ML13263A077
| ML13263A077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | |
| Michael Bielby | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML11354A431 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML13263A077 (78) | |
Text
Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: DAYS MODE: 1 POWER: 5%
PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: NORMAL PROTECTED TRAIN: 1 ASSET UTILIZATION: GREEN GRID RISK: NORMAL SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:
N/A CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None PROTECTED EQUIPMENT Train 1 OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None DAILY STATUS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS - See Daily Status Report AT THE CONTROLS RO Continue Reactor Startup ALARM STATUS:
LICENSE REQUIREMENTS - See attached for details ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None BALANCE OF PLANT RO:
Open MFW Block Valves CONTROL ROOM WORK AROUNDS - None CONTROL ROOM BURDENS - None CTRM DEFICIENCIES OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM NON-OUTAGE repairs in the CTRM
Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS GENERAL STATUS Plant was shutdown for bushing replacement on the Main Transformer. Reactor startup is in progress and currently at 5%. Continue a plant startup per DB-OP-06901, starting at Step 3.42. Completed testing of both AFPTs for operability.
Planned: Continue Reactor startup.
In Progress: Line-ups for placing MDFP in AFW mode, complete venting of FW779 and FW780 CHEMISTRY - STATUS Intake Chlorination - #1 and #2 Circwater Chlorination - I/S Circwater Dynacool - I/S Sodium Bisulfite - I/S MSD Skid -I/S MSR Drains: #1 FWD #2 FWD Polishers I/S - 1, 2, 3 and 4 EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS FOLLOW-UP ITEMS M&TE ISSUED FOR TESTING NOP-WM-5002 COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES IN PROGRESS - Expected completion date (Refer to CR-09-68507)
DB-OP-06901 - complete today
Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Date &
Time Entered Equipment Affected Specification Action Required Next Action Due Responsible Individual Issue Owner/
Test Leader
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Facility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
NRC 2013 Examiners:
Operators:
SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions:
5% power Rod Control Panel in Auto MFPT 2 in service Turnover: Plant was shutdown for bushing replacement on the Main Transformer. Reactor startup is in progress and currently at 5%. Continue a plant startup per DB-OP-06901, starting at Step 3.42. Completed testing of both AFPTs for operability. Planned: Continue Reactor startup. In Progress: Line-ups for placing MDFP in AFW mode, complete venting of FW779 and FW780.
Critical tasks: 1. Isolate SG 1 (CT17)
- 2. Initiate HPI Cooling (CT14)
- 3. Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps (CT1)
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
R-ATC/SRO Continue Reactor startup from 5% to 10%. Stabilize at 10%
to perform NIP to HBP comparison 2
SRO (TS)
MDFP Inoperable due to oil leak, Enter TS 3.7.5 Condition B 3
N-BOP/SRO Place Main Feed Reg Valves in service (Open Block Valves) 4 C-ATC/SRO Pressurizer Spray Valve Fails Open 5
SRO (TS)
RC TE3A6, RCS Hot Leg Temp to PAM fails high. Enter TS 3.3.17 Condition A 6
I-BOP/SRO Slow failure of Steam Generator 1 Startup Level Transmitter, LT SP9B4, to zero.
7 C-BOP/SRO Sheared shaft on Condensate Pump 1.
8 M-All Steam leak on AFPT 2 develops with MS 107A failed in the open position. Manual reactor trip required.
9 M-All Loss of all Feedwater due to a steam leak on AFPT 2 and AFPT 1 Governor overspeed trip. Motor driven feed pump breaker will not close. (oil leak on pump - event 2) 10 C-ATC/SRO Makeup Pump 1 does not start. Establish MU/HPI/PORV Cooling (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Summary 2013 NRC Scenario 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 2 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 DAVIS-BESSE 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 The Crew will take the watch with power stabilized at approximately 5%. A Reactor startup is in progress following a shutdown for bushing replacement on the Main Transformer. Direction will be to increase power to 10%, stabilize for NIP to Heat Balance comparison and continue to 14%
power During the power increase an Equipment Operator (EO) will be placing the Motor Driven Feed Pump (MDFP) in the Auxiliary Feedwater mode. The EO will call the Control Room and report the oil has leaked out of the MDFP. The SRO will declare the MDF Pump Inoperable and enter TS 3.7.5 Condition B.
An Equipment Operator will report the steps complete for venting the bonnets for the MFW Block Valves. The BOP RO will open the MFW Block Valves placing the Main Feedwater Control Valves in service. When the Main Feedwater Control Valves are in service the Pressurizer Spray Valve will slowly fail open. The ATC will close the Pressurizer Spray Block Valve. The SRO will enter DB-OP-02513, PRESSURIZER SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION, and verify the immediate actions complete and give direction for maintaining pressure manually.
Following the actions required in the Pressurizer System Abnormal Procedure the T Hot instrument input to the Subcooling margin meter will fail high which will bring in the loss of subcooling margin annunciator. The SRO will identify this as a Tech Spec required Post Accident Monitoring instrument and enter TS 3.3.17 Condition A.
LT SP9B4 will then slowly fail to zero which will cause Steam Generator 1 to overfeed. The Crew will take the Steam Generator 1 startup and main Feedwater control valves to hand and restore level to 40 inches.
When Steam Generator level control is regained, Condensate Pump 1 will shear its shaft which will be recognized by low amps and a condensate header pressure annunciator. The Crew will shutdown Condensate Pump 1 and start the standby Condensate Pump.
Following Condensate flow restoration a steam leak will develop at AFPT 2. DB-OP-02525, STEAM LEAKS, will be entered. The EO will report no personnel hazard. When isolation is attempted it will be discovered MS107A cannot be closed thus rendering the leak Unisolable.
The ATC will be directed to trip the reactor and initiate and isolate SFRCS.
A loss of all Feedwater will occur due to AFPT 1 overspeed trip since AFPT is isolated due to the steam leak and the MDFP is in the process of being shifted to the Auxiliary Feedwater mode. Specific Rule 4 will require the start of the standby makeup pump 1. Makeup pump 1 will not start which will require the crew to immediately establish MU/HPI/PORV cooling.
Upon loss of subcooling, the crew will secure all RCPs. After all RCPs have been secured, the scenario will be terminated, at the Lead Evaluators discretion.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
1, 2, 3 Page 3
of 14 Event
Description:
Continue Reactor Startup from 5% to approximately 14%
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 3 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 1: Continue Reactor Startup from 5% to approximately 14%
2: Enter TS 3.7.5 Condition B for MDFP 3: Place Main Feed Reg Valves in service (Open Block Valves)
SRO Direct increase reactor power to 10% and stabilize per DB-OP-06901, starting at Step 3.42 Perform NI Power and Heat Balance Power comparison ATC Increase reactor power to 10% at 35°F/hr Increase power using Reactor Demand Station Perform NI Power and Heat Balance Power comparison Booth Cue When RO commences power increase, role-play EO and report: During lineup to place the MDFP in the Auxiliary Feedwater mode it is discovered all the oil has drained out of the MDFP pump inboard bearing reservoir SRO Declare the MDFP Inoperable and enter TS 3.7.5, Condition B SM Cue (If necessary) Continue power increase while MDFP repairs are in progress, estimated time for repairs is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Booth Cue 2 minutes following MDFP oil leak report, role-play EO and report: Steps 3.43.1. a and b are complete. FW 779 and FW 780 bonnets have been vented and are ready to be opened per steps 3.43.2 through 3.43.7 BOP Open MFW Block Valves, FW779 and FW 780 Open SP 6B to 5%, Close SP 6B Open FW 780 (Takes ~ 2 minutes to stroke)
Open SP 6A to 5%, Close SP 6A Open FW 779 (Takes ~ 2 minutes to stroke)
On Lead Evaluators discretion, insert Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
4 Page 4
of 14 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Spray Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 4 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 4: Pressurizer Spray Valve Fails Open Indications Available:
Spray Valve indicates 40% Open ALL Pressurizer Heaters ON 4-4-C, HOT LEG PRESS LO CREW Recognize Spray Valve failure SRO Implement DB-OP-02513, Pressurizer System Abnormal Operations for Pressurizer Spray Valve, RC2 Failed Open:
- Attempt to close RC2
- Close RC10, Pressurizer Spray Block ATC Perform immediate actions per DB-OP-02513, Pressurizer System Abnormal for Pressurizer Spray Valve, RC2 Failed Open:
- Attempt to close RC2
- Close RC10, Pressurizer Spray Block SRO Refer to TRM 8.4.2, Pressurizer All conditions met, Entry is not required On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
5 Page 5
of 14 Event
Description:
RC TE3A6 RCS Hotleg input to Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 5 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 5: RC TE3A6, RCS Hotleg temperature input to PAM fails high Indications Available:
4-1-B, SUB COOLING MARGIN LO RC TE3A6 indicates approximately 900 °F Subcooling margin meter indicates 0 °F CREW Recognize indications of RC TE3A6 loop 2 Thot PAM failure.
Crew Refer to DB-OP-02004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel 4 Annunciators, for 4-1-B Determines subcooling margin is satisfactory Determines RC TE3A6 loop 2 Thot instrument failure SRO Enter TS 3.3.17 Condition A for RC TE3A6 Inoperable NOTE:
There is no procedure direction to reference TS 3.3.17.
If necessary, ask this TS reference as a follow-up.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
6 Page 6
of 14 Event
Description:
Steam Generator 1 Startup Level Instrument, LT SP9B4, fails to zero Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 6 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Steam Generator 1 Startup Level Instrument, LT SP9B4, fails to zero Indications Available:
12-4-A, SG 1 LVL LO 14-4-E, ICS INPUT MISMATCH Rising level on LI SP9BA, Steam Generator 1 Startup Level Indicator BOP Determine that a Steam Generator 1 overfill is in progress.
SRO Direct the implementation of DB-OP-02012, Stm Gen/SFRCS Alarm Panel 12 Annunciator BOP to place SG1 Main Feedwater Startup Control Valve in hand.
BOP to restore Steam Generator 1 level to 40.
BOP Place SG1 Main Feedwater Startup Control Valve in hand Adjust FW SP7B in hand and maintain 40 in Steam Generator 1.
NOTE:
Crew may enter DB-OP-02526, Pri/Sec Heat Transfer Upset.
BOP Reset ICS input mismatch alarm per DB-OP-02014 Depresses acknowledge on SASS panel SRO Direct Steam Generator 1 startup level transfer to the Y instrument per DB-OP-06407, Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Operating Procedure, Section 4.1.
Review attachment 7 to determine affected control stations Select the Y Steam Generator 1 startup level instrument
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
6 Page 7
of 14 Event
Description:
Steam Generator 1 Startup Level Instrument, LT SP9B4, fails to zero Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 7 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Steam Generator 1 Startup Level Instrument, LT SP9B4, fails to zero BOP Use DB-OP-06401, ICS Operating Procedure to place valves in Auto Review Attachment 3, FIC ICS 33A & B Feedwater Startup Valves 2 & 1 Verify FW 780 MFW BLOCK VALVE, is closed Adjust FIC ICS33B, FEEDWATER STARTUP VALVE demand, to control Steam Generator level slightly less than setpoint of 40 inches Depress and release AUTO on FIC ICS33B, FEEDWATER STARTUP VALVE FW1 SUFW VLV AUTO DEMAND On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 7
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
7 Page 8
of 14 Event
Description:
Condensate Pump 1 sheared shaft Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 8 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 7: Condensate Pump 1 Sheared Shaft Indications Available:
13-2-B, CNDS PMP DISCH HDR PRESS Low amps on Condensate Pump 1 FI 578 indicates zero flow CD 2796 indicates not fully open BOP Identify that Condensate Pump 1 has sheared its shaft.
SRO Direct implementation of DB-OP-02013, Condensate Feedwater Alarm Panel 13 Annunciators (13-2-B)
Verify correct number of Condensate Pumps running.
NOTE:
Crew may elect to start the standby pump, or first perform Deaerator level control, or start the standby pump IAW the operating procedure. The important portion of this task is to establish condensate flow PRIOR to Deaerator level dropping to 0.5 feet.
BOP If directed, place CD 420 and CD 421, Deaerator Storage Tank Level Control Valves, in hand and establish manual control over the condensate pump discharge header pressure.
Booth Cue If EO sent to Condensate Pump, wait 2 minutes then role play EO and report broken coupling at Condensate Pump 1 BOP Start Condensate Pump 3 or 2 BOP Stop Condensate Pump 1 On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 8, 9 and 10
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
8, 9, 10 Page 9
of 14 Event
Description:
Steam Leak, Loss of all Feedwater and Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 9 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 8: Unisolable steam leak on Aux Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) 2 9: Loss of all Feedwater 10: Makeup 2 failure to start - Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling Indications Available:
12-2-A, SG 1 TO AFPT 2 MN STM PRESS LO Fire alarms in Aux Feed pump 2 room CREW Identify a steam leak on AFPT 2 Booth Cue If EO sent to AFP 2 room, wait two minutes and report steam coming from the room vent into Turbine Building.
Can stay in area (not a personnel hazard)
SRO Direct the implementation of DB-OP-02525, Steam Leaks:
Perform Attachment 1 of DB-OP-02525, Steam Leaks BOP to attempt to isolate the leak.
ATC to trip the reactor.
ATC to initiate and isolate SFRCS BOP to continue with attachment 1 to isolate AFW to Steam Generator 1 and open the atmospheric vent valve on Steam Generator 1.
Go to DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture.
BOP Perform DB-OP-02525 Attachment 1 Close MS 107A, MS 1 to AFPT 2.
Identify that MS 107A failed to close.
Booth Cue If EO sent to locally close MS 107A wait two minutes and report unable to locally close.
ATC Trip Reactor Initiate and Isolate SFRCS SRO Transition to DB-OP-02000
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
8, 9, 10 Page 10 of 14 Event
Description:
Steam Leak, Loss of all Feedwater and Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 10 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 8: Unisolable steam leak on Aux Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) 2 9: Loss of all Feedwater 10: Makeup 2 failure to start - Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling Critical Task
- Energize control power to AF 608
- Open SG 1 Atmospheric Vent Valve, using ICS11B, to depressurize SG 1 BLOCK SFRCS Place the AVV H\\A Station ICS11B in HAND Reduce demand to zero Depress the AVV BLOCK pushbutton Depress the AUTO push button Fully open the AVV using the AVV H\\A Station ICS11B IF AT ANY TIME an SFRCS isolation trip occurs during the blow down of the affected SG, THEN reopen the affected AVV by repeating this step.
ATC Perform DB-OP-02000 immediate actions:
Manually trip the reactor Verify reactor power is decreasing on the intermediate range.
Manually trip the turbine.
SRO Direct the implementation of DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture Verify immediate actions Recognize loss of all Feedwater Give Attachment 5 to the BOP to restore Feedwater Direct ATC performance of Attachment 4 to implement MU/HPI cooling.
ATC performs Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in service.
Route to Section 12, MU/HPI/PORV cooling.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
8, 9, 10 Page 11 of 14 Event
Description:
Steam Leak, Loss of all Feedwater and Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 11 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 9: Loss of all Feedwater - Continued 10: Makeup 2 failure to start - Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling - Continued BOP Identify a loss of all Feedwater (MFW & AFW).
ATC Attempt to start Makeup Pump 1 Critical Task
- Start standby CCW pump.
- Start both HPI pumps.
- Start both LPI pumps.
- Open piggyback valves, DH63 and DH64.
- Transfer MUP suctions MU3971 and MU6405 to BWST Set Pressurizer level controller to 100 inches Place all Pressurizer heaters in off.
- Lock MU3971 and MU6405 to BWST Close Makeup Pump 1 to Seal Injection Valve, MU6409.
- Open Pressurizer Level Control Valve Bypass, MU6420.
Verify MU6422, MU CTMT ISOLATION is Open
- Close MU6407, MU PUMP 1 MINIMUM RECIRC
- Close MU6406, MU PUMP 2 MINIMUM RECIRC Verify PORV Block Valve, RC11 open.
- Lock open PORV, RC2A.
- Open High Point Vent Valves, RC4608A, RC4608B, RC4610A, RC4610B, RC200 and RC239A.
Verify/Close either Letdown Iso,MU2B, or MU3, Letdown Clrs Outlet Verify/Close CTMT Normal Sump Valves, DR2012A and DR2012B.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
1 Event #
8, 9, 10 Page 12 of 14 Event
Description:
Steam Leak, Loss of all Feedwater and Initiate MU/HPI/PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 12 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Critical Task
- Trip all running RCP when subcooling margin is lost
(<20 °F SCM).
EAL Alert HA4 or FA1 Terminate scenario at Lead Examiners discretion
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 13 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Justification for Critical Tasks A. Isolate Overcooling Steam Generator - Close AF 608, AFW to SG 1,(CT-17)
The steam leak on AFPT 2 steam supply line and MS 107A being failed open results in a steam leak on Steam Generator 1 that cannot be isolated. The SFRCS System will not actuate on low SG pressure due to the size of the reducer in the AFPT steam supply line. The operator is required to take actions to actuate SFRCS and close AF 608 to isolate AFW to #1 SG.
B. Establish MU/HPI/PORV Cooling. (CT-14)
MU/HPI cooling is required to be established immediately when only one makeup pump is available during a loss of all feedwater. Establishing MU/HPI cooling will prevent the RCS pressure from exceeding the shut off head of the HPI pump.
C. Trip 4th RCP per Specific Rule 2 following initiation of MU/HPI/PORV Cooling. (CT-1)
Subcooling margin is normally lost following initiation of MU/HPI/PORV Cooling.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 14 of 14 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION
- 1.
Simulator Setup (See attached simulator setup sheet)
- 2.
Procedures a)
DB-OP-06901, Plant Startup Procedure signed off appropriately to Step 3.42 b)
DB-OP-06407, NNI Operating Procedure c)
DB-OP-02513, Pressurizer System Abnormal for Pressurizer Spray Valve d)
DB-OP-02004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel 4 Annunciators, for 4-1-B e)
DB-OP-02012, Stm Gen/SFRCS Alarm Panel 12 Annunciator f)
DB-OP-02014 MSR/ICS Alarm Panel 14 Annunciators g)
DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating Procedure h)
DB-OP-02013, Condensate Feedwater Alarm Panel 13 Annunciators 13-2-B i)
DB-OP-06221, Condensate System Procedure.
j)
DB-OP-02525, Steam Leaks k)
DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 2)
For Simulator Instructor:
a)
None
Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: DAYS MODE: 1 POWER: 100%
PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: NORMAL PROTECTED TRAIN: 1 ASSET UTILIZATION: GREEN GRID RISK: NORMAL SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:
N/A CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None PROTECTED EQUIPMENT Train 1 OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None DAILY STATUS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS - See Daily Status Report AT THE CONTROLS RO Maintain 100 % Power ALARM STATUS:
LICENSE REQUIREMENTS - See attached for details ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None BALANCE OF PLANT RO:
CONTROL ROOM WORK AROUNDS - None CONTROL ROOM BURDENS - None CTRM DEFICIENCIES OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM NON-OUTAGE repairs in the CTRM
Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS GENERAL STATUS Maintain 100 % Power CHEMISTRY - STATUS Intake Chlorination - #1 and #2 Circwater Chlorination - I/S Circwater Dynacool - I/S Sodium Bisulfite - I/S MSD Skid -I/S MSR Drains: #1 FWD #2 FWD Polishers I/S - 1, 2, 3 and 4 EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS FOLLOW-UP ITEMS M&TE ISSUED FOR TESTING NOP-WM-5002 COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES IN PROGRESS - Expected completion date (Refer to CR-09-68507)
Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Date &
Time Entered Equipment Affected Specification Action Required Next Action Due Responsible Individual Issue Owner/
Test Leader
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Facility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
NRC 2013 Examiners:
Operators:
SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions:
100% power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Critical Tasks : 1. Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps (CT1)
- 2. Initiate LPI (CT4)
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
I-BOP/SRO (TS)
SFAS Containment Pressure transmitter fails low 2
C-BOP/SRO High Pressure Feedwater Heater Tube Leak 3
R-ATC/SRO Controlled power reduction 4
I-BOP/SRO SAC 2 trips and SAC 1 fails to load, Emergency Instrument Air Compressor fails to AUTO start (Manual start available).
5 C-ATC/SRO (TS)
Operating Makeup Pump 2 trips, Loss of Makeup capability 6
M-All Rapidly progressing RCS leak, Manual Reactor Trip required 7
C-ATC/SRO SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC1467 fails to re-position) 8 C ATC/SRO LPI Pump 1 trips requiring discharge cross connect (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Summary 2013 NRC Scenario 2 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 2 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 DAVIS-BESSE 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 The crew will assume control with directions to maintain 100% power.
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, PT2003, Containment Pressure transmitter will fail low. The crew should respond to alarm 5-4-B, SFAS CTMT PRESS LO FAIL, in accordance with DB-OP-02005, PRIMARY INSTRUMENTATION ALARM PANEL 5 ANNUNCIATORS. The SRO will enter the TS action and direct the ATC to trip the channel by tripping the SFAS Channel 4 Containment Pressure HI and SFAS Channel 4 Containment Pressure HI-HI bistables.
After the containment pressure channel actions are complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the HP FW Tube leak. The crew should respond in accordance with DB-OP-02013, CONDENSATE FEEDWATER ALARM PANEL 13 ANNUNCIATORS. DB-OP-02013 will direct them to DB-OP-06229, HIGH PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER SYSTEM OPERATION.
DB-OP-06229 requires a power reduction to 95% prior to removing the heater from service.
The Crew will reduce Rx power then remove High Pressure Feedwater Train 1 from service.
After High Pressure Feedwater Train 1 is removed from service, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the running Station Air Compressor (SAC) 2. The standby SAC 1 will start but fail to load and the Emergency Instrument Air Compressor (EIAC) fails to automatically start. The BOP Operator will manually start the EIAC. The SRO will implement DB-OP-02528, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, Section 4.3 for Air Compressor trip.
When the EIAC has been started and the plant is stabilized, the Lead Evaluator can cue loss of operating Makeup pump 2. The Crew will implement DB-OP-02512, MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, due to the running makeup pump off. Letdown and seal injection will be isolated by taking MU32 and MU19 to hand and closing. The standby Makeup pump will be started and letdown and seal injection will be restored. The SRO will declare makeup pump 2 non functional and enter TRM 8.1.1. Condition A.
While the crew is performing DB-OP-02512 to restore seal injection, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of a progressive RCS leak. The crew should respond to indications/alarms and enter DB-OP-2522, SMALL RCS LEAKS. The SRO should direct a MANUAL reactor trip no later than PZR Level 100 inches. The leak will become a design basis LOCA when the reactor trip occurs.
The crew should enter DB-OP-02000. Coincident with the SFAS actuation, SFAS L3 Output Module will fail requiring the crew to manually open CC1467, CCW FROM DH CLR 1 VLV.
Section 5,Loss of Subcooling Margin will be entered which will route to Section 10, LARGE LOCA. LPI Pump 1 will have tripped off and be unable to be started. Attachment 22 of DB-OP-02000 for cross connecting LPI discharge will be performed.
When Attachment 22 is complete the scenario can be terminated at the Lead Evaluators discretion.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 Event #
1 Page 3
of 21 Event
Description:
SFAS CTMT PRESS LO FAIL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 3 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 1: SFAS Containment Pressure transmitter Fails Low Indications Available:
5-4-B, SFAS CTMT PRESS LO FAIL PI2003 SFAS 4 Pressure Indicator indicates zero CREW Refer to DB-OP-02005, Primary Instrumentation Alarm Panel SRO Determine SFAS 4 Channel CTMT Pressure is INOPERABLE.
PI M403 is failed low and BA 408 is tripped (Red light lit) in SFAS Channel 4 cabinet.
SRO REFER TO Technical Specifications 3.3.5 and Table 3.3.5-1 and take action as required. Enters Condition A, one (1) hour to trip channel.
SRO Direct action IAW DB-OP-06405, SFAS, Section 4.1 for tripping the Inoperable SFAS Instrument String Trip Bistable.
SRO Direct circling SFAS Channel 4 indicating the Inoperable SFAS Instrument String Trip Bistable selected.
SRO Determines bistable(s), BA409 and BA410, are required to be tripped to achieve the desired results
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 Event #
1 Page 4
of 21 Event
Description:
SFAS CTMT PRESS LO FAIL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 4 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 1: SFAS CTMT PRESS LO FAIL (cont.)
BOP Perform actions for an Inoperable SFAS Instrument String Trip Bistable BOP Obtains the door key for the designated SFAS cabinet.
(Key 28)
BOP Depress the TEST pushbutton on the trip bistable(s) listed in Step 4.1.3 (BA409 and BA410) AND verify the TRIP light is ON.
BOP Verify the associated 1/5 lights on the output modules for all four SFAS Channels are ON.
BOP Verify the SFAS cabinet door is closed and locked.
BOP Return the SFAS door key.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 Event #
2 & 3 Page 5 of 21 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 5 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 2: HP FW Heater Tube Leak 3: Controlled Power Reduction Indications Available:
14-2-F, ICS ULD TRBL 12-3-A, SG 1 OPERATE LVL HI 13-5-E, HP FW HTR 1-5 LVL CREW Implement DB-OP-02013, Condensate Feedwater Alarm Panel 13 Annunciators NOTE:
Crew may enter DB-OP-02526 Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer Upsets to stabilize the plant.
CREW Check the computer point alarm list to determine whether a high or low level exists:
LAH L458, HP HEATER 1-5 HIGH LEVEL ALARM Determine level is high.
BOP Direct EO to locally verify HD 271A, FW HEATER 1-5 EMERGENCY DRAIN CONTROL VALVE, is throttled.
Direct EO to locally verify HD 271B, FW HEATER 1-5 NORMAL DRAIN CONTROL VALVE, is open.
BOOTH CUE After 2 minutes role-play EO and report:
HD 271A, FW HEATER 1-5 EMERGENCY DRAIN CONTROL VALVE, is throttled OPEN HD 271B, FW HEATER 1-5 NORMAL DRAIN CONTROL VALVE, is FULL OPEN Level in 1-6 HTR is 10.5 Level in 1-5 HTR is 13 NOTE: Comparison of normal drain flows may help determine if heater drain flow is abnormal. Normal drain flows at 100% power are approximately 1400 KPPH.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 Event #
2 & 3 Page 6 of 21 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 6 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 2 & 3: HP FW HTR 1-5 Tube Leak and Power Reduction (cont.)
CREW Crew may confirm tube leak in heater by monitoring for abnormally high or excessive heater draining.
- a.
Compare normal drain flow computer points.
F450, HP FW HTR 1-5 NORM DRN FLOW (KPPH) ~1,700 KPPH F457, HP FW HTR 2-5 NORM DRN FLOW (KPPH) ~1,462 KPPH CREW Determine HPFW Heater Train 1 has a tube leak SRO Refer to DB-OP-06229, High Pressure Feedwater Heater System Operation.
SM CUE IF necessary, Role-play the SM and Direct crew to bypass HPFW Train 1 SRO Refers to DB-OP-06229, Section 5.1, HPFW Heater Tube Rupture Train 1 NOTE:
Bypassing HPFW Heaters will result in Feedwater Flow and Temperature transients including Deaerator levels. Minimizing plant power levels prior to bypassing will reduce the potential for a plant trip.
SRO/ATC Initiate a plant power reduction per DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown, to the following power level:
95 percent - A single HPFW Train will be removed from service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 Event #
2 & 3 Page 7 of 21 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 7 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 2 & 3: HP FW HTR 1-5 Tube Leak and Power Reduction (cont.)
BOP Isolate feedwater to HPFW Heater Train 1 by simultaneously performing the following:
Dispatch Equipment Operator to local stop pushbutton for FW448 Throttle open FW 460, HP HTR TRAINS BYPASS, using HIS 460 to maintain Train 2 flow, as read on FI 581, HPFW HTR GROUP 2 FW FLOW, approximately one half the total Feedwater flow. FI 581 flow equals either 428 or 438 flow Close FW 448, HP HEATER TRAINS ISOLATION 1-4 INLET, using HIS 448.
Close FW 440, HP HEATER TRAINS ISOLATION 1-6 OUTLET, using HIS 440.
BOOTH CUE Report EO on station at FW448 If necessary, role play EO and stop motion of FW448 as directed.
BOP Close ES 2014, EXT STM TO HP HTRS ISO TRAIN 1, using HIS 2014.
Verify ES 252, FEEDWATER HEATER - EXT STM LINE DRAINS TRAIN 1, 1-6, is open, using HIS 252.
BOP Direct EO to locally isolate HPFW Heater Train 1 per DB-OP-06229, Step 5.1.6.
BOOTH CUE Locally isolate HPFW Heater Train 1 or remove malfunction NOTE:
The reliefs for the HPFW Heaters relieve to the TPCW Low Level Tank.
This may result in elevated TPCW temperatures and levels.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 Event #
2 & 3 Page 8 of 21 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 8 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 2 & 3: HP FW HTR 1-5 Tube Leak and Power Reduction (cont.)
CREW Monitor TPCW System performance. REFER TO DB-OP-06263, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System, as necessary.
BOOTH CUE If necessary, Role-play the SM and report Alignment of the 50# header is NOT required On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 4
Page 9 of 21 Event
Description:
SAC 2 Trips and SAC 1 Fails to Load; Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Fails to AUTO Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 9 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 4: SAC 2 Trips and SAC 1 Fails to Load; Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Fails to AUTO Start Indications Available:
9-2-E, STA AIR CMPRSR 2 TRBL/TRIP 9-3-E, STA AIR HDR PRESS LO 9-1-F, INSTR AIR HDR PRESS LO Air header pressure lowering CREW Recognize that Station Air Compressor 2 has tripped Standby Air Compressor SAC 1 has started (fails to load)
Air system pressure is still lowering EIAC fails to start at 95 psig.
BOP Manually start the EIAC by taking HIS 813, EMER INSTR AIR COMPRESSOR to START position.
SRO Enter abnormal procedure DB-OP-02528, Instrument Air System Malfunctions, for Air Compressor trip.
SRO IF AT ANY TIME a severe secondary plant upset occurs, OR the Instrument Air header pressure drops to 75 PSIG:
Trip the Reactor Initiate and Isolate SFRCS using Manual switches Go to DB-OP-02000 and return to DB-OP-02528, Section 4.1 as conditions permit BOP Verify an Air Compressor is running
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 4
Page 10 of 21 Event
Description:
SAC 2 Trips and SAC 1 Fails to Load; Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Fails to AUTO Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 10 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 4: SAC 2 Trips and SAC 1 Fails to Load; Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Fails to AUTO Start (contd)
BOP REFER TO DB-OP-06251. Station and Instrument Air System Operating Procedure, Section 5.3 for any air compressor that Auto started or was manually started.
Directs EO/Field Supervisor to perform DB-OP-06251 Section 5.3 BOP IF the EIAC is the only compressor running AND SA6445, IA/SA CROSSTIE SOLENOID has closed, THEN gradually re-pressurize Station Air as required.
Directs Equipment Operator to re-pressurize Station Air header.
SRO Contacts Maintenance to investigate Air Compressor issues.
NOTE:
The crew may refer to the Severe Loss of Air procedure.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 5
Page 11 of 21 Event
Description:
Makeup Pump 2 trips Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 11 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 5: Makeup Pump 2 trips Indications Available:
(6-5-C) SEAL INJ FLOW LO (6-6-C) SEAL INJ TOTAL FLOW.
Makeup Pump 2 red light OFF CREW Recognize loss of makeup capability SRO Implement DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions Section 4.1 ATC Close MU2B Verify CCW is being supplied to the RCPs. REFER TO,
Close MU19 Place MU32 in Hand AND close MU32 Monitor RCP Seal performance Maintain RCS Tave constant SRO Enters TRM 8.1.1 Condition A for Makeup Pump 2 Non Functional. Restore W/I 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> BOOTH CUE If EO is directed to investigate Makeup Pump trip, report pump conditions normal and breaker AD105 has 51 overcurrent relay actuated.
ATC Align MU6405, MUP 1 Suction to the Makeup Tank Start MU Pump 1
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 5
Page 12 of 21 Event
Description:
Makeup Pump 2 trips Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 12 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 5: Makeup Pump 2 trips (contd)
ATC Restore Makeup Flow per Attachment 4:
Verify MU6421 is closed Verify MU6422 is open Slowly raise MU flow using MU 32.
WHEN PZR level is correct for the existing Tave in accordance with Curve CC 4.3, Minimum Pressurizer Level vs. RC Temperature, of DB-PF-06703, Miscellaneous Operations Curves. THEN return MU 32 to AUTO.
ATC Restore Seal Injection flow as follows per Attachment 5:
- 1. Verify MU 19 is closed
- 2. Verify Seal Injection flowpath valves are open HIS MU66C - RCP 1-1 HIS MU66D - RCP 1-2 HIS MU66A - RCP 2-1 HIS MU66B - RCP 2-2 HIS 6408 - MU6408 HIS 6409 - MU6409
- 3. Gradually (over ~ 2 minutes) open MU 19 to a setpoint of 12-15 gpm (~3 gpm pcr RCP).
- 4. After 10 minutes and as the time permits increase total seal injection flow to ~20-25 gpm (~6 gpm per RCP).
- 5. After another 10 minutes and as time permits adjust total seal injection flow to the normal range of 30 - 32 gpm (~8 gpm per RCP).
- 6. Return MU 19 to AUTO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 5
Page 13 of 21 Event
Description:
Makeup Pump 2 trips Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 13 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 5: Makeup Pump 2 trips (contd)
ATC Restore Letdown:
Open valve that was use to isolated Letdown (MU2B, MU3, or MU2A)
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 6, 7 & 8 Page 14 of 21 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position), and LPIP #1 Trips after manual start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 14 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate Event 7: SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Indications Available:
CTMT radiation computer points Pressurizer level rapidly lowering RCS pressure rapidly lowering CREW Implement DB-OP-02522, Small RCS Leaks may include isolating letdown, power reduction, and attachments 1 and 2 as time permits.
CREW Should determine that reactor should be tripped.
SRO Directs crew to manually trip the Reactor.
CREW GO TO DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture ATC Perform DB-OP-02000 immediate actions:
- 1. Manually trip the reactor Depress the reactor trip pushbutton
- 2. Verify reactor power is decreasing on the intermediate range.
- 3. Manually trip the turbine.
- Depress the turbine trip pushbutton SRO Direct the implementation of DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture Verify immediate actions.
Check for Specific Rule or Symptom Mitigation
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 6, 7 & 8 Page 15 of 21 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position), and LPIP #1 Trips after manual start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 15 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6&7: RCS leak (cont.)
SRO Applies ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN Specific Rule 2 CRITICAL TASK*
- Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps ATC Verify MU, HPI AND LPI are in service per Attachment 8.
ATC Verify BOTH HPI Trains are in service as follows:
ATC Verify BOTH CCW Trains are in service to supply essential cooling:
CCW Train 1 CCW Train 2 ATC Verify BOTH HPI Pumps are running:
HPI Pump 1 running HPI Pump 2 running ATC Verify HPI Injection Valves fully open:
HP2C HP2D HP2A HP2B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 6, 7 & 8 Page 16 of 21 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position), and LPIP #1 Trips after manual start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 16 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6&7: RCS leak (cont.)
ATC Verify BOTH LPI Pumps are in service:
- LPI Pump 1 (must be manually started if not previously started - time delayed to trip following start)
LPI Pump 2 ATC Open both piggyback valves:
DH64 - Open DH63 - Open ATC Lineup Makeup System as follows:
Transfer MU Pumps suction to the BWST position and press OFF for each switch:
MU6405 MU 3971 ATC Isolate Letdown using MU2B.
ATC Check all Pressurizer Heaters are off ATC Open MU 6420, MU 32 BYPASS.
ATC Verify MU 6422, MU CTMT ISOLATION is open.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 6, 7 & 8 Page 17 of 21 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position), and LPIP #1 Trips after manual start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 17 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6&7: RCS leak (cont.)
ATC Verify proper SFAS response per Table 2 Align CC-1467 if NOT already performed.
BOP Verify proper SFRCS actuation for the trip parameters present using Table 1.
BOP Verify proper SG level control by AFW using Specific Rule 4.
SRO IF RCS pressure lowers to the point where LPI flow is observed, THEN GO TO Section 10, Large LOCA.
SRO SRO routes to Section 10.
CREW Verify proper SFAS response using Table 2.
CREW Perform actions to close breakers for DH 7A, DH 7B, DH 9A, DH 9B and HP 31. REFER TO Attachment 7, Section 1, Actions to close breakers for DH 7A, DH 7B, DH 9A, DH 9B and HP 31.
ATC IF LPI flow into the RCS exists, THEN perform the following:
Stop running Makeup Pumps Makeup Pump 1
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 6, 7 & 8 Page 18 of 21 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position), and LPIP #1 Trips after manual start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 18 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6&7: RCS leak (cont.)
ATC/BOP Start Control Room EVS as follows per Attachment 21:
Start BOTH Control Room EVS Fans.
Place HIS 5261, CREVS Train 1 in start.
Place HIS 5262, CREVS Train 2 in start ATC/BOP For each Control Room EVS fan that has been started, perform the following:
- a.
Open the outside air Inlet damper(s):
HA 5261, FAN 1 OUTSIDE AIR INLET DAMPER HA 5262, FAN 2 OUTSIDE AIR INLET DAMPER
- b.
Verify the process radiation monitor(s) in operation:
RCM-5327, CTRM FLT FAN 1 DISCH RCM-5328, CTRM FLT FAN 2 DISCH ATC/BOP
- c.
IF accessible, THEN place the Air Cooled Condensing Units) in serve following Emergency Start. REFER to DB-OP-06505, control Room Emergency Ventilation System Procedure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
2 6, 7 & 8 Page 19 of 21 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position), and LPIP #1 Trips after manual start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 19 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6&7: RCS leak (cont.)
Critical Task*
ATC IF only DH Pump 2 is available, THEN cross-connect DH Pump discharges as follows:
- a. Verify DH Pump 1 is off.
- b. *Block AND close DH 2733, DH PUMP 1 LPI SUCT.
- c. *Restore Close Power for DH 1A and DH1B.
- d. *Close DH1B
- e. *WHEN DH 2733 is closed, THEN open DH 830, DECAY HEAT COOLER DISCH XOVER 2 TO 1 ATC
- Throttle closed DH 1A AND throttle open DH 1B to obtain the following:
ATC Maximize total DH Pump 2 flow NOT to exceed 4000 gpm.
ATC Balance flow between DH Injection Lines, FY1 DH2B AND FYI DH2A ATC Do NOT throttle either LPI line to less than 1350 gpm, FYI DH2B OR FYI DH2A ATC Continue to monitor and adjust total DH Pump 2 flow as necessary.
EAL Alert FA1 Due to Loss of RCS Barrier On Lead Evaluators discretion, Scenario may be terminated when LPI is cross-connected
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 20 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Justification for Critical Tasks A. Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps per Specific Rule 2 following Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-1)
Subcooling Margin will be lost due to the Large Break LOCA. Continued RCP operation during certain small break LOCA accidents could lead to fuel clad failure.
B. Operation of one LPI pump with suction from the BWST, cross-tie open and LPI valves open (throttled) (CT-4)
LPI/HPI/MU will be placed in service per Section 5, Lack of Adequate Subcooling Margin. LPI Pump 1 will trip on a time delay following initial start (manual start will be unsuccessful). This will require opening the LPI cross connect and throttling LPI Pump 2 discharge valve to maximize flow without exceeding 4000 gpm.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 21 of 21 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION
- 1.
Simulator Setup (See attached simulator setup sheet)
- 2.
Procedures a)
DB-OP-02005, Primary Instrumentation Alarm Panel Annunciators 5-4-B b)
DB-OP-06405, Safety Features Actuation System Procedure, Section 4.1 c)
DB-OP-02013, Condensate Feedwater Alarm Panel 13 Annunciators 13-5-E d)
DB-OP-06229, High Pressure Feedwater Heater System Operation, Section 5.1 e)
DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown f)
DB-OP-06263, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System g)
DB-OP-02528, Instrument Air System Malfunctions h)
DB-OP-06251. Station and Instrument Air System Operating Procedure, Section 5.3 i)
DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions Section 4.1 j)
DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 2)
For Simulator Instructor:
a)
DB-OP-06229, High Pressure Feedwater Heater System Operation b)
DB-OP-06251. Station and Instrument Air System Operating Procedure, Section 5.3
Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: DAYS MODE: 1 POWER: 50%
PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: NORMAL PROTECTED TRAIN: 1 ASSET UTILIZATION: GREEN GRID RISK: NORMAL SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:
N/A CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None PROTECTED EQUIPMENT Train 1 OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None DAILY STATUS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS - See Daily Status Report AT THE CONTROLS RO Maintain 50 % Power ALARM STATUS:
LICENSE REQUIREMENTS - See attached for details ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None BALANCE OF PLANT RO:
Planned to perform the Backup Overspeed trip test for the Main Turbine in accordance with DB-SS-04154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test CONTROL ROOM WORK AROUNDS - None CONTROL ROOM BURDENS - None CTRM DEFICIENCIES OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM NON-OUTAGE repairs in the CTRM
Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS GENERAL STATUS Planned to perform the Backup Overspeed trip test for the Main Turbine in accordance with DB-SS-04154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test CHEMISTRY - STATUS Intake Chlorination - #1 and #2 Circwater Chlorination - I/S Circwater Dynacool - I/S Sodium Bisulfite - I/S MSD Skid -I/S MSR Drains: #1 FWD #2 FWD Polishers I/S - 1, 2, 3 and 4 EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS FOLLOW-UP ITEMS M&TE ISSUED FOR TESTING NOP-WM-5002 COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES IN PROGRESS - Expected completion date (Refer to CR-09-68507)
Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Date &
Time Entered Equipment Affected Specification Action Required Next Action Due Responsible Individual Issue Owner/
Test Leader
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Facility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
NRC 2013 Examiners:
Operators:
SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions:
50% Power Turnover: Planned to perform the Backup Overspeed trip test for the Main Turbine in accordance with DB-SS-04154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Critical Tasks: 1. Establish AFW to SG (CT10)
- 2. Control HPI (CT5)
- 3. Isolate affected SG (CT22)
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N-BOP/SRO Perform TG Overspeed Test, DB-SS-04154 2
C-All (TS)
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low 3
I-ATC/SRO Seal injection flow instrument fails low 4
R-ATC/SRO (TS)
SG 2 tube leak and plant shutdown 5
C-BOP/SRO Turbine High Vibrations - Manual Turbine trip required 6
M-All SG Tube Rupture - Manual Reactor trip required 7
C-BOP/SRO MFPT 2 speed lowers resulting in Loss of Main Feedwater, SFRCS Ch 1 fails to actuate (auto and manual)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Summary 2013 NRC Scenario 3 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 2 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 DAVIS-BESSE 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 The crew will assume control with power at 50% power. Following turnover the crew will perform DB-SS-04154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Following the completion of DB-SS-04154 the Lead Evaluator will cue the RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low. The Crew will recognize the failure by the RCS Low Pressure annunciator alarms, the RPS Channel 1 low pressure trip alarms along with all Pressurizer heaters energized and the narrow range pressure recorder failed to 1700 psig. The SRO will implement DB-OP-02513, PRESSURIZER SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION which will direct manual control of the Pressurizer heaters. The crew will swap the NNI inputs and return heater control to auto. The SRO will declare RPS Channel 1 Inoperable and enter TS 3.3.1 Condition A.
Following TS declaration the Lead Evaluator will cue the FT MU 19, RCP Seal Injection Flow Transmitter low failure causing MU 19, RCP SEAL INJ FLOW CONTROLLER to open. MU 19 will have to be controlled manually.
When Seal Injection Flow is returned to normal the Lead Evaluator will cue the Steam Generator 2 Tube Leak. The crew should respond to annunciator 12-1-B, MN STM LINE 2 RAD HI, in accordance with DB-OP-06012, STM GEN/SFRCS Alarm Panel 12 Annunciator and then enter DB-OP-02531, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK. The crew will evaluate the SG leakage and determine the leak rate is in excess of T.S. 3.4.13 and start a rapid shutdown.
During the power reduction Main Turbine bearing vibration levels will increase to the point annunciator 15-2-E T-G BEARING VIB HI will alarm. The crew will respond in accordance with DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators and manually trip the Main Turbine.
After the Main Turbine is tripped the Lead Evaluator will cue the increase in SG tube leakage.
This leak size will be larger than Makeup capacity. Since the plant is on Low Level Limits, the Crew will manually trip the Reactor and enter DB-OP-02000, RPS SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture After the reactor trip, the Main Feedwater Pump 2 speed will coast down leading to a loss of all Main Feedwater. SFRCS Channel 1 will not actuate either automatically or manually requiring the crew to reposition the SFRCS actuated valves.
The Crew will route to Section 8, SG Tube Rupture. The RCS will be cooled down and depressurized using the atmospheric vent valves. SG 2 will be isolated at 500 °F Thot and 1000 psig RCS pressure.
When SG isolation is complete the scenario can be terminated at the Lead Evaluators discretion.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
1 Page 3
of 16 Event
Description:
Perform DB-SS-04154, Turbine Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 3 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 1: Perform DB-SS-04154, TG Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test BOP Place HIS MP111A, Backup Overspeed Trip Test Switch, in TEST position BOP Depress and hold the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test pushbutton located on the EHC Monitor Panel (C5757B)
BOP Check that the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test lamp comes on BOP Release the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test pushbutton BOP Check that the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test lamp goes off BOP Place HIS MP111A, Backup Overspeed Trip Test Switch, in NORMAL position BOP Notify the Shift Manager this procedure is complete On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
2 Page 4
of 16 Event
Description:
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 4 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 2: RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low Indications Available:
4-4-C HOT LEG PRESS LO 5-1-G RPS CH 1 TRIP 5-3-G RPS RC LO PRESS TRIP 5-3-J RPS RC PRESS-TEMP TRIP All Pressurizer Heater Banks are on RCS Wide Range (actual) Pressure is rising CREW Recognize failure of RPS pressure input to PZR heaters SRO Implement DB-OP-02513, Pressurizer System Abnormal Operation, for failure of pressure input to heaters ATC Manually control Pressurizer Heaters and Spray to maintain required RCS Pressure (2105 to 2205)
SRO Refer to TS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow DNB Limits - entry into Tech Spec is not required for this failure.
ATC Exchange RCS pressure input to NNI from RPS, REFER TO DB-OP-06403, RPS and NI Operating procedure
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
2 Page 5
of 16 Event
Description:
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 5 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 2: RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low (contd)
ATC Place the following Pressurizer Heaters in OFF
- HIS RC2-2, Bank 2
- HIS RC2-3, Bank 3
- HIS RC2-4, Bank 4
- HIS RC2A, Essen Bank 1
- HIS RC2B, Essen Bank 2 Place PIC RC2 Bank 1 in MANUAL and maintain RCS pressure by adjusting the output.
BOP Obtains Key 33 from SM key locker and Opens RPS Channel 2 cabinet.
Remove the cap on the selection panel for the alternate RC PRESSURE NNI receptacle in RPS Channel 2.
Disconnect the amphenol connector from the RC PRESSURE NNI subassembly and reconnect the amphenol connector to the alternate RC PRESSURE NNI Receptacle.
Cap the open RC PRESSURE NNI receptacle.
ATC Return PZR heaters to Auto Control
- HIS RC2-2, Bank 2, in AUTO + BASE
- HIS RC2-3, Bank 3, in AUTO
- HIS RC2-4, Bank 4, in AUTO
- HIS RC2A, Essen Bank 1, in AUTO
- HIS RC2B, Essen Bank 2, in AUTO Place PIC RC2 Bank 1 in AUTO ATC Circle the RPS Channel now supplying the input signal to the NNI. RPS Channel 2 is now supplying.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
2 Page 6
of 16 Event
Description:
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 6 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 SRO REFER to TS 3.3.1. Declare RPS Channel 1 Inoperable.
Enter TS 3.3.1 Condition A Trip or Bypass W/I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SM CUE IF necessary, Role-play SM and direct crew to leave RPS channel in the tripped condition.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
3 Page 7
of 16 Event
Description:
RCP Seal Injection Flow Transmitter, fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 7 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 3: FT MU 19, RCP Seal Injection Flow Transmitter, fails low 6-6-C SEAL TOTAL FLOW Seal injection flow increasing MU19 open demand increasing CREW Recognize indications of FT MU19 failing low
- Seal injection flow - high SRO Direct ATC actions per DB-OP-02006, RCP ALARM PANEL ANNUNCIATORS ATC
- Place MU19, RCP SEAL INJ FLOW CONTROLLER in Manual
- Control seal injection flow to ~32 gpm total based on individual seal flow indications On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
4 Page 8
of 16 Event
Description:
Steam Generator tube leak of approximately 20 gpm Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 8 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 4: Steam Generator Tube Leak Indications Available:
9-4-A VAC SYS DISCH RAD HI 12-1-B MN STM LINE 2 RAD HI Increasing Makeup flow CREW Recognize indications of a SG tube leak SRO Route to DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak ATC Calculate a leak rate. REFER to Attachment 1, Steam Generator tube Leak Calculation CREW Determine SG 2 has the tube leak SRO Refer to TS 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage. Determine Condition B applies SM CUE IF necessary, Role-play SM and direct crew to reduce power at 5%/min.
SRO Direct a plant shutdown per DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown,, Power Reduction Actions ICS Full Automatic ATC/BOP Begin plant shutdown
- Set rate of change
- Select target Power
- Monitor Power
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
4 Page 9
of 16 Event
Description:
Steam Generator tube leak of approximately 20 gpm Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 9 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 4: Steam Generator tube leak (contd)
ATC When Low Level Limits for both SGs are reached place the following in Hand and reduce to zero:
- SG/RX DEMAND
- REACTOR DEMAND BOP When Low Level Limits for both SGs are reached place the following in Hand and reduce to zero:
- SG 1 FEEDWATER DEMAND BOP Direct the Balance of Plant Operator to perform Attachment 6, Balance of Plant Actions for Rapid Shutdown
- Shutdown Low Pressure Heater Drain Pumps
- Establish one Condensate Pump at 3.5 MMPH SRO Notify Equipment Operators to commence Attachment 15, Field Actions for a Rapid Shutdown SRO Notify the SCC Load Dispatcher of plant shutdown SRO Notify Chemistry to Monitor Condensate Polisher Operation and sample the RCS for isotopic iodine. Refer to TS 3.4.16.
ATC Maintain Makeup Tank Level between 55 and 86 inches Event 5 will occur during the power reduction below 40%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
5 Page 10 of 16 Event
Description:
High Turbine vibrations requiring turbine trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 10 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 5: High Turbine vibrations requiring turbine trip Indications Available:
15-2-E T-G BEARING VIB HI High vibration on any Turbine or Generator Bearing at ZJR 2538, Main Turbine &
MFP Turbines-Bearing Vibration & Eccentricity CREW Recognize increasing vibrations on the Main Turbine bearings 3 & 4.
~13.2 mils BOP Refer to DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators BOP Verify bearing vibration location and intensity at ZJR 2538 BOP When vibration intensity is greater than 12 mils for any bearing, then trip the Main Turbine SRO GO TO DB-OP-02500, Turbine Trip BOP Verify Turbine Stop Valves OR all Control Valves are closed BOP Check Feedwater is controlling on Low Level Limits (40 inches)
ATC Reduce Reactor Power if necessary to within the capacity of the TBVs to allow AVVs to close:
- Adjust Reactor Demand On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
6 & 7 Page 11 of 16 Event
Description:
Steam Generator tube rupture and SFRCS failure to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 11 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Steam Generator tube rupture requiring Reactor trip Event 7: SFRCS Channel 1 fails to actuate Indications Available:
Makeup flow increasing Pressurizer level decreasing CREW Recognize increase in leak rate indicates a SG Tube Rupture SRO Go to DB-OP-02000, RPS SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture, Section 8 ATC Trip the reactor when Pressurizer level drops to 100 inches or lower ATC Perform DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions
- Manually trip the reactor
- Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range
- Manually trip the turbine SRO Verify immediate actions CREW Check for Specific Rule implementation
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
6 & 7 Page 12 of 16 Event
Description:
Steam Generator tube rupture and SFRCS failure to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 12 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Steam Generator tube rupture requiring Reactor trip (contd)
Event 7: SFRCS Channel 1 fails to actuate (contd)
BOP Recognize SFRCS Channel 1 did not actuate automatically (on reverse steam to feed delta P) or manually when Main Feedwater Pump 2 coasts down causing a loss of all Main Feedwater.
Implement Specific Rule 4 CRITICAL TASK*
- Align SFRCS per table 1 for reverse delta P trip Align Auxiliary Feedwater to SG 1 o Open MS 5889A to start AFPT 1 o Close FW 612 o Open MS 106 o Close MS 394 OR Start the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump to replace AFPT1 Enable both MDFP Discharge Valves Close both MDFP Discharge Valves Start the MDFP Feed SG 1 BOP Maintain RCS pressure constant or slightly decreasing using the Atmospheric Vent Valves CREW Check for Symptom direction Recognize SG 2 tube rupture SRO Route to Section 8 CRITICAL TASK*
- Implement Attachment 8, Place MU/HPI/LPI in Service Start/Verify running the standby CCW Pump Start/Verify running both HPI Pumps Verify open HP 2A, HP 2B, HP 2C and HP 2D Start both LPI Pumps Open DH 64 and DH 63 MU Pump suctions on the BWST
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
6 & 7 Page 13 of 16 Event
Description:
Steam Generator tube rupture and SFRCS failure to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 13 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Steam Generator tube rupture requiring Reactor trip (contd)
Event 7: SFRCS Channel 1 fails to actuate (contd)
ATC Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches ATC Start the standby Makeup pump SRO Verify the following attachments from DB-OP-02531 are in progress:
- , Chemistry Responsibilities
- , Radiation Protection Responsibilities
- , Control of Secondary Contamination BOP Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to place the Auxiliary Boiler in service ATC Turn off all Pressurizer heaters ATC Begin spraying the Pressurizer to lower RCS pressure Open PZR spray vale to reduce RCS pressure as low as Fig. 1 will allow ATC Block SFAS low RCS pressure trips ATC Control MU/HPI to maintain Pressurizer level 80 to 120 inches BOP Begin a RCS cooldown using the Atmospheric Vent Valves Open AVVs to achieve 100 °F/hr C/D rate BOP Block the SFRCS Low Main Steam Line Pressure AND HIGH SG Level Trips when Block permits are received.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
3 Event #
6 & 7 Page 14 of 16 Event
Description:
Steam Generator tube rupture and SFRCS failure to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 14 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Event 6: Steam Generator tube rupture requiring Reactor trip (contd)
Event 7: SFRCS Channel 1 fails to actuate (contd)
CRITICAL TASK*
When RCS Thot is 500 °F and RCS pressure is 1000 psig:
- Stop steaming SG 2 by performing Attachment 17, Isolation of a Faulted SG raise steaming rates on #1 SG AVVs and reduce steaming rates on #2 SG AVVs until AVVs on #2 SG are closed Place PIC ICS11A, ATMOS VENT VALVE CONTROL in HAND AND lower demand to zero.
Open MS106, MAIN STEAM LINE 1 TO AFPT 1 ISOLATION.
BOOTH CUE:
If requested, Defeat the MSIV to TBV interlock by pulling fuse 14 in the rear of Cabinet C5761, ICS Cabinet 1.
CRITICAL TASK*
- Close the following valves:
MS107, MAIN STEAM LINE 2 TO AFPT 2 ISOLATION MS106A, MAIN STEAM LINE 2 TO AFPT 1 ISOLATION AF599, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR 2 LINE STOP.
CRITICAL TASK*
- Lineup all available Auxiliary Feedwater Trains to feed #1 SG as follows:
Verify AF3870 is open Open AF3871 Close AF3869 Close AF3872 EAL SU7 Unusual event based on leak greater than 10 gpm or FA1 Alert based on greater than 250 gpm On Lead Evaluators discretion, Scenario may be terminated
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 15 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 Justification for Critical Tasks A. Establish AFW to SG (CT-10)
Steam Feed Rupture Control System Channel 1 will fail to actuate automatically and manually upon loss of Main Feedwater. This will require the operator to manually start and align AFW train 1 per specific rule 4.
B. Control HPI (CT-5)
Due to the loss of inventory, through the Steam Generator tube rupture, High Pressure Injection will be placed in service to inject water to maintain Pressurizer level and be controlled per specific rule 3.
C. Isolate affected SG (CT-22)
When RCS pressure is 1000 psig the ruptured steam generator will be isolated as it is not required for continued Cooldown.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 16 of 16 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 1 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION
- 1.
Simulator Setup (See attached simulator setup sheet)
- 2.
Procedures a)
DB-SS-04154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test b)
DB-OP-06403, RPS and NI Operating procedure c)
DB-OP-02006, RCP Alarm Panel Annunciators d)
DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak e)
DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown f)
DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators g)
DB-OP-02500, Turbine Trip h)
DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 2)
For Simulator Instructor:
a)
None
Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: DAYS MODE: 1 POWER: 50%
PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: NORMAL PROTECTED TRAIN: 1 ASSET UTILIZATION: GREEN GRID RISK: NORMAL SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:
N/A CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None PROTECTED EQUIPMENT Train 1 OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None DAILY STATUS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS - See Daily Status Report AT THE CONTROLS RO Increase power to 100%, Add 200 gallons of water to the Makeup Tank ALARM STATUS:
LICENSE REQUIREMENTS - See attached for details ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS - None BALANCE OF PLANT RO:
CONTROL ROOM WORK AROUNDS - None CONTROL ROOM BURDENS - None CTRM DEFICIENCIES OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM NON-OUTAGE repairs in the CTRM
Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS GENERAL STATUS Increase power to 100%, Add 200 gallons of water to the Makeup Tank CHEMISTRY - STATUS Intake Chlorination - #1 and #2 Circwater Chlorination - I/S Circwater Dynacool - I/S Sodium Bisulfite - I/S MSD Skid -I/S MSR Drains: #1 FWD #2 FWD Polishers I/S - 1, 2, 3 and 4 EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS FOLLOW-UP ITEMS M&TE ISSUED FOR TESTING NOP-WM-5002 COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES IN PROGRESS - Expected completion date (Refer to CR-09-68507)
Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Date &
Time Entered Equipment Affected Specification Action Required Next Action Due Responsible Individual Issue Owner/
Test Leader
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 0 Facility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
4 Op Test No.:
NRC 2013 Examiners:
Operators:
SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions:
50% Power Turnover: Increase power to 100%, Add 200 gallons of water to the Makeup Tank Critical Tasks: 1. Shutdown Reactor - ATWS (CT24)
- 2. Establish AFW Flow (CT10)
- 3. Isolate Overcooling (CT17)
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
R-ATC/SRO Add 200 gal of water to the RCS Makeup tank 2
I-ATC/SRO Selected Pressurizer temperature instrument fails low 3
SRO (TS)
EDG 2 low air start pressure 4
I-ATC/SRO (TS)
Power range NI5 fails high 5
I-BOP/SRO MFW control valve delta pressure instrument fails low 6
M-All Loss of Condenser Vacuum leads to turbine trip w/o Rx trip -
ATWS 7
C-BOP/SRO AFPT 1 Overspeed trip, MDFP manual start required 8
C-BOP/SRO MDFP target rock valve fails open (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Summary 2013 NRC Scenario 4 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 2 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev. 0 DAVIS-BESSE 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 Add water to the Makeup Tank (MUT) in preparation for increasing power from 50% to 100%.
Following the water add the Lead Evaluator will cue the low failure of the PZR temperature input to the channel selected for level control. The crew will respond to level alarm(s) IAW DB-OP-2004, REACTOR COOLANT ALARM PANEL ANNUNCIATORS, and then enter DB-OP-02513, PRESSURIZER SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION. The ATC will place MU32 in hand, select the good temperature instrument and return MU32 to auto.
When MU32 is back in AUTO, the Lead Evaluator will cue Annunciator 1-2-K, EDG 2 Air Receiver Pressure Low alarm. The SRO will dispatch an operator locally. The EO will report both EDG 2 Air Receivers indicating 150 psig with compressors running. The SRO will refer to DB-OP-06316 for EDG 2 Operability. EDG 2 will be declared Inoperable and Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B will be entered.
When EDG 2 is declared Inoperable the Power range NI 5 high failure can be cued. Rod control will be transferred to manual. The Reactor Demand station will be transferred to Hand. If Tave is greater than 2 degrees below setpoint, Feedwater Loop Demands will be taken to Hand. Tech Spec 3.3.1 will be entered. The SRO will direct placing RPS Channel 2 in Bypass and restoring ICS controls to Automatic.
The MFW control valve delta pressure transmitter PDT SP5B1 fails low can be initiated with controls still in manual from the NI5 failure. The Main feed pump speeds up causing a SG overfill. MFP speed control is taken to HAND and a different instrument is selected for control.
The MFP controls are returned to AUTO.
When the cue is given the condenser will rapidly lose vacuum and the main turbine will trip. The reactor will not trip from the manual pushbuttons requiring 480 VAC Buses E2 and F2 to be de-energized which will trip the reactor.
SFRCS will actuate on reverse valve delta pressure due to the loss of main feed pump due to loss of vacuum. AFPT 1 will overspeed trip. The MDFP will be placed in service to feed SG 1.
AF6459, MDFP TO AUX FEED LINE 1 FLOW CONTROL will fail open and SG 1 will overfeed.
The crew will route to the Overcooling Section and will close AF608.
When the overfeed of SG 1 is isolated the Crew should route to the supplemental section. The scenario can then be terminated at the Lead Evaluators discretion.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
1 Page 3
of 15 Event
Description:
Add water to the RCS Makeup Tank Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 3 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 1: Add water to the RCS Makeup Tank SRO Direct addition of 200 gallons from the Clean Waste Monitor tank to the RCS Makeup tank ATC Determine MU39, Batch Flow Control Valve, position.
Depress and release:
DISPLAY (lower)
VALVE CE Valve % should indicate 0 Verify MU23 closed using HC MU23 Verify WC 3526 closed using HIS 3526 Estimate the time for batch completion (~ 4 minutes)
ATC Program Batch Controller using following keystroke sequence:
BATCH SET
- keys equating to 200 ENTER Exit BATCH SET mode by depressing DISPLAY Display batch size by depressing BATCH Repeat a through e if not correct Verify desired batch size indicated Request Independent Verification
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
1 Page 4
of 15 Event
Description:
Add water to the RCS Makeup Tank Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 4 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 1: Add water to the RCS Makeup Tank (contd)
ATC Reset indicated total on the Batch Controller:
DISPLAY (lower)
TOTAL TOTAL RESET Display FLOW RATE DISPLAY (upper) ZERO RATE ATC Enable Batch Controller by pressing RUN ATC Open MU 40 using HIS MU40 ATC Open WC 3526 using HIS 3526 ATC When Batch is complete:
Verify MU 40 closed Close WC 3526 Notify Unit Supervisor batch operations complete On Lead Evaluators discretion, insert Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
2 Page 5
of 15 Event
Description:
Selected Pressurizer temperature instrument fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 5 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 2: Selected Pressurizer temperature element (TE), RC15-1, fails low Indications Available:
Indications Available:
2-4-C, MU FLOW HI TRN 2 4-2-E, PZR LVL LO SRO Implement DB-OP-02513, Pressurizer System Abnormal Operation, Section 4.6, Failure of Selected Pressurizer Level or Temperature Instruments.
ATC Place MU32, RCS Makeup valve, in HAND ATC Adjust MU32 to obtain desired Makeup flow or Pzr level ATC Compare PZR Instrument, identify selected TE has failed SRO Set Pressurizer level control band based on uncompensated level (~135-145 inches).
ATC Select a good TE Place HIS RC 15 to the TT RC 15-2 position ATC Place MU32 in AUTO SRO May review TS 3.4.4, Pressurizer Level, Condition A for high level, if Pressurizer level rises above 228 inches or uncompensated level greater than 147 inches.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
3 Page 6
of 15 Event
Description:
Emergency Diesel Generator Low Air Start Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 6 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 3: Emergency Diesel Generator Low Air Start Pressure Indications Available:
1-2-K EDG 2 Air RCVR Press LO Crew Respond to DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators, alarm 1-2-K.
SRO Dispatch Equipment Operator to EDG 2 to investigate BOOTH CUE Role Play:
EO reports local alarm 44-3-B, Low Air Start Pressure is in alarm and both EDG 2 Air Receivers indicating 150 psig with both EDG air compressors running.
Crew Respond to DB-OP-02044, Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Alarm Panel 44 Annunciators 44-3-B SRO Declares EDG 2 Inoperable. Enter TS 3.8.1 Condition B SM CUE If necessary: Another Operator is performing DB-SC-03023, Off Site Sources Lined Up and Available.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
4 Page 7
of 15 Event
Description:
Power Range NI5 Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 7 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 4: Power Range NI5 fails high Indications Available 5-1-H RPS CH 2 TRIP 5-2-H RPS HI FLUX TRIP Power is failed high on NI NI5, Power Range Indicator CREW Recognize that NI5 has failed high SRO Direct the implementation of DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrumentation Failures.
ATC Place Rod Control Panel in manual and Reactor Demand Station in hand.
Reactor power is stabilized and held constant or restored to previous level.
BOP If Tave is > 2°F from setpoint then place both Feedwater Loop Demands to hand and adjust to stabilize RCS Tave SRO Enter TS 3.3.1 Condition A for NI5 Inoperable Refer to TS 3.3.16 (only 3 ARTS Channels required)
SRO Brief contingency actions for Power Range instrument failure RFR will not actuate TBV Bias for reactor trip will not function Main FW block valves will not auto close SM CUE If necessary, Role-play Shift Manager and direct placing RPS Channel 2 in manual bypass and restoring ICS controls to auto.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
4 Page 8
of 15 Event
Description:
Power Range NI5 Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 8 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 4: Power Range NI5 fails high (contd)
SRO Directs placing RPS 2 in Manual Bypass per DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protective System (RPS) and Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) Operating Procedure ATC Obtain RPS Manual Bypass key Rotate the MANUAL-BYPASS KEY SWITCH to actuate the manual bypass relay in RPS Channel 2 Check MANUAL-BYPASS light is BRIGHT Check SUB-SYSTEM light is DIM ATC Place the Power Range Test Module for NI5 in TEST OPERATE SRO Directs placing ICS in Auto per DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating Procedure BOP If necessary place Feedwater Loop Demands in auto Adjust FEEDWATER DEMAND to place measured variable on the caret Press AUTO on FIC ICS32B (A), FEEDWATER DEMAND ATC Depress AUTO on HC NI44, ROD CONTROL PANEL Verify Tave at setpoint Depress AUTO on HIC ICS20, REACTOR DEMAND NOTE:
Restoration of ICS hand/auto stations not required to continue to next event.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
5 Page 9
of 15 Event
Description:
MFW control valve delta pressure transmitter fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 9 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 5: MFW control valve delta pressure transmitter fails low Indications Available:
14-4-E, ICS INPUT MISMATCH 12-5-A, SG 1 OR 2 FW VLV DELTA P LO MFP speed increasing CREW Recognize PDT SP5B1 failing low BOP Place HIC ICS36A/HIC ICS36B, MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE HAND/AUTO STATIONS, in HAND Lower MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE speed NOTE: Depending on quickly the crew recognizes the failure, they may implement the Pri/Sec upset procedure and take manual control of the feed regulating valves in addition to lowering Feed pump speed.
BOOTH CUE If Reactor trips during manual Feedwater operation, insert event 6 (loss of condenser vacuum) to ensure Main Feedwater is lost.
NOTE: May continue to next event at this point if desired SRO Direct BOP actions per DB-OP-02014, MSR/ICS Alarm Panel 14 Annunciators
- Determine which instrument has caused alarm BOP May depress the SASS Annunciator RESET pushbutton for the appropriate SASS module(s) if directed SM CUE If necessary Role-play Shift Manager and direct selecting good instrument and returning MFP speed control to Auto
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
5 Page 10 of 15 Event
Description:
MFW control valve delta pressure transmitter fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 10 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 5: MFW control valve delta pressure transmitter fails low (cont.)
SRO Direct MFW Valve P control transferred to the Y instrument per DB-OP-06407, Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Operating Procedure, Section 4.1.
BOP Select the Y MFW Valve P instrument BOP Place HIC ICS36A/HIC ICS36B, MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE HAND/AUTO STATIONS, in Auto On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
6 Page 11 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of condenser Vacuum/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 11 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 6: Loss of condenser vacuum/ATWS Indications Available:
15-1-F HP CNDSR HI 15-2-F LP CNDSR HI HP PR 530 rising LP-PR 541 rising CREW Recognize indications of rapidly increasing condenser pressure.
SRO Implement DB-OP-02518, High Condenser Pressure Directs manual reactor trip May direct initiate & isolate SFRCS Crew Recognize indications of an ATWS.
Rods do NOT drop when the manual trip pushbuttons are pushed.
Reactor power is NOT decreasing.
CRITICAL TASK*
ATC/BOP
Manually de-energize the Control Rod Drive System by momentarily de-energizing E2 and F2.
Verify reactor power is decreasing Manually trip the turbine.
Initiate & isolate SFRCS due to loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 7 & 8
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
7 & 8 Page 12 of 15 Event
Description:
AFPT 1 overspeed trip and MDFP Discharge Valve fails open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 12 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Event 7: AFPT 1 overspeed trip Event 8: MDFP Target rock valve fails open SRO Direct Supplemental actions per DB-OP-02000.
Crew Implement Specific Rules Crew Recognize AFPT 1 tripped Annunciator 10-2-G, AFPT 1 OVRSPD TRIP.
No AFW flow to SG 1 CRITICAL TASK*
- Implement Specific Rule 4 for loss of an AFW Pump
- 1. Enable both MDFP Discharge Valves
- HIS 6460
- HIS 6459
- 2. Close both MDFP Discharge Valves
- LIC 6460
- LIC 6459
- 3. Start the MDFP
- 5. When SG 1 is at setpoint place discharge valves in auto BOP Use atmospheric vent valves to control RCS pressure constant or slightly decreasing
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2013 Scenario #
4 Event #
7 & 8 Page 13 of 15 Event
Description:
AFPT 1 overspeed trip and MDFP Discharge Valve fails open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 13 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Crew Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections Crew Recognize Overcooling SRO Direct actions per Overcooling Section DB-OP-02000 CRITICAL TASK*
- Manually Initiate and Isolate SFRCS Crew Recognize an overfeed of SG 1 due to AF 6459 loss of power (failed open)
CRITICAL TASK*
- Stop overfeed of SG1 by closing AF608, AUX FEED TO SG 1 LINE STOP VALVE - may elect to stop Motor Driven Feed Pump or use local manual valve to throttle flow.
SRO Direct Supplemental actions per DB-OP-02000.
EAL SA3, Alert - Automatic actions fail to shutdown the reactor. Manual actions from the control room area are successful.
On Lead Evaluators discretion scenario can be terminated
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 14 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 Justification for Critical Tasks A.
Shutdown Reactor - ATWS (CT24)
The reactor must be shut down prior to proceeding since the Technical Bases Document accident mitigation is based on having the reactor shut down. De-energize E2 and F2 to shut down the reactor.
B.
Establish AFW Flow (CT10)
Feedwater is required to at least one SG to ensure the secondary systems are available for primary system heat removal. Primary to secondary heat transfer is preferred to prevent degrading the containment building environment. Start the MDFP and deliver flow to the SGs.
C.
Isolate Overcooling (CT17)
Stopping the AFW overfeed (from MDFP) will terminate the RCS overcooling.
Concerns related to an extended overcooling include loss of pressurizer level, saturated RCS, SG damage, and pressurized thermal shock. Stop overfeed of SG 1 after the MDFP is started.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 15 of 15 FENOC Facsimile Rev.1 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION
- 1.
Simulator Setup (See attached simulator setup sheet)
- 2.
Procedures a)
DB-OP-06001, Boron Concentration Control b)
DB-OP-2004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel Annunciators c)
DB-OP-02513, Pressurizer System Abnormal Operation d)
DB-OP-06316, Emergency Diesel Generator Operating Procedure e)
DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators f)
DB-OP-02044, Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Alarm Panel 44 Annunciators g)
DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrumentation Failures h)
DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating Procedure i)
DB-OP-02014, MSR/ICS Alarm Panel 14 Annunciators j)
DB-OP-06407, Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Operating Procedure k)
DB-OP-02518, High Condenser Pressure l)
DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 2)
For Simulator Instructor:
a)
DB-OP-02044, Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Alarm Panel 44 Annunciators