Text

License Amendment Request for a Revision to Technical Specification 3.3.2 in Support of NRC Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies
	ML13262A500
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	09/12/2013
From:	Capps S; Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML13262A500 (36)
	v • d • e

Steven D. Capps DUKE Vice President

ENERGY, McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy MG01VP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 27078 o: 980-875-4805 f: 980-875-4809 Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com September 12, 2013 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

SUBJECT:

License Amendment Request for a revision to Technical Specification 3.3.2 in support of NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events", dated March 12, 2012.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, enclosed is a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy) License Amendment Request (LAR) for the McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire) Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed LAR is in support of plant modifications required to achieve compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events", dated March 12, 2012.

The proposed LAR affects TS 3.3.2,"Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation" for McGuire Units 1 and 2. Applicable aspects of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," are incorporated into the scope of the proposed changes.

Duke Energy requests approval of this LAR within one calendar year of the submittal date. This will support the planned implementation of the associated plant modifications for Unit 1 during its fall 2014 refueling outage (1 EOC23). Implementation of the plant modifications for McGuire Unit 2 will be in the fall 2015 refueling outage (2EOC23). Amendment implementation will be accomplished within 60 days of NRC approval.

Note that the proposed TS changes have been structured to be implemented and utilized as applicable until modifications are fully implemented on both units. Within one year following the implementation of the modification for the final unit, Duke Energy will submit a follow-up administrative LAR to delete the superseded TS requirements.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 12, 2013 Page 2 provides a description of the proposed change, the technical justification, an evaluation of significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92(c), and the following attachments: provides the current affected TS page (3.3.2-14) marked-up to show the proposed changes. This enclosure also includes the complete TS 3.3.2 for information only. provides the existing Bases pages marked-up to show the proposed changes. These pages are provided for information only. provides retyped (clean) TS pages. provides a Simplified Partial Flow Diagram (Figure 1) to show Auxiliary Feedwater pump and suction configuration. provides the regulatory commitments associated with this LAR.

In accordance with Duke Energy's administrative procedures and Quality Assurance Program, this LAR has been reviewed and approved by the McGuire Plant Operations Review Committee.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this LAR is being sent to the designated official of the State of North Carolina.

If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact George Murphy at (980)875-5715.

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 12, 2013.

Sincerely, Steven D. Capps Enclosures

1. Evaluation of the Proposed Change

2. McGuire Units 1 and 2 List of Regulatory Commitments

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 12, 2013 Page 3 xc with enclosure:

V.M. McCree, Region II Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 E J. Leeds, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 0-8C2A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J.C. Paige, Project Manager (MNS and CNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J. Zeiler NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station W.L. Cox Ill, Section Chief North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources Division of Environmental Health Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh. NC 27699-1645 J. Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

ENCLOSURE 1 Evaluation of the Proposed Change

Subject:

LAR to revise TS 3.3.2, Emergency Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation

1.

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION

2.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

3.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.

REGULATORY EVALUATION 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 4.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination 4.3 Conclusions

5.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.

REFERENCES ATTACHMENTS:

1.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 TS Page Markups

2.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 Bases Page Markups

3.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 Retyped TS Pages

4.

Figure 1 Simplified Partial Flow Diagram Page 2 of 12

1.

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a request to amend Renewed Facility Operating Licenses NPF-9 and NPF-17 for McGuire Units 1 and 2.

The proposed change would revise the McGuire TS 3.3.2, "Emergency Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation", (Ref. 3) to support planned plant modifications associated with NRC Order EA-12-049 (Ref. 6).

The proposed amendment modifies the Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoints listed in Table 3.3.2-1, Function 6.f, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump suction transfer on low suction pressure. The higher values proposed for the TS will ensure that the transfer of the safety-related AFW (McGuire AFW acronym is CA) suction source occurs at a pressure higher than the pressure setpoint for a new automatic suction transfer scheme planned to be installed during each units refueling outage. The new Alternating Current (AC) independent AFW pump suction transfer scheme is being added to meet requirements associated with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events", dated March 12, 2012.

The proposed schedule for implementation of the proposed changes reflects Order EA-12-049 implementation schedule requirements. For McGuire Unit 1, this will be the fall 2014 refueling outage. For McGuire Unit 2, this will be the fall 2015 refueling outage.

2.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION Specifically, the proposed changes would revise the McGuire Units 1 and 2 TS follows:

1.

A separate Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint will be added specifically for the 2A AFW Motor Driven Pump (MDP). The basis for addressing the 2A MDP separately is the measuring device reference elevation difference which is discussed later in this submittal. The 2A MDP values are identified in items 2, 3, and 4 below.

2.

Table 3.3.2-1 presently lists an Allowable Value entry for Function 6.f, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low", of ->3 psig. It is proposed to change the listed Allowable Value to a6.5 psig (-7.5 psig for the 2A MDP only).

3.

Table 3.3.2-1 presently lists a Nominal Trip Setpoint entry for Function 6.f, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low", of 3.5 psig. It is proposed to change the listed Nominal Trip Setpoint to 7.0 psig (8.0 psig for the 2A MDP only).

4.

A new Note (c) is added and reads as follows:

(c) Prior to completion of the AC independent AFW pump suction transfer scheme modification on the respective Unit, the Allowable Value for this Function is -3 psig

(-4 psig 2A MDP only) and the Nominal Trip Setpoint for this Function is 3.5 psig (4.5 psig 2A MDP only)

5.

Function 6.f Surveillance Requirements 3.3.2.7 and 3.3.2.8 are modified to reference existing TSTF-493, Revision 4, related Notes (a) and (b).

Page 3 of 12 Further Discussion As described above, the Table 3.3.2-1 Function 6.f Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint are modified with a Note (c) such that the existing values (in the note) are to be used until completion of the applicable modification, since the plant modifications that support the setpoint changes will occur during separate refueling outages for each Unit. After full implementation of all the modifications, a future administrative LAR will be processed such that only the post-modification requirements are shown in the TSs. This action is listed as a commitment in.

Also included in the scope of the proposed changes is the addition of references to existing TS Table 3.3.2-1 footnotes (a) and (b) for TS Table 3.3.2-1 Function 6.f. These footnotes are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 4. provides a marked-up version of the affected pages of TS 3.3.2 for McGuire showing the proposed changes and a copy of the full TS 3.3.2 for information. Attachment 3 provides the retyped (clean) TS 3.3.2 affected pages.

Duke Energy will make conforming changes to the TS Bases in accordance with TS 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program." Attachment 2 provides the affected TS Bases markups for McGuire. These Bases markups are included for information only.

Circumstances Establishinq Need for the Proposed Amendment Plant modifications are proposed to install pressure switches which will automatically align a new AC-independent AFW suction source for Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) event coping, pursuant to NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events", dated March 12, 2012 requirements. This modification ensures a suction source will be available for the AFW pumps during beyond design basis events described in the order. During beyond design basis events outlined in the order, the lack of AC power will prevent the AFW pump suction from transferring to the safety-related source. The new AC independent AFW suction source will provide suction to the AFW pumps by transferring the pump suction to an alternate source utilizing component(s) not relying on an AC power source.

To ensure that the credited safety-related AFW suction transfer initiates before the new AC-independent AFW suction source transfer during design basis events, the TS setpoints of the safety-related pressure switches are to be set at a higher value. The new TS setpoints will ensure that the safety-related suction source transfer actuates before the new AC independent suction source transfer. The setpoints of the safety-related switches must be set above the ELAP-related pressure switch setpoints by at least the sum of the switch setpoint maximum uncertainty limit for each switch type. This requires raising the Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value from those currently defined in TS 3.3.2. The new TS setpoints for the AFW pump suction transfer pressure switches will cause the AFW pump suction to begin to transfer from the normal suction source to the safety-related suction source earlier than the current TS setpoints.

Page 4 of 12

3.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION General The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) upon a loss of normal feedwater supply. The AFW system is required to operate until normal feedwater flow is restored or until the reactor coolant pressure is lowered to the point where the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System can be utilized.

The AFW system is described in UFSAR Chapter 10. The AFW system is provided with two MDPs and one turbine driven pump. Each of the MDPs supplies two steam generators. The turbine driven pump supplies water to all four steam generators. A simplified partial flow diagram is provided in Attachment 4. The minimum system capability during normal operation of the AFW system required to bring the unit to and maintain it at safe shutdown is one AFW pump feeding two steam generators.

The MDPs and the turbine driven pump suction supply is currently from the following sources in the order of their priority based on water quality:

1. Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank (CAST) (normally aligned source)

2. Nuclear Service Water (NSW) (assured source which is automatically aligned on low AFW pump suction pressure).

The diversity and redundancy provided in the present system design precludes the possibility that any single credible failure would prohibit the AFW System from performing its intended safety function.

The failure of AC power or air supply does not cause loss of function for the AFW system for the following reasons:

1. The turbine driven pump steam supply valve is designed to fail open for either loss of AC power or loss of air supply.

2. The auxiliary feedwater supply to the steam generators via the turbine driven pump is normally aligned to the CAST such that no action is required under loss of AC power or loss of air conditions to assure feedwater supply.

AFW pump suction diversity is provided by using several water sources and adequate valving for suction source change. All three AFW pumps are normally supplied from a common header which is normally aligned to the CAST. This source is provided with motor operated valves with control room operation. The assured (safety-related) AFW pump suction is from the NSW system.

Page 5 of 12 To comply with Order 12-049 a plant modification will install pressure switches and modify valve 1(2)CA-162, "CA Suction Header RN Supply Isolation valve" to operate independently of AC power. In addition valve 1(2)CA-161, "CA Suction Header RN Supply Isolation valve" will remain open. The modification will provide an additional automatic suction source to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP) during beyond design basis events.

The existing safety-related automatic alignment of NSW to the AFW pumps' suction is achieved by means of pressure switches which open AC-motor operated valves. The pressure switches are located on the AFW pump suction lines. The AFW MDPs utilize two pressure switches per train (one switch per isolation valve). The TDAFWP utilizes four switches per train. A low pressure signal sensed by two switches on either train will cause the assured NSW supply of water for the pump to be aligned.

TS 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation" states that the AFW suction pressure auto-realignment to the NSW System shall be operable with trip setpoints set consistent with the values as shown in Table 3.3.2-1, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation", Function 6.f. The current TS states that the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 3.5 psig and the Allowable Value is greater than or equal to 3 psig.

Setpoint Calculation Changes The instrument loop uncertainty calculation evaluated the current TS Nominal Trip Setpoint to be equal to 3.5 psig. The instrument loop uncertainty calculation also concluded that the current TS Allowable Value should be greater than or equal to 3 psig.

As previously described, plant modifications are proposed to install pressure switches to automatically align a new AC-independent AFW suction source for an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) event coping, pursuant to NRC Order EA-12-049 requirements. The modifications will provide an automatic suction source to the TDAFWP in the event of a failure of the CAST due to a beyond design basis event.

To ensure that the existing safety-related suction transfer initiates before the new AC-independent AFW suction source transfer, the setpoints of the existing safety-related pressure switches will be set to ensure that no overlap exists between allowable actuation ranges of the safety-related (TS 3.3.2) pressure switches and the new AC-independent AFW suction source pressure switches. To achieve this, the TS setpoints for the safety-related suction transfer pressure switches must be set above the new AC-independent AFW suction source for ELAP pressure switch setpoints by at least the sum of the switch setpoint maximum uncertainty limit for each switch type. This requires raising the Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value from those currently defined in TS 3.3.2.

The McGuire calculations for the set points of the AFW suction transfer pressure switches are referenced from the centerline elevation of the respective AFW pump suction flow element. Any differences in elevations of the pressure switches, sensing line taps, and unit differences have been historically compensated for in the calibration procedures to achieve the required setpoint.

The centerline elevation of the 2A MDP suction flow element is approximately 2 feet lower than that of the other pump suction flow elements. As stated above, this difference in elevation has been compensated for in the switch calibration process to meet the existing TS values. The calculation and switch calibration process recognize the difference in elevation for the 2A MDP and compensate for the (-2 feet) elevation difference by relating the 2A MDP suction transfer Page 6 of 12 pressure switches to the elevation of the remaining AFW pump suction transfer pressure switches. This process has ensured compliance with the current single TS setpoint.

Going forward a separate value for the 2A MDP will be included in TS Table 3.2.2-1 to account for the difference in elevation. The purpose of adding a separate value for 2A MDP is for improved clarity and consistency in the calibration procedures and other documents. To account for the (-2 feet) elevation difference the pressure switch setpoints for 2A MDP will be 1 psig higher than the pressure switch setpoints for the remaining AFW pumps. The setpoints in items 2, and 3 from the Detailed Description above address the 2A MDP AFW suction transfer pressure switch elevation difference. The new Note (c) described in item 4 of Section 2 allows for co-existence of new setpoints on one unit and old setpoints on the other unit until the changes are implemented on both units.

Based on the parameters as analyzed by these calculations, the TS Nominal Trip Setpoint value and the Allowable Value should be changed as shown in Table 3.3.2-1 as depicted in Attachments 1 and 3. The amended Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value are conservative relative to the analytical limit and to the current TS values.

Instrument Uncertainty Calculation Changes Introduction Setpoint calculation revisions were performed in support of the planned plant modifications, resulting in the need for changes to associated values listed in TS Table 3.3.2-1, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation", as described in Section 2 above. These setpoint calculations were performed in accordance with Duke Energy Engineering Directives Manual (EDM)-102, "Instrument Setpoint/Uncertainty Calculations," Revision 4. The methodology used as described in EDM-102 is consistent with the intent of Instrument Society of America (ISA) Standard RP67.04-1994 Part II, "Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-related Instrumentation."

Basic Methodology - EDM-102 The loop uncertainty methodology is primarily based on the "Square-Root-Sum-of-the-Squares" (SRSS) technique for combination of random-independent uncertainty terms.

Random-dependent and bias uncertainty terms must be addressed through a combination of the SRSS and/or algebraic techniques.

Page 7 of 12 The overall methodology requires identification of applicable sources of instrument uncertainty, and categorization of each as random-independent (x,y), random-dependent (w,u), and bias/abnormal distribution (v,t) terms. The magnitude of each term is then combined to determine the "Total Loop Uncertainty" (TLU) as depicted below. The "+" and "-" convention represents the positive or negative uncertainty limits within the measured setpoint or indication.

+ TLU=+{x 2 + y2 + (w + U)2}1/2 +V + t

- TLU=_{x2 + y2 + (w + U) }1/2 -

V - t The treatment of bias/abnormal distribution terms requires additional discussion. Bias terms are typically based on conservative estimates and are predictable. Bias terms would normally be applied only in an additive manner, to the respective "+" or "-" TLU component. Biases of unknown direction would be applied in an additive manner to both the -TLU and +TLU determinations. Application of a non-recurring bias term shall not be applied so as to decrease a TLU value. Proper application of a bias would normally result in reduced margin for the setpoint limit of interest. Terms that have an abnormal distribution cannot be SSRS'd with normally distributed terms and must therefore be added as a limit of error in both directions.

Evaluation of setpoint acceptability requires comparison of the total loop uncertainty against the operational ranges and the protected limits (process, analytical, and/or safety limits). This setpoint relationship is based on guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation". The typical reactor protection and/or safeguard setpoint relationship, depicting a high process setpoint, is depicted as follows:

Safety Limit Analytical Limit Total Loop Uncertainty Allowable Value Allowance VN __

Limiting Trip Setpoint As-Found Tolerance (Upper Limit)

Setting Tolerance Nominal Trip Setpoint (As-Left Band)

As-Found Tolerance (Lower Limit)

Range of Normal Operation Safety Limits (SL) are the values chosen to reasonably protect the integrity of physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. Analytical Limits (AL) typically are values utilized in the safety analyses, which were specifically chosen to allow the equipment time to act and prevent exceeding the SL.

Page 8 of 12 The Limiting Trip Setpoint is the limiting value for the Nominal Trip Setpoint and represents the AL plus or minus the TLU. The Limiting Trip Setpoint is the minimum total uncertainty allowance adjustment required to ensure trip actuation prior to the AL. The Nominal Trip Setpoint represents the trip setpoint at which the device is actually set in the plant, and is greater than or equal to the Limiting Trip Setpoint.

The Allowable Value (AV) represents an acceptable benchmark (specified by TS) for which periodic calibrations/checks must fall within to ensure operability. When a channel "As-found" condition is determined to be less conservative than the AV, the channel must be declared inoperable. The AV determination is based on expected uncertainty influences for the portion of the loop not tested. Uncertainty magnitudes must be representative of the surveillance interval duration. Examples of typical uncertainty influences are transmitter reference accuracy, calibration uncertainty, temperature effects, process measurement allowances and biases. The AV was determined as follows:

AV = AL +/-( RUNT +Biases) = AL + / - {[(TLU - Biases)2 - RUTcaI2]1/ 2 +/- Biases) where:

TLU =

Total loop uncertainty AL =

limit of a measured or calculated variable established by the safety analyses to ensure that a safety limit is not exceeded

+

- =

+ or %" sign convention dictated by whichever is in the direction setpoint (i.e. towards setpoint)

RUNT = denotes uncertainty associated with the portion of the loop not tested during the channel check, calibration, etc.

RUT-caI = denotes uncertainty associated with the portion of the loop tested during the channel check, calibration, etc.

TSTF-493 As-Found/As-Left Tolerance The channel as-found and as-left acceptable tolerances are established in accordance with TSTF-493, Rev. 4. This method for determination of allowable calibration tolerances serves to assure that the instrument channels are operating within the bounds defined in the Safety Analysis.

As-Found Tolerance "As-Found" is the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is found after a period of operation and before recalibration (if necessary). The As-Found Tolerance is the allowance the channel or portion thereof is expected to be within based on calculations which ensure the channel is capable of actuating prior to reaching the Safety Analysis AL. Values recorded during a channel as-found surveillance which are within the As-Found Tolerance would clearly indicate a channel is operating as intended. Values recorded during a channel as-found surveillance which exceed the As-Found Tolerance would require a more detailed review to determine the effects of the increased uncertainty on the operability of the channel.

Uncertainties which make up the As-Found Tolerance typically include the square root sum of squares combination of reference accuracy, drift, and measurement and test equipment.

Page 9 of 12 As-Left Tolerance "As-Left" is the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is left after calibration or final setpoint device setpoint verification. The As-Left Tolerance is the acceptable setting variation about the setpoint that the technician may leave the setting following calibration.

Uncertainty terms which make up the As-Left Tolerance for the portion of the channel under surveillance would typically include the SRSS combination of reference accuracy and measurement and test equipment.

Included in the scope of the proposed changes is the reference to two existing lettered footnotes applicable to the affected Surveillance Requirements listed in Table 3.3.2-1 for the AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low. These footnotes are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 4.

The reference to the footnote for this channel serves to ensure that unexpected as-found conditions are evaluated prior to returning the channel to service, and ensuring that as-left settings provide sufficient margin for uncertainties. These changes will have no adverse effect on plant safety.

Page 10 of 12

4.

REGULATORY EVALUATION 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria Following implementation of planned plant modifications, the McGuire will remain in compliance with applicable regulations and requirements. Discussion of the 1 OCFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) is provided in various UFSAR sections including Chapter 3.0 "Design Criteria - Structures, Components, Equipment and Systems" and Chapter 7, "Instrumentation and Controls." These sections identify applicable GDCs for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). Applicable GDC's include Criteria 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 37, 40, 43 of the 1971 General Design Criteria. Compliance with certain IEEE Standards is presented in Section 7.1.2.1. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.22 is discussed in Section 7.1.2.1. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.47 is discussed in Section 7.8.2. UFSAR Section 7.3.2.2 outlines the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System compliance with IEEE 279,1971.

4.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed amendment affects McGuire TS 3.3.2, "Emergency Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation. Specifically, the setpoints in Table 3.2.2-1 Function 6.f will be revised to support planned plant modifications in support of NRC Order 12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events", dated March 12, 2012. The revised setpoints will cause the AFW pump suction transfer from the non-safety-related CAST to the safety-related RN suction source to occur sooner than under the existing setpoints. Applicable aspects of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," are incorporated in the scope of the proposed changes.

An evaluation has been performed to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendments by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1.

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed TS changes are in support of a plant modification involving the installation of an AC-independent AFW Suction Transfer scheme and hardware to ensure a continuous AFW suction source during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) event. The purpose of Table 3.3.2-1 Function 6.f is to preserve the AFW pumps by ensuring a continuous suction supply to the pumps. The proposed change will cause the AFW pumps to align to the safety-related suction source sooner than under the current setpoint values for design basis events. The result of the proposed TS setpoint changes will be an increase in margin for AFW pump suction. The new TS setpoints were selected with sufficient margin for instrument uncertainty to ensure that the safety-related AFW suction transfer function actuates before the new AC independent AFW suction transfer function and to prevent any adverse interaction of the two schemes. In other words, the proposed change will ensure the safety-related Page 11 of 12 suction transfer is initiated before the non-safety AC independent AFW suction transfer initiates. The specific TS changes are associated with 1) the specific Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values for the AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low feature, 2) the addition of specific requirements to be taken if the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, and 3) the addition of specific requirements regarding resetting of an channel setpoint within an as-left tolerance.

The AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low feature does not affect the probability of any accident being initiated. In addition, none of the above-mentioned proposed TS changes affect the probability of any accident being initiated.

Actuation of the AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low feature will continue to ensure that adequate AFW pump suction is maintained during design bases events. Transfer to the safety-related suction source will actually occur earlier due to the proposed change. The proposed changes to Nominal Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values are based on accepted industry standards and will preserve assumptions in the applicable accident analyses. None of the proposed changes alter any assumption previously made in the radiological consequences evaluations, nor do they affect mitigation of the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

In summary, the proposed changes will not involve any increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or single failures are introduced as a result of any of the proposed changes. The AFW Pump Suction Transfer feature is not an accident initiator. No changes to the overall manner in which the plant is operated are being proposed. Therefore, none of the proposed changes will create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their intended functions. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, and the containment barriers. The proposed TS setpoints serve to ensure proper AFW system suction transfer for design bases events, whereby the proposed TS changes will not have any effect on the margin of safety of fission product barriers. In addition, the proposed TS changes will not have any impact on these barriers. No accident mitigating equipment will be adversely impacted as a result of the modification. Therefore, Page 12 of 12 existing safety margins will be preserved. None of the proposed changes will involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, it is concluded that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c), and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.3 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.

REFERENCES

1.

Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-493, Revision 4, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions."

2.

Duke Energy Engineering Directives Manual, EDM-102, Rev. 4, "Instrument Setpoint/Uncertainty Calculations"

3.

McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications, Amendments 266/246, Technical Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation"

4.

McGuire Nuclear Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 17, Section 7.1.2.4, "Instrument Range Design Criteria"

5.

McGuire Nuclear Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 17, Section 10.4.10, "Auxiliary Feedwater System"

6.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events"

ATTACHMENT 1 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Page Markups Note:

TS page 3.3.2-10 is also being revised under a separate previously submitted LAR (TAC #s: MF-1 732, MF-1 733)

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

6.

Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)

e.

Trip of all Main 1,2 1 per MFW K

SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA Feedwater pump SR 3.3.2.9 Pumps

f.

Auxiliary 1,2,3 2 per MDP, N,O SR 3.3.

_(,)(b) 3--psi§ 3.-psig Feedwater Pump 4 per TDP SR 3. 2.8(a)(b)

>6 si 70i" Suction Tr/rIe~-,,<

SR 3.

.9 on Suctior

)

)" > 7,5 Xsia 8.0 osia Pressure -. ow (c)

(2 M"

(

MDP

7.

Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump

a.

Refueling Water 1,2,3 3

PS SR 3.3.2.1

> 175.85 180 inches*

Storage Tank SR 3.3.2.3(a)(b) inches*

(RWST) Level -

SR 3.3.2.8(a)(b)

Low SR 3.3.2.9 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

Safety Injection (continued)

Following implementation of the modifications associated with ECCS Water Management on the respective Unit, the Allowable Value for this Function shall be > 92.3 inches and the Nominal Trip Setpoint for this Function shall be 95 inches.

(a) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

(b) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the UFSAR.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 Amend-14 a

ment Nos.difci

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2 APPLICABILITY:

The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

According to Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTIONS

NOT Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Fur r! -----------------------------------------------------------

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in Table 3.3.2-1 required channels or for the channel(s) or trains inoperable, train(s).

B.

One channel or train B.1 Restore channel or train to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

OR B.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months AND B.2.2 Be in MODE 5.

84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-1 Amendment Nos. 26W245

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One train inoperable.

C.1 ---------

NOTE-------

One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.

Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

OR C.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months AND C.2.2 Be in MODE 5.

60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months D.

One channel inoperable.

D.1 NOTE-------

One channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing.

Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-2 Amendment Nos. 250/230

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

One Containment E.1 NOTE-------

Pressure channel One additional channel inoperable.

may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing.

Place channel in bypass.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR E.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND E.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months F.

One channel or train F.1 Restore channel or train to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

OR F.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months AND F.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months G.

One Steam Line G.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Isolation Manual OPERABLE status.

Initiation - individual channel inoperable.

OR G.2 Declare associated steam 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months line isolation valve inoperable.

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-3 Amendment Nos. 248/228

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H,

One train inoperable.

H.1 NOTE-------

One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.

Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

OR H.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months AND H.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months One train inoperable.

1.1

NOTE-------

One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.

Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

OR 1.2 Be in MODE 3.

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-4 Amendment Nos. 248/228

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J.

One channel inoperable.

J.1 NOTE-------

One channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing.

Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR J.2 Be in MODE 3.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months K.

One Main Feedwater K.1 Place channel in trip.

1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Pumps trip channel inoperable.

OR K.2 Be in MODE 3.

7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months L.

One required channel in L.1 Restore the inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months one train of Doghouse train to OPERABLE status.

Water Level-High High inoperable.

OR 73 hours8.449074e-4 days 0.0203 hours 1.207011e-4 weeks 2.77765e-5 months L.2 Perform continuous monitoring of Doghouse water level.

M.

Two trains of Doghouse M.1 Perform continuous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Water Level-High High monitoring of Doghouse inoperable, water level..

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-5 Amendment Nos. 248/228

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N.

One or more channels of N.1 Restore channel(s) to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Auxiliary Feedwater OPERABLE status.

Suction Pressure-Low for one auxiliary OR feedwater pump inoperable.

N.2 Declare associated 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable.

0.

One or more channels of 0.1 Declare associated Immediately Auxiliary Feedwater auxiliary feedwater pumps Suction Pressure-Low inoperable.

for two or more auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable.

P.

One channel inoperable.

P.1 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND P.2 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months OPERABLE status.

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-6 Amendment Nos. 198/179

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Q.

One channel inoperable.

Q.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months required state for existing unit condition.

OR Q.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months AND Q.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months R.

One or more R.1 Declare affected supported Immediately Containment Pressure system inoperable.

Control System channel(s) inoperable.

S.

Required Action and S.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition P not AND met.

S.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-7 Amendment Nos. 198/179

INFORMATION ONLY ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ESFAS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.2 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.3 Perform COT.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.4 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.5 Perform COT.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.6 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.7

NOTE Verification of setpoint not required for manual initiation functions.

Perform TADOT.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-8 Amendment Nos. 261/241

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.8

NOTE This Surveillance shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.2.9

NOTE Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after SG pressure is > 900 psig.

Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within limit.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-9 Amendment Nos. 261/241

INFORMATION ONLY Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Safety Injection

a.

Manual Initiation

b.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

c.

Containment Pressure - High

d.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low Low 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2

2 trains 1,2,3 3

4 B

SR 3.3.2.7 C

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 NA NA NA NA

< 1.2 psig 1.1 psig

> 1835 psig 1845 psig

2.

Containment Spray*

a.

Manual Initiation

b.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1 per train, 2 trains 2 trains B

SR 3.3.2.7 C

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 E

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 NA NA NA NA

c.

Containment Pressure - High High 1,2,3 4

< 3.0 psig 2.9 psig

3.

Containment Isolation

a.

Phase A Isolation (1)

Manual Initiation (2)

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2

2 trains B

SR 3.3.2.7 C

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 NA NA NA NA (continued)

The requirements of this function are not applicable following implementation of the modifications associated with ECCS Water Management on the respective Unit.

(a)

Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-10 Amendment Nos. 265/245

INFORMATION ONLY Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

3.

Containment Isolation (continued)

(3)

Safety Injection

b.

Phase B Isolation (1)

Manual Initiation (2)

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (3)

Containment Pressure -

High High

4.

Steam Line Isolation

a.

Manual Initiation (1) System (2)

Individual Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3 1 per train, 2 trains 2 trains 4

B SR 3.3.2.7 C

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 E

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA NA NA

< 3.0 psig 2.9 psig 2 trains 1 per line 2 trains F

G SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA NA NA

b.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

c.

Containment Pressure - High High

d.

Steam Line Pressure (1)

Low H

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 E

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 NA

<3.0 psig NA 2.9 psig 1,2 (b), 3 (b) 4 1,2(b), 3(a)(b) 3 per steam line D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9

> 755 psig 775 psig (continued)

(a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.

(b) Except when all MSIVs are dosed and de-activated.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-11 Amendment Nos. 265/245

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

4.

Steam Line Isolation (continued)

(2)

Negative Rate - High

5.

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

a.

Turbine Trip (1) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (2) SG Water Level-High High (P-14) 3(b)(c) 3 per steam line D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9

< 120(d) psi 100O(d) ps 1,2 2 trains SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 NA NA 1,2 3 per SG J

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9

<_85.6%

83.9%

(3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. See item Injection 5.a.(1) for Applicable MODES.

b.

Feedwater Isolation (1) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (2) SG Water Level-High High (P-14) 1,2(6), 3(e) 1,2(e), 3(e) 2 trains 3 per SG H

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 NA

< 85.6 NA 83.9%

(continued)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Except when all MSIVs are dosed and de-activated.

Trip function automatically blocked above P-1I (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and may be blocked below P-11 when Steam Line Isolation Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.

Time constant utilized in the rate/lag controller is > 50 seconds.

Except when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are dosed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-12 Amendment Nos. 265/245

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (continued)

(3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. See Item Injection 5.b.(1) for Applicable MODES.

(4) Tavg-Low 1 per loop J

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8

> 551'F 553°F coincident with Reactor Trip, P-4 (5) Doghouse Water Level-High High

6.

Auxiliary Feedwater

a.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

b.

SG Water Level -

Low Low

c.

Safety Injection

d.

Station Blackout Refer to Function 8.a (Reactor Trip, P-4) for all initiation functions and requirements.

1,2,3 1,2,3 2 per train per Doghouse 2 trains 4 per SG L,M SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.7 H

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9

< 13 inches 12 inches NA

> 15%

NA 16.7%

Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

(1) Loss of voltage (2) Degraded Voltage 1,2,3 1,2,3 3 per bus 3 per bus D

SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9 D

SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9

> 3122 V (Unit 1)

> 3108 V (Unit 2) with 8.5 +/- 0.5 sec time delay

> 3661 V (Unit 1)

> 3685.5 V (Unit 2) with < 11 sec with SI and

< 600 sec without SI time delay 3174 V (Unit 1) 3157 V (Unit 2) +/-

45 V with 8.5 +/- 0.5 sec time delay 3678.5 V (Unit 1) 3703 V (Unit 2) with < 11 sec with Sl and < 600 sec without SI time delay (continued)

(e)

Except when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are dosed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-13 Amendment Nos. 265/245

INFORMATION ONLY Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

8.

ESFAS Interlocks

a.

Reactor Trip, P-4

b.

Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 C.

Tvg - Low Low, P-12

9.

Containment Pressure Control System 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 per train, 2 trains 3

F SR 3.3.2.7 Q

SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 Q

SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.8 R

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA

< 1965 psig 1955 psig 1,2,3 1,2,3,4 1 per loop 4 per train, 2 trains

> 551 *F Refer to Note 1 on Page 3.3.2-14 553°F Refer to Note 1 on page 3.3.2-14 NOTE 1:

The Trip Setpoint for the Containment Pressure Control System start permissive/termination (SP/T) shall be > 0.3 psig and < 0.4 psig. The allowable value for the SP/T shall be > 0.25 psig and < 0.45 psig.

McGuire Unit 1 and 2 3.3.2-15 Amendment Nos. 265/245

ATTACHMENT 2 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Bases Page Markups (Provided for information only)

INFORMATION ONLY ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

e.

Auxiliary Feedwater-Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps A Trip of all MFW pumps is an indication of a loss of MFW and the subsequent need for some method of decay heat and sensible heat removal to bring the reactor back to no load temperature and pressure. Two contacts are provided in series (one from each MFW pump) in the starting circuit for each AFW pump. A trip of all MFW pumps closes both contacts and starts the motor driven AFW pumps to ensure that at least two SGs are available with water to act as the heat sink for the reactor. This function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. This ensures that at least two SGs are provided with water to serve as the heat sink to remove reactor decay heat and sensible heat in the event of an accident. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the MFW pumps are normally shut down, and thus neither pump trip is indicative of a condition requiring automatic AFW initiation.

f.

Auxiliary Feedwater-Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure-Low A low pressure signal in the AFW pump suction line protects the AFW pumps against a loss of the normal supply of water for the pumps, the non-safety-related AFW Storage Tank (Water Tower). Two pressure switches per train are located on the AFW pump suction line. The turbine driven AFW pump has a total of four switches. A low pressure signal sensed by two-out-of-two switches on either train will cause the emergency supply of water for the pump to be aligned.

The NSWS (safety grade) is then lined up to supply the AFW pumps to ensure an adequate supply of water for the AFW System to maintain at least two of the SGs as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal.

This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure a safety grade supply of water for the AFW System to maintain the SGs as the heat sink for the reactor. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the reactor to require the SGs as a heat sink. In MODE 4, AFW automatic suction transfer does not need to be OPERABLE because RHR will already be in operation, or sufficient time is available to place RHR in o eration, to remove decay heat.

Note: the setpoints listed in this function are referenced from the centerline of the respective pump suction flow element.

The elevation of the centerline of the 2A MDP suction flow element is lower than the other AFW pumps. The lower elevation accounts for the Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value difference between the 2A MDP and the

,-other CA pumps.

McGuire Unit 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-22 Revision No. 2-2

ATTACHMENT 3 McGuire Units I and 2 Retyped Technical Specification Pages

Page 1 of 1 ENCLOSURE 2 McGuire Units I and 2 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Duke Energy in this document. Any.

other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. G. M. Murphy (980)875-5715...

COMMITMENT DUE DATE/EVENT Duke Energy will submit a follow-up administrative LAR to Within one year following delete the superseded TS requirements.

the implementation of the modification for the final McGuire Unit.

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:MF2741, Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance Administration Questions 9 April 2014 28 April 2014 Answers 20 May 2014 22 July 2014 Results Approval Other: ML13247A777
MONTHYEAR2014-02-09 [Table View]

ML13262A500

Text

SUBJECT:

Subject:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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