ML14181A586
| ML14181A586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1994 |
| From: | Crlenjak R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hinnant C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A587 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9409070142 | |
| Download: ML14181A586 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1994021
Text
PRIORITY 2
(NUDOCS OFFSITE FACILIT)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9409070142
DOC.DATE: 94/08/31 NOTARIZED: NO
DOCKET #
O!ACIL:50-261 H.B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power & Light C
05000261
AUTH.NAME
AUTHOR AFFILIATION
CRLENJAK,R.V.
Region 2 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
HINNANT,C.S.
Carolina Power & Light Co.
P
SUBJECT: Forwards insp rept 50-261/94-21 on 940815-19 & notice of
violation.Activities appear to be in violation of NRC
R
requirements.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR
ENCL /SIZE:
+
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response
C
NOTES:
RECIPIENT
COPIES
RECIPIENT
COPIES
R
ID CODE/NAME
LTTR ENCL
ID CODE/NAME
LTTR ENCL
PD2-1 PD
1
1
MOZAFARI,B
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1
INTERNAL: AEOD/DEIB
1
1
AEOD/SPD/RAB
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AEOD/SPD/RRAB
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AEOD/TTC
1
1
DEDRO
1
1
NRR/DORS/OEAB
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NRR/DRCH/HHFB
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NRR/PMAS/IRCB-E
1
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NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
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OE-D.IR
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OGC/HDS3
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R EG FI.E
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RES/HFB
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FILE
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ERNAL: EG&G/BRYCE,J.H.
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NOAC
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NRC PDR
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E
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL
DESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 504-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM
DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR
19
ENCL
19
August 31, 1994
Docket No. 50-261
License No. DPR-23
Carolina Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. C. S. Hinnant
Vice President
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Unit 2
P. 0. Box 790
Hartsville, SC 29550-0790
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-261/94-21)
This refers to the inspection conducted by B. Crowley of this office on
August 15-19, 1994.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized
for your Robinson facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings
were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed
report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within
these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures
and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of
activities in progress.
Based on the results of this inspection, certain of your activities appeared
to be in violation of NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Notice of
Violation (Notice).
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your
response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this
Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future
inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is
necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of
this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
9409070142 940831
PDR ADOCK 05000261
0
A weakness was identified relative to documentation of corrective actions for
previously identified violations.
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Affairs
D. Dyxterhouse, Manager Civil Engineering - Engineering Support Services
S. Farmer, Manager Engineering Testing - Engineering Support Services
T. Freeman, Flow Accelerated Corrosion Coordinator
- D. Gardner, Project Engineer - Engineering Testing
C. Griffin, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Department
- C. Hinnant,.Vice President - Robinson Nuclear Project
- K. Jury, Manager -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- R. Krich, Manager -
Regulatory Affairs
J. Little, RCS System Engineer
- M. Pearson, Robinson - Plant Manager
- J. Sanders, Plant Welding Engineer
- D. Weber, Technical Support - Senior Inservice Inspection Specialist
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, QA/QC personnel, craft personnel, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Employees
- C. Ogle, Resident Inspector
- W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Inservice Inspection (ISI)
See NRC Inspection Report 50-261/93-20 for documentation of a previous
inspection in this area.
The inspector reviewed documents and records, as indicated below, to
determine whether ISI was being conducted in accordance with applicable
procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitments.
The
applicable code for ISI is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code,Section XI, 1986 Edition,
except that the extent of examination for pipe welds, category B-J, is
the 1974 Edition, Summer 1975.
The third 10-Year interval started February 19, 1992, and ends
February 19, 2002. The plant is currently in the last cycle of the first
period of the third interval.
2
The third 10-Year interval program was submitted in August, 1991, with
additional information provided by letters dated February 13, 1992, and
June 18, 1992.
NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on
October 19, 1992.
a.
ISI Program and Procedure Review (73051 and 73052)
The inspector discussed plans for the next outage (Refueling Outage
16.- Spring of 1995) ISI inspections with the site ISI Specialist.
Currently the planned work scope is small since the next outage will
be the last outage of the first period and most of the period
inspections have been completed. The licensee has submitted a
Relief Request to delay the scheduled period one reactor vessel (RV)
inspections until the third period of the interval.
This request is
to move all remaining RV inspections to the third period resulting a
cost savings to the licensee. However, the change will not result
in more than a ten-year time span between inspections for any weld.
If this relief is granted, the total scope of ISI inspections for
refueling outage 16 will be less than 10 items.
In addition to review of the scope of ISI for the next outage, the
inspector reviewed the following documents relative to requirements
for ASME Section XI Repairs and Replacements (R&R).
-
CP&L PLP-025, Revision 6, In-Service Inspection Program
-
CP&L TMM-015, Revision 16, Inservice Inspection Repair .and
Replacement Program
-
CP&L PLP-026, Revision 19, Corrective Action Management
-
CP&L MOD-001, Revision 18, Engineering Evaluations
-
CP&L MOD-010, Revision 6, Design Verification and Technical
Review
-
CP&L MMM-003, Revision 40, Maintenance Work Requests
The inspector noted that, for replacements, procedure TMM-15
requires a "Suitability Evaluation" of the replacement in accordance
with paragraph IWA-7000 of ASME Section XI.
For the replacement
package reviewed in paragraph b. below, no specific document
identified as a "Suitability Evaluation" was identified. The
inspector also noted that the procedures that implement repair and,
replacement activities, i.e., MR, modifications, and corrective
action procedures, do not clearly require "Suitability Evaluations".
Further discussions with licensee personnel revealed the following:
-
For replacements involving modifications/design changes
(anything other than "like for like" replacements), an
engineering evaluation is required. This evaluation, although
3
not labeled "Suitability Evaluation", is intended to meet the
requirement for a "Suitability Evaluation".
The licensee indicated that for "like for like" replacements,
their MR packages and the reviews involved with development of
the MR are considered to be the "Suitability Evaluation."
However, the ASME Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII)
Audit HSP 94-01, dated July 19, 1994, identified a deficiency
for not having specific "Suitability Evaluations."
As a result
of this ANII audit, the licensee is evaluating their procedures
to determine the need for clarifying exact requirements for
documenting "Suitability Evaluations."
The clarifications resulting from resolution of the ANII concerns
will be reviewed during future inspections of ISI.
This matter is
identified as Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 261/94-21-01, ASME
Section XI Suitability Evaluations for Replacements.
b.
Inservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation (73755)
In addition to review of the above procedures for R&R, the inspector
reviewed the following completed Maintenance Request (MR) packages
relative to R&R documentation of the work activities. The records
were reviewed to determine if R&Rs were being performed in
accordance with Code requirements and applicable procedures.
-
WR 94-ALIE3 -
Repair leak on leak in "C" charging pump suction
stabilizer socolet weld
-
WR 93-AHWL1 - Replace safety injection check valve SI-873B
-
WR 93-AJMC1 -
Repair liquid penetrant (PT) indication in
chemical volume and control system elbow (elbow was cut out of
system, repaired and reinstalled)
-
WR 93-AQGU1 -
Repair broken tacks on spring can SI-H4
See paragraph 3.b below for documentation of review of weld records
associated with the above repairs and replacements.
Results
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. One
IFI was identifed to review clarifications made to procedures relative to
"suitability evaluations" for ASME Section XI replacements.
3. Nuclear Welding (55050)
The inspector observed welding and reviewed welding records as indicated
below to determine if welding was being performed in accordance with
regulatory requirements, applicable codes and licensee procedures. The
4
applicable code for safety related pipe welding is the ASME Code For
Pressure Piping Power Piping ANSI/ASME B31.1, 1986 Edition.
a. Observation of Welding
Since no safety related work was in progress and Balance of Plant
(BOP) piping is welded to the same program as safety related piping,
the inspector observed in-process welding on BOP welds 1, 2 and 3 on
MR 94-ACTW1 to evaluate in-process welding. Welds 2 and 3 were in
the final weld condition and the root pass was being welded on weld
1. Welder knowledge and ability, weld appearance, use of
appropriate welding procedure, weld material control, and general
compliance with requirements were evaluated. In addition, welder
qualification and welding material certification records were
reviewed as indicated below.
b. Weld Records
The inspector reviewed the following Weld Data Reports/Repair Weld
Data Reports:
-
WR 94-ALIE3 - Welds WMR1 and WMR2
-
WR 93-AHWL1 - Welds W-1 and W-2
-
WR 93-AJMC1 - Welds W12, W13, and base metal repair
-
WR 93-AQGUI -
Repair broken tacks on spring can SI-H4
During review of these records, the inspector noted that for welds
W12 and W13 on WR 93-AJMC1, the final visual (VT) hold point had not
been signed off by QC.
The records had been accepted and were in
the records vault.
All other inspections, including the final PT
and hydrostatic testing had been signed off by QC.
The QC inspector
involved in inspecting the weld stated that he remembered VT
inspecting the welds and just failed to document the inspection.
Licensee procedure NW-07, Revision 4, Weld Data Reports, Preparation
and Use, requires that, "QC inspectors.... shall sign off their
respective designated hold points........ This failure to follow
procedures for sign off of hold points is identified as Violation
261/94-21-02, Failure to Sign off VT Hold Points.
c. Welder Qualification Records
The inspector reviewed welder qualification records for the below
listed welders who welded on the welds identified in paragraphs a.
and b. above.
5
Welder Symbol
R-1
HF
H-40
H-18
M-39
d.
Welding Material Control
The inspector reviewed weld material certification records,
including receiving inspection records, for the below listed welding
materials used in welding the welds listed in paragraphs a. and b.
above.
Material Type and Size
Heat/Lot Number
1/8" ER316L
DT6011
1/8" ER70S-2
L02015
3/32" ER308L
CT6028
In addition, the inspector observed welding material control
practices, including material storage and segregation, cleanliness,
identification, oven temperature controls (coated electrodes), and
issue controls at the rod issue stations located in the 0&M Building
and the Radiation Control Area (RCA).
e. Welding Procedure Specifications (WPSs)
The inspector reviewed the below listed WPSs, including supporting
Welding Procedure Qualification Records (PQRs), which were used to
make the welds listed in paragraphs a. and b. above. The WPSs and
PQRs were compared with ASME Section IX requirements to determine if
Code requirements were met.
Welding Procedure Specifications
WPS 08 2 01
WPS 01 2 01
f. Welding Audits
The inspector reviewed the following Nuclear Assessment Department
(NAD) assessments of the licensee welding program:
NAD Report 92-366 dated July 24, 1992
NAD Report 93-101 dated March 19, 1993
NAD Report 93-277 dated April 29, 1993
6
NAD Report 93-585 dated November 27, 1993
The 93-101 Report identified significant problems with the Robinson
welding program. The report identified five issues and 3 general
areas of weakness. The major issues were related to welder
qualification, weld material control, and self assessments. Also,
problems were identified with.utilization of the Plant Welding
Engineer and the diversification of his responsibilities.
The 93-985 Report assessed improvements made in response to the 93
101 assessment and concluded that corrective actions had been taken
for the issues and weaknesses identified.
Results
No violations, except as noted in paragraph b.., or deviations were
identified. Based on the inspector's evaluation (including review of
licensee assessments) performed during the current inspection, the
inspector concluded that significant improvements had been made in the
welding program, particularly in the areas of welder qualification
controls and welding material controls. Also, the inspector concluded
that the Plant Welding Engineer was intimately involved in all aspects of
the welding program and instrumental in improving the program.
4. Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Program (49001)
See NRC Inspection Report 50-261/93-20 documentation of a previous
inspection in this area.
During the 93-20 inspection, the inspector noted significant improvements
in the FAC program. However, some areas where improvements were needed
were identified. During the current inspection, the inspector reviewed
changes made to the program since the 93-20 report and reviewed the
report for inspections performed during refueling outage 15.
The areas for improvement identified in report 93-20 were: (1) more
formal details needed on development, issue, control, and implementation
of outage plan; (2) modification procedures needed to provide for FAC
Coordinator review and input to modification and change documents for
systems susceptible; (3) interface procedure for Corporate and Sites
needed to be issued; and (4) corrective actions for the weaknesses
identified in the NAD Assessment needed to be completed.
The inspector discussed program improvements with the FAC Coordinator and
reviewed the following procedures, which contained most of the program
improvements:
-
NED Design Guide DG-VII.5, Revision 1, Corporate Program for Flow
Accelerated Corrosion
-
Draft System Elimination Documentation
7
-
PLP-051,, Revision 1, Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) monitoring
Program
Technical Support Guideline TSG-210, Revision 2, FAC Program
Implementation
-
MOD-018, Revision 11, Temporary Modifications
-
AP-022, Revision 6,, Document Change Procedure
-
PLP-064, Revision 1, Engineering Services.Request
Essentially all of the improvements had been completed. Upgrading the
Isometric Drawings to plant controlled drawings was still in process.
The results from refueling outage inspections were documented in report
RO-15 Inspection Report, dated July 15, 1994. The following is a summary
of the inspection results:
-
Approximately 400 components were inspected.
-
Ninety (90) components were either below 87.5% of nominal wall or
were predicted to go below 87.5% during cycle 16.
These received
engineering evaluations to ensure there was sufficient remaining
wall thickness through the next cycle.
Forty-five (45) of the 90
are predicted to run at least 6 cycles before going below minimum
wall.
Four (4) are scheduled to be replaced and 10 will be re
inspected in refueling outage 16.
The remaining 21 must be
inspected again within 2-3 cycles of operation.
-
Five (5) components were replaced due to predicted wear going below
minimum wall during cycle 16.
-
One (1) component had to be replaced because of being below minimum
wall.
-
The inspection results were used to perform the EPRI CHECMATE Pass 2
analysis.
Results
No violations or deviations were identified. The FAC program continues
to improve and is considered to be a strength. RO-15 Inspection Report,
dated July 15, 1994, is an excellent presentation of FAC inspection
results for the last outage. The report concisely presents the findings
of the inspection and provides predictions for future pipe wear and the
need for future inspections and pipe replacements.
5. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed) VIO 261/90-24-01, Welds not Identified on Inservice
Inspection Isometric Sketches
8
See NRC Inspection Report 261/93-20 for documentation of a previous
inspection of thi.s item.
This item concerned missing welds on ISI Isometric sketches used to
identify configuration, weld location and weld population in the ISI
program. The licensee's letter of response, dated December 20,
1990, indicated that corrective actions will include verification of
the accuracy of the Isometric Drawings by physical walkdown and
other appropriate means and drawing revisions as necessary. This
action is to be completed by the end of the first period of the
third 10-Year interval or June 1995. The inspector discussed the
status of this action with the Site Senior ISI Specialist and
engineering personnel responsible for updating the drawings.
The
following summarizes the status of the corrective actions and the
inspector's review:
-
A total of 161 drawings required review/walkdown and
correction. The process included review of drawing changes,
walkdowns as necessary, marking up existing drawings to include
changes and additional updated information to make the drawing
more usable, and finally correction and issue of updated
drawings. As of July 11, 1994, 70 drawings had been corrected
and were in the vault. Another 70 had received technical
checks and reviews and were being corrected and issued.
The
remaining 21 were being technically reviewed.
All drawings
should be approved and in the vault by November 1, 1994.
-
In addition to discussion of the status and method of the
update process with the responsible engineer, the inspector
reviewed the following:
Open Adverse Condition Report (ACR)92-275 - The ACR documents
the problem and corrective actions, and is open pending
completion of the project.
PCN: 91-205/00, which budgets money for the project -
Hours
are budgeted into 1995 to ensure completion of the project.
Marked-up drawings, check sheets, and corrected drawings for
the following drawing numbers: HBR2-10618, sheets 16, 18, 20,
36, and 54.
This item is closed based on the fact that the majority of the
corrective action work has been done and budget and controls are in
place to finish correcting the drawings ahead of schedule.
b.
(Closed) VIO 261/93-20-01, Failure to Follow Procedures for
Calibration and Certification of ET Equipment
This violation involved the use of Eddy Current (ET) test equipment
without current calibration/certification documentation. The
licensee's letter of response dated November 26, 1993, was reviewed
9
by the regional staff and found to be acceptable. The violation was
attributed to the lack of CP&L oversight of contractor activities
and the lack of procedure sign-off or other means to document that
equipment calibration had been achieved. Corrective actions
included:
-
Current calibration/certification documentation was obtained
for equipment with expired documentation. For equipment that
was not calibrated/certified, the equipment was replaced and
testing completed with unqualified equipment was repeated with
the replacement equipment.
-
The contractor (ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB)) performed an onsite
audit of personnel qualifications and equipment calibration for
all ABB work.
-
ACR Report 93-177 was issued to document the violation and
corrective actions.
-
An Engineering Surveillance Test (EST) procedure will be
developed to serve as the governing document for Steam
Generator Eddy Current Program.
-
Plant procedure AP-004, Procedure Control, was revised to
ensure management oversight is applied to special procedures
governing onsite vendor activities. Training was accomplished
to ensure personnel are aware of this change.
The inspector performed the following reviews to verify the above
corrective actions:
-
ABB Field Quality Operations Audit OM93QA-082, Revision 1,
dated October 18, 1993, was reviewed.
-
ACR 93-177 was reviewed. The ACR is still open pending issue
of the EST for the Steam Generator Eddy Current Program.
-
Revision 38 to procedure AP-004 was reviewed. This change
requires vendor procedures to be issued as special site
procedures. Documentation of training for this procedure
change was also reviewed.
Based on the above corrective actions, this item is closed.
Although the EST has not been issued, the issue of the procedure is
identified as outstanding item for closure of the ACR and is
scheduled before the next refueling outage. The corrective actions
are identified as commitment # 93-0258.
10
c.
(Open) VIO 261/93-25-01, Missing Welds at Supports FW-6B-73 and FW
This violation involved missing welds on 2 pipe supports. The
licensee's letter of response, dated December 16, 1993, as
supplemented by letter dated January 27, 1994 was reviewed by the
regional staff and found to be acceptable. The cause of the
violation was attributed to oversight by the installing organization
and the QC inspector and the fact that at the time of the
modification, all welds on the complex structure (20 welds) was
documented with one inspection signature required. The corrective
actions included:
-
ACR Report 93-255 was issued to document the violation and
corrective actions.
-
Since the supports in question were modified, changes were made
to the inspection requirements to specifically identify and
document each weld on a structure.
-
For the supports involved, a Design Change Backup Form was
completed for each calculation to document the acceptability of
the missing welds.
-
Based on the uniqueness and complexity of the supports in
question, and review of other supports, CP&L concluded that the
problem was an isolated case and no further reviews were
necessary. They further considered that the documentation
process change noted above was sufficient to preclude future
similar violations.
The inspector performed the following reviews to verify the above
corrective actions:
-
ACR 93-255 was reviewed.
-
Changes to the documentation process requiring documentation of
each individual weld were reviewed. In addition, an example
(Package for Modification 1105, Support SS-2132) of the newer
process, requiring identification and documentation of each
individual weld, was reviewed.
-
Design Change Backup Forms for calculations RNP-C/SPPT-1287,
1288, and 1289 were reviewed.
-
As noted above, the licensee response indicated that other
supports were reviewed as a basis for determining this problem
was isolated. When questioned by the inspector about
documentation for the review of other supports, the licensee
stated that they did not mean that other supports were
inspected, but that other reviews had not identified problems
of missing welds, and review of other support designs did not
identify other supports with the unique and complex design of
those with the missing welds. After further discussions after
the close of the inspection, the licensee decided to perform
additional hardware inspections to verify their previous
reviews were correct and that the condition was isolated as
their review indicated.
The lack of documentation of the reviews identified in the
letter of response is considered to be a weakness in the
corrective action program.
This item remains open pending review of results from the licensee's
additional hardware inspections.
d.
(Closed) VIO 261/93-25-02, Material Purchase Order Differences
Between the Field Installation and Documents for Support FW-7-33C
This violation involved a problem with the Purchase Order number
(primary identification for traceability) on a.pipe clamp being
different from that recorded in the installation documentation
signed by the installer and QC.
The licensee's letter of response,
dated December 16, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated January 27,
1994, was reviewed by the regional staff and found to be acceptable.
The cause of the violation was attributed to inadvertently removing
and switching identification tags during painting the clamps. As a
result, a clamp was stencilled incorrectly and installed on the
wrong support.
The corrective actions included:
-
ACR 93-230 was issued to document investigation of the cause of
the problem and the corrective actions.
-
Purchase order numbers were corrected on the clamps and the
clamps moved to their correct location.
-
Other supports were inspected and no discrepancies.were noted.
-
Painting practices were revised to ensure proper traceability
of parts is maintained when disassembly is required.
The inspector performed the following reviews to verify the above
corrective actions:
-
ACR 93-230 and the enclosed investigation report was reviewed.
-
Procedure CM-613, Revision 7, which adds requirements for
maintaining traceability if parts are disassembled for
painting, was reviewed.
-
The letter of response stated that other supports were
inspected and no discrepancies were noted. When questioned
about documentation for the inspection of other supports, the
licensee stated that the specific supports inspected were not
12
documented. The only documentation -is
the investigation report
included in the ACR, which states that, "16 additional strut
supports were inspected and no discrepancies were found."
Further discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the
16 other supports inspected were similar to those identified in
the violation and were inspected during the NRC inspection at
the time of the violation.
The incomplete documentation of additional supports inspected is
another example of the weakness in the corrective action program
identified in paragraph c. above.
Based on the above review, the corrective actions were considered
adequate and this item is closed.
6.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 19, 1994, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
(Open) IFI 261/94-21-01, ASME Section XI Suitability Evaluations for
Replacements - Paragraph 2.a
(Open) VIO 261/94-21-02, Failure to Sign off VT Hold Points - Paragraph
3.b
(Closed) VIO 261/90-24-01, Welds not Identified on Inservice Inspection
Isometric Sketches - Paragraph 5.a
(Closed) VIO 261/93-20-01, Failure to Follow Procedures for Calibration
and Certification of ET Equipment - Paragraph 5.b
(Open) VIO 261/93-25-01, Missing Welds at Supports FW-6B-73 and FW-6C-109
-
Paragraph 5.c
(Closed) VIO 261/93-25-02, Material Purchase Order Differences Between
the Field Installation and Documents for Support FW-7-33C - Paragraph 5.d
7. Acronyms
ASEA Brown Boveri
ACR
Adverse Condition Report
ANII
Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Balance of Plant
Carolina Power and Light Company
Electric Power Research Institute
Eddy Current Examination
13
EST
Engineering Surveillance Test Procedure
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
Inservice Inspection
NAD
Nuclear Assessment Department
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Maintenance Request
PLP
Plant Procedure
Procedure Qualification Record
Liquid Penetrant Examination
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Radiation Control Area
RII
NRC Region II
R&R
Repair and Replacement
RV
Reactor Vessel
Safety Evaluation Report
Visual Examination
Violation
WPS
Welding Procedure Specification
Carolina Power & Light Co.
2
August 31, 1994
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject
to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
Original signed by
M. B. Shymlock/for
R. V. Crlenjak, Chief
Engineering Branch,
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosures:
1. NRC Inspection Report
cc w/encls:
M. P. Pearson
Plant Manager
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
P. 0. Box 790
Hartsville, SC
29550
H. W. Habermeyer, Jr.
Vice President
Nuclear Services Department
Carolina Power & Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
-
Mail 0HS7
Raleigh, NC
27602
R. Krich, Manager
Regulatory Compliance
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
P. 0. Box 790
Hartsville, SC 29550
Max Batavia, Chief
Bureau of Radiological Health
Dept. of Health and Environmental
Control
2600 Bull Street
Columbia, SC 29201
(cc w/encls cont'd - See page 3)
Carolina Power & Light Co.
3
(cc w/encls cont'd)
Dayne H. Brown, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environmental
Commerce & Natural Resources
P. 0. Box 27687
Raleigh, NC
27611-7687
H. Ray Starling
Manager -
Legal Department
Carolina Power and Light Co.
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC
27602
Karen E. Long
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
P. 0. Box 629
Raleigh, NC
27602
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff - NCUC
P. 0. Box 29520
. Raleigh, NC 27626-0520
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. 0. Box 11649
Columbia, SC
29211
Hartsville Memorial Library
147 W. College
Hartsville, SC
29550
Carolina Power & Light Co.
4
August 31, 1994
bcc w/encl:
H. Christensen, RII
B. Mozafari, NRR
G. A. Hallstrom, RII
Document Control Desk
NRC Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 5, Box 413
Hartsville, SC
29550
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BCrowtey%4
HChristen
PDR?
DATE
LO8/2 /94
8/
/94
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/94
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