ML13312A872

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Rev 1 to Engineering Procedure SO23-SPE-017, Standby Power Capacity Test. Related Info Encl
ML13312A872
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1986
From:
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML13303B878 List:
References
SO23-SPE-017, SO23-SPE-17, NUDOCS 8801210085
Download: ML13312A872 (45)


Text

SA*1 ON3FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNilS ? AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 1 OF 15 EFFECTIVE DATE JAN 0 8 1984 CANCEL DATE STANDBY POWER CAPACITY TEST TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0* OBJECTIVE 2

2.0 REFERENCES

SITE FILE COPY 2

3.0 PREREQUISITES iJE I V E 4

4.0 PRECAUTIONS JAN08 1984 6

5.0 CHECK-OFF LIST(S)

CDM SITE 7

6.0 PROCEDURE 8

6.1 Shared Unit Standby Power Capacity Test 8

6.2 Diesel Generator Permanently Connected Load Capacity Test 13 7.0 RECORDS 15 8.0 ATTACHMENTS 15 8.1 ESF Load Determination 8.2 Test Connections for Diesel Generator Capacity Test 8.3 Standby Power Capacity Test Sequence of Events PAGES CHANGED WITH THIS REVISION: 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 15

, Attachmrnt 8.2, page 1 PREPARED BY:

__/

"AUTHOR DAfE APPROVED BY:

MANAGER, TECHNICAL 0237d/cem 8801210085 880114

  • PDR ADOCK 05000361 P

PDR

SA I ON)FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNilS ? AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 1 OF 15 EFFECTIVE DATE

'JAN 08 1984 CANCEL DATE QW)LLS

-g STANDBY POWER CAPACITY TEST TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 OBJECTIVE 2

2.0 REFERENCES

2 3.0 PREREQUISITES iE CE IVk U 4

4.0 PRECAUTIONS JAN 08 1984 6

5.0 CHECK-OFF LIST(S)

CDM SITE 7

6.0 PROCEDURE 8

6.1 Shared Unit Standby Power Capacity Test 8

6.2 Diesel Generator Permanently Connected Load Capacity Test 13 7.0 RECORDS 15 8.0 ATTACHMENTS 15 8.1 ESF Load Determination 8.2 Test Connections for Diesel Generator Capacity Test 8.3 Standby Power Capacity Test Sequence of Events PAGES CHANGED WITH THIS REVISION:

2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 15 VAttachmi-n-t 8.2, page 1 PREPARED BY:

AUTHOR DA E APPROVED BY:

4Sxk DATE

MANAGER, TECHNICAL 0237d/cem

Mm JUc: s0123-Vi-1.0.1 S. MWs (W Fm luI T

T001CM 3PECIFICATI O 1LATIGS IF NJ PAoctSSLD IIThIs 14 MS Statt" Docutat____stem.

1 3ca trF cW ta6 ealti Statina Ita7rmIn THecdp~eS station Dkcmt Title :STAvi~f5X Powa

&iA cfl/ r-7ES

3.

Thfe"oll taius lbe effetsA ttor t

t affecte COPY

3.

This chage cannot att until the next revisfo of the Station Decuet and is required.

A.

To allow perforince to coplete objective(s) of the Stat sin Docwmnt

8.

To effect tfeely im pleetioen of olf t changes within the Station Docuet ii E r o e Isiesa C.

To intement Tc S4pec Chage Amendment ft.

Paragrap go.

1 U

n

0.

To tI plent fcchlatn design change (PFC, INCR TMt, etc. I facility design che d.nto.iferl eirwTilT.

a e

CDM SITE Ilhemtentation of the facility do6en change has been determined.

YES m

(It h,o a TCn cannot be

revd u til the facility design cho s tAictl mia t)

E.ur for a one use change In order to coplete a test Ahch comwiscei usfai a prior proded reduesta l

Procedure No.

or pIor Rev. No.

F.-

Other (e.p., CAN, MAC, LtIconstagj Coasitat

  • So specif ic with reason)
4.

Dao*

rriginag 0e *C 1 A t1CSM iSc Juse ant)

1.

Does this change affect the nonr admoloitmet enviroment osn offs T* arei 949 Refe c distio durin site p)reparation and plant tonstruction?

YES no/N

. 1 the fna ten of the original ocu mnt altre YES NO e i>(

9.

is the documat to be changed an Es-er genc or Abnorml OD.en/

InstrcTeon1 YES

10.

Does this change ose an unreviewed safet question Oer 14 CFAOR I...

Joes It increase thepri lit of occurrence or the consequetces -if an 4c identj create the oosalbillit4 of & different accidenti or reduce tus tech.

Spec.

iarATal of safet_?

ItS N0 (F THE A14SWER TO 6..

. 9 N S. A TCN IS NOT MITHOAllED)

IC.

oes this change offdet itcraeng cosetcnt requirialfnts a stated In the Referene Sectiot YES 0

12.

,eRtEoD a progaess 1VtiWCAX:

lorgantoitteon:

N -elv M

-/ntrVAI

-n~tiT Tl qone v5~

13.

Copy forwarded to the nuclar Safet Grop al SD

14.

SIGatATYR(5 REQUIRED REVIEWED AND APPOVEo sT:*

(AT LEAST ONE (1) SAO oM rTK UNIT AFFECTEo) t Matff it I Det4 TIMee Could this (CN affect or does It represent a Change to aplant Could this TCN affect or doa It r tes t

an a to a o terafton In progress?

YES*

N plant oeretton in

?.ins our eN 3)O -

V U4 D"eIa we Shit perdor

  • Uit IDae TMP' RLVIEtWED AND APPROVED 8Y.

qrw~uy s eiiL i

h 4 e t ae n nts hasde db ourmr Cha-ngs re..

9)

M IAL APPROVAL SHAL til WIH 14 DAYS OF' W1

  • Approval shall be by two -subrs of the Plant Management Staff knowledgeable to t ' a ress affected, at I-t.t One Of whom holds an SA0 License on the unit or units effcted.

(for TCH approval.

of LUe F1644 Neen stiff are defind as the sue Iori chare of the shft, or &6 desigroted in, ittag by tW cysm,.

rean responsibility in the speclif c are4 &nd unirms addressed by the chasnge.)

    • If YES.

tL aplproval of the ipesvisor in cage wf the shift sll be obtained, if NO se

  • 10(1231 110. m. a

. 93 00W

a oE-

.S E

-oil sees

.At.

e

1.

It reqIred. TCU 8sdatfee Jtproel:

U VRas

  • ~~~~~11 se;s.~~tuu RT~rt E frilV~cmr-r

.0 sw~etwrtr as3 lce re samem me a a

t.

TMe reneming caag shtsl e o effect (Attea o earted W

tcopy asth asRE o

5:

^'AC""SITE FILE COP JAN 091984

3.

This chae caet wa t t e next resisles of tM statioe ocusest see I reIre.:

CDM SITE A. Y To atten Performance to 4epleste objectfve(s) of th Statis D

ast D.

To effect timely Ietemsetattes of o*Ikf chedes satis the Stetie Dcint C.___

To Iftalmet Tech Spec ChasA

- Assassent fs.

Paragraph as.

a._o Yoe, ieeant facllf 1 destoo cheese (Pc, Ka.

Ti.

etc.)

Facility 4tasit chas6e Ideatifler I o seek~eta FC, E Tril etc.

jEIdeaie lempementatiee et th facility desiga chag has bees detaersed.

IIE a

(It M.

a TCU ceanot be apprWed sill hs feciitty destp cshsa be*1ilemated) 9._

For a

  • time chas" 14 order Is couleta a test AIca cmaneced msted a prtor procedw rsevitei Procedwre gs.

Arter Rev.

ft.

F.

Steer (*.g..

CM.

AC. LceaafaI Comitamat

  • So pcifIc with resses)
4.

Date ortgfeated I4 I'-

S. Issuance JA Ue 9n lyWp)

6.

D.es this clo co5

. Comsal ets TS

7.

Does thIs chae affect the nkweaioedical ewironesent of ay offsffa are relouslj edisture"e 4wtae site p.reparatfa and plant GAstractes TES M

,e

8.

Is the Intent of the ortminal Jacasat alteraY KS rt cT

0. I tiedocueeI to be changed sA Ewerec rAnr.I~i~

IsiTe1 YS__

D>

10.

Das ats caes e eose as unrettewed safet question er 4 JCFR st.59 i.e.. Joss it facrease the ra45eit of 0ascafraace or the conseqencas of &a accident 8 create the osribillyt of a differee

accident, r reduce tae Tech.

,c.

mrgia of safeth?

YES (if THE AsaswU To 6.7

6. 9 W10 ISTs.

A TCs Is or Atrntittal It.

Does this cheaa strect Iceastaj caettuant requIre its as stated to the Reference Sectie?

YES _

0 U 1?.

PaUAnES er:

r..(te -

PAZ:

O6 -7 ore lese:

ISf5

'F/

-TET.-oa rel TWrTitAim) a I.

Cops forwarde to tohe mcaer See Gret.

p Saram an;

14.

sIGUArKs tquIRts 111IL LJRysor REi1ttK WAD APPotto BT:*

(AT LEAST ONE (1) SA0 0 THE U"lT AFFECTED) waiaf*et I gate TINS lI eaugm Staff -

Suts zA3 eto I.m Could ts TCU affect or does It represent 5 change to a pleat Could this ICM affect or does ft represent a ChaAs toa oerateas it progreas?

VES M_

S _

_t eparatoe o So oss?

YLS*

s a - hit I

Es MU - Unite te 3hStf supervisor -

imit I uat Te o1'I Kft pervir - Uwits 2/

Date TIta I

FVitt AtPPME T lt1it srac ai t I

tqity Astsur e - 1615 ra DzAe II

~FItAL Afft"AL POLL K tilTIl

.0"I t

sTHItatif Tar latw A* oeaol shell be by two samers of the Plant Wnagemat Staff knowledgeable Io tke Lres affected, at least oe of waem Lalds

&A 550 Lkase on the uait or ualts effected.

(For Its syproval, -sesra Cf the rlt t pl06Aa.a4t St, ff are defied as the awereslaer Is charie of the shift. or as destrated is wiqsad ja the CFSN*tAeercssian rsesibilfitj to the specific area tzod unit(s) addrees*4 by the chande.)

  • ITtthe approal of the supervisw to charges f the shift skill be estape.

It gf a ee*

so(023)

Il1.

am.

6 0Iz-4.

col6

Exes 59.

atacWX TEWNICA W&CIFICATIN IOLATIONI WT ?"C"DSL wITNil 14 MfS Statien Cocu.

A. SO 3 -

sPE m

t Statfoa Dqcu t Title S C

1.

If required. TC Doviatfea Aproval:

CFW UUtaist_

2.

The followitg change shall be to effect: (Attach a earted-vip C of the affected osio(4)

REC:bD

3.

this change cannot wait until the next revisfoa of the Station Dcmnt and is required:

JAN 0 9 984 A.

To allow performance to coqlete objective(s) of the Stetlo Document I.-

To effect timely Iaplesentatlon of 00eliy Chnes sithl the Station Doc st EDM-SITE C._____ To qilement Tech Spec Chanve - Assnegat No.

Pararh Ae.

0._

To Impleent facilfty design Change (PC. 11R.

TMW.

0tc.)

Facility design Chan*e Identifie d

PFC,
i.

TYRl tcc In er Implementaion of the facility desig change Us been deteralned.

YES so (if no, a TCN cannlot be oegroved until the facility desigN Chawlsala bisu-iomte4)

E._

For a one time change in order to complete a test which comenced using a prior procedure revisloal rocedure No.

. pflor Rev. ft.

F._

Other (e.

ACiC Licenssfg ColefteNt

  • Be specIfic with ruases)

F. rocdurN.SITE FIL ISSU~n IRJtJAN 9 19BV rorj wuse Only)

4. Date originte
5. Ifor COnUse Cate
6.

Does this Changeafi;7T oU r ocn. S,0@c.--ZoiiiT!Znts?

YES

. oe thiscPan,* affect the nonradoi.SicaI environment of any off-ite area proIaslj undisturo*4 dring site preparation and plant tonstruction?

YES No X

8.

Is the Intent of the oriutnal Jutweant alterigf" VIS 50

9.

Is the document to be changed an iesrjency or Abnormal 0 crtin 0t ruc.e.

oes its no I

0.

Puas this chanlge 0,oI an unreviawed safety question #or 1.~i 0.S59

  • I.e..

Joes It m e-ts the #r-V fjof

1. occurrerur the consequences of an a cidenti create the #ossibility of a different accident, or reduce the Tech.

S ec. uart of safet I Its sO II.

Des this c

anjo a1fet licensing Citment reauArsflta as state In the Reference Sectiont TES 50

12.

PaR.PARE0

1.

-AE-707 Organitation:

.I&

8 I g o

13.

Copy forwarded thexu ar Safety Group

$1 a

U 14.sIjjGNATUR!ES 1UIRED:_

atvitED AND APPRaOVED IT:*

(AT LEAST ONE (1) SA0 ON THEL UNIT AFFECTED) 1)Pln NsenttA I

fi-:

,,r-i-i lit Could this TC affect or does it represent a change to a plant Could this TCH affect or does it represent a Chae to a oorat ion In progress?

YES*

NO

-p9lant ationtIharogrels YES-VA X

)

/ A.f S up) e r v i s o r no-nI Fr T -& 1iiT

-- u

-noTI

=-i13.-Dolt s o 7Wls VIDE iD AND APPROVED W.

9)

FlaAL AfPROVM S4ML RE WITHIN 14 DATS I

c Approval shall be by two meabers of the Plant Management Staff knowledgeable is the area& affected. at 1*44t one of roe ise an SA0 LIC he on the unit or aIts affected.

(for EA approval wr qf t" Plant K*no

  • se t Staff are dvf lied as the swu i~ri hrj of the shift. or.16 designated i.ffltiag as t"m' CYSN. e"WO loin*

res asibility in the spe ic area and uant(s) addreAod by c chan*t.)

  • If V([S the approval of the supers or in chari 0f the skit tA.ol be obtained.

It no 1141 n0(123) 110. Rev. 6 06-12-83 0014P

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 2 OF 15 STANDBY POWER CAPACITY TEST 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 The objective of this test is to functionally verify that a diesel generator has the ability to supply the worst case emergency loads on one unit plus the worst case shutdown loads on the opposite unit using the 4.1 kV ESF bus tie.

1.2 Demonstrate that the installed diesels can satisfy REGULATORY POSITIONS 2.d and 2.e of REGULATORY GUIDE 1.81; Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants and IEEE standard 308.

1.3 Verify that a diesel generator has the capacity to support a 1000 HP HPSI pump by starting two 600 HP HPSI pumps on one train on an ESF signal while maintaining voltage of 4360 +436 volts and frequency of 60 +1.21-.3 Hz.

1.4 Verify the accuracy of Table 8.3-1 in the Final Safety Analysis Report by empiracally measuring various 1E loads and the Diesel Generator load while supplying the worst case accident loads.

NOTE:

This test is to be performed concurrently during operational surveillance S023-3-3.12, Integrated ESF Test.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Cross-reference to Licensing Commitment Requirements 2.1.1 Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.3, Onsite Power Systems, Amendment 32, May 1983 2.2 Operating Instructions 2.2.1 S023-3-3.12, Integrated ESF System Refueling Tests, Rev. 7 2.2.2 S023-2-17, Component Cooling Water System Operating Instruction, Rev. 5 2.2.3 5023-6-2, Transferring of 4160 Volt Buses, Rev. 4

'2.2.4 S023-3-5.4.1, Loss of Offsite AC Power to a Unit, Rev. 9 2.2.5 5023-3-2.7, Safety Injection System Operation, Rev. 6 2.2.6 S023-2-13, Diesel Generator Operation, Rev. 7

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENF?

TNG STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UVT REVISION 1 PAGE 3 OF 15 2.0 REFFRCS-(o~~

2.4 Urawings 2.3.1 32328, Elementary Diagram Electric Auxiliary - 4.16 kV Bus 3A04 Diesel Generator 3G002 Breaker, Rev 10 2.3.2 32216,.Elementary Diegram Electric Auxiliary - 4.16 kV Bus 3A04 Tie Breaker (3A04), Rev 6 2.3.3 32258, Elementary Diagram Electric Auxiliary Bus 3804 MCC 38D Feeder Breaker, Rev. 3 2.3.4

32329, Elementary Diagram, Diesel Generator 3G002 Protection AC System, Rev. 9 k

2.3.5 32261, Sheet 1, Elementary Diagram, Electric Auxiliary Bus 3804 MCC BQ Feeder Breaker, Rev. 4 2.3.6 32219, Elementary Diagram, Electric Auxiliary 4.16 kV Bus 3A04 Feeder Breaker (3804), Rev. 3 2.3.7 32643, Elementary Diagram, Reactor HP Safety Injection Pump P017, Rev. 3 2.3.8 32645, Elementary Diagram, Reactor HP Safety Injection Pump P018,,Rev. 3 2.3.9 S023-302-2-451-3, Wiring Diagram ControlBuilding Electric Auxiliary 4160 V Switchgear 3A04 2.3.10 S023-302-2-450-4, Wiring Diagram Control Building Electric Auxiliary 4160 V Switchgear 2.3.11 S023-302-2-454-0 Wiring Diagram Control Building Electric Auxiliary 4160 V Switchgear 3A04 2.3.12 S023-302-2-446-0, Wiring Diagram Control Building Electric Auxiliary 4160 V Switchgear 2.3.13 S023-302-2-453-2, Wiring Diagram Control Building Electric Auxiliary 4160 V Switchgear 3A04 2.3.14 33763, Sht. 3, Wiring Diagram Control Building Electric Auxiliary 4160 V Switchgear32A04, Rev. 5

'2.3.15 30219 Elementary Diagram Electric Auxiliary 4.16 kV Bus 2A4 Feeder Breaker Metering, Rev. 3 2.3.16 30259 Elementary Diagram Electric Auxiliary Bus 204 MCC 2BY Feeder Breaker, Rev. 3 2.3.17 30260 Elementary Diagram Electric Auxiliary Bus 2BO4 MCC 2M3E Feeder Breaker, Rev. 3

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 NO REVISION 1 PAGE 4 OF 15

2.0 REFERENCES

(Continued) 2.3.18 30261 Elementary Diagram Electric Auxiliary Bus 2804 MCC BQ Feeder Breaker, Rev. 4 2.3.19 S023-403-12-69 (-10), 4700 kW, 4360 V, 3 0, 60 Hz,

.8 PF Emergency Diesel Generator 2.4 Other 2.4.1 Regulatory Guide 1.81, Rev. 1, Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants 2.4.2 IEEE Standard 308, Section 8, 1978 2.4.3 10 CFR 50, General Design Criterion 5, Appendix A 3.0 PREREQUISITES INITIAIS/DATE NOTE:

This test is to be performed concurrently during operational surveillance S023-3-3.12, Integrated ESF Test.

3.1 Prior to use of an uncontrolled (pink) copy of this Station Document to perform work, verify it is current by utilizing one of the following methods:

3.1.1 Checking a controlled copy and any TCNs.

3.1.2 Accessing an SCE Oocument Configuration System (SOCS) TSO Terminal.

3.1.3 Referencing a current (within one week)

Configuration Control Log and associated daily update.

3.1.4 Contacting COM by tolophone or through counter inquiry.

3.1.5 Obtaining an uncontrolled (pink) copy of the Station Document from CDM.

VERIFIED) BY:/

t NOTE:

Step 3.2 may be performed at any time:

atnd is not required for' the compl etion of this test.

3.2 0bt ain the hinf;>

tion requested in Atchmwnt 4-.

VFRIVIlF)

BY:

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENCINEFRING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 GE 5 OF 15 STANDBY POWER CAPACHVIY TEST 3.0 PREREQUISITES (Continued)

INITIALS/DATE 3.3 Have the Station Electrical TestDepartment attach a multiple channel recorder to record the parameters listed in Attachment,&.

'b4

/ ti 1')

3.4 Unit 3 is in Mode 5 or 6. If Unit 3 is in Mode 6, all reactivity changes must be suspended for the duration of this test.

3.5 No LCOAR exists against any Unit 2, Load Group B ECCS subsystems.

3.5.1 The Unit 2 LOCAR log has been reviewed and is satisfactory for the performance of this. test.

3.5.2 The Unit 2 EOMR log has been reviewed and is satisfactory for the performance of this test.

3.6 Charging pump 2P191 is aligned to 2B04.

3.7 The following Unit 2 Load Group A Shutdown loads are available:

3.7.1 1 CCW pump (Component Cooling Water)

(2PO24 or 2PO25) 3.7.2 1 SWC pump (Saltwater Cooling)

(2P112 or 2P114)

-j 3.7.3 1 LPSI pump (Low Pressure Safety Injection) (2P015) 3.7.4 2 Charging pumps (2P190, 2P191) 3.7.5 1 Motor Driven AFP (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump) (2Pl41) f

/'-

3.7.6 2 Dome Circulating Fans (2AO71 and 2AO74) 3.8 HPSI pump 3P018 is aligned to Train A per Ref. 2.2.5, and tested per Check-Off List 2 of Ref. 2.2.1.

(Mark

'this step N/A if Section 6.2 is not to be performed.)

/-<(

LV 3.9 Unit 2 noncritical CCW loop is being supplied from Train B per Ref. 2.2;2.

/e N k It

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 VISiOM 1 PAGE 6 OF 15 3.0 PREREQUISITES (Continued)

INITIALS/DATE NOTE:

All jumpers are to ue installed with spade.

lugs.

3.10 Have the Station Electrical Test Department install a switched jumper accross AE7 and AE8 in cubicle 3AO416.

This will permit the diesel generator to operate in the speed control mode with bus-tie breaker 3AO416 closed.

Verify that the switch is open.

(Ref. E.D. 32328, W.D. S023-302-2-453-2, S023-403-12-69)

J4%

//-:

I; Second Verification

/ /-o f 3.11 2P-140, Turbine-driven AFP is operable.

64

/i-4s Z.(0 4.0 PRECAUTIONS 4.1 Performing step 6.1.5 will enable Unit 3 4.16 kV ESF bus 3AO4 tie breaker 3AO416 to be closed simultaneously with 3AO413, 3G002 diesel generator feeder breaker.

4.2 If Unit 2 is in Modes 1, 2, 3 or 4, performance of this test may exceed the provisions of LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) 3.8.1.1 and 3.8.3.1.

The duration of this test is expected to be less than 15 minutes. It may be required to initiate LCOARs (Limiting Condition for Operation Action Requirements) for the following:

4.2.1 Placing 2G002 in Maintenance Lockout (step 6.1.6).

4.2.2 4.16 kV ESF bus 2AO4 energized from 3G002 (step 6.1.11).

4.2.3 De-energizing bus 2AO4 (step 6.1.9).

NOTE:

The following applies only if Unit 2 is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 while 4.16 kV ESF bus 2AO4 is connected to 3G002.

4.3 If Unit 2 receives a SIAS while 2AO4 is connected to 3G002, immediately perform the following to restore bus 2AO4 to normal status:

4.3.1 Open bus tie 2AO417 by pressing TRIP on 2H1S-1660A1 at 2CR-63.

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 7 OF 15 4.0 PRECAUTIONS (Continued)

-4.3.2 Place 2G002 in service by performing the following:

.1 Select 2G002 to NORMAL on keyswitch 2HS-1767-1, 2G002 Maintenance on 2CR63.

cc 1

.2 Depress LOCKOUT RESET on 2HS-1661-1, Diesel Gen 2G002 Lockout Relay Reset on 2CR63.

CAUTION If 2G002 fails to start, immediately refer to 5023-3-5.4.1, Loss.of Offsite AC Power to a Unit.

.3 Verify 2G002 is starting.

.4 Verify 2AO413 closes, using 2HS-1664-1 on 2CR63, energizing 2AO4.

4.5 Prior to lifting the wire in step 314, verify that 4.16 kV ESF bus tie breaker 2AO417 transfer switch is selected to manual.

Lifting this wire removes the interlock which prevents 4.16 [SF bus tie breaker 3AO416 to be closed while Diesel Generator feeder breaker 3AO413 is closed. Having 2AO417 in manual will prevent an asynchronous auto transfer of 2AO4 to 3AO4 in the event of an LOVS on Unit 2.

4.6 Verify that 4.16 kV ESF bus 2AO4 voltage is essentially 0 (residual voltage <30% nominal) prior to energizing 2AO4 from 3AO4 via the cross-tie while 3AO4 is energized from 3G002.

4.7.3 serves as a summary of the sequence, of events performed by this test and should be referenced often to ensure test continuity.

4.8 Do not load any diesel generator greater than 5200 kW at any time during this test.

5.0 CH1CK OFF LIST(S 5.1 None

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCPDURF SO23-SPE-n1' UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 eAGL c Ue 6.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY/DATE

'6.1 Diesel Generator 2G002 Load Capaciy Test 6.1.1 Verify that step 2.2.1 in Check-Off List of S023-3-3.12, Integrated ESF System Refueling Test, has been completed.

/ I I 6.1.2 Secure boration of the RCS by performing the following:

.1 Override and stop Charging Pump 3P-190 using 3HS-9228-1

/

.2 Override and stop Charging Pump 3P-191 using 3HS-9229-1

.3 Override and stop Charging Pump 3P-192 using 3HS-9230-2

/

6.1.3 Verify/place 4.16 kV ESF 3AO4 bus-tie transfer switch in MANUAL using 3HS-1660B1 on 3CR63.

/!I*

CAUTION Hot bus transfer of 2AO4 to 3AO4 with 3AO4 energized from 3G002 and 2AO4 energized from Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 2XR1 must not occur as the voltagesare asynchronous.

6.1.4 Verify/place 4.16 kV ESF 2AO417 bus-tie transfer switch in MANUAL using I

2HS-1660B1 on 2CR63.

/ 1t'ltY

.1 Open/Verify open 4.16kV ESF 2AO417 bus-tie1A/

/

I using 2HS-1660B1.

/

/

NOTE:

After step 6.1.5 has been completed, the interlock between 4.16 kV ESF bus tie 3AO416 and diesel generator feeder breaker 3AO413 will be defeated.

6.1.5 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to lift and isolate wire C32 from termination AE14 in 3AO416 (Reference E.0. 32328 and W.0.

S023-302-2-453-2).

/

Second Verification r,6

_ -Jil

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISI PACE 9 OF 15 6.0 PROCEDURE (Continued)

VERIFIED BY/DATE 6.1.6 Place 2G002 in MAINTENANCE LOCKOUT using keyswitch 2HS-1767-1 on 2CR63.

1 9

6.1.7 Close the switch in the jumper installed in 3AO416 cubicle. (This will maintain the diesel generator in speed control mode with 3AO416 closed).

/1 b

/

C.

b'INc-on~ I4s -164,-41 o,, 2c rrp

.1 PrCc CL0i :

MS-

-(hoA 2Cv(o3 4

07 Press S-INC o%.2A5-It 1,161W

,.I Press SAlNC ot

-VS-ooAI

.A 3c 1

LD a

5.2 S1le<.

SSF A

S5YNo tASIIER cutre-4/

111s W

t1a1-1 t b o

3<,

forg; Performn s4cks

(..lo.J I

O

(.

1. II/.iad 6,1 1.1 rt' c(

6-"o c0

/

1Ct 3Coo'W j

Cos, ll S j

v1c/a

/Aoq

&.s 7/

o,,d ver Decy A," J/lun,%*f'd

  • e

.L

/2168 /

</?C463, 3

Reve

now,

-:j a s

04o S&

ccAurted

.1d jol 6.1.12 Verify in-service/start the following Unit 2 loads and record the flow rates as required (these loads represent the worst case shutdown loads.

Ref. 2.1.1).:

.1

'SW'C pump (circle one) 2P-112/

07 with flow as read from 2FI-6400 gpm.

/

2 CCW pump (circle one)

P§0

/2P-025 with flow As read from 2:1-6 on 2CR64 g{:m (Critical loop A) and 2FI-6312 y(

I on 2CR64 (Noncritical loop)

_gpm.

/

M4l pump P-141 with flow as read from 2FI425-1 pm.

M

.4 Charn'~no ouma 2P-190

. /1

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 10 OF 15 6.0 PROCEDURE -(Continued)

VERIFIED BY/DATE 6.1.12.5 Charging pump 2P-191 with flow as read from 2FI-0212 gpm._gp/

.6 Upper Dome Air Circulating Fan 2A-071 IL/ 0/6

.7 Upper Dome Air Circulating Fan 2A-074

/_

.8 Containment Emergency Fan 2E-399

/

.9 Containment Emergency Fan 2E-402

/

.10 AFW Pump Room Fan 2A-394

/

f

.11 Safety Equipment Building Pump Room Air Conditioning Units 2E-417 and 2E-517

/_L_

.12 Fuel Handling Building Accident Air Conditioning Units 2E-370

//88

.13 Fuel Handling Building Pump Room Emergency Air Conditioning Unit 2E-441

/ (Igol

.14 In tructure Cooling Fans 2A-370 and 373 /ZA5T-S owl o1

.15 C

gin Pump Area Air Conditioning Unitsc4/..-,

E-437 and 2E-438

/

.16 BAMU Pump Area Emergency Air Conditioning

/14,8 Units 2E-439 and 2E-440

/

.17 CCW Building Pump Room Emergency Air Conditioning Units 2E-453 and 2E-454

.18 Control Room Cabinet Emergency Air Conditioning Unit 2E-424

/ /ic/gy.

.19 1E-Pressurizer heaters, red train, using

/ L 2HS-0100F1

/ i(to 4 6.1.13 Start Charging Pump 3P-190 by pressing (&

71 START on 3HS-9228-1 on 3CR58 6.1.14 Start Charging Pump 3P-191 by pressing START on 3HS-9229-1 on 3CR58

//AI

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINE kiNG PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017

' AN REVISION 1 PAGE 11 OF 15 AN D.3 T-Crl I 6.0 PROCEOURE (Continued)

VERIFIED BY/DATE 6.1.15 Diesel Generator S22420MG002 has supplied emergency AC power to the Unit 3, Load Group A, ECCS subsystem loads required to mitigate the worst case accident and supplied emergency power to the Unit 3, Load Group A, ECCS subsystem load required for the worst case shutdownl~

1~

scenario.

~~'

.III' 6.1.16 Record the following Diesel Generator data at 3A0413:

3G002 Volts:

A80_O 3~

CA0 O O

3G002 Vars:

15. flV 30002 Watts:3's 3G002 Amperes: AO tO 3G002 Frequency:

1_

'/'

~ui 6.1.17 Secure Unit 3 RCS boration by performing step i-:1A in Check -Of f Li st 4-1n T

/q 6.1.18 Synchronize 2A04 to Reserve Auxiliary Tr.3nsforrfler 2XR1 as follows (Ref. 2.2.3).

.1 Select LSF A SYNC MASTER CONtROL, 2DS1627-1 to ON on 2CR63. ha

.2 Plire the Reserve Auxiliary Transfor3er

?XR1 feeder breaker to 2Am41i8 in the sync ircuit by depressing SYNC on 211S.-1659-1.

.3 AdjUSt 3,1)02 volae using 31S-166 t, 1)1 [ SF1'.

G IN 3G002 VOLTAMG.3 RE:GULATOR COIMIO lo d 3 002 f orequency us cn 3 S -

h.16 w1-d Iscenari. G-N :3000 GOVLRNOR COMM.. to mRtch the incoming freuency and vol tage so IthaL L he synch scopo i s mov inrg sloly11Y4-

/ t.1.

in, ihe ci cckw i se direc;tion.

TCH %-a SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 12 OF 15 6.0 PROCEDURE (Continued)

VERIFIED BY/DATE CAUTION Perform steps 6.1.18.4 and 6.1.18.5 in rapid succession.

This will ensure smooth transfer of diesel generator operating mode from speed control to droop control.

Failure to do so may result in motoring of the diesel generator.

6.1.18.4 When the synch scope is within 5 minutes of the straight up position, depress CLOSE on 2HS-1659-1, 4.16 kV BUS 2A04 RES AUX XFMR 2XR1 FOR BKR, 2AO418.

/+/-It

.5 'Open the switch in the jumper installed in 3AO416 cubicle to transfer the diesel generator from speed control mode to droop control mode. Verify "Droop In" illuminated on 3ZL-1768-1 on 3CR63.

/ ///e 6.1.18.6 Verify proper voltage on 2A04, then remov 3AO418 from the sync circuit.

/_

CAUTION Perform steps 6.1.18.8 and 6.1.18.7 in rapid succession.

This will ensure smooth transfer of diesel generator opprating mode from droop control to speed control.

.7 Open 2AO4 bus-tie 2AO417 by pressing TRIP on 2HS-1660A-1.

CL ose

.8 Zp44 the switch in the jumper installed in

  • cubicle 3AO416 and verify 3G002 in speed control by observing "Droop In" not illuminated on 37L-1768-1 on 3CR63.

6.1.19 Stop the strip chart recorder started in C step 6.1.8.

NOTE:

Do not secure Dome Air CirculaLing Fans unless Lhey have been in service for 15 minutes.

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 13 OF 15 6.0 PROCEDURE (Continued)

VERIFIED BY/DATE 6.1.20 Secure loads, as required, that were placed in service per step 6.1.12.

/ IjL4 6.1.21 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to terminate the wire lifted per step 6.1.5.

//, tL!

Second Verification Tu Suved.Hw

/I Alty P6l TIELZ 0ov 6.1.22 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to remove the switched jumper intalled in step 3.10.

/_S Second Verification

//jeISLI 6.1.23 After the interlock between the bus-tie and the diesel has been reinstalled, perform the following:

Place 2G002 in NORMAL using keyswitch 2HS-1767-1 on 2CR63.

.2 Depress LOCKOUT RESET on 2HS-166Y'-1, Diesel Gen 2G002 Lockout Relay Reset on 2CR63.

/

6.1.23.3 Place the 4.16 kV ESF 2A04 bus-tie transfer switch in AUTO using 2HS-1560B1 on 2CR63.

/

d

_]e 6.1.24 Perform operability test on 2G002 using Ref. 2.2.6.

/

6.2 Diesel Generator Permanently Connected Load Capacity Test CAUTION Ensure the switch in the jumper to be installed is open.

Closing the switch will auto start HPSI pump 3P017.

NOTE:

Step 6.2.1 may be performed prior to the completion of section 6.1.

6.2.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to install a switched jumper in the following location:

SAN ONfFRF NilCLEAD 1,'T"NG STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 REVISION 1 PAGE 14 OF 15 6.0 PROCEDURE J)

VERIFIED BY/DATE 6.2.1.1 Across terminations BR1 and BR2 (PI and P41) in 3AO409 (Ref. E.D.

32643 and 32645, W.D. S023-302-2-446-0)

/

SECOND VERIFICATION 0ATE 6.2.2 Open/verify open the switch in the jumper.

/

6.2.3 Rack in HPSI pump, 3P017, on Train A and close the D.C. breaker and ready the pump for service per S023-3-2.7.

/

6.2.4 Verify step 2.2.3 in Check-Off List 2 in 5023-3-3.12 has been completed.

/

6.2.5 Station an operator at the switched jumper previously installed and establish commun ications.

/

6.2.6 Perform step 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 in Check-Off List 2 in 5023-3-3.12.

6.2.7 Have the operator close the switch in the jumper after verifying the diesel generator breaker 3AO413 has opened, and 4.16 kV FSF bus 3A04 has shed all i t s l o a d s.

A -~

a-

  • i
  • - *.s-o-

L.*

P.

4 so_3_-_3_-

3.4_7

.2.8 Verify that two HPSI pumps start when 3AO4 is energized.

6.2.9 Secure liPSI pump 3PO17/on Train A from 3CRS7 after step

".-.5 has been completed in Check-Off List -t in 5023-3-3.12.

/

6.2.10 Open the switch in the jumper.

/

6.2.11 Have operations open the D.C. breaker and rack out the breaker of lIPSI pump 3P017 on Train A.

/

6.2.12 Have the Station Electrical Test Department remove the jumper installed in SLCOND VERIFl iA ION DA I'F

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 L'.

AN 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 15 OF 15 6.0 PROCEDURE (Continued)

VERIFIED BY/DATE 6.2.13 Analyze the strip chart recorder traces and record the information below:

Min Max Time (0 sec:time when 2AO413 closed)

.1 Voltage - 4.16 kV

.2 Voltage -

480 V

.3 Frequency - Hz 3G002 has started two HPSI pumps while maintaining voltage and frequency within the acceptance criteria listed in 1.3.

RECORDED BY:

/

6.2.14 Return to step 2---6 in Check-Off List 2 in S023-3-3.12, Integrated ESF System Refueling Test.

6.2.15 Notify the Shift Supervisor that this test has been completed.

VIERIFIED BY:

/

Shift Supervisor 6.2.16 Remove the multiple channel recorde and terminations installed per step 3.

1.0 RE1CORDS 7.1 None 8.0 Ar TACHMNTS 8.1

[SF Load Oetermination 8.2 rest Connections for Oiesel Generator Capacity Test 8.3 St.ndby Power Capacity Test Sequence of Events 037d

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENtINE.RING PROCOURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 I

1.

I-GE 1 OF 9 T1 I

ATTACHMENT 8.1 ESF LOAD DETERMINA1ION 1.0 OISCUSSION The objective of this attachment is to measure the as-built loads of certain ESF components when in service at their rated capacities.

Load calculations are made using the following form'ula:

L = (IA +8

+

x V x PF x 3 Tc 3

where L

Load in watts IAO AS current in amps 10= 80 current in amps IC0 = CO current in amps V

Bus Voltage PF Cosine of the phase angle or Power Factor. Power Factor may be obtained from the equipment description in the FSAR, Station Manual, or from field measurements.

2.0 PROCEDURE VERIEFD BY 2.1 Auxiliary Building Emergency Chiller 2.1.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of Chiller 1:335 or 1:336.

/

2.1.2 Chiller tested (circle one):

1-335, E336 Oate Time

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATIN-STATTON FNGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 1

PAGE 2 OF 9 AiTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.1.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.1.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.1.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.1.6 Load Calculation

/

2.2 Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (LPSI) 2.2.1 Request the-Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of LPSI pump 2/3 P015, P016 at approximately.

4150 gpm.

/

2.2.2 LPSI pump tested (circle one):

2P015, 2P016, 3P015, 3P016 gpm (FE0306)

Date Time

/

2.2.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.2.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.2.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.2.6 Load calculation

/

2.3 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump (HPSI) 2.3.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of HPSI pump, 2/3 P017, P018 or P019 at approximately 650 gpm.

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 3 OF 9 ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.3.2 HPSI pump tested:

2PD17, 2P018, 2P019, (circle one) 3P017, 3P018, 3P019 gpm Date Time

/

2.3.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.3.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.3.5 Phase angle measured:

2.3.6 Load calculation:

2.4 Containment Spray Pump 2.4.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Containment Spray pump 2P012, 2P013 3P012 or 3P013 at approximately 1900 gpm.

/

2.4.2 Containment Spray pump tested (circle one):

2P012, 2P013, 3P012, 3P013

/

gpm Date Time 2.4.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.4.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.4.5 Phase angle measured:

2.4.6 Load calculation:

2.5 Saltwater Cooling (SWC) Pump 2.5.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of SWC pump, 2P112, 2P113, 2P114, 2P307, 3P112, 3P113, 3P114 or 3P307 at approxi mately 17,000 gpm.

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.5.2 SWC pump tested (circle one):

2P112, 2P113, 2P114, 2P307, 3P112, 3P113, 3P114, 3P307

/

gpm Date Time

/

2.5.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.5.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.5.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.5.6 Load calculation:

/

2.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 2.6.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a CCW pump 2PO24, 2PO25 2PO26, 3PO24, 3PO25 or 3PO26 while it is supplying the noncritical loop.

/

2.6.2 CCW pump tested (circle one):

2PO24, 2PO25, 2PO26 3PO24, 3PO25, 3PO26 gpm Date Time

/

2.6.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.6.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.6.5 Phase angle measured:

/

?.6.6 Load calculation:

/

2.7 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFW) 2.7.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a motor-driven AFW pump, 2P141, 2P504, 3P141, 3PS04 at approximately 700 cpm.

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION I PAGE 5 OF 9 ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.7.2 AFW pump tested (circle one):

2P141, 2P504, 3P141, 3P504 gpm Date Time

/

2.7.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.7.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.7.5 Phase angle measured:

2.7.6 Load calculation:

2.8 Charging Pump 2.8.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Charging pump, 2P190, 2P191, 2P192, 3P190, 3P191, 3P192.

2.8.2 Charging pump tested (circle one):

2P190, 2P191, 2P192, 3P190, 3P191, 3P192 gpm Date Time

/

2.8.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.8.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.8.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.8.6 Load calculation:

/

2.9 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Unit 2.9.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Unit, E418 or E419.

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE 5023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 6 OF.9 ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.9.2 Emergency Air Conditioning Unit tested (circle one):

E418 or E419 gpm Date Time

/

2.9.3 Phase current measured:

A 8

C

/

2.9.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.9.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.9.6 Load calculation:

/

2.10 Battery Charger 2.10.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Battery Charger, 2B001, 28002, 2B003, 28004, 38001, 3B002, 38003, 38004.

/

2.10.2 Battery Charger tested (circle one):

2B001, 2B002, 28003, 2B004 38001, 3B002, 38003, 38004 Date Time

/

2.10.3 Phase current measured:

A 8

C

/

2.10.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.10.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.10.6 Load calculation:

/

2.11 Upper Dome Air Circulating Fan 2.11.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of an Upper Dome Air Circulating Fan, 2AO71, 2AO72, 2AO73, 2AO74, 3AO71, 3AO72, 3AO73, 3AO74.

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017

!TS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 7 OF 9 ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.11.2 Upper Dome Air Circulating Fan tested (circle one):

2AO71, 2AO72, 2AO73, 2AO74 3AO71, 3AO72, 3AO73, 3AO74 Date Time

/

'2.11.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.11.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.11.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.11.6 Load calculation:

/

2.12 Containment Emergency Fan 2.12.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Containment Emergency Fan, 2E399, 2E400, 2E401, 2E402, 3E399, 3E400, 3E401, 3E402.

/

2.12.2 Containment Emergency Fan tested (circle one):

2E399, 2E400, 2E401, 2E402 3E399, 3E400,' 3E401, 3E402 Date Time

/

2.12.3 Phase current measured:

A 8

C

/

2.12.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.12.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.12.6 Load calculation:

/

2.13 'Emergency Chiller Water Pump 2.13.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of an Emergency Chiller Water Pump, 2P160, 2P162, 3P160, 3P162 at approximately 650 gpm.

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 8 OF 9.

ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.13.2 Emergency Chiller Water Pump tested (circle one):

2P160, 2P162, 3P160, 3P162 Date Time

/

2.13.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

gpm Discharge Pressure 2.13.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.13.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.13.6 Load calculation:

I 2.14 Diesel Radiator Fan 2.14.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Diesel Radiator Fan, 2E546, 2E550, 2E547, 2E549, 3E546, 3E550, 3E547, and 3E549.

/

2.14.2 Diesel Radiator Fan tested (circle one):

2E546, 2E550, 2E547, 2E544 3E546, 3E547, 3E549, 3E550 Date Time

/

2.14.3 Phase current measured:

A 8.

C

/

2.14.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.14.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.14.6 Load calculation:

/

2.15 Diesel Generator Building Emergency Supply Fan 2.15.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a Diesel Generator Building Emergency Supply Fan, 2A274, 2A275, 2A276, 2A277, 3A274, 3A275, 3A276, 3A277.

/

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 9 OF 9 3

ATTACHMENT 8.1 2.0 PROCEDURE VERIFIED BY 2.15.2 Diesel Generator Building Emergency Supply Fan tested (circle one):

2A274, 2A275, 2A276, 2A277 3A274, 3A275, 3A276, 3A277 Date Time

/

2.15.3 Phase current measured:

A...

B C

/

2.15.4 Bus voltage measured volts

/

2.15.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.15.6 Load calculation:

/

2.16 Boric Acid Makeup Pump (BAMU Pump) 2.16.1 Request the Station Electrical Test Department to measure the phase current and bus voltage of a BAMU Pump, 2P174, 2P175, 3P174, or 3P175 at approximately 200 gpm flow.

/

2.16.2 BAMU Pump tested (circle one):

2P174, 2P175, 3P174, 3P175 Date Time

/

2.16.3 Phase current measured:

A B

C

/

2.16.4 Bus voltage measured __ __

volts

/

2.16.5 Phase angle measured:

/

2.16.6 Load calculation:

/

0237d

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 741 UI r E

REVISION 1 PAGE 1 OF 2 ATTACHMENT 8.2 L

TESY CONNICTIONS FOR DIESEL CAPACITY TEST 1.1 ConneAt/verify connected the following load group A parameters to a visicorder(s) or equivalent multiple-input recorder to monitor and record test data.

NOTE:

All connections are to be made with spade lugs so that the permanent wiring will not be disconnected while connecting/

disconnecting test equipment.

Item Bkr. No. Parameter-(Terminationsl Trace No.

W.D. #

E

-D A. 3AO414 Diesel Generator 3G002 Frequency 32329 RA42(F2) RA43(F1) 33763-2/32329 S023-302-2-451-3 B. 3AO414 Diesel Generator 3G002 Voltage RA22(1B31) RA23(1B32) 33763-2/32329 S023-302-2-451-3 C. 3AO413 Diesel Generator 3G002 Breaker Position RX1(P11) RX6(C13) 33763-2/32328 S023-302-2-450-4 b

0. 3AO413 Diesel Generator 3G002 Current RY39(l.12) RY4O(1I1) 33763.-2/

32329 S023-302-2-450-4 E. 4A04f& Bus 0ie 3A04 Current 311(03 Sl6 o?0Ij RX25(Al) 04~.--(A) e316 -3Y 3-P-&

F.

3AO417 MCC 31304 Current RX(l)WAl)'3/63--3/

32219 S023-302 2-454-0 G. 2AO420 MCC 2R04 Current RX1(Al) RX2(All) 31763-20 30219 R.

20415 MCC 213Y Current Clamp on Ammaoter N/A 30259

f. 20414 MCC 213E AO Current Clamp on Ammoter N/A

.30260 J.

3P,0415 MCC 31Y AO Current lI A~m ;o ro Lor

-N/A305

SAN UNOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 0 2 kid 3 REVISION 1 PAGE 2 OF 2 TC(1 ATTACHMENT 8.2 Bkr. No. Parameter (Terminations)

Trace No.

W.D. 1 E.D. #

K. 380414 MCC 3BE AO Current Clamp on Ammeter N/A 30260 L. 2/380417 MCC BQ AO Current Clamp on Ammeter N/A 30261/

-32261 M. 380407 MCC 280 AP Current Clamp on Ammeter N/A 32258 1orE.

a"re w

M.

AF-s or os AL.

C.A A-iIfdL

, II V a

j

\\16216' sav 3*2

1)

A 0

d~a -cc' e~ 1 TcAI2

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017

.01*FPs 1.2 PAGE 1 OF 2 ATTACHMENT 8.3 Sequence of Events Summary The following is a summary of the sequence of events during the performance of S023-SPE-017, Standby Power Capacity Test.

1.

Station Electrical Test to install and make operable test recorders.

2.

LOVS concurrent with SIAS, CRIS, CCAS, CSAS, EFAS-1, and EFAS-2.

(Step 2.2.1 in Check-Off List 1 in S023-3-3.12).

3.

Place red train transfer switch in manual.

(6.1.3 and 6.1.4)

4.

Remove bus-tie breaker and diesel generator breaker interlock on Unit 3. (6.1.5)

5.

Place 2002 in MAINTENANCE LOCKOUT. (6.1.6)

6.

Start test recorder. (6.1.8)

7.

De-energize 2AO4, (6.1.9)

8.

Energize 2AO4 from 3G002 using bus-tie. (6.1.11)

9.

Place worst case shutdown loads in-service on Unit 2. (6.1.12)

10.

Take required test data. (6.1.16)

11.

Parallel and connect 2AO4 to 2XR1.

(6.1.18)

12.

Open bus-tie. (6.1.18)

13.

Stop test recorder. (6.1.19)

14.

Replace bus-tie breaker and diesel generator breaker interlock. (6.1.21)

15.

Return 2G002 to NORMAL. (6.1.22)

16.

Return bus-tie breaker transfer switches to AUTO. (6.1.22)

17.

Have Station Electrical Test install switched jumper to defeat Kirk key interlock in 3P017 control circuit. (6.2.1)

18.

Verify open/open switch in jumper. (6.2.2)

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENGINEERING 'PROCEDURE S023-SPE-017 UNITS 2 AND 3 RFI"SION 0 PAGE 2 OF 2 AITACHMENT 8.3

19.

Rack in 3AO409 and close D.C. breaker. (6.2.3)

20.

Emergency loads in-service energized from diesel generators for greater than 15 minutes. (2.2.2 in Check-Off List 1 in S023-3-3.12)

21.

Start strip chart recorder (6.2.6)

22.

Open diesel generator breakers. (2.2.4 in Check-Off List 1 in S023-3-3.12)

23.

Close switch in jumper after bus strips. (6.2.7)

24.

Secure 3P017 after loads have sequenced. (6.2.9)

25.

Stop test recorder. (2.2.8 in Check-Off List 1 in S023-3-3.12)

26.

Remove jumper, rack out 3AO404. (6.2.11 and 6.2.12) 0237d 4.

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CONFORMANCE WITH NRC GUIDELINES The following Regulatory Guides and General Design Criteria were reviewed during the evaluation of the proposed Emergency Diesel Generator Cross-Connect design change. The proposed change was found to be in conformance with the guidance or requirements of each as currently committed to by SCE for SONGS 2 and 3:

o 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 5, 17, 18, 33, 34, 35, 38, 41, 44, revised as of January 1, 1985.

o Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Safety Guide 6), "Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems," Rev. 0, March 1987.

o Regulatory Guide 1.32, "Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 1, March 1976.

o Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electric Power Sources,"

December 1974.

o Regulatory Guide 1.47, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems," Rev. 0, May 1973.

o Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electric Systems,"

Rev. 1, January 1975.

o Regulatory Guide 1.81, "Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 1, January 1975.

Specifically, with respect to GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components," and GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems," the following information is provided.

o General Design Criterion (GDC) 5 requires that:

"Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units."

As supported by the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and single failure evaluation performed for the proposed cross-connect, as well as the review of SONGS Units 2 and 3 FSAR safety analyses, implementation of the proposed diesel generator cross-connect will not impair the ability of the plant ESF systems and components to perform their intended safety functions, nor will it compromise:

The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;

-2 The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposure of 10 CFR 100.

Therefore, it was determined that the proposed design change complies with the requirements of GDC 5.

o General Design Criterion 17 requires (inpart) that:

"An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

The onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure...

Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies."

The results of the FMEA and single failure evaluation performed for the proposed cross-connect coupled with the review of SONGS Units 2 and 3 FSAR safety analyses demonstrate the compliance of the proposed cross-connect with the requirements of GDC 17.

The safety function of the emergency standby power systems will not be impaired by implementation of the proposed design change. The proposed cross-connect will not compromise:

The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or

-3 The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposure of 10 CFR 100.

Therefore, it was determined that the proposed design change complies with the requirements of GDC 17.

APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION TO SHARED SYSTEMS The sequence of events for a loss of offsite power with the proposed design change installed and one of the transfer enable switches in the AUTO position would be:

o preferred source lost o

backup preferred source lost o

associated diesel generator not available o

opposite unit diesel generator in same train supplies power to vital buses o

vital loads are supplied in both units.

The single failure analysis and the failure modes and effects analysis evaluated the failure of each component in the ESF power supply system (i.e.

diesel generator, tie breaker, feeder breaker, vital bus etc.).

These evaluations showed that the worst case single failure was the loss of a vital bus (either through loss of a cross-tied diesel generator, cross-tie breaker, feeder breaker or bus failure) which has been analyzed for in the FSAR previously and found not to impact the safety of the plant, since in each case at least one train of ESF equipment was available.

SCE's interpretation of the Single Failure Criterion satisfying the guidance of SRP Section 3.8.1.111.4, Regulatory Guide 1.81 C.2.b., and SECY-77-439 is the application of a single failure to the onsite emergency AC electric system, a part of which is the shared portion of the system. Further, per Regulatory Guide 1.81 C.2.b, one of the single failures considered in the evaluation of the set of possible single failures should be "a false or spurious accident signal at the system level in the non-accident unit."

It should be noted here that SCE's interpretation somewhat parallels the design basis for Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 where there are two diesel generators cross-connected to support both units.

Prairie Island FSAR Section 8.4.1 discusses application of the Single Failure Criterion as follows:

"... the question becomes whether it is credible to assume that in addition to the most restrictive single failure already assumed, if one diesel generator fails to start, another single failure must be hypothesized to occur generating the spurious safety injection signal in such a manner as to deny the unit with the accident adequate diesel power to supply its Engineered Safety Features. The probability of these two single failures occurring simultaneously is so low as to represent no hazard to the public."

-4 In addition, Section 9.1.2.3 of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 FSAR describes the shared standby service water system. Specifically, the design basis is:

"The system operation analysis for Mode III is based on the following assumptions:

a. LOCA occurs in one unit, assumed to be Unit 1.
b. Normal shutdown of the other unit, Unit 2.
c. Total loss of offsite power for both units.
d. Worst single active failure occurs in the unit experiencing a LOCA. The worst active failure for this analysis is the loss of one of the two standby diesel generators which removes one of the standby service water loops from operation. The Unit 1 A standby diesel generator is assumed to fail.
e. No makeup water is available to the SSW cooling tower basins for 30 days
f. Worst 30-day site meteorology for heat rejection.

These assumptions will result in the greatest heat rejection rate for the ultimate heat sink during the most severe meteorology for cooling tower heat rejection.

Cooling requirements for shutdown of the two units are satisfied by:

a. Unit 1 - SSW Loop A and HPCS Service Water Loop C
b. Unit 2 -

SSW Loop A and SSW Loop B The licensed Prairie Island and Grand Gulf positions are precedents which support SCE's interpretation of available regulatory guidance.

COMPLIANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.81 POSITIONS

a. Regulatory Position C.2.b regarding the application of single failures.

Regulatory Guide 1.81, Regulatory Position C.2.b, and Standard Review Plan, Section 8.3.1, Subsection 111.4, address application of the single failure criterion.

o SRP Section 8.3.1.111.4, on page 8.3.1-14, states:

to ensure that the selected capacity is sufficient to power the minimum ESF loads in any unit and safely shut down the remaining units in the event of an accident in one unit and a single failure or spurious or false accident signal from another unit and loss of preferred power to all the units."

-5 o

Regulatory Guide 1.81, Regulatory Position C.2.b states:

"A single failure (a false or spurious accident signal at the system level in the non-accident unit should be considered as a single failure) should not preclude the capability to automatically supply minimum engineered safety feature (ESF) loads in any one unit and safely shut down the remaining unit, assuming a loss of the offsite power."

SCE's interpretation of the Single Failure Criterion satisfying the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.81 C.2.b, SRP Section 3.8.1.111.4 and SECY-77-439 is the application of a single failure to the onsite emergency AC electric system, a part of which is the shared portion of the system. Further, per Regulatory Guide 1.81 C.2.b, one of the single failures considered in the evaluation of the set of possible single failures should be "a false or spurious accident signal at the system level in the non-accident unit."

b. Regulatory Position C.2.e regarding the need for procedural control of any additional operator actions (e.g., unit-to-unit enable switch position, override of spurious SIAS signal).

Regulatory Guide 1.81, Regulatory Position C.2.e, addresses the necessity for coordination between unit operators.

o Regulatory Guide 1.81, Regulatory Position C.2.3, states:

"Coordination between the unit operators should not be necessary in order to meet Regulatory Positions 2.b and 2.c. Coordination required to meet Regulatory Position 2.d should be minimized."

The issues here are:

o Written procedures for control of the unit-to-unit load transfer enable switch for each train; and o

Operator action to override the dual unit SIAS signal, in particular, if this is an immediate action necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

For the design change evaluated, this action is not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, administrative procedures will also be required to prevent the control room operator, on the unit with the actual LOCA, from resetting the SIAS signal while the shared diesel generator is carrying LOCA loads. If the SIAS signal is reset, then a false/spurious SIAS signal, from the non-LOCA unit, would not cause the bus tie breaker to open and could overload the diesel generator.

-6 The common control operator has responsibility for:

1) Electrical Power distribution switching equipment in Units 2 and 3
2) All four diesel generators at Units 2 and 3
3) All diesel generator tie breakers Before any plant modification is declared operable, an evaluation of the station's Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs) and FSAR accident analyses will be performed. This evaluation will ensure that there are no existing requirements, in either the EOIs or FSAR, that the SIAS signal be reset for accident mitigation.
c. Regulatory Position C.3 regarding the NRC preferred configuration.

Regulatory Guide 1.81, Regulatory Position C.3, states:

"In the case of multi-unit nuclear power plants for which the construction permit application was made on or after June 1, 1973, each unit should have separate and independent onsite emergency and shutdown electric systems, both a.c. and d.c., capable of supplying minimum ESF loads and the loads required for attaining a safe and orderly cold shutdown of the unit, assuming a single failure and loss of offsite power.

The regulatory guide allows conformance to Regulatory Position C.2 or C.3 for multi-unit nuclear power plants for which the construction permit application was made prior to June 1, 1973, as was the case for SONGS 2 and 3. The current design does in fact meet Regulatory Position C.3, which endorses the NRC's preferred configuration. The proposed design change will involve SCE conformance to Regulatory Position C.2 which provides an alternative to C.3 deemed acceptable to the NRC.

0657H

C

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START AT 30 SECONDS UNIT 2 TRAIN A DIESEL (2o02)

LOAD APPLIED VOLTS (LO/HI)

FREQUENCY (La/HI)

TEST DATE NORMAL LOADS 3850/4655, 59.7/60.4 05/12/86 NOMINAL: 4360 NOMINAL 60.1 NORMAL LOADS 3920/47,25 59.8/60.4 11/18/83 PLUS A SECOND CCW PUMP NOMINAL 4445 NOMINAL 60.0.

NORMAL LOADS PLUS A 4025/4850 60.0/60.5 11/19/83 SECOND HPSI PUMP NOMINAL. 4550 NOMINAL 60.1

SUMMARY

As the. conneced' load increases, the voltage and frequency dips are reduced for those loads-sequenced on as the load sequence continues.

The more connected load that the diesel has already accelerated to monimal voltage and frequency, the less-the dips from the starting of additional loads.

LOAD SEQUENCE AT TIME ZERO UNIT 2 TRAIN A DIESEL (2Go02)

LOAD APPLIED VOLTS (LO/HI)

FREQUENCY (LO/HI)

TEST DATE NORMAL LOAD SEQUENCE 3850/4743 59.54/60.64 05/12/86 NOMINAL 4515 NOMINAL 60.08.

LIMITS 3386/5644 LIMITS 57.07/63/08 NORMAL LOAD SEQUENCE 3589.5/4900 59.0/60.7 11/19/83 PLUS ONE EXTRA CCW NOMINAL 4325 NOMINAL 60.0 PUMP AT 1.2 SECONDS LIMITS 3281/5469 LIMITS 57.0/63.0 NORMAL LOAD SEQUENCE 3570/5285 59.5/61.0 11/19/83 PLUS ONE EXTRA HPSI NOMINAL 4550 NOMINAL 60.7 PUMP AT TIME ZERO LIMITS 3412.5/5687.5 LIMITS 57.1/63.1

ENCLOSURE IV

UNIT DATE 7

o S023-3-3.12 PARAGRAPH 26 TRAIN A Equip ID Trace No Tech Spec Time ictual Time Circle One

0002 i /O17t

< 10 sec 7 -5 Sec Sat /Unsat AO41

< 10 sec 7 55 Unsat 804 0 sec P0180

+0.5 0 SEC Q Z.'E Sec Sat /Unsat 57 5 Sec Sat / Unsat P015

/

EC+-0.5 se A7/615 5 +/-

0.5 sec LO Sec Sat / Unsat A071_____

5 +/--0.5 sec 5, G Sec Sa/Unt A74 5

0.5 sec 5

Sec Sat / Unsat E418

/

5 +/

0.5 sec S

Ssec_

Sat /unsat P012

?0 10 +/-

0.5 sec cf9W5 Sec Sat /

Unsat E546 9

10 +/-

0.5 sec 10a05 Sec Sot Unsat E550

// ~

i0

+/-

0 5 s.95 Sec Sat Unsat A274

/2 15 +/-

0.5 sec IA-Z Sec Sat / Unsat A275

/3 15+/- 0.5 sec 14,5 Sec Sat / Unsat PO24

25) 2/2Z 15 +/-

n-5 sec ib.4-Sec Sat /Unsat Pi1 l2/ZeL0

+1 0 -

sec

-0.

35 Sec Sat/

at P141 9

0 +0.5 -10 sc 2c'5 Sec Sat Unsat L336 3 4.5 7J0 sec 5/.5 Sec Sat Unsat DO Freg Min fRo Hz Max (d07-Hz Sat /_Unsat DC Volts Min 950 Vac Max 4-So vac Sat /Unsat MCC BD Min 400 Vac MCC BE 4-Z Vac Sat /Unsat 4,

A".61!.

.