ML13088A133
| ML13088A133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/2013 |
| From: | Mark King NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Capps S Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| IR-13-007 | |
| Download: ML13088A133 (33) | |
See also: IR 05000369/2013007
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
March 27. 2012
Mr. Steven D. Capps
Site Vice President
Duke Energy Corporation
McGuire Nuclear Station
MG01VP/12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Huntersville, NC 28078
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 & 05000370/2013007 AND
EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Capps:
On February 15, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report
documents the inspection results which were discussed on February 15, 2013, with you and
other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
The enclosed report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance
(Green) that was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating
this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide
a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-
001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC
Resident Inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station.
The enclosed report also documents one noncompliance for which the NRC is exercising
enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy,
Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48). The noncompliance
is associated with your implementation of the requirements and standards of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1,
1979. The non-compliance was identified by the licensee, and is a violation of
NRC requirements. The inspectors have screened the violation and determined that it
warranted enforcement discretion per the Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement
S. Capps
2
Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues, and Section 11.05(b) of Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 Operating Reactor Assessment Program..
You are not required to respond to this letter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's
"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be
available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the
Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS
is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael F. King, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-369 & 370
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000369/2013007
and 05000370/2013007 w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
cc: (See page 3)
_________________________
XG SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE G FORM 665 ATTACHED
OFFICE
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRP
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
NAME
JONES
BRAXTON
DYMEK
MONTGOMERY
BARTLEY
DATE
3/21/2013
3/20/2013
3/21/2013
3/20/2013
3/22/2013
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO
YES
NO YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO YES
NO
YES
NO
S. Capps
3
cc:
Charles J. Morris III
Plant Manager
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Jeffrey J. Nolin
Design Engineering Manager
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
H. Duncan Brewer
Organizational Effectiveness Manager
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Kenneth L. Ashe
Regulatory Compliance Manager
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Kay L. Crane
Senior Licensing Specialist
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Joseph Michael Frisco, Jr.
Vice President, Nuclear Design Engineering
General Office
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
M. Christopher Nolan
Director - Regulatory Affairs
General Office
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
David A. Cummings (acting)
Fleet Regulatory Compliance & Licensing
Manager
General Office
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Alicia Richardson
Licensing Administrative Assistant
General Office
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Lara S. Nichols
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
David A. Cummings
Associate General Counsel
General Office
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Beth J. Horsley
Wholesale Customer Relations
Duke Energy Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
David A. Repka
Winston Strawn LLP
Electronic Mail Distribution
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
William B. McGuire Nuclear Station
12700 Hagers Ferry Rd
Huntersville, NC 28078
County Manager of Mecklenburg County
720 East Fourth Street
Charlotte, NC 28202
W. Lee Cox, III
Section Chief
Radiation Protection Section
N.C. Department of Environmental
Commerce & Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Letter to Steven D. Capps from Michael F. King dated March 27, 2013.
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 & 05000370/2013007 AND
EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Distribution:
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-369 & 370
License Nos.:
Report Nos.:
05000369/2013007, 05000370/2013007
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Huntersville, NC 28078
Dates:
January 28 - February 1, 2013 (Week 1)
February 11 - 15, 2013 (Week 2)
Inspectors:
D. Jones, Senior Reactor Engineer (Lead Inspector)
P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector
J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector
J. Montgomery, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
Michael F. King, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000369/2013007 and 05000370/2013007; 01/28 - 02/01/2013 and 02/11 - 15/2013;
McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial).
This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection
team composed of four regional inspectors. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was
identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,
Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process,
(SDP) dated 06/02/11. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be
assigned a severity level after U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) management
review. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within The Cross-
Cutting Areas, dated 10/28/11. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuires Selected Licensing
Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensees inadequate
implementation of modifications that resulted in nonfunctional fire doors.
The licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-
01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire
areas of concern.
The licensees inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the
failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated
Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than
minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of
Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on
nine fire doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire
resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; Fire Protection
Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet the inspectors determined the
finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still
provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection A cross-cutting aspect was
not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee
performance. (Section 1R05.02)
B.
Licensee Identified Violations
None
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R05 Fire Protection
This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the McGuire
Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC
Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), issued October 28,
2011. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of four risk-
significant fire areas to verify implementation of the fire protection program (FPP) and to
verify site specific implementation of at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy as well as the
storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The four fire areas
(FAs) were selected after reviewing risk information analyzed by a Senior Reactor
Analyst from Region II, as well as previous inspection results, plant walk downs of fire
areas, relational characteristics of ignition sources to targets, and location of equipment
needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting the
B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety
evaluation reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous
NRC inspection reports. The IP specifies a minimum sample size of three fire areas and
one B.5.b implementing strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This
inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure. The specific FAs chosen for
review were:
1. FA 5, Unit 1 Train A Diesel Generator Room (Elevation 733.0)
2. FA 16-18, Unit 2 Train A Switchgear & Penetration Room (ETB) (Elevation
750.0)
3. FA 20, Unit 2 Cable Room (Elevation 750.0)
4. FA Turbine Building 1, 7KV Switchgear Room, (Elevation 760.0)
The team evaluated the licensees FPP against applicable requirements, including
McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection; Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G., J., L.
and O; 10 CFR 50.48; commitments to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP)
Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1; McGuire Units 1 and 2
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); related NRC safety evaluation reports
(SERs); Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC). The
review of the B.5.b mitigating strategies was based on the McGuire B.5.b submittal
letters, related NRC SERs, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and
previous NRC inspection reports. The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as
documented below, against these requirements. Specific licensing bases documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
4
Enclosure
.01
Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a.
Inspection Scope
For the selected FAs, the inspectors performed physical walk-downs to observe: (1) the
material condition of fire protection systems and equipment; (2) the storage of
permanent and transient combustibles; (3) the proximity of fire hazards to cables relied
upon for SSD; and (4) the licensees implementation of procedures and processes for
limiting fire hazards, housekeeping practices, and compensatory measures for
inoperable or degraded fire protection systems and credited fire barriers. The specific
documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Methodology
The team evaluated the potential for fires, the combustible fire load characteristics, and
the potential fire severity exposure for the selected FAs. The team reviewed Design
Basis Document (DBD) MCS-1465-00-00-0008; the UFSAR applicable SERs; and plant
administrative procedures that (1) established and implemented controls and practices to
prevent fires and (2) controlled ignition sources and the storage of permanent and
transient combustible materials. These evaluations were performed to ensure that the
objectives established by the NRC approved FPP were satisfied and to ensure that the
licensee had properly characterized in-situ combustible fire loads and limited transient
fire hazards in a manner consistent with the plant administrative and FPP procedures.
For each of the selected FAs the team reviewed the fire hazards analysis, SSD analyses
and supporting drawings and documentation to verify whether the shutdown
methodology had properly identified and protected the components necessary to achieve
and maintain SSD conditions for equipment in the FAs selected for review.
Operational Implementation
The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of abnormal and emergency procedures, to
verify that the shutdown methodology properly identified the systems and components
necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The inspectors performed a walk-
through of abnormal procedure steps to verify implementation and human factors
adequacy of the procedures. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel credited for
procedure implementation had procedures available, were trained on implementation,
and were available in the event a fire occurred. The inspectors also reviewed selected
operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the
specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified
limits.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
5
Enclosure
.02
Passive Fire Protection
a.
Inspection Scope
For the selected FAs, the inspectors verified the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings,
floors, mechanical and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers. The
inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs to observe material
condition of the passive barriers and to identify degradation or nonconformances. The
inspectors compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details
and supporting fire endurance test data to assure that the respective fire barriers met the
requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G and Appendix A to BTP APCSB
9.5-1. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensing bases documentation to verify that
passive fire protection features met license commitments. A sample of completed
surveillance and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, and
penetration seals were reviewed to ensure that these passive fire barriers were being
properly inspected and maintained. Specific barriers reviewed are listed in the
Attachment.
b.
Findings
Introduction: An NRC identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Nuclear
Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated
Assemblies, was identified for the licensees inadequate implementation of modifications
that resulted in nonfunctional fire doors.
Description: The team identified nine fire doors, associated with risk significant areas
such as the control room and battery rooms, that had been modified in the 1980s and
90s by the licensee. Seven of the fire doors (705B, 706B, 925B, 925C, 925D, 926, 928)
were modified with welded angle brackets to permanently prevent the doors from being
opened. The other two fire doors (PD5 and PD6) were modified by welding metal
brackets to the doors that supported an I beam that was used to provide an additional
security barrier. These modifications were performed in 1985 and 1995 under
modification packages MG-11709 and MGMM-6884. The doors were procured as three-
hour assemblies as required by the licensees commitment in SER Supplement 2, Part
2,Section IV.3.A, dated March 1, 1979, which states, in part, that fire doors of proper
fire rating have been provided.
All nine doors were labeled by Underwriters Laboratory (UL) meaning that the
manufacturer received certification of the doors through specified testing. Field
modifications beyond the scope of prescriptive allowances by the labeling agency or
manufacturer typically result in the decertification of the fire door. Metal plates and
brackets found welded to the outer skin of the doors and door frames could create
localized thermal stresses under actual fire conditions which would result in warping,
twisting or tearing of the doors as they attempt to expand. These failure mechanisms
would potentially allow the passage of excessive smoke and heat. The inspectors
determined that the licensees modification packages were inadequate because they (1)
lacked a detailed discussion on the effects of welding a fire rated assembly, and (2) did
not include an evaluation or concurrence from the manufacturer or UL. Additionally, the
team noted that NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 80, Fire Doors and Other
Opening Protectives required that when fire doors are no longer used for ingress and
egress, that the opening shall be filled with construction equivalent to that of a wall. This
6
Enclosure
requirement was based upon the fact that as long as a door is used for ingress and
egress, the storage of combustible materials in close proximity was not possible. Once
the door was permanently secured, combustible materials could be placed on either side
thus allowing a pathway for fires to communicate between fire zones. For these
reasons, the inspectors concluded that the licensee lacked reasonable assurance that
the three-hour ratings of the doors were maintained. The licensee entered the finding
into the corrective action program as PIP (Problem Identification Report) M-13-01454,
declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of
concern.
Analysis: The licensees inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that
resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment
16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance
deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events and adversely affected the
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the
welding modifications performed on nine fire doors adversely affected their capability to
provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609
Appendix F, Part 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors
determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire
doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection; and the
fixed fire ignition sources, and combustible or flammable materials, were positioned such
that the degraded fire doors would not have been subject to direct flame impingement.
A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not
reflect current licensee performance.
Enforcement: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition
2.C. (4), Fire Protection Program states in part that, Duke Energy shall implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in
the UFSAR for the facility and as approved in the NRC SER (NUREG-0422) and
associated supplements. SER Supplement 2, Part 2,Section IV.3.A dated March 1,
1979 stated, in part, that fire doors of proper fire rating have been provided. SLC
16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, states, in part, that fire doors in a fire rated assembly
shall be operable at all times. For an inoperable fire door, SLC 16.9.5 required, in part,
that (1) a continuous fire watch be established; or (2) verify fire detectors on at least one
side of the door and establish a fire watch patrol; or (3) complete an evaluation as
permitted by NRC RIS (Regulatory Issues Summary) 2005-07 to institute required
action(s).
Contrary to the above, since 1995, nine fire doors in rated fire assemblies were
inoperable and the licensee failed to implement the required actions described above.
Specifically, the doors are inoperable because the licensee performed welding
modifications that resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the fire doors
maintained their UL qualification. Because this finding is of very low safety significance
and because it was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-13-
01454, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 05000369 and 05000370/2013007-01, Modifications
Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors.
7
Enclosure
.03
Active Fire Suppression
a.
Inspection Scope
For the selected FAs, the inspectors performed in-plant observations to verify the
material condition and operational lineup of the fire water intake structure; the electric
motor driven fire pumps; the fire protection water supply distribution piping including
sprinklers, manual fire hose, and standpipe systems; and installed fire extinguishers.
The inspectors reviewed engineering drawings and specifications to verify that the as-
built configuration of fire suppression equipment was adequately maintained. Internal
standpipe and hose stations, and heat and smoke detection systems were reviewed
against specifications, drawings and engineering calculations to verify that the fire
detection and suppression methods were appropriate for the types of fire hazards that
existed in the FAs. The inspectors also verified that the suppression equipment met
applicable NFPA Standard(s). The inspectors reviewed completed surveillance testing
and maintenance procedures to verify that the equipment was adequately maintained.
The inspectors reviewed fire fighting pre-plans to verify that the strategies were
adequate. The inspectors observed the fire brigade staging and dress out areas to
assess the condition of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. In addition, the
inspectors verified the capabilities of the fire brigade by reviewing staffing, qualification
and training records. The Letters of Agreement with off-site emergency responders
were reviewed to verify the availability of additional resources to combat fires. Fire hose
stations and permanently installed fire extinguishers that were inspected are listed in the
attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.04
Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether manual water-based fire fighting activities or heat and
smoke migration from fires within the selected FAs could adversely affect equipment
credited for SSD, inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment, or adversely affect
local operator actions required for SSD. The inspectors reviewed McGuire Nuclear
Station evaluations addressing concerns identified in Information Notice 1998-31, Fire
Protection System Design Deficiencies and Common Mode Flooding of Emergency Core
Cooling System Rooms at Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2. Fire Strategies (pre-fire
plans); fire brigade training procedures; heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC)
drawings; and abnormal procedures for fires were also reviewed to verify that inter-area
migration of water or the ventilation of heat and smoke were addressed and would not
adversely affect SSD equipment or the performance of operator manual actions.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
8
Enclosure
.05
Alternative Shutdown Capability
a.
Inspection Scope
Methodology
The licensee credited an alternative shutdown capability for a postulated fire in FA 20
(Unit 2 Cable Room). The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 9.5.1, the McGuire FPP,
and corresponding abnormal procedures to ensure that appropriate controls provided
reasonable assurance that alternative shutdown equipment remained operable,
available, and accessible when required. In cases where local operator manual actions
(OMA) were credited in lieu of cable protection of SSD components, the inspectors
performed a walk-through of the procedures to verify that the OMAs were feasible. The
inspectors reviewed applicable process and instrumentation diagrams to gain an
understanding of credited equipments flow path and function. The inspectors reviewed
applicable licensee calculations to ensure the alternative shutdown methodology
properly identified systems and components to achieve and maintain safe-shutdown for
the FAs selected for review. Reviews also included verification that alternative shutdown
could be accomplished with or without offsite power.
The team reviewed procedures, work orders and completed surveillances to verify that
the alternative shutdown transfer capability was periodically tested. Additionally, the
team reviewed electrical schematics and one line diagrams to ensure that the transfer of
safe shutdown control functions to the alternate shutdown facility included sufficient
instrumentation to safely shutdown the reactor. This review also included verification that
shutdown from outside the MCR could be performed both with and without the
availability of offsite power.
Operational Implementation
The inspectors reviewed procedure AP-24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or
Sabotage, to verify the adequacy of this procedure to mitigate a fire in the Unit 2 Cable
Room. The inspectors reviewed selected training materials for licensed and non-
licensed operators to verify that training reinforced the shutdown methodology that is
utilized in the FPP and abnormal procedures for FA 20. The inspectors also reviewed
shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using
alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those
assigned as fire brigade members.
The inspectors performed a walk-through of procedure steps with operations personnel
to assess the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures and
shutdown strategy to evaluate the ambient conditions, difficulty and operator
familiarization associated with each OMA. The inspectors reviewed the systems and
components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would
remain free from fire damage. The inspectors reviewed selected operator actions to
verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions
within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
9
Enclosure
.06
Circuit Analyses
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees Appendix R design basis documentation, calculations,
drawings, wiring diagrams, and applicable McGuire circuit breaker coordination curves
for selected safe shutdown components to verify that fire damage to electrical circuits
associated with the post-fire safe shutdown capability would not adversely affect
achieving safe shutdown.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.07
Communications
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant
personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade
duties. The team verified that portable radios and fixed emergency communications
systems were available, adequate, and operable for the performance of the designated
activities. The team reviewed that the electrical power supplies and cable routing for the
wall mounted phone system would allow them to remain functional following a fire in the
selected fire areas. Additionally the team verified that a fire would not affect
communication equipment such as antennas, repeaters and transmitters.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.08
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed maintenance and design aspects of the fixed 8-hour battery
pack emergency lighting units (ELUs) required by the licensees approved FPP and 10
CFR 50 Appendix R,Section III.J. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns of the
post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs to observe the placement and coverage
area of the ELUs throughout the selected FAs. The inspectors also evaluated the
adequacy of the ELUs to illuminate access and egress pathways, and any equipment
requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. The
inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance procedures and completed surveillance
tests to verify that adequate surveillance testing was in place. Additionally, the
inspectors reviewed completed 8-hour discharge test records to verify the adequacy of
the licensees three year battery replacement schedule. The team validated that the
emergency lighting system was scoped into the licensees Maintenance Rule Program.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
10
Enclosure
09.
Cold Shutdown Repairs
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the McGuire FPP and abnormal procedures to verify that the
licensee identified repairs needed to reach and maintain cold shutdown and had
dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish these repairs after
a fire event, assuming no offsite power was available. The inspectors verified that the
fire damage repair procedures were current, adequate, and that repair parts and
equipment were being stored and maintained onsite. The inspectors viewed the
containers where cold shutdown fire damage repair equipment and tools were stored to
examine the material condition of the tools and equipment. The inspectors reviewed
licensee inventory records to verify that repair parts and equipment were maintained in
accordance with the applicable attachments in electrical preventive maintenance
procedures. The inspectors reviewed the inventory inspection work order records and
compared them to the equipment and tool lists to verify that all required replacement
parts and equipment were being accounted for and were available for use.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.10
Compensatory Measures
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded and/or
inoperable fire protection features (e.g. detection and suppression systems and passive
fire barriers) as well as hot work from cutting, welding and grinding activities. The
inspectors also reviewed the operator compensatory actions log (dated January 29,
2013) and the fire protection system impairment log (dated February 13, 2013) to identify
and verify the adequacy of FPP interim compensatory measures. The team observed
performance of a fire protection roving fire watch activity in the Unit 2 Cable Spreading
Room (FA 20) and Unit 2 Train A Switchgear Room & Penetration Room (FA 16-18) and
compared hourly watch sign-in sheets against badge access transaction reports for
credited access doors used for egress through the fire areas. Fire watch personnel were
interviewed for familiarity with job requirements.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.11
Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes
a.
Inspection scope
The inspectors reviewed six modifications associated with the FPP to verify that changes
were in accordance with the fire protection license condition and had no adverse affect
on the ability to achieve SSD.
11
Enclosure
b.
Findings
No findings were identified
.12
Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of numerous plant areas that were important to
reactor safety, including the selected FAs, to verify the licensees implementation of fire
protection requirements as described in procedures NSD 313, Control of Transient Fire
Loads; NSD 314, Hot Work Authorization and Portable Heater Control; and NSD 316,
Fire Protection Impairment and Surveillance. The inspectors verified that the licensee
had properly evaluated transient fire hazards, controlled hot-work activities, and
maintained general housekeeping consistent with administrative control procedures and
the fire hazards analysis. For the selected FAs, the inspectors evaluated the potential
for fires and explosions, and potential fire severity. There were no hot work activities
ongoing during the inspection so direct observations of hot work related activities could
not be performed.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.13
B.5.b Inspection Activities
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed procedures to verify the adequacy of procedural guidance for the
manual depressurization of the steam generators and use of portable pump strategy.
The team performed walkdowns to verify the feasibility of implementing the guidance
provided in the procedures; and to verify that the apparatus required by the procedure,
to include communication equipment, was adequately staged. The team reviewed
records to verify that personnel were appropriately trained; and to verify that appropriate
preventive maintenance was performed on a recurring bases. The team reviewed a
calculation to verify that the minimum required flow for the strategy was achievable.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed recent independent audits and evaluations to verify that the
licensee was performing appropriate assessments of the FPP. In addition, a sample of
fire protection nonconformances were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were identified,
12
Enclosure
entered into, and resolved by the licensees corrective action program. The problem
identification reports (PIP) were reviewed with regard to the adequacy of the evaluation,
appropriateness of the proposed corrective actions, and the timeliness of implementing
the corrective actions.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.01
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000369/2012-001-00: Appendix R Non-
Compliance Could Have Potentially Affected Cold Shutdown (EA-13-050)
a.
Inspection Scope
On May 17, 2012, the licensee submitted an LER documenting the identification of
circuits that, if impacted by fire, could result in damage of the steam generator (SG)
power operated relief valve (PORV) block valves. This potential cable damage could
also result in valve damage. This inadequacy could prevent operators from achieving
and maintaining cold shutdown (CSD) of the plant in the case of a postulated fire. The
inspectors performed a detailed review of the information related to the LER. The
inspectors reviewed documents, performed walk-downs, and discussed the LER with
plant personnel to gain an understanding of the operation of SG PORV block valves
during a postulated fire event. The inspectors assessed the licensees compensatory
measures and corrective actions to determine if they were adequate.
The following finding was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC
requirements. This finding has been screened and determined to warrant enforcement
discretion per the Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for
Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48).
b.
Findings
Introduction: A licensee-identified non-compliance with the Units 1 & 2 McGuire
Operating License Conditions 2.C.(4), Fire Protection Program, was identified for the
failure to provide fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage such that
systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown could be repaired within 72
hours. Specifically, the licensee discovered that a postulated fire could cause damage
to SG PORV block valves, and the valves would be unable to be repaired within 72
hours.
Description: During circuit analysis review in support of the NFPA 805 transition, the
licensee discovered that a fire in the Units 1 & 2 Train A Switchgear and Penetration
Rooms (FAs 15-17 and 16-18) could cause hot shorts that would result in the spurious
operation of the block valves for the SG PORVs. In addition to causing spurious valve
operation, these shorts could potentially bypass the valves limit/torque switches. These
switches provide the valves signal to stop, bypassing these switches would possibly
result in motor burnout, gear box damage, and internal valve damage. This failure
mechanism is discussed in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18, Potential for Loss of
Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire.
13
Enclosure
To achieve and maintain hot standby after a fire event, the SG PORVs or block valves
are required to remain closed to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the reactor coolant
system (RCS). The inspectors determined that the SG PORVs would be available and
able to perform their hot standby function for a fire in FAs 15-17 and 16-18.
For cold shutdown, operators modulate the SG PORVs to accomplish a controlled plant
cooldown. This evolution requires the block valves to be open. The hot shorts
described above could result in the inability to, remotely or locally, open the valves.
Because these valves are unisolable, they would not be repaired in a timely manner to
support requirements for achieving cold shutdown conditions during fire events.
The licensee determined that these conditions were caused by a latent Appendix R
design deficiency in the electrical circuits for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SG PORV block
valves. Upon discovery, the licensee implemented compensatory measures, in the form
of roving fire watches for the affected areas.
Analysis: Failure to provide features that are capable of limiting fire damage such that
systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, in
accordance with the NRC approved FPP, was a performance deficiency. This finding is
more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety mitigating system
cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e., fire), and affects the
cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems
that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the
guidance of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process
the inspectors determined that this finding was in the cold shutdown category. The
inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)
because the noncompliance only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold
shutdown conditions.
Because this issue relates to fire protection, and this non-compliance was identified
during the licensees transition to NFPA 805, this issue is being dispositioned in
accordance with Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues
(10 CFR 50.48) of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors determined that a
cross-cutting aspect was not applicable to this non-compliance and that it met the criteria
for enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy.
Enforcement: McGuire Operating License condition 2.C.(4) for Units 1 & 2, state, in part,
that Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of
the approved fire protection program as approved in the NRC SER (NUREG - 0422)
Supplement 5, dated April 1981. SER Supplement 5 stated, in part, that, in a letter
dated January 9, 1981, the licensee committed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 stated, in part, that
fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components
important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so
that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control
room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from initial plant operation through March 22, 2012, the licensee
failed to implement all provisions of the McGuire approved FPP in that features were not
14
Enclosure
provided that were capable of limiting fire damage such that systems necessary to
achieve and maintain cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Specifically, the
licensee discovered that since initial plant operation, for fires in FA 16-18 and 15-17,
circuits for the SG PORV block valves were not adequately protected, and as a result,
postulated spurious actuation of the valves could cause valve damage. These valves
would be unable to be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The licensee entered this finding into
the corrective action program (CR 12-02194) and the licensee has taken appropriate
compensatory measures.
Because the licensee committed to adopt NFPA 805 and change their fire protection
licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC is exercising enforcement and
reactor oversight process (ROP) discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC
Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection
Issues (10 CFR 50.48) and Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. Specifically, this issue
was identified and will be addressed during the licensees transition to NFPA 805, was
entered into the licensees corrective action program, immediate corrective action and
compensatory measures were taken, was not likely to have been previously identified by
routine licensee efforts, was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high
safety significance (i.e., Red). (EA-13-050)
4OA5 Other Activities
.01
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 2003-07-04: Requirements Relative to the Number of
Spurious Operations that Must be Postulated
a.
Inspection Scope
The 2003 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection documented an URI associated with the
licensees procedural guidance associated with mitigating a postulated main control
room fire (FA 24) that adversely affected a single pressurizer PORV and the associated
pressurizer PORV block valve.
Additionally, during the 2006 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection the URI was updated to
include concerns with a postulated fire in the motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW)
pump room (FA 2). The issue was associated with the spurious closure of the auxiliary
feedwater (AFW) air-operated control valves (1CA36AB and 1CA64AB) during a
postulated fire event that would isolate the flow path to the D and A steam generators
(SG).
The team performed an in-office and on-site review of NRC inspection reports
(05000369 & 370/2003007 and 05000369 & 3702006/008), applicable regulatory
requirements, fire protection licensing documents, design bases documents, drawings,
operating procedures, and NFPA- 805 transition documentation. Additionally, the NRC
regional inspectors interviewed numerous licensee personnel to determine if a more
than minor performance deficiency existed for the URI.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
15
Enclosure
URI 2003-07 is closed based on the following discussions:
In 2003, the NRC opened URI 2003-007-04 that documented an issue for a postulated
fire in the main control room (FA 24) that could result in the spurious opening of a single
pressurizer PORV (2NC34A) and its associated isolation valve (2NC33A). The spurious
opening of both valves would result in a breach of the RCS pressure boundary with the
possibility of pressurizer level going outside of the indicating range. For this fire
scenario, procedures directed operators to close the pressurizer PORV isolation valve
within 10 minutes. The NRCs concern was that the licensees procedures provided no
follow-up actions, such as de-energizing the PORV isolation valve, to ensure that it
would not spuriously reopen. The 2013 inspection team determined that, for a control
room fire, procedure AP-45, Plant Fire provided appropriate instructions to isolate all of
the PORVs by closing the associated block valves within 10 minutes. Procedure AP 45
directed the performance of procedure AP-24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or
Sabotage which directed electrical realignments that closed all of the pressurizer
PORVs, and aligned control to the Standby Shutdown Facility. The team determined
that the proceduralized actions were consistent with the licensees fire protection
requirements and commitments. Additionally, the team noted that the licensees
proceduralized actions were consistent with current regulatory guidance. Specifically,
Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Section 5.4.1, which
states, in part, The licensee should consider one spurious actuation or signal to occur
before control of the plant is achieved through the alternative or dedicated shutdown
system for fires in areas that require alternative or dedicated shutdown.
In 2006, the triennial fire protection inspection team updated URI 2003-007-04 by
documenting an issue for a postulated fire in the Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater
pump room (FA 2). The report discussed multiple fire-induced cable short circuits that
could adversely affect AFW air-operated valves (1CA-36AB or 1CA-64AB). The
inspectors concern was that two simultaneous proper polarity direct current short
circuits could cause either valve to close, thus isolating AFW flow from the turbine driven
AFW pump to either the D or A SG. The 2013 inspection team determined that fire
damage to the cables would cause a loss of power to the associated solenoid valves.
This loss of power would result in valves 1CA-36AB or 1CA-64AB failing to an open
position which is the required position. Therefore, a fire-induced short on the affected
cables will not adversely impact SSD.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On February 15, 2012, the inspection team leader presented the preliminary inspection
results to Mr. S. Capps and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee
acknowledged the results. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was
retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
J. Bryant, Regulatory Affairs Lead
G. Carpenter, Fire Protection Engineer
D. Houser, Emergency lighting Engineer
J. Lukowski, Appendix R/NFPA 805 Engineer
S. Manning, B.5.b Supervisor
D. Miller, Fire Suppression Engineer
N. Sayles, Communications
P. Thompson, Operations
B. Weaver, PRA Engineer
NRC personnel
M. King, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire Nuclear Station
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000369&370/2013007-01
Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire
Doors (Section 1R05.02)
Closed
05000369/2012-001-00
LER
Appendix R Non-Compliance Could Have
Potentially Affected Cold Shutdown
Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire
Doors (Section 4OA3.01)
05000370/2003-07-04
Requirements Relative to the Number of
Spurious Operations that Must be Postulated
(Section 4OA5.01)
Discussed
None
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED
(Refer Report Section 1R05.02 and 1R05.03)
Fire Damper Identification
Description
1-733-42.2-5
FA 9-11 to
Fire Door Identification
Description
701C
FA 9-11 to Stairwell
705B (Welded)
FA 13 to Battery Room
716B (Welded)
FA 13 to Battery Room
801B
FA 20 to Stairwell
801J
804
925B (Welded)
FA 24 to Stairwell
925C (Welded)
FA 24 to Stairwell
925D (Welded)
926 (Welded)
928 (Welded)
PD5 (Welded)
PD6 (Welded)
1XCDDFRA (Roll-Up)
Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Identification
Description
1-733-410.2
FA 9-11 to 2A
1-750-158.0-2
2-750-131.0-1
1-736-5.1-9
1-736-5.2-2
1-736-8.1-1
Wall, Ceiling, Floor Identifications
Description
Unit 1 Diesel Generator Rooms 1A & 1B
FA 5
1ETB/733 Electrical Penetration Room
FA 9-11
2ETA/750 Electrical Penetration Room
FA 16-18
Service Building Cable Spreading Room
FA 20
Unit 1 Turbine Building Switchgear Room
Fire Extinguishers Inspected
Description
9069
FA 5
9071
FA 5
9072
FA 5
9075
FA 5
9412
FA 9-11
9414
FA 9-11
9415
FA 9-11
9826
FA 9-11
9440
FA 16-18
9441
FA 16-18
9842
FA 16-18
3
Attachment
9843
FA 16-18
9845
FA 16-18
9438
FA 20
9439
FA 20
Fire Hose Stations Inspected
Description
1RF 891
FA 5
1RF 892
FA 5
1RF 893
FA 5
1RF 894
FA 5
1RF 889
FA 9-11
1RF 890
FA 9-11
1RF 895
FA 9-11
1RF 967
FA 16-18
1RF 968
FA 16-18
1RF 969
FA 16-18
1RF 970
FA 16-18
1RF 971
FA 20
1RF 972
FA 20
LIST OF COMPONENTS REVIEWED
(Refer to Report Sections 1RO5.05- and 1RO5-.06)
Components Sampled
2NV VA0842AC, Standby Makeup Pump Suction Isolation
2NV VA0849AC, Standby Makeup Pump Containment Outside Isolation
2CA PU0002, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B
2ETB Switchgear
2EVDD 125Vdc
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Audits and Self Assessment Reports
10-22, Audit- McGuire Triennial Fire Protection Program
10-13, Audit McGuire Triennial Fire Protection Program 12-013, Audit - McGuire Fire Protection
NRC Triennial 2013 Assessment
2011 MNS Fire Brigade Health Report
Cable Wiring Diagrams
Cable Block Diagram for 2CA PU0002
Cable Block Diagram for 2NV VA0842AC
Cable Block Diagram for 2NV VA0849AC
Cable Block Diagram for Radio Equipment
Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA0064AB
Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA0036AB
Cable Block Diagram for 1CA VA0064AB
Cable Block Diagram for 1CA VA0036AB
Cable Block Diagram for 1CA VA 0162C
Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA 0162C
Cable Block Diagram for 1CA VA 0161C
Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA 0161C
CALCULATIONS
MCC-1205.06-00-0046, Rim Pull Requirements for Time Critical Valves, Rev. 4
MCC-1223.20-00-0016, B.5.b Portable Pump Requirements, Rev. 3
MCC 1381.05-00-0335, Appendix R Coordination Study, Rev 1
MCC-1435.00.00-0059, NFPA 805-App R Safe Shutdown Deterministic Analysis, Rev. 2
MCC-1435.00-00-0022, Fire Prot. Manual Action Feasibility and Reliability Demonstration,
Rev. 0
MCC-1435.00-00-0023, NFPA 805 Transition Expert Panel Report for Addressing Potential
McGuire Multiple Spurious Operations, Rev. 1
MCC 1435.00-00-0027, NFPA Transition Licensing Action Review
MCC-1435.00-00-0059-00, NFPA 805 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Deterministic Analysis
MCC-1435.03-00-0013, Fire Protection Code Deviations, 8/29/2012
MCC-1435.00-00-0026, NFPA-805 Transition Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations,
11/23/2010
MCC-1435.00-00-0027, NFPA 805 Transition Licensing Action Review, 8/31/2010
MCC-1435.00-00-0031, NFPA 12A Code Conformance Review, Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed
Pump Room, 5/25/2010
MCC-1435.00-00-0033, NFPA 20 Code Conformance Review, 5/25/2010
MCS-1435.00-00-0003, Design Specification for Mechanical and Electrical Penetration Fire
Flood and Pressure Seals, Rev.6
MCC-1535.00-00-0115, Risk Evaluation of McGuire Fire Issues
MCC-1535.00-00-0160, Fire PRA Evaluation of Steam Generator PORV Block Cables in Fire
Areas 16-18 and 15-17, Rev. 0
MCS-1184.00-1 Specification for McGuire 1-2 Rolling Doors, 6/29/1972
MCS-1465.00-00-0008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 13
MCS-1465.00-00.0008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 14
MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Design Basis Specification for the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Rev. 13
5
Attachment
MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Design Basis Specification for the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Rev. 14
EDM-101, Engineering Calculations/Analyses, Rev. 17
EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev. 19
Completed Procedures/ Surveillances/ Work Orders
WO 01784420-01, PM 1ECPPARX1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 RX PA System, dated 10/18/08
WO 01956849-01, PM 1ECPPARX1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 RX PA System, dated 9/28/11
WO 01909654-01, PM 1ECPPAUnit 1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 PA System, dated 12/1/10
WO 01813353-01, PM 1ECPPAUnit 1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 PA System, dated 2/25/09
WO 01840421-01, PM 2ECPPARX2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 RX PA System, dated 10/11/09
WO 01924533-01, PM 2ECPPARX2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 RX PA System, dated 10/30/12
WO 01909654-01, PM 2ECPPAUnit 2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 PA System, dated 2/2/11
WO 01909654-01, PM 2ECPPAUnit 2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 PA System, dated 7/1/09
WO 01080119, Fire Hose and Fire Hydrant Inspection, February 08, 2013
WO 02051614, Roll-up Fire Door Test, January 28, 2013
WO 02076651, Test Fire Zone 37H and 50H, January 28, 2013
WO 02076651, Test Fire Zone 70H, January 29, 2013
WO 01960534-02, SSS Emergency lighting Battery Discharge Test, dated 6/30/11
WO 02052333-01, PT 2ELDLPXXX1: Test Emergency Lighting Unit 2, dated 1/22/13
WO 01981680-01, PT 2ELDLPXXX1: Test Emergency Lighting Unit 2, dated 10/17/11
WO 01882848-01, PT 2ELDLPXXX1: Test Emergency Lighting Unit 2, dated 1/20/10
WO 01760001-25, MD100745 Addition of Emergency Lighting (Batts 35-48) dated 3/3/08
WO 01859190-01, PT 1ELDLPXXX1: Emergency Lighting Unit 1 & SSF, dated 8/27/09
WO 02032676-01, PM 2CF-151 Lube Stem, dated 10/12/12
WO 02032677-01, PM 2CF-153 Lube Stem, dated 10/8/12
WO 02016208-01, SG Tempering Flow Check Valve Testing, dated 9/15/12
PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, dated 12/13/12
PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, dated 1/12/13
PT/1/A/4200/041, Unit 1 SSF System Integrated Test, dated 4/11/07
PT/2/A/4200/041, Unit 2 SSF System Integrated Test, dated 8/25/06
PT/1/A/4200/041, Unit 1 SSF System Integrated Test, dated 6/22/98
PT/0/A/4400/010 A, Main Fire Pump A, 4/16/2012
PT/0/A/4600/112, Exterior/Interior Fire Equipment Inspection, 1/04/2013
PT/0/A/4400/022, Godwin Portable Pump Quarterly, dated 12/14/12
PT/0/A/4600/112, Exterior/Interior Fire Equipment Inspection, dated 1/07/13
Design Basis Documents
MCS-1223.SS-00-001, Design Basis Specification for the Standby Shutdown System, Rev. 29
MCS-0115.00-EPC-0001, Design Basis Spec. for the 4.16KV Essential Auxiliary Power, Rev. 13
MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Design Basis Spec. for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 13
MCS-1465.00-00-008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 14
DRAWINGS
MCCD-1702-02.00, One Line Diagram 4160V Essential Auxiliary Power System, Rev. 13
MCCE-215-00.24, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6, Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Motor #2B - Part 1, Rev. 13
MCCE-215-00.24-01, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6 , Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 3, Rev. 7
6
Attachment
MCCE-215-00.24-03, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6 , Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 4, Rev. 1
MCCE-215-00.24-02, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6 , Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 2, Rev. 5
MCEE-212-00.29-01, Elementary Diagram Standby Shutdown Facility Transfer Scheme, Rev. 5
MC-1315-01.04-100, Diesel Generator Building Unit 1- Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries
General Arrangement, Elevation 736+6, Rev. 7
MC-1315-01.04-101, Diesel Generator Building Unit 1- Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries
General Arrangement, Elevation 736+6, Rev. 0
MC-1203-02.0A, Diesel Generator Building Unit 1- General Arrangement Floor Plan, Elevation
764+8, Rev. 29
MC-1204-4-A, Auxiliary Building Unit 1 & 2 Gen. Arrangement, Floor Elevation 750+0, Rev. 23
MC-1204-5-A, Auxiliary Building Unit 1 & 2 General Arrangement, Switchgear Room Plans,
Floor Elevation 750+0 , Rev. 22
MC-1315-01.05-005, Auxiliary Building - Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries General
Arrangement, Switchgear Room Plans, Elevation 750+0, Rev. 2
MC-1315-01.05-105, Auxiliary Building Unit 2- Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries General
Arrangement, Elevation 750+0, Rev. 1
MCEE-0147-32.00, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), DC Motor Operated
Valve 1CA0161C, Rev. 4
MC-1831-01.01, Communications Plant Telephone & Intercom System, Rev. 0
MC-1831-02.01, Communications Telephone & PA Systems Telephone Directory, Rev. 0
MC-1908-07.00, Electrical Equipment Layout Auxiliary Building Mounting Details, Rev. 8
MC-1888-01.00, Auxiliary Building Unit 1 Station Grounding Plan, Elevation 767 +0, Rev. 55
MC-1831-11.00, Communications PA & Telephone Systems Roof Plan, Rev. 15
MC-1831-07.00, Communications- PA & Telephone Systems Auxiliary Building Elevation
733+0, Reactor Building Elevation 738+ 3, Turbine Building Elevation 739+0, Rev. 34
MC-1831-01.00, Comm. Plant Telephone & Intercom Systems Details & Sections, Rev. 13
MC-1831-09.00, Communications PA & telephone Systems Auxiliary Building Elevation 733+0
& 767 + 0, Reactor Building Elevation 767+0, Turbine Building Elevation 760+6, Rev. 63
MC-1705-02.00, One Line Diagram 125VDC-240/120VAC Auxiliary Control Power, Rev. 141
MCFD-1554-01.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 9
MCFD-1554-01.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 10
MCFD-1554-01.02, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 12
MCFD-1554-01.03, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 3
MCFD-1554-02.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 17
MCFD-1554-02.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 6
MCFD-1554-03.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 16
MCFD-1554-03.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 23
MCFD-1554-04.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 9
MCFD-1554-05.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 20
MCFD-1574-01.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 20
MCFD-1574-01.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 27
MCFD-1574-02.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 29
MCFD-1574-02.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 10
MCFD-1574-03.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 32
MCFD-1574-03.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 10
MCFD-1574-04.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 17
MCFD-1574-05.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 4
MCFD-1592-01.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 7
MCFD-1592-01.01, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 24
MCFD-1592-01.02, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 8
7
Attachment
MCFD-1592-02.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 5
MCFD-1593-01.00, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 19
MCFD-1593-01.01, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 18
MCFD-1593-01.03, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 17
MCFD-2554-01.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 10
MCFD-2554-01.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 10
MCFD-2554-01.02, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 11
MCFD-2554-01.03, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 3
MCFD-2554-02.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 19
MCFD-2554-02.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 6
MCFD-2554-03.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 17
MCFD-2554-03.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 25
MCFD-2554-04.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 6
MCFD-2554-05.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 11
MCFD-2574-01.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 30
MCFD-2574-02.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 26
MCFD-2574-02.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 10
MCFD-2574-03.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 17
MCFD-2574-03.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 9
MCFD-2574-04.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 27
MCFD-2574-05.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 5
MCFD-2592-01.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 10
MCFD-2592-01.01, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 22
MCFD-2592-02.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 4
MCFD-2593-01.00, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 18
MCFD-2593-01.01, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 21
MCFD-2593-01.03, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 17
MCCD-1703-06.10, One Line Diagram 600 VAC Essential Motor Control Center 1EMXH1,
Rev. 3
MCCD-2700-00.00, Unit 2 Configuration One Line Diagram Unit Essential Power System,
Rev. 5
MC-1705-01.00, One Line Diagram 125 VDC/120 VAC Vital Instrument & Control Pwr. Sys.,
Rev. 100
MCCD-1700-00.00, One Line Diagram, Unit One Configuration Essential Power System,
Rev. 5
MCEE-0147-11.00, Elementary Diagram Aux. Feedwater System AFWP 1B Isolation Valve
1CA0042B, Rev. 2
MCEE-270-05.16, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2D
Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV25, Rev. 1
MCEE-270-05.15, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2C
Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV26, Rev. 1
MCEE-270-05.13, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2A
Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV27, Rev. 1
MCEE-270-05.14, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2B
Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV28, Rev. 2
MCID-1499-CA.08, Instrument Detail T.D. Aux. FWP Disch. To Steam Gen. Valve Control,
Rev. 2
8
Attachment
MC-1384-07.14-01, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 733.0 and 736.0, Rev.13
MC-1384-07.14-02, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 733.0 and 736.0, Rev.14
MC-1384-07.15-01, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 750.0, Rev.14
MC-1384-07.15-02, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 750.0, Rev.13
MC-1418-06.43-01, Piping Layout System RF Plan Elevation 750.0, Rev.10
MC-1762-01.00-03, Location Diagram Fire Detector System Elevation 733 and 739, Rev. 15
MC-1762-01.00-03, Location Diagram Fire Detector System Elevation 750 Rev. 15
MCFD-1599-01.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 17
MCFD-1599-01.01, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 17
MCFD-1599-02.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 23
MCFD-1599-02.01, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 11
MCFD-1599-02.02, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 11
MCFD-1599-02.03, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 7
MCFD-1599-03.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 11
MCFD-1599-03.01, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 6
MCFD-1599-04.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 3
MCFD-1599-05.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 1
MCFD-2599-04.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 2
MCFD-1591-01.00, Flow Diagram of Feedwater System, Rev. 4
MCFD-1591-01.01, Flow Diagram of Feedwater System, Rev. 22
Engineering Changes (EC)
104730, OWST Project Piping/Pumps/Valves & Controls Replacement, 8/26/2011
103857, Install Anti-Hammer Circuit for Valve 1NV842AC, 4/10/2012
103930, Change Activator on 2NV-142B, 10/10/2012
98743, Disable Auto-Open Function 1CA161C, 10/12/2011
103255, Fire Alarm Control Panel Installation, 2/22/2012
95850, Edwards System Technology Fire Detection Installation, 9/21/2011
103857, Install an Anti-Hammer Circuit for Valve 1NV 842AC
98743, MD-101869 - DISABL Auto Open Function 1CA-161C / 1CA-162C Mod
103930, Change Actuator on 2NV-142B from NA2 to NA1E
104730, OWTS Project Piping/Pumps/Valves and Controls Replacement
Fire Protection Pre-Plans and Fire Drill Critiques
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, C shift, 1/29/2011
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, D shift, 2/10/2011
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, A shift, 2/15/2011
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, B shift, 4/11/2011
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, E shift, 8/17/2011
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, B shift, 7/28/2012
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, C shift, 8/12/2012
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, A shift, 8/31/2012
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, D shift, 11/07/2012
PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, E shift, 12/26/2012
MFDS-005.006, Unit 1 DG Rooms, Rev. 0
MFDS-009.011, 1ETB / 733 Elec. Pen. Room, Rev. 0
MFDS-016.018, 2ETA / 750 Elec. Pen. Room, Rev. 0
MFDS-019.020, Unit 2 750 Aux. Cable Room 801C, Rev. 0
McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Aux. Diesel Generator 1A, Rev. 0
McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Unit 1 733 Electrical Penetration Room, Rev. 0
McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Unit 2 750 Electrical Penetration Room, Rev. 0
9
Attachment
McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Unit 2 Aux Cable Room 801C, Rev.1
Procedures
AP/2/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Enclosure 30, Rev. 30
AP/2/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Enclosure 30-Shifting 2ETB Power from Alternate
(SATB) to Normal (2ATD), Rev. 30
AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Rev. 31
AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, Rev. 11
AP/2/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, Rev. 12
AP/1/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev.24
AP/1/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev.29
AP/2/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev. 30
AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire, Rev. 5
AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire, Rev. 13
AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire, Rev. 14
IP/0/A/3090/023, Fire Damage Control, Rev. 4E
OP/O/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, Rev. 54
OP/2/A/6350/005, AC Electrical Operation other Than Normal Lineup, Rev. 36
OP/0/A/6350/008, Operation of Station Breakers, Rev. 67
OP/0/A/6100/020, Operational Guidelines Following a Fire in Auxiliary Building or Vital Area,
Rev. 27
OP/0/A/6100/21, Shutdown Outside the Control room following a Fire, Rev. 19
PT/0/B/4350/022, Periodic Inspection of Plant PA System, Rev. 7
PT/1/A/4200/041, Unit 2 SSF System Integration Test, Rev. 4
PT/2/A/4200/041, Unit 2 SSF System Integration Test, Rev. 4
RP/0/A/5700/025, Fire Brigade Response, Rev. 19
RP/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, Rev. 05
EDM-101, Engineering Calculations/Analysis, Rev.17
EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev.19
MP/0/A/7650/122, Inspection of Fire Hose Stations and Hydrant Houses, Rev.10
NGD-FB-05, Initial Fire Brigade Training: Fire Hose, Nozzles, Appliances and Streams, 7/3/06
NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training and Responsibilities, 9/11/12
NSD 301, Nuclear Station Modifications, 9/30/97
NSD 313, Control of Transient Fire Loads for McGuire, 12/31/12
NSD 314, Hot Work Authorization and Portable Heater Control for McGuire, 12/31/12
NSD 316, Fire Protection Impairment and Surveillance for McGuire, 12/31/12
NDS 320, Fire Protection Program Change Review Form, 11/15/2011
OP/1/A/6400/002A, Fire Protection System, Rev. 139
OP/0/A/6400/002B, Halon Fire Protection System, Rev. 17
OP/0/A/6400/002C, Fire Detection System, Rev. 60
OP/0/A/4600/016B, Halon Fire Detectors Monthly Test, Rev. 20
OP-MC-JPM-SSRFY:019, Manually Initiate Diesel Generator Halon, Rev.13/01-09-02
PT/0/A/4250/004, Fire Barrier Inspection, Rev. 33
PT/0/A/4600/032D, Fire Detection System Operational Tests for Aux. Bldg 733 and 750, Rev.3
PT/0/A/4600/112, Exterior/Interior Fire Equipment Inspection, Rev. 8
PT/0/A/4700/043, SLC Fire Hose Station Valve Operability Test, Rev.5
PT/0/A/4700/049, SLC Fire Hose Inspection, Rev.4
PT/0/B/4600/118, Fire Brigade Qualification Verification, Rev.3
PT/1/A/4400/001N, Halon 1301 System Periodic Test, Rev. 38
PT/0/A/4400/017, Fire Pump A & B Operability Test, Rev. 21
PT/0/A/4400/017, Fire Pump C Operability Test, Rev.17
10
Attachment
PT/0/4600/127, B.5.b Equipment Inventory, Rev. 0
Evaluations by Station Management in the TSC, Volume 2, Book 2 of 3, Rev. 1
Miscellaneous Documents
AR3010, Organization Chart and Access Report, 1/29/2013
Aurora Pump Factory Acceptance Test for Pump D36271A, 6/26/1973
Aurora Pump Factory Acceptance Test for Pump D36271B, 6/26/1973
Aurora Pump Factory Acceptance Test for Pump D36271C, 6/26/1973
Badge Access Transaction Report for Roving Fire Watch 287547, 2/13/2013
Badge Access Transaction Report for Roving Fire Watch 325000, 2/13/2013
ETQS2400.0 Attachment 6.6, Training ILT Class Attendance Sheet, 12/22/2012
Fire Protection System Impairment Log, 2/13/2013
Kinnear AKBAR Rolling Fire Door Model FH-A Service Manual
Letter of Agreement between Duke Energy Company and Cornelius VFD, 4/13/2010
Letter of Agreement between Duke Energy Company and Huntersville FD, 7/28/2010
MG-11709, Nuclear Station Modification Safety Evaluation for Fire Door Modification, 5/13/1985
MGMM-6884, Screening Form for 10CFR50.59 for Fire Door Modification, 4/10/1995
NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000369/2009007 and 05000370/2009007,
June 25, 2009
NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000369/2006008 and 05000370/2006008,
January 29, 2007
NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 50-369/03-07 and 50-370/03-07, July 03, 2003
OBED 05-039881, Internal Flooding/Spray Down Event of Safety Related Equipment, 8/11/2005
Penetration Seal Data Sheet for Penetration Seal Number 750-158.0-2, 8/23/1999
Purchase Order A27426, Duke Power Company and W. Fred Casey & Co for Furnish and
Delivery of Rolling Doors, 9/27/1972
Summary Report, Three Hour Qualification of Whittaker Electronics Resources Appendix R and
SI 2400 Silicone Dioxide Insulated Fire Cable, December 1994
Summary Test Report for Appendix R Fire Test, ER 98-033, October 29, 1998
ST2122, Multiple Assigned Job Status Report, 1/29/2013
Underwriters Laboratory Online Certifications Directory, VUFZ.EX1394, 10/31/1996
Underwriters Laboratory Fire Door Certificate C28916, September 11, 1973
Underwriters Laboratory Standard 10B, Fire Test of Door Assemblies
Engineering Support Document, Emergency Communications System, Rev. 1A
IMP-MC-2012-00946, Fire Hemyc Wrap, Cable not Meeting the 1-Hour Fire Resistance Criteria
Impairment and Compensatory Measures Form [Selected Fire Areas], dated 01/13/13
NFPA 12A- 1977, Standard on Halon 1301 Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 13-1978, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 14-1976 Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems
NFPA 15-1977, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection
NFPA 20-1978, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps
NFPA 24-1977, Standard for the Installation of Private Service Mains and their Appurtenances
NFPA 72E-1974, Standard on Automatic Fire Detection
NFPA 80-1977, Fire Doors and Windows
NFPA 80-2007, Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
NFPA 80-2013, Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
Technical Manuals and Vendor Information
Data Sheet Motorola Digital Two- Way Portable Radios-Mototrbo XPR 6550/XPR 6350, dated
1/11
Data Sheet Clear Command Helmet Communication System-dated 3/07
11
Attachment
Data Sheet Motorola Digital Two- Way Portable Radios-Mototrbo XPR 4550/XPR 4580, dated
1/11
Data Sheet C & D Technologies Tel Series Valve Regulated Lead Acid Battery, dated 04/12
Licensing Documents
Selected Licensing Commitment, 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System
NUREG-0422, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2, March 1978
NUREG-0422, Supplement 2, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire
Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, March 1979NUREG-0422, Supplement 3, Safety Evaluation
Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, May 1980
NUREG-0422, Supplement 4, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire
Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, January 1981
NUREG-0422, Supplement 5 with Corrections, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the
Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, November 1993
NUREG-0422, Supplement 6, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire
Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, February 1983
Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7- Standby Shutdown System
Letter dated January 5, 1983 regarding responses to several concerns in the draft Safety
Evaluation Report for the McGuire Standby Shutdown System
Letter dated September 10, 1984 regarding the Standby Shutdown System at McGuire and
Catawba Nuclear Station
Letter dated December 14, 1982 regarding the McGuire Standby Shutdown System
Letter dated August 2, 1984 regarding Fire Protection for Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment
Letter dated September 12, 1984 regarding meeting at Region II office to discuss the Standby
Shutdown Facility for McGuire Units 1 and 2, Catawba Unit 1 and Oconee SSF
Letter dated May 15, 1989 regarding Fire Protection Deviations for McGuire Unit 1 and 2
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Request for Deviation from Fire Protection Program
Incorporating Requirements of Appendix R to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, January 13, 2003
NRC Letter dated April 16, 1984 regarding Issuance of Amendment No. 31
LIST OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS (PIP) REVIEWED DURING INSPECTION
M-09-05990, Documentation of Noncompliances with the Appendix R Program Identified as Part
of the Reconstitution Project
M-03-02311, Evaluate May 2003 Fire Protection Inspection Items
M-06-04539, NRC Response (September 26, 2006) to McGuire Letter of Intent to Adopt
10CFR50, Section 50.48 (c)
M-12-01086, Swap of 1EMXH-1 to Alternate (SSF) Power Source, along with Associated SSF
Controls, is not Periodically Tested
M-09-05990, Documentation of Noncompliances with the Appendix R Program Identified as Part
of the Reconstitution Project
M-02-01708, It has Been Discovered that Pressurizer Ambient Heat Losses are Greater than
Calculated in OSC-3144, Impacting SSF ASW System Operability (T.S. 3.10.1) and T.S.
3.4.9 (Pressurizer)
M-05-04859, CNS PIP M-05-6055 on Appendix R Manual Action Rule NRC Public Meeting
M-12-01020, Review Noncompliances Identified as a Result of the Appendix R Reconstitution
and NFPA-805 Transition Work for Reportability
M-12-02194, Evaluation Identified an Appendix R Noncompliance which has the Potential to
Adversely Affect the Ability to Achieve and Maintain a Cold Shutdown on Unit 2
M-02-03265, Columbia Generating Station Water Spill Event
12
Attachment
M-06-04727, Fire Nozzle 1RF841 is not Rated for Use on Electrical Fires
M-10-02460, Manual Halon System Release Located Within Fire Hazard Area
M-10-04408, Portable Fire Extinguisher Code Deviations
M-10-04416, TDAFW Pump Room Halon System Code Deviations
M-10-04632, Fire Service Main and Appurtenances Code Deviations
M-10-07639, Unit 2 CSR Water Based Suppression Adverse Effects
M-12-01098, NDS 313-1, Transient Fire Load Approval Forms are not Retained
M-12-02351, Duct Fire Detector Test Sampling Methodology to Include DP
M-1208218, Concrete Hatch Plugs are a Degraded Fire BarrierM-13-00011, Shift Fire Brigade
Member not Recorded in LMS
M-12-01086, Swap of 1EMXH-1 to Alternate Power Source
M-12-04539, Issues Noted During Annual #1 and #2 Hale Pump Testing
M-13-00880, PIP Evaluate Failed Emergency Lights for Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
List of PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS (PIP) Generated as a Result of this
Inspection
M-13-00359, Relay House Fire protection Power light was not Illuminated
M-13-00909, Penetration Seal 2-750-131.0-1, 0.25 Gap in Cable Spreading Room Floor
M-13-00912, Evaluate 1ETB SWGR Room MI Cable (two) with Tape as not Impacting 3 Hour
Rating
M-13-00950, Task for Radio Battery Swaps was Removed from the Operations WCC Routine
Task List
M-13-00951, Discrepancy in the Nomenclature used on the Radios used at the Plant
M-13-00980, Evaluate Maint. Rule Functional Failure Criteria for Emergency Lighting
M-13-00925, MCC-1223.20-00.0016 Contains the Computer Model Output Data but does not
Contain the Computer Model Input Data
M-13-01021, Fire Strategy for 1A D/G Requires More Detail for Manual Halon Actuation
M-13-00124, Incomplete Documentation of Fire Brigade Members for July 4, 2010 Day Shift
M-13-01154, Electrically Rated Fire Hose Nozzle are Required to be provided at Locations
where Electrical Equipment or Cabling is Located
M-13-01407, Inspection of Repair Kits Identified Electrical Tape was out of Date
M-13-00414, WO 02032676 was Closed without Performing Functional
M-13-00415, WO 02032678 was Closed without Performing Required Scope as Directed
M-13-00416, WO 02032679 was Closed without Performing Required Scope as Directed
M-13-00451, App. R DBD Says Wiring and Cabling used for Repairs must be Pre-fitted with
Lugs
M-13-01454, Fire Doors Modified Without Proper Evaluations
M-13-01510, Fire Pre-plan Backlog Observations
M-13-01511, Fire Evaluation Screening Form Might Need to be Improved
M-13-01513, Evaluate if MRFF Criteria for Particular Systems/Components are Adequate to
Detect Adverse Trends
M-13-01514, App R Related conclusions and Basis is not Contained in a Controlled Document
13
Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
APCSB
Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch
Action Request
Branch Technical Position
Corrective Action Program
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Direct Current
DSP
Dedicated Shutdown Procedure
ELS
Emergency Lighting System
Fire Area
Fire Hazards Analysis
Fire Protection manual
FZ
Fire Zone
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Condition
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
IP
NRC Inspection Procedure
LER
Licensee Event Report
an explanatory document published by the NRC
Nuclear Condition Report
Non Cited Violation
National Fire Protection Association
NRC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
Problem Identification Report
Power Operated Relief Valve
Rev
Revision
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
Significance Determination Process
Safety Evaluation Report
Selected Licensee Commitments
Systems, Structures and Components
SSD