ML14170A521
| ML14170A521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris, Brunswick, Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Jackie Jones CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911160104 | |
| Download: ML14170A521 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Z
REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 In Reply Refer To:
NOV 5 1979 RII:JPO 50-325, 50-324 50-400, 50-401 50-402, 50-403 50-261 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN:
J. A. Jones Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Sincerely, James P. O'Reill Director
Enclosures:
- 1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-26
- 2.
List of IE Information Notices Issued in the Last Six Months 9111601e
Carolina Power and Light Company
-2 cc w/encl:
A. C. Tollison, Jr.
Plant Manager Box 458 Southport, North Carolina 28461 R. Parsons, Site Manager Post Office Box 101 New Hill, North Carolina 27562 R. B. Starkey, Jr., Plant Manager Post Office Box 790
-Hartsville, South Carolina 29550
SSINS:
6870 Accession No:
7908220133 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 5, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-26 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
.Description of Circumstances:
On September 14, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (CPC) notified the NRC of discovery at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant of a valve misalignment that had resulted in containment integrity being breached for an indeterminate length of time.
While preparing to perform a Type "C" leak test between two manual valves in a 3" bypass line around the main 48" containment purge valve, plant personnel dis covered that both of these manual isolation valves were locked in the open posi tion. These valves should have been locked closed.
Investigation by the licensee indicated that the valves may have been improperly positioned since April, 1978, when an efficiency test of the bypass line filters was performed. The plant has operated at power for the major portion of that time period.
The valve misalignment had no actual impact on the public health. However, in the event of a design basis accident wherein fuel damage and release of primary coolant inside the containment are postulated, the open valves would provide a significant path for a radioactive release from the containment.
The initial design purpose for the bypass system was to provide a long term hydrogen contro,capability for the containment atmosphere following a design basis accident.-
It was intended that after approximately 30 days following an accident, when containment pressure and activity levels dropped sufficiently to permit venting, this system would be manually valved to vent the containment atmosphere, through high efficiency and charcoal filters, to the exhaust stack.
Thus the components in the bypass line beyond the two manual isolation valves were not designed for the severe service they would be exposed to with the valves open during the initial pressure surge of the design basis accident, and signif icant uncontrolled release would result. High radiation in the vicinity of the bypass line would also make immediate closing of the manual isolation valves, even if identified as the source of leakage, an extremely hazardous operation.
The principal cause for this event was inadequacy of the procedures addressing proper use and positioning of these valves. The master containment integrity valve line-up checklist, which is performed prior to each startup from cold 1/ Current NRC requirements call for the use of hydrogen recombiners to control hydrogen buildup. Palisades has recombiners installed.
IE Information Notice No. 79-26 November 5, 1979 Page 2 of 2 shutdown, did not include these valves. The filter efficiency test for the 3" bypass line did not adequately specify the final position of these valves, and this is the probable cause for the valves being left incorrectly positioned.
The valve misalignment represents a case where human factors in the form of inadequate procedures resulted in a loss of safety system function.
CPC has updated the above mentioned procedures to assure that proper positioning of these valves is addressed. Concurrently, CPC is reviewing other paths from containment to assure that procedures and checklists are complete.
CPC has also hired a qualified consultant to perform an independent review for the same purpose.
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a significant occurrence. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Information Notice No. 79-26 Enclosure November 5, 1979 Page 1 of 2 LISTING OF IE INFORMATION NOTICES ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued 79-26 Breach of Containment 11/5/79 All power reactor Integrity facilities holding OLs and CPs 79-25 Reactor Trips at Turkey 10/1/79 All power reactor Point Units 3 and 4 facilities holding OLs and CPs 79-24 Overpressurization of 10/1/79 All power reactor Containment of a PWR facilities holding Plant After a Main Steam OLs and CPs Line Break 79-23 Emergency Diesel Generator 9/26/79 All Holders of CPs Lube Oil Coolers and OLs 79-22 Qualification of Control 9/17/79 All Holders of CPs Systems 9/14/79 All Holders of OLs 79-21 Transportation and Commer-9/11/79 All Licensees as Supple cial Burial of Radioactive mental Information to Materials IE Bulletin Nos. 79-19
& 79-20 79-20 NRC Enforcement Policy 9/7/79 All Holders of Reactor (Rev. 1)
NRC Licensed Individuals OLs and CPs and Production Licensees with Licensed Operators 79-20 NRC Enforcement Policy 8/14/79 All Holders of Reactor NRC Licensed Individuals OLs and CPs and Production Licensees with Licensed Operators 79-19 Pipe Cracks in Stagnant 7/18/79 All Holders of Reactor (Correction -
Borated Water Systems at OLs and CPs Enclosure)
PWR Plants 79-19 Pipe Cracks In Stagnant 7/17/79 All Holders of Reactor Borated Water Systems At OLs and CPs PWR Plants 79-18 Skylab Reentry 7/6/79 All Holders of Reactor OLs
IE Information Notice No. 79-26 Enclosure November 5, 1979 Page 2 of 2 LISTING OF INFORMATION NOTICES ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued 79-17 Source Holder Assembly Damage 6/20/79 All Holders of Reactor Damage From Misfit Between OLs and CPs Assembly and Reactor Upper Grid Plate 16 Nuclear Incident at Three 6/22/79 All Research Reactors Mile Island and Test Reactors with OLs 79-15 Deficient Procedures 6/7/79 All Holders of Reactor OLs and CPs 79-14 NRC Position of Electrical 6/11/79 All Power Reactor Cable Support Systems Facilities with a CP