ML15131A479
| ML15131A479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| Issue date: | 05/01/2015 |
| From: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15131A464 | List: |
| References | |
| SMT-2015-014 | |
| Download: ML15131A479 (4) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 2 ATTACHMENT 1 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. APPLICATION FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGES (MARK-UP) 3 pages follow
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria Table 3.1-1 Systems List (Sheet 3 of 3)
System System Name Code Section Reference(a)
Facility Ventilation Zone 4 FVZ4 9a2.1.2 Facility Integrated Control FICS 7b.2.3.2.1 System Facility Potable Water System FPWS 9b.7.8 Facility Compressed Air FCAS 9b.7.10 System Facility Breathing Air System FBAS 9b.7.11 Facility Inert Gas System FIGS 9b.7.12 Facility Welding System FWS Table 3.5-1 Facility Roof Drains System FRDS 9b.7.13 Facility Sanitary Drains System FSDS 9b.7.14 Facility Data and FDCS 9a2.4 Communications System Facility Lighting Protections FLPS 8a2.1.7 System Facility Demineralized Water FDWS Table 3.5-1 System Facility Chilled Water Supply FCHS 9a2.1.3 and Distribution System Facility Heating Water System FHWS 9a2.1.4 Facility Acid Reagent Storage FARS 9b.7.15 and Distribution System Facility Alkaline Reagent Storage and Distribution FLRS 9b.7.16 System Facility Salt Reagent Storage FSRS 9b.7.17 and Distribution System Facility Organic Reagent Storage and Distribution FORS 9b.7.18 System Cathodic Protection System CPS 8a2.1.8 Emergency Lighting System ELTG Table 3.5-1 Facility Grounding System FGND 8a2.1.6 Lighting System LTG Table 3.5-1 Standby Diesel Generator SDGS 8a2.1.3, 8a2.1.4 System a) Bolded section numbers indicate the location of the most detailed system description.
SHINE Medical Technologies 3-5 Rev. 01
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Criticality-Safety Controls
- The NCS analyses are performed in accordance with the methods specified and incorporated in the configuration management program.
- Nuclear criticality safety controls and controlled parameters ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety that is used.
- Process specifications incorporate margins to protect against uncertainties in process variables and against a limit being accidentally exceeded (ANSI/ANS, 2007a).
- Use of ANSI/ANS-8.7-1998 (R2007) (ANSI/ANS, 2007b), as it relates to the requirements for subcriticality of operations, the margin of subcriticality for safety, and the selection of controls.
- ANSI/ANS-8.10-1983 (R2005) (ANSI/ANS, 2005a), as modified by Regulatory Guide 3.71, as it relates to the determination of consequences of NCS accident sequences, is used.
- If administrative keff margins for normal and credible accident scenarios are used, NRC pre-approval of the administrative margins will be sought.
- Subcritical limits for keff calculations such that the margin is large compared to the uncertainty in the calculated values, and includes adequate allowance for uncertainty in the methodology, data, and bias to ensure subcriticality are used.
- Studies to correlate the change in a value of a controlled parameter and keff value are performed. The studies include changing the value of one controlled parameter and determining its effect on another controlled parameter and keff.
- The calculation of keff is based on a set of variables within the methods validated area of applicability.
- Trends in the bias support the extension of the methodology to areas outside the area or areas of applicability.
The NSCE procedure addresses requirements for:
- Normal case operating conditions.
- Nuclear criticality hazard identification.
- Hazard identification method.
- Hazard identification results.
- Nuclear criticality hazard evaluation.
- Nuclear criticality parameter discussions.
- Nuclear criticality safety controls (passive design features, active engineered features and administrative controls).
- Nuclear criticality safety peer review requirements.
Geometry Tanks Each of the tanks within the scope of this section features criticality safety controls that meet the double-contingency principle, i.e., an inadvertent criticality is not credible unless two independent and unlikely events occur simultaneouslyprocesses incorporate sufficient safety factors so that at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions are required before a nuclear criticality accident is possible. The first criticality safety control is that each tank, with the exception of the tanks associated with liquid waste processing, is criticality safe by geometry or by the combination of geometry and a layer of neutron absorbing material integral to the tank construction. The second, independent criticality-safety control is that the most reactive concentration of uranium in any tank results in keff 0.95, based on MCNP analyses. MCNP is a SHINE Medical Technologies 6b-17 Rev. 12
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences tank that is not designed to be criticality-safe. Both scenarios may lead to an inadvertent criticality. Cell waste and shipping containers will have criticality-safe containers.
Leaks in the piping or UREX process resulting in target solution collecting in the sump, trenches and/or drains that could lead to criticality-unsafe accumulation of fissile material.
Changes to spacing of uranium oxide containers in the uranium container storage racks that may result in a criticality-unsafe condition. Not following procedures and use of container transfer carts when transferring uranium oxide containers to the target solution preparation area. These scenarios may lead to an inadvertent criticality.
- Fission product waste stream.
Improper monitoring of the raffinate for unacceptable amounts of uranium prior to transfer of the raffinate to criticality unsafe vessels in the waste processing storage area. Failure to hold transfer of raffinate until the unacceptable amount of uranium is removed.
Transfer of waste with an unacceptable amount of uranium to criticality unsafe geometry vessels in the waste storage area may result in an inadvertent criticality.
Improper residence time or acid concentration in the uranium metal dissolution tank (1-TSPS-02T) or the uranyl sulfate preparation tank (1-TSPS-01T) could lead to carry-over of this material further into the process system. This scenario is prevented by the presence of filters downstream of these tanks. A differential pressure monitor is also installed at each filter to alert personnel of a build-up of uranium metal particles or other fissile particles on the filter.
13b.2.5.3 Sequence of Events An inadvertent criticality in the RPF is not crediblehighly unlikely as it is prevented by the facility design using multiple passive safety-related engineered SSCs and administrative controls in the RPF. The SHINE definition for Safety-related SSCs, described in PSAR Section 3.5.1.1.1, assures that required SSCs remain functional during normal conditions and during and following design basis events such that the potential for an inadvertent criticality accident is not credibleall nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality.
Therefore, a radiological consequence analysis for a criticality accident was not performed.
13b.2.5.4 Safety Controls As stated before, the credible accident scenarios that could cause an inadvertent criticality are highly unlikely. This is accomplished by specifying safety controls that reduce the likelihood of such scenarios. A list of safety controls is provided in Table 13b.2.5-1.
SHINE Medical Technologies 13b-27 Rev. 12