ML12102A218
| ML12102A218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/2012 |
| From: | Lyon C Watts Bar Special Projects Branch |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Lyon, Fred | |
| References | |
| TAC ME6500, BL-11-001 | |
| Download: ML12102A218 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555"()001 April 23, 2012 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Corporate Manager, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 3R Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - CLOSEOUT OF NRC BULLETIN 2011-01, "MITIGATING STRATEGIES" (TAC NO. ME6500)
Dear Mr. Shea:
On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML111250360), to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The purpose of the bulletin was to obtain a comprehensive verification that licensees' mitigating strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel cooling, and containment following a large explosion or fire were compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.54(hh)(2).
The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provided its responses to the bulletin for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 by letters dated June 10 and July 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML11167A098, publicly available, and ML11195A148, non-publicly available, respectively).
The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by TVA for WBN Unit 1 and concludes that its response to the bulletin is acceptable. As summarized in the enclosure, the staff verified that TVA provided the information requested in the bulletin. No further information or actions under the bulletin are requested at this time.
Sincerely, CFT Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager Watts Bar Special Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390
Enclosure:
Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO NRC BULLETIN 2011-01 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WAITS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. SO-390 On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies," (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML 1112S0360) to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section SO.54(f). The first responses were due 30 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A098), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provided its response for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 to this first set of questions (first response).
The second responses were due 60 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated July 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 1119SA148, not publicly available), TVA provided its response to this second set of questions (second response). As summarized below, the NRC staff has verified that TVA provided the information requested in the bulletin for WBN Unit 1.
1.0 BACKGROUND
On February 2S, 2002, the NRC issued EA-02-026, "Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures" OCM Order). Section B.S.b of the ICM Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.
By letter dated August 9,2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072200034), the NRC staff issued its Safety Evaluation (SE) to document the final disposition of information submitted by TVA regarding Section B.S.b of the ICM Order. Along with the SE, the staff issued a conforming license condition to incorporate the B.S.b mitigating strategies into the licensing basis.
On March 27,2009, the NRC issued 10 CFR SO.S4(hh)(2) as a new rule, in order to capture the B.S.b mitigating strategies and related license conditions as regulatory requirements for both current and future licensees. At that time, licensee compliance with the conforming license Enclosure
- 2 conditions was sufficient to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) (74 FR 13926) so no further actions were required on the part of current licensees.
2.0 30-DAY REQUEST In order to confirm continued compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), the bulletin requested that licensees address the following two questions within 30 days of the date of the bulletin:
- 1. Is the equipment necessary to execute the mitigating strategies, as described in your submittals to the NRC, available and capable of performing its intended function?
- 2. Are the guidance and strategies implemented capable of being executed considering the current configuration of your facility and current staffing and skill levels of the staff?
The NRC staff reviewed TVA's first response to determine if it had adequately addressed these questions for WBN Unit 1.
2.1 Question 1: Availability and Capability of Equipment In its first response, TVA stated it confirmed that equipment it needs to execute the 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) mitigating strategies is available and capable of performing its intended function. The NRC staff verified that this confirmation covered equipment needed for Phases 2 and 3 of B.5.b mitigation strategies, but the first response did not clearly indicate that equipment needed for Phase 1 had been included in the confirmation. During a subsequent telephone conversation, TVA stated that its confirmation included equipment needed for Phase 1 and that it had inadvertently left out a reference. In its second response, TVA corrected its 30-day response to include the missing reference, and the NRC staff verified that TVA's confirmation included equipment needed for Phase 1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that TVA has adequately responded to Question 1 for WBN Unit 1.
2.2 Question 2: Guidance and Strategies Can Be Executed In its first response, TVA confirmed that the guidance and strategies it has implemented for 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) are capable of being executed considering the current facility configuration, staffing levels, and staff skills. Since TVA has considered its current facility configuration, staffing levels, and staff skills, and confirmed that it can execute its implemented guidance and strategies, the NRC staff finds that TVA has adequately responded to Question 2 for WBN Unit 1.
3.0 60-DAY REQUEST The bulletin required a response to the following five questions within 60 days of issuing the bulletin:
- 1. Describe in detail the maintenance of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it is functional when needed.
- 3
- 2. Describe in detail the testing of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR SO.S4(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it will function when needed.
- 3. Describe in detail the controls for assuring that the equipment is available when needed.
- 4. Describe in detail how configuration and guidance management is assured so that strategies remain feasible.
S. Describe in detail how you assure availability of offsite support.
The NRC staff reviewed TVA's second response to determine if it had adequately addressed these questions. The NRC staff also reviewed the August 9, 2007, SE to determine what equipment, training, and offsite resources at TVA were relied upon by NRC staff to conclude that TVA's actions would ensure compliance with Section B.S.b of the ICM Order and the conforming license condition for WBN Unit 1.
3.1 Questions 1 and 2: Maintenance and Testing of Equipment Questions 1 and 2 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail the maintenance and testing of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR SO.S4(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it is functional when needed. In its second response, TVA listed the equipment used to support the 10 CFR SO.54(hh)(2) mitigating strategies that receive maintenance or testing. For each item, TVA described the maintenance and testing performed, including the frequency and basis for the maintenance or testing activity.
The NRC staff verified that TVA listed equipment that typically requires maintenance or testing that was relied upon to make conclusions in the SE or commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies. In its second response, TVA stated that the fire engine, portable pump, portable power supply, hoses, nozzles, and communications equipment receive maintenance or testing. The NRC staff noted that the fuel level for the fire el1gine and portable pump is verified during maintenance. TVA also identified other items that support the mitigating strategies that receive maintenance or testing.
The NRC staff verified that TVA described the process used for corrective actions and listed the testing performed to ensure that the strategies were initially feasible. TVA stated in its second response that its 10 CFR Part SO, Appendix B, corrective action program is used to document equipment failure, establish priorities, and perform trending.
Based upon the information above, the NRC staff finds that TVA has provided the information requested by Questions 1 and 2 for WBN Unit 1.
3.2 Question 3: Controls on Equipment Question 3 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail the controls on equipment, such as inventory requirements, to ensure that the equipment is available when
-4 needed. A list of inventory deficiencies and associated corrective actions to prevent loss was also requested.
The NRC staff verified that TVA described its process for ensuring that B.5.b equipment will be available when needed. In its second response, TVA identified equipment included in its inventory, the inventory frequency, storage requirements, and items verified. Items verified include proper quantity, location, and accessibility of equipment; compressed gas bottle pressures, equipment shelf lives; calibrations; and control of storage locations. TVA stated that at the time of its second response there were no outstanding inventory deficiencies that would render the strategies not viable.
The NRC staff verified that TVA inventoried equipment that was relied upon to make conclusions in the SE or commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies. In its second response, TVA stated that procured nonpermanently installed B.5.b equipment is inventoried at least annually in accordance with station procedures, and indicated that most equipment specifically listed in response to Question 3 is inventoried more frequently. The second response specifically states that the following items are included in the inventory: fire engines; portable pump; hoses; communications equipment; nozzles; appliances; and firefighter turnout gear. TVA also identified other items that support the mitigating strategies that are inventoried.
Based upon the information above, the NRC staff finds that TVA has provided the information requested by Question 3 for WBN Unit 1.
3.3 Question 4: Configuration and Guidance Management Question 4 of the SO-day request required licensees to describe in detail how configuration and guidance management is assured so that the mitigation strategies remain feasible. The NRC staff verified that TVA described its measures to evaluate plant configuration changes for their effects on the mitigating strategies and to ensure its procedures are current. In its second response, TVA stated that plant configuration changes are procedurally required to be evaluated against the licensing basis, which includes evaluating changes for their affect on the B.5.b mitigating strategies. TVA states that the design change process requires a review of affected procedures and that procedure changes are validated to ensure that the B.5.b mitigating strategies remain viable.
The NRC staff verified that TVA described measures it has taken to validate the procedures or guidelines developed to support the mitigating strategies. In its second response, TVA identified testing in response to Question 2 that demonstrated the ability to execute some strategies. TVA also states that "initially, B.5.b mitigating strategies were validated by walkdowns, engineering evaluations and/or table top reviews" and they were similarly revalidated in 2011.
The NRC staff verified that TVA described the training program implemented in support of the mitigating strategies and how its effectiveness is evaluated. In its second response, TVA identified the training provided to its operations personnel, emergency response organization, fire operations, security personnel, and others. TVA also identified the frequency with which each type of training is provided and the methods for training evaluating.
- 5 Based upon the information above, the NRC staff finds that TVA has provided the information requested by Question 4 for WBN Unit 1.
3.4 Question 5: Offsite Support Question 5 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail how offsite support availability is assured.
The NRC staff verified that TVA listed the offsite organizations it relies upon for emergency response, including a description of agreements and related training. The NRC staff compared the list of offsite organizations that TVA provided in its second response with the information relied upon to make conclusions in the SE. TVA stated that it maintains letters and memorandum of understanding with these offsite organizations, which are reviewed annually, and that these agreements were current at the time of its second response. TVA also described the training and site familiarization it provides to these offsite organizations. TVA stated that it reviewed its corrective action program back to 2008 and found no issues involving lapsed agreements related to offsite support for B.5.b events.
Based upon the information above, the NRC staff finds that TVA has provided the information requested by Question 5 for WBN Unit 1.
4.0 CONCLUSION
As described above, the NRC staff has verified that TVA provided the information requested in Bulletin 2011-01. Specifically, TVA responded to each of the questions in the bulletin as requested. The NRC staff concludes that TVA has completed all of the requirements of the bulletin for WBN Unit 1, and no further information or actions under the bulletin are requested at this time.
Principal Contributor: Blake A. Purnell Date: April 23, 2012
April 23, 2012 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Corporate Manager, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 3R Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - CLOSEOUT OF NRC BULLETIN 2011-01, "MITIGATING STRATEGIES" (TAC NO ME6500)
Dear Mr. Shea:
On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML111250360), to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The purpose of the bulletin was to obtain a comprehensive verification that licensees' mitigating strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel cooling, and containment following a large explosion or fire were compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.54(hh)(2).
The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provided its responses to the bulletin for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 by letters dated June 10 and July 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML11167A098, publicly available, and ML11195A148, non-publicly available, respectively).
The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by TVA for WBN Unit 1 and concludes that its response to the bulletin is acceptable. As summarized in the enclosure, the staff verified that TVA provided the information requested in the bulletin. No further information or actions under the bulletin are requested at this time.
Sincerely, IRA!
Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager Watts Bar Special Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390
Enclosure:
Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Distribution:
PUBLIC RidsNrrLABClayton Resource RidsOgcRp Resource RidsNrrPMWattsBar1 Resource LPWB rlf BPurnell, NRR RidsNrrDprPgcb Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource RidsNrrDorlLp_WB Resource RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource ADAMS Accession No ML12102A218
- memo dated OFFICE NRRlLPWB/PM NRRlLPWB/LA NRRlPGCB/BC NRRlLPWB/BC NRRlLPWB/PM NAME FLyon BClayton KMorgan-Butler*
SCampbell FLyon DATE 4/17/2012 4/1712012 3/20/12 4/23/2012 4/23/2012 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD