ML12297A088

3 North Anna 2012-301 Draft SRO Written Exam

ML12297A088
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/23/2012
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
50-338/12-301, 50-339/12-301
Download: ML12297A088 (28)

Text

1. 001AA2.04 76 Unit 1 is exiting a scheduled refueling outage and is currently at 29% and stable, holding for chemistry.

After hearing the annunciator horn, you as the Unit 1 SRO look up and see that B-A7, Median/Hi Tavg < > Tref Deviation, is the ONLY annunciator flashing, and you hear rods stepping.

The OATC reports that NI power is increasing.

Which ONE of the following identifies a malfunction that would cause ONLY those indictions listed above, and includes the procedure used to address the failed instrument?

A. Median/Hi Tavg Selector failed; 1-AP-1.1, Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion B. Median/Hi Tavg Selector failed; 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation C. Selected First Stage Pressure Channel failed; 1-AP-1.1, Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion D. Selected First Stage Pressure Channel failed; 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation A. Incorrect. Plausible since that is the annunciator that came in, however the median selector inputs to other control systems. The candidate who does not consider, or is not aware of the full cause-effect response of a median Tavg failure and the indications that would result would likely default to choices "A" or "B". Second part is consistent with the first part.

B. Incorrect. Plausible, but again a failure would be accompanied by other annunciators.

C. Incorrect. Plausible since it would give the subject annunciator but for power to be decreasing rods would have to be stepping in which means the first stage pressure would have to fail low which again would mean other alarms would have to come in (SG level deviation alarms). procedure is consistent with first part.

D. Correct. A high failure of the selected first stage pressure channel would cause a deviation alarm ONLY and as power mismatch with turbine increasing greater than reactor rods will step out resulting in NI power increasing. 1-AP-3 is the procedure that will be implemented based on the failure.

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal :

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Reactor power and its trend Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

AR B-A7 & 1-AP-3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered a KA match because the candidate must identify a failure that would generate outward rod motion (to explain the increase in power); futher the candidate must demonstrate full knowledge of the cause-effect relationship of the various instruments to eliminate the distractors.

Answer: D

2. 005AG2.1.19 77 Zero Power Physics Testing is in progress IAW 1-PT-94, Refueling Nuclear Design Check Tests, following a scheduled refueling outage After moving rods annunciator A-F1, CMPTR ALARM ROD DEV/SEQ, alarms.

The OATC checks PCS and notes that the indication for one of the rods did not change from it's initial value and is now 16 steps different than the associated group position indication.

Intermediate Ranges NIs indicate 8E-9 amps and stable Which ONE of the following identifies the action required IAW 1-AP-1.3, Control Rod Out of Alignment?

A. maintain stable plant conditions B. manually insert all Control Bank Rods C. initiate RCS boration D. manually trip the reactor

a. Incorrect. Plausible since this would be the correct response if the reactor were sub-critical (i.e.

intermediate range NIs were decreasing).

b. Incorrect. Plausible since this would put the unit in Mode 3 which is the correct response if the control rod was declared inoperable.

c. Incorrect. Plausible since again this would be an action related to shutdown margin

d. Correct. 1-AP-3, Step 3, checks rx critical AND above the POAH, the RNO is implemented since for the stated conditions you are not above the POAH, however by the stated conditions you are critical and with that the procedure requires a trip.

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 1 Group: 2

Technical

Reference:

1-AP-1.3, TS 3.1.4, TS 3.1.9 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

3. 008AG2.4.6 78 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 was at 100% power when a spurious Safety Injection occurred.

• The crew has progressed through 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination, and is in the process of establishing Letdown.

• 1-RC-PCV-1456, PRZR PORV, opens and cannot be closed or isolated.

• RCS pressure is 1100 psig and decreasing.

• All steam generators are stable at 1000 psig.

Which ONE of the following identifies the direction the SRO should provide to the crew?

A. Manually initiate SI and go to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

B. Manually initiate SI and go to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

C. Manually start Charging Pumps, align BIT and go to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

D. Manually start Charging Pumps, align BIT and go to 1-ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

A. Incorrect but plausible. This is the guidance on the ES-0.1 foldout page for the plant conditions and would also be correct after exiting ES-1.1; the fact that the initiating event was a spurious event and plant conditions now REQUIRE SI further enhances the plausibility.

B. Incorrect but plausible. Similar to "A" above, but with the correct procedure transition.

C. Correct. The candidate must realize that plant conditions require SI (subcooling < 25°F due to the RCS pressure drop), know the foldout page requirement for these plant conditions, and have in depth knowledge of ES-1.1 to know the stated action & procdure transition is correct.

D. Incorrect but plausible. As noted earlier for this EOP procedure SI is manually aligned vice actuating the switch; the procedure transition would be correct had the stated plant conditions occured at an earlier point (e.g. Step 3, 6, or 7); the fact that ES-1.2 is the procedure that ultimately copes with this event further enhances plausibility of this distractor.

Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1

Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

4. 012A2.01 79 Unit 1 is at 4% following a scheduled refueling outage.

Intermediate Range N-35 spiked low once on the previous shift and was placed in Level Trip Bypass.

A Technician from the Instrument Shop is in the Control Room to begin troubleshooting.

The Technician reports that although his work package stated to remove the Instrument Power fuses from the N-35 drawer he has removed the Control Power fuses in error.

The OATC reports the unit is stable at 4% power.

Which ONE of the following identifies the direction the US should provide to the crew and includes the reason for this direction?

A. Trip the reactor and enter 1-E-0 because the reactor should have automatically tripped.

B. Enter TS 3.0.3 and begin an orderly shutdown because the reactor should have automatically tripped.

C. Enter 1-AP-4.2, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Intermediate Range), because it will provide guidance to de-energize the Source Range High Voltage.

D. Enter 1-AP-4.1, Malfunction of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation, because it will provide guidance to de-energize the Source Range High Voltage.

A. Incorrect but plausible, an automatic reactor trip signal is generated however since the cause is solely due to a mis-operation of the subject instrument resulting in generation of the trip signal, there is no guidance to intitate a manual trip.

B. Correct. Even with the channel bypassed a trip signal is generated, the lack of an automatic trip indicates BOTH trains of SSPS have failed therfore TS 3.0.3 applies and an orderly shutdown is required.

C. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate who erroneously concludes that the bypassed channel would not generate a trip signal as a result may conclude that the P-6 permissive would be lost and AP-4.2 would be used to cope with this.

D. Incorrect but plausible. Similar to "C", AP-4.1 also has guidance for coping with SR high voltage energized when it shouldn't be, so if this erroneous conclusion is drawn, the candidate may chose this distractor.

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Faulty bistable operation Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

AR D-C3, 1-AP-4.1, 1-AP-4.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

5. 025AA2.02 80 Given the following:

• Unit 1 is in Mode 5.

• RHR is in service.

• RCS temperature is stable at 190°F.

• RCS pressure is 320 psig and lowering slowly.

• Containment sump level is rising slowly.

• Containment Gaseous & Particulate Radiation Monitors are both trending up.

• The OATC has 1-CH-FCV-1122 in MANUAL with 100% demand and 1-CH-HCV-1142 at 0%

demand.

• Pressurizer level is 24% and slowly lowering.

Which ONE of the following identifies the procedure used to address the event in progress and the mitigation actions this procedure will require?

A. 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR ; manually initiate SI B. 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR ; manually align cold leg injection C. 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA ; manually initiate SI D. 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA ; manually align cold leg injection A. Incorrect but plausible. AP-11 has steps that address RCS leakage and contains attachments that are essentially the same as AP-17 (i.e. they align injection flow to the RCS), however they are provided in the context of AP-11 for coping with a loss of decay removal related to system malfunctions vice system breach. For this case (large amount of leakage) AP-11, although it would provide makeup and assure core cooling, directs the operator to AP-17. SI actuation would seem logical under the circumstances since the SI system is available and actuation would result in RCS makeup and CNTMT isolation (both of which are required), for these plant conditions although Phase

"A" isolation is actuated, SI is aligned manually.

B. Incorrect but plausible. Similar reasoning as above, only for this case the mitigation (method of refilling the RCS) is correct.

C. Incorrect but plausible. First part is correct; as explained in "A", for a leak this large AP-11 will transition the operator to AP-17. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. As previously discussed even though AP-11 may be initially entered mitigating actions are driven in this case by AP-17. As seen in the attached technical reference (applicable pages of 1-AP-17) based on the conditions given the RCS will be refilled by manually aligning cold leg injection.

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Leakage of reactor coolant from RHR into closed cooling water system or into reactor building atmosphere Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-17 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

6. 035G2.1.23 81 Given the following sequence of events:

• Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

• The team is recovering from a reactor trip due to a loss of offsite power.

• All systems functioned as designed EXCEPT there was no AFW flow to "C" SG because a Periodic Test was in progress at the time of the event.

• Local actions have restored the capability to supply AFW to "C" SG.

The following conditions exist:

• RCS Hot-leg temperatures are 558°F and trending down slowly.

• "C" SG Wide-range level is 6% and trending down slowly.

Based on these conditions, 1-FR-H.5, Response to Steam Generator Low Level, directs the crew to

___________. The bases for this restriction is to prevent ___________ .

A. establish AFW flow to "C" SG at < 100 gpm ; an undesired SI actuation

B. establish AFW flow to "C" SG at < 100 gpm ; thermal stress to SG components C. NOT establish AFW flow to "C" SG ; an undesired SI actuation D. NOT establish AFW flow to "C" SG ; thermal stress to SG components

a. Incorrect. Plausible since candidate would tend to want to refill the SG and may reason that reduced flow rate would be an acceptable method. Excessive feed particularly with low SG inventory can result in depressurization of the SG which would cause a Steamline P SI. the candidate who overlooks (or doesn't know) the dry criteriaof H.5, or the bases for it, could easily choose this distractor.

b. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as noted above; second part is correct as described in the WOG Background Document & Executive Volume.

c. Incorrect. First part is correct; as aluded to above this action is conservative and ensure that the condition is evaluated, or another strategy such as cooling the RCS is used prior to re-initiating feed due to the potential consequence. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in Distractor a.

d. Correct. First part is correct as discussed in Distractor c. Second part is also correct as discussed in distractor b.

Steam Generator System (S/Gs)

Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-FR-H.5 & WOG ERG Background document, 1-OP-3.7 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: 558°F given in stem is realistic based on post-trip decay heat load with natural circ and steaming on SG PORVs vice Condenser Steam Dumps.

Answer: D

7. 039A2.03 82 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when the following sequence of events occurred:

• Annunciator K-G6, N-16 RAD DET, alarms

• RO reports N-16 modules for "C" SG AND Main Steam Header are in alarm and trending up

• BOP reports 1-RM-SV-121, Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor indication has not changed

• RO reports PRZR level rapidly decreasing

• The crew trips the reactor and initiates SI Current Status:

• The immediate actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, have just been completed.

• All SG's are below the Narrow Range.

• The BOP recommends isolating AFW flow to the "C" SG.

Based on the above, which ONE of the following identifies how the US should proceed?

A. allow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; contact HP & Chemistry for confirmation of the affected SG prior to initiating 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

B. allow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; have the RO initiate 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

C. DO NOT allow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; contact HP & Chemistry for confirmation of the affected SG prior to initiating 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

D. DO NOTallow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; have the RO initiate 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

a. incorrect. First part is plausible because on the surface it sounds ok; knowledge of the EOP bases is required to eliminate this part of the distractor. Second part also plausible 1-RM-SV-121 should be showing something but it is not (malfunction); the candidate who doesn't feel the N-16 is enough to go on may delay actions that are important to limiting offsite dose (attachment 8 isolates steam supply to the terry turbine, this is a local action).

b. Incorrect. First part is plausible as noted above. Second part correct, even though they are not independent on a process basis (i.e. a deviation in SG LEVEL could be confirmed by comparing steam FLOW and feed FLOW) both show expected indication based on the conditions given, so they would be enough confirmation.

c. incorrect. First part is correct; EOP basis wants SG U-tubes covered to insulate steam space, so you will isolate AFW, but you need to wait until level is higher. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "a".

d. correct. First part is correct as noted in "c". Second part also correct as discussed above the malfunction of 1-RM-SV-121 should not detour the SRO from implementing attachment 8.

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation monitors (during SGTR)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, 1-E-3 WOG Background document, 1-AP-5 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

8. 056AG2.2.40 83 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

A loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurs and the only operator actions taken thus far are the immediate operator actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Which ONE of the following identifies the most limiting required action and completion time that applies to Unit 1?

A. Enter TS 3.0.3 immediately B. Restore one EDG to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> C. Restore one offsite circuit or one EDG to operable status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> D. Restore one offsite circuit to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> A. Correct. Based on current status of the event action k. applies since EDGs are the sole source for the busses, since it applies for both EDGs you are in action m. (3.0.3) because the LOOP rendered two of your offsite circuit inoperable.

B. Incorrect but plausible if the candidate overlooks the STRs discussed in "A".

C. Incorrect but plausible since the candidate may overlook the two hour action.

D. Incorrect but plausible because the candidate may ignore the status of the STRs, conclude that the EDGs are operable and select this distractor which is TRUE, but only AFTER the EDGs have been configured per AP-10.

Loss of Offsite Power Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.1 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

9. 061AA2.03 84 Unit 1 is at 20% power and ramping up following a scheduled refueling outage.

Annuciator K-D2, Rad Monitor System Hi Rad Level, alarms.

The Backboards operator reports 1-SV-RM-121, Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, HIGH alarm light is LIT.

Based on the above 1-SV-RMS-121 is (1) and 1-SV-TV-102-2, Condenser Air Ejector Discharge to Vent Stack A, is (2) .

A. (1) functional (2) closed B. (1) functional (2) open C. (1) non-functional (2) closed D. (1) non-functional (2) open

a. Incorrect. First part plausible because the monitor is required by TRM in Modes 1 and 2; second part is also plausible since some components reposition on high alarm while others don't reposition until hi-hi is received.

b. Incorrect. First part plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct based on the information provided in the stem.

c. Incorrect. First part is correct; although the monitor will indicate and trend below 30% power, per TRM 3.4.5 Bases there is insufficient Ar-41 to "declare" it functional below this power level. Second part also incorrect but plausible since candidate may erroneously conclude that the function to divert the air ejector to containment would occur at the high alarm threshold in order to minimize any release.

d. Correct. First part is correct; as noted above per TRM Bases, at the given power level the monitor can not be "declared" functional. Second part is also correct; the automatic actuation (closing of the subject valve) will not occur until the hi-hi alarm is received, so based on the information provided in the stem the valve will remain in its normal position (open) for the given plant status.

Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)

System Alarms:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Setpoints for alert and high alarms Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

TRM 3.4.5 Bases, 1-AP-5, DWG 11715-ESK-6MN Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info: considered bank since question is essentially two seperate bank questions that have been combined to form one question.

Answer: D

10. 062A2.15 85 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

On the previous shift when attempting to transfer 120v vital AC Bus 1-I from its associated Constant Voltage Transformer to Inverter 1-I the Sync light failed to light and the procedure was halted.

120v vital AC Bus 1-I is being powered from its associated Constant Voltage Transformer with Inverter 1-I tagged out for corrective maintenance.

The POD has the following items scheduled:

• Tagout 1J EDG to allow Engineering to inspect various panels.

• Instrument shop perform 1-PT-31.5.2, Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II (1-RC-P-1456)

Channel Operational Test Which ONE of the following identifies how the WCCS should address each of these POD activities?

A. Tagout the 1J EDG ; allow the Instrument shop to perform 1-PT-31.5.2 B. Tagout the 1J EDG ; DO NOT allow the Instrument shop to perform 1-PT-31.5.2 C. DO NOT Tagout the 1J EDG ; allow the Instrument shop to perform 1-PT-31.5.2 D. DO NOT Tagout the 1J EDG ; DO NOT allow the Instrument shop to perform 1-PT-31.5.2 A. Incorrect. plausible because there is no obvious correlation between the bus, which is energized, and these activities.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because again there is no obvious correlation between the EDG which is a seperate TS and the vital bus which is operable, although the inverter isn't. Second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. The first part is true; second part is plausible because again the vital bus and associated instruments are all operable, so to the average Joe (and to 7300 process instrumentation, for that matter) where the voltage is coming from doesn't matter.

D. Correct. The TS 3.8.7 Bases requires no EDG planned maintenance and no planned maintenance on another RPS channel that places that channel in trip (candidate must know the bases and know that doing the subject PT will place the channel in trip).

AC Electrical Distribution System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Consequence of paralleling out-of-phase/mismatch in volts Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.7 Bases, 1-PT-31.5.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: K/A intent met since Inverters are part of the AC distribution system Answer: D

11. 063G2.4.9 86 Unit 1 shutdown for a scheduled refueling.

Cooldown is in progress and RCS temperature is 340°F and decreasing Operators entered 1-AP-24.1, Shutdown Steam Generator Tube Leak, and have maximized charging and isolated letdown The crew is on step 4 of 1-AP-24.1, "Check if Charging Flow is Adequate", and the OATC reports PRZR level is 18% and slowly decreasing.

Several alarms are received and the OATC reports that he has lost light indication for 1-CH-P-1A and Condenser Steam Dumps are closed.

Based on these plant conditions, the US will direct the OATC to ______________________ IAW 1-AP-24.1, and direct the Backboards operator to perform 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power, to restore power to _________.

A. manually actuate SI ; 1-I DC BUS B. manually actuate SI ; 1-III DC BUS C. align one charging pump to flow through the BIT ; 1-I DC BUS D. align one charging pump to flow through the BIT ; 1-III DC BUS A. plausible because this is the most prevelant action taken for cases where inventory is not being maintained and the candidate who doesn't know the different strategy employed by AP-24.1 as compared to AP-24 or other procedures would likely default to this; second part is correct B. plausible as noted above second part is also plausible since this would explain why the steam dumps closed.

C. correct AP-24.1 aligns 1 charging pump in this fashion because this path will flow more than the normal charging line. second part correct based on the information provided; the person who has detailed knowledge of DC bus loads can conclude that this is the affected bus. The term "several alarms" is used since it is the most realistic description (several things will be impacted by the loss of

a DC bus and thus several alarms, some valid, some not, will come in virtually simultaneously).

D. incorrect. first part correct as discussed in "C", second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

DC Electrical Distribution System Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-24.1 & 0-AP-10, 11715-ESK-5AL Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: NAPS has only ONE loss of power procedure. it covers all Busses for both units (i.e.

SWYD, 120 vital and semi-vital ac busses, 4160 & 480v busses, etc.) KA intent met since providing direction as to the specific bus that is effected is equivalent to other stations where a specific procedure would be selected (e.g. a plant with an AP [aka ONOP] for each DC bus would select the correct procedure based on the information provided).

Answer: C

12. 065AA2.02 87 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The OATC reports the following changes since his last board scan:

• PRZR level 68% slowly trending up

• makeup flow 70 gpm slowly trending up

• letdown flow 80 gpm and stable

• VCT level 32% and slowly lowering

• 1-CH-FCV-1122 demand is 20% slowly lowering Which ONE of the following identifies the cause of these indications and the action to be taken in response to them?

A. instrument air leak on 1-CH-FCV-1122, isolate and bypass 1-CH-FCV-1122 B. CVCS leak on the charging line, isolate normal letdown & close 1-CH-MOV-1289A or B C. 1-CH-LCV-1115A, Letdown Divert valve leaking by, isolate normal letdown & place excess letdown inservice D. Controller failing on 1-CH-FCV-1122, take local control of 1-CH-FCV-1122 at the Aux Shutdown Panel.

A. Correct diagnostic; valve would open further than demanded if supply pressure is reduced which is supported by indications provided in the stem the AR will direct this method as a means of controlling

charging until the problem is corrected.

B. plausible but doesn't explain all of the indications; the action to be taken is a logical response to the cause C. plausible but doesn't explain all off the indications; action to be taken is appropriate since excess letdown is needed for continued plant operation.

D. Similar to "C" and again if that were the only problem this would be an appropriate way to deal with it Loss of Instrument Air Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Relationship of flow readings to system operation Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-C-C5, B-G8, B-G6, 1-AP-49, DWG 11715-CH-001 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: KA is met since candidate must evaluate several parameters and sucessfully evaluate cause-effect of each choice provided; SRO level met since question includes the selection of the apprpriate procedure strategy to cope with the situation.

Answer: A

13. 069AG2.1.31 88 Unit 1 is heating up following a scheduled refueling outage and is currently at 310°F and slowly increasing.

You are the oncoming SRO and in the process of walking down the boards observe that the Containment Purge Supply and Purge Exhaust valves, (1-HV-MOV-100A, B, C & D), all have green lights ON and red lights OFF.

With respect to your observation, this configuration is _____________ with 1-OP-1E, Containment Integrity Checklist; according to the Applicable Safety Analysis of TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Bases, the DBA analysis assumes that the Purge Valves are ______________________?

A. in compliance ; open and will isolate within 60 seconds after the accident B. in compliance ; in the closed position at the onset of the accident C. NOT in compliance ; open and will isolate within 60 seconds after the accident D. NOT in compliance ; in the closed position at the onset of the accident

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because at first glance the bases says only that the valves need to be closed, 1-OP-1E verifies the breakers for the valves are locked off prior to entry into Mode 4 so although the valves being closed appears to satisy the TS minimum at first glance, it doesn't meet procedural requirements to go to mode 4 per the controlling procedure (1-OP-1.1 does this before it lets you get permission to move on to 1-OP-1.3 to change modes) . Second part incorrect but plausible because this is a basis for other valves listed in 3.6.3; candidate may not know detail of what is assumed by the accident analysis.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct per the TS bases.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct, based on the light indication one should conclude that the MCC breakers are closed (ON), but are required to be "locked off" (as an administrative control) for this Mode (see "A" above; note they also appear on the station administrative lock list). So again although the requirement of TS 3.6.3 may appear to be met, the procedural requirement is not.

Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part correct per attached Technical Reference (TS 3.6.3 Bases).

Loss of Containment Integrity Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-1E, 1-OP-1.1, TS 3.6.3 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered bank because it combines a couple of bank questions.

Answer: D

14. 071A2.01 89 Unit 1 is in a refueling outage.

Operators are performing 1-OP-10.9, Recovering RCS Loop Stop Leakage to the Gas Stripper and Returning to the VCT using Degas Mode.

The operator performing the line-up missed the step to position 1-BR-TV-110A, A Gas Stripper Outlet, and realizes the valve has been in the open position since the evolution was started.

Which ONE of the following identifies the consequence of this mis-operation, and includes the action that would be required if the alignment went uncorrected?

A. increased activity levels in the in-service WGDT ; isolate the affected WGDT and dilute with N2 B. increased activity levels in the in-service WGDT ; isolate the affected WGDT and immediately release

C. excessive O2 concentration in the in-service WGDT ; isolate the affected WGDT and dilute with N2 D. excessive O2 concentration in the in-service WGDT ; isolate the affected WGDT and immediately release

a. Incorrect. Plausible since candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the procedure/alignment may default distractor based on sensitivity to ALARA; second part also plausible since this could be done to reduce the RATE of a subsequent release (µCi/sec less).

b. Incorrect. Plausible as discussed in "A"; second part also plausible since it goes hand-in-hand with the first part (i.e. releasing would reduce general area dose rate).

c. Correct. First part is correct per 1-OP-10.9; second part also correct this action will reduce O2 content below the TRM limit.

d. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed in "C"; second part is incorrect but plausible since as with "B" the given action would on the surface provide relief for the stated condition.

Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Use of WGDS to prevent entry of oxygen into holdup tanks during liquid transfers Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-10.9, 1-AR-Y-E4, 0-OP-23.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

15. 079A2.01 90 Both Units are in Mode 3.

The following sequence of events occurs:

• A large instrument air leak occurs in the auxiliary building.

• The immediate actions of 1-AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air, have been completed and Instrument Air pressure is stable at 85 psig.

• A loss of offsite power occurs.

Based on the above, which of the following choices, (1) describes the response of the Instrument Air System AND (2) includes the action required by 1-AP-28.

A. (1) pressure decreases initially and then returns to ~85 psig (2) bypass both instrument air dryers in the auxiliary building B. (1) pressure decreases initially then returns to ~85 psig (2) initiate 1-AP-33.2, Loss of RCP Seal cooling while continuing with 1-AP-28 C. (1) pressure decreases continuously (2) bypass both instrument air dryers in the auxiliary building D. (1) pressure decreases continuously (2) initiate 1-AP-33.2, Loss of RCP Seal cooling while continuing with 1-AP-28 A. plausible because IACs are powered from "H" busses and will reload on the EDG (hence distractor wording "decrease initially" which implies that time frame between BUS UV and EDG bkr closure) second part correct because this action is taken to reduce any restriction to air flow.

B. plausible as noted above. second part also plausible since CC to thermal barrier will isolate on LOOP and a subsequent step (21) of 1-AP-28 recognizes that under certain plant conditions a loss of seal cooling could be encountered.

C. correct. the candidate must have good integrated plant knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between the LOOP and station air system, and incorporate that with the resultant upset it will cause to the equilibrium that existed prior to the LOOP. Second part is also correct but the candidate must have detailed knowledge of the procedure to know when/if the procedure will direct this action based on the plant conditions.

D. incorrect but plausible as noted above; also second part is plausible but incorrect as discussed in "B".

Station Air System (SAS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Cross-connection with IAS Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-28, SDBD-NAPS-IA, Station Load List, DWG 11715-ESK-6MC, 1-OP-26A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

16. 103G2.4.31 91 Unit 1 is at 29% holding for chemistry following a scheduled refueling outage.

Annunciator J-F2, Containment Partial Press +0.1 PSI CH I-II, alarms The OATC reports the following:

• Containment Sump Level - increasing

• PRZR Level - stable

• RCS Makeup Flow - stable

• Reactor power - stable Several minutes later Annunciator J-G1, Containment Partial Press +0.25 PSI CH I-II, alarms and the OATC reports there are no changes in the parameters reported above.

Which ONE of the following (1) identifies the cause of these plant conditions AND (2) correctly states the Technical Specification Bases for the TS 3.6.4 Containment Pressure LCO ?

A. (1) Leakage from a Main Feed Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to less than 2.0 psig within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA B. (1) Leakage from a Main Feed Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to subatmospheric pressure within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA C. (1) Leakage from a Main Steam Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to less than 2.0 psig within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA D. (1) Leakage from a Main Steam Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to subatmospheric pressure within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA A. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) is correct, indications support a high energy source of leakage and (2) because there is a 2.0 psig requirement, but that has to be met within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> not 6 as stated in the distractor.

B. Correct. (1) is correct as stated above and (2) is also correct per the Tech Spec Bases C. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) could be correct if the turbine were in IMP-OUT or on the limiter in which case you would be trading steam from the turbine to the CNTMT so power would be relatively constant and (2) because there is a 2.0 psig requirement, but that has to be met within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> not 6 as stated in the distractor.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) clould be correct if the turbine were in IMP-OUT or on the limiter in which case you would be trading steam from the turbine to the CNTMT so power would be relatively

constant and (2) because this is correct per the Tech Spec Bases.

Containment System Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.3)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-J-F2, J-G1, TS 3.6.4 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

17. G2.1.15 92 Select the choice that completes the following statement from OP-AA-100, Conduct of Operations.

In the event that requirements in the Technical Specifications (TS) or the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) are determined to be improper or inadequate, a Standing Order may be issued to impose

________________ restrictive requirements on an expedited basis and _______________________

prior to implementation.

A. more ; shall be approved by the Director Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing B. more ; shall be presented to the Facility Safety Review Committee (FSRC)

C. more OR less; shall be approved by the Director Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing D. more OR less; shall be presented to the Facility Safety Review Committee (FSRC)

A. Incorrect. First part is correct; standing orders can clarify, or impose additional/more restrictive requirements but are not a vehicle used to relax or relieve any requirements. Second part is incorrect but plausible; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge in this area may default to this choice as it would be a logical (although erroneous) conclusion that since the subject is TS & TRM, the director of Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing would have to approve it.

B. Correct. First part is correct as noted above. Second part is also correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge in this area may select this choice as they would feel there must be a provision to cope with the subject condition. As noted above there is indeed, but a different process is used for the case where relief is needed from a TS requirement. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference.

Conduct of Operations Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-100, Attachment 7 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

18. G2.2.18 93 Unit 1 is shutting down for a scheduled refueling and is currently at 150°F with 1-RC-P-1C running.

Which ONE of the following identifies the LATEST time that a containment closure team must be established?

A. prior to depressurizing the RCS below 50 psig B. prior to draining below 5% PRZR level C. prior to draining below the reactor vessel flange D. prior to detensioning the reactor vessel head

a. Correct. Candidate must have knowledge that credit can not be taken for loops filled when the RCS is depressurized below 50# and that although there is plenty of inventory in the RCS, procedures require containment closure capability within a specified time frame when this configuration is entered.

b. Incorrect. Plausible since this constitutes decreased inventory and the candidate may erroneously conclude that admin requirements for containment closure team would be triggered by entering this configuration.

c. Incorrect. Plausible since as discussed above the candidate may erroneously conclude that a closure team would not be required until a significant reduction in inventory occurred.

d. Incorrect. Plausible since as discussed above the candidate may erroneously conclude that a closure team would not be required until the reactor coolant system is significantly opened to atmosphere.

Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-LOG-18 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

19. G2.2.7 94 Which ONE of the following describes the personnel requirements of OP-AA-106, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions (ICCE), for conducting a Category I ICCE?

A. a Senior Operations Manager is optional, a test coordinator is optional B. a Senior Operations Manager is required, a test coordinator is optional C. a Senior Operations Manager is optional, a test coordinator is required D. a Senior Operations Manager is required, a test coordinator is required

a. Incorrect plausible since the candidate may not be knowledgeable of the hierarchy of categories and may not be sure of the requirements as to whether a specific position must be filled.

b. incorrect but plausible since it would be true for a Cat III evolution

c. incorrect; as discussed, to the person who isn't sure of the requirements (or just recalls they are not the same), any of the choices is plausible.

d. Correct. Both of these positions are required.

Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-106 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

20. G2.3.15 95 Unit 1 is shutting down for a scheduled refueling.

Operators are preparing to place RHR in service when a loss of offsite power occurs.

Based on the above, select the choice that correctly completes the following statement.

1-RM-RMS-159/160, Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (gaseous and particulate) (1) and the Digital Containment Partial Air Pressure Indicators (2) .

A. (1) are required to be declared inoperable (2) are required to be declared inoperable B. (1) are required to be declared inoperable (2) are NOT required to be declared inoperable C. (1) are NOT required to be declared inoperable (2) are required to be declared inoperable D. (1) are NOT required to be declared inoperable (2) are NOT required to be declared inoperable A. Correct. The LOOP causes a loss of Containment Air Recirc Fans (CARFs) which are required by TS Bases (at least 1) to support 159/160 operability. The loss of the CARFs also requires (by AP-35) declaring partial air pressure indicators inoperable. Since the stem states "preparing to place RHR in service" the candidate must have knowledge that this means the Unit is in Mode 4 and that the Spec is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since candidate may not correlate the cause and effect relationship between the CARFs and the partial pressure indicators.

C. Incorrect. First part is plausible since their is not a physical correlation between the CARFs & the subject rad monitors and the candidate may not have knowledge of the TRM Bases. Second part is correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. Both parts are incorrect but plausible as previously discussed.

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-AP-35, TS 3.4.15 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered bank since this is essentially a combination of 2 bank questions Answer: A

21. G2.3.5 96 Unit 1 is in mode 3.

1-RM-RMS-128 failed earlier in the shift HP reports general area readings in the vicinity of 1-RM-RMS-128 is 150 mrem/hr The Instrument Shop planner has prepared a troubleshooting package and estimates 2 persons for 1/2 hour at 1-RM-RMS-128 to perform the initial troubleshooting.

Based on these plant conditions the area around 1-RM-RMS-128 will be posted as a ______________

and the troubleshooting will be performed under ____________.

A. Radiation area ; a Specific RWP B. Radiation area ; a General RWP C. High Radiation area ; a Specific RWP D. High Radiation area ; a General RWP A. incorrect. Plausible becasue candidate may not know the thresholds and/or requirements discussed below.

B. Incorrect. Second part is correct. Although dose for this entry is 150 (2 X 150 X 1/2) the requirement unlike most ALARA requirements is based on INDIVIDUAL vice total dose; the candidate may not be aware of this subtle difference.

C. Incorrect. First part iscorrect > 100 mrem/hr is the threshold for upgrading posting to HRA. Second part is plausible as discussed above.

D. Correct. both parts are correct as discussed above the > 100 mrem/hr in itself drives the first part, and as alraedy noted since individual dose is 75 each person, work can be done under a General even the total dose on the entry will be greater than 100 for a single entry.

Radiation Control Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

VPAP-2101 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info: KA match since SROs do not physically use the subject equipment but rather, use the information obtained from it.

Answer: D

22. G2.4.25 97 15:00 Both Units were at 100% power when the control room was evacuated due to a fire.

15:02 Offsite power is lost.

15:15 ROs have established control from the Aux Shutdown Panels and report unit conditions stable.

Based on these plant conditions the Shift Manager will declare a(n) _________________________ and IAW 0-FCA-1, Control Room Fire, begin preparations for __________________________ of Unit 1 & 2.

A. Alert ; sequential cooldown B. Alert ; simultaneous cooldown C. Site Area Emergency ; sequential cooldown D. Site Area Emergency ; simultaneous cooldown A. Correct. first part correct; enough info proveided for candidate to conclude that safe shutdown requirements were met in required time frame. second part also correct procedure picks unit with highest PRZR level first (not specifically mentioned SM has latitude to choose either unit based on actual equipment availability, plant conditions, or other considerations).

B. Incorrect but plausible, since there is so much emphasis on limited ECST volume the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the procedure may default to this distractor.

C. Incorrect plausible because the control room was evacuated and there are complications (LOOP);

sequential cooldown part is correct.

D. Incorrect, both parts incorrect but plausible as previously discussed.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EAL technical Bases Document & 0-FCA-1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

23. G2.4.30 98 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

12:00 Excess Letdown is placed in service 12:01 OATC notes CC Head Tank level is increasing 12:04 Excess Letdown is removed from service, OATC reports CC head Tank level is stable 12:08 STA quantifies leakage into the CC head tank at 80 gallons Based on the above, Notification to the State within 15 minutes _________ required and Notification to the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> _________ required.

A. is ; is B. is ; is NOT C. is NOT ; is D. is NOT ; is NOT A. Incorrect. plausible if candidate erroneously concludes that penetration however slight triggers the 15 minute clock. goes hand-in-hand with erroneous 15 minute assumption.

B. Plausible since a lot of things are 4 or 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> reports to the nrc C. Correct per EPIP-1.01 condition exceeded an EAL but no longer exists (at the time it was determined) so state isn't required to be notified within 15 minutes. NRC however still has to called within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (See VPAP-2802).

D. Incorrect. plausible because candidate may assume that this is identified leakage (or for that matter CVCS vice RCS leakage and conclude that it is neither classifiable or reportable (or if it is reportable it would be at a lower threshold like an LER or have a less stringent time requirement, like 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />).

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

VPAP-2802, EAL Technical Bases Document, EPIP-1.01 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

24. WE04EG2.4.18 99 Unit 1 was at 100% power when the following sequence of events occurred:

• PRZR PORV, 1-RC-PCV-1455C spuriously opened and stuck full open

• PRZR PORV Block Valve, 1-RC-MOV-1536 breaker tripped when the control switch was taken to close

• Manual reactor trip and SI have been actuated

• The crew has implemented 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection The following additional alarms have been identified:

• 1A-C1, SFGDS Area Sump Hi/Hi-Hi Level

• High alarm on 1-VG-RI-180-1, (MGP) Vent Stack B Noble Gas Normal Range Which ONE of the following identifies the correct procedure transitions from 1-E-0?

(Procedure titles) 1-E-1, Loss of reactor or Secondary Coolant 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Capability 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment A. 1-E-1 1-ECA-1.1 B. 1-E-1 1-ECA-1.2 C. 1-ECA-1.2 1-E-1 D. 1-ECA-1.2 1-ECA-1.1 A. Incorrect. First part correct. Second part is incorrect but plausible because there is a kickout from E-1 to this procedure, and asssuming you can't stop the leak O.C. you will be sent to this procedure.

B. Correct. First part is correct because of the PORV issue even though CNTMT conditions may still be normal (assuming PRT hasn't ruptured) you will be sent here by an earlier step in E-0. Second part is correct 1-E-1 will look for indications of LOCA O.C. and send you here to attempt to isolate.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since for scenarios like a Steam Line Break with SI actuation (where leakage exists in LHSI injection path), E-0 sends you directly to ECA-1.2, and assuming you successfully isolate you would be sent to E-1.

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is another possible flowpath upon leaving ECA-1.2.

LOCA Outside Containment Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, 1-E-1, 1-ECA-1.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered a match for SRO, because procedure selection (needed to make SRO level question) demonstrates the candidate knows the hierarchy (in this case because of the PORV issue you MUST transition to E-1 first) and understands the "bases" for the procedures (eca-1.1 & 1.2) as they relate to this event.

Answer: B

25. WE05EA2.1 100 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power with the following equipment tagged out:

• 1-FW-P-3A, Motor-driven AFW pump A seismic event results in a loss of offsite power and damage to all main steam lines in the Main Steam Valve House.

Current status is:

• The crew is currently performing 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.

• All SGs are 800 psig and slowly decreasing

• All SG levels below the Narrow Range

• 1-FW-P-2, Turbine-driven AFW, tripped shortly after starting up and operators are unable to reset it.

• The crew has just shutdown the 1J EDG due to a leak on the radiator.

Which ONE of the following identifies how the US will address the current conditions?

A. Remain in 1-ECA-2.1; perform 1-AP-22.6, Loss of 1-FW-P-2 Turbine-driven AFW Pump and One Motor-Driven AFW Pump, concurrently B. Remain in 1-ECA-2.1; perform 0-OP-6.6, Operation of the SBO Diesel (Non-SBO Event) to Reenergize 1J 4160V Emergency Bus Following Loss of 1J 4160V Emergency Bus, concurrently C. Transition to 1-FR-H.1; perform 1-AP-22.6, Loss of 1-FW-P-2 Turbine-driven AFW Pump and One Motor-Driven AFW Pump, concurrently D. Transition to 1-FR-H.1; perform 0-OP-6.6, Operation of the SBO Diesel (Non-SBO Event) to Reenergize 1J 4160V Emergency Bus Following Loss of 1J 4160V Emergency Bus, concurrently A. Incorrect. Plausible because ECA-2.1 intentionally reduces feed flow to less than H.1 entry requirement, and question stem supports that there is adequate inventory in SGs for heat removal (pressure indicative of smaller breaks & RCS cooling down - uncontrolled), thus on the surface fr-H.1 entry would not be warrented. 1-AP-22.6 entry conditions are met, but stem specificly solicites addressing the "current conditions" so 0-OP-6.6 needs to be done before AP-22.6 B. Incorrect but plausible as discussed above.

C. Incorrect but plausible; H.1 transition is correct, but as discussed above 0-OP-6.6 needs to be done before AP-22.6.

D. Correct. Current conditions warrent the transition to H.1 since AFW is no longer readily available (even though the unavailablity is due to 1J EDG being intentionally shutdown by the crew); as noted above the use of 0-OP-6.6 is appropriate based on the information provided (guidance to use 0-OP-6.6 is contained in 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power. AP-10 would have initially been performed by the Non-accident unit (Unit 2) in response to the LOOP, but the action contained to use

the SBO Diesel located in the RNO for checking 1J Bus would not have been addressed since the condition occurred subsequent to the initial procedure performance. The Unit 1 SRO needs to know that they should go back to that procedure and reference the step RNO that provides the option to use the SBO.

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-F-0,1-FR-H.1, WOG ERG background Documents, 0-AP-10, 1-OP-26A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D