ML14175A591
| ML14175A591 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  (DPR-023) |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1979 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14175A592 | List: |
| References | |
| DPR-23-A-038 NUDOCS 7907090217 | |
| Download: ML14175A591 (7) | |
Text
C.N, REQ(,
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-261 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 38 License No. DPR-23
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by Carolina Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated May 18, 1979, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
t 7 I
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- 2
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-23 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 3a are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date-of Issuance:
May 24, 1979
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 38 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-23 DOCKET NO. 50-261 Revise Appendix A as follows:
Remove the following pages and insert identically numbered revised pages:
Pages 3.5-2 3.5-4 3.5-7 3.5-10
Safety Inlection System Actuation Protection against a Loss-of-Coolant or Steam Break accident is brought about by automatic actuation of the Safety Injection System which pro vides emergency cooling and reduction of reactivity.
The Loss-of-Coolant Accident is characterized by depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System and rapid loss of reactor coolant to the contain ment.
The Engineered Safety Features have been designed to sense these effects of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident by detecting low pressurizer pressure and generates signals actuating the SIS active phase.
The SIS active phase is also actuated by a high containment pressure signal (Ri-Level) brought about by loss of high enthalpy coolant to the contaiment. This actua tion signal acts as a backup to the low pressurizer pressure signal actuation of the SIS and also adds diversity to protection against loss of coolant.
Signals are also provided to actuate the SIS upon sensing the effects, of a steam line break accident. Therefore, SIS actuation following a steam line break is designed to occur upon sensing high differential steam pressure between the steam header and steam generator line or upon sensing high steam line flow in coincidence vith low reactor coolant average temperature or low steam.line pressure.
The increase in the extraction of RCS heat following a steam line break results in reactor coolant temperature and pressure reduction. For this reason protection against a steam line break accident is also provided by low pressurizer pressure signals actuating safety injection.
?.otection is also provided for a steam line break in the containment by actuation of SIS upon sensing high containment pressure.
3.5-2 Amendment No. 38
Feedwater Line Isolation The feedwater lines are isolated upon actuation of the Safety Injection System in order to prevent excessive cooldown of the reactor coolant system. This mitigates the affect of an accident such as steam break which in itself causes excessive coolant temperature cooldown.
Feedwater line isolation also reduces the consequences of a steam line break inside the containment, by stopping the entry of feedwater.
Settine Limits
- a.
The Ki-Lavel containment pressure limit is set at about 10% of design containment pressure. tnitiation of Safe:7
'Injection protects against Loss-of-Coolanrt or steam line break(3 ) accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.
- b.
The Hi-Ri Level containment pressure limit is set at about 50% of design containment pressure.
Initiation-of Containment Spray and Steam Line Isolation protects against large Lose-of-Coolant( 2 ) or steam line break accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.
- c.
The pressurizer low pressure limit is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it.is sufficiently high to protect against a Loss-of-Coolant Accident as shown in the safety analysis.
3.5-4 Amendment No. 38
TAIL.E 3.5-1 ENGAIJEEMiED SAFEY FEATiltE SYSTEM INilTIATIOil INSTRUMENT SETTING LIITS NO.
FUNCTImAL UI1T CIANINEL ACTION SETTING LIttrTT 1
High Containment Pressure (111 Level)
Safety Inijectlon*'
5 pag 2
High Coitainnient Pressure (Il-Il Level)
- a.
Containment Spray**
25 plg
- b. Steam Line Isolation 3
Preusur izer Low Pretsure Safety In jectioa
>1700 poig 4
111gh Differential Pressure Safety Injection*
< 150 psi Between any Steam Line and the Steam I.Ine Header 5
Hilgh Steam Floi Ii 2/3
- a. Safety InjectionO
< 401 (at zero load)
Steam Lines*A*
of full steam flow b).
Steam Line Isolation
< 40% (at 20% load) of full steam flow
<110% (at zero load) of full steam flow Coluc Ident jL tI Low T or
>5410F T sqV vg LOW Steam L.1ric Pretsutre
>600 Pulig steam I lne prensure 00 Ajf galo otaitnie'tit I1solation; (I'Iaue A). feedwater l ine Isolation slnd starting of sill containment fans.
- Initiates also contalnmeast isolation(Phase 1I).
- AAInrIved from aneqivalent Al' measurement d.
TABLE. 3.5-1 INSTRIMENTATIOt OP ERAT I NG C()ND IToINs FOR ENG.FIIEIRED SAFETY FFATIIES 1
.2 3
HINTHIM OPERATOR ACTIONI HTNHIMM DEGREE IF CONDITIONS OF OPERABI.E OF COLUMN 1 OR 2 NO.
FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS IEDIINDANCY CANNOT RE MET
- 1.
SAFETY INJECTION
- a.
Haiial 1
0 Cold shutdown
- b.
Iigh Contaliinett Presoure (III Level) 2 1
Cold slhtidowin C.
1Igh Differential PreRsure between any 2
1 Cold shutdown Steam Line and the Steam Line Header
- d. PressurIzer Lou Pressure 2
1 Cold shutdown***
0
- e.
ligh Steam Flow In 2/3 Steam Lines
]/Steam line Cold shutdo.ni****
Colicident with Low r or Low Steam Preusure 2 T Signals 1
avg 2 Pressure Signals 1
- 2.
CONTAI NMENT SPRAY
- a. Muaiial 2
0**
Cold shutdown fD
- b.
High Containment Pressure (it-lli Level) 2/set 1/set Cold shutdown (D
0 Miist actuate two switch1(e viniltaneously.*
^AWhIteni primary preaure to leas than 2000 paig, channels may be blocked.
- "When primary temperature 19 Jess tha 547,*F, channels may be blocked.
- Ali% this case the 2/3 high steam flow Is already in the trip mode.