ML14176A603
| ML14176A603 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1981 |
| From: | Julian C, Skolds J, Weise S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A597 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-81-08, 50-261-81-8, NUDOCS 8105080437 | |
| Download: ML14176A603 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1981008
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REQION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report No.
50-261/81-08
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, NC
27602
Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Docket No. 50-261
License No. DPR-23
Inspection at Robinson site near Hartsville, South Carolina
Inspectors:
C
/
.
S. Weise(Resident Ins ector, Robinson
Date Signed
J. Skold!.. Resident In
ector, V. C. Summer
Date Signed
Approved by:__
6
/
C. Julia6J Acting Section Chief, Division of
5ate Signed
Resident and Reactor Project Inspection
SUMMARY
Inspection on February 21 - March 10, 1981
Areas Inspected
This routine announced inspection involved 128 resident inspector-hours on site
in the areas of technical specification compliance,
reportable occurrences,
housekeeping, operations performance, quality assurance practices, maintenance
activities, site security procedures,
radiation control activities, licensee
action on previous inspection findings, event followup,
IE Bulletin followup,
review of
IE Circulars
and
Notices,
surveillance activities, review of
outstanding items, and TMI Action Plan Category A requirements.
Results
Of the fifteen areas inspected,
no items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified in thirteen areas; one violation was found in one area (failure to
control modification activities, paragraph 5.)
and one deviation was found in one
area (Failure to keep relief valve position monitor installed as committed,
paragraph 13.d).
81050.80q(3
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. B. Starkey, Plant Manager
- H. S. Zimmerman, Manager Technical and Administration
- M. Page, Project Engineer
W. Flanagan, Project Engineer
J. Curley, Engineering Supervisor
F. Lowery, Operations Supervisor Unit 2
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members,
and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 16,
1981 with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee representatives.
acknowledged their understanding of the findings.
W
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved item 79-24-01-Monitoring teams duties/responsibilities.
This item dealt with the qualifications of the personnel
performing
monitoring duties during an emergency drill.
The plan for the emergency
drill scheduled for March 11-12,
1981 states that evaluators will be
qualified personnel and not trainees as was allowed in previous drills.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved item 80-19-03-Technical Specification discrepancy. This
item documented that Technical Specifications covering Diesel Generator
Testing were not the same as standard technical specifications.
The com
parison was done at IE Headquarters request. Any changes will be originated
from IE Headquarters, therefore this item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved item 80-19-02-Failure of PCV-1716 to close. This item
concerned the failure of PCV-1716 during the performance of PT-2.1.
Licensee Event Report 80-18 reported this occurrence. Adequate corrective
action was taken to close out LER 80-18. The licensee could not determine
when the override switch was placed on override, and therefore must assume
it was placed in override during plant operations. However, the plant was
in cold shutdown
when the condition was discovered and
no further
operational action was required.
This item is closed.
2
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or
deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are
discussed in paragraph 8.b.
5.
Event Followup
On January 29,
1981,
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 experienced a transient which
resulted in a containment isolation signal.
When verifying that all
required containment isolation valves had shut, the operators discovered
that Fire Suppression water containment isolation valve (FP-248) had failed
to close. Containment isolation was maintained by the redundant isolation
valve FP-249,
and FP-248 was closed manually.
Investigation into this
failure determined that the valve motor breaker had tripped on the isolation
signal due to improper setting of the magnetic overload trip. This improper
trip setting was common to all four of the Fire Suppression water system
containment isolation valve motor breakers, although only one valve failed
to operate. Further investigation revealed that, of three separate breaker
replacements done on each valve motor circuit to satisfy modification #445,
the final replacement was done using the previous breaker installation
procedure and no post-modification testing was conducted. Since the second
set of breakers used a thermal overload trip and the present breakers use
magnetic overloads, use of the previous procedure was improper. Failure to
perform post-modification testing on the final breaker installation is not
in accordance with plant procedures. This failure to control modification
activities constitutes a violation (50-261/81-08-01).
This event was
reported by Licensee Event Report (LER)
81-06 and bears marked similarity to
the improper overcurrent trip setting on the MCC-5 transfer switch reported
in LER 80-04. Since the corrective action to prevent further recurrence in
LER's 80-04 and 81-06 are essentially the same,
the inspector feels that
additional action by the licensee is needed to adequately prevent future
recurrence.
6.
Plant Operations Review
The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift
logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and
records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs,
auxiliary logs, operating orders, standby orders, jumper logs and equipment
tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and
demeanor during plant tours. During abnormal events, operator performance
and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted
random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that
operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved
licensee procedures. The inspector had no further comments.
3
7.
Plant Tour
The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection
interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,
.equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant
conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspector
determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established,
excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible material
was disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the
existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic
restraint abnormal settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment
clearance tags and component status, adequacy of firefighting equipment, and
instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The
inspector noted no violations or deviations.
8.
Technical Specification Compliance
During this reporting interval,
the inspector verified compliance with
selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and reviewed results of
selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by
direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch
positions,
and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's
compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed
as they
happened.
Findings were acceptable except as noted below:
a. A discrepancy was noted in a comparison of Technical Specifications and
plant procedures. Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.a requires that at.
least 2505 gallons (about
35% tank level) of 30% sodium hydroxide
solution be maintained in the spray additive tanks.
Plant procedure
PLS-7 states that the spray additive tank low level alarm is 33% + 1%.
After researching this item, the licensee commmitted to revise the low
alarm setpoint by April 30,
1981.
This is an open item (50-261/
81-08-02).
b. While monitoring the daily surveillance to measure safety-related heat
tracing currents, the inspector identified the following conditions:
(1) All primary and secondary safety-related heat tracing thermostatic
control junction boxes did not have their covers fastened in
place. Some contained considerable debris and boric acid. These
covers were apparently designed to protect the heat tracing
circuitry from adverse environmental conditions, as the cover data
plate emphasizes that the cover screws be kept tightly fastened.
The inspector questioned the practice of leaving these covers
open. The inspector also noted the cover fasteners were time
consuming to operate and would result in increased radiation
exposure to technicians performing the surveillance because of
their locations. The licensee committed to evaluate the need for
cover plates and commented that some design changes were being
considered from an ALARA standpoint.
This is an Unresolved item
(50-261/81.-08-03.)
4
(2) The protective armor cable for safety-related heat tracing wiring
to the thermostatic control junction boxes was broken on at least
six boxes.
(3) In the Boron Injection Tank room, the motor wiring conduit for
safety injection valve SIS-870 B for cold leg injection was not
fastened to its supports and the flexible protective cable to the
motor was broken.
The licensee committed to correct the discrepancies noted in items 2 and 3
above and also the debris and boric acid in and around the thermostatic
control junction boxes
by May 31,
1981..
This item is open (50-261/
81-08-04).
The inspector verified by observation and interview during the reporting
interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organi
zation of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates,
doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and
badging was proper, that search practices were appropriate,
and that
escorting and communications procedures were followed.
10.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup
The inspector reviewed the following LER's to verify that the report details
met license requirements,
identified- the cause of the event, described
appropriate corrective actions, adequately assessed the event, and addressed
any generic implications. Corrective action and appropriate licensee review
of the below events was verified. The inspector had no further comments.
LER
EVENT
80-04
MCC-5 Transfer Switch Trip
80-05
CCW-626 Staking Problem
80-09
B Steam Generator Tube Leakage
80-11
Source Range Channels De-energized
80-18
Failure of PCV-1716 to Close
80-22
A and B Steam Generator Tube Leaks
80-23
Improper Charcoal Refill for Control Room Ventilation
80-26
Spray Additive Tank Isolated
78-03
Primary Pressure Exceeding Technical Specification
Limit
78-16
BIT Boron Concentration out of Specification
11.
Followup of IE Bulletins
For the following Bulletins, the inspector verified that the response was
timely, included the required information, contained adequate commitments
5
and that corrective action as described in the written responses was
completed.
a.
IEB 81-01 Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this Bulletin dated
February .18,
1981.
No mechanical
are in use at H. B.
Robinson.
This item is closed.
b.
IEB 80-23 Valcor Solenoid Failures
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this Bulletin dated
December 8, 1980.
No such parts or solenoids are in use at H. B.
Robinson.
This item is closed.
12.
Review of IE Circulars and Notices (IEC's and IEN's)
The inspector verified that IE Circulars and Notices had been received
onsite and reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel.
Selected applicable IE
Circulars and Notices were discussed with licensee personnel to ascertain
the licensee's actions on these items. The inspector also verified that IE
Circulars and Notices were reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee in
accordance with facility administrative policy.
Licensee action on the
following IE Circulars and Notices were reviewed by the inspector and are
closed.
IE Circulars
IE Notices
80-03.
79-17
79-34
79-31
79-35
79-32
80-06
79-33
13.
TMI Action Plan Category A Items
a.
TAP No.
I.C.3,
NUREG 0578, Section 2.2.1.a Shift Supervisor Respons
ibilities. The inspector reviewed plant Administrative Instructions
and corporate directives to verify that the four elements of this task
have been implemented.
No violations or deviations were observed in
this area.
b. TAP No. 11.6.1., NUREG 0578, Section 2.1.1. Natural Circulation Power
Supplies. The inspector verified that the components were powered and
qualified as required by this item.
c. TAP No. II.E.4.2, NUREG 0578, Section 2.1.4. Containment Isolation
Dependability.
The inspector reviewed the manually operated
non
essential containment isolation valves and found that the licensee has
administratively locked all such valves shut. Modifications have been
completed which ensure that isolation valves associated with the below
systems remain closed on resetting the containment isolation signal:
6
1) Steam generator blowdown and sample lines
2)
Instrument air
3)
Containment atmosphere monitor lines
No violations or deviations were observed in this area.
d.
TAP No. II.D.3, NUREG 0578,
Section 2.1.3 Valve Position Indication,
Relief and SafetyValves
The control
room instruments for the safety relief valve vibration
monitors for position indication were inspected.
These monitors are
installed on the valve flanges. The-inspection revealed the following
concerns:
1) One safety relief valve (V-551A) does not have a vibration monitor
accelerometer. The accelerometer was lost during the fall of 1980
refueling outage and a replacement has not been received.
2) All three vibration monitor channels (one for each valve) have
continuous low level alarms. The low level alarm is designed to
help verify system operability, as a circuit failure should
normally result in a low level alarm due to a lower than normal
ambient noise level. The continuous alarm condition is a design
problem,
in that, the background noise at the monitors is lower
than
the
system
bandpass filters were
designed for.
An
engineering change is being developed by the system vendor.
No
compensatory measures are being taken to verify system operability
while the low level alarms are not functional.'
3) There is no audible annunicator associated with the low level
alarms, and no procedure exists for response to the low level
alarm condition.
4) The proposed Technical Specifications for surveillance of the
vibration monitors requires system testing every refueling outage.
The inspector is concerned that this infrequent testing may be
inadequate.
This is open item (50-261/81-08-05.)
5) Safety grade seismic and environmental qualification of this
system has not been completed by the vendor. Qualification of the
system is expected by the third quarter of 1981.
This was
documented in CP&L's letter to the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation of December 10, 1980.
The system deficiencies noted in items. 1 and 2 above are an item of
deviation (50-261/81-08-06).
The inspector also requested that the
licensee commit to informing the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
by letter of the existence of the deficiencies noted in items 1 and 2
above, their proposed corrective action, and an anticipated schedule.
The licensee postponed this commitment pending Commission clarification
of reporting requirements for occurring deficiencies in TMI Action Plan
7
required equipment for which Technical Specifications have not -been
issued.
14.
Review of Outstanding Items
a.
(Open)
79-03-02
Wrong-valve
numbers
on Containment
Spray Q-list
drawing. This item documented that four valves had incorrect numbers
on the Q-list drawing.
The controlled drawings have been corrected,
however, in the two years since this minor item was brought to the
licensee's attention, no further generic corrective action has been
taken.
b.
(Closed) 79-07-02-Qualifications for personnel performing verification
mapping following fuel loading. This item dealt with an inspector's
concerns about who would be allowed to perform core verification and
about the desirability of making a videotape.
FT-
9.11 has been
revised to indicate that personnel from Engineering and QA will perform
and review the verification.
The procedure also indicates that a
videotape is highly desirable,
though not required.
This item is
closed.
c.
(Closed)
80-19-01-Revision to PT 2.1.
Previously,
PT 2.1 did not
specifically document that the SI pumps started during the test.
2.1 has been revised to document SI pump starting times. This item is
closed.
d.
(Closed) 79-27-03-X-Y Potter. Previously, the X-Y plotter connection
to the Tavg signal from the process computer loaded down the circuit
causing an.error in the plotted Tavg value. Appendix E to CPL-R-6.0,
Refueling Startup Procedures, has been changed to eliminate this error.
This item is closed.
e.
(Open) 79-30-02-Current Procedure at Waste Evaporator Panel.
This item
dealt with the fact that there is no method in use to ensure that the
correct revision to procedures are used at local stations outside the
control room - specifically, the Waste Evaporator Panel.
Conversations
with plant personnel indicate that different methods have been tried,
but, none has
been totally successful.
The licensee intends to
establish a controlled set of procedures for the Waste Evaporator
Panel.
The licensee committed to implement this plan by April 30,
1981. This item will remain open pending future inspection after the
implementation date.
f.
(Closed) 81-03-01-Anticipated Transient Without Scram. The inspector
reviewed the licensee's changes to Abnormal Procedure-2 and Emergency
Instruction-14. The licensee's procedural actions resolve the original
concerns.
This item is closed.