and 2)

1. (a or b)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a RX Power of <5% and decreasing Basis Under the conditions of this IC, the efforts to bring the reactor less than five percent power have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

Failure of the actions listed in FR-S.1 to trip the Reactor include actions in the Main Control Room and in other areas of the plant.

Although there are additional capabilities (i.e., emergency boration) to bring the plant under control, the indication of a Core Cooling Red indicates these capabilities are not effective and are a precursor for a core melt sequence.

In addition, the challenge to the Steam Generators in the early stages of the event (i.e., Heat Sink Red) indicates insufficient feed water flow to remove heat and is also a precursor for a core melt sequence. It should be noted that this EAL is not applicable if actions of FR-H.1 are not implemented due to Operator ability to control Aux Feedwater >410 gpm.

In either situation, if these challenges exist at a time that the reactor has not been brought below 5% power, a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, SG2, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS FR-C.1 Inadequate Core Cooling FR-H.1 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-54 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.3 FAILURE OF RX PROTECTION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode 1,2 Description Reactor power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual Trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)

1. VALID RX Auto Trip signal received or required.

2. Manual RX Trip from the MCR was Not successful.

3. FR-S.1 has been entered.

Basis This IC indicates a failure of the automatic and main control room manual signals to scram the reactor.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Although this IC may be viewed as anticipatory to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

FR-S.1 lists actions intended to shutdown the reactor. This includes actions in the main control room and in other areas of the plant. FR-S.1 is utilized within the EAL to discriminate between those situations in which immediate manual reactor trip was not possible from the control room. The Unit 1 control room has two trip control locations on the main control board. Both are within immediate access for the reactor operator. If both fail to result in a reactor trip EOP E-0 directs the operator to FR-S.1.

An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on the inability to trip the Rx and indications of Heat Sink Red or Core Cooling Red.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SS2, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-55 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.3 FAILURE OF RX PROTECTION Classification ALERT Mode 1,2 Description Automatic RX trip did NOT occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful. (1 and 2)

1. VALID Rx Trip signal received or required

2. Manual RX Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing.

Basis This EAL indicates failure of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) to automatically trip the reactor. This condition is a potential degradation of a safety system in that a primary front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient or condition requiring system actuation. There are analyzed transients (e.g., MSLB) for which the timing of the reactor trip is essential to the safe response of the plant. The importance of this timing is evidenced by the technical specifications governing protective system response.

If an automatic reactor trip failed and the manual trip from the MCR is successful, the event would be classified as an Alert, with further escalation based on the higher events in this tab, or on the basis of fission product barriers.

As a result of the manual trip, the reactor is producing less heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. On the long-term the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown. However, on the short-term, the power excursion may have caused localized fuel damage. In addition, the extent of the RPS failure and the impact on other plant controls and indication is not known.

The Alert declaration will ensure that adequate resources, through staffing of the technical support center, are available to monitor and control plant systems such that any further degraded condition can be detected and responded to.

FR-S.1 is not used in this EAL since reactor power is below 5% normally associated with the transition to FR-S.1.

An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on the reactor power not being reduced to less than five percent by actions of FR-S.1.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SA2, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS WOG Background Document for FR-S.1, Rev. 1B, 2/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-56 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.3 FAILURE OF RX PROTECTION Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Not Applicable Escalation Escalation of this event is based on a successful manual scram of the Rx from the main control room References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92, T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS PAI-2.04 Reactor/Turbine Trip Report

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-57 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.4 FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.4 FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-58 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.4 FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for an Alert for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-59 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.4 FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4,5 Description Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16) (1)

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b)

a. Dose equivalent Iodine (I-131) >0.265 µCi/gm for >48 Hours or

>14 µCi/gm

b. Specific activity >100/ µCi/gm Basis This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. One (1) addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant Tech. Specs. for an Iodine Spike.

The RCS specific activity LCO limits the allowable concentration level of radionuclides in the reactor coolant. The LCO limits are established to minimize the offsite radioactivity dose consequences in the event of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident.

The LCO contains specific activity limits for both Dose Equivalent I-131 and gross specific activity. The allowable levels are intended to limit the 2-hour dose at the site boundary to a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 dose guideline values.

The limits in the LCO are standardized and based on parametric evaluations of offsite radioactivity dose consequences for typical site locations.

These parametric evaluations showed the potential offsite dose levels for a SGTR accident were an appropriately small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guideline dose limits. Each evaluation assumes a broad range of site applicable atmospheric dispersion factors in a parametric evaluation.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU4, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity, Bases

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-60 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-61 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.5 RCS UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.5 RCS UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.5 RCS UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for an Alert for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-62 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.5 RCS UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4,5 Description Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage >10 GPM

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Specs.) >10 GPM as indicated below (a or b)

a. 1-SI-68-32 results

b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM NOTE: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized Basis This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications.

If the leak is not reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, the true RCS, and the leak is isolable from the RCS, the leak should not be classified as RCS leakage. However, if the RHR system is tied to the RCS and is being used as the cooling system for the core, the RHR system is and should be considered RCS.

Note: for the leak to be isolable, personnel must be able to operate the isolable valve(s), which isolate the leak (e.g., isolate letdown to stop a leak in the CVCS). If a leak of radioactive fluid is occurring, which is suspected to be RCS, and is not known to be isolable, this leakage should be classified as RCS leakages determined by the shift manager/Site Emergency Director.

Only operating modes in which there is fuel in the reactor coolant system and the system is pressurized are specified.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NES-007, SU5, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage AOI-6 Small Reactor System Leak 1-SI-68-32 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-63 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.6 RCS IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.6 RCS IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on Fission Product Barrier Challengers.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.6 RCS IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Alert for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-64 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.6 RCS IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4,5 Description Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Specs.) >25 GPM (a or b)

a. I-SI-68-32 results

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank NOTE: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized Basis This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 25 gpm value for the identified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. This IC is set at a higher value than unidentified due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.

If the leak is not reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, the true RCS, and the leak is isolable from the RCS, the leak should not be classified as RCS leakage.

However, if the RHR system is tied to the RCS and is being used as the cooling system for the core, the RHR system is and should be considered RCS.

Note: for the leak to be isolable, personnel must be able to operate the isolable valve(s), which isolate the leak (e.g., isolate letdown to stop a leak in the CVCS). If a leak of radioactive fluid is occurring, which is suspected to be RCS, and is not known to be isolable, this leakage should be classified as RCS leakages determined by the shift manager/Site Emergency Director.

Only operating modes in which there is fuel in the reactor coolant system and the system is pressurized are specified.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU5, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage AOI-6 Small Reactor System Leak TI.4,Part II, Plant Curve Book 1-SI-68-32 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-65 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.7 UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.7 UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on "Fission Product Barriers Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-66 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.7 UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for an Alert for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on "Fission Product Barriers Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.7 UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3 Description UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection initiation (1 and 2)

1. Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System (<675 psig)

2. Safety injection has initiated or is required Basis For this IC a rapid depressurization could be caused by a Main Steam line break or Feed line break which results in rapid RCS cool down and safety injection.

This EAL is therefore consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event and warrants declaration.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU5, Rev. 2, 1/92 E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation T.S. 3.3.2 Engineering Safety Features Activation System Instrumentation (ESFAS)

WBN-OSG4-188, (O-05)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-67 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.8 TURBINE FAILURE Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.8 TURBINE FAILURE Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges."

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-68 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.8 TURBINE FAILURE Classification ALERT Mode 1,2,3 Description Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment

1. Turbine PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following areas:

Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station CST Basis This IC is intended to address the threat to safety related equipment imposed by PROJECTILES generated by main turbine rotating component failures. The list of areas provided includes all areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if PROJECTILES have damaged or penetrated areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of the affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

It is noted that due to Watts Bar's Turbine configuration and the location of the safety related equipment, the probability of Turbine Projectiles causing damage to these areas is considered remote.

In addition it is recognized that the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) is not considered to be safety related equipment at WBN, but it is added due to its support of other site safety systems.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 3.5.1.3 Turbine Missiles

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-69 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.8 TURBINE FAILURE Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3 Description Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration

1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing or Damage to Main Generator Seals Basis This IC is intended to address main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the main turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids, lubricating oils and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other events. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on potential damage done by turbine PROJECTILES to safety related equipment.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 3.5.1.3 Turbine Missiles

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-70 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-71 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Technical Specifications is not applicable for a General Emergency Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Technical Specifications is not applicable for a Site Area Emergency Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-72 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Technical Specifications is not applicable for an Alert Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech. Spec. limits (1 and 2)

1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement requiring a Mode reduction has been entered

2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement Basis Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO- specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU2, Rev. 2, 1/92 T.R. 3.0 Technical Requirements (TR) Applicability (T.R. 3.03)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-73 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.10 SAFETY LIMIT Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Safety limit is not applicable for a General Emergency Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.10 SAFETY LIMIT Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Safety limit is not applicable for a Site Area Emergency Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.10 SAFETY LIMIT Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Safety limit is not applicable for an Alert Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-74 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.10 SAFETY LIMIT Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4,5 Description Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure >

safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits"

2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

Basis This IC requires that specified acceptable fuel design limits must not be exceeded during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). This is accomplished with a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) design basis that corresponds to a 95% probability, at a 95% confidence level that DNB, will not occur and by requiring that fuel-centerline temperature stays below the melting temperature.

The restrictions of this SL prevent overheating of the fuel and cladding, as well as possible cladding perforation that would result in the release of fission products to the reactor coolant. Overheating of the fuel is prevented by maintaining the steady-state peak linear heat rate (LHR) below the level at which centerline fuel melting occurs. Overheating of the fuel cladding is prevented by restricting fuel operation to within the nucleate boiling regime, where the heat-transfer coefficient is large and the cladding-surface temperature is slightly above the coolant-saturation temperature.

Centerline fuel melting occurs when the local LHR, or power peaking, in a region of the fuel is high enough to cause the fuel-centerline temperature to reach the melting point of the fuel. Expansion of the pellet upon centerline melting may cause the pellet to stress the cladding to the point of failure, allowing an uncontrolled release of activity to the reactor coolant.

Operation above the boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperature because of the onset of DNB and the resultant sharp reduction in heat-transfer coefficient. Inside the steam film, high cladding temperatures are reached, and a cladding-water (zirconium-water) reaction may take place. This chemical reaction results in oxidation of the fuel cladding to a structurally weaker form. This weaker form may lose its integrity, resulting in an uncontrolled release of activity to the reactor coolant.

This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event and warrants declaration.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-75 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 2.0 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 2.10 SAFETY LIMIT Classification UNUSUAL EVENT (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4,5 Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU2, Rev. 2, 1/92 B.2.1.1 Reactor Core Safety Limits (SLs)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-76 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-77 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops)

Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power (1 and 2)

1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes

2. (a or b)

a. Core Cooling Red or Orange

b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 Hours of Loss Basis Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink.

Prolonged loss of all AC power will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment.

The four hours to restore AC power was based on a site blackout coping analysis performed in conformance with 10 CFR 50.63 and Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout", as available, with appropriate allowance for offsite emergency response.

Although this IC is redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

This IC is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.

The (15 minute) time duration was selected to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Site Emergency Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is Imminent?

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-78 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops)

Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY (continued)

Mode 1,2,3,4 Basis (continued) 2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

The indication of continuing core cooling degradation is based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Director judgement as it relates to Imminent Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

Escalation Not Applicable Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, SG1, Rev 2, 1/92 FSAR 15.2.9 Loss of Offsite Power to the Station Auxiliaries FSAR 15.5.1 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Loss of AC Power to Plant Auxiliaries T.S. 3.8.1 AC Sources, Operating T.S. 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel, and Lubrication Oil (Diesels)

T.S. 3.8.9 Distribution Systems, Operating AOI-35 Loss of Offsite Power General Design Criteria 17, App. ,A 10 CFR 50 NUREG 1.155 Station Blackout

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-79 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops)

Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 Minutes

1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Basis The Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

The (15 minute) time duration was selected to exclude transient or momentary power Losses.

Escalation Prolonged loss of all offsite power and prolonged loss of all onsite power will, when combined with inadequate core cooling, result in an escalation of this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007 SS1, Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-35 Loss of Offsite Power FSAR 15.2.9 Loss of Offsite Power to the Station Auxiliaries General Design Criteria 17, App. ,A 10 CFR 50 FSAR 15.5.1 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Loss of AC Power to Plant Auxiliaries T.S. 3.8.1 AC Sources, Operating T.S. 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel, and Lubrication Oil (Diesels)

T.S. 3.8.9 Distribution Systems, Operating

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-80 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops)

Classification ALERT Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Loss of Offsite Power and 1A or 1B Diesel Generator (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available Basis The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of one emergency diesel generator to supply power to its emergency busses.

The (15 minute) time duration was selected to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation Prolonged Loss of all offsite power and prolonged Loss of all onsite power will escalate this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007,SA5, Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-35 Loss of Offsite Power General Design Criterion 17 of App. A, 10 CFR 50 FSAR 15.2.9 Loss of Offsite Power to the Station Auxiliaries FSAR 15.5.1 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Loss of AC Power to Plant Auxiliaries T.S. 3.8.1 AC Sources, Operating T.S. 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel, and Lubrication Oil (Diesels)

T.S. 3.8.9 Distribution Systems, Operating

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-81 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops)

Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Loss of Offsite Power for >15 Minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for > 15 minutes

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Bd Basis Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout).

Fifteen (15) minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation Loss of one additional power supply to the shutdown boards will escalate this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007 SU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-35 Loss of Offsite Power FSAR 15.2.9 Loss of Offsite Power to the Station Auxiliaries FSAR 15.5.1 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Loss of AC Power to Plant Auxiliaries General Design Criterion 17 of App. A, 10 CFR 50 T.S. 3.8.1 AC Sources, Operating T.S. 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel, and Lubrication Oil (Diesels)

T.S. 3.8.9 Distribution Systems, Operating

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-82 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-83 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of AC Power in Mode 5 and 6 will Not cause a declaration of a General Emergency Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of AC Power in Mode 5 and 6 will Not cause a declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-84 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification ALERT Mode 5,6, or Defuel Description UNPLANNED Loss of Offsite And Onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)

Basis Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode this event is classified as an Alert because of the significantly reduced decay heat and lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses. Fifteen (15) minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

Escalation Escalation is not applicable from this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007 SU1 (expanded), Rev 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown T.S. 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-85 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 5,6, Defuel Description UNPLANNED Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board Basis Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen (15) minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

Escalation Loss of one additional power supply to the shutdown boards will escalate this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU1, Rev 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown T.S. 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-86 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-87 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.3 LOSS OF DC Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Loss of Function" (2.2)

Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or " Loss of Function" (2.2) for escalation considerations.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-88 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.3 LOSS OF DC Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes

1. Voltage <105 VDC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-II and 1-III and 1-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to the "Fission Product Battier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2.2), and Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)

Basis Loss of all DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control plant safety functions. Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

The minimum specified independent and redundant DC power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50.

Escalation Escalation would occur through the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Degradation or Loss or Function (2.2)

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SS3, Rev. 2, 1/92 General Design Criteria 17, App. ,A 10 CFR 50 FSAR 8.3.2 DC Power System T.S. 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating AOI - 21.01 - 21.04 Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Boards

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-89 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.3 LOSS OF DC Classification ALERT Mode 1,2,3,4 Description Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)

Basis There is NO Alert classification for this event. Reference should be made to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2.2), or "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1) for possible Alert or higher classifications.

Escalation Loss of All vital DC Power for greater than 15 minutes or the Inability to monitor a Significant Transient in Progress or Loss of Function needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown may cause an escalation in a loss of DC event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU7, Rev. 2, 1/92 General Design Criteria 17, App. A, 10 CFR 50 T.S. 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating AOI-21.1-21.4 Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Boards FSAR 8.3.2 DC Power Systems

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-90 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 3.0 LOSS OF POWER Event 3.3 LOSS OF DC Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 5,6 and Defuel Description UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 Minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105 VDC on 125V Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 Minutes

2. Voltage <105 VDC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II and 1-IV for

>15 Minutes Basis The purpose of this IC is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This IC is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

The 105 volt Bus Voltage is the minimum bus voltage necessary for the operation of safety related equipment. This voltage value should incorporate a margin of at least 15 minutes of operation before the onset of inability to operate those loads. This voltage is usually near the minimum voltage selected when battery sizing is performed. Typically the value for the entire battery set is approximately 105 VDC.

For a 60 cell string of batteries the cell voltage is 1.75 Volts per cell. For a 58 string battery set the minimum voltage is typically 1.81 Volts per cell.

The fifteen minute threshold is utilized to exclude a transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation The event will escalate if the DC loss results in an inability to maintain cold shutdown.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU7, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 8.3.2 DC Power Sources T.S. 3.8.5 DC Sources Shutdown T.S. 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown AOI-21.1-21.4 Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Boards

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-91 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.1 FIRE Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.1 FIRE Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) or "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

In addition the seriousness of a Fire in the Control Room requires reference to the emergency conditions identified in Section (4.5) "Control Room Evacuation" Escalation Escalation would be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges" References NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-92 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.1 FIRE Classification ALERT Mode All Description FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 That is Affecting Safety Related Equipment (1 and 2)

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a or b)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE

b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the FIRE Basis Fires that are likely to affect the plant's safety systems represent a degraded plant condition. The fire may have damaged equipment or damage is likely due to the proximity of heat or flame to the systems required for safe shutdown. The likelihood of damage is subjective but is based on fire location, intensity and duration without performance of a detailed damage assessment prior to classification. The determination of the safety and supporting systems necessary for safe shutdown during the applicable operating mode and the assessment of the impact of the fire on the performance of those systems will be determined by the Site Emergency Director.

Table 4-1 Plant Structures Associated with Fire and Explosion EALs Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

RWST Turbine Building FIRE is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-93 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.1 FIRE Classification ALERT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) VISIBLE DAMAGE is damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.,

paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

Escalation Escalation would be based on Fission Product Barrier challenges or Control Room Evacuation (4.5)

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA2, Rev. 2, 1/92 Figure 4-A Protected Area and Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-94 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.1 FIRE Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA Threatening any of the Areas Listed in Table 4-1 that is Not Extinguished within the 15 Minutes From the Time of Control Room Notification or Verification of Control Room Alarm Basis This event covers verified fires that occur in selected areas of the plant that house safety systems It also covers verified fires outside of these areas that may impact structures that contain safety systems due to the proximity of the fire. In either case these fires may be potentially significant precursors to damage of safety systems or may impact structures that contain safety systems. The initiating condition excludes fires that occur outside these key buildings, such as the warehouses, or other small fires that do not potentially affect safety systems.

The 15 minute time limit has been established to exclude small fires that can be controlled by Plant Fire Fighting resources.

Verification of the fire in this event is either by direct communication with plant personnel confirming that a fire exists or the action taken by the Control Room personnel to determine that a fire annunciator received in the Control Room is not due to a spurious signal.

Table 4-1 Plant Structures Associated with Fire and Explosion EALs Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

RWST Turbine Building

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-95 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 4-A

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-96 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.1 FIRE Classification UNUSUAL EVENT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) FIRE is combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Escalation Escalation of this event is based on the Fire affecting plant safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU2, Rev. 2, 1/92 Figure 4-A Protected Area/Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-97 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.2 EXPLOSIONS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.2 EXPLOSIONS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation would be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-98 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.2 EXPLOSIONS Classification ALERT Mode All Description EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a or b)

a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment

b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the EXPLOSION Refer to Security (4.6)

Basis EXPLOSIONS include those that are of sufficient magnitude to damage permanent structures or equipment within the plant vital area. As used here, an EXPLOSION is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and material.

VISIBLE DAMAGE is damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

The "Report of VISIBLE DAMAGE" should not be interpreted as requiring a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The observation of damage to a structure is sufficient to make a declaration. The declaration of the Alert and the activation of the TSC is warranted and will provide the Site Emergency Director (SED) with resources necessary to perform damage assessment.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-99 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.2 EXPLOSIONS Classification ALERT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) Table 4-1 Plant Structures Associated with Fire and Explosion EALs Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

RWST Turbine Building Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA2, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-100 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.2 EXPLOSIONS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description UNPLANNED EXPLOSION Within the PROTECTED AREA Resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to Any Permanent Structure or Equipment (Figure 4-A)

Refer to Security (4.6)

Basis As used here, an EXPLOSION is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and material. For this event classification, the occurrence of the EXPLOSION is sufficient to make the declaration without making a lengthy assessment of the damage.

In addition, certain hazardous materials are transported by river barge past the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant site. Explosive materials are also transported over nearby railroad lines. Therefore, these materials were evaluated for their potential to damage the safety related structures of the plant. The materials include TNT, gasoline, liquid natural gas (LNG) and unspecified fertilizers.

There is no potential for damage to the Watts Bar plant due to the transport of TNT from or storage of TNT at the TVA plant. The potential for damage to the Watts Bar plant from a gasoline barge explosion is considered to be negligible. It should be noted that barge shipments of LNG past Watts Bar are rare since natural gas transportation is handled almost entirely by pipeline in this region. Therefore, the potential for an exploding LNG barge near the Intake Pumping Station is a non-credible event.

Given the low probability of a barge collision and the low percentage of fertilizer shipments on the Tennessee River, it is concluded that, because of the very low probabilities associated with the event, no hazard exists to the Intake Pumping Station from the transportation of fertilizers by barge on the Tennessee River system.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on EXPLOSION damage to a structure or equipment causing a degradation in the performance of equipment required to shutdown the plant.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU2, Rev 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military Facilities

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-101 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 4-A

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-102 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.3 FLAMMABLE GAS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.3 FLAMMABLE GAS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-103 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.3 FLAMMABLE GAS Classification ALERT Mode All Description UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment or associated with Power production.

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft Triangular Area is > 25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 Basis Report or detection of flammable gases within plant vital structures in concentrations that are life threatening to plant personnel or affect the ability to achieve or maintain the plant in a cold shutdown condition is a degradation of the level of safety of the plant and warrants the declaration of an Alert.

Table 4-2 Plant Structures Associated with Toxic or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA3, Rev 2, 1/92 Figure 4-B One Mile Radius/Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-104 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.3 FLAMMABLE GAS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER.

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft Triangular Area is > 25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B)

OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials That a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL (Lower Explosive Limit). (Refer to Figure 4-B)

Basis Report or detection of flammable gases in concentrations within the site or near the site that will affect the health of plant personnel or affect the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing flammable gases, etc.) constitutes an Unusual Event. The evacuation area is as determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials, in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

In addition, it should be noted that there are no industrial or military facilities where large quantities of flammable or toxic chemicals are stored within a five mile radius of the plant. The shipping on the Tennessee River consists mainly of fuel oils, wood products and minerals. Chemicals represent only a minor percentage of the barge shipping by the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The release of flammable or toxic materials on the river in the vicinity of the plant will have minimal effect on the plant safety features.

The main control room habitability during postulated hazardous chemical releases at or near the plant has been evaluated. This evaluation utilizes the approach outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.78 and concludes that the main control room habitability is not jeopardized by accidental release of chemicals. In addition, plant procedures maintain a list of onsite hazardous materials, their storage facilities, and quantities they are stored in.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-105 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.3 FLAMMABLE GAS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) Table 4-2 Plant Structures Associated with Toxic or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-B and 7-A.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on flammable gases entering a plant area that jeopardizes life or impacts cold shutdown capabilities.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU3, Rev 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military Facilities DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-106 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 4-B

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-107 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.4 TOXIC GAS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.4 TOXIC GAS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-108 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.4 TOXIC GAS Classification ALERT Mode All Description Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold S/D (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2

2. (a or b)

a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL)

3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment Basis Report or detection of toxic gases within plant vital structures in concentrations that are life threatening to plant personnel or affect the ability to achieve or maintain the plant in a cold shutdown condition is a degradation of the level of safety of the plant and warrants the declaration of an Alert.

Table 4-2 Plant Structures Associated with Toxic or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building TOXIC GAS is a gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA3, Rev 2, 1/92 Figure 4-B One Mile Radius/Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-109 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.4 TOXIC GAS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure Listed in Table 4-2 OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in Concentrations > than the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)

Basis Report or detection of a release of toxic gases in concentrations within the site or near the site perimeter that will affect the health of plant personnel or affect the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.) constitutes an Unusual Event. The evacuation area is as determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials, in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

In addition, it should be noted that there are no industrial or military facilities where large quantities of flammable or toxic chemicals are stored within a five mile radius of the plant.

The shipping on the Tennessee River consists mainly of fuel oils, wood products and minerals. Chemicals represent only a minor percentage of the barge shipping by the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The release of flammable or toxic materials on the river in the vicinity of the plant will have minimal effect on the plant safety features.

The main control room habitability during a postulated hazardous chemical releases at or near the plant has been evaluated. This evaluation utilizes the approach outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.78 and concludes that the main control room habitability is not jeopardized by an accidental release of chemicals. In addition, plant procedures maintain a list of onsite hazardous materials, their storage facilities, and quantities they are stored in.

TOXIC GAS is a gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-110 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.4 TOXIC GAS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) Table 4-2 Plant Structures Associated with Toxic or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building Escalation Escalation to this event will be based on toxic gases entering a plant area that jeopardizes life or impacts cold shutdown capability References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU3, Rev 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military Facilities DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials Figure 4-B One Mile Radius/Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-111 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 4-B

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-112 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-113 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.5 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency in this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.5 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode All Description Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment Has Not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3)

1. (a or b)

a. AOI-30.2 Fire Safe Shutdown entered

b. AOI-27 Main Control Room Inaccessibility entered

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation

3. Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and L11B.

Basis Transfer of safety system control has not been performed in an expeditious manner and it is unknown if any damage has occurred to the fission product barriers. This condition warrants the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

The 15 minute time limit for transfer of control is based on a reasonable time period for personnel to leave the control room, arrive at the Auxiliary Control Room area, and reestablish plant control to preclude core uncovery and/or core damage per (AOI-30.2)

Fire Safe Shutdown Inaccessibility. The determination of whether or not control is established at the Remote Shutdown Panel is in the judgement of the SED, who will take all event specific factors into consideration.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HS2, Rev 2, 1/92 AOI-30.2 Fire Safe Shutdown AOI-27 Main Control Room Inaccessibility

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-114 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.5 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION Classification ALERT Mode All Description Evacuation of the Control Room is Required (1 and 2)

1. (a or b)

a. AOI-30.2 Fire Safe Shutdown entered

b. AOI-27 Main Control Room Inaccessibility entered

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation Basis Main Control Room evacuation requires establishment of plant control from outside the Main Control Room (Auxiliary Control Room) and support from the Technical Support Center and/or other Emergency Operating Centers and, for this potential substantial degradation, an Alert is warranted. A Main Control Room evacuation represents a serious plant situation since the level of control is not as complete as it would be without the evacuation.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on the inability to establish plant control from outside the Main Control Room within 15 minutes.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA5, Rev 2, 1/92 AOI-30.2 Fire Safe Shutdown AOI-27 Main Control Room Inaccessibility Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.5 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATIONS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode Not Applicable Description An Unusual Event for this event is "Not Applicable" Basis Not Applicable Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on Evacuation of the Main Control Room.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-115 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Event 4.6 SECURITY Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode All Description HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility: (1 or 2)

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONs.

2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

Basis Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

EAL #1 This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAS (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location.

If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS can be transferred to another location, then the above initiating condition is not met.

EAL #2 This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT fuel damage is likely, such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool.

Escalation Not Applicable References NEI 99-01 R5, HG1.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-116 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.6 SECURITY Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode All Description HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA:

A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.

Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of PROTECTED AREA and SITE PERIMETER.

Basis Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land, or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires ORO readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Escalation Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on actual plant status after impact or progression of attack.

References NEI 99-01 R5, HS4.

Figure 4-A Protected Area and Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-117 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.6 SECURITY Classification ALERT Mode All Description HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat:(1 or 2)

1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.

2. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

Basis Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

EAL #1 This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OCA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Note that this EAL is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes ISFSIs that may be outside the PROTECTED AREA but still within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-118 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.6 SECURITY Classification ALERT (continued)

Mode All EAL #2 This EAL addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat.

Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

The Owner Controlled Area is defined by the Site Security Plan Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.

References NEI 99-01R5, HA4 Figure 4-A Protected Area and Site Perimeter

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-119 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.6 SECURITY Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the plant: (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.

2. A site specific credible threat notification.

3. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

Basis Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under EAL 4.6 Alert, SAE, and GE.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the security threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification level in accordance with the sites Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan.

EAL #1 Reference is made to site specific security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant Safeguards Contingency Plan.

This threshold is based on site specific security plans. Site specific Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

EAL #2 This threshold is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat.

Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Notification of an Unusual Event.

The determination of credible is made through use of information found in the site specific Safeguards Contingency Plan.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-120 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.6 SECURITY Classification UNUSUAL EVENT (continued)

Mode All EAL #3 The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the aircraft threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC. Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation Escalation to Alert emergency classification level would be via EAL 4.6 Alert would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

References NEI 99-01R5, HU4 Figure 4-A Protected Area and Site Perimeter

I TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-121 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA I SITE PERIMETER

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-122 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-123 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.7 EMERGENCY DIRECTOR JUDGMENT Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode All Description Events are in process or have occurred which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results, in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

Basis This event classification provides the Shift Supervisor/Site Emergency Director, the flexibility to declare a General Emergency if in their judgment unanticipated conditions not explicitly covered elsewhere warrant declaration of an emergency.

The declaration of a General Emergency indicates that there is a very high probability that the fuel has been damaged and the loss of containment integrity is possible or other conditions exist that may result in a release to the environment that may be greater than the EPA Protective Action Guides.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, HG1, HG2, Rev 2, 1/92; HG1, NRC Bulletin 2005-02 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.7 EMERGENCY DIRECTOR JUDGMENT Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode All Description Events are in process or have occurred which involve an Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for Protection of the Public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) prevent effective access to equipment needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. Refer to Figure 7-A.

Basis This event classification provides the Shift Supervisor/Site Emergency Director, the flexibility to declare a Site Area Emergency if in their judgment unanticipated conditions not explicitly covered elsewhere warrant declaration.

The declaration of a Site Area Emergency indicates high probability of Major failures of plant functions needed to protect the public.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on actual or imminent substantial core degradation.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HS2, Rev 2, 1/92; HS1, HS4, NRC Bulletin 2005-02

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-124 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA/SJTE BOUNDARY

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-125 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.7 EMERGENCY DIRECTOR JUDGMENT Classification ALERT Mode All Description Events are in process or have occurred which involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant or a Security Event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels.

Basis This event classification provides the Shift Supervisor or the Site Emergency Director, the flexibility to declare an Alert if, in their judgment, unanticipated conditions not explicitly covered elsewhere warrant declaration of an emergency.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on actual or likely failures in plant functions needed to protect the public.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA6, Rev 2, 1/92; HA4, HA7, HA8 NRC Bulletin 2005-02 Section 4.0 HAZARDS AND SED JUDGMENT Event 4.7 EMERGENCY DIRECTOR JUDGMENT Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant or indicate a Security Threat to facility protection has been initiated. No Releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

Basis This event classification provides the Shift Supervisor the flexibility to declare an Unusual Event if, in his judgment, unanticipated conditions not explicitly covered elsewhere warrant declaration of an emergency.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on actual degradation of plant safety systems.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU5, Rev 2, 1/92; HU4, NRC Bulletin 2005-02

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-126 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-127 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.1 EARTHQUAKE Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.1 EARTHQUAKE Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-128 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.1 EARTHQUAKE Classification ALERT Mode All Description Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. (a and b)

a. Ann.166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded"

b. Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated"

2. (a or b)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event Basis A seismic event of this level can cause damage to safety related systems.

Plant seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100. All specified measurement ranges represent the minimum ranges of the instruments.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on " Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 1.2 General Plant Description FSAR 2.5 Geology, Seismology and Geotechnical Engineering Summary of Foundation Conditions T. R. 3.3.4 (Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation)

NUREG 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes", April 1974 ARI-166-172, Rev. 1 EPRI Report NP-6693 Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, December 1989

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-129 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.1 EARTHQUAKE Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. Ann. 166E indicator "Seismic Recording initiated"

2. (a or b)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event Basis A seismic event of this level can cause some minor damage to plant structure or systems but it is not expected to have any impact on overall plant safety functions.

Plant seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100. All specified measurement ranges represent the minimum ranges of the instruments.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on a Safe Shutdown Earthquake. (SSE)

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 1.2, General Plant Description FSAR 2.5 Geology, Seismology and Geotechnical Engineering Summary of Foundation Conditions T. R. 3.3.4 (Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation)

NUREG 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes", April 1974 ARI-166-172, Rev. 1

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-130 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-131 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.2 TORNADO Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.2 TORNADO Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-132 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.2 TORNADO Classification ALERT Mode All Description Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1.

2. (a or b)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at >100 mph. National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400 can provide additional information if needed.

Basis Tornadoes or high winds striking the structures listed in Table 5-1 can cause damage to plant structures or systems needed for Safe Shutdown of the Plant. At Watts Bar, tornadoes are a phenomenon whose occurrence cannot be specifically predicted.

The FSAR estimates the probability of a tornado occurrence onsite as one in 6,700 years.

Windstorms are relatively infrequent, but may occur several times a year. The records show the highest wind speed recorded in Chattanooga was 82 mph in March 1947. The records show the highest wind speed recorded in Knoxville was 73 mph in July 1961.

Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-133 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.2 TORNADO Classification ALERT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches should not be included).

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on Fission Product Barriers Challenges.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HAI, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 1.2 General Plant Description FSAR 2.3 Meteorology Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.2 TORNADO Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Tornado Within The SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been Sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

Basis A tornado touchdown near or within the Site Protected Area may have the potential to damage plant structures containing systems required for Safe Shutdown of the plant.

At Watts Bar, tornadoes are a phenomenon whose occurrence cannot be specifically predicted. The FSAR estimates the probability of a tornado occurrence onsite as one in 6,700 years.

SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 5-A.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on the tornado striking plant structures or high sustained winds within the protected area.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HUI, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 1.2 General Plant Description FSAR 2.3 Meteorology Figure 5-A

i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-134 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA I SITE PERIMETER

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-135 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.3 AIRCRAFT/PROJECTILE CRASH Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.3 AIRCRAFT/PROJECTILE CRASH Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-136 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.3 AIRCRAFT/PROJECTILE CRASH Classification ALERT Mode All Description Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure Listed in Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a or b)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas.

Basis VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

There are no industrial or military facilities within five miles of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant site which would potentially pose a hazard to the safe operation of the plant.

Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST Escalation Escalation to this event will be based on "Fission Product Barriers Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA1, HA2, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities Table 5-1

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-137 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.3 AIRCRAFT/PROJECTILE CRASH Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impacts within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

Basis Aircraft or PROJECTILE Impacts within the SITE PERIMETER are off normal events that can indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

There are no industrial or military facilities within five miles of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant site which would potentially pose a hazard to the safe operation of the plant.

SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 5-A and 7-A.

PROJECTILE includes an object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure.

The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

Escalation Escalation to this event will be based on an Impact on plant structures or barriers.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-138 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA I SITE PERIMETER

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-139 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.4 RIVER LEVEL HIGH Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.4 RIVER LEVEL HIGH Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-140 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.4 RIVER LEVEL HIGH Classification ALERT Mode All Description River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning (1 or 2)

1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft

2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Operations Basis The requirements for flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. A Stage 1 flood warning is issued when the water in the forebay is predicted to exceed 715.5 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum during the Winter season, or 720.6 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum during the Summer season. A Stage II flood warning is issued when the water in the forebay is predicted to exceed 727 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum. A maximum allowed water level of 727 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum provides sufficient margin to ensure waves due to high winds cannot disrupt the flood mode preparation. A Stage I or Stage II flood warning requires the implementation of procedures which include plant shutdown. Further, in the event of a loss of communications simultaneous with a critical combination flood, headwaters, and/or seismically induced dam failure the plant will be shutdown and flood protection measures implemented.

Chickamauga Lake level during nonflood conditions should be no higher than elevation 685.44, top of gates, and is not likely to exceed elevation 682.5, normal summer level, for any significant time. No conceivable hurricane or cyclonic-type winds could produce the some 20 feet of wave height required to reach plant grade elevation 728.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on "Fission Product Barriers Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering T.R. 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan Safety Evaluation Report dated January 28, 2015 [ML15005A314]

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-141 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.4 RIVER LEVEL HIGH Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (1 or 2 or 3)

1. River Reservoir level >720.6 Ft for the Summer season

2. River Reservoir level >715.5 Ft for the Winter season

3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been Issued by River Operations Basis The requirements for flood protection ensure that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. A Stage 1 flood warning is issued when the water in the forebay is predicted to exceed 715.5 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum during the Winter season, or 720.6 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum during the Summer season.

A Stage I flood warning requires the implementation of procedures which include plant shutdown. Further, in the event of a loss of communications simultaneous with a critical combination flood, headwaters, and/or seismically induced dam failure the plant will be shutdown and flood protection measures implemented.

Chickamauga Lake level during nonflood conditions should be no higher than elevation 685.44, top of gates, and is not likely to exceed elevation 682.5, normal summer level, for any significant time. No conceivable hurricane or cyclonic-type winds could produce the some 20 feet of wave height required to reach plant grade elevation 728.

Because of its inland location, the Watts Bar plant is not endangered by tsunami flooding.

Escalation Escalation of this event will be based on river level being at Stage II Flood Warning.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering T.R. 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan Safety Evaluation Report dated January 28, 2015 [ML15005A314]

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-142 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-143 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.5 RIVER LEVEL LOW Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.5 RIVER LEVEL LOW Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-144 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.5 RIVER LEVEL LOW Classification ALERT Mode All Description River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Operations Basis The ERCW pumping station is located within the plant intake structure, and has direct communication with the main river channel for all reservoir levels including loss of downstream dam. The minimum required reservoir level for normal operation is 668 feet. This level applies for ERCW supply temperature less than or equal to 83ºF.

Since January 1940, water levels at the plant have been controlled by Chickamauga Reservoir. Since then, the minimum level at the dam was 673.3 on January 21, 1942.

Because of its inland location on a relatively small, narrow lake, low water levels resulting from surges, seiches, or tsunamis are not a potential problem.

Escalation Escalation to this event will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges."

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HA1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering FSAR 9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water T.S. 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink AOI-22 Break of Down Stream Dam

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-145 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.5 RIVER LEVEL LOW Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description River Reservoir level is 673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Operations Basis The ERCW pumping station is located within the plant intake structure, and has direct communication with the main river channel for all reservoir levels including loss of downstream dam. The minimum required reservoir level for normal operation is 668 feet. This level applies for ERCW supply temperature less than or equal to 83º F.

Since January 1940, water levels at the plant have been controlled by Chickamauga Reservoir. Since then, the minimum level at the dam was 673.3 on January 21, 1942. Because of its location on Chickamauga Reservoir, maintaining minimum water levels at the Watts Bar plant does not represent a problem. The high rainfall and runoff of the watershed and the regulation afforded by upstream dams assure minimum flows for plant cooling. Because of its inland location on a relatively small, narrow lake, low water levels resulting from surges, seiches, or tsunamis are not a potential problem.

Escalation Escalation to this event will be based on reduced river levels.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering FSAR 9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water T.S. 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink AOI-22 Break of Down Stream Dam

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-146 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-147 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.6 WATERCRAFT CRASH Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a General Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.6 WATERCRAFT CRASH Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-148 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.6 WATERCRAFT CRASH Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Basis The basis for an Alert for this event is primarily the extent and severity of fission product barrier challenges, based on plant conditions as presently known or as can be reasonably projected.

Escalation Escalation will be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 5.0 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Event 5.6 WATERCRAFT CRASH Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW) (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station

2. (a or b or c)

a. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A 0-PI-67-18A is <15 psig

b. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B 0-PI-67-17A is <15 psig

c. RCW Supply Header Pressure 0-PI-24-22 is <15 psig Basis Based on Watts Bar's river location, the potential for a watercraft accident affecting Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Fire Support Water is remote. In the unlikely event that this accident occurs, the potential exist for possible damage to plant safety systems needed for safe shutdown. With this potential an Unusual Event is warranted.

Escalation Escalation would be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges".

References NUMARC/NESP-007, HU1, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 2.0 Geography and Demography FSAR 2.4.8 Cooling Water Canals and Reservoirs FSAR 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown FSAR 9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water T.S. 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-149 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN DEGRADATION Event 6.1 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode 5,6 Description Note: Additional Information will be provided later pending NRC/NUMARC guidance on Shutdown EALs.

Refer to Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

Basis Pending Escalation Not Applicable References NRC/NUMARC, future guidance

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-150 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN DEGRADATION Event 6.1 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode 5,6 Description Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of RHR capability

2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718'

3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS Temp. > 200º F

4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT Note: If CNTMT open, refer to Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Basis For WBN, this IC is based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal ", SECY-91-283, "Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues." A number of variables such as initial vessel level (e.g., mid-loop, reduced level/flange level, normal, or cavity filled), RCS venting strategy, decay heat removal system design, vortexing pre-disposition, steam generator U-tube draining, and level instrumentation problems can have a significant impact in causing or degrading a loss of decay heat removal. NRC analyses show that specific sequences can result in core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

This EAL is intended to establish the escalation threshold for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. This Site Area Emergency declaration is consistent with the need to rapidly correct the problem through the augmentation of onsite personnel and the need to inform offsite authorities. Continued degradation can rapidly result in fuel uncovery and severe damage with resultant releases of a significant fraction of the gap activity. In the situation where the RCS is vented/opened to Containment, the potential exists (if reactor vessel water level is not reestablished) to release radioactivity to the environment.

The Rx vessel level indication of el 718' represents the water level at the hot leg center line.

Escalation Escalation to this event will be based on Gaseous Effluent (7.2)

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SS5 (expanded), Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-14 Loss of RHR T.S. 3.4.7 & 8 RCS Loops Filled and Not Filled T.S. 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-151 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN DEGRADATION Event 6.1 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS Classification ALERT Mode 5,6 Description Inability to maintain unit in Cold Shutdown (1 and 2)

1. RHR capability is not available for RCS cooling

2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp > 200ºF.

Note: If CNTMT open, refer to Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Basis Inability to maintain Cold Shutdown refers to unplanned actions resulting from either equipment malfunctions or operator error that results in an increasing trend in Reactor Coolant Temperature.

This condition could result from the loss of Cooling Water to the RHR Heat Exchanger, equipment failures within the RHR System, or AC/DC power loss to the RHR and/or Service Water Components (i.e., CCS, ERCW). Should this condition occur, the first line of defense is to maintain Heat Sink Capability and remove heat via the Steam Generators.

For WBN, this IC and its associated EAL are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, RCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems which can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that these sequences can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost. Under these conditions, RCS integrity is lost and fuel clad integrity is lost or potentially lost, which is consistent with an Alert. The indicators for these EALs are those methods used by the plant in response to Generic Letter 88-17 which include core exit temperature monitoring and RCS water level monitoring.

The inability to achieve this condition warrants declaration of an Alert.

Escalation Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the vessel will escalate this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SA3, Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-14 Loss of RHR T.S. 3.1.2 Shutdown Margin Tavg. < 200 F.

Generic Letter 88-17 "Loss of Decay Heat Removal"

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-152 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN DEGRADATION Event 6.1 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 5,6 Description Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC/NUMARC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Basis Pending Escalation Not Applicable References NRC/NUMARC, Future guidance

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-153 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of AC Power in Mode 5 and 6 will Not cause a declaration of a General Emergency Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of AC Power in Mode 5 and 6 will Not cause a declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-154 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification ALERT Mode 5,6, or Defuel Description UNPLANNED loss of Offsite And Onsite AC Power for >15 Minutes

1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdowns Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Basis Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event is classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

Fifteen (15) minutes was selected as threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation Escalation is not applicable from this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU1 (expanded), Rev 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown T.S. 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-155 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.2 LOSS OF AC (Shutdown)

Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 5,6 or Defuel Description UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown board.

Basis Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout).

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

Fifteen (15) minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation Loss of one additional power supply to the shutdown boards will escalate this event.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU1, Rev 2, 1/92 T.S. 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown T.S. 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-156 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-157 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.3 LOSS OF DC (SHUTDOWN)

Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of DC Power (Shutdown) in Modes 5 and 6 will not cause a General Emergency.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.3 LOSS OF DC (SHUTDOWN)

Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of DC power (Shutdown) in Modes 5-6 will not cause a Site Area Emergency.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-158 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.3 LOSS OF DC (SHUTDOWN)

Classification ALERT Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Loss of DC power (Shutdown) in Modes 5-6 will not cause an Alert.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-159 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 6.0 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Event 6.3 LOSS OF DC (SHUTDOWN)

Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode 5,6, defueled Description UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105 VDC on 125V DC vital battery buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105 VDC on 125V DC vital battery buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes Basis The purpose of this IC is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This IC is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

The 105 volt Bus Voltage is the minimum bus voltage necessary for the operation of safety related equipment. This voltage value should incorporate a margin of at least 15 minutes of operation before the onset of inability to operate those loads. This voltage is usually near the minimum voltage selected when battery sizing is performed.

Typically the value for the entire battery set is approximately 105 VDC. For a 60 cell string of batteries the cell voltage is 1.75 Volts per cell. For a 58 string battery set the minimum voltage is typically 1.81 Volts per cell.

The fifteen minute threshold is utilized to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, SU7, Rev. 2, 1/92 FSAR 8.3.2 DC Power Sources T.S. 3.8.5 DC Sources Shutdown T.S. 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown AOI-21.1-21.4 Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Boards

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-160 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-161 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode All Description EAB Dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr gamma or an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 Ci/cc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1000 mrem TEDE or

>5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Basis Calculation WBNTSR115 results are included in Table 7-1 The release rates for the determination of GE from monitor readings are calculated in the same manner as for the Site Area Emergency. The GE site release rate is equal to 10 times the release rate used for the SAE.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, AGI, Rev 2, 1/92 WBNTSR115 Rev. 10 Main Steam System Description, (N3-1-4002)

Calibration Factors for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, (WBNAPS3-047)

(ODCM) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual TI-18 Calculation Methods for Effluent Radiation Monitors (CTD) Chemistry Technical Document, Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitor Default Set Point Determination, CR-060795-01-01 FSAR 11.3 Gaseous Waste Systems

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-162 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode All Description EAB Dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds values under Site in Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma or an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 µCi/cc at the SP (Figure 7-A)

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release. Refer to Figure 7-A.

Basis The SAE gaseous effluent EAL release rate values are those required to deliver the EAL dose in one hour. EAL release rates are back calculated from both the 100 mrem TEDE and 500 mrem CDE (thyroid) criteria, separately. The most conservative of these release rates will be used in the determination of the EAL.

The meteorology, calculation methodology were used in Engineering Calculation WBNTSR115. The results of this calculation are included in Table 7-1 Escalation Escalation would be based on increased release rates by a factor of 10.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AGI, Rev 2, 1/92 WBNTSR115 Rev. 10 Main Seam System Description, (N3-1-4002)

Calibration Factors for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, (WBNAPS3-047)

(ODCM) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual TI-18 Calculation Methods for Effluent Radiation Monitors (CTD) Chemistry Technical Document, Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitor Default Set Point Determination, CR-060795-01-01 FSAR 11.3 Gaseous Waste Systems

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-163 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Classification ALERT Mode All Description Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds values under Alert in Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at the SP >15 minutes

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Basis Calculation WBNTSR115 results are included in Table 7-1 For gaseous releases, the EAL for the Alert can be determined by multiplying the NOUE noble gas monitor readings by a factor of 100.

Escalation Escalation would be based on dose rates greater than 100 mrem Total Body or 500 mrem child thyroid.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AAI, Rev 2, 1/92 WBNTSR115 Rev. 10 Main Steam System Description, (N3-1-4002)

Calibration Factors for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, (WBNAPS3-047)

(ODCM) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual TI-18 Calculation Methods for Effluent Radiation Monitors (CTD) Chemistry Technical Document, Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitor Default Set Point Determination, CR060795-01-01 FSAR 11.3 Gaseous Waste Systems

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-164 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds values under Unusual Event in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at the SP >60 minutes

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Basis The ODCM dose factors, meteorology, calculation methodology and the design annual releases (noble gas only) from the WBN FSAR were used in Engineering Calculation WBNTSR115, The results of this calculation are included in Table 7-1 Escalation Escalation would be based on increasing the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AUI, Rev 2, 1/92 Main Steam System Description, (N3-1-4002)

Calibration Factors for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, (WBNAPS3-047)

(ODCM) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual WBNTSR115 Rev. 10 TI-18 Calculation Methods for Effluent Radiation Monitors (CTD) Chemistry Technical Document, Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitor Default Set Point Determination, CR-060795-01-01 FSAR 11.3 Gaseous Waste Systems

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-165 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA/SITE BOUNDARY

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-166 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-167 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.2 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Not Applicable Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.2 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Not Applicable Basis Not Applicable Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-168 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.2 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Classification ALERT Mode All Description Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is Not exceeded

2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Basis Calculation WBNTSR115 results are included in Table 7-1 For liquid release, the monitor values for the Alert classification values, but will be a factor of 100 higher than the NOUE values.

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, AA2, Rev 2, 1/92 WBNTSR115 Rev. 10 (ODCM) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 10 CFR 20 TI-18 Calculation Methods for Effluent Radiation Monitors

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-169 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.2 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is Not exceeded

2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration Basis For liquid releases, the ODCM limit is equal to 10 times the Effluent Concentration Limits (ECL) listed in 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2. The calculation methodology is in Engineering Calculation WBNTSR115, The results of this calculation are included in Table 7-1.

Escalation Escalation would be based on an UNPLANNED release exceeding 200 times the ODCM limit for greater than 15 minutes.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AU2, Rev 2, 1/92 (ODCM) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 10 CFR 20 WBNTSR115 Rev. 10 TI-18 Calculation Methods for Effluent Radiation Monitors

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-170 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specific assessment. If the assessment cannot be completed within 15 minute (60 minutes for NOUE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

ICS Site Area General Units NOUE Alert Screen Emergency Emergency Total Site (Gas) EFF1 Ci/s(2) 1.98E+05 1.98E+07 2.11E+07 2.11E+08 Shield Building EFF1 Ci/s 1.98E+05 1.98E+07 2.11E+07 2.11E+08 1, 2-RE-90-400 Auxiliary Building 4RM1 cpm 4.77E+04 4.77E+06 5.08E+06 Offscale(1) 0-RE-90-101B Service Building 4RM1 cpm 1.09E+06 Offscale(1) Offscale(1) Offscale(1) 0-RE-90-132B Condenser Vacuum Exhaust 3PAM 1-RE-90-255 mR/hr 5.42E+02 Offscale Offscale Offscale 1-RE-90-256 mR/hr 5.42E+02 5.42E+04 5.77E+04 5.77E+05 SG Discharge 4RM2 mR/h(3) N/A 6.48E+02 6.90E+02 6.90E+03 1-RE-90-421 thru -424 Assessment Method: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the control room or local indication as necessary Condensate Demineralizer in use- Liquid, Case 1 ICS Site Area General Units NOUE Alert Screen Emergency Emergency Total Site (Liquid) Ci/ml(2) 5.68E-03 5.68E-01 N/A N/A Radwaste Monitor 4RM2 cpm 1.09E+06 Offscale(1) N/A N/A 0-RE-90-122 SGBD 4RM2 cpm 6.24E+05 Offscale(1) N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 Condensate Demin 4RM2 cpm 1.09E+06 Offscale(1) N/A N/A 0-RE-90-225 Turbine Bldg Sump 4RM2 cpm 1.11E+04 1.11E+06 N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 Release Duration Minutes 60 15 15 15 Assessment Method: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the control room or local indication as necessary

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-171 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Condensate Demineralizer not in use, Direct Steam Generator Blowdown release with dilution-Liquid, Case 2 ICS Site Area General Units NOUE Alert Screen Emergency Emergency Total Site (Liquid) Ci/ml(2) 6.05E-03 6.05E-01 N/A N/A Radwaste Monitor 4RM2 cpm 3.46E+06 Offscale(1) N/A N/A 0-RE-90-122 SGBD 4RM2 cpm 1.98E+06 Offscale(1) N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 Condensate Demin 4RM2 cpm 3.46E+06 Offscale(1) N/A N/A 0-RE-90-225 Turbine Bldg Sump 4RM2 cpm 3.35E+04 3.35E+06 N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 Release Duration Minutes 60 15 15 15 Assessment Method: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the control room or local indication as necessary Steam Generator Blowdown only, no treatment or dilution- Liquid, Case 3 ICS Site Area General Units NOUE Alert Screen Emergency Emergency Total Site (Liquid) Ci/ml(2) 1.16E-04 1.16E-02 N/A N/A Radwaste Monitor 4RM2 cpm 5.80E+04 5.80E+06 N/A N/A 0-RE-90-122 SGBD 4RM2 cpm 5.80E+04 5.80E+06 N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 Condensate Demin 4RM2 cpm 5.80E+04 5.80E+06 N/A N/A 0-RE-90-225 Turbine Bldg Sump 4RM2 cpm 7.44E+04 7.44E+06 N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 Release Duration Minutes 60 15 15 15 Assessment Method: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the control room or local indication as necessary (1) The calculated value is offscale of the upper range for this detector and other confirmatory data is required for event classification. The maximum output which can be read is 1E+07 cpm.

(2) These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant. In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value. Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.

(3) These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1185 psig 600 degrees F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e.g., PORV).

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-172 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.3 RADIATION LEVELS Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Basis Not Applicable Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 1/92 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.3 RADIATION LEVELS Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Basis Not Applicable Escalation Escalation may be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges" or Gaseous Effluent levels.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-173 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.3 RADIATION LEVELS Classification ALERT Mode All Description UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room or CAS.

2. (a and b)

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2.

b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Basis This IC addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

EAL #1 applies to areas that are manned continuously. The value of 15 mrem/hr has been determined to be representative of the CRITERION. This value was obtained from Section III.D.3 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", which specified a criterion of 15 mR/hr averaged over the assumed 30 day duration of the accident. The value was based on the GDC 19 criterion of 5 rem for the duration of the accident, with adjustment for occupancy factors. The value is used here without averaging, as a 30 day duration implies an event potentially more significant than an ALERT.

The Control Room, and the Central Alarm Station (CAS) should be continuously manned. Thus, the 15 mR/hr value applies to these facilities.

EAL #2 applies to areas that require infrequent access. Table 7-2 tabulates the areas identified for WBN and the associated radiation level, above which access is considered impeded. The areas were selected on the basis of the relative need for access. The specified radiation levels are such that normal radiation exposure control measures intended to maintain doses within normal 10 CFR 20 occupational exposure guidelines would impede necessary access.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-174 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.3 RADIATION LEVELS Classification ALERT (continued)

Mode All Basis (continued) This IC is not meant to apply to increases in the containment dome radiation monitors as these are events which are addressed in the fission product barrier matrix ICs. Nor is it intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.,

incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, component venting, etc.).

An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g. alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

Escalation Escalation may be based on "Fission Product Barrier Challenges" or Gaseous Effluent levels.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AA3, Rev 2, 1/92 WBN QDCN 20764 B - Radiation Monitor Readings for the REP, WBN TSR-044, R0 (B18891227 254) Required Range and Accuracy of the WBN Area Radiation Monitors, WBN TSR-077, R2 (B18 920727 317) Radiation Zones.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-175 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.3 RADIATION LEVELS Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor of 1000 over normal levels.

Note: In Either The UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other INITIATING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

Basis This IC addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel..

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g. alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

Escalation Escalation will be based on the inability to access certain operating stations or equipment needed to establish or maintain Cold Shutdown.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AU2, Rev 2, 1/92 WBN QDCN 20764 B - Radiation Monitor Readings for the REP.

WBN TSR-044, R0 (B18 891227 254) Required Range and Accuracy for the WBN Area Radiation Monitors.

WBN TSR-077, R2 (B18 920727 317) Radiation Zones.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-176 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Monitor Monitor No. Building and Elevation Reading 1 1&2-RE-90-1 Auxiliary El.757.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (spent fuel pool) 1 &2-RE-90-2 Auxiliary El.757.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (personnel air lock) 0-RE-90-3 Auxiliary El.729.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (waste pac. area) 0-RE-90-4 Auxiliary El.713.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (decon room) 0-RE-90-5 Auxiliary El.737.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)

1&2-RE-90-6 Auxiliary El.737.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)

1&2-RE-90-7 Auxiliary El.713.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (sample room) 1&2-RE-90-8 Auxiliary El.713.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (aux. feed pump area) 0-RE-90-9 Auxiliary El.692.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.)

1&2-RE-90-10 Auxiliary El.692.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (cvcs area) 0-RE-90-11 Auxiliary El.676.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (ctmt.spry. & rhr pmp ar.)

1-RE-90-61 Reactor El.713.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (RB low. cmpt .inst. m.)

0-RE-90-230 Turbine El.685.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.)

0-RE-90-231 Turbine El.685.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.)

NOTE: (1) These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-177 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is intentionally blank.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-178 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.4 FUEL HANDLING Classification GENERAL EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to Gaseous Effluents (event 7.1)

Basis The basis for a General Emergency is primarily the extent and severity of Gaseous Effluents (event 7.1)

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.4 FUEL HANDLING Classification SITE AREA EMERGENCY Mode Not Applicable Description Refer to Gaseous Effluents (event 7.1)

Basis The basis for a Site Area Emergency is primarily the extent and severity of Gaseous Effluents (event 7.1)

Escalation Not Applicable References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 1/92

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-179 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.4 FUEL HANDLING Classification ALERT Mode All Description Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of Water Level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID Alarm on 0-RE-90-101B or 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400

2. (a or b)

a. Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b. Plant personnel report water Level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Basis The major concern of the EAL is a fuel handling accident or loss of water covering spent fuel. Events of this type could cause an increase in radioactivity readings and potentially a release to the environment. Offsite doses during these accidents would be below the EPA Protective Action Guidelines and the classification of an Alert is therefore appropriate.

Monitoring radiation on the refueling floor and containment is by Particulant Iodine Gas Monitors and Area Monitors. Values for these monitors are set so as to not exceed safety limits and to ensure that the Design Basis does not exceed limits referenced in 10 CFR 20.

An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

Escalation Escalation would occur by offsite dose rates. See Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AA2, Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-29 Dropped or Damaged Fuel or Refueling Cavity Seal Failure NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents FSAR 15.5.6 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Fuel Handling Accident T.S. 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations T.S. 3.7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-180 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Section 7.0 RADIOLOGICAL Event 7.4 FUEL HANDLING Classification UNUSUAL EVENT Mode All Description UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered with water Basis The term UNPLANNED refers to unplanned actions resulting from either equipment malfunctions or operator error that results in a decreasing water level in the Spent Fuel Pool, Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal.

Unplanned is included in the IC to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

The main concern of this EAL is the loss of water covering spent fuel and the potential of increased doses to plant staff. This event has a long lead time relative to the potential for a radiological release outside the site boundary, thus the impact to public health and safety is very low. Classifications of an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

Escalation Escalation of this event would be based on uncovering an irradiated fuel assembly or indications of high radiation levels on the refueling floor.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, AU2, Rev. 2, 1/92 AOI-29 Dropped or Damaged Fuel or Refueling Cavity Seal Failure NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents FSAR 15.5.6 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Fuel Handling Accident T.S. 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations T.S. 3.7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-181 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5 SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION WBN maintains an organization capable of responding to a radiological emergency. The on-shift staffing for response to emergencies is shown on Figure 1-C.

The 90 minute shift augmentation positions are shown in Figure 2-C and 3-C.

Within the on-shift team, Advanced Radiation Workers (ARWs) are utilized to accomplish some radiological assessment needs.

C.5.1 The Unit Shift Operations Staff is manned by qualified Operations personnel that meet the requirements established in site Technical Specifications.

Concerning Assistant Units Operators, (AUOs) a normal shift compliment is typically (7) AUOs. A minimum of (5) AUOs are on shift at all times.

C.5.2 The Fire Shift Operations Staff is manned by qualified personnel that meet the requirements established in the site Fire Protection Report.

C.5.3 The RP/Chemistry Staff is manned by qualified personnel that meet the requirements established in the site Technical Specifications.

C.5.4 The Security Shift Staff is manned by qualified personnel that meet the requirements established in the Physical Security Plan.

C.5.5 The Maintenance Shift Staff is manned by a multi-discipline staffing of personnel who are available to respond to postulated events that could involve one or more of the three commonly recognized areas of : mechanical, electrical, or instrumentation.

Each maintenance team member has a background in one or more discipline(s).

Team members may perform cross-disciplinary work if they have a background to perform the respective task/activity. Team members may include representatives from the following plant work groups: maintenance management, maintenance craft, operations, and maintenance planning.

C.5.6 The Maintenance team shift managers and team foremen are considered qualified to provide a first response capability within the bounds of the actions required during the initial phase (in the first 90 minutes) of a radiological emergency for their related background(s). Therefore, staffing credit is taken for the foreman or shift manager, when necessary, to satisfy minimum staffing requirements.

The electrical skills necessary during a radiological emergency are considered to be satisfied by an individual with instrumentation skills as indicated by table B-1 in NUREG-0654.

C.5.7 Upon activation of the OSC (Figure 5-C), the Maintenance onshift staffing falls under the control of the OSC.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-182 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.8 The on-shift composition listed in Figure 1-C may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time in order to accommodate unexpected absences of personnel provided action is taken to restore the composition to within the following time requirements:

Unit Shift Operations Staff (per Technical Specifications)

Fire Shift Operations Staff (per Fire Protection Report)

Security Shift Staff (per the Physical Security Plan)

RP Shift Staff (one technician, per Technical Specifications)

(remaining staff, notified within two hour to arrive, as soon as possible)

Chemistry and Rad Chem (notified within two hour to arrive, as soon as possible Support Shift Staffing

Maintenance Shift Staff (notified within two hour to arrive, as soon as possible

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-183 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 FIGURE 1-C ON-SHIFT STAFFING Chemistry (1) Maintenance (3)

Fire Operations (5)

RP Technicians (2) I &C (1)

Elect/ I & C ( 1)

Mechanical (1)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-184 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.9 The TSC emergency response positions are described in WBN EPIP-6, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center. Figure 2-C provides the typical staffing of the TSC.

(#) denotes 90 minute minimum staffing position(s).

Figure 2-C Technical Support Center (TSC)

WBN EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-185 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.10 The Operations Support Center positions are described in WBN EPIP-7 Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center Figure 3-C provides the typical staffing of the OSC.

(#) denotes 90 minute minimum staffing position(s).

Figure 3-C OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ORGANIZATION

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-186 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.11 Site Vice President The Site Vice President serves as a corporate interface for the SED, relieving him from duties which could distract from the SEDs primary purpose of plant operations and accident mitigation activities. The Site Vice President shall provide assistance in the following areas:

1. Provides TVA policy direction to the Site Emergency Director.

2. Directs the site resources to support the Site Emergency Director in the accident mitigation activities.

3. Provides direct interface on overall site response activities with:

a. NRC, FEMA, or other Federal organizations responding to the site.

b. CECC Director.

c. Onsite media.

4. At his/her discretion, may provide interface at the appropriate offsite location on the overall site response activities with:

a. State and local agencies.

b. NRC region/corporate.

c. Joint Information Center.

5. Provides support to other emergency operation centers as necessary.

C.5.12 Site Emergency Director

1. Directs onsite emergency accident mitigation activities.

2. Consults with CECC Director and Site Vice President on significant events and their related impacts.

3. Initiates onsite protective actions.

4. Coordinates accident mitigation actions with NRC.

5. Initiates long-term 24-hour accident mitigation operations.

6. Prior to the CECC being staffed, makes recommendations for protective actions (if necessary) to State and local agencies. This responsibility cannot be delegated except to the CECC Director after the CECC is operational.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-187 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106

7. Responsible for determining the emergency classification. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

8. Approves or authorizes emergency doses. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

C.5.13 Operations Manager

1. Directs operational activities.

2. Informs Site Emergency Director of plant status and operational problems.

3. Assures the control room is aware of the accident assessment and response.

4. Recommends solutions and mitigating action for operational problems.

C.5.14 Technical Assessment Manager

1. Directs onsite effluent assessment.

2. Directs activities of technical assessment team.

3. Projects future plant status based on present plant conditions.

4. Keeps assessment team informed of plant status.

5. Provides information, evaluations, and projections to Site Emergency Director.

6. Coordinates assessment activities with the CECC plant assessment team.

7. Establishes and maintains a status of significant plant problems.

C.5.15 TSC Clerks

1. Answer telephones.

2. Distribute plant parameter data sheets.

3. Maintain TSC organization board.

4. Operate facsimile machine.

5. Other duties as assigned by Site Emergency Director.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-188 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.16 Nuclear Security Manager

1. Directs activities of Nuclear Security Services personnel.

2. Controls access to site and control rooms.

3. Reports on site accountability/evacuation as defined in WBN-EPIPs.

C.5.17 Rad Protection Manager

1. Directs and/or performs assessment of inplant and onsite radiological conditions.

2. Directs onsite RP activities.

3. Coordinates additional RP support with CECC Radiological Assessment Manager.

4. Makes recommendations for protective actions for onsite personnel.

5. Maintains status map of offsite radiological conditions.

6. Coordinates assessment of radiological conditions offsite with CECC Radiological Assessment Coordinator.

7. Maintains in-plant radiation status board.

8. Authorizes issue of KI to onsite personnel.

9. Makes recommendations to the Site Emergency Director for personnel entry to radiological hazardous environment.

C.5.18 Chemistry Manager

1. Coordinates assessment of radioactive effluents with CECC Rad Assessment Coordinator.

2. Coordinates post-accident sampling activities.

3. Performs release rate calculations as needed.

4. Determines impact of incident on radwaste and various effluent treatment systems.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-189 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.19 NRC Coordinator

1. Acts as primary liaison with onsite NRC personnel.

2. Updates NRC personnel on plant status.

3. Provides information requests from NRC to TSC personnel.

C.5.20 Operations Communicator

1. Provides operational knowledge for status evaluation of plant systems.

2. Provides advice regarding technical specifications, system response, safety limits, etc.

3. Assists in development of recommended solutions to developing problems.

4. Serves as the control room - TSC - OSC link.

C.5.21 Emergency Preparedness Manager

1. Advises Site Emergency Director regarding overall radiological emergency plan, use of implementing procedures, emergency equipment availability, and coordination with CECC.

2. Confirms TSC is operating properly.

C.5.22 Technical Assessment Team

1. Prepares and provides periodic current assessments on plant conditions and provides this information to the CECC plant assessment team.

2. Projects future plant status based on present plant conditions.

3. Provides technical support to plant operations on mitigating actions.

C.5.23 OSC Manager

1. Directs repairs and corrective actions in coordination with the TSC.

2. Performs damage assessment.

3. Directs activities of Operations Support Center.

4. Coordinates maintenance teams and ensures they have received proper briefings and are accompanied by a RP technician, as necessary.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-190 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.5.24 OSC Assistant Manager

1. Oversees the operations of OSC teams.

2. Maintains communications with the TSC.

3. Maintains team tracking boards.

4. Assigns TSC tasks to team briefers.

C.5.25 OSC RP Supervisor

1. Directs activities of the RP lab.

2. Ensures RP coverage of damage repair teams.

3. Verifies habitability of the TSC, OSC, and Control Room.

4. Briefs the OSC Manager and TSC on RP status.

C.5.26 OSC Briefing Teams

1. Provide mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation technical expertise.

2. Evaluate task conditions and provide methods best suited to safely perform an assignment.

3. Track OSC teams in the field.

4. Debrief OSC teams after task completion.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-191 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES Specific plant areas, facilities, and equipment are selected and provided for use during a radiological emergency. The preselection, allocation, and inclusion of emergency facilities assure that needed services and equipment are available for use during emergency conditions.

C.6.1 Technical Support Center (TSC)

A specific area (adjacent to the relay room) in the Control Building at elevation 755 is designated for use as the TSC. The room is provided with communication capabilities to plant areas and areas external to the plant. The communication facilities include TVA and Bell System telephones, NRC Emergency Notification System and Health Physics Network, access to a paging-intercom system, and two-way radio. This room is sufficiently shielded to ensure occupancy during an emergency and is designed to be continuously habitable during all radiological emergencies. All ventilating and air-conditioning facilities have redundant or backup systems. Toilet facilities are available on the same elevation.

The diesel generators will provide emergency power when there is a loss of normal ac power, and cooling water for the air-conditioning equipment is taken from the essential raw cooling water system. Figure 4-C shows a detailed TSC layout.

Meteorological information is available in the TSC, OSC and in the Main Control Room and includes wind speed, direction and temperature differences between the 10-meter, 46-meter and 91-meter tower elevations. This information is utilized in the sites initial dose projection procedure, WBN EPIP-13. Should the Met tower be unavailable, WBN EPIP-13 provides backup methods for acquiring the data. Also available in the TSC, OSC and Main Control Room is information from the onsite radiation monitors and radio capabilities to relay information from the WBN Radiological Monitoring Van at any of the 16 site radiological monitoring survey points on the site perimeter.

C.6.2 Operations Support Center (OSC)

The role of the OSC is to provide assembly areas for operations support personnel during an emergency situation which are under the supervision of the OSC Manager or a designated alternate.

The OSC is located on Elevation 713 adjacent to the RP Lab. It contains emergency team briefing areas and additional space provided in the adjacent hallway and adjoining rooms for staging, briefing rooms for staging, briefing and dispatching maintenance teams. The Alternate OSC is located in the Outage Control Center (OCC), with additional space provided in the nearby Plant Assembly Room for staging, briefing and dispatching maintenance teams. The OSC is provided with telephone and radio communications. Figures 5-C and 6-C show the OSC areas. Respiratory protective devices, protective clothing, portable lighting, other protective equipment and tools are available, as needed.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-192 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 4-C TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER CONTROL BLDG El 755 FACILITY DIAGRAM FIGURE 5-C

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-193 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 Figure 5-C OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER SERVICE BLDG El 713 FACILITY DIAGRAM

I TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-194 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 FIGURE 6-C Alternate Operations Support Center Layout 0 ; ~ !

'i I

I)

CQT[!

B DOD DOD

[]

D S0£01JIDS II POIND II

.t..:,llri!IN. ~l rn I I I IR DDDDDD

....T 0 0 D

~ gOI I I I I u 0 0 000 OOOOCJ

/1 Ln I

OU I AG ~ CON IROL C l N I ~R PLANT OFFIC :: BLDG.

WATTS 3AR N. r .

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-195 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6.3 RP Laboratory and Equipment The RP laboratory is located in the Service Building, Elevation 713. The portable radiation monitoring and counting equipment normally used by the plant RP section is kept in this space and is available for use during an emergency. Sufficient reserves of instruments/equipment are available to replace those removed from service for calibration or repair. Calibration of equipment is carried out at intervals as specified in the Radiation Protection Plan (RPP).

C.6.4 Alternative Facilities Following the declaration of Alert or higher, for some conditions, primarily in response to hostile action events when ERO members may not have access to the site, an alternative facility has been identified. This facility is located in the Power Services (PSO) building and serves as a staging area for augmentation staff, which will minimize delays in overall site response and allow for a swift, coordinated augmented response when the site is deemed accessible.

The alternative facility is accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and have the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation; for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action.

C.6.5 Onsite Monitoring Systems and Equipment C.6.5.1 Natural Phenomena In the event an emergency is the result of a natural phenomena, there is instrumentation to monitor its severity. The Environmental Data Station is located onsite and contains instruments capable of measuring wind direction, wind speed, and temperatures. Seismic instrumentation is available in the plant to monitor acceleration levels of ground movement.

Hydrological monitoring systems are installed to supply flow and level information for each site. Meteorological and seismic instrumentation have readily accessible readout in the main control room. More specific information on these systems can be found in the Watts Bar FSAR.

C.6.5.2 Radiological Monitors The installed Radiation Monitoring System consists of process monitors and area monitors which read out on local panels and in the control room.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-196 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6.5.2.1 Process Monitors (Radiological)

The process system continuously monitors selected lines containing or possibly containing radioactive effluents. The system's function is to warn personnel of increasing radiation levels, to give early warning of a system malfunction, and to record and control discharges of radioactive liquids and gases to the environment. The system consists of active and redundant channels.

Examples of process monitors are:

1. Ventilation Gas and Particulate

2. Process Gas and Particulate

3. Containment Gas and Particulate

4. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust

5. Steam Generator Blowdown

6. Liquid Waste

7. Service Water

8. Component Cooling Water

9. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

10. Reactor Coolant System C.6.5.2.2 Area Radiation Monitors Area monitors are placed at specific locations in the plant. Examples of area monitor locations are:

1. Containment

2. New and Spent Fuel Storage Area

3. Main Control Room

4. Incore Instrument Area C.6.5.2.3 Portable Monitors Portable radiation detection equipment consists of low-range and high-range instruments to measure gamma dose rates. Instruments for alpha, beta-gamma, and neutron radiation measurements are available. Sampling equipment is available to take low- or high-volume air samples. Air samplers can be used to collect low-volume samples either onsite or offsite. The counting room has appropriate equipment for isotopic analysis.

C.6.5.2.4 Process Monitors (Nonradiological)

Installed in the main control room are the necessary instrumentation readouts to assess plant systems status, including reactor coolant system pressure and temperature, containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, fire detection equipment, and meteorological instrumentation. More specific information on control room instrumentation can be found in the Watts Bar FSAR.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-197 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6.5.2.5 Fire Protection The plant's fire protection system is designed to furnish water and other extinguishing agents with the capability of extinguishing any single or probable combination of simultaneous fires that might occur. The use of combustible materials is minimized, and the greatest possible use of fire-retardant materials has been incorporated in plant design.

The standards of the National Fire Protection Association and the recommendations of the nuclear insurers are considered in the system design to provide the following:

1. Supply of water for the fire protection system.

2. Automatic fire or smoke detection in the more critical areas.

3. Fire suppression by fixed equipment actuated automatically or manually.

4. Manually-operated portable fire extinguishing equipment at strategic locations.

5. Compartmentalization to limit the spread of fire.

C.6.5.2.6 Environment Facilities available for assessing the impact of plant operations on the environment include atmospheric monitoring stations, direct gamma radiation detectors, and automatic water samplers. This equipment is used in the routine environmental radiological monitoring program and is available in the event of a radiological emergency condition.

The atmospheric monitoring network is divided into three subgroups. Local air monitors are located at or adjacent to the site boundary in the directions of predominant wind flow.

Perimeter monitors are located three to ten miles from the plant in areas of relatively high population densities and/or in the direction of predominant air flow. Remote monitors (controls) are located at sites greater than 10 miles from the plant.

At each monitor, air is continuously passed through a particulate filter at a regulated flow. In series with, but downstream of, the particulate filter is a charcoal filter used to collect iodine.

Each monitor has a collection tray and storage container to collect rainwater on a continuous basis.

Primary dosimeters are placed at approximately 40 sites around the plant. These Primary dosimeters are located typically in each of the 16 meteorological sectors at or near the Site Boundary and at a distance of approximately four to five miles. Three dosimeters are usually placed at each site.

Automatic water samplers are located above and below the plant discharge and at the first potable water supply downstream from the plant.

In addition to these facilities, established sampling points for milk, vegetation, soil, fish, and sediment are located in the vicinity of the plant. Samples may be collected from these stations on a nonroutine basis as needed.

All samples are returned to TVA's radiological laboratory for processing.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-198 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6.6 Emergency Equipment Figure 7-C contains listings of emergency equipment and storage locations throughout the plant.

Required calibration of equipment is carried out at intervals recommended by the supplier of the equipment or as specified in the Watts Bar FSAR.

C.6.7 First Aid and Medical Facilities C.6.7.1 Decontamination Facilities The site is responsible for maintaining supplies and equipment to establish a temporary decontamination area for the purpose of gross radiological decontamination and injured person evaluation and stabilization. This area, complete with shower and sink, is located in the Service Building, Elevation 713'. Equipment and materials for decontamination and first aid, including a stretcher, are available.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-199 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 FIGURE 7-C EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT Location Description

1. RP Laboratory (Service Bldg., El. 713) Radiological survey meters and SCBAs

2. Site medical station and ambulance General use emergency medical supplies

3. Service Bldg. El. 713 (near breathing air Emergency SCBAs with compressor) additional cylinders

4. Decon Facility (Service Bldg. El. 713) Decon supplies

5. Emergency Van (RP, environmental General emergency monitoring) supplies related to

6. Rhea County Medical Center Supplies specific to Emergency Room radiological injuries

7. Athens Regional Medical Center Supplies specific to Emergency Room radiological injuries

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-200 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6.7.2 First Aid Stations and Supplies Emergency medical equipment is strategically located throughout the plant, with trauma kits and other specified equipment available for use by the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT).

First aid is provided by EMTs. Medical supplies and treatment for minor injuries are available.

A minimum of one ambulance is also available. First aid treatment is available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day.

A medical office, staffed by registered nurses, is located at the west end of the Watts Bar Training Center. Medical treatment is available during the day and evening shifts.

Examinations (employment, routine, occupational) are available during the day shift, Monday-Friday.

Potassium Iodide tablets for onsite personnel are controlled and stored by site RP. Specific information including authorization and dispersal of tablets is contained in the site EPIPs.

C.6.7.3 Receiving Hospitals and Supplies Arrangements have been made with the Rhea County Medical Center and Athens Regional Medical Center to receive patients from WBN.

C.6.7.4 Ambulance Service A TVA ambulance is available at the site and is maintained and staffed in conjunction with the MERT. Arrangements have been made for offsite ambulance assistance to WBN.

C.6.8 Additional Local Support C.6.8.1 Fire Arrangements have been made for local fire support upon request. The senior fireman responding will work with and for the TVA Incident Commander in directing the activities of the firemen. Watts Bar will be responsible for providing radiological protection and proper safety clearance in all fire areas.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-201 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.6.8 Additional Local Support (continued)

C.6.8.2 Law Enforcement Agreements are maintained with local law enforcement agencies to support TVA when necessary.

C.6.9 Vendor Support If necessary, the NSSS vendor, Westinghouse, will be contacted by the TSC to provide assistance in the form of manpower, equipment, and technical backup. Other vendors will also be contacted if their assistance is needed.

C.6.10 Assembly/Accountability Alarm Undulating sirens are provided in strategic areas for indicating the assembly of plant personnel. A three-minute undulating tone of the alarm is the signal for assembly.

The sirens are powered by redundant 120V ac supplies. The sirens are activated in the main control room or the auxiliary control room diesel panel.

C.6.11 Local Recovery Center (LRC)

The LRC is a designated, non-dedicated space located in Classroom 6 of the Watts Bar Training Center (WBN) outside the protected area of the site. Figure 8-C shows the location of the WBN LRC in the WBN Training Center.

The LRC has telephone communications capabilities to enable personnel to communicate with the CECC and the Watts Bar TSC.

Meteorological information and dose rate calculations are also available to LRC personnel.

Other equipment in the WTC available for use by LRC personnel include:

1. Facsimile machine

2. Copy machine

3. Hand-held calculators

4. Plant-specific drawings, manuals, procedures, etc. (drawings located in nearby WBN Operations Training Area)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-202 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 FIGURE 8-C LOCAL RECOVERY CENTER The NRC Local Recovery Center (LRC) is in the Watts Bar Training Center in Classroom 6 r~ 11 1 ~,

~Ui;: 1: ]~

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-203 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.7 WBN Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures The following is a listing of the WBN-EPIPs:

C.7.1 WBN EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Logic This procedure provides guidance to the Shift Manager Site Emergency Director or TSC Site Emergency Director in determining the classification of an accident to ensure that appropriate predetermined actions are implemented. It details initiating conditions and directs shift personnel to appropriate notification and assessment procedures.

C.7.2 WBN EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event This procedure provides for the timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager SED or TSC SED has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a Notification of Unusual Event. It details requirements for periodic reassessment and the implementation of appropriate actions.

C.7.3 WBN EPIP-3 Alert This procedure provides for the timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager SED or TSC SED has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as an Alert. It details requirements for periodic reassessment and the implementation of appropriate actions.

C.7.4 WBN EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency This procedure provides for the timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager SED or TSC SED has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a Site Area Emergency. It details requirements for periodic reassessment and the implementation of appropriate actions.

C.7.5 WBN EPIP-5 General Emergency This procedure provides for the timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager SED or TSC SED has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a General Emergency. It details requirements for periodic reassessment and the implementation of appropriate actions. It also provides for determination of an initial protective action recommendation to State and local agencies.

C.7.6 WBN EPIP-6 Activation and Operation of the TSC This procedure directs the activation and operation of the TSC during an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency or at the discretion of the SED. It details notification requirements and responsibility for supervision of the TSC.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-204 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.7.7 WBN EPIP-7 Activation and Operation of the OSC This procedure directs the activation and operation of the OSC during an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency or at the discretion of the SED.

C.7.8 WBN EPIP-8 Personnel Accountability and Evacuation This procedure details the requirements for accountability of all personnel and visitors and the orderly evacuation of areas of the plant during a radiological emergency. This procedure also details the requirements for accountability of personnel and visitors at auxiliary facilities and their orderly evacuation during a radiological emergency.

C.7.9 WBN EPIP-9 Loss of the Meteorological Data Terminated see EPIP-13 C.7.10 WBN EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response This procedure details actions to be followed during medical emergencies. It provides for the organization and activation of the onsite Medical Emergency Response Team. It contains the duties and responsibilities of the onsite Medical Emergency Response Team. The procedure provides guidance on the care and handling of patients who may have been exposed to or contaminated with radioactive material, including provision for the transport of these individuals to offsite medical support facilities. Maps and appropriate instructions are included.

C.7.11 WBN EPIP-11 Security and Access Control This procedure details responsibilities and requirements for access control and accountability during a radiological emergency.

C.7.12 WBN EPIP-12 Emergency Equipment and Supplies This procedure details requirements for periodic inspection and maintenance of emergency equipment and supplies. It assigns responsibility and specifies the inspection frequency and documentation requirements.

C.7.13 WBN EPIP-13 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies This procedure provides initial guidance to support site activities concerning dose assessment for an actual or exercise airborne release situation.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-205 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 C.7.14 WBN EPIP-14 Radiological Control Response This procedure outlines the actions to be followed by health physics personnel during a plant emergency. It details responsibilities, RP assessment actions and recordkeeping requirements. The procedure provides guidance regarding the administration of potassium iodide (KI).

C.7.15 WBN EPIP-15 Emergency Exposure Guidelines This procedure provides guidance on acceptable personnel exposures for various conditions.

It specifies absolute dose rates and authorizes the Site Emergency Director to permit dose rates in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits in order to perform an emergency mission.

C.7.16 WBN EPIP-16 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery This procedure outlines responsibilities and provides guidance to terminate the emergency condition and recovery after, an emergency to assure adequate planning for efficient utilization of resources and radiation exposure.

C.7.17 WBN EPIP-17 Fire Emergency Procedure This procedure provides guidance on timely responses to fire emergencies at WBN.

C.8 Alert Notification System See Generic REP Section.

C.9 Training and Drills C.9.1 Training Personnel Personnel with specific duties and responsibilities in the WBN REP program receive instruction in the performance of their duties and responsibilities per the Nuclear Power Training Manual, Section TRN-30 (Radiological Emergency Preparedness Training), and as required in REP Section 15.0, (Training).

C.9.2 Drills and Exercises Drills and exercises are conducted regularly to develop and maintain the key skills that are required for emergency response. The drills identified in Section 14.0 (Drills and Exercises) may be conducted individually or as part of a REP exercise.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NP-REP APPENDIX C WBN NUCLEAR POWER Page C-206 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Revision 106 This page is the last page of Appendix C and is intentionally blank.

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:MF6050, (Open)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance, Acceptance Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement Administration Meeting Questions 14 August 2015 25 August 2015 2 October 2015 Answers 14 September 2015 25 September 2015 22 December 2015 30 November 2015 Results Approval... Other: ML15173A114, ML15173A116, ML15225A377, ML15286A001
MONTHYEAR2015-05-27 [Table View]

CNL-15-104, Submittal of Revision 106, Appendix C to Central Emergency Control Center, Radiological Emergency Plan

Text

Subject:

Enclosures:

Enclosures:

Navigation menu

CNL-15-104, Submittal of Revision 106, Appendix C to Central Emergency Control Center, Radiological Emergency Plan

Text

Subject:

Enclosures:

Enclosures:

Navigation menu

Search