ML13330B128
| ML13330B128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1986 |
| From: | Medford M Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | Lear G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8611050278 | |
| Download: ML13330B128 (4) | |
Text
Southem California Edison Company P. 0.
BOX BOO 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD. CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (818) 302-1749 AND LICENSING October 31, 1986 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
G. E. Lear, Director PWR Project Directorate No. 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206 Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators Recent 10 CFR 21 Reports from TDI San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1
References:
(A) Letter J. A. Zwolinski (NRC) to K. P. Baskin (SCE),
dated June 17, 1985 Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI)
Diesel Generators-Recent 10CFR Part 21 Reports from TDI (B) Letter M. 0. Medford (SCE) to 3. A. Zwolinski (NRC),
dated August 14, 1985, Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI)
Diesel Generators Recent 10CFR21 Reports from TDI By Reference (A) you requested Southern California Edison (SCE) to identify 10 CFR Part 21 reports issued by TDI since April 1984 which concerned problems potentially applicable to San Onofre Unit 1, but which were not addressed in the DR/QR report for Unit 1. You also requested that SCE describe actions taken to assess whether these potential problems exist at San Onofre Unit 1, causes of any such problems, short and long term corrective actions to be taken and implementation schedules.
By Reference (B), SCE provided this information to you.
As further requested by Reference (A), our Reference (B) letter provided a commitment to update the above information regarding any subsequent TDI 10 CFR Part 21 reports, pending issuance of the NRC's safety evaluation
,,,10502A76 05002o6 ee P.'(e 4eoiK 49' I
S Mr. G. E. Lear
-2 for the San Onofre Unit 1 diesel generators. Accordingly, enclosed is information describing SCE's actions relative to TDI 10 CFR Part 21 notifications that were issued between August 1, 1985 and August 30, 1986.
If you have any questions, please let me know.
Very truly yours, Enclosure cc: R. F. Dudley, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Unit 1 F. R. Huey, Senior NRC Site Inspector, San Onofre
TABLE SHOWING SCE'S ACTIONS RELATIVE TO TDI 10 CFR 21 REPORTS (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
SCE's ACTIONS TO ASSESS DATE OF IF POTENTIAL PROBLEM 10CFR21 POTENTIAL PROBLEM, CAUSES EXISTS AT SAN ONOFRE SHORT & LONG TERM IMPLEMENTATION REPORT
& TDI'S RECOMMENDATION UNIT 1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SCHEDULES 11/1/85 A potential problem exists with On 12/10/85, subject welds NONE N/A American Air Filter (AAF) Model were inspected on DG#1.
TDM and FTDM intake silencers, All welds were satisfac as reported in AAF to NRC letter tory. On 4/12/86, sub dated 9/3/85. It is remotely ject welds were inspected possible that the intake silencer on DG#2. All welds were has an internal part not welded satisfactory.
in place. If the part is not welded in place as required by the design, it is possible for it to be ingested into the engine upon startup. AAF recommended physical inspection of the silencers to verify that both end caps of the centerline "bullet" of the silencer are properly welded on to the cylindrical section.
11/6/85 A potential problem exists with On 12/2/85 all springs on Short Term:
None Minimum of 25% spring the engine's intake and exhaust DG#l were inspected for color Long Term:
Selectively change out on each en valve springs which could result code, cracked or broken replace Betts springs gine at the next refuel in engine non-availability.
springs and shot peening with qualified replace-ing outage. Remaining The valve springs are manufac-uniformity.
All springs had ment springs.
springs to be chang at tured by Betts Spring Co. and white stripes.
All springs subsequent refuelinW are identified by a white stripe were satisfactory.
intervals. NOTE: If painted on the spring. On one On 3/11/86 all springs on engine Group I heads are ship, eleven springs failed with-' DG#2 were inspected for color replaced with Group III in a short time.
code, cracked or broken heads, the springs in thi Failure was after 5,000 to 7,000 springs and shot peening uni-Group III heads will be operating hours.
Preliminary formity. All springs had new and qualified for indications revealed material white stripes. All springs nuclear service.
impurities, draw marks from the were satisfactory.
manufacturing process and incom plete shot peening. TDI request ed all users to inspect their en gines for broken springs.
-2 TABLE SHOWING SCE'S ACTIONS RELATIVE TO TDI 10 CFR 21 REPORTS (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
SCE's ACTIONS TO ASSESS DATE OF IF POTENTIAL PROBLEM 10CFR21 POTENTIAL PROBLEM, CAUSES EXISTS AT SAN ONOFRE SHORT & LONG TERM IMPLEMENTATION REPORT
& TDI'S RECOMMENDATION UNIT 1.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SCHEDULES 3/10/86 A potential problem could exist San Onofre Unit 1was erro-Based on significant N/A with the Lube Oil (LO) Sump Tank neously placed on TDI's list design differences Foot Valve. At Carolina Power of affected nuclear sites.
between the diesel and Light's Shearon Harris plant, By notification dated 5/8/86, generator lube oil the elastomer liner in the foot TDI informed the NRC of this system in use at valve mounted in the LO Sump Tank error.
Shearon Harris and was found in pieces. TDI recom-that at San Onofre mended that all affected utili-Unit 1, the potential ties inspect the condition of the problem identified in foot valve liners.
the notification has been determined to be not applicable to San Onofre Unit
- 1.
7/2/86 A potential problem exists with In May 1986 SCE completed Short Term:
None At next connecting the fastening of the engine's connecting rod inspections Long Term:
Per TDI in-rod inspection, which connecting rod assembly, which recommended by the DRQR spection procedures is scheduled to could result in engine non-avail-report.
All connecting rod dated 8/13/86, 1) take place at ability.
In two separate ship fasteners were torqued to TDI Change out all Cycle X refueling propulsion applications, rod as-specifications and the torque connecting rod washers outage.
semblies wereBfound cracked after verified by SCE and by to new style N
13,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and 21,800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> Failure Analysis Associates electroless nickle of operation.
TDI investigations using ultrasonic method.
plated washers (P/N revealed that the connecting rod R-1317) ii) Inspect cracking was caused by insuffi-connecting rod bolts, dgent clamping force applied repair or replace as through the rod bolting.
On necessary and then 8/13/86, TDI issued inspection reinstall.
procedures for connecting rod washer replacement and connecting rod bolt inspection, repair and reinstallation.
TDI recommended that these procedures be implemented at the next scheduled connecting rod inspection.
7445 F