ML15076A226

Issuance of Amendments Adoption of TSTF-427, Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System Operability, Revision 2

ML15076A226
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/06/2015
From:	Dietrich A Plant Licensing Branch III
To:	Weber L Indiana Michigan Power Co
Chawla M
References
TAC MF5696, TAC MF5697
Download: ML15076A226 (36)

Text

Mr. Lawrence J. Weber Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 6, 2015 Indiana Michigan Power Company Nuclear Generation Group One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106

SUBJECT:

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: ADOPTION OF TSTF-427, "ALLOWANCE FOR NON-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BARRIER DEGRADATION ON SUPPORTED SYSTEM OPERABILITY," REVISION 2 (TAC NOS. MF5696 AND MF5697)

Dear Mr. Weber:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 327 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-58, and Amendment No. 310 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 and

2. The amendments consist of changes to the technical specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated February 6, 2015.

The amendments modify the TSs requirements for unavailable barriers by adding limiting condition for operation 3.0.8. The changes are consistent with the NRC approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification change TSTF-427, "Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System OPERABILITY," Revision 2. The change allows a time delay for entering a supported TS when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable barrier if risk is assessed and managed.

A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 327 to DPR-58

2. Amendment No. 310 to DPR-74

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via ListServ Sincerely, Allison Dietrich, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 111-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-315 DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 327 License No. DPR-58

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated February 6, 2015, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as ievised through Amendment No. 327, are hereby incorporated in this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Operating License No. DPR-58 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: Apri 1 6, 2015 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D

i L. Pel n, Plant Licensing Branch 111-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 327 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58 DOCKET NO. 50-315 Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3

3 Replace the following pages of Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3 3.0-4 INSERT 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3 3.0-4 3.0-5 and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (4)

Pursuant to the Act and 1 O CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument and equipment calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C.

This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not to exceed 3304 megawatts thermal in accordance with the conditions specified herein.

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 327, are hereby incorporated in this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

Less than Four Loop Operation The licensee shall not operate the reactor at power levels above P-7 (as defined in Table 3.3.1-1 of Specification 3.3.1 of Appendix A to this renewed operating license) with less than four reactor coolant loops in operation until (a) safety analyses for less than four loop operation have been submitted, and (b) approval for less than four loop operation at power levels above P-7 has been granted by the Commission by amendment of this license.

(4) Fire Protection Program Indiana Michigan Power Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the licensee's amendment request dated July 1, 2011, as supplemented by letters dated September 2, 2011, April 27, 2012, June 29, 2012, August 9, 2012, October 15, 2012, November 9, 2012, January 14, 2013, February 1, 2013, Renewed License No. DPR-58 Amendment No.-~. ~. ~. 327

LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.4 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2, LCO 3.0.7, and LCO 3.0.8.

Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated.

When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a.

MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;

b.

MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and

c.

MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

a.

When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time;

b.

After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications, or Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 3.0-1 Amendment No. ~. 327

3.0 LCO Applicability SR Applicability 3.0 LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.6 LCO 3.0.7 LCO 3.0.8

c.

When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, an evaluation shall be performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.13, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Test Exception LCO 3.1.8, "PHYSIC TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2,"

allows specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. When a Test Exception LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Test Exception LCO shall be met. When a Test Exception LCO is not desired to be met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall be made in accordance with the other applicable Specifications.

When one or more required barriers are unable to perform their related support function(s), any supported system LCO(s) are not required to be declared not met solely for this reason for up to 30 days provided that at least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE and supported by barriers capable of providing their related support Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 3.0-2 Amendment No. 2-8+, 327

3.0 LCO Applicability LCO 3.0.8 (continued)

SR Applicability 3.0 function(s), and risk is assessed and managed. This specification may be concurrently applied to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system provided at least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE and the barriers supporting each of these trains or subsystems provide their related support function(s) for different categories of initiating events.

If the required OPERABLE train or subsystem becomes inoperable while this specification is in use, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the provisions of this specification cannot be applied to the trains or subsystems supported by the barriers that cannot perform their related support function(s).

At the end of the specified period, the required barriers must be able to perform their related support function(s) or the supported system LCO(s) shall be declared not met.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 3.0-3 Amendment No. ~. 327

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.4 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR.

Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per... "

basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 3.0-4 Amendment No.~. 327

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.4 (continued)

This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 3.0-5 Amendment No. 327

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-316 DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 310 License No. DPR-74

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated February 6, 2015, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public: and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 310, are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Operating License No. DPR-7 4 and Technical Specifications Date of lssuance:Apri 1 6, 2015 Dav L

I on, Chi f Plant Licensing Branch 111-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 310 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74 DOCKET NO. 50-316 Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3

3 Replace the following pages of Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3 3.0-4 INSERT 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3 3.0-4 3.0-5 radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (4)

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument and equipment calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C.

This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not to exceed 3468 megawatts thermal in accordance with the conditions specified herein and in Attachment 1 to the renewed operating license.

The preoperational tests, startup tests and other items identified in Attachment 1 to this renewed operating license shall be completed. Attachment 1 is an integral part of this renewed operating license.

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 310, are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) Additional Conditions (a) Deleted by Amendment No. 76 (b) Deleted by Amendment No. 2 (c) Leak Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System Valves Indiana Michigan Power Company shall prior to completion of the first inservice testing interval leak test each of the two valves in series in the Renewed License No. DPR-74 Amendment No.,~.~. W9, 310

LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.4 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2, LCO 3.0.7,and LCO 3.0.8.

Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated.

When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a.

MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;

b.

MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and

c.

MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

a.

When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time;

b.

After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications, or Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 3.0-1 Amendment No.~. 310

3.0 LCO Applicability LCO Applicability 3.0 LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.6 LCO 3.0.7 LCO 3.0.8

c.

When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, an evaluation shall be performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.13, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Test Exception LCO 3.1.8, "PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2,"

allows specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. When a Test Exception LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Test Exception LCO shall be met. When a Test Exception LCO is not desired to be met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall be made in accordance with the other applicable Specifications.

When one or more required barriers are unable to perform their related support function(s), any supported system LCO(s) are not required to be declared not met solely for this reason for up to 30 days provided that at least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE and supported by barriers capable of providing their related support Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 3.0-2 Amendment No. 2-99 Corrected by letter dated November 26, 2008, 310

3.0 LCO Applicability LCO Applicability 3.0 LCO 3.0.8 (continued) function(s), and risk is assessed and managed. This specification may be concurrently applied to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system provided at least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE and the barriers supporting each of these trains or subsystems provide their related support function(s) for different categories of initiating events.

If the required OPERABLE train or subsystem becomes inoperable while this specification is in use, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the provisions of this specification cannot be applied to the trains or subsystems supported by the barriers that cannot perform their related support function(s).

At the end of the specified period, the required barriers must be able to perform their related support function(s) or the supported system LCO(s) shall be declared not met.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 3.0-3 Amendment No. 2%

Corrected by letter dated November 26, 2008, 310

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.4 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR.

Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per... "

basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 3.0-4 Amendment No.~. 310

3.0 SR Applicability SR 3.0.4 (continued)

SR Applicability 3.0 This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 3.0-5 Amendment No. 310

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 327 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERA TING LICENSE NO. DPR-58 AND AMENDMENT NO. 310 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-315 AND 50-316

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated February 6, 2015 (Agencywide Documents and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15041A069), Indiana Michigan Power Company requested changes to the technical specifications (TSs) for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. According to the licensee's letter, the proposed amendment would modify TS requirements for unavailable barriers by adding Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.8. This LCO establishes conditions under which TS systems would remain operable when required physical barriers are not capable of providing their related support function. The licensee's application further stated, "the changes are consistent with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved lndustry/TSTF [Technical Specification Task Force] Standard TS change TSTF-427, 'Allowance for Non Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System OPERABILITY,'

Revision 2. The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on October 3, 2006 (71 FR 58444), as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLllP)."

On May 3, 2006, the industry owners group submitted a proposed change, TSTF-427, Revision 2, to the standard technical specifications (STSs) (NUREGs 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry (TSTF-427, Revisions 0 and 1 were prior draft iterations). TSTF-427, Revision 2, is a proposal to add an LCO 3.0.9, allowing a delay time for entering a supported system TS, when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated initiating events which may require a functional barrier are limited to those with low frequencies of occurrence, and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the majority of anticipated challenges.

This proposal is one of the industry's initiatives being developed under the risk-informed TS program. These initiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety through the incorporation of risk assessment and management techniques in TS, while reducing unnecessary burden and making TS requirements consistent with the Commission's other risk-informed regulatory requirements.

The licensee's proposed change adds a new LCO, LCO 3.0.8, to the TSs. Currently, the Donald C. Cook TSs does not have an LCO 3.0.8. Therefore, the licensee is proposing STS LCO 3.0.9 as CNP's LCO 3.0.8 in order to follow the numbering scheme. CNP's proposed TS LCO 3.0.8 (STS LCO 3.0.9) will allow the licensee to delay declaring an LCO not met for equipment supported by barriers unable to perform their associated support function, when risk is assessed and managed. This new LCO 3.0.8 states:

When one or more required barriers are unable to perform their related support function(s), any supported system LCO(s) are not required to be declared not met solely for this reason for up to 30 days provided that at least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE and supported by barriers capable of providing their related support function(s), and risk is assessed and managed. This specification may be concurrently applied to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system provided at least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE and the barriers supporting each of these trains or subsystems provide their related support function(s) for different categories of initiating events.

If the required OPERABLE train or subsystem becomes inoperable while this specification is in use, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the provisions of this specification cannot be applied to the trains or subsystems supported by the barriers that cannot perform their related support function(s).

At the end of the specified period, the required barriers must be able to perform their related support function(s), or the supported system LCO(s) shall be declared not met.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In Title 1 O of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.36, the Commission established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) LCOs; (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the "Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification... " Donald C. Cook TS Section 3.0, "LCO and SR Applicability," provides details or ground rules for complying with the LC Os.

Barriers are doors, walls, floor plugs, curbs, hatches, installed structures or components, or other devices, not explicitly described in TS that support the performance of the functions of systems described in the TS. For purposes of this TS LCO, the term "barrier" refers to one or more devices which protect one train of a safety system from a given initiating event. A "degraded barrier" refers to a barrier that has been found to be degraded and must be repaired, or to a barrier that is purposefully removed or reconfigured to facilitate maintenance activities.

As stated in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-08, Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8 (STS LCO 3.0.9) specifically does not apply to fire barriers, snubbers, barriers which support ventilation systems or non-TS systems, or barriers which support TS systems where the unavailability of the barrier does not render the supported system inoperable.

Some TS-required systems may require one or more functional barriers in order to perform their intended function(s) for certain initiating events for which the barriers provide some protective support function. For example, there are barriers to protect systems from the effects of internal flooding, such as floor plugs and retaining walls, and barriers are used to protect equipment from steam impingement in case of high energy line breaks. Barriers are also used to protect systems against missiles, either internally generated, or generated by external events.

Barriers are not explicitly described in the TS, but are required to be capable of performing their required support function by the definition of OPERABILITY for the supported system which is described in the TS. Therefore, under the current STS, the supported system must be declared inoperable when the related barrier(s) are unavailable. However, the magnitude of plant risk associated with the barrier which cannot perform its related support function is much less than the risk associated with direct unavailability of the supported system, since barriers are only required for specific, low frequency initiating events.

Some potential undesirable consequences of the current TS requirements include:

1.

When maintenance activities on the supported TS system require removal and restoration of barriers, the time available to complete maintenance and perform system restoration and testing is reduced by the time spent maneuvering the barriers within the time constraints of the supported system LCO;

2.

Restoration of barriers following maintenance may be given a high priority due to time restraints of the existing supported system LCO, when other activities may have a greater risk impact and should therefore be given priority; and

3.

Unnecessary plant shutdowns may occur due to discovery of degraded barriers which require more time than provided by the existing supported system LCO to complete repairs and restoration of the barrier.

To improve the treatment of unavailable barriers and enhance safety, the TSTF proposed a risk-informed TS change that introduces a delay time before entering the actions for the supported equipment, when one or more barriers are found to be degraded, or are removed or reconfigured to support maintenance activities, if risk is assessed and managed. Such a time delay will provide needed flexibility in the performance of maintenance and at the same time will enhance overall plant safety by:

1.

Performing system maintenance and restoration activities, including post-maintenance testing, within the existing TS LCO time, and allowing barrier removal and restoration to be performed outside of the TS LCO, providing more time for the safe conduct of maintenance and testing activities on the supported TS system;

2.

Requiring barrier removal and restoration activities to be assessed and prioritized based on actual plant risk impacts; and

3.

Avoiding unnecessary unscheduled plant shutdowns and thus minimizing plant transition and realignment risks.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The industry submitted TSTF-427, Revision 2 (Reference 1), "Allowance for Non Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System OPERABILITY" in support of the proposed TS change. This submittal documents a risk-informed analysis of the proposed TS change. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods are used, in combination with deterministic and defense-in-depth arguments, to identify and justify delay times for entering the actions for the supported equipment associated with unavailable barriers at nuclear power plants. The industry also submitted implementation guidance NEI 04-08, March 2006 (Reference 2). This submittal provides detailed guidance on assessing and managing risk associated with unavailable barriers. This is in accordance with guidance provided in Regulatory Guides (RGs) 1.174 (Reference 3), and 1.177 (Reference 4).

The risk impact associated with the proposed delay times for entering the TS actions for the supported equipment can be assessed using the same approach as for allowed completion time (CT) extensions. Therefore, the risk assessment was performed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 for evaluating proposed extensions in currently allowed CTs:

1.

The first tier involves the assessment of the change in plant risk due to the proposed TS change. Such risk change is expressed (1) by the change in the average yearly core damage frequency (LiCDF) and the average yearly large early release frequency (LiLERF), and (2) by the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP). The assessed

!iCDF and !iLERF values are compared to acceptance guidelines, consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement as documented in RG 1.17 4, so that the plant's average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range. The assessed ICCDP and IC LE RP values are compared to acceptance guidelines in RG 1.177, which provide assurance that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the period the equipment is taken out of service.

2.

The second tier involves the identification of potentially high-risk configurations that could exist if equipment in addition to that associated with the change were to be taken out of service simultaneously, or other risk-significant operational factors such as concurrent equipment testing were also involved. The objective is to ensure that appropriate restrictions are in place to avoid any potential high-risk configurations.

3.

The third tier involves the establishment of an overall configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are identified. The objective of the CRMP is to manage configuration-specific risks by the appropriate scheduling of plant activities and/or appropriate compensatory measures.

A simplified risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed addition of Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8 to the TS. This approach was necessitated by (1) the general nature of the proposed TS change (i.e., it applies to all plants and is associated with an undetermined number of barriers that are not able to perform their function), and (2) the lack of detailed modeling in most plant-specific PRAs which do not include passive structures such as barriers.

The simplified risk assessment considers three different parameters:

1.

The length of time the affected barrier is unavailable,

2.

The initiating event frequency for which the affected barrier is designed to mitigate, and

3.

The importance to CDF (or LERF) of the TS equipment (train, subsystem, or component) for which the affected barrier is designed to protect, measured by the risk achievement worth (RAW) of the equipment.

The ICCDP can be calculated based on the following equation:

where:

Tc is the time the barrier is unavailable (hours),

T c/8766 is therefore the fraction of the year during which the barrier is unavailable, IE/IET is the ratio of the initiating event frequency for which the affected barrier is designed to mitigate, IEj, and the total initiating event frequency, IET, RAWi is the risk achievement worth of the component(s) for which the barrier provides protection, and CDFbase is the baseline core damage frequency (per year).

ICLERP also may be similarly determined, using baseline LERF and RAW values with respect to LERF. It is assumed that the magnitude of the LERF risk resulting from the barrier unable to perform its related support function would be generally at least one order of magnitude less than the corresponding CDF risk. Containment bypass scenarios, which are typically the significant contributors to LERF, would not be uniquely affected by application of Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8, and initiating events which would be significant LERF contributors, such as steam generator tube rupture and interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), are not typically associated with barriers within the scope of Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8. Therefore, the assumption regarding LERF risk is reasonable and acceptable for the generic risk evaluation, provided that LERF risk impacts are considered on a plant-specific basis for unavailable barriers, as described in Section 3.1.3.

The relevant initiating events (i.e., events for which barriers subject to Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8 provide protection) are:

internal and external floods, high energy line breaks, feedwater line breaks, LOCA (small, medium, and large},

tornados and high winds, and turbine missiles.

Generic frequencies for most of these initiating events were obtained from NUREG/CR-5750 (Reference 5). For external floods, turbine missiles, and tornados, other industry source documents were referenced. The most limiting (highest frequency) initiating event was obtained for a high energy line break from NUREG/CR-5750, with a frequency of 9.1 E-3 per year. The risk assessment is, therefore, based on this limiting frequency, and the proposed methodology to apply Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8 is similarly restricted to barriers protecting against initiating events whose total frequency is no more than 9.1 E-3 per year.

3.1 Risk Assessment Results and Insights The results and insights from the implementation of the three-tiered approach of RG 1.177 to support the proposed addition of Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8 to the TSs are summarized and evaluated in Sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.3.

3.1.1 Risk Impact The bounding risk assessment approach, described in Section 3.0, was developed for a range of plant baseline CDF values and for a range of protected component RAW values. The maximum allowable 30-day outage time was used. The results are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 Risk Assessment Results for a Postulated 30-Day Barrier Outage.

B r

CDF 1E 6 ase1ne

=

per vear RAW ICCDP ICLERP 2

7.5E-10 7.5E-11 10 6.7E-09 6.7E-10 50 3.7E-08 3.7E-09 100 7.4E-08 7.4E-09 B

r CDF 1E 5 ase1ne

=

per vear RAW ICCDP ICLERP 2

7.5E-09 7.5E-10 10 6.7E-08 6.7E-09 50 3.7E-07 3.7E-08 100 7.4E-07 7.4E-08 B

I" CDF 1E 4 ase1ne

=

per year RAW ICCDP IC LE RP 2

7.5E-08 7.5E-09 10 6.7E-07 6.7E-08 50 3.7E-06 3.7E-07 100 7.4E-06 7.4E-07 The above results represent a sensitivity analysis covering the expected range of plant baseline CDF values and component RAW values. The most limiting configurations involving very high risk components (RAW> 10) would not be anticipated to occur for most planned maintenance activities.

The calculations conservatively assume the most limiting (highest frequency) initiating event and the longest allowable outage time (30 days). Occurrence of the initiating event during unavailability of the barrier is conservatively assumed to directly fail the protected equipment; no credit is taken for event-specific circumstances which may result in the equipment remaining functional even with the barrier unavailable. (For example, a barrier required to protect equipment from steam impingement for high energy line breaks may only be required for breaks occurring in specific locations and orientations relative to the protected equipment, and only for large size breaks.) No credit is taken for avoided risk identified in Section 2.

The risk assessment results of Table 1 were compared to guidance provided in the revised Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2 (Reference 6), and endorsed by RG 1.160 (Reference 7), for implementing the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, 1 O CFR 50.65. Such guidance is summarized in Table 2. Guidance regarding the acceptability of conditional risk increase in terms of CDF for a planned configuration is provided. This guidance states that a specific configuration that is associated with a CDF higher than 1 E-3 per year should not normally be entered voluntarily. The NRC staff notes that the higher risk configurations documented in Table 1 would exceed this guidance, and would therefore not be permitted to be entered voluntarily. For example, with a baseline CDF of 1 E-4 per year, a component with a RAW greater than 10 would exceed the 1 E-3 per year criteria. Therefore, the sensitivity analyses presented in Table 1 are understood to include higher risk configurations which would not be permitted under the guidance of Reference 6.

Table 2 Guidance for Implementing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

~RcoF Guidance Greater than 1 E-3/year Configuration should not normally be entered voluntarily ICCDP Guidance IC LE RP Greater than 1 E-5 Configuration should not normally be Greater than 1 E-6 entered voluntarily 1 E-6 to 1 E-5 Assess non-quantifiable factors 1E-7 to 1E-6 Establish risk management actions Less than 1 E-6 Normal work controls Less than1E-7 Guidance regarding the acceptability of ICCDP and ICLERP values for a specific planned configuration and the establishment of risk management actions is also provided in NUMARC 93-01. This guidance, as shown in Table 2, states that a specific plant configuration associated with ICCDP and ICLERP values below 1 E-6 and 1 E-7, respectively, is considered to require "normal work controls." Table 1 shows that for the majority of barrier outage configurations, the conservatively assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are within the limits for what is recommended as the threshold for the "normal work controls" region.

As stated in the implementation guidance for STS LCO 3.0.9 (Reference 2), plants are required to commit to the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 Section 11, and therefore the above limits would be applicable. Plant configurations including out of service barriers may, therefore, be entered voluntarily if supported by the results of the risk assessment required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4),

and by LCO 3.0.8.

RG 1.177 (Reference 4) provides guidance of 5E-7 ICDP and 5E-8 ILERP as the limit for TS allowed outage time. As shown in Table 1, the guidance is met for the typically anticipated configurations, unless either the baseline CDF for the plant approaches 1 E-4 per year or the RAW of the protected components is well above 10. Such configurations may exceed the criteria described in Reference 6 (Table 2) and would not be voluntarily entered. Such configurations are not expected to be frequently encountered, and may be addressed on a case-by-case plant-specific basis by limiting the allowed outage time and by implementing plant-specific risk management actions, as per the implementing guidance (Reference 2).

RG 1.174 (Reference 3) provides guidance of 1 E-5 per year 11CDF and 1 E-6 per year 11LERF.

The ICCDP calculations demonstrated that each individual 30-day barrier outage is anticipated to be low risk. Although there is no explicit limit on the number of times per year that Donald C.

Cook LCO 3.0.8 may be applied, even assuming barrier outages occurred continuously over the entire year, the risk incurred would still be anticipated to be below the limits of the guidance.

The NRC staff finds that the risk assessment results support the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to Donald C. Cook TSs. The risk increases associated with this TS change will be insignificant based on guidance provided in RGs 1.17 4 and 1.177 and within the range of risks associated with normal maintenance activities.

3.1.2 Identification of High-Risk Configurations The second tier of the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 involves the identification of potentially high-risk configurations that could exist if equipment, in addition to that associated with the TS change, were to be taken out of service simultaneously. Insights from the risk assessments, in conjunction with important assumptions made in the analysis and defense-in-depth considerations, were used to identify such configurations. To avoid these potentially high-risk configurations, specific restrictions to the implementation of the proposed TS changes were identified.

When the proposed LCO 3.0.8 is applied, at least one train or subsystem is required to be operable with required barriers in place, such that this train or subsystem would be available to provide mitigation of the initiating event. The proposed LCO 3.0.8 may be applied to multiple trains of the same system only for barriers which provide protection for different initiating events, such that at least one train or subsystem is available to provide mitigation of the initiating event.

The use of LCO 3.0.8 for barriers which protect all trains or subsystems from a particular initiating event is not permitted. Therefore, potentially high-risk configurations involving a loss of function required for mitigation of a particular initiating event are avoided by the restrictions imposed on applicability of LCO 3.0.8.

LCO 3.0.8 also addresses potential emergent conditions where unplanned failures or discovered conditions may result in the unavailability of a required train or subsystem for a particular initiating event. Such conditions may result during application of LCO 3.0.8 from equipment failure on the operable train, such that all trains of a TS system are not protected from the same initiating event. In such cases, a 24-hour allowed time is provided to restore the conditions to permit continued operation with unavailable barriers, after which the applicability of LCO 3.0.8 ends, and the supported system LCO becomes effective. This allowed time is provided so that emergent conditions with low risk consequences may be effectively managed, rather than requiring immediate exit of LCO 3.0.8 and the potential for an unplanned plant shutdown.

A limit of 30 days is applied to the LCO 3.0.8 allowed outage time for each barrier, after which the barrier must be restored to an available status, or the supported system TS must be applied.

This 30-day backstop applies regardless of the risk level calculated, and provides assurance that installed plant barriers will be maintained available over long periods of time, and that the application of LCO 3.0.8 will not result in long-term degradation of plant barriers.

The NRC staff finds that the restrictions on the applicability of LCO 3.0.8 assuring that one safety train remains available to mitigate the initiating event, along with the 30-day limit applicable to each barrier, assure that potentially high-risk configurations are avoided in accordance with the guidance provided in RGs 1.17 4 and 1.177.

3.1.3 Configuration Risk Management The third tier of the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 involves the establishment of an overall CRMP to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are identified. The objective of the CRMP is to manage configuration-specific risk by appropriate scheduling of plant activities and/or appropriate compensatory measures. This objective is met by licensee programs to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) to assess and manage risk resulting from maintenance activities, and by LCO 3.0.8 requiring risk assessments and management using (a)(4) processes if no maintenance is in progress. These programs can support licensee decision making regarding the appropriate actions to manage risk whenever a risk-informed TS is entered.

The implementation guidance for Donald C. Cook LCO 3.0.8 (Reference 2), requires that the allowed outage time determination for an unavailable barrier be performed using the plant-specific configuration. Further, the risk determinations are to be updated whenever emergent conditions occur. These requirements assure that the configuration-specific risk associated with unavailable barriers is assessed and managed prior to entry into LCO 3.0.8 and during its applicability as conditions change.

These evaluations for the unavailable barrier are performed as part of the assessment of plant risk required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The numerical guidance identified in Table 2 is applicable to implementation of LCO 3.0.8, using the results of the configuration-specific risk assessment which addresses the risk impact of the unavailable barrier along with all other out of service components and plant alignments.

Risk management actions are required to be considered when the calculated risk exceeds specific thresholds per NUMARC 93-01 Section 11, as identified in Table 2. Additional guidance on risk management actions are provided in the implementation guidance for LCO 3.0.8.

The allowed outage time for a barrier is calculated based on an ICCDP limit of 1 E-6. This is the NUMARC 93-01 Section 11 guidance for applicability of normal work controls, and is conservatively lower than the guidance of 1 E-5 for voluntary maintenance activities. The use of 1 E-6 will result in conservatively short allowed outage times for barriers compared to allowed times for other maintenance activities.

If the scope of the PRA model used to support the plant-specific CRMP does not include the initiating event for which a barrier provides protection, then LCO 3.0.8 applicability is limited to one barrier on a single train. Multiple barriers for such initiating events may not be unavailable under LCO 3.0.8, and in such situations the LCO(s) associated with the protected components would be applicable. Applicability of LCO 3.0.8 to the single barrier for an initiating event that is not modeled in the plant PRA is acceptable based on the generic risk analysis provided by TSTF-427, as described in Section 3.1.

Assessment of the LERF risk impact on an unavailable barrier is required to be performed in accordance with NUMARC 93-01 Section 11. If an unavailable barrier provides protection to equipment which is relevant to the containment function, or which protects equipment from the effects of an initiating event which is a contributor to LERF, then applicability of LCO 3.0.8 must be limited to that one barrier unless a quantified assessment of LERF is performed.

The NRC staff finds that the risk evaluations necessary to support the applicability of LCO 3.0.8 appropriately consider the risk from unavailable barriers in an integrated manner based on the overall plant configuration. Therefore, potentially high-risk configurations can be identified and managed in accordance with the guidance provided in RGs 1.17 4 and 1.177.

3.2 Summary and Conclusions The unavailability of barriers which protect TS-required components from the effects of specific initiating events is typically a low-risk configuration which should not require that the protected components be immediately declared inoperable. The current TSs require that when such barriers are unavailable, the protected component LCO is immediately entered. Some potential undesirable consequences of the current TS requirements include:

1.

When maintenance activities on the supported TS system requires removal and restoration of barriers, the time available to complete maintenance and perform system restoration and testing is reduced by the time spent maneuvering the barriers within the time constraints of the supported system LCO;

2.

Restoration of barriers following maintenance must be given a high priority due to time restraints of the existing supported system LCO, when other more risk-important activities may have a greater risk impact and should therefore be given priority; and

3.

Unnecessary plant shutdowns may occur due to discovery of degraded barriers which may require more than the existing supported system LCO time to complete repairs and restoration.

To remove the overly restrictive requirements in the treatment of barriers, the licensee is proposing a risk-informed TS change which introduces a delay time before entering the actions for the supported equipment when one or more barriers are found degraded or removed to facilitate planned maintenance activities. Such a delay time will provide needed flexibility in the performance of maintenance during power operation and at the same time will enhance overall plant safety by (1) performing system maintenance and restoration activities, including post-maintenance testing, within the existing TS LCO time, and allowing barrier removal and restoration to be performed outside of the TS LCO, providing more time for the safe conduct of maintenance and testing activities on the supported system; (2) requiring barrier removal and restoration activities to be assessed and prioritized based on actual plant risk impacts; and (3) avoiding unnecessary unscheduled plant shutdowns, thus minimizing plant transition and realignment risks.

The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177. A simplified bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. This bounding assessment was selected due to the lack of detailed plant-specific risk models for most plants which do not include failure modes of passive structures such as barriers. The impact from the addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.8 to the TS on defense-in-depth was also evaluated in conjunction with the risk assessment results.

Based on this integrated evaluation which is bounding for CNP, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the licensee's TSs would lead to insignificant risk increases as stipulated by RG 1.177 and depicted in Table 1 above. This conclusion is true without taking any credit for the removal of potential undesirable consequences associated with the current conservative treatment of barriers. Therefore, the proposed change provides adequate protection of public health and safety and is acceptable provided the conditions set forth below are satisfied.

Consistent with the NRC staff's approval and inherent in the implementation of TSTF-427, the licensee agreed to implement LCO 3.0.8 by operating in accordance with the following stipulations:

1.

The licensee committed to the guidance of NUMARC 93-01, Section 11 (Reference 6) and NEI 04-08 (Reference 2); and

2.

The licensee stated that procedures would be revised to ensure that the guidance on the risk assessment and management process described in NEI 04-08 is used whenever a barrier is considered unavailable and the requirements of LCO 3.0.8 are to be applied.

This would be done in accordance with an overall CRMP to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are identified and avoided.

The licensee's application made regulatory commitments in Section 3.2, Verification and Commitments, to implement LCO 3.0.8 with the above stipulations. The NRC staff finds the licensee's regulatory commitments acceptable.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

The Commission may issue the license amendments before the expiration of the 60-day period provided that its final determination is that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. These amendments are being issued prior to the expiration of the 60-day period.

Therefore, a final finding of no significant hazards consideration follows.

The NRC's regulations in 1 O CFR 50.92 state that the NRC may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the amendment, would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a), an evaluation of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1 - The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification (TS) when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable barrier if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated initiating events which may require a functional barrier are limited to those with low frequencies of occurrence, and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the majority of anticipated challenges.

Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident while relying on the allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8 are no different than the consequences of an accident while relying on the TS required actions in effect without the allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 - The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Allowing delay times for entering supported system TS when inoperability is due solely to an unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed and managed, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 - The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of Safety The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated initiating events which may require a functional barrier are limited to those with low frequencies of occurrence, and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the majority of anticipated challenges. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177.

A bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. This application of LCO 3.0.8 is predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant as indicated by the anticipated low levels of associated risk (ICCDP and ICLERP) as shown in Table 1 of Section 3.1.1 in the Safety Evaluation. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the three standards of 1 O CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff has made a final determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved for the proposed amendments and that the amendments should be issued as allowed by the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.91.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change the requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or change the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (80 FR 11478). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

8.0 REFERENCES

1.

TSTF-427, Revision 2, "Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System OPERABILITY," May 3, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061240055).

2.

NEI 04-08, "Allowance for Non-Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System OPERABILITY (TSTF-427) Industry Implementation Guidance," March 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061220426)

3.

Regulatory Guide 1.17 4, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," USNRC, July 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003740133)

4.

Regulatory Guide 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," August 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003740176)

5.

NUREG/CR-5750, "Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, 1987-1995,"

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, February 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070580080)

6.

NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, Section 11 "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," April 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101020415).

7.

Regulatory Guide 1.160, Revision 3, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," May 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113610098)

Principal Contributor: C. Tilton, NRR Date: Apri 1 6, 2015

ML15076A226 OFFICE NRR/LPL3-1/PM NRR/LPL3-1/LA NAME ADietrich MHenderson DATE 03/17/2015 03/24/2015 Sincerely, IRA!

Allison Dietrich, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 111-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

• via memo DSS/STSB/BC NRR/LPL3-1/BC NRR/LPL3-1/PM RElliott*

DPelton ADietrich 03/17/2015 04/06/2015 04/06/2015