ML13331B448
| ML13331B448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1989 |
| From: | Baskin K Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13331B158 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8903270166 | |
| Download: ML13331B448 (20) | |
Text
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
)
COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY )
for a Class 104(b) License to Acquire,
)
DOCKET NO. 50-206 Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as
)
Part of Unit No. 1 of the San Onofre Nuclear )
Amendment No. 167 Generating Station
)
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 167.
This amendment consists of Proposed Change No. 200 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13. Proposed Change No. 200 modifies the Technical Specifications incorporated in Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 as Appendix A.
Proposed Change No. 200 is a request to revise Appendix A Technical Specifications 3.14, "Fire Protection Systems Operability," and 4.15, "Fire Protection Systems Surveillance," for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (SONGS 1).
In the event of conflict, the information in Amendment Application No. 167 supersedes the information previously submitted.
Based on the significant hazards analysis provided in the Description of Proposed Change and Significant Hazards Analysis of Proposed Change No. 200, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.
8903270166 890320 PDR ADOCK 05000206 PD PDC
-2 Subscribed on this d
day of /
1989 Respectfully submitted, By:
Kenneth P. Baskin Vice President Subscribed and sworQ to before me this Ad~
day of
/
7A.
OFFIKIAL SEAL AGNES CRABTREE Notary Public-Califoia LOS ANGELES COUNTY my Comm. Exp. Sep. 14, 1990 Nota Public in and for the County of Los ngeles, State of California Charles R. Kocher James A. Beoletto Attorneys for Southern California Edison Company By:
James Beoleto 03800
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of SOUTHERN
)
CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
)
and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC
)
Docket No. 50-206 COMPANY San Onofre Nuclear
)
Generating Station Unit No. 1
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the Supplement to Amendment Application No. 167 was served on the following by deposit in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the 20th day of March
, 1989.
Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
Staff Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 David R. Pigott, Esq.
Samuel B. Casey, Esq.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 L. G. Hinkleman Bechtel Power Corporation P.O. Box 60860, Terminal Annex Los Angeles, California 90060 Michael L. Mellor, Esq.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges Two Embarcadero Center San Francisco, California 94111 Huey Johnson Secretary for Resources State of California 1416 Ninth Street Sacramento, California 95814 Janice E. Kerr, General Counsel California Public Utilities Commission 5066 State Building San Francisco, California 94102
-2 C. 3. Craig Manager U. S. Nuclear Projects I ESSD Westinghouse Electric Corporation Post Office Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 A. I. Gaede 23222 Cheswald Drive Laguna Niguel, California 92677 Frederick E. John, Executive Director California Public Utilities Commission 5050 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
'mes A. Beolefto 03720
DESCRIPTION AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 200 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-13 This is a request to revise Sections 3.14, "Fire Protection Systems Operability," and 4.15, "Fire Protection Systems Surveillance," of Appendix A Technical Specifications for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (SONGS 1).
This change incorporates and supercedes Proposed Change No. 136 submitted by Amendment Application No. 120 dated June 8, 1984, as revised by SCE to NRC letter dated December 17, 1985, and Proposed Changes No. 159 and No. 162 submitted by Amendment Application No. 136 dated May 19, 1986.
Additionally, this change incorporates resolution of the NRC staff's comments resulting from the March 23, 1988 meeting between SCE and the NRC staff.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES This proposed change incorporates and supercedes all previous changes to the San Onofre Unit 1 fire protection technical specifications. Several changes have been incorporated to resolve NRC staff comments, to reformat consistent with standard technical specifications, and to clarify where necessary. These changes are discussed below:
- 1) Renumbering and addition of titles were incorporated to enhance readability of the proposed specifications and to provide format consistent with Standard Technical Specifications.
- 2) Revised the LCO for proposed specification 3.14.1, "Fire Suppression Water System," to clarify the requirement for the operability of at least one fire pump from Unit 1.
- 3) Revised the action statement of proposed specification 3.14.1, "Fire Suppression Water System," to include the special reporting requirements of the Standard Technical Specifications per agreements reached with the NRC staff.
- 4) Revised the footnote to the appropriate proposed action statements to include the agreements reached with the NRC staff on backup fire suppression capability. In addition, this footnote was modified to clarify the requirement for backup fire suppression capability for the containment fire area. Once containment integrity has been established, it is not practical to breech the containment boundary to run fire hose during plant operation.
- 5) Revised the footnote to the appropriate proposed action statements to include the agreements reached with the NRC staff on temporary inaccessibility of fire areas.
01
-2
- 6) Revised the action statement for proposed specification 3.14.2 to provide temperature monitoring in containment should suppression become inoperable.
- 7) Revised the action statement for proposed specification 3.14.5, "Fire Hose Stations," to permit storage of hose in an easily accessible area if it would represent a recognizable hazard to plant workers. Revised proposed Table 3.14.5.1, "Fire Hose Stations," to include two hose stations not previously listed. Review of the required fire hose stations table identified that these hose stations which could be used to provide protection of safety-related or safe shutdown equipment were excluded.
- 8) Revised the action statement for proposed specification 3.14.4, "Halon Systems," to allow for consideration of the double bank capability of the Halon system. The automatic halon systems consist of double bottle banks to assure second Halon application capability. Both bottle banks must be in service for the system to remain fully operable. With only one halon bank in service, the system continues to provide a level of protection and a hourly fire watch is provided as a compensatory measure. With both halon banks of the same system out of service, a constant fire watch with backup suppression is provided. These action statements along with the availability of the site full-time fire department ensure that an adequate level of fire protection is provided at all times.
The change permits for an hourly fire watch when only one halon bottle bank is inoperable. The other operable bank would be sufficient for fire suppression capability.
- 9) The LCO has been revised to permit temperature monitoring for 2 of 3 reactor coolant pumps upon loss of detection within containment. The temperature monitoring will be made at the lower and upper portion of the RCPs hourly. Since all three RCPs are closely confined within the biological shield, a fire associated with the third RCP would be detected by temperature monitoring the adjacent RCPs. Outside the biological shield temperature monitoring will be provided hourly at 3 of 5 locations. Four equipment locations were chosen since this equipment ventilates (or supplies) most areas of the containment having fixed combustibles. The sphere space is monitored because heat associated with a fire would rise into the sphere space. Thus, the sphere space acts as a plenum capturing heat from a fire. The spatial distribution of the sample locations and the air collection ability of the equipment assures fire within containment will be detected by temperature monitoring.
Proposed Table 3.14.6.1, "Fire Detection Instruments," is revised to indicate early warning and actuation detector per agreements reached with the NRC staff. Additionally, the note to proposed Table 3.14.6.1, on which detectors are excluded from the the table, has been revised for clarification per.agreements reached with the NRC staff.
- 10)
Revised the LCO for proposed specification 3.14.7, "Fire Barriers," to include the required non-rated fire barriers as well as the rated barriers per agreements reached with the NRC staff.
-3
- 11)
Revised the action statement for proposed specification 3.14.8, "Dedicated and Alternate Shutdown Systems," to include the Standard Technical Specifications action statement, including the requirement for plant shutdown, per agreements reached with the NRC staff. Provisions are made to determine boron concentration utilizing either potentiometric analysis or the PASS boronometer to determine safe shutdown margins.
Additionally, this specification has been renumbered to be included in Specification 3.14, "Fire Protection."
- 12)
Revised the action statement for proposed specifications 3.14.9, "Eight Hour Emergency Lighting Units," to be consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications per agreements reached with the NRC staff.
Additionally, this specification has been renumbered to be included in Specification 3.14, "Fire Protection."
- 13)
Revised the basis of proposed technical specification 3.14 to reflect the changes discussed above, as appropriate.
- 14)
Revised the surveillance requirement of specification 4.15.1, "Fire Water Suppression System," to require a system flush every 18 months per agreement reached with the NRC staff. The requirement of E.4 has been changed to maintain 95 psig reflecting the minimum pressure needed when the Unit 1 fire main is aligned to the Unit 2/3 fire main via the cross-tie.
- 15)
Revised the surveillance requirement of proposed specification 4.15.6, "Fire Detection Instruments," to include surveillance of NFPA 72D supervision circuits per agreements reached with the NRC staff. The Standard Technical Specification requirement for non-supervised circuits was excluded since all the required detectors at Unit 1 have supervisory circuits. Also, included in the basis is a description of the CHANNEL CHECK criteria for detectors.
- 16)
Revised the surveillance requirements of proposed specification 4.15.7.1, "Fire Doors," to incorporate the Standard Technical Specifications wording on locked close fire door position surveillance per agreements reached with NRC staff.
- 17)
Revised the surveillance requirements of proposed specification 4.15.9 for the testing of emergency lights.
- 18)
Revised the basis of proposed technical specification 4.15 for clarification.
EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION The existing Technical Specifications are included as Attachment 1. Proposed Change No. 136 submitted by Amendment Application No. 92 dated June 8, 1984, as revised by SCE to NRC letter dated December 17, 1985, and Proposed Changes No. 159 and No. 162 submitted by Amendment Application No. 136 dated May 19, 1986, were utilized in the development of this change package. The change bars provided in the right margin in this proposed change indicate where the previous proposed changes have been modified.
-4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See Attachment 2.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION See Attachment 3.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS As required by 10CRF50.91(a)(1), this analysis is provided to demonstrate that a proposed license amendment to implement the proposed fire protection technical specifications for SONGS 1 represents a no significant hazards consideration. In accordance with the the three factor test of 10CFR50.92(c),
implementation of the proposed amendment was analyzed using the following standards and found not to: 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences for an accident previously evaluated; or 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in margin of safety.
DISCUSSION The proposed Fire Protection Technical Specifications for San Onofre Unit 1 have been under review for several years. During this time the proposed changes have evolved due to plant modifications, changes to the Unit 1 Fire Protection Program, compliance with10CFR50 Appendix R requirements and interaction with NRC staff members. Proposed Change No. 200 incorporates all these changes and supercedes all previous proposed changes to the Fire Protection Technical Specifications. SCE has reviewed and determined that the safety analysis provided with Amendment Application No. 120 dated June 8, 1984, as supplemented by SCE submittal dated April 1, 1986, for Proposed Change 136 and Amendment Application No. 136 dated May 19, 1986, for Proposed Changes No. 159 and No. 162, is applicable and there is no change to the previous conclusions.
ANALYSIS Conformance of the proposed amendments to the standards for a determination of no significant hazard as defined in 10CFR50.92 (three factor test) is shown in the following:
- 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
RESPONSE: NO Proposed Change No. 200 adds operability and surveillance requirements for equipment which has been installed to improve the Fire Protection Program at San Onofre Unit 1, in accordance with NRC I
-5 requirements. This equipment will reduce the probability and/or consequences of a fire. Additionally, spurious operation of this equipment has been evaluated and determined not to significantly affect plant operation. Therefore, operation of San Onofre Unit 1 in accordance with Proposed Change 200 will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.
- 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
RESPONSE: NO Proposed Change No. 200 incorporates changes to the approved Fire Protection Program at San Onofre Unit 1 into the technical specifications.
The proposed specifications assure that the required equipment is maintained operable or compensatory measures are implemented in compliance with the Fire Hazards Analysis for San Onofre Unit 1. Therefore, operation in accordance with Proposed Change No. 200 will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Will operation of the facility in accordance withthis proposed change involve a significant reduction in margin of safety?
RESPONSE: NO Proposed Change No. 200 will assure that degradation of the required Fire Protection equipment will be detected and repaired or compensatory measures implemented. Therefore, operation of San Onofre Unit 1, in accordance with Proposed Change No. 200, will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
SAFETY AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above, it is concluded that: (1) Proposed Change No. 200 does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFR50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.
0777n
ATTACHMENT 1 EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.14 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.15 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE
3.14 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS OPERABILITY Applicability:
Applies to the operating status of the fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment at all times.
Objective:
To ensure availability of fire protection systems.
40 3/8/78 Specification:
A.
As a minimum, the following fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment shall be operable.
1
- 1. The Fire Suppression Water Systems with:
- a. Any two of the following four pumps operable each with a capacity of 1000 gallons per minute with their discharge aligned to the fire main:
(1) San Onofre Unit 1 fire water pumps (2) 50 7/19/79 (2) San Onofre Units 2&3 motor driven fire water pumps (2)
- b. With San Onofre Unit I fire water pumps satisfying the pump requirement, the San Onofre 40 Unit 1 service water reservoir supply available 3/8/78 containing a minimum of 300,000 gallons reserved for fire fighting.
- c. With San Onofre Units 2&3 fire pumps satisfying the pump requirement, the San Onofre Units 2&3 service and fire water storage tanks available with 300,000 gallons reserved for fire 50 fighting.
7/19/79
- d. With a combination of the four pumps satisfying the pump requirement, the separate water supplies for each pump(s) available as indicated in A(1)b and A(1)c above.
- e. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the separate supplies per A(1)b or A(1)c above and transferring the water through 50 distribution piping with OPERABLE section-7/19/79 alizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves and the first valve upstream of each sprinkler, hose standpipe or spray system riser, required to be OPERABLE per Specifications 3.14.A.(2) and 3.14.A(3).
3-98 Revised:
11/30/79
- 2. The Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems located in the following areas:
- a. Containment sphere. This includes a refueling water pump, 240,000 gallons of water in the Refueling Water Storage Tank and associated system valves. During refueling operations, when the Refueling Water Storage Tank water has been 40 transferred to the refueling cavity, backup fire 3/8/78 suppression equipment shall be provided.
- b. Lube oil reservoir and conditioner.
- c. Hydrogen seal oil.
- d. Diesel generator building.
- 3. The Fire Hose Stations indicated in Table 3.14.1.
- 4. The Fire Detection Instrumentation for each fire detection area or zone indicated in Table 3.14.2.
B. In the event a limiting condition for operation for the fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment indicated in A above is not met, the following corrective measure shall be taken:
- 1. The Fire Suppression Water System
- a. With less than the required equipment indicated in A(l) above, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within seven days or in lieu of 40 any other report required by Specification 6.9 3/8/78 prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.3.c within the next thirty days outlining the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not 93 applicable.
5/30/86
- b. With no Fire Suppression Water System operable; (1) Establish a backup Fire Suppression Water System within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and (2) In lieu of any other reports required by Specification 6.9, submit a special report in accordance with Specification 6.9.3.c; (a) By telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, 3-99 Revised:
6/17/86
(b) Confirmed by telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission no later than the first working day following the event, and (c) In writing within 14 days following the event, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.
(3) If B.(l)b.l and 2.(a) above cannot be fulfilled, place the reactor in Hot Standby within six (6) hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following thirty (30) hours.
- 2. The Spray and/or Sprinkler System
- a. With a spray and/or sprinkler system inoperable establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire 40 suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s),
within one hour.
- b. Restore the system to operable status within fourteen days or in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.3.c within the next thirty days outlining the action taken, the cause of inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 93 are not applicable.
5/30/86
- 3.
The Fire Hose Stations With one or more of the fire hose stations indicated in Table 3.14.1 inoperable, route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area from an operable hosestation within one hour. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not 93 applicable.
5/30/8
- 4. The Fire Detection Instrumentation With one or more of the fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.14.2 inoperable.
- a. Within one hour, establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour with the exception of the zones inside containment where 40 the following alternative instrumentation shall be 3/8/78 utilized:
3-100 Revised:
6/17/86
(1) Inside the -secondary shield: temperature indication of air after primary coolant motor cooling fan unit, primary coolant motor space, and reactor coolant pump lower bearing coolant temperature, motor winding temperature and oil lubricated bearing temperature.
(2) Outside the secondary shield:
temperature of control rod cooler discharge, control rod shroud air inlet, sphere space, and control rod cooler inlet; closed circuit television camera.
- b. Restore the inoperable instrument(s) to operable status within fourteen days, or in lieu of any other report required.by Specification 6.9, 40 prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 3/8/78 6.9.3.c within the next thirty days outlining the course of action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument(s) to operable status.
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 93 are not applicable.
5/30/86 BASIS:
The operability of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The Fire Suppression Systems consist of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression system is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.
In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the affected equipment is restored to service.
In the event that the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a twenty-four hour report to the Commission provides.for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measure to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.
3-101 Revised: 6/17/86
The operability of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.
This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.
Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for 40 damage to safety related equipment and is an integral 3/8/78 element in the overall facility fire protection program.
In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is returned to service.
Reference:
- 1.
Fire Protection Program Review, BTP APCSB 9.5-1, San Onofre tuclear Generating Station, Unit I, March 1977; submitted to the NRC by letter dated March 16, 1977 in Docket No. 50-206.
3-102 Revised:
11/30/79
Table 3.14.1 FIRE HOSE STATIONS Fire Area or Zone Inside Sphere One Reactor Auxiliary Building, Lower Level One Boric Acid Injection Pump Room One Turbine Plant Cooling Water Area One Chemical Feed and Lubricating-Oil One Reservoir Area East Feedwater Pump/Condenser Area Three West Feedwater Pump/Condenser Area Two Turbine and Heater Decks Six Administration/Control Building, One First Floor Single-Story Office Area Administration/Control Building, First One Floor Health Physics and Locker Area Control Room Area One Administration/Control Building, One Third Floor East Office Space and Storage Diesel-Generator Room No. 1 One Diesel-Enclosure Room No. 2 One Sphere Enclosure Cable Penetration Four Area Administration/Control Building, One Second Floor North Stairwell 40 3/8/78 3-103 Revised:
11/30/79
Table 3.14.2 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Minimum Instruments Operable Zone:
Location Infrared Scanners Smoke 1
DC switchgear and battery room 3
2 480-V switchgear room
-7 3
4160-V switchgear room 15 4
Exciter and MCC3 area 15 Control room and third floor 12 administration building 8
Turbine lube oil reservoir 28 9
Containment sphere inside 5
secondary shield 10 Containment sphere outside 5
secondary shield 11 Reactor auxiliary building 7
and storage rooms 16 Sphere enclosure building 11 DG 1 Diesel Generator Room No. 1 2
2 DG 2 Diesel Generator Room No. 2 2
2 NOTE:
Fire Detection Zones 5, 6, 12, 13, 14 and 15 do not contain safety related equipment, nor do they contain potential fire hazards to safety related equipment.
40 3/8/78 3-104 Revised:
11/30/79
4.15 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE APPLICABILITY: Applies to the surveillance of fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment.
OBJECTIVE:
To ensure the OPERABILITY of fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment.
SPECIFICATION: A. The Fire Suppression Water System shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE.
(1) Withthe San Onofre Unit 1 fire water pumps satisfying the pump requirements of Technical Specification 3.14.A(1), at least once per seven days by verifying the water supply volume in the San 40 Onofre Unit 1 Service Water Reservoir. With the 3/8/78 San Onofre Units 2 and 3 fire water pumps satisfying the pump requirements of Technical Specification 3.14.A(1), by initially verifying the water supply volume in the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 service and firewater storage tanks and at least once per seven days thereafter.
(2) At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by starting each pump satisfying the pump requirements of Technical Specification 3.14.A(1) and operating it for at least fifteen minutes.
(3) At least once per thirty-one days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) is in its correct position. For valves located inside the containment sphere, verification shall be made 43 consistent with the 31-day requirement when possible 3/8/78 during available plant outages or during containment entrances for other reasons.
(4) At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable 50 valve through one complete cycle of full travel.
7/1979 (5) At least once per 18 months by performing a system 40 functional test which includes simulated actuation of 3/8/78 the system and:
- a. Verifying that each valve in the flow path is in its correct position.
- b. Verifying that each pump develops at least 90% of the flow and head at some point on the manufacturer's pump performance curves.
- c. Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and Typo Revision:
11/28/84 4-87 Revised:
05/24/78
- d.
Verifying that each pump starts to supply the 50 fire suppression water system at >50 psig.
7/19/79 (6) At least once per 36 months by performing flow tests of the system in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition, published by National Fire Protection Association.
B. The Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems indicated in Technical Specification 3.14.A(2) shall be demonstrated to be operable:
(1) At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel. For the valves located in the containment sphere, testing shall be performed consistent with the 12-month requirement when possible during available plant outages.
(2) -At least once per 18 months.
40 3/8/78
- a. By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:
- 1. Verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a smoke and infrared test signal, and
- 2. Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
- b. By inspection of the spray headers to verify their integrity, and (3) By inspection of each nozzle at least once every refueling outage to verify no blockage.
(4) At least once every second refueling outage by performing an air flow test through each accessible spray/sprinkler header and verifying that the spray/sprinkler nozzles are unobstructed.
C. Each Fire Hose Station indicated in Table 3.14.1 shall be verified to be operable:
(1) At least once per 31 days by visual inspection of the station to assure all equipment is at the station.
For the station located in the containment sphere, inspection shall be performed consistent with the 31 days requirement when possible during available plant outages or during containment entrances for other reasons.
4-88 Revised: 5/24/78 I
(2)
At least once per 18 months by removing the hose for inspection and re-racking and replacing all degraded gaskets in the couplings.
(3) At least once per 36 months, partially open each hose 40 station valve to verify valve operability and no 3/8/78 blockage.
For the hose station located in the containment sphere, this verification shall be performed every other refueling outage.
(4) At least once per 36 months conduct a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure at least 50 psig greater than the maximum pressure available at that hose station. For the hose station located in the containment sphere, this test shall be performed every other refueling outage.
D. Each of the Fire Detection Instruments indicated in Table 3.14.2 shall be demonstrated to be operable:
(1) At least once per six months by performance of a channel functional test.
For the instrumentation located in the containment sphere, the test shall be conducted consistent with the six-month requirement when possible during available plant outages.
BASIS:
Refer to the Basis for Technical Specification 3.14.
40 3/8/78
Reference:
- 1. Refer to Reference I for Technical Specification 3.14.
4-89 Revised: 5/24/78