LR-N13-0155, License Amendment Request to Relocate the Flood Protection Technical Specification to the Technical Requirements Manual

License Amendment Request to Relocate the Flood Protection Technical Specification to the Technical Requirements Manual

ML13249A242
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	09/05/2013
From:	Davidson P Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
LR-N13-0155, LAR H13-02
Download: ML13249A242 (17)

Text

SEP 0 5 2013 LR-N13-0155 LAR H13-02 PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Hope Creek Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 NRC Docket No. 50-354 I>SE<i Nucutar LLC 10 CFR 50.90

Subject:

License Amendment Request to Relocate the Flood Protection Technical Specification to the Technical Requirements Manual Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) requests an amendment to the renewed facility operating license listed above. The proposed changes would relocate the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection from the Hope Creek Generating Station ( Hope Creek) Technical Specifications (TS) to the Hope Creek Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).

The affected TS are: Flood Protection, 3. 7.3 and 4. 7.3. As part of the proposed change, the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection will be relocated verbatim into the Hope Creek TRM. of this submittal provides an evaluation supporting the proposed changes. provides the marked-up TS pages, with the proposed changes indicated. provides, for information only, the marked-up TS bases page. No regulatory commitments are contained in this submittal.

The changes in this License Amendment Request (LAR) are not required to address an immediate safety concern; PSEG requests approval of this LAR in accordance with standard NRC approval process and schedule. Once approved, the amendment will be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

These proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

PSEG has concluded that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92.

LR-N13-0155 Page 2 10 CFR 50.90 PSEG is notifying the State of New Jersey of this LAR by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. Emily Bauer at (856)339-1 023.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 9'

• d., 0 \\ 

Sincerely, Paul J. Davison Site Vice President (Date)

Hope Creek Generating Station Attachments:

1. Evaluation of Proposed Changes

2. Technical Specification Pages with Proposed Changes

3. Technical Specification Bases Page with Proposed Change cc:

W. Dean, Administrator, Region I, USNRC J. Hughey, Project Manager, USNRC NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek P. Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE P. Bonnett, Commitment Tracking Coordinator, Hope Creek L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 License Amendment Request to Relocate the Flood Protection Technical Specification to the Technical Requirements Manual Evaluation of Proposed Changes Table of Contents

1.0 DESCRIPTION

.................................................................................................................. 2

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S................................................................................................... 2 3.0 BACKGROUN D................................................................................................................ 3

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

................................................................................................... 4

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

............................................................................................... 5

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

............................................................................ 7

7.0 REFERENCES

.................................................................................................................. 8 1

LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 1.0 DESCRIPTION In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) requests an amendment to renewed facility operating license NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek).

The proposed change would remove the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection from the Technical Specifications (TS) for Flood Protection, 3.7.3 and 4.7.3.

As part of the proposed change, the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection will be relocated verbatim into the Hope Creek Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The TRM is controlled in a manner consistent with procedures that are fully or partially described in the Hope Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Future changes to the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection will be performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

The proposed change conforms to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.36 for the contents of Technical Specifications, and to the improved standard TS approved by the NRC in NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications-General Electric BWR/4 Plants" (Reference 1 ).

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S The proposed license amendment would remove the following items from the TS and relocate them to the TRM:

1.

TS 3.7.3 on page 3/4 7-9. This specification reads: "Flood protection shall be provided for all safety related systems, components, and structures when the water level of the Delaware River reaches 6.0 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) USGS datum (95.0 feet PSE&G datum) at the Service Water Intake Structure." The associated applicability is: "At all times." The associated Actions follow:

a. With severe storm warnings from the National Weather Service which may impact Artificial Island in effect or with the water level at the service water intake structure above 6.0 feet'MSL USGS datum (95.0 feet PSE&G datum), initiate and complete:

1.

The closing of all service water intake structure watertight perimeter flood doors identified in Table 3.7.3-1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or declare affected service water system components inoperable and take the actions required by LCO 3.7.1.2;

- and -

2.

The closing of all power block watertight perimeter flood doors identified in Table 3.7.3-1 within 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Once closed, all access through the doors shall be administratively controlled.

2 LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155

b. With the water level at the service water intake structure above elevation 10.5 MSL USGS datum (99.5 feet PSE&G datum), be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2.

TS 4.7.3 on page 3/4 7-9. This specification reads, "The water level at the service water intake structure shall be determined to be within the limit by:

a.

Measurement in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program when the water level is below elevation 6.0 MSL USGS datum (95.0 feet PSE&G datum), and

b.

Measurement at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when severe storm warnings from the National Weather Service which may impact Artificial Island are in effect.

c.

Measurement in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program when the water level is equal to or above elevation 6.0 MSL USGS datum (95.0 feet PSE&G datum)."

3. Table 3.7.3-1, "Perimeter Flood Doors" on page 3/4 7-10.

Upon approval of the proposed changes, the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection will be incorporated verbatim into the Hope Creek TRM.

The following associated changes will also be made to support relocation of TS 3/4.7.3:

1.

The TS Index will be revised to delete the reference to TS 3/4.7.3 and Bases 3/4.7.3.

2.

TS Bases page B 3/4 7-1b will be changed to delete the description for 3/4.7.3 Flood Protection. This bases definition will also be incorporated verbatim into the Hope Creek TRM.

Marked-up TS pages are provided in Attachment 2. The marked-up TS Bases page is provided, for information only, in Attachment 3.

3.0 BACKGROUND

Technical Background The requirement for flood protection ensures that facility protection features are in place in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 1 0.5' Mean Sea Level [99.5 feet PSEG datum]

is based on the elevation at which facility flood protection features provide protection to safety related equipment.

Regulatory Background On July 22, 1993, the NRC published its "Final Policy Statement of Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," 58 FR 39132 (Reference 2). This Final Policy Statement established a set of objective criteria as guidance for determining which regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be included in TS, as follows:

3 LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 (1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

These four criteria were later incorporated into 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications."

The Final Policy Statement also provided that LCOs which do not meet any of the four criteria may be removed from the TS and relocated to licensee-controlled documents, such as the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Changes to the facility or to procedures described in the FSAR are subject to the controls of 10 CFR 50.59. NRC-approved NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications - General Electric BWR/4 Plants," identifies an improved standard TS that was developed based on the criteria in the Final Policy Statement.

The proposed changes are consistent with similar changes approved for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 on December 20, 2012 (Amendment No. 238, Reference 3).

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The proposed license amendment relocates flood protection operability and surveillance requirements from the Hope Creek Technical Specifications. Operability and surveillance requirements will be incorporated Into the Hope Creek TRM. The TRM is controlled in a manner consistent with procedures that are fully or partially described in the Hope Creek UFSAR, and under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The TRM has been used to capture and control other requirements associated with previous Hope Creek license amendments, including Hope Creek Generating Station Amendment No. 171 (Reference 4 ), which relocated the primary containment isolation valve table to the TRM. Hope Creek Amendment No. 171 also established the TRM as a licensee-controlled document included in the UFSAR and controlled under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

As discussed in the Regulatory Background section, an NRC Final Policy Statement concluded that those existing TS requirements which do not satisfy one of the four criteria incorporated in 10 CFR 50.36 may be removed from the TS and relocated to a licensee-controlled document, subject to the controls of 10 CFR 50.59.

While flood protection is important to ensure safety related equipment is protected, it is not a detector or indicator of reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation. The TS for Leakage Detection Systems is an example of a requirement provided to monitor degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Therefore, flood protection does not meet Criterion 1 for inclusion in the TS.

Flood protection is not a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis. This is consistent with the NRC Final Policy Statement, which provided that Criterion 2 analyses are contained in Chapters 6 4

LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 and 15 of the FSAR. Flood events are contained in Chapters 2 and 3 of the Hope Creek UFSAR. Therefore, flood protection does not meet Criterion 2 for inclusion in the TS.

Flood protection is not part of the primary success path in the mitigation of a design basis accident or transient. Therefore, flood protection does not meet Criterion 3 for inclusion in the TS.

Hope Creek operating experience has shown that site flooding (i.e. flooding above plant grade elevation) is a highly unlikely event. Hope Creek has never initiated a plant shutdown due to a high water level of 99.5 feet (PSEG Datum).

Additionally, the Hope Creek UFSAR highest historical high water was 97.5 feet (PSEG Datum), recorded in November 1950, which is 4 feet below plant grade.

The Hope Creek response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4 (Reference 5) provided the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for severe accident vulnerabilities. The IPEEE found that the evaluation of "other" external events [i.e. high winds, floods, etc.] were screened out by compliance with Standard Review Plan (SRP) criteria or by demonstration that their predicted core damage frequency (CDF) fell below the IPEEE screening criteria. In addition, the IPEEE found no known plant-unique external event that poses a significant threat of severe accidents. The NRC staff evaluation report (Reference 6) on the IPEEE submittal concluded that the IPEEE results are reasonable given the Hope Creek design, operation, and history. Based upon this risk data, flood protection is not a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, flood protection does not meet Criterion 4 for inclusion in the TS.

Flood protection does not meet any of the four screening criteria in the Final Policy Statement and 10 CFR 50.36. This conclusion is supported by the absence of operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection in the improved standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) presented in NUREG-1433. Accordingly, this proposed change conforms to the ISTS, and flood protection requirements can be established in a licensee-controlled document, the Hope Creek TRM. Future changes to flood protection requirements in the TRM will be subject to the controls of 10 CFR 50.59.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

10 CFR 50.36(a)(1) requires that each applicant for a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility shall include in its application proposed TS in accordance with the requirements of section 50.36. The TS are part of the facility operating license and any changes to the operating license and TS must be in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90. The changes proposed by this license amendment request conform to these regulations.

No Significant Hazards Consideration PSEG requests an amendment to the Hope Creek Operating License. The proposed changes would remove the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection from the Technical Specifications for the Hope Creek Generating Station. The affected TS are: Flood Protection, 3.7.3 and 4.7.3

. As part of the proposed change, the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection will be relocated as written into the Hope Creek Technical Requirements Manual.

5 LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 PSEG has evaluated the proposed changes to the TS, using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92, and determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The following information is provided to support a finding of no significant hazards consideration.

1.

Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability and surveillance requirements for the flood protection from the TS to the TRM. Flood protection is not assumed to be an initiator of an accident in the Hope Creek UFSAR. The proposed changes do not alter the design of any system, structure, or component (SSC). The proposed changes conform to NRC regulatory guidance regarding the content of plant TS, as identified in 10 CFR 50.36, NUREG-1433, and the NRC Final Policy Statement in 58 FR 39132.

Therefore, these proposed changes do not represent a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection from the TS to the TRM. The proposed changes do not involve a modification to the physical configuration of the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed changes will not impose any new or different requirement or introduce a new accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.

Additionally, there is no change in the types or increases in the amounts of any effluent that may be released off-site and there is no increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability and surveillance requirements for flood protection from the TS to the TRM. This relocation will not affect protection criteria for plant equipment and will not reduce the margin of safety.

Operability and surveillance requirements will be established in a licensee-controlled document, the TRM, to ensure the capability for external flood protection remains intact.

6 LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 Changes to these requirements in the TRM will be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, providing an appropriate level of regulatory control.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the above, PSEG concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there Is a reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the NRC's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7

LAR H13-02

7.0 REFERENCES

LR-N13-0155

1.

NUREG-1433, Volume 1, Specifications, Revision 4.0, "Standard Technical Specifications-General Electric BWR/4 Plants," dated April 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12104A192

2.

NRC "Final Policy Statement of Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," dated July 22, 1993, 58 FR 39132

3.

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3-Issuance of Amendment Re: Relocating Technical Specifications to the Technical Requirements Manual (TAG No. ME7614),

dated December 20, 20 12, ADAMS Accession No. ML12278A331

4.

Hope Creek Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment Re: Relocate Component Lists for Primary Containment Isolation Valves from Technical Specifications (TAG No.

MD3600), dated August 27, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML071430403

5.

PSEG letter LR-N970380, "Response to Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4-Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," dated July 31, 1997

6.

NRC letter from Mr. R. Ennis to Mr. H. Keiser, "Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal for Hope Creek Generating Station (TAG No.

M83630)," dated July 26, 1999; including Enclosure titled, "Staff Evaluation Report of Public Service Electric & Gas Company-Individual Plant Examination of External events (IPEEE) Submittal for Hope Creek Generating Station" 8

LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 Technical Specification Pages with Proposed Changes The following Technical Specification pages for Renewed Facility Operating License No.

NPF-57 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page Index xiii Index XX 3/4.7.3 3/4 7-9 Table 3.7.3-1 3/4 7-10

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION 3/4.7.5 3/4.7.6 3/4.7.7 3-1.Perimete REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM.................

DELETED SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION...........................

MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM............................

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES A.C. Sources-Operating................................

Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 Diesel Generator Test Schedule....

A. C. Sources-Shutdown.................................

3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES D.C. Sources-Operating................................

Table 4.8.2.1-1 Battery Surveillance Requirements...

D.C. Sources Shutdown.................................

3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS Distribution Operating..............................

Distribution -

Shutdown...............................

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices..................................

PAGE 3/4 7-11 3/4 7-19 3/4 7--21 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-10 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-12 3/4 8-15 3/4 8-17 3/4 8-18 3/4 8-21 3/4 8-24 Table 3.8.4.1-1 Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices......

3/4 8-26 Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload Protection (Bypassed) 3/4 8*30 HOPE CREEK xiii Amendment No.

179

INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 3/4.7.2 3/4.7.5 3/4.7.6 3/4.7.7 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS............................

CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS.............................

r--------

7-----

=

CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM............

DELETED SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION......................

MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM.......................

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.............................

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES..........

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 3/4.9.2 3/4.9.3 3/4.9.4 3/4.9.5 3/4.9.6 3/4.9.7 REACTOR MODE SWITCH..............................

INSTRUMENTATION..................................

CONTROL ROD POSITION.............................

DELETED.

DELETED....,

DELETED..........................................

DELETED..........................................

3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL -

REACTOR VESSEL and WATER LEVEL SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL........

3/4.9,10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL..............................

3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION....

B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-1b B 3/4 7-1c B 3/4 7-4 B 3/4 7-4 B 3/4 8-1 B 3/4 8-3 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-2 B 3/4 9-2 B 3/4 9-2 B 3/4 9-2 B 3/4 9**2 HOPE CREEK XX Amendment No. 191

3.7.3 Flood protection sli I be provided for all safety related sy tms, components and stru ures when the water level of the Delaw River reaches 6.0 feet Mean Sea L,* el (MSL) USGS datum (9. feet SE&G datum) at the Service ter Intake Structure.

a.

b.

a.

b.

At all times.

Wi severe storm warnings from i'l

ational Weather Service which m y,!mpact Artific*lland in effect or with the wa r level at the service water intake strn ture above elevation 6eet MSL USGS datum (9.9 feet PSE&G datum), initiate and co Jete:

1.

The cllqg of all service water intkucture watertight perimeter flood doo identified iri'-1,.able 3.7.3-1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or eclare affected service water system components irlh erable and take the actions guired by LCO 3.7.1.2;

2.

-and-3.7. 1 within 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

Otherwise, be in a

st HOT SHUTDOWN wtl:lin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in OLD SHUTDOWN within tfi following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. One lased, all access through til doors shall be administratively oiled.

ith the water level at the sewater intake structure ao e elevation 10.5 feet MSL U QS datum (99.5 feet PSE&G da'tti!Jl), be in at least HOT SR TDOWN within the next 12 h s and in COLD SHUTDOWN WI in the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

• ned to be within the limi

easurement in accordance

'th the Surveillance Frequency trol Program whe th j

SL USGS datum (95.0 feet PSIS datum), and



Measure nt at least once per 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> hen severe storm warnings f he National Weather Ser i which may impact Artificla. Island are in effect.

Measurement in Q{dance with the Surveillanc Frequency Control Program whe the water level is equal to or-above elevation 6.0 MSL datum (95.0 feet PSE&G atum).



HOPE CREEK 3/4 7-9 Amendment No. 187

Ha h S-13 33408 33378 6312 63238 5315A 5315C 4323A 4304 3301A 3058 3

58 332 33318 3209A Water tight door 1 Water tight door 3 ter tight door 6 Wat tight door 8 Exterior lnterior-1 02' HOPE CREEK Location 45; K 45.5; L 44;M 44; Md 45.4; T 45.4; u

.9; X 29, 13.6; 13.6; u 13.6; Md 13.6; L 25; H 27; H 35; H 6; H 3/4 7-10 Amendment No. 122 LAR H13-02 LR-N13-0155 Technical Specification Bases Page with Proposed Change The following Technical Specification Bases page for Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page B 3/4.7.3 B 3/4 7-1b

CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM (Continued) redundant subsystems that provide cooling and heating of recirculated control room air. Each subsystem consists of heating coils/

cooling coils1 fans1 one control room chilled water subsystem (which provides cooling water to the coo1ing coils ) 1 ductwork1 dampers/

and instrumentation and controls to provide for control room temperature control.

The Control Room AC System is designed to provide a controlled environment under both normal and accident conditions. Each control room chilled water subsystem includes a centrifugal water chiller1 a

chilled water circulating pump1 head tank1 controls1 piping1 and valves.

The Control Room AC System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils/

fans/

chillers1 compressors1 ductwork/

dampers1 and associated instrumentation and controls. Due to radioactive decay/

the Control Room AC System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e.1 fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

With one Control Room AC subsystem inoperable/

the inoperable Control Room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition/

the remaining OPERABLE Control Room AC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However1 the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day allowed outage time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation/

the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection1 and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

If both Control Room AC subsystems are inoperable/

the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function. Therefore/

the control room area temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained low enough that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected. With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit1 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to restore a Control Room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. This allowed outage time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits and the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION* If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 11 21 or 31 the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore1 inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to e ui e! reactor shutdown.

De\\eA*ec[?

he intent action for condi ions that a feet the wate the plant (have effect on tidal lev ls) and ha the potenti to impact the ation by flooding usceptible areas.

cond tions are tro ical storms or h ricanes.

The NWS oes not have

'severe storm arnings1 act ns are taken un r this LCO to prot ct against flooding wheneve the NWS decl res a "tropical torm warning11 or rricane warning11 fo Salem Cou ty.

HOPE CREEK B 3/4 7 -1b Amendment No. 191 (PSEG Issued)