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MONTHYEARML14128A5562014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident Project stage: Other 2014-06-30
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Similar Documents at Byron |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000454/20230042024-02-0202 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2023004 and 05000455/2023004 ML24022A2722024-01-23023 January 2024 Request for Information for an NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal Inspection Report 05000454/2024011 ML24018A0362024-01-17017 January 2024 Paragon Energy Solutions, Defect with Detroit Diesel/Mtu Fuel Injectors P/N R5229660 Cat Id 0001390618 ML23320A1762023-12-13013 December 2023 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0027 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) ML23277A0032023-12-11011 December 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Adoption of TSTF-370 ML23318A5102023-12-0101 December 2023 Relief from the Requirements of the ASME Code IR 05000454/20233012023-11-27027 November 2023 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000454/2023301 and 05000455/2023301 BYRON 2023-0065, Unit 2 - Notification of Deviation from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Topical Report MRP-227, Revision 1-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guideline2023-11-17017 November 2023 Unit 2 - Notification of Deviation from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Topical Report MRP-227, Revision 1-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guideline BYRON 2023-0063, Day Inservice Inspection Report for Interval 4, Period 3, (B2R24)2023-11-16016 November 2023 Day Inservice Inspection Report for Interval 4, Period 3, (B2R24) IR 05000454/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2023003 and 05000455/2023003 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion RS-23-117, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023 Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums ML23313A0852023-11-0909 November 2023 Submittal of 2023-301 Byron Initial License Examination Post-Examination Comments RS-23-114, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds2023-11-0101 November 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds ML23297A2352023-10-26026 October 2023 Information Request for the Cyber Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection RS-23-100, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-10-13013 October 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans RS-23-108, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles2023-10-11011 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles RS-23-105, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2023-10-10010 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections ML23278A0272023-10-0505 October 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval - Byron Station, October 2023 RS-23-093, License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel.2023-09-29029 September 2023 License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel. ML23251A1622023-09-29029 September 2023 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements RS-23-094, Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 752023-09-29029 September 2023 Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 75 RS-23-091, Relief Request I4R-25, Alternative Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Inservice Inspection Intervals2023-09-26026 September 2023 Relief Request I4R-25, Alternative Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Inservice Inspection Intervals ML23226A0062023-09-19019 September 2023 Review of License Renewal Commitment Number 10 Submittal ML23180A1692023-09-11011 September 2023 Calvert Cliff Units 1 & 2, and R.E. Ginna Plant - Withdrawal of Proposed Alternatives to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Requirements (Epids L-2022-LRR-0074, 0076, 0079, 0091, 0092, 0093 and 0094) ML23242A3282023-09-0101 September 2023 Amendment No. 233 Correction IR 05000454/20235012023-08-31031 August 2023 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000454/2023501 and 05000455/2023501 IR 05000454/20230052023-08-30030 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Byron Station (Report 05000454/2023005 and 05000455/2023005) IR 05000454/20230022023-08-0303 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2023002 and 05000455/2023002 ML23209A7242023-07-31031 July 2023 Request for Information on the NRC Quadrennial Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection: Inspection Report 05000454/2024010 and 05000455/2024010 ML23192A0362023-07-25025 July 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23122A3022023-07-20020 July 2023 Issuance of Amendments Technical Specifications 2.1.1 and 4.2.1 to Allow a Previously Irradiated Accident Tolerant Fuel Lead Test Assembly to Be Further Irradiated in Unit No. 2 IR 05000454/20234022023-07-18018 July 2023 Baseline Security Inspection Document; 05000454/2023402; 05000455/2023402 ML23198A0372023-07-17017 July 2023 Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution (PIR) Inspection at Byron Nuclear Plant ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III RS-23-083, Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators2023-06-27027 June 2023 Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators ML23172A1172023-06-22022 June 2023 Notification of NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection Request for Information RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23159A1302023-06-0808 June 2023 Day Inservice Inspection Report for Interval 4, Period 3, (B1R25) ML23159A1542023-06-0808 June 2023 2022 Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report RS-23-075, Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2023-06-0707 June 2023 Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML23157A2832023-06-0606 June 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information BYRON 2023-0029, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements2023-06-0101 June 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements ML23138A1342023-05-18018 May 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Braidwood Station and Byron Station ML23003A7882023-05-11011 May 2023 Report for December 12-16, 2022, Regulatory Audit Regarding Reinsertion of a High Burnup Accident Tolerant Fuel Lead Test Assembly 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood BW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form RS-23-094, Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 752023-09-29029 September 2023 Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 75 RS-23-056, Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 102023-04-20020 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 BYRON 2022-0071, Materials Reliability Program: Topical Report for Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Mitigation by Surface Stress Improvement (MRP-335, Revision 3-A) Final Causal Report and Description of Corrective Action Assignment2022-10-13013 October 2022 Materials Reliability Program: Topical Report for Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Mitigation by Surface Stress Improvement (MRP-335, Revision 3-A) Final Causal Report and Description of Corrective Action Assignment NMP1L3469, Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits2022-06-30030 June 2022 Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-093, R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2021-09-0101 September 2021 R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections RS-21-056, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld2021-05-12012 May 2021 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld RS-21-001, Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping2021-01-0404 January 2021 Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping BYRON 2020-0085, 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report2020-12-10010 December 2020 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report BYRON 2020-0084, 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary Report2020-12-10010 December 2020 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary Report ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML20195B1592020-07-10010 July 2020 Attachment 1 - Description and Assessment ML20195B1622020-06-30030 June 2020 Attachment 11 - SG-SGMP-17-25-NP, Revision 1, Foreign Object Limits Analysis for the Byron and Braidwood Unit 2 Steam Generators June 2020 ML20195B1612020-06-25025 June 2020 Attachment 6 - Intertek Report No. Aim 200510800-2Q-1(NP), Byron Unit 2 Operational Assessment Addressing Deferment of B2R22 Steam Generator Tube Examinations to B2R23, April 2022 ML19228A0232019-08-15015 August 2019 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-879 ML18192C1522018-07-18018 July 2018 Review of Fall 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML17355A5612017-12-21021 December 2017 Ltr. 12/21/17 Response to Disputed Non-Cited Violation Documented in Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000454/2017009; 05000455/2017009 (DRS-N.Feliz-Adorno) ML17234A4782017-08-22022 August 2017 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Information - NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 2, H.4.4 Path 4: GMRS ≪ 2xSSE RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 ML16344A0062016-12-0909 December 2016 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary of Biennial Report of Changes, Tests, or Experiments, Performed RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17360A1742016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6: Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations (Non-Proprietary) ML16356A0202016-10-0707 October 2016 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. RS-16-122, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-08-31031 August 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-088, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-07-15015 July 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-16-057, Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds2016-03-15015 March 2016 Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds RS-15-267, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2015-11-30030 November 2015 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-15-072, Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 542015-02-12012 February 2015 Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 54 RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application RS-14-277, Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 12014-09-24024 September 2014 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1 ML14128A5562014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14178B2222014-06-24024 June 2014 Technical Review of TIA 2013-02, Single Spurious Assumptions for Braidwood and Byron Stations Safe-Shutdown Methodology ML14085A5332014-05-29029 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses BYRON 2014-0040, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Revised for Negative Pressure Application During Reactor Coolant System Vacuum Fill2014-03-27027 March 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Revised for Negative Pressure Application During Reactor Coolant System Vacuum Fill ML14079A4232014-03-12012 March 2014 Enclosure 1, Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Revision 0 ML14066A4792014-03-0404 March 2014 Clarification of Licensing Basis Assumptions for a Natural Circulation Cooldown Event RS-14-082, ECCS Evaluation Model Error - 10 CFR 50.46 30-Day Report2014-02-27027 February 2014 ECCS Evaluation Model Error - 10 CFR 50.46 30-Day Report BYRON 2014-0003, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (Mur) Power Uprate2014-02-13013 February 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (Mur) Power Uprate ML13225A5952013-12-17017 December 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation Related to Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049(Mitigation Strategies) 2023-09-29
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARBW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form ML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML18192C1522018-07-18018 July 2018 Review of Fall 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML17355A5612017-12-21021 December 2017 Ltr. 12/21/17 Response to Disputed Non-Cited Violation Documented in Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000454/2017009; 05000455/2017009 (DRS-N.Feliz-Adorno) RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 ML16344A0062016-12-0909 December 2016 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary of Biennial Report of Changes, Tests, or Experiments, Performed RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. RS-16-122, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-08-31031 August 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-088, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-07-15015 July 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-15-072, Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 542015-02-12012 February 2015 Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 54 RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application ML14128A5562014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14085A5332014-05-29029 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses ML14066A4792014-03-0404 March 2014 Clarification of Licensing Basis Assumptions for a Natural Circulation Cooldown Event ML13225A5952013-12-17017 December 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation Related to Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049(Mitigation Strategies) ML13182A0312013-07-0303 July 2013 Transmittal of Final Byron Station, Unit 2, Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis IR 05000456/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000272/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML13008A2192013-01-31031 January 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000454/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000461/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000237/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000373/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000352/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000219/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000289/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000254/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000277/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee RS-12-162, Company, LLCs 180-Day Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2012-11-27027 November 2012 Company, LLCs 180-Day Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML12341A1622012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generation Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-002 Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 2 RS-12-161, Byron Generation Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-002 Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 22012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generation Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-002 Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 2 RS-12-161, Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 32012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 3 RS-12-161, Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 32012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 3 RS-12-161, Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 3 of 32012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 3 of 3 RS-12-161, Q0108.20-R-002, Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 22012-11-0707 November 2012 Q0108.20-R-002, Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 2 ML12341A1662012-11-0707 November 2012 Enclosure 2, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Byron Station, Unit 2, Report No: 12Q0108.20-R-002, Revision 1 ML12341A1652012-11-0707 November 2012 Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 3 of 3 ML12341A1642012-11-0707 November 2012 Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 3 ML12341A1612012-11-0707 November 2012 Enclosure 1, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Byron Station, Unit 1, Report No. 12Q0108.20-R-001, Revision 1 2023-11-17
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 30, 2014 Mr. Michael J. Pacilio Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO)
Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2- STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE FLOODING WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NOS. MF0205 AND MF0206)
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Paragraph 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.
By letter dated November 27, 2012, as supplemented by a May 21, 2013, letter, the Exelon Generation Company, LLC, submitted a Flooding Walkdown Report as requested in of the 50.54(f) letter for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, (Byron) site. By letter dated January 31, 2014, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, provided a response to the NRC request for additional information in order for the staff to complete its assessments.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.
M. Pacilio If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-6606 or by e-mail at Joei.Wiebe@nrc.gov.
Sincerely,
)tJ-~
oel S. Wiebe, Project Manager lant Licensing 111-2 and Planning and Analysis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455
Enclosures:
Staff Assessment of Flooding Walkdown Report cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv
STAFF ASSESSMENT OF FLOODING WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOs. 50-454 and 50-455
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 2012, 1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR), Paragraph 50.54(f)
(50.54(f) letter), to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 4, "Recommendation 2.3:
Flooding,"2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct flooding walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC.
The 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following:
- a. Describe the design basis flood hazard level(s) for all flood-causing mechanisms, including groundwater ingress.
- b. Describe protection and migration features that are considered in the licensing basis evaluation to protect against external ingress of water into structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety.
- c. Describe any warning systems to detect the presence of water in rooms important to safety.
1 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340.
2 ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A050.
Enclosure
- d. Discuss the effectiveness of flood protection systems and exterior, incorporated, and temporary flood barriers. Discuss how these systems and barriers were evaluated using the acceptance criteria developed as part of Requested Information Item 1.h.
- e. Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process (e.g., details of selection of the walkdown team and procedures) using the documentation template discussed in Requested Information Item 1.j, including actions taken in response to the peer review.
- f. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision 1, to the NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the CAP.
- g. Document any cliff-edge effects identified and the associated basis. Indicate those that were entered into the CAP. Also include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these effects.
- h. Describe any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures including flood barriers that further enhance the flood protection.
Identify results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.
In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 4, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the flooding walkdown guidance. By letter dated May 21, 2012 3 , the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted NEI 12-07, Revision 0 A, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features" to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 2012 4 , the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance.
By letter dated November 27, 2012 5 , as supplemented by a May 21, 2013, letter6 , Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Byron, the licensee), provided a response to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for Byron, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The NRC staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee regarding the available physical margin (APM) dated December 23, 20137 . The licensee responded by letter dated January 31, 2014.* 8 3
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML121440522.
4 ADAMS Accession No. ML12144A142.
5 ADAMS Accession No. ML12332A380.
6 ADAMS Accession No. ML13141A594.
7 ADAMS Accession No. ML13325A891.
8 ADAMS Accession No. ML14031A443
The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The SSCs important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2: "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;" and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an SSC of a facility must perform, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design. The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.
The current licensing basis (CLB) is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Design Basis Flooding Hazard for Byron The licensee reports that there are two design basis flood hazards for the Byron site. In the case of the nuclear block, located on a bluff overlooking the Rock River, the worst hydrological condition is caused by a local intense precipitation (LIP) event. In the case of the screen house location, adjacent to the Rock River proper and housing the essential service water (SX) make-up pumps, the worst hydrological condition is a combined flood event.
The grade and floor elevation for the Byron power block is 869.0 feet (ft) and 870 ft above mean sea level (MSL), respectively (all elevations herein refer to the 1929 U.S. Geological Survey datum.) The licensee reports that the LIP event is expected to generate a maximum surface water flood elevation of 870.82 ft MSL, in the form of local pending, in areas immediately adjacent to safety-related structures. The licensee estimates that this flood elevation would cause only minor local flooding at the site.
The makeup water system for the Byron ultimate heat sink consists of a combination of SX make-up pumps located along the Rock River and deep ground-water wells located within the reactor site footprint. The SX make-up pumps are installed at an elevation is 702 ft MSL; the pumps are housed within a 4-ft high fire wall. Superimposing the maximum wave run-up height
on the river still-water elevation yields a combined event flood stage elevation of 703.39 ft MSL for the river screen house location.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has described the design basis flood hazard level(s) as indicated in Requested Information Item 2.a of the 50.54(f) letter, consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.2 Flood Protection and Mitigation 3.2.1 Flood Protection and Mitigation Description The CLB for flood protection at the Byron site is a LIP event within the main power block yard and the combined flood event on the Rock River at the river screen house location.
Both reinforced concrete curbs and steel barriers have been incorporated into the Byron design at elevations above 870.82 ft MSL to prevent any sheet flow associated with the LIP from entering critical areas. All Byron Station substructures below an elevation of 869 ft MSL are designed to withstand full hydrostatic pressure associated with groundwater.
The river screen house structure enclosing the SX pumps has been designed for the combined event flood as well as waves produced by a 40 mile per hour (mph) wind. To prevent damage to the screen house due to the combined event flood, the floor elevation for this structure is 702 ft MSL. A 4-ft-high fire wall has also been constructed to enclose the area where safety-related equipment is located. Sump pumps are located within the enclosed area to remove any water associated with external leaks into the SX rooms.
3.2.2 Incorporated and Exterior Barriers The site has incorporated and/or exterior barriers that are permanently in-place, generally requiring no operator manual actions. Such barriers are passive and include walls and penetration seals that were incorporated into the original Byron design. Water entering these areas would generally be removed using the existing floor drain system. Grading and drainage at the Byron site are designed to ensure that no flooding of safety-related facilities will occur for events as severe as the LIP.
To prevent damage to the screen house containing the SX pumps due to the combined event flood, a 4-ft-high fire wall has been constructed to enclose the area where safety-related equipment is located.
3.2.3 Temporary Barriers and Other Manual Actions The site has no temporary barriers and other manual actions that require operator action in the event of a flood threat.
3.2.4 Reasonable Simulation and Results The purpose of performing reasonable simulations is to verify that the required flood protection procedures or activities can be executed as specified /as written. The licensee noted that flood protection features at Byron do not include any temporary or active features that would require the implementation of a procedure for the performance of those manual/operator actions necessary for the flood protection feature in question to perform its intended flood protection function. Therefore, the licensee reported that no procedure, walk-through, or 'Reasonable Simulation', was conducted at Byron.
However, the licensee has noted that there is a Station Structural Monitoring Program that provides ongoing verification of flood barrier effectiveness by identifying and trending areas of potential groundwater ingress.
3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has described protection and mitigation features as indicated in Requested Information Item 2.b of the 50.54(f) letter consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.3 Warning Systems An automated internal leak detection system is located in the basement of the building containing SX water pumps. These pumps are compartmentalized and each has its own sump.
This alarm system, though, is not credited in the licensing basis for detecting groundwater ingress although it is capable of doing so.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has provided information to describe any warning systems as indicated in Requested Information item 2.c of the 50.54(f) letter, consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.4 Effectiveness of Flood Protection Features The worst hydrological condition at Byron is a flood caused by: (a) a LIP event, in the case of the nuclear block, or (b) a postulated probable maximum precipitation (specifically a combined effects flood), in the case of the river screen house location.
By its very nature, the LIP event and associated runoff is a limited, short-duration event affecting the power block yard. All flood protection features at the Byron power block yard are intended to protect safety-related structures and equipment against the LIP are passive design features, such as grading, walls, doors, penetration seals, and floor drains. All buildings with exterior walls below grade are also designed to be water tight up to an elevation of 870ft MSL, the floor elevation of the reactor power block.
The Rock River screen house containing the SX pumps is the only structure susceptible to floods. The screen house is designed for both a combined event flood as well as waves produced by a 40 mph wind. The only active flood protection features are the sump pumps in
the SX rooms associated with the river screen house. These are credited in the CLB as protecting against internal flooding but also provide an additional function of removing water leaks from external sources in the SX rooms. As a consequence, they were not included in the flooding walkdown scope.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has discussed the effectiveness of flood protection features as indicated in Requested Information Item 2.d of the 50.54(f) letter consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.5 Walkdown Methodology By letter dated June 8, 2012, 9 the licensee responded to the 50.54(f) letter that they intended to utilize the NRC-endorsed walkdown guidelines contained in NEI 12-07, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features." The licensee's walkdown submittal dated November 26, 2012, indicated that the licensee implemented the walkdowns consistent with the intent of the guidance provided in NEI 12-07. The licensee did not identify any exceptions from NEI 12-07.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has presented information related to the implementation of the walkdown process as indicated in Requested Information Item 2.e of the 50.54(f) letter, consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.6 Walkdown Results 3.6.1 Walkdown Scope The licensee performed walkdowns of currently-credited flood protection features; the exact number of as-built features inspected was approximately 40. The scope of the flooding walkdown was developed following a detailed review of all relevant licensing documents. The licensee reported that walkdowns of the Byron physical plant consisted of four main parts:
- The walls, floors and penetrations through the walls and floors in the river screen house SX make-up pump diesel drive cubicles were inspected.
- The main steam isolation valve (MSIV) rooms, radwaste truck bay, fuel handling building and the refueling water storage tank (RWST) tunnel exterior hatches were inspected to ensure runoff from LIP is kept out of the safety-related buildings.
9 ADAMS Accession No. ML12159A395.
- An outdoor walkdown was conducted to verify that plant modifications implemented since original, construction, such as security barrier installation and changes to topography, do not adversely affect plant flooding protection.
- The below-grade structures (i.e., basement walls and basement slabs and penetrations through these walls and floors) in the main power block were inspected. These areas are credited in the CLB to keep groundwater and runoff from LIP out of the safety related buildings.
The licensee also reported that visual inspections of walls, floors, and penetrations through the walls and floors were conducted to verify there are no observable structural deficiencies that may impact the structure's ability to perform its intended flood protection function.
As mentioned earlier, the licensee noted that flood protection features at Byron do not include any temporary or active features that would require the implementation of a procedure for the performance of those manual/operator actions necessary for the flood protection feature in question to perform its intended flood protection function. Consequently, no reasonable simulation of manual actions at the site was conducted.
The licensee reported that the containment building was not included in the inspection scope because the exterior walls and the floor are credited with leak tightness based on both periodic integrated leakage rate tests, and the fact that the lowest elevation of the building is above the maximum estimated groundwater elevation. Conduits associated with manholes or cable vaults were not considered relevant to the walkdown scope because they did not provide a path for groundwater or meteoric (rain) water to enter safety-related buildings.
The licensee used acceptance criteria consistent with the intent of NEI 12-07.
3.6.2 Licensee Evaluation of Flood Protection Effectiveness, Key Findings, and Identified Deficiencies The licensee performed an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the Byron flood protection features. By virtue of its walkdown inspections, the licensee verified that permanent safety-related SSCs at the Byron site were acceptable, not degraded, and capable of performing their intended design function as credited in the CLB. No Byron operator actions are credited for external flood protection.
NEI 12-07 defines a deficiency as follows: "a deficiency exists when a flood protection feature is unable to perform its intended function when subject to a design basis flooding hazard." The licensee reported that it did not identify deficiencies during the course of the flood walkdowns.
NEI 12-07 specifies that licensees identify observations that were not yet dispositioned at the time the walkdown report was submitted, and that were placed in the CAP. The licensee placed a total of 15 items in the CAP, two of which were determined to be deficient per the current licensing basis. These are:
(1) A small slab that serves as an LIP curb between the radwaste truck bay and the auxiliary building was observed as "not per design." The slab was found to have been installed 12 inches below the designed elevation (0.82 ft below the LIP flood level).
(2) The licensee also reported that the caulking around the LIP curb located in the 1A/1 D MSIV room was considered to be "degraded."
3.6.3 Flood Protection and Mitigation Enhancements There are no recently-implemented or planned enhancements to the Byron site that are intended to improve or increase flood protection and/or mitigation.
3.6.4 Planned or Newly Installed Features The licensee identified two planned changes to the Byron site as a result of the flooding walkdown. These include:
Modification of the LIP curb between the radwaste truck bay and the auxiliary building to reflect existing design drawings.
Replacement of the caulking on the 1N1 D MSIV room LIP curb.
3.6.5 Deficiencies Noted and Actions Taken or Planned to Address Two items were determined by the licensee to be deficient per the CLB, and were entered into the Byron CAP for disposition. These were:
- 1) A small slab that serves as an Ll P curb between the radwaste truck bay and the auxiliary building was observed as "not per design." The slab was found to have been installed 12 inches below the designed elevation (0.82 ft below the LIP flood level).
- 2) The licensee also reported that the caulking around the Ll P curb located in the 1N1 D MSIV room was considered to be "degraded." NRC staff reviewed the licensee's walkdown report dated November 27, 2012. Based on the above assessment, staff concludes that that the licensee performed the walkdowns consistent with the intent of the guidance provided in NEI 12-07.
3.6.6 NRC Staff Analysis of Walkdowns The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's walkdown report dated November 27, 2012, and supplemental letter dated May 21, 2013. Staff reviewed this additional information in conjunction with the submitted walkdown report and supplements.
As part of the walkdown effort, the licensee evaluated the capability of flood protection features by conducting a set of visual inspections. Two deficiencies were noted, but are being corrected through the site CAP. The features were confirmed to be in place and available and also to be capable of performing their intended flood protection or mitigation functions. No changes or enhancements to flood protection or mitigation features were identified as a result of the walkdowns.
During the walkdowns, items were identified as not immediately acceptable; however, corrective actions were identified and taken.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has provided results of the walkdown and described any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures as indicated in Requested Information Items 2.f and 2.h of the 50.54(f) letter consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance. Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.
3.6.7 Available Physical Margin The NRC staff issued an RAI to the licensee regarding the APM dated December 23, 2013.
The licensee responded in a letter dated January 31, 2014. The licensee has reviewed their APM determination process, and entered any unknown APMs into their CAP. The staff reviewed the response and concluded that the licensee met the intent of the APM determination per NEI 12-07.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has documented the information requested for any cliff-edge effects, as indicated in Requested Information Item 2.g of the 50.54(f) letter, are consistent with Appendix D, Walkdown Report, of the walkdown guidance. Further, staff reviewed the response, and concludes that the licensee met the intent of the APM determination per NEI12-07.
3.7 NRC Oversight 3.7.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors On June 27, 2012, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/187 "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns." In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that the licensee implemented the flooding walkdowns at Byron consistent with the intent of the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of flood protection features. The inspection report dated February 5, 2013, documents the results of this inspection. No findings of significance were identified.
4.0 SSCS NOT WALKED DOWN The licensee did not identify any SSCs as restricted access; therefore, no SSCs will be walked down at a later date.
4.1 Restricted Access The licensee identified no restricted access features or areas within the Byron site.
4.2 Inaccessible Features The licensee reported that a portion of the exterior wall located directly behind there cycle holdup tanks (OAB01TA/TB) and the regeneration waste drain tank (OWX25T) was deemed inaccessible due to the close proximity of those tanks to the wall. Nevertheless, the licensee reported that it has reasonable assurance that the walls in question are water-tight based on the fact that visual inspection of the walls and floors adjacent to these tanks and throughout the balance of the plant revealed no deficiencies or evidence of degradation that would prevent performance of flood protection functions. The licensee reported that there are no conduit or piping penetrations located within these areas, and water stops are provided in all horizontal and vertical construction joints in all exterior walls.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of flooding walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The staff concludes that the licensee, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities, and in accordance with plant processes and procedures, verified the plant configuration with the current flooding licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed flooding conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.
M. Pacilio If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-6606 or by e-mail at Joel. Wiebe@nrc. gov.
Sincerely, IRA/
Joel S. Wiebe, Project Manager Plant Licensing 111-2 and Planning and Analysis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455
Enclosures:
Staff Assessment of Flooding Walkdown Report cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC RidsOpaMail Resource RidsRgn3MaiiCenter Resource LPL3-2 R/F RidsNrrLASRohrer Resource BRini, EDO Rl, Rll, Rill, RIV RidsNroDsea RidsNrrPMBraidwood Resource RidsNrrPMByron Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource NChokshi, NRO RidsNrrDorllpl3-2 Resource RKuntz, NRR RKaras, NRO SFianders, NRO CCook, NRO EMiller, NRR PChaput, NRO MJardaneh, NRO RidsAcrsAcnw MaiiCTR Resource ADAMS A ccess1on N um ber: ML14128A556
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