ML14038A351
| ML14038A351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/2014 |
| From: | Bartley J Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6 |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR-13-005 | |
| Download: ML14038A351 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000390/2013005
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
February 7, 2014
Mr. Joseph W. Shea
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
Dear Mr. Shea:
On December 31, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. On January 16, 2014, the NRC inspectors
discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Cleary and other members of the Watts Bar
staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green)
in this report. The finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this
violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement
Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30
days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
As a result of the Safety Culture Common Language Initiative, the terminology and coding of
cross-cutting aspects were revised beginning in calendar year (CY) 2014. New cross-cutting
aspects identified in CY 2014 will be coded under the latest revision to Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0310. Cross-cutting aspects identified in the last six months of 2013 using the
previous terminology will be converted to the latest revision in accordance with the cross-
reference in IMC 0310. The revised cross-cutting aspects will be evaluated for cross-cutting
themes and potential substantive cross-cutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with
the CY 2014 mid-cycle assessment review.
J. Shea 2
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections,
Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.: 50-390
License No.: NPF-90
Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2013005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc Distribution via ListServ
____ML_______ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP
SIGNATURE Via email Via email JDH /RA/ JHB /RA/
NAME RMonk KMiller JHamman JBartley
DATE 02/07/2014 02/06/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
J. Shea 3
Letter to Joseph Shea from Jonathan H. Bartley dated February 7, 2014
SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII
L. Douglas, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMWattsBar1 Resource
RidsNrrPMWattsBar2 Resource
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.: 50-390
License No.: NPF-90
Report No.: 05000390/2013005
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
Location: Spring City, TN 37381
Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2013
Inspectors: R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Miller, Resident Inspector
Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000390/2013-005; 10/01/2013 - 12/31/2013; Watts Bar, Unit 1; Problem Identification and
Resolution.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors. One Green
non-cited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color
(Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance
Determination Process," (SDP) dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined
using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. The
NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Green. An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components,
was documented for the licensees failure to ensure that three failed QA/1 pressure
switches (BTN027C) returned to power stores were adequately labeled or segregated to
prevent their inadvertent use or installation. The licensee entered this issue into the
corrective action program as problem evaluation report (PER) 794117 and segregated
the defective pressure switches.
The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left
uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern;
specifically, the subject safety-related defective pressure switches could have been
installed in another safety-related component. The inspectors determined that the
finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the pressure switches were
not installed into a subsequent component and did not cause a loss of function of a
system. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect that the
licensee define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural
compliance and personnel follow procedures in the Work Practices component of the
Human Performance area, in that the licensee failed to provide adequate and timely
direction to prevent the pressure switches from being returned to the Maintenance
personnel. [ H.4(b) (Section 4OA2.1)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at essentially 100 percent power the entire reporting period with the
exception of a planned down power to 62 percent power on December 7, 2013, for
repairs to #3 feed water heater drain tank level control valve. The unit was returned to
100 percent power the following day.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors observed a detailed plant exercise of licensee procedure AOI-7.01, Maximum
Probable Flood. This included staffing of the Central Emergency Control Center in
Chattanooga, the Technical Support Center, a mock control room, and the Operations
Support Center. Using appropriate time compression, the licensee demonstrated to a
plausible degree that changes incorporated into AOI-7.01 were adequate to accomplish
the complex activities to place the plant into the flood mode configuration to protect the
reactor core during a design basis Probable Maximum Flood within the required 27-hour
time line. This activity constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Readiness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee actions taken in preparation for low temperature
weather conditions to limit the risk of freeze-related initiating events and to adequately
protect mitigating systems from its effects. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure
1-PI-OPS-1-FP, Freeze Protection, and walked down selected components associated
with the four areas listed below to evaluate implementation of plant freeze protection,
including the material condition of insulation, heat trace elements, and temporary heated
enclosures. Corrective actions for items identified in relevant problem evaluation reports
(PERs) and work orders (WOs) were assessed for effectiveness and timeliness. This
activity constituted one inspection sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment.
Enclosure
4
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted the equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to
evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other
train or system inoperable or out of service (OOS). This also included that redundant
trains were returned to service properly. The inspectors reviewed the functional system
descriptions, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating
procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for
the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to
verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies
which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system. This activity
constituted three inspection samples. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Realignment of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump following
preventive maintenance/corrective maintenance outage
- Partial walkdown of the 1A containment spray (CS) pump while 1B OOS for
preventive maintenance
- Partial walkdown of the 1B residual heat removal (RHR) system while the 1A RHR
system was OOS for preventive maintenance
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Fire Protection Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas important to reactor safety, listed below, to
verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in: the
Fire Protection Program, Nuclear Power Group Standard Programs and Processes
(NPG-SPP)-18.4.6, Control of Fire Protection Impairments; NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of
Transient Combustibles; and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work).
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to: 1) licensee control of
transient combustibles and ignition sources; 2) the material condition, operational status,
and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and 3) the
fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. This activity constituted 10
inspection samples.
Enclosure
5
- Cable spreading room
- 480 V reactor (RX) motor-operated valve (MOV) board room 1A
- 480 V RX MOV board room 1B
- 480 V RX MOV board room 2A
- 480 V RX MOV board room 2B
- Vital battery room I, II, III, IV, V (counts as five samples)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
.1 Auxiliary Building
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed internal flood protection barriers associated with a refueling
water storage tank, component cooling system (CCS) pipe break, and essential raw
cooling water (ERCW) pipe break in the auxiliary building to verify that the flood
protection barriers and equipment were being maintained consistent with the UFSAR.
The licensees corrective action documents and open WOs were reviewed to verify that
internal flood-related items in the auxiliary building were being corrected. The
inspectors walked down the auxiliary building 676 elevation, which contains risk-
important equipment, to evaluate the adequacy of flood barriers, floor drains, and
passive sump level switches, as well as their overall material condition. This activity
constituted one inspection sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Cables in Underground Manholes
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors directly observed one underground bunker/manhole, Manhole 7, subject to
flooding that contained cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment.
Specific attributes evaluated were: 1) the cables were not submerged in water; 2) the
cables and/or splices appeared intact and the material condition of cable support
structures was acceptable; and 3) dewatering devices (sump pump) operation and level
alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged
or were in an environment for which they were qualified. This activity constituted one
inspection sample.
Enclosure
6
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Operator Requalification Review: On October 31, 2013, the inspectors
observed the simulator evaluation for an operations staff crew per 3-OT-SRT-E1-7, Loss
of Coolant, Revision 3. The plant conditions led to a Site Area Emergency.
Performance indicator credit was not taken.
The inspectors specifically evaluated the following attributes related to the operating
crews performance:
- Clarity and formality of communication
- Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Correct use and implementation of abnormal operating instructions and emergency
operating instructions
- Timely and appropriate Emergency Action Level declarations per emergency plan
implementing procedures
- Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
- Command and Control provided by the unit supervisor and shift manager
The inspectors also attended the critique to assess the effectiveness of the licensee
evaluators, and to verify that licensee-identified issues were comparable to issues
identified by the inspector. This activity constituted one inspection sample.
Quarterly Observation of Operator Performance: Inspectors observed and assessed
licensed operator performance in the plant and main control room, particularly during
periods of heightened activity or risk and where the activities could affect plant safety.
Inspectors reviewed various licensee policies and procedures such as procedures
OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations; NPG-SPP-10.0, Plant Operations; and GO-4, Normal
Power Operation.
The inspectors utilized activities such as post maintenance testing, surveillance testing
and refueling, and other outage activities to focus on the following conduct of operations
as appropriate;
- Operator compliance and use of procedures
- Control board manipulations
- Communication between crew members
- Use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications, and alarms
- Use of human error prevention techniques
- Documentation of activities, including initials and sign-offs in procedures
Enclosure
7
- Supervision of activities, including risk and reactivity management
- Pre-job briefs
This activity constituted one inspection sample.
Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results: On December 13,
2013, the licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required
to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), Requalification requirements, of the NRCs
Operators Licenses. The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall
pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations and the crew simulator
operating examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11,
Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance. The
results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification
Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the performance-based problems listed below. A review was
performed to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped
structures, systems, or components (SSCs) and to verify that the licensee was following
the requirements of TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring,
Trending, and Reporting 10 CFR 50.65, and NPG-SPP-03.4, Maintenance Rule
Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting 10 CFR 50.65. Reviews
focused, as appropriate, on: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identification and
resolution of common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
4) characterization of reliability issues; 5) charging unavailability time; 6) trending key
parameters; 7) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification; and
8) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and
corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). This activity constituted two inspection
samples.
- Review of addition of flood mode functions into the scope of the program and
category classification
- Review of Revision 2 of the (a)(1) action plan for the demineralized water system
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Enclosure
8
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, for the work activities listed below:
1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities
were conducted; 2) the management of risk; 3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen
situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work
activities; and 4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were
adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was
complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4); NPG-SPP-07.0, Work Control
and Outage Management; NPG-SPP-07.1, On Line Work Management; and TI-124,
Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix. This activity constituted three inspection samples.
- Risk assessment for emergent failure of the A main control room (MCR) chiller while
the A emergency board room chiller was OOS for corrective maintenance
was OOS for preventive maintenance
system
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating
systems listed below, to assess, as appropriate: 1) the technical adequacy of the
evaluations; 2) whether continued system operability was warranted; 3) whether the
compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were
appropriately controlled; 4) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the
impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance
with the significant determination process (SDP). The inspectors verified that the
operability evaluations were performed in accordance with NPG-SPP-03.1, Corrective
Action Program. This activity constituted two inspection samples.
- Prompt determination of operability (PDO) for PER 73250 - ABSCE/MCRHZ
penetration seals
- PDO for PER 632402-Turbine Overspeed Protection
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Enclosure
9
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a permanent plant modification against the requirements of
NPG-SPP-09.3, Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control, and NPG-SPP-
09.4, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments, and verified that
the modification did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS or
the UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors determined whether: 1) the installation of the
permanent modification was in accordance with the work package; 2) adequate
configuration control was in place; 3) procedures and drawings were updated; and
4) post-installation tests verified operability of the affected systems. This activity
constituted one inspection sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- DCN 61571, Revision A, Revise the seismic classification of the Steam Surface
Condenser and CCW Piping (WBN-1&2-COND-002-0001, -0007, -0010; WBN-1&2-
PIPE-027-H in the turbine building).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance test procedures and/or test activities,
(listed below) as appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess
whether: 1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control
room and/or engineering personnel; 2) testing was adequate for the maintenance
performed; 3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational
readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; 4) test instrumentation
had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; 5) tests
were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; 6) jumpers installed or
leads lifted were properly controlled; 7) test equipment was removed following testing;
and 8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The
inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with NPG-SPP-
06.9, Testing Programs; NPG-SPP-06.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing; and NPG-
SPP-07.1, On Line Work Management. This activity constituted eight inspection
samples.
- WO 115156188, Replacement of 1-XM-46-57, TDAFW pump demand isolator
- WO 114511140, Replace diesel generator engine 1A2 fuel oil priming pump, WBN-1-
PMP-018-0059/1-A
- WO 115257354, Repair of TDAFW steam admission valve limit switch
- WO 113722377, Vacuum pump vane replacement for containment building lower
compartment area radiation monitor fan B, 1-PMP-090-0106B
Enclosure
10
- WO 112092077, 1-FCV-67-66A, 1A EDG ERCW supply valve wiring change to auto
open on EDG start
- WO 112092077, 2-FCV-67-66A, 2A EDG ERCW supply valve wiring change to auto
open on EDG start
- WO 112092141, 1-FCV-67-67B, 1B EDG ERCW supply valve wiring change to auto
open on EDG start
- WO 112092141, 2-FCV-67-67B, 2B EDG ERCW supply valve wiring change to auto
open on EDG start
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed the surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected
risk-significant SSCs listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the SSCs met the
requirements of the TS; the UFSAR; NPG-SPP-06.9, Testing Programs; NPG-SPP-
06.9.2, Surveillance Test Program; and NPG-SPP-09.1, ASME Section XI. The
inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs
were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. This
activity constituted six inspection samples.
In-Service Test:
- WO 114667657, 1-SI-3-902, Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1A-S quarterly
performance test
RCS Leak Detection
- WO 114435658, 1-SI-61-6, 92 day COT containment building lower compartment
particulate rad monitor loop 1-LPR-90-106A
Ice Condenser
- WO 114845325, 1-SI-90-13, Weekly Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Visual
Inspection
Other Surveillances
- WO 115168118, 0-SI-67-901-B, Emergency raw cooling water pump E-B and pump
G-B performance test
- WO 114667548, 1-SI-62-901-A, Centrifugal charging pump 1A-A quarterly
performance test
- WO 114667524, 0-SI-82-11-A, Monthly diesel generator start and load test DG 1A-A
Enclosure
11
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in-office review of the latest revisions of
various Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the Emergency Plan
located under ADAMS accession numbers ML12326A678, ML13025A102,
ML13070A025, ML13219A022, and ML13234A356, as listed in the Attachment.
The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes made in
the revisions resulted in no reduction in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the
revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50. The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and
did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are
subject to future inspection. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This
inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and
emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)
As required by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution,
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily PER summary
reports and periodically attending daily PER review meetings.
Findings and Observations
Introduction: A Green, NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV,
Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, was identified for the licensees failure
to ensure that three failed QA/1 pressure switches (BTN027C) returned to power stores
were adequately labeled or segregated to prevent their inadvertent use or installation.
Description: During the daily review of the SR package, the inspectors noted that SR
792287 (later PER 794117) identified an attempt to install defective safety-related
pressure switches. A follow-up review with the originator indicated that three safety-
Enclosure
12
related pressure switches had failed to calibrate for use on safety-related component, B
Main Control Room Chiller. They had been returned to the warehouse with SR 781194
dated September 17, 2013, attached, indicating that all three new pressure switches had
failed to calibrate. Warehouse personnel placed the switches in a box on a shelf with the
SR attached awaiting instructions as to what method was going to be used to disposition
these switches. On September 24, 2013, a different warehouse employee was called
after normal working hours to come to the plant and give Maintenance personnel these
same failed pressure switches for use on a different safety-related component. None of
the three failed pressure switches were installed due to again failing the calibration
procedure. The inspectors monitored the licensees handling of the issue in the CAP and
determined the licensee did not recognize that they had not properly segregated the failed
components as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XV, Nonconforming
Materials, Parts, or Components. Once the inspectors informed the licensee of the non-
compliance with Criterion XV, the licensee modified PER 794117 to include briefings of all
Material Handlers and site Materials Management concerning the proper disposition of
defective and non-conforming materials.
Analysis: The licensees failure to ensure that three non-conforming safety-related
pressure switches were not quarantined in a manner that would prevent issuance of them
to Maintenance personnel for use in the plant was a performance deficiency. The
inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected,
it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the
subject safety-related defective pressure switches could have been installed in another
safety-related component. Using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings,
dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0906, Appendix A, The Significance Determination
Process (SDP) for Findings At Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined
that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the pressure
switches were not installed into a subsequent component and did not cause a loss of
function of a system. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting
aspect that the licensee defines and effectively communicates expectations regarding
procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures in the Work Practices
component of the Human Performance area, in that, the licensee failed to provide
adequate and timely direction to prevent the pressure switches from being returned to the
Maintenance personnel. [ H.4(b)
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials,
Parts, or Components, states, in part, that measures shall be established to control
materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent
their inadvertent use or installation. These measures shall include, as appropriate,
procedures for identification, documentation, segregation, disposition, and notification to
affected organizations. Contrary to the above requirement, from September 19 until
September 27, the licensee failed to control three defective pressure switches which did
not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation.
Immediate corrective action to restore compliance was to segregate the defective
switches. The violation was entered into the licensees CAP as PER 794117. This
violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with the Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy and will be identified as NCV 05000390/2013005-01, Failure to
Adequately Control Non-Conforming or Degraded Equipment.
Enclosure
13
.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends
a. Inspection Scope
As required by IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors
performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends
that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors
review was focused on human performance trends, licensee trending efforts, and
repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues. The inspectors also
considered the results of the daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section
4OA2.1. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of July 2013
through December 2013, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when
the scope of the trend warranted. This activity constituted one inspection sample.
b. Observations
No findings were identified. Those systems listed in this section of IR 2013003 (ice
condenser intermediate deck doors, main control room, 6.9 kV shutdown board room
and 480 V board room chillers) as having long-standing reliability issues continue to
linger. The licensee has identified that there has been an upward trend in the number of
maintenance rule preventable functional failures. The inspectors have engaged the
licensee on the long-standing equipment issues a number of times. Also, the inspectors
have noted what appears to be an increase in a trend of obtaining incorrect replacement
parts or late parts arrival/approval. Most of these issues manifest themselves in delayed
maintenance activities. Although, on at least one occasion, the incorrect relay coil type
was installed in a non-safety-related service air compressor. Inspectors will continue to
monitor these activities.
.3 Annual Sample: Review of Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operator workaround program to verify that workarounds
were identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the CAP, and that
corrective actions were proposed or implemented. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed
the licensees workaround list and repair schedules, conducted tours, and interviewed
operators about required compensatory actions. Additionally, the inspectors looked for
undocumented workarounds, reviewed appropriate system health documents, and
reviewed PERs related to items on the workaround list. This activity constituted one
inspection sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
14
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 050000390/2012005-01: Engineering Justification for
Design of Control Building Watertight Hatches
a. Inspection Scope
The Watts Bar 1 integrated inspection report 05000390/2012005 identified a URI
associated with the design requirement that the two equipment hatches at elevation
708.0 feet in the control building be watertight. Section 3.8.4.1.1 of the UFSAR, and
Design Criteria WB-DC-20-21, Miscellaneous Steel Components for Category I
Structures, Revision 13, both specified the watertight design requirement for the floor
hatches (WBN-1-EQH-271-0008 and WBN-2-EQH-271-0008). In addition, Design
Criteria Document WB-DC-40-60, Special Hatches and Manways, Revision 6, Section
3.12.2.2, stated that the hatches must withstand a pressure of 1.3 psi from topside
(water to elevation 711.0 feet due to a turbine building (TB) flood resulting from a rupture
in the condenser circulating water (CCW) system).
As part of the inspectors review during the internal flooding inspection, it was noted that
Service Request (SR) 427917 (initiated September 5, 2011) reported:
Water leaking down into the EBR Chiller Room - Water leaking through the
equipment hatch (WBN-2-EQH-271-0008) seals and dripping down into the EBR
Chiller room and pooling in front of the door. Repair/replace leaking hatch seals and
the seals around the coffer dam. The source of water appears to be from rain water
entering the TB around the Steam & Feed line penetrations in the NE corner
elevation 729 feet, Unit-2 side. Cover/close/or seal these penetrations to prevent
rain water from entering TB.
This SR was closed to WO 112678945, and the WO was cancelled on May 9, 2012. It is
unlikely that the hatches are capable of being watertight at a pressure of 1.3 psi from
topside (water to elevation 711.0 feet) if they leak rain water from the floor at elevation
708.0 feet. According to UFSAR, Section 3.8.4.1.1, the covers (hatches) will remain
closed at all times during plant operation to ensure that essential safety equipment
located below elevation 708.0 feet is protected from water resulting from a CCW system
rupture in the turbine building.
Following the fourth quarter 2012 internal flooding inspection, the licensee prepared and
approved a new calculation, Calculation CDQ0010272013000268, Seismic II/I
Evaluation of the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) Piping and Condenser in the
Turbine Building, Rev. 4. This calculation provided the seismic II/I evaluations of the
CCW inlet and outlet piping and waterboxes to the condenser, and the condenser
anchorage for pressure boundary integrity under safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)
loads. The conclusion of the calculation stated that internal flooding of the turbine
building after an SSE event due to gross failure of the CCW piping need not be
postulated. This calculation was completed in support of Design Change Notice (DCN)
61571. The DCN documents that the turbine building watertight equipment hatches at
elevation 708.0 feet are no longer required to be maintained watertight. The CCW line
Enclosure
15
break is no longer postulated to flood the turbine building to a level of elevation 708.0
feet. This design change (documentation only) applies to both Watts Bar Unit 1 and Unit
2. All affected documents have been revised to reflect removal of the watertight design
requirement for the floor hatches (WBN-1-EQH-271-0008 and WBN-2-EQH-271-0008).
Based upon review and verification of this information for the floor hatches (WBN-1-
EQH-271-0008 and WBN-2-EQH-271-0008), the inspectors confirmed that current hatch
design was adequate, as documented in the calculation and DCN.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force
personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee
security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities
did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an
integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
On January 16, 2014, the resident inspectors presented the quarterly inspection results
to members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential
report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
Y. Aboulfaida, Systems Engineering
G. Arent, Licensing Manager
R. Bankes, Chemistry/Environmental Manager
L. Belvin, QA Manager
G. Boerschig, Plant Manager
M. Bottorff, Operations Superintendent
M. Casner, Site Engineering Director
T. Cleary, Site Vice President
S. Connors, Operations Manager
T. Detchemende, Emergency Preparedness Manager
K. Dietrich, Engineering Programs Manager
D. Gronek, Plant Manager
W. Hooks, Radiation Protection Manager
B. Hunt, Operations Support Superintendent
D. Jacques, Security Manager
T. Morgan, Licensing Engineer
D. Murphy, Maintenance Manager
W. Prevatt, Work Control Manager
R. Stroud, Site Licensing
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000390/2013005-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Control Non-Conforming or
Degraded Equipment. (Section 4OA2.1)
Closed
05000390/2012005-01 URI Engineering Justification for Design of Control
Building Watertight Hatches (Section 4OA5)
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
AOI-7.01, Maximum Probable Flood
PER 764536
PER 784020
PER 784059
PER 740086
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Power Checklist 3.02-1P
SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Checklist 3.02-1V
SOI-72.01, Containment Spray System Power Checklist 72.01-1P
SOI-72.01, Containment Spray System Valve Checklist 72.01-1V
SOI-74-01, Residual Heat Removal System Power Checklist 74.01-3P
SOI-74-01, Residual Heat Removal System Valve Checklist 74.01-3V
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Sections 3.6A.2, 3.4
WBNOSG4099, Moderate Energy Line Break Flooding Study
WO 114044412 and WO 114404417, 0-SI-77-1, 18 month channel calibration auxiliary building
passive sump loop 0-LPL-77-134
WO 114044408 and WO 114044401, 0-SI-77-2, 18 month channel calibration auxiliary building
passive sump loop 0-LPL-77-135
AOI-13, Rev. 1, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water
AOI-17, Rev. 0, Loss of Component Cooling Water System
PER 339112
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
DCN 61571
PER 652770
PER 666516
PER 667589
PER 669065
PER 671993
PER 689314
UFSAR Section 3.8.4.1.1
NPG Calculation WBNAPS2-165, Turbine Building Flooding Due to a Break in the Condenser
Circulating Water System, Rev. 7
NPG Calculation WCGE023, Review of Flood Protection Requirements for Watertight Doors
and Hatches, Rev. 4
Design Criteria Document WB-DC-40-60, Special Hatches and Manways, Rev. 6
Design Criteria Document WB-DC-20-21, Miscellaneous Steel Components for Category I
Structures, Rev. 13
WBN Maintenance Instruction MI-270-07, Visual Examination of Control and Auxiliary Building
Doors and Hatchways, Rev. 15
Attachment
3
Calculation CDQ0010272013000268, Seismic II/I Evaluation of the CCW Piping and Condenser
in the Turbine Building, Rev. 4
Procedure 1-AOI-9, Earthquake, Rev. 4
Procedure ARI-166-172, Miscellaneous & HPFP, Rev. 21
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Change Packages
TVA Radiological Emergency Plan, Revision 99 and 100
CECC EPIP-2, Operations Duty Specialist Procedure for Notification of Unusual Event,
Revision 43
CECC EPIP-3, Operations Duty Specialist Procedure for Alert, Revision 44
CECC EPIP-4, Operations Duty Specialist Procedure for Site Area Emergency, Revision 45
CECC EPIP-5, Operations Duty Specialist Procedure for General Emergency, Revision 50
CECC EPIP-7, CECC Radiological Assessment Staff Procedure for Alert, Site Area
Emergency, and General Emergency, Revision 34
TVA Radiological Emergency Plan, Revision 101
Evacuation Time Estimate Study Update
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
WO 115279843-Work around for CVCS dilution flow indicator
Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
CAP Corrective Action Program
CCS component cooling system
CCW condenser circulating water
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CY calendar year
DCN Design Change Notice
ERCW essential raw cooling water
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP inspection procedure
MCR main control room
NCV non-cited violation
NPG-SPP nuclear power group standard programs and processes
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OOS out of service
PER problem evaluation report
PDO prompt determination of operability
SDP Significance Determination Process
SR service request
SSCs structures, systems, or components
TDAFW turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater
TS technical specifications
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI unresolved item
WBN Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
WO work order
Attachment