ML13319A857

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Root Cause Evaluation of 4 Kv Breaker Secondary Contact Block Failure
ML13319A857
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 08/11/1995
From: Mostafa M, Riddle J, Strom W
Southern California Edison Co
To:
Shared Package
ML13319A856 List:
References
RCE-95-010, RCE-95-10, NUDOCS 9511150379
Download: ML13319A857 (48)


Text

ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION OF 4KV BREAKER SECONDARY CONTACT BLOCK FAILURE RCE 95-010 ATTACHMENT #1 9511150379 951107 PDR ADOCK 05000206 s

PDR

ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION OF 4KV BREAKER SECONDARY CONTACT BLOCK FAILURE RCE 95-010 AUGUST 11, 1995 AUTHORED BY:

J.

. Riddle Root Cause Engineer M.S.

Mosta PhD Sr, Root Cause Engineer REVIEWED BY:

_</__

W.W. Strom, Supervisor Independent Safety Engineering APPROVED BY:

A.J.

Schramm, Manager Safety Engineering

CLARIFICATION OF PURPOSE This report is intended to be a self-critical use of hindsight to identify all problems and the sources of those problems.

The root causes identified in this report were discovered and analyzed using all information and results available at the time it was written. All such information was, of course, not available during the timeframe in which relevant actions were taken and decisions were made.

The purpose of using such a self-critical approach is to provide the most comprehensive analysis possible for identifying "lessons learned" as a basis for improving future performance.

The use of an open, documented self-critical analysis program is imperative in the nuclear power industry and cannot be compromised or confused with a management prudency assessment.

Thus, this report does not attempt to make a balanced judgement of the prudency or reasonableness of any of the actions or decisions that were taken by vendors, utility management, or individual personnel based on the information that was known or available to them at the time.

0vialet

TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

BACKGROUND 6

EVIDENCE COLLECTION.

........ 7 LABORATORY ANALYSIS AND TESTING.

..... 8 ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION.

13 IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER SUSCEPTIBLE ITEMS..........

13 OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW.

13 10 CFR 21 EVALUATION 14 OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT 14 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 14 PHOTODOCUMENTATION ATTACHMENT I CONTACTOR APPLICATION SCHEMATICS ATTACHMENT II VENDOR DATA ATTACHMENT III METALLURGICAL REFERENCE ATTACHMENT IV HARDNESS TEST AND MATERIAL ANALYSIS DATA

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

At the return to service of Component Cooling Water Pump 3PO26, on June 13, 1995, the control room had no indication from the breaker when the DC was turned on.

The subsequent investigation determined that an electrical contact finger had broken in the stationary secondary contact block for the 4KV breaker in 3AO605.

Laboratory analysis of the failed contact block and three other contact blocks of the same vintage revealed that the root cause of failure was the use of hardened, brittle brass material in the manufacturing of the contact fingers.

Cracks and work hardening were induced in the finger bends during fabrication.

Mechanical cycling during removal and insertion of the breaker further hardened the material eventually causing an overload fracture.

The corrective actions for this event are identified as follows:

-Provide an operability assessment for the affected Safety Related trains.

-Issue NCR's against each Class 1E 4KV Switchgear with operability requiring checking of proper functioning after racking in the breaker.

-Ordered replacement Class 1E contact blocks from ABB. with verification that the strips meet the current specification which is a softer material and not susceptible to cracking.

-Replace all Class 1E Unit 3 Train A contact blocks during the Unit 3 Cycle 8 outage in July/August 1995 and evaluate the removed contact blocks for.cracking problems.

-Replace Class 1E Unit 2 Train A and B and Unit 3 Train B contact blocks during scheduled online equipment outages with full replacement complete no later then the end of the U2/3, Cycle 9 outage.

-Sent failed contact block to ABB for Part 21 evaluation.

5

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 BACKGROUND

-t. the return to service of Component Cooling Water Pump 3PO26, on June 13, 1995, the control room had no indication from the breaker when the DC was turned on.

The subsequent investigation determined that a finger in the stationary secondary contact assembly (referred hereafter as the "contact block") for the 4KV breaker in 3AO605 had broken.

The contact block was removed and delivered to the Root Cause Group for failure analysis and Root Cause Evaluation. Reference NCR 95060044 and MO 95060799001.

The following NCR's were written to address the operability of the Class 1E 4KV Switchgear:

NCR 95060065 Bus 2AO4 NCR 95060069 Bus 2A06 NCR 95060070 Bus 3AO4 NCR 95060071 Bus 3AO6 The Busses are considered operable based on a seismic review, verification of contact connection when the breaker is racked in, and the fact that the fracturing of the contact block fingers only occurs when racking in/out the breakers.

A detailed discussion is in the Operability Assessment section of this report.

Three (3) additional contact blocks were supplied to support the analysis.

The first sample was a contact block from spare position 2AO602, removed under MO 95060832.

The second sample was an unused warehouse stock unit.

The third sample was removed from the Salt Water Cooling Pump 2P114, breaker location 2A0611, under MO 95061249. The 2P114 contact block was selected because there had been a relatively large number of rack in/out cycles on the breaker. All three samples are of the same manufacturing vintage as the failed unit.

6

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 EVIDENCE COLLECTION The contact blocks were originally manufactured for ITE Metal Clad 4KV switchgear by Brown Boveri aS part number 834838-Ti.

The material Code for the block is 02-26208.

The current vendor, ABB Power T&D Company, was contacted and they have no history of problems with the contact blocks.

The specification sheet and Critical Characteristic Analysis for the contact block fingers was obtained for correlation of the laboratory analysis data. The specification sheets are in the attachments to this report.

A review of maintenance history revealed only two (2) failures in 155 breakers in the past 15 years.

This includes the current failure in 3AO605 and a failure in 1990 in 3AO606 documented in NCR 90090043.

The 1990 failure was considered an isolated incident.

An NPRDS search revealed no records of failed contacts on ABB breakers.

Nine utilities with ABB 4KV breakers were contacted and they have not experienced any problems with contact block finger breakage with the exception of a contact finger failure at Waterford which was caused by misalignment of the breaker when racking it in.

7

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 LABORATORY ANALYSIS AND TESTING The contact fingers -:ere arbitrarily numbered 1 through 12 to facilitate the analysis.

These contact numbers correspond to the electrical connection numbering scheme in the following way:

Analysis Electrical Numbering Numbering 2

7 3

13 4

14 5

3 6

7 6

8 9

9 10 10 15 11 4

12.

2 3AO605 Contact Block Preliminary examination of the 3AO605 contact block revealed that one of the contact fingers (74) was fractured at the 90 degree bend at the inside end of the long section. See Figures 1, 2 and

3. The four bends in the contact fingers are designated A through D. See Figure 4. The fracture and cracks on this contact block are at bend C. Cracks were present in two other contact fingers

(#9 & #10)- at the same location.

See Figures 5 and 6.

Scanning Electron Microscope examination (SEM) of the fracture face on contact 4 revealed a fresh intergranular fracture which is a sign of embrittled material.

See Figure 10.

Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) of the contact finger surface revealed that it was silver plated. See Figure 11.

EDS of the base material revealed that it was 70% copper and 30% zinc which is a 70/30 brass.

See figures 12 and 13.

No contamination was present on or near the fracture surface.

8

RCZ 95-010 August 11, 1995

-ie fractured area of contact 4 was mounted for metallurgical cross sectioning and the sample was cross sectioned from the side into the base metal. Microhardness testing.was performed on the

.ase metal at bend B and in the straight section between bend B ad the fracture area at bend C. The Rockwell Hardness, b scale, the bend was 91.

The Rockwell Hardness, b scale, in the

-traight area was 71.

This data indicates that the bend area is ardened and embrittled in the bend area.

All of the Hardness testing data is in an Attachment to this report.

Cntical microscope examination of the cross sectioned fracture area on contact 4 revealed a grain structure indicative of Extra zard temper.

See Figure 7. Intergranular cracks extended into the brass from the fracture face.

The fracture face was also along grain boundaries. Optical microscopy of the cross section

=t bend B revealed a small intergranular crack in the inner diameter of the bend. The grain structure in the bend area was characteristic of Extra Hard temper.

See Figures 8 and 9. The arain structure in the straight area, away from the bend, was characteristic of Hard temper.

A mechanical fatigue test was performed on the 3AO605 Contactor Block to determine the number of insertion and removals were required to fracture the cracked fingers.

A fixture was fabricated with the mating contacts to the same dimensions as on the breaker.

Finger 12 fractured on the thirty-second insertion in the fixture.

The finger fractured across the preexistent crack at bend C.

Optical Emission Spectrometry was performed on samples from all 12 contact fingers.

The analysis confirmed that the base

-.aterial was 70/30 brass in all cases.

The Current ABB specification for the contact material is Alloy 230 which is an 85% copper, 15% zinc brass which is less brittle than Alloy 260, 70% copper, 30% zinc.

The material specification was changed to alloy 230 in 1982.

Information from the vendor on the material specification prior to 1982 was not available.

9

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 2AO602 Spare Contact Block Optical microscope inspection of the 2AO602 contact block revealed that nine of the twelve contact fingers had cracks.

The cracks were mostly on the outer diameter of bend B and D. The inner diameter of the bends could not be inspected until the fingers were removed.

The contact block was disassembled by mechanical means.

First, an attempt was made to open bend D but four of the five fingers cracked at the bend during this process.

It is significant that contact finger 10 was removed by opening the D'bend and the finger did not crack. It was decided that the most effective way to recover the fingers was to cut them in half along the straight section. This procedure keeps the bend areas intact for inspection and analysis.

Contact 10 was subjected to several cycles of reverse bending at an original bend area and no cracks developed.

The finger was cross sectioned. Examination of the microstructure revealed that the grain structure in the straight area was characteristic of Half Hard temper and the grain structure at the bend was characteristic of a less brittle material and consequently less work hardening. See Figures 14 and 15. Metallurgical examination of other fingers revealed the same Extra Hard temper condition as on.the failed contact block.

Microhardness testing on contact 7 revealed a Rockwell hardness, b scale, of 72 and 94 on the straight and bent areas, respectively.

Microhardness testing on contact 10 revealed a Rockwell hardness,.b scale, of 76 and 90 on the straight and bent areas, respectively.

Note that the Hardness numbers are similar for both contacts while contact 10 is significantly more ductile as indicated in the microstructure. Microhardness is not a sensitive indicator for slight variations in material temper.

10

RCE 95-010 August 1,

1995 Warehouse Contact Block Optical microscope examination of the unused contact block obtained from the warehouse revealed cracks at the outer diameter radius of the B bend on all the contact fingers.

The contact fingers were removed from the block by sawing the fingers in half at the center of the straight section.

Inspection of the inner diameter of the bends revealed cracks in all the samples at the B bend.

Contacts 7 and 8 were examined in the SEM to document the surface cracks at bend B. See Figures 16 and 17.

Both contacts were cross sectioned to determine the depth of the cracks and the microstructure.

The inner diameter crack on contact 7 was deep, approximately one third of the thickness of the contact.

See Figures 18 and 19.

The grain structure at the bend was characteristic of Extra Hard temper and the grain structure in the straight area is characteristic of Hard temper. The cracks on contact 8 were shallower than those on contact 7. See Figures 20 and 21.

The grain structure at the bend was characteristic of Extra Hard temper and the grain structure in the straight area is characteristic of Hard temper.

Microhardness testing on three contacts revealed the following Rockwell Hardness, b scale, data:

Contact straight area bend area 4

83 90 7

78.5 91.5 8

76 91.5 The material condition of the unused block is similar to that of the failure and the spare block. The unused block from the warehouse is to be of the same vintage as the blocks installed in the plant.

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 2A0611 Contact Block The contact block was removed from the plant because it was installed on Salt Water Cooling Pump P114 and is considered to have a large number of insertion and removal cycles.

See Figures 22 and 23.

Optical examination of the contact fingers revealed cracks on the outer diameter of the B Bend on contacts 2, 5,

6 and 11.

See Figures 24 through 27.

The contact block was cycled in the test fixture 500 times and the cracks did not grow perceptibly. The test cycling was so extensive that the silver plating was scraped off the brass fingers.

This test demonstrated that cracks in the fingers do not necessarily grow to fracture in the short term.

New Contact Finger Material In the process of reordering contact blocks for replacement of all unit 3 Train A applications during the U3C8 outage, a sample of twenty contact finger bars were obtained from ABB.

Elemental analysis of the bars revealed that they were Alloy 230, 85%

copper and 15% zinc in accordance with the current ABB specification. The Rockwell b scale hardness was found to be in the range of 40-60.

According to the ASTM B36 Standard, the material is in the Quarter Hard temper range which is less likely to crack in the contact block application. Microstructural analysis revealed that none of the fingers had cracks in the bend area and the grain structure was characteristic of Quarter Hard in the straight area and Half Hard in the bend area.

See Figures 28 through 31.

Based on this analysis, production of the replacement contact blocks was authorized.

12

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION The root cause of the fracturing of the finger on the 3AO605 contact block was improper material used in the finger construction. The 70/30 brass used in the older (Pre-1982 )

contact blocks is too brittle for the application. Examination of the other contact blocks supports the conclusion that cracks originate at the bends during fabrication due to work hardening of the brass.

The variation in material hardness accounts for the degree of cracking and susceptibility to fracture during the stress of removal and insertion of the associated 4KV breakers.

IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER SUSCEPTIBLE ITEMS This type of connector is associated with 64 Class 1E 4KV breakers in 4 buses and 91 Non-1E breakers in 8 buses in Units 2 and 3.

All of the affected breakers have been identified by Station Technical.

OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW As discussed in the Evidence Collection section of the report there were no reports of failed contacts in ABB breakers in the NPRDS data base.

The manufacturer, ABB Power T&D Company, was contacted and they have no records or recollection of fractured contact fingers.

Nine power plants, with the same kind of breakers, were contacted by Station Technical. One contact failure event occur-red at Waterford due to breaker misalignment during rack in.

Several other plants reported breaking of the plastic frame due to breaker misalignment during racking.

The plants contacted were Waterford, Vogtle, Catawba, Crystal River, Limerick, Zion, Prairie Island, Hope Creek and Beaver Valley.

13

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 10CFR21 EVALUATION ABB Power T&D Company of Sanford, Florida is currently analyzing contact block finger material from SONGS and several other sources. As soon as the testing and data gathering are complete, ABB currently intends to issue a 10CFR Part 21 Report covering the broken and cracked contact fingers.

If ABB does not issue a 10CFR Part 21 Report, than ISEG will evaluate the need to write a 1CER Part 21 Report on the defective contact blocks discovered at SONGS.

OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT Seismic Considerations The control fingers are not stressed by a seismic event because the control assembly is supported firmly by the circuit breaker and cubicle.

The circuit breaker is held in place firmly by its attachment to the bus and cubicle.

Therefore, the control fingers do not support any seismic loads and fractures of the control fingers would not be caused by a seismic event.

All 4kv breakers contain these stationary secondary contact blocks which provide breaker control and indication.

The breakers are operable for the following reasons and under the following conditions:

Ooerational Considerations The secondary contact control fingers. provide power for four different functions. Control fingers 2 and 5 provide for the charging of the breaker control spring. When the breaker is racked into the operate position from the disconnected position, and the DC control power is applied, the breaker control spring will be charged. This action is quite noisy and readily apparent.

If the breaker control spring has not been 14

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 discharged, the charging spring motor will not be heard upon closing of the DC control power. Spring charging can be verified after the first breaker operation by either..hearing the charging spring motor operate (per above) or by viewing the "SPRING CHARGED CAUTION" tag through the breaker viewing port in the lower right hand corner of the breaker cubicle door.

Caution tag is located at either bottom right or left center of the circuit breakers front.

Control fingers 13 and 14 provide the green, circuit open indication.

This indication is received at the local cubicle door and in the control room when the DC is turned on and the breaker open.

Control fingers 6 and 7 cause the breaker x y scheme to operate closing the breaker.

Control fingers 9 and 10 (for all breakers except the Diesel Generator breakers) provide the trip path and also provide the red indicating light when the breaker is closed. Any time the breaker is closed the red light performs the function of monitoring the breaker trip path. If the red lights are on (when the breaker is closed) the trip path is operable.

For the diesel generator breakers, the red light does not monitor the trip coil.

If the red light is on (with the breaker closed) then contact fingers 14 (also used in green indicating lights) and 15 are functioning properly. And, if the Diesel Generator circuit breaker trips by operator control action at the end of its run, then secondary control fingers 9 and 10 are operating properly.

Whenever a circuit breaker is returned to service, operations as a normal routine, functions it to show operability of the equipment.

To determine that all 1E breakers presently racked into the operating position have their control springs charged, station technical inspected all breakers (through the sliding cubicle 15

RCZ 95-010 AugJust 11, 1995 door) on 2AO4,

2AO6, 3AO4 and 3AO6 at approximately.1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> on

,/21/95.

Each breaker racked into the energized position had its control spring charged.

Restricted Operability

1.

Any time a breaker is racked out of the connected (racked in) position, to be considered operable after having been returned to the connected (racked in) position it must:

a.

Verify charging spring charges when DC is applied to breaker cubicle, or, if charging spring was not discharged, verify spring is charged after the first operation by inspection (per above).

b.

With the breaker open and DC power on, green indications lights must be observed at the proper locations.

c.

Close the breaker and observe red indicating lights at the proper locations and the load is energized.

d.

For the Diesel Generator Breakers only, red indicating lights must be illuminated at the proper locations and the diesel breaker must be tripped by operator control action at the end of the appropriate diesel run.

16

RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Non-Conformance Reports have been issued against each Class 1E 4KV switchgear to require operability verification after the breaker is racked in. These NCR's are NCR 95060065 for Bus 2AO4, NCR 95060069 for Bus 2AO6, NCR 95060070 for Bus 3AO4 and NCR 95060071 for Bus 3AO6.

New contact blocks have been ordered from ABB to replace the blocks in the plant. The contact finger material has been verified to be the correct Quarter Hard 85/15 brass as discussed in the Laboratory Analysis section of the report.

All of the contact blocks in Unit 3, Train A, will be replaced during the U3C8 outage in July/August 1995.

The tracking documents for this activity are the above mentioned NCR's.

An MO has been written for each cubicle and each MO references the associated NCR.

The removed contact blocks will be evaluated by ISEG/RCG for the degree of cracking and the results will be used to validate the overall replacement schedule.

All of the remaining old type contact blocks will be replaced in Unit 2 Train A and B and Unit 3 Train B during Scheduled Equipment outages with all the blocks being replaced no later that the end of the Cycle 9 outage on both Units.

The failed 3AO605 contact block was sent to ABB Power T&D Company for failure analysis and Part 21 evaluation.

17

NoIlTTN lOGoLoHd

RCE 95-010 Pho Lodocurnentation J.

J Figure 1: Optical photograph of the failed 3AO605 contact block.

Note the fractured finger at location 4.

Figure 2: Optical photograph of the back of the 3AO605 contact block showing the fracture at finger #4.

RCE 95-010 Photodocurnentation

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  1. 4 at bend C. Crack in finger #9 is on lower right.

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IeFigure 7: Optical Micrograph of a cross section of one side of the finger #4 fracture showing the intergranular cracks and extra hard temper grain structure.

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Figure 8: Optical Micrograph of finger #f4 cross section at bend B showing a crack at the inner diameter and the extra hard temper grain structure at the bend. Mag:SOX

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Al Figure 10: Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) photograph of the fracture face on finger 4 showing the intergranular structure.

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  1. 4, cntact block 3AO605.

RCE 95-010 Photodocuinentation

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Figure 12: EDS of the base metal of 3AO605, finger #4 showing copper and zinc are present.

RCE 95-010 Photodoculnentation 15-Jun-1995 15:53:37 CONTACT #4,FRACTURE Accelerating voltage 20.0 KeV Beam -

sample incidence anole 60.0 degrees Xray emergence angle 29.0 degrees Xray window incidence angle 1.b degrees STANDARDLESS EDS ANALYSIS (ZAF CORRECTIONS VIA MAGIC V)

ELEMENT WEIGHT ATOMIC PRECISION

& LINE PERCENT PERCENT*

2 SIGMA K-RATIO**

Cu KA 69.19 69.79 0.69 0.6959 Zn KA 30.81 30.21 0.54 0.3093 TOTAL 100.00 ITERATIONS 4

  • NOTE:

ATOMIC PERCENT is normalized to 100

    • NOTE: K-RATIO = K-RATIO x R where R = reference (standard) /reference (sample)

NORMALIZATION FACTOR:

1.000 Figure 13: Table of copper and zinc elemental percentages in the EDS spectrum in figure 12.

The material is 70/3 brass.

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RCE 95-010 Photodocurnentation

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ST, Figure 20: optical micrograph of the cross section of-contact finger #8, bend b, showing the depth of the cracks.

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Figure 21: Close-up of the inner diameter crack in finger #8, bend B, in Figure 20.

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RCE'95-010 Photodocumentation Figure 22: Optical photograph of the 2AO611 contact block after removal from the P114 breaker.

656 Figure 23: Optical photograph of back of the 2AO611 contact block showing the location of the cracked fingers.

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Figure 24 : Close-up of the crack in finger #2, bend B, in contact block 2AO611.

Figure 25: Close-up of the crack in finger #5, bend B, in contact block 2AO611.

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Figure 26: Close-up or the crack in finger #6, bend B, incott cntblock 2A.

RCE 95-010 Photodocurnentation N.'.

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1q4 Figure 28: Cross sectional micrograph of the new contact finger material in the bend area showing a grain structure indicative of Half Hard temper.

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RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation y;-

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c Figure 30: Cross sectional micrograph of the new contact finger material in the straight area showing a grain structure indicative of Quarter Hard temper.

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~L L Figure 31: Magnified view of the new material in the straight area showing the acceptable grain structure. Mag:200X

ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE Customer:

Certificate Number 1

Page 1

of 1

UAM E Certificate is CONDITIONAL 0 Order Is INCOMPLETE 0 NAME ABB Power T&D-SanfordFL UNCONDITIONAL E

COMPLETE M

ORDER NO.

P311407-00 Record Checklist Attached YES NO LATEST REV.

NONE E

0 ABB CE Order No.

406265 01 Supplement No. 0 CuSL ABBCE Quantity Part Number Description hn#

Item#

Order Ship 1

1.0 3

3 701902C00 Material Analysis of Secondary Contacts--3/6 samples.

2 2.0 3

3 816978A00 Material Analysis of Secondary Contacts--3/6 samples.

3 3.0 6

6 816978A00 Material Analysis of Secondary Contacts--6/6 samples.

c As checked off; the following apply to the item(s) and /or services being certified:

Nuclear Spare Parts Quality Assurance Program description (QAM-300), revision 09.

System Staging Group Quality Assurance Program (QAM-400), revision 01.

As checked off; the following method(s) for acceptance apply:

Source Verification U Dropship/Receiving Inspection L Post Assy Test/ Inspection Documentation Review Whereby this order has bco processedhi accordancc wth the ABB Combustion Enyeeawg Nuclear Qualfty Assurance Manauf/(QAM-.I), 4th Edito, revsikmn2, dated2/1/*95and anyof/btheabovechecked ABBhereby certifes that the item(s) andorsefres descibedabove meet the referenced purchase order reWuMen, kclud7g applicable codes, speciicaros, standards and equoment qualifa te requaremens. Any arceptions to these requkem eats have been documented and evaluated byproperly eAecuteddeviadOh notices as noted withl this documentaton. Addftiwall-ths item(s) andorsevceissuppliedfrom ABB/CE'scdityst Wkdsor, CZ or from a suppffer that has been p rouslyapproedbyABB/CE Wndso,; anzueakat.

Comments: ()THIS CERTIFICATION PROVIDES RESULTS OF MATERIAL ANALYSES ON SAMPLE SECONDARY CONTACTS PROVIDED BY ABB POWER T&D, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS DIVISION, SANFORD, FL.

(2) THIS WORK WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH MATERIALPROCESS SPECIFICATIONS AS DEFINED ON ABB DRAWINGS 701902. REV. 6 AND 816978, REV. 7.

THESE SPECIFICATIONS INC MATERIAL: C.F. BRASS #2, ALLOY 230,---SILVER PLATING: ABB SPEC. 51664A. REV. 5. (3) COPIES OF ORIGINAL TEST REPORTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS WILL BE FORWARDED BY MAIL.

Distribution:

Quality Assurance File Purchasing File

/,#$/A 0QngAneering

__OQ Representative Date A W STEWART

'Wther Customer ABB POWER T&D N/A N/A Cognizant Engineer Date ATTACHMENT #2

ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations RECORDS CHECKLIST (RCL)

CUSTOMER: ABBPOWERT&D ABB CE ORDER NO.

406265-01 ORDER NO. P311407-00 C OF C NUMBER ONE RCL PAGE 1

OF 1

SEE CODES AT RIGHT FOR IDENTIFYING EXCLUDING THIS RCL AND C OF C; THE TOTAL RECORDS INDICATED BELOW PAGE COUNT INCLUDED IS SEVEN (7)

ABB CE ITEM NO.

RECORD CODES 1.0--3.0 EA.

NO ADDITIONAL DOC. REQ.

C. SUPPLIER'S C OF C D. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE (MAT'LS)

_________~~~~

TEST RESULTS F. MILL TEST CERT. AND ANALYSIS (CMTR)

G. WELD MATERIAL CERT. AND ANALYSIS (CMTR)

H. SEISMIC TEST REPORT I. WATER ANALYSIS J. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS K DYE PENETRANT REPORT L MAGNETIC PARTICLE REPORT M. RADIOGRAPHIC READER SHEET N. RADIOGRAPHIC FILM

0. ULTRASONIC REPORT P. HYDROSTATIC TEST REPORT R. DIMENSIONAL REPORT S. AS-BUILT DRAWINGS T. CLEANING CERTIFICATION U. PACKAGING PROCEDURE V. SHIPPING AND STORAGE PROCEDURE W. HEAT TREATMENT CERTIFICATION

_________~~~X SENSTIVIYCOEFFICIENTS Y. RECEIPT INSPECTION DEFICIENCY REPORT Z. LOW CHLORIDE CERTIFICATION AM ICKEL PLATE CERIFICATION AB. SHELF LIFE STATEMENT BB.COMPONENT FAILURE REPORT CD. ASME CODE DATA REPORT IM. INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING AND QUALITY PLAN COMMENTS:

DIRATS LABORATORIES TEST REPORTS NUMBER 226979, 226980, &

ADDITIONAL CODES, AS REQUIRED

226981, DD.

EE.

FF.

GG.

HH.

TAPPCALE TECHNICAL CHANGE REQUESTS (FOR'S):

NONEF APPLICABLE DEVIATION FROM CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS FORM (DCR'S):

NONE QA REP. M. W. STEWART DATE: 8/29/95 Pa44V

08/29/95 09:16

'413 568 1453 DIR.1TS LABS ABB/CE NUC PARTS 003/007 TEST REPORT

.9,IQRATS ABORATO RI ES Tom B. Preston Report Number 226979 ASS Combustion Engineering Report Date 29-AUG-95 Nuclear Spare Parts Page 1 of 2 P.O. Box 500 M/S 9426-DH24 Client Number 004400 Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Client Order 406265-01 Release ITEM 1.0 RECEIVED 6 Contacts IDENT AS P/N 701902C00 MATERIAL

.050 CF Brass #2, Alloy 230 Silver Plated CONDITION TEST TO ITE 51664A Rev. 5 and Client Instructions TEST PER PURPOSE S

SPEC INST Return specimens and 3 unused parts PROPERTIES AS SUPPLIED SEMI-QUANTITATIVE SPECTRO CHECK OF PLATING Disp S/NI InSpec The spectrographically detectable elements are present in approximately the required amounts for Silver, S/N 2 In Spec The spectrographically detectable elements are present In approximately the required amounts for Silver.

S/N 3 inSpec The spectrographically detectable elements are present In approximately the required amounts for Silver.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BY XRF Sample 1

2 3

Base Metal Base Metal Base Metal Cu 84.91 84.91 85.16 Fe

<0.01 0.01

<0.01 Pb 0.01

<0.01

<0.01 Zn REM REM REM Cu +sum of named elements 99.99 99.95 99.99 Disp:

For Info For Info For Info The symbol < signifies not detected at the detectability limIt indicated.

08/29/95 09:16 12413 568 1453 DIRATS LABS BB/CE NUC PARTS 00u04/07 TEST REPORT DI;';RAOTS§'

~ABORATORIES ASS Combustion Engineering Report Number 226979 Nuclear Spare Parts Report Date 29-AUG-95 Windsor, CT 06096-0500 Page 2 of 2 HARDNESS TEST OF BASE METAL Sample Hardness Dlsp 1

HR30T67 For Info 2

HR30TS7 For Info 3

HR30T66 For Info Note: No authorized hardness conversion table for this material.

METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF PLATING Disp Sample: I In Spe Thickness: Min. 0.00005, Max. 0.00010", Predom. 0.00005' Sample: 2 In Spec Thickness: Min. 0.000051. Max. 0.00010", Predom. 0.00010" Sample: 3 In Spec Thickness: Min,. 0.0005, Max. 0.00010', Predom. 0.00005" SWE CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF OUR RECORDS IwJISigned for J, Dirats and Co, by Pichard C. Simmons, Tcn4e Mange I 1 JNOTE: The recording of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or entries on this document I Jmay be punished as a felony under federal law.

D.. sp

08/29/95 09:15

%413 568 1453 DIRATS LABS

-.

  • ABB/CE NUC PARTS

[001/007 N

TEST REPORT jMRATS ABORATOR IES TOMn B. Preston Report Number 226980 ABB Combustion Engineering Report Date 29-AUG-95 Nuclear Spare Parts Page 0of 2

P.O. Box 500 MIS 9426-DH24 Client Number 004400 Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Client Order 406265-01 Release ITEM 2.0 RECEIVED 6 Contacts IDENTAS P/N 816978A00 MATERIAL

.050 CF Brass #2, Alloy 230 Sliver Plated CONDITION w

TEST TO ITE 51664A Rev. 5 and Client Instructions TEST PER SPEC INST Return specimens and 3 unused parts PROPERTIES AS SUPPLIED SEMI-QUANTITATIVE SPECTRO CHECK OF PLATING Disp S/N 1 InSpec The spectrographically detectable elements are present In approximately the required amounts for Silver.

S/N 2 InSpeo The spectrographically detectable elements are present In approximately the required amounts for Silver.

S/N 3 InSpec The spectrographically detectable elements are present in approximately the required amounts for Silver.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS SY XRF Sample 1

2 3

Base Metal Base Metal Base Metal Cu 85.55 85.46 85.57 Fe

<0.01 0.01 0.01 Pb

<0.01 0.01

<0.01 Zn REM REM REM Cu+sum of named elements 99.98 99.95 99.99 Disp:

For Info For Info For Info The symbol < signifies not detected at the detectability limit Indicated.

08/29/95 09:15 V413 568 1453 DIRATS LABS

      • ABB/CE NUC PARTS 002/007 TEST REPORT IJRATS ABORATORIES ABB Combustion Engineering Report Number 226980 Nuclear Spare Parts Report Date 29-AUG-96 Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Page 2 of 2 HARDNESS TEST OF BASE METAL Sample Hardness Disp I

HR30T68 For Info 2

HR30T 68 For Info 3

HR30T68 For Info Note: No authorized hardness conversion table for this material.

METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF PLATING DIsp Sample: 1 In Spec Thickness: Min. 0.00010', Max. 0.000100, Predom. 0.00010m

.Sample., 2 In Spec Thickness; Min. 0.00010", Max. 0.00010", Predom. 0.00010" Sample: 3 In Spec Thickness: Min. 0.00005", Max. 0.00010", Predom. 0.00010" W E CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF OUR RECORDS e

Signed for J. Dirats and Co. by Richard C. Simmons, To'chnical Manage INOTE:

The recording of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or entries an this document may be punished as a felony under federal law.

08/28/95 0 9: 16

'M'41 3 56,8,1 453

.D -IRAT.S AB S ABB/CE NbC PARTS (6005/007 TEST REPORT ABORATORIES Report Number 226981 Tom B. Preston Report Date 29-AUG-95 ABB3 Combustion Engineering P a 1 of 3 Nuclear Spare Parts C11ent Number 004400 P.O. Box 500 M/S 9426-DH24 Client Order 406265-01 Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Release ITEM 3.0 RECEIVED 6 Contacts IDENTAS PIN 816978A00 Second Lot identified as SCE1 thru SCE6 MATERIAL

.050 CF Brass #2, Alloy 230 Silver Plated CONDITION TEST TO ITE 51664A Rev. 5 and Client instructions TEST PER PURPOSE SPEC INST Return specimens PROPERTIES AS SUPPLIED SEMI-QUANTITATIVE SPECTRO CHECK OF PLATING Plsp SIN SCE1 The spectrographically detectable elements are present in in Spec approximately the required amounts for Silver.

S/N SCE2 The spectrographically detectable elements are present in In Spec approximately the required amounts for Silver.

S/N SCE3 The spectrographically detectable elements are present In In Spec approximately the required amounts for Silver.

S/N SCE4 The spectrographically detectable elements are present In In Spec approximately the required amounts for Sliver.

S/N SCES The spectrographically detectable elements are present In In Spec approximately the required amounts for Silver.

SIN SCE6 The spectrographically detectable elements are present In In Spec approximately the required amounts for Silver.

08A/29/95 09: 1 -7 V~4.1 3 568 1453 DIRATS LABS O4 AB/CE N1JC PAkRTS Z 006/007 TEST REPORT pIR ATS ABORATORIES ABB Combustion Engineering Report Number 2269A 1

Nuclear Spare Parts Report Date 29-AUG-95 Windsor, CT 0609-0500 page 2of3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BY XRF Sample SCE1 SCE2 SCE3 BASE METAL BASE METAL BASE METAL BASE METAL CU 85.66 -

85.58 85.67 Fe 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Pb

<0.01

<0.01

<0.01

<0101 Zn REM REM REM REM Cu and sum of named elements:

99.99 99.98 99.97 For Info For Info For info For Info Sample SCES SCE6 BASE METAL BASE METAL Cu 85.69 85.78 Fe 0.01 0.01 Pb

<0.01

<0.01 Zn REM REM Cu and sum of named elements:

99.99 99.99 For Info For Info The symbol < signifles not detected at the detectability limit Indicated.

HARDNESS TEST OF BASE METAL Sample Hardness DIsp SCE1 HR3oT 67 For Info SCE2 HR30T 67 For Info SCE3 HR30T 67 For Into SCE4 HR30T 67 For Into SCES HR30T 67 For Info SCE6 HR30T 68 Note: No authorized hardness conversion table for this material.

08/29/95 09:17

'0413 568 1453 DIRATS LABS ABB/CE NUC PARTS @007/007 TEST REPORT IRATS ABORATORIES Report Number 226981 ABB Combustion Engineering Report Date 29-AUG95 Nuclear Spare Parts Pago 3 of 3 Windsor, CT 06095-0500 METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF PLATING Disp Sample: SCEl Off Spec Thickness: MMin.0.00010', Max. 0.00020"', Predom. 0,00010", see photo.

Sample: SCE2 Off Spec ThickeOSs Mtn. 0.00010*, Max. 0.00020", Predom. 0.00020"; see photo.

In Spec Sample: SCE3 Thickness: Min. 0.000050, Max. 0.00010', Predom. 0.00010" Sample; SCE4 In Spec Thickness: Min. 0.00005', Max. 0.00010', Predom. 0.00010" in Spec Sample: SCE5 I

Thickness: Min. 0.00005", Max. 0.00010', Predom. 0.00010' Sample: SCES In Spec Thickness: Min. 0.000051, Max. 0.00010, Predom. 0.000100 PHOTOGRAPHS ARE ATTACHED

.,. WE CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF OUR RECORDS c

i;.iSigned for J. Dirats and Co. by Richard C. Simmons, Technical Manager NOTE: The recording of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements at entries on this document ar~kn may be punished as a felony under federal law.

HK 1witU1hg al Which may in:crporat.e

-i O cAluo.y26u or str.ps with possible forming cracks into secondary dinconnect asseribly Lit i r y St at ion S.0.

Type Date Product ARKA&AA POWER X LIC ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 33-55472 ORIG 03/00/84 5HK ARK&SAS POWER R L.G ARKANSAS N:MAR OF 33-F5662 ORIG 10/00/84 5HK BALTiMORE GAS & ELEC CALUERT CLIFFS 33>-I67 QRTG 09/07/71 15HK &SKA NSPB CARO ITNA POWER V LIG BRUNSWICK 23-d?219 ORIG 01./11/73 5HK350 CINCINATTI GAS & ELE ZIMMER 33-49297 ORIG 12/05/74 5HK CINCINATT I GM ELF ZIMME 33 -51823 ORIG 06/00/77 5HK CINCINATTI GAS ELE Z I'M MER 33-51829 ORIG 06/00/77 7.5HK CINCINATTI GAS &ELE Z IMMER 3-54797 ORIG 09/00/81 5HK CLEVELAND ELEC.

ILLU PERRY 33-5195a ORIG 03/03/83 5HK350 COMI1ION FED DE ELEC LAGUNA VERDE 33-53462 ORIG 04/00/81 5HK COMISION FED DE ELEC LAGUNA VERDE 33-53462 ORIG 02/00/81 5HK 350 COMhNWEALTH EDISON LASALLE 33-500.0 nRIG 12/09/77 7.5HK -

5HK COMPONWEALTH EDISON LASALLE 3-52612 OPIG 04/00/78 5HK COMMONWEALTH EDISON LASALLE 13-52612 0RIG 04/00/78 7..5HK.

. CO-ONWEALTH EDISON ZION 33-45122 ORIG 02/05/73 5HK CONSUMERS POWER MIDLAND 33-29708 ORIG 05/C0O/82 5HK CONMERS POWER MIDLAND 33-5032 ORIG 01/23/82 5HK250 DETPOIT EDISON ENRICO FERMI 33-47196 nRIG 11/00/83 5HK DUI POWER CATAWBA 33-d0616 ORIG 03/15/82 5HK DUKE POWER

ATAW0BA 3-50405 ORIG 07/00/80 5HK DUKE POW.IlER CATAWBA 33-52420 ORIG 10/00/77 7.5 HK DUKF POWER McGUIRFE 2 -485 ORIG 101/02/74 7.5HK DUKE POWER MCGUIRE 33-506S4 orig 03/26/74 7.5HK RCP SWGR DUKE POWER McGUIRE 33-51059 ORIG 11/24/75 15HK DUKE POWER OCONEE 33-39402 ORIG 02/12/82 7.5HK DUKE POWER OCONEE 3-53272 ORG 01/00/79 5HK DUKE POWER OCONEE 33-5356 ORIG 03/00/80 5HK DUKE POWER OCONEF 32-5371? ORIG 05/00/79 5HK DUQUENE LIGHT COMPA BEAVER VALLEY 33-4690 ORIG 04/21/75 5HK & i-ISPB DUP bNE LIGHT COMPA BEAVFR U k L Pv.

33-50:

ORIG 10/00/03 5HK350 UQUE5NE LIGHT COMPA BEAVER AL.01 k F0-500F1 ORIG 07/00/83 5KU HPLC 9kA ATTACHMENT #3

Ut it Li v Inn

.0 Type Dote Product FLURIDA P OWE R CORP CRYSL I PVERI 33-46256 ORIG 12/21/70 SHK 250 GULF STfES UTILITIE RFlER' BENDri 3-51123 ORIG 04/00/80 SHK250 HCUSTON LIGHiTING F P SOU TH TEAScj PROJECT

-5279 ORIG 02/1 4/7/9 5HK250 HO0UjS' I

HTI G P OUTH IrXS PROJECT 37(5)190 ORIG 09/0/79 1 5HK HY'DRC'--E LECT RIC POWER PICFRiNAG GENEFATING ST 61-73 3(

RIG 08/3.1/78

9HK, HPL-C 5K INIANA IC HIGAN E DONILD C. COOK 33-4322

'RIG 03/15/72 K-LINE 5HK250 INDIANA A MIC:HG-E DONALD C A 1COOLK

>3-44 0 RITG 07/1, /71 K -LINE; 5HK250 INDIANA & il l HI GAN A ON i4AL I C COK r48.

I,'G 0 1 1 7 1 5IHK INDIANA & MICHIt E

.D CF CAfO1, !

R 0 4 00/9 5HK ijSSISSIPPI POW URN U LF r-6 N LRIG 09/ 00/

6 5H K M

I51 P IP r OW.

T -

GN rL Ai F

46 Cl fRIG 09 //

1HK illSSISSIPPI PO WER P R-'

GULF N3-50470 R'I 06/00/7 1 '.HK NI R-IHWK NTi M 1 POI I N T i

I ORIC 05/00/8 C 1HK NORTHEA.ST UTILITIE M

ILTON 99 O9R'G 08/00/81 K-LINE /5H1-K.

PECO LIERICK

.3-H7L51 ORI 03/00/77 5HlK-350 PE1CO L.IMERICK 33-55112 OR1G 0 1.04/83 5HK-250 PEC.O L-IE RIC:K 33-551 1.2 ORIG 03/02/83 5HK--350 P. ORTLAND GENERAL ELE TROJAN 33-4735 ORIG 02/25/72 SHK PUBSLIC: SEFRVIC:E EL C. HOPE C:REEK 3

52 20 ORIG 04/1 3/81 5H K350 PUBLIC SERVICE FLEFC HOPE CREEK 33 5226.0 ORIG 11/01/83 SHK350 PUBLIC SERV IC:E INDIA MD BL E HILL 5266.0 ORIG 08/20/8C SHK PUBLIC SERVICE I NDI MARBLE HILL 37-52213 ORIG 07/00/80 5HK PUBLIC SERYICE INf1 M1 ARBLl HTLL 35 2213 RIG 10,/0D0/81

7. 5HK PUBLIC SERVIC:E NEW H SEABROOK 03-50750 ORIG 0 0085 SHK SUC RNCHO SFD j3-4.596 ORIG 05/25/71. 5HK 5KY NSPB SOUITHFRN-CALIFORNIAI
SN ONCFRE 33-035-d ORIG 06./01/83 5HK F-CfUTIHE RH C L IFO(R NJ SAN-7, ONICH F3-4 0591 OR:IGCO 0/23/82 SHK 0 OUTHRN CAL.IFOR'NIA lN iF E

3 0

ORIG 04/ 00 [

UHK TATWAN'j' POWER' KU 4HEN'G

/-

0735 OIG 0./'

/

SHK TEX A' U ILI TIE.S LMACHE PE AK 0.1R G 092/

5H K TUp L

GE 3

.)H-36330 ORI 0/2.i.?

.5HK TU BEL LEoT 3

61URI 1,'2/8 7.

5 HK

UtL 1I titty Si 01 S..

Type Date Product TV BELLEFONT 33-51014 ORTG 06/00/7

7. 5H,:'

T03 BELLEFONTE

?3 -5104 ORIG 03/00/79 15HK

TOQ, HARTSILLE 37-52313 ORIG 07/00/80 7.5HK TUR HARTSVILLE 7-0321

' ORTG 10/00/80 7 SHK TVA SEQUOYAH 33-5447 ORIG 01/11/79 7 5HK TO A SEQUOYAH 33-37216 ORIG 03/00/2 7,5HK T L.A SEQUOYAH 33-40441 ORTG 00/00/82

.5H TUA SEQUOYAH 32-41666 ORiG 04/00/80 SHK T A SEQUYAH 3-47035 ORIG 02/10/

1 SHK T ' A SEQUOYAH A3-48672 nRIG 02/05/73 15HK TO.'S SEQUOYAH 33-51068 ORIG 11.14/75 7.5HK TA SEQUOYAH 33-54968 ORIG 06/00/82 7.5HK TUA SEQUOYAH 37-54995 ORIG 05/00/82 15HK T0 YELLOW CREEK 33-54350 ORIG 10/00/82 7.5HK & 15HK U.S.

ATOMlC ENERGY C FAST FLUX TEST FACILITY 33-50593 ORIG 04 /09/75 15HK U.S.

DEPT OF ENERGY GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICH 37-55462 ORIG 12/20/S3 HKKTR IRGINIP ELEF:-

& POW NORTH ANNA 33-46358 ORIG 05/21/75 5HK

.IRGINIA ELEC.

K POW NORTH ANNA 32-48708 ORIG 04/26/76 5HK WPPS9 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJ 33-51659 ORIG 08/00/80 5HK Ioos-WtSHINGTON NUCL EAR PROJ 33-54898 ORIG 04/20/2 SHK.HPLCRCPH