ML13317A713

Forwards Draft Topic Assessment for SEP Topic III-4.D Re Site Proximity Missiles (Including Aircraft)

ML13317A713
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	10/23/1981
From:	Moody W Southern California Edison Co
To:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-03-04.D, TASK-3-4.D, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8110270327
Download: ML13317A713 (22)

Text

Southern California Edison Company P. 0.

BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 W. C. MOODY TELEPHONES MANAGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING Or213) 522-1381, October23 191j (213) 572.1806 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

D. M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing co U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Docket 50-206 SEP Topic III-4.D Site Proximity Missiles (Including Aircraft)

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 In accordance with the redirection of the Systematic Evaluation Program, enclosed is the draft topic assessment for San Onofre Unit 1 for Topic III-4.D, Site Proximity Missiles (Including Aircraft).

The model for this topic assessment was the safety evaluation of this topic for the Palisades plant sent to Consumers Power Company by letter dated January 13, 1980.

If you have any questions on this assessment or require additional information, please let us know.

Sincerely yours, Enclosure 8110270327 811023 PDR ADOCK 05000206 P

!PDR

SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 SEP TOPIC III-4.D - SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES (INCLUDING AIRCRAFT)

I.

INTRODUCTION The safety objective of this topic is to assure that safety-related structures, systems and components will perform their safety functions in the event of a site proximity missile; including the impact of aircraft.

II. REVIEW CRITERIA The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance given in SRPs 3.5.1.5, 3.5.1.6 and 2.2.3.

III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES Topic II.1-C, Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities refers to this topic.

Topic XV-20, Fuel Damaging Accidents Outside Containment is referenced in this topic assessment.

IV. EVALUATION The San Onofre site is located on the Camp. Pendleton USMC Base and adjacent to Interstate 5 and the Atchison, Topeka and 'Santa Fe Railroad.

Activities associated with the military base and the transporation routes are evaluated in Sections 2.2 and 3.5.1.5 of the San Onofre Units '2 and 3 FSAR.

Based on that information, there is no credible basis for anticipating site proximity missiles, except aircraft. The air traffic within 50 miles of the plant and the potential for a crash onto the plant, which are discussed in the following paragraphs, are based on the information in the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 FSAR.

A. Aircraft Operations There exist many aircarrier, general aviation, and military airports within 50 miles of the plant.

Except for the San Onofre Heliport, there are no airports within 5 miles. Figure 1 shows the location of airports near the site. Those with control towers which serve as source or destination for a large number of the planes flying airways in the vicinity are:

Airport Distance (Statute Miles)

Long Beach 45 Orange County 27 Lindbergh 50 Montgomery 47 Palomar (Carlsbad) 25 Gilespie 50

-2 Other general aviation airports along the Southern California coast which present a small contribution to airways in the vicinity are:

Airport Distance (Statute Miles)

Meadowlark 37 Oceanside

15.

Military airfields are:

Airport Distance (Statute Miles)

Los Alamitos NAS 40 El Toro MCAS 20 Camp Pendleton MCALF 15 Miramar NAS 45 Santa Ana MCAS 29 Operations for calendar year 1975 and projected operations for airports within 50 miles'of the plant are shown in Table 1. None of the airports has sufficient operations to require statistics on aircraft accidents as required by USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2. A description of each airport with operations that could contribute to the airways in the vicinity of the plant is as follows:

Long Beach Airport. Long Beach Airport isi located approximately 45 miles northwest of the site.

It is basically a general aviation airport with a small number of flights associated with McDonald-Douglas Aircraft testing and commercial service. The total number of operations in 1975 was 538,230. Of this number, 293,592 were itinerant operations.

Orange County Airport.

Orange County Airport is approximately 27 miles from the plant. It is primarily a general aviation airport. Air Cal is based at the airport and there are jet flights.

The majority of these flights are north-bound. There were 618,889 operations in calendar year 1975. Of these operatons, 304,459 were itinerant operations. Although the Federal Aviation Administration has forecast 690,000 operations by 1987, Orange County Airport has forecast.660,000 (+ 10,000) by 1990. The airport reports that this number of operations represents a practical evaluation of present peak utilization of airport facilities and the potentially low probability of any major airfield improvements that might significantly extend this capacity.

Lindbergh Field.

Lindbergh Field is approximately 50 statute miles southeast of the site Lindbergh Field is primarily an air carrier operation field and also has a number of general aviation operations. In calendar year 1975, there were 195,016 operations at Lindbergh, of which 83,018 were general aviation and air taxi operations.

Montgomery Airport.

Montgomery is located 47 statute miles southeast of the plant. It is primarily a general aviation field. In calendar year 1975, there were 341,339 operations, of which 131,547 were itinerant.

-3 Palomar Airport. Palomar Airport is located approximately 25 miles southeast of the site. In calendar year 1975, there were 183,989 operations at the airport, of which 97,592 were itinerant operations.

Gillespie Airport.

Gillespie Airport is located approximately 50 miles southeast of the site. In calendar year 1975, Gillespie had 243,601 operations, of which 116,018 were itinerant.

El Toro MCAS.

El Toro is located approximately 20 miles northwest of the plant. In calendar year 1975, there were approximately 140,000 operations at El Toro. Of this number, approximately 40,000 were approaches which use a corridor that passes approximately 7.5 statute miles northwest of the plant.

From observations made by radar scope at El Toro, these approaching aircraft tend to stay on a straight line approximately 10 miles away from the plant.

The majority of the operations out of El Toro are high speed jet aircraft.

Camp Pendleton.- Camp Pendleton Airport is located approximately 15 statute miles from the plant. In calendar year 1975, there were approximately 67,100 operations. These operations were primarily helicopters. However, there are some fixed-wing aircraft operating out of the field.

Miramar.

Miramar Naval Air Station is located approximately 45 statute miles southeast of the site. In calendar year 1975, there were 789,795 operations.

Los Alamitos NAS. Los Alamitos Naval Air Station is located approximately, 40 miles from the plant.

In calendar yeard 1975, there were 50,034 operations. The majority of these operations were military helicopters.

Meadowlark and Oceanside Airports.

These general aviation airports are located 35 and 17 miles, respectively, from the site. Since they have no official control towers, they are assumed to have very little traffic.

The FAA has provided an estimate of 58,000 movements per year for Meadowlark.

San Onofre Heliport.

The San Onofre Heliport is located approximately 433 yards north of Unit 1 as shown in Figure 7. It is currently expected to have an average of 15 operations per year for the next two years, and about 6 per year thereafter.

Helicopter operations in previous years were greater (35 operations in 1976) due to construction activities at Units 2 and 3. At the time a similar analysis was performed for the Units 2 and 3 FSAR, the number of operations was approximately 72/year.

Takeoffs and landings are along the paths indicated in Figure 7.

There are four categories of air traffic observed in the vicinity of the plant.

They are:

1. Commercial aviation and other high speed jet aircraft;

2.

Military operations; and

3.

General aviation.

4. Southern California Edison Company helicopters.

A description of each of these categories follows.

-4 Commercial and other high speed jet aircraft.

These aircraft generally fly parallel to the coast along Airway V-25 (approximately). Many are enroute to a landing at, or departing from, Lindbergh Field in San Diego. The remainder are making through flights at higher altitudes.

The observed distribution of aircraft is shown in Figure 2. The Airway V-25-27 centerline passes 12 miles southwest of the plant along bearing 304 0 north of Mission Bay VORTAC.

The location of the airway is shown on Figure 3. The estimated annual frequency of commercial air carriers and high-speed business jets is 71,656.

For this analysis business jets are distinguished from the rest of general aviation because they fly at much higher speeds and many weigh more than 12,500 lbs.

Near the San Onofre site they generally fly the offshore Airway V-25, along with the commercial air carrier jets. Since the business jets generally have higher standards of pilot qualification and aircraft maintenance, the crash rate is assumed to correspond to the commercial experience.

Military Aircraft. Military operations are either helicopter flights associated with Camp Pendleton or high speed jet flights associated with El Toro Marine Corps Air Station.

The high speed military flights are concentrated 7.5 miles northwest of the plant in the El Toro landing corridor, and in a widely distributed pattern of traffic also associated with El Toro as shown in Figure 4. The estimated annual frequency of helicopter operations is 7072, distributed as shown in Figure 5.

The estimated annual frequency of military jet operations is 26,676.

General Aviation. These aircraft generally fly parrallel to the coast along Airway V-23 (approximately).

The observed distribution of aircraft is shown in Figure 6.

The Airway V-23 centerline passes one-half mile seaward of the plant along bearing 3010 north of Oceanside VORTAC.

Restricted area R2533 requires that Visual Flight Rule (VFR) traffic along this airway be above 2000 feet MSL when passing the plant, unless otherwise' authorized by the FAA Air Route Traffic Controller at El Toro, or the Commanding General, Camp Pendleton. This airway is shown on Figure 3. Aircraft moving along V-23 are single-engine piston aircraft, twin-engine piston aircraft, and twin-engine turbo-prop aircraft. The estimated annual frequency of general aviation is 93,444.

Southern California Edison Company Helicopters The approach and departure paths are kept away from the plants. Since helicopters operate only under visual flight rule (VFR) conditions, they would be expected to adhere to the nominal path.

The closest they would get to the plant would be in the immediate vicinity of the heliport itself. Possible deviation from the centerline of the landing or takeoff path is conservatively represented by a negative exponential distribution with a decay angle of 300 or P(y)=1/2ed6/(y tan 300) where d is distance from the landing pad to the plant and y tan 300 is the decay distance. This decay is consistent with the 300 vertical approach angle typical of helicopter operations. The negative exponential distribution is more slowly decaying than the more frequently used Gaussian, so it provides a conservative model.

-5 The Federal Aviation Administration "Aviation Forecast, Fiscal Years 1976-1987" forecasts a 45% increase in commercial aviation hours flown, and an 80% increase in general aviation hours flown. Military operations are forecast to remain constant. The resultant increases in air traffic in the vicinity of the plant are as follows:

1976 Operations 1987 Forecast General aviation 93,444 168,198 Commercial 71,700 103,900 Military 33,700 33,700 SCE helicopters 35*

6 B. Probability of Crash The crash rates for enroute aircraft which might cause significant damage to the plant are taken from historical statistics of crashes which result in fatalities. This is a conservative assumption, because many fatal crashes involve relatively light impacts, with occupants killed by subsequent fires.

It can be argued that there are examples of crash landings without fatality (in open fields or roads) which would certainly have produced fatalities had the plane crashed into a building. On the other hand, there are crash landings (in open fields or roads) which produce fatalities, but in which the pilot had sufficient control while the plane was airborne to avoid any large structures which would prove fatal immediately.

Indeed, any landing on a road, and most landings in open fields, are prima-facie evidence that the pilot had sufficient control to select such a relatively safe landing location.

The enroute crash rates for the above categories of aircraft are estimated to be:

1.

Commercial Air Carrier and Business Jets Information from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) shows seven enroute crashes producing fatalities in the years 1970-1975.

During these six years, there were a total of 1.56 x 1010 regularly scheduled plus supplemental air carrier miles flown, which implies a fatal crash rate:

C = 0.45 x 10-9 per mile 29 of these operations were associated with construction activities at Units 2 and 3. Once construction is complete, flights are expected to be reduced. Operations for previous years was greater, up to 72 operations as reported in the Units 2 and 3 FSAR.

-6

2.

Military Crash statistics on military aircraft are difficult to obtain, and they would not be directly useful since total domestic miles flown do not appear to even be tabulated.

Furthermore, the distinction between fatal and non-fatal crashes would not be valid since pilots of high-performance aircraft can safely eject before very serious accidents.

It is expected that military crash rates should be lower than general aviation total crash rates. Most general aviation crashes are caused by poorly maintained aircraft (particularly running out of fuel), poorly trained pilots (only 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />) and inadequate navigation instrumentation.

Military pilots would have much greater advantages in these areas which suggests a crash rate close to the commercial experience.

For purposes of this analysis we have estimated the military crash rate to be five times the commercial crash rate:

C = 2.3 x 10-9 per mile

3.

General Aviation Information from the NTSB shows a total of 528 fatal accidents involving single engine aviation aircraft during 2.62 x 107 hours0.00124 days <br />0.0297 hours <br />1.76918e-4 weeks <br />4.07135e-5 months <br /> flown in 1976.

Also, approximately 54% of all small fixed wing (SFW) general aviation crashes occurred during enroute operations. From the FAA Statistical Handbook (1975),

an average cruising speed of 112 mph was determined, leading to a SFW single engine crash rate of:

C = 9.8 x 10-8 enroute crashes/mile During the year 1976, there were a total of 128 fatal accidents involving multi-engine general aviation aircraft, of which, 54% were assumed to be enroute. There were 7.93 x 106 domestic flight hours recorded during this time period. An average multi-engine cruising speed of 156 mph leads to a SFW multi-engine crash rate of:

C = 5.6 x 10-8 enroute crashes/mile

4. Southern California Edison Company Helicopters The National Transportation Safety Board reports seven fatal helicopter crashes oz takeoff and landing during 1973. The FAA tabulated 1.16 x 10 helicopter hours for 1973 which implies 4.6 x 106 takeoff or landing operations based on two operations per typical half-hour flight. This implies a fatal crash rate of:

C = 1.5 x 10-6 per operation (landing or takeoff)

-7 For commercial, business jet and military aviation, the probability of impacting San Onofre Unit 1 was estimated using methodology consistent with Standard Review Plan 3.5.1.6. Specifically, the probability of impact into the plant per year is given by P=CNA fwhere C is the enroute crash rate per mile, N is the annual number of operations along the corridor past the site, A is the effective plant area (direct impact area plus skid area) and is the aircraft crash density at the plant site.

(The sphere enclosure buil ing was not included in the plant area since its walls are made of approximately 34 inches of reinforced concrete and are expected to be able to withstand an aircraft collision. The roof is constructed of reinforced concrete support by steel beams. The probability that an aircraft would penetrate the roof, the 1" steel containment sphere, and cause an accident which exceeds 10CFR100 is extremely low.)

The results of these calculations are shown in Table 2 and indicate that the probability of impact from each of these types of aircraft is less than 10- 7 and therefore within the guidelines of Standard Review Plan 2.2.3.

The probability of impact for general aviation at Unit 1 was estimated in a similar manner. The parameters used and the results are shown in Table 2.

This is a very conservative estimate based on the above assumptions and also the following considerations. For fixed wing aircraft, there is a certain degree to which a pilot can avoid a crash into buildings when other more attractive emergency landing sites exist.

For the case of the San Onofre site, the plant is located between Interstate 5 (which is parallel to the general aviation air corridors) and the Pacific Ocean.

Since the minimum altitude for general aviation flights near the plant is restricted to 2000 feet unless otherwise authorized by the FAA Air Traffic Controller at El Toro or-the Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, in all but the most extreme cases, a pilot should be able to avoid a crash into the plant by diverting the plane to the highway, the beach or the ocean.

For Southern California Edison Company helicopters, the following conservative analysis leads to an estimate of less that 2.5 x 10-8 per year (based on 30 landings and takeoffs) for the expected frequency of fatal helicopter crashes into Unit 1. The greatest deviation near the plant can occur when the helicopter is 327 feet from the pad, just opposite the northeastern or southwestern boundaries (plus 15 feet for the radius of the rotor circle) of the plant as shown in Figure 7. At this point the decay angle of 300 implies a decay distance of 189 feet (327 tan 300).

For a negative exponential distribution with this decay length, the probability of a deviation greater than 433 yards in one direction (the distance required to reach Unit 1) on either takeoff or landing is 5.5 x 10-4.

This is also a conservative estimate of the conditional probability of impacting the plant, given that the helicopter crashed on landing or takeoff. The expected frequency of fatal crashes per year is then the product of the number of operations per year, multiplied by the national average rate of fatal crashed per operation, multiplied by the conditional probability of crashing into the plant given that the helicopter crashes:

(15 x 2) (1.5 x 10-6) (5.5 x 10-4) = 2.5 x 10-8 Helicopter operations of the San Onofre Heliport are no credible hazard to the plant.

-8 C. Effect of Aircraft Impact on Plant Systems The probability of impact onto the plant of military jets, all helicopters and commercial jets is less than 10- 7/year and meets the review criteria.

In light of the fact that the probability of impact for general aviation is estimated to be greater than the guidelines of Standard Review Plan 2.2.3, we have reviewed the safety-related equipment vulnerable to potential aircraft impacts with respect to availability of backup systems and the importance of the equipment with respect to achieving a safe shutdown. This evaluation is provided in the following paragraphs.

1.

Condensate Storage Tank This is a source of water for the auxiliary feedwater pumps, and is not required for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions.

A backup water supply is available from the fire protection system. The tank is shadowed on the north and east sides by the turbine building.

2. Atmospheric Dump Valves and Main Steam Safety Valves These valves service the main steam lines and are protected by the sphere enclosure building, turbine building and control/

administration building. However, the vents protrude beyond the turbine building deck and could conceivably be crimped in the event of an aircraft crash.

Valve operation is needed for accommodating a plant trip with a loss of offsite power. Due to the separation of these valves from the switchyard and the station transformers, the simultaneous loss of offsite power in the event of an aircraft crash onto the vents has a very low probability. Hence, the potential for crimping of the vents in the event of an aircraft impact is acceptable, since the vents are not needed for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions. In addition, one valve is adequate to remove decay heat 8 seconds after reactor trip.

Because of the separation of the eight main steam safety and four atmospheric dump valves, the probability of all twelve vent pipes being crimped shut is low. In the event an aircraft crash into these valves results in a main steam line break, the ability to mitigate the consequences of the break would not be affected since the valves are not required for this accident.

3.

Transformer Area Damage of auxiliary transformer C west of the turbine building, could cause a loss of offsite power. However, station transformers A and B, located east of the turbine building, would not be affected. Moreover, the diesel generators would be available for supplying the required electrical power for vital plant systems.

S

-9

4.

Refueling Water Storage Tank This is the source of water for the Safety Injection System. In addition, this tank can be used as a source of borated water for shutdown. The Refueling Water Storage Tank is not needed or relied upon for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions.

5.

Diesel Generators The two diesel generators are redundant, enclosed in a reinforced concrete building and physically separated from each other by a reinforced concrete wall.

The diesel generators are not needed for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions, since the simultaneous loss of offsite power and the diesel generators due to an aircraft crash has a very low probability.

6.

Spent Fuel Pool The fuel storage building consists of a reinforced concrete pool supporting a superstructure constructed of reinforced hollow concrete block walls and steel framing. The spent fuel pool is 44 feet, 9 inches high and the superstructure is 23 feet high.

The pool structure is partially embedded to a depth of 17 feet on the south side and 22 feet, 9 inches on the other three sides.

.Adjoining the pool structure on the south side is a three-story wing constructed of reinforced hollow concrete block walls and steel framing. The adjoining three-story wing is 51 feet high.

The fuel storage building is shadowed on the north side by the ventilation equipment building and sphere enclosure building. The pool structure contains spent fuel storage and handling, spent fuel shipping cask storage and handling, and fuel transfer tube areas.

Therefore, the spent fuel is protected from the north and south sides by a combination of shadowing, embedment and reinforced concrete.

However, an aircraft crash into the superstucture over the spent fuel pool would likely cause damage to the superstructure with a potential for debris falling into the pool and damaging spent fuel.

The number of fuel rods which would have to be ruptured to result in an offsite dose in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines can be conservatively estimated based on the calculations of exclusion area boundary (EAB) doses in the NRC's Amendment No. 36 to Provisional Operting License No. DPR-13 dated September 25, 1978 and in the NRC's topic assessment for SEP Topic XV-20 dated January 17, 1980. As indicated in these references, the dose at the EAB from rupture of one fuel assembly (180 fuel rods) is calculated as 1 Rem whole body and 99 Rem thyroid. Therefore, 25 fuel assemblies (4500 fuel rods) would have to be ruptured to exceed the 10 CFR 100 guidelines for whole body dose and 3 fuel assemblies (540 fuel rods) would have to be ruptured to exceed the 10 CFR 100 guidelines for

-10 thyroid dose. The assumptions used in calculating these doses are very conservative. The combined probability of an aircraft impacting the plant, of that impact being on the spent fuel storage building (less than 7% of the overall plant area), and of the impact causing debris to fall into the spent fuel pool such that 540 to 4500 fuel rods are damaged is considered to be sufficiently low such that Standard Review Plan 2.2.3 guidelines are met.

7.

Steam and Motor Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps These pumps are located in the turbine building and are vulnerable only from the west side.

General aviation flight corridors are generally parallel to the coast (plant north-south).

Therefore, crashes from fixed wing aircraft are not likely to occur from the west.

Furthermore, in the unlikely event this equipment were damaged by an air crash, the normal feedwater system would still be available.

Furthermore, no feedwater is required for 30 minutes following reactor trip due to the secondary water inventory in the steam generators. At that time, decay heat may be removed by charging/letdown and subsequently, the RHR.

8. Component Cooling Water System The component cooling water system pumps and heat exchangers are located on the auxiliary building roof. The area is shadowed by the sphere enclosure building, spent fuel pool and the refueling water storage tank.

In the event they were damaged by an air crash, the plant could be kept in a warm shutdown condition using the main steam/feedwater/main condenser systems.

This would provide time to repair the component cooling water system.

9.

Salt Water Cooling System The salt water cooling pumps are located in the circulating water pump pit.

The auxiliary salt water cooling pump is located below grade to the west of the circulating water pump pit.

The separation is such that the possibility of all salt water cooling pumps being damaged by a single air crash is extremely small.

In the event the salt water cooling system piping was damaged in such a manner as to cause loss of all salt water cooling flow, the plant could be kept in a warm shutdown condition using the main steam/feedwater/main condenser systems or the auxiliary feedwater/condensate storage tank/fire water systems. This would provide time to repair the salt water cooling system piping.

-11

10.

Instrument Air System The Instrument Air System is located south of the auxiliary feedwater pumps in the turbine building. As discussed for the auxiliary feedwater pumps, general aviation flight corridors are generally parallel to the coast.

Therefore, crashes from fixed wing aircraft are not likely to occur from the west and result in damage to the instrument air components. Branch lines which go outside the turbine building which could be damaged by aircraft impact can be manually isolated.

Furthermore, San Onofre Unit 1 has the capability to connect a portable diesel driven air compressor to the instrument air header.

11. 125 Volt dc Power Supply The 125 volt dc power supply is located in the south end of the control/administration building and in the diesel/generator building. Because of the physical separation, a single air crash cannot disable both trains of the 125 volt dc power supply.

12. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

The CVCS is located inside the auxiliary building. This building would provide some protection from air crashes. However, in the unlikely event the CVCS were damaged, reactor coolant inventory can be maintained by the Safety Injection System which is physically separated from the CVCS.

13.

Main Control Room The main control room is vulnerable to air crashes from the south and, to a lesser degree, the east sides, and from above. The north and west sides are shadowed by the sphere enclosure building and are constructed of 40 inches of reinforced concrete (for biological shielding).

In the unlikely event of an air crash into the control room, the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown condition using the remote shutdown panel (located at the south end of the turbine building) and equipment located away from the control room area.

As indicated above, the safety-related systems potentially vulnerable to aircraft impacts either have a backup system available or are not needed for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions. This finding is based on the consideration that the combined probability of an aircraft impacting one of the systems and the simultaneous loss of a normal operating function which would lead to a demand for that system is sufficiently low and well within the criteria of SRP 2.2.3.

-12 V. CONCLUSION It is concluded that the risk of missile impacts (other than aircraft) from offsite sources on San Onofre Unit 1 is well within the SRP 2.2.3 criteria.

Except for the spent fuel storage building, the risk of aircraft impacts on the plant is judged to be sufficiently low on the basis of the low aircraft crash probability and the finding that the consequences in the event of an aircraft crash onto the site are acceptable since the plant will have the ability to achieve a safe shutdown. For the spent fuel storage building, it is concluded that the combined probability of an aircraft crashing onto the building and subsequently damaging enough spent fuel to exceed 10 CFR 100 limits is acceptably low.

VI.

REFERENCES

1.

Amendment No.

36 to Provisional Operating License No.

DPR-13 dated September 25, 1978.

2.

Letter from Dennis L. Ziemann to R. Dietch dated January 17, 1980, regarding SEP Topic XV-20.

TABLE 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1975 AND PROJECTED OPERATIONS FOR AIRPORTS WITHIN A 50-MILE RADIUS FROM THE SAN ONOFRE SITE Distance to Plant, Operations~a)

(Projected Type, Name Sector CY 1975 Operations Air Carrier Orange County 27 NW 618,889

660, b)

Long Beach 45 NW 538,230 8,000(c)

Ontario 45 N

153,958 28-0 ~

Lindbergh (San Diego) 50 SSE 195,016 60 00c Los Angeles 63 NW 455,846 0,0()e Military Camp Pendleton MCB 15 ESE 67,100 NA El Toro NCAS 20 NNW 140,000 Los Alamitos NAS 40 NW 50,034 NA March AFB 40 NNE 55,000 NA Miramar NAS 45 SE 789,795 NA Santa Ana MCAS 29 NW 103,033 NA General Aviation (d)

Falibrook 17 E

10,000 1

Oceanside 17 SE 20,000 29,000(d)

Skylark 22 NE 130,0005,0(d Palomar 25 SE 183,989 35,000 Rancho California 25 ENE 5,000 10,000(d)

Perris Valley 30 NNE 6,000 9,000 Co ron a 35 N

50,000 1400c Meadowl ark 35 NW 58,000650(d Fullerton 40 NW 223,248 400,000 Hemet-Ryan 40 NE 45,000 60,000(c)

Riverside 40 N

124,176 218,000 Chino 45 N

183,037 311000(c)

Fla-Bob 45 N

36,000 42,000(d)

Ramona 45 ESE 36,000 51,000 Montgomery 47 SSE 341,339 559,000(c)

Brackett 50 NNW 218,107 357,000(c)

Cable 50 N

75,000 224,000 Gillespie 50 SE 243,601 423,000(c)

Tri-City 50 NNE 24,000 89,0000d Aval on 50 W

50,000 86,000(c) a Personal Correspondence with Western Region FAA,

b. 1990 Forecast by Orange County Airport

c. 1987 Forecast Federal Aviation Administration

d. 1982 Forecast by Western Region FAA

e. Los Angeles International is included here for completeness, even though it is greater than 50 miles from San Onofre.

NA Not available

TABLE 2

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS Aircraft Classification C

N A

Probability crashes/mi flights/yr sq. mi.

aircraft/mi Of Impact/yr SFW GA(1) Single Engine 9.8E-8 73840 4.1E-3

.316 9.3E-6

<5000 1bs SFW GA(1 ) Multi-engine 5.6E-8 19604 4.5E-3

.231 1.1E-6 5000-12500 lbs Air Carrier 4.5E-10 71656 8.3E-3

.0186 5.OE-9

>12500 lbs Military Helicopter 2.3E-9 7072 5.OE-3

.199 1.6E-8

>12500 lbs Military Jet 2.3E-9 26676 7.3E-3

.037 1.6E-8

>12500 lbs (1) SFW GA -

Small Fixed Wing General Aviation

164046'5000~.

k "'J 4~3REDLA 3

00D dRMA 06 5

J3 216 S53213

-5 OJ 61 r,

ICq r

4

~6~6l42 0

B6 DANA POITN SAT/AiAN ONOFREU 65000 ISO OU NA$)

-0

• AG NOA'T NAUTICAL MILE NUCEA GEEAIGNTTO COASTAL AIFILD 6079100-1 UCEA 2 85)

FIGURE 2 Observed Distribution of Aircraft Comnercial 80 a

600 O

0.

40 20 50 5

10 15 20MILES LAND OCEAN NE.LSW

r INGE D

R

2.

5 3

2o a

62 1

G?

8 I~L OCEANj Ar OCEAN ACOl F%? T Bo Zo toAG o

o20.o "o

NAUTICALSA MIOsSNNNOR mmmm V23 UCEARGENRAINGSTAIO

-Unit 1

IIllilIIIIllullini VV

- 27 S A I FEEA AIRAY 2

3 S

ANFigureli3 0079-11D-1421C 60C6O CENS

FIGURE 4 El Toro Landing Corridor and Traffic Pattern 60 50 40 30 0

40 0 20 U.

L) 10 5

0 5

10 15MILES PLANT SITE N

SE -

I W

FIGURE 5 Military Helicopter Observed Distribution 30

'U C',

0 20 U

-0 5

0 SMILES OCEAN I LAND SW-1-

. NE

FIGURE 6 Observed Distribution of Aircraft General Avaiation 250 200 150 w

0100 LL

<50 0

10 5

0 5

10 15 MILES LAND OCEAN NE SW A

FIGURE 7 Location and Approach/Departure Paths for the San Onofre Heliport APPROACH PATH 15' EXTRA FOR RADIUS T

OF ROTOR CIRCLE 625 HELIPORT 625' PLANT AND SHADOW AREA 312 '

433 Yd.

DEPARTURE PATH OCEAN