ML113570208

Response to License Amendment Request - Use of Neutron Absorbing Inserts in Units 2 & 3 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks

ML113570208
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	12/22/2011
From:	Jesse M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
Shared Package
ML113570216	List: ML113570208
References
Download: ML113570208 (18)

Text

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION - WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 10 CFR 50.90 December 22, 2011 u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 NRC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject:

License Amendment Request - Use of Neutron Absorbing Inserts in Units 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks

References:

1) Letter from M. D. Jesse (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IlLicense Amendment Request - Use of Neutron Absorbing Inserts in Units 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks,1I dated November 3, 2011

2) Letter from J. D. Hughey (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to M. J.

Pacilio (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), IIPeach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action RE: Use of Neutron Absorbing Inserts in Units 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks (TAC NOS. ME7538 and ME7539), II dated December 14, 2011 In the Reference 1 letter, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requested a proposed change to modify the Technical Specifications (TS) to include the use of neutron absorbing spent fuel pool rack inserts for the purpose of criticality control in the spent fuel pools at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. In the Reference 2 letter, the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission requested additional information as part of the acceptance review of this License Amendment Request. Attachment 1 is our response to questions 1, 2, 3, and 4. The response to question 5 is contained in Attachment 2. In the Reference 2 letter, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission also requested that Exelon provide the structural analysis issuance date and the associated document number. That information is contained in our response to question 1. Additionally, the completion date for the clean pool testing was also requested. That information is contained in our response to question 4.

Attachment 2 transmitted herewith contains Proprietary Information.

When separated from attachments, this document is decontrolled.

License Amendment Request Spent Fuel Pool Rack Inserts December 22, 2011 Page 2 contains information proprietary to Global Nuclear Fuel. Global Nuclear Fuel requests that this document be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390. Attachment 3 contains a non-proprietary version of the Global Nuclear Fuel documents.

An affidavit supporting this request is contained in Attachment 4.

Exelon has reviewed the information supporting a finding of no significant hazards consideration and the environmental consideration provided to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Reference 1. The additional information provided in this submittal does not affect the bases for concluding that the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration. In addition, the additional information provided in this submittal does not affect the bases for concluding that neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Tom Loomis at (610) 765-5510.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 22 nd day of December 2011.

Respectfu lIy, Michael D. Jesse Director, Licensin & R Exelon Generation Attachments: 1) Response to Acceptance Review Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4

2) Proprietary Version of Global Nuclear Fuel Response to RAI-05

3) Non-Proprietary Version of Global Nuclear Fuel Response to RAI-05

4) Affidavit cc: USNRC Region I, Regional Administrator USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PBAPS USNRC Project Manager, PBAPS R. R. Janati, Bureau of Radiation Protection S. T. Gray, State of Maryland

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Acceptance Review Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4

Response to Acceptance Review Questions - License Amendment Attach ment 1 Request to Use Neutron Absorbing Inserts Page 1 Question:

IIStructural Analysis: , Section 3.5, "Structural," of the November 3, 2011, submittal includes the following:

"A structural analysis is being performed to show that the in-service loads on the NETCO-SNAP-IN rack insert during normal and seismic conditions are insufficient to cause an operational failure of the rack insert."

and, "The stress on the structure of the existing spent fuel pool storage racks due to the force exerted from the rack insert is being evaluated. The calculated stress will be below the allowable stress of the spent fuel pool storage racks, and is, therefore, acceptable." , Section 4.3, "No Significant Hazards Consideration," of the November 3, 2011, submittal includes the following in response to question No.2 regarding the spent fuel pool inserts:

"These devices do not add any limiting structural loads or affect the removal of decay heat from the assemblies."

The licensee's statements above indicate that the structural integrity of the proposed spent fuel pool rack inserts has been presumed acceptable prior to completion of the technical analysis that would support that conclusion.

RAI 01: Summarize the results of the structural analysis related to the spent fuel pool rack inserts and the spent fuel pool racks that supports the technical acceptability asserted in Section 3.5 and Section 4.3 of Attachment 1 of the November 3, 2011, submittal, as well as any necessary changes to the "No Significant Hazards Consideration" contained in Section 4.3. This summary should demonstrate that the structural design basis criteria associated with the racks and rack inserts will be satisfied following installation of the NETCO-SNAP-IN neutron absorbing inserts. Additionally, discuss the interface between the insert and the spent fuel racks, and specifically discuss how the NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts are supported at this interface. Further, please address the effects of design basis loading combinations on the adequacy of the insert support at the interface. 1I

Response

The structural analysis has determined that the NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts meet all of the specified design requirements and the design basis load combinations continue to be bounded by the Westinghouse spent fuel pool calculation (Design Report of High Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks For Philadelphia Electric Company Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2

& 3,11 WNEP 8542, June 18,1985). Based on the discussion below, no changes to the No Significant Hazards Consideration are necessary.

Response to Acceptance Review Questions - License Amendment Attachment 1 Request to Use Neutron Absorbing Inserts Page 2 The structural analysis prepared by NETCO addressed the structural integrity of the NETCO-SNAP-I N neutron absorber insert and the spent fuel storage rack in the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit 2 spent fuel pool. The NETCO structural analysis was entered into the PBAPS documentation system as Calculation PM-111 0 via ECR 11-00077, dated June 24, 2011. The analysis addressed dead loads, including internal stresses in the installed insert and external forces upon the rack walls, and live loads including their impact on SSCs during a seismic event. Based on the similarity of Unit 2 and Unit 3 this analysis is applicable to both PBAPS, Units 2 and 3.

The dead load analysis documented that each insert will be pre-loaded during installation by compressing it from its initial 93 degree bend angle to its installed 90 degree bend angle. The analysis, using experimental data, showed that the maximum internal stresses developed in the inserts are less than the ultimate strength of the material used to manufacture the insert and is thus acceptable. The clean pool test results and the corresponding minimum removal force criteria (200 pounds min.) confirm that sufficient horizontal and vertical restraint exist to prevent the inserts from displacing during normal plant operations or a Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) design basis event, and are thus considered to be integral with the spent fuel storage racks.

The external stresses imparted to the spent fuel storage rack wall by the insert were calculated to be far below the yield stress of the 304 stainless steel used to manufacture the rack. The analysis utilized the maximum specified design weight of the installation tool (800 Ibs) as the installation force. This installation force was divided by the insert wing contact area, which resulted in a force to the spent fuel storage rack wall of 34 psi. Review of the Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record reveals the controlling stress for the rack design is 7384 psi actual vs. 9260 psi allowable. Thus, the racks will remain well below their allowable stress limits with the additional 34 psi associated with the insert installation.

The live load analysis documents that the Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record determined a maximum impact force between a fuel bundle and the rack wall of 403 Ibf.

This value was conservatively assumed to remain the limiting impact force since the installation of the insert will reduce the horizontal distance available for the fuel assembly to accelerate during a seismic event. The NETCO analysis assumed this impact force is applied to a 1 square inch area producing an impact stress of 403 psi in the insert. Based upon the impact force, the resultant stresses applied to the insert during a seismic event have been shown to be less than the insert material yield stress of 8000 psi.

Question:

IIS e ismic Analysis: , Section 3.6, "Seismic," of the November 3, 2011, submittal includes the following:

"The calculation documents that the weight of the insert combined with the weight of a channeled PBAPS fuel assembly is less than the weight used in the original PBAPS Westinghouse spent fuel pool storage rack design, and is thus bounded by the Westinghouse design. Therefore the structural integrity of the Reactor Building, spent fuel pool, and storage racks is not compromised."

Response to Acceptance Review Questions - License Amendment Attachment 1 Request to Use Neutron Absorbing Inserts Page 3 , Section 3.1.3, "Proposed Method for Mitigation of Boraflex Degradation," of the November 3, 2011, submittal includes the following:

"The rack insert is designed to become an integral part of the spent fuel storage rack once it has been installed."

PBAPS Units 2 and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.3.4.1.3, "Base Support Assembly," states, "The high density spent fuel storage racks are seismic Category I equipment as defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.13. These racks are designed to withstand the effects of a maximum credible earthquake and remain functional, in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 and the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 100."

and, "The results of the seismic and structural analyses are interrelated as the loads of the seismic analysis are used in the structural analysis to calculate stresses. The resulting margins of safety are positive and satisfy the requirements of the ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code."

The seismic assessment presented in Attachment 1, Section 3.6, of the licensee's submittal does not address any potential impact on the functionality of the spent fuel pool storage racks associated with the structural integrity of the inserts under seismic loadings. Specifically, there is no information regarding the effect of the installation of the NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts on the hydrodynamic behavior of the modified (Le., with inserts installed) racks nor the effect of the rack inserts on the revised fuel-to-rack impact loads during seismic excitation.

RAI 02: With respect to the seismic analyses performed to support the license amendment request associated with the neutron absorber inserts at PBAPS, please summarize the results of the revised seismic analysis and address how the inserts meet Seismic Category I requirements as an integral part of the spent fuel pool storage racks. II

Response

The insert weight and applied impact forces are bounded by the Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record so that the structural integrity of the Reactor Building, spent fuel pool, storage racks and fuel assemblies is not compromised.

The spent fuel storage racks are designed to comply with Seismic Category I requirements in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, Revision 3. Loads and load combinations are in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.8.4, Revision 1, except USNRC Letter dated April 14, 1978, IIOT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent fuel Storage and ll Handling Applications was used in lieu of Appendix D. As a result, the rack inserts are also classified as Seismic Category I.

Two load effects associated with the use of the rack inserts have been evaluated.

Response to Acceptance Review Questions - License Amendment Attach ment 1 Request to Use Neutron Absorbing Inserts Page 4 First, the impact loads of the fuel assemblies on the rack inserts during the MCE design basis event were evaluated. During the MCE design basis event, fuel assemblies will impact on the spent fuel storage rack cell walls and installed rack inserts due to horizontal acceleration of the individual fuel racks. With the NETCO-SNAP-IN rack inserts installed, the "Fuel Assembly-to-Storage Rack" impact forces will be reduced as the horizontal distance available for fuel assembly acceleration will be reduced by the thickness of the rack insert. Review of the Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record indicates that without a rack insert installed, and conservatively assuming the total impact force is concentrated within one square inch of material, the horizontal impact stress on the spent fuel storage rack cell walls is 403 psi.

Application of this impact stress directly to the insert during a seismic event has been shown to be less than the insert material yield stress of 8000 psi. Additionally, since the horizontal "Fuel Assembly-to-Storage Rack" distance is reduced by the insert installation, the existing Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record remains bounding for the spent fuel storage racks and the fuel assemblies.

Second, the impact of the insert on the spent fuel storage racks was reviewed. The rack inserts have a calculated dry weight of approximately 16 pounds and a wet weight of approximately 10.4 pounds. The license amendment request provided a conservative wet weight of approximately 12 pounds. The weight of the limiting consolidated fuel assembly in the Westinghouse spent fuel storage Rack calculation of record is 1315 pounds, as compared to the weight of the fuel assembly in the NETCO analysis of 800 pounds. The assumed 800 pound fuel assembly in the NETCO analysis bounds the weight of any used PBAPS fuel assembly currently residing in the pools as well as the weight of the assemblies used in the current fuel design. Comparing these values the analysis concluded that the weight of the insert is much less than the difference between the assumed weight of PBAPS fuel assemblies (i.e., 515 pounds).

The installation force is limited to the weight of the installation tool (800 pounds max.). This installation force does not overstress the spent fuel storage rack or the inserts. The clean pool test results and the corresponding minimum removal force criteria (200 pounds min.) confirm that sufficient horizontal and vertical restraint exist to prevent the inserts from displacing during an MCE design basis event. Therefore, the inserts are considered integral with the spent fuel storage racks, and are classified as Seismic Class I. (The insert dry weight is approximately 16 pounds, and the corresponding Reactor Building floor response defines the MCE horizontal acceleration as 0.432g (zpa) / 2.88g (peak) and MCE vertical acceleration as 0.288g (zpa) /

1.92g (peak).)

Question:

"RAI 03: As stated in Section 3.4.1 of the LAR submittal, the installation of the NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts reduces the clearance between the spent fuel rack cell and the spent fuel bundle within the rack. No information is provided in the LAR submittal regarding the effect of this reduced clearance on the impact forces between the rack and fuel bundle generated during a seismic event. Consistent with the design and licensing basis requirements related to the PBAPS spent fuel racks, please provide information which demonstrates that the loads induced on a fuel assembly, when considering the inclusion of the NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts, does not lead to damage of the fuel."

Response to Acceptance Review Questions - License Amendment Attachment 1 Request to Use Neutron Absorbing Inserts PageS

Response

As discussed in the response to RAI-02, the impact loads of fuel assemblies on the rack inserts during the MCE design basis event were evaluated. During the MCE design basis event, fuel assemblies will impact on the spent fuel storage rack cell walls and installed rack inserts due to horizontal acceleration of the individual fuel racks. With the NETCO-SNAP-IN rack inserts installed, the IIFuel Assembly-to-Storage Rack ll impact forces will be reduced as the horizontal distance available for fuel assembly acceleration will be reduced by the thickness of the rack insert. Review of the Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record indicates that without a rack insert installed, and conservatively assuming the total impact force is concentrated within one square inch of material, the horizontal impact stress on the spent fuel storage rack cell walls is 403 psi. Application of this impact stress directly to the insert during a seismic event has been shown to be less than the insert material yield stress of 8000 psi.

Additionally, since the horizontalllFuel Assembly-to-Storage Rack ll distance is reduced by the insert installation, the existing Westinghouse spent fuel storage rack calculation of record remains bounding for the spent fuel storage racks and the fuel assemblies.

Question:

IIRetention Forces Section 3.4.3 and Section 3.4.4 of the LAR submittal states that a demonstration program will be used in evaluating whether the NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts will dislodge during fuel assembly placement and removal.

RAI 04: Please provide a technical justification regarding the lack of prior completion of retention force testing for the PBAPS NETCO-SNAP-IN spent fuel rack inserts. This justification should demonstrate that there is reasonable assurance that the NETCO-SNAP-I N inserts will exhibit adequate performance such that the insertion, drag and withdraw forces imposed on these inserts will not induce a condition which would prevent the inserts from performing their intended safety function. 1I

Response

Retention force testing of the rack inserts was performed in a clean pool environment on July 26 and 27, 2011, and August 8,2011. These clean pool tests were performed using specially made, full-scale test cells that were fabricated using design specifications of the spent fuel pool rack cells at PBAPS. During these tests, full size NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts, made from the same Alcan W 11 OON series material that will be used in the PBAPS spent fuel pools, were installed and removed from each test cell in order to verify that the mechanical design specifications for each NETCO-SNAP-IN insert size had been met. The clean pool testing verified specific design criteria which included the insertion forces, drag forces, and withdrawal forces. This clean pool testing verified the mechanical design criteria and assumptions in a clean pool environment, and demonstrated reasonable assurance that the insertion, drag and withdrawal forces imposed on these inserts will not induce a condition that would prevent the inserts from performing their intended safety function.

The rack inserts are intended to be a permanent addition to the spent fuel storage racks. In order to demonstrate that the installed rack inserts remain in place under loads experienced during insertion and removal of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel storage rack cells, the

Response to Acceptance Review Questions - License Amendment Attachment 1 Request to Use Neutron Absorbing Inserts Page 6 retention forces were measured in clean pool testing. These retention forces are sufficient to ensure the rack insert remains in place during normal (Le., fuel handling) conditions as shown by fuel assembly drag forces and abnormal (Le., seismic) conditions as described in our response to RAI-02 above. The maximum installation force (less than 800 Ibs), maximum drag force (less than 75 Ibs) and minimum removal force (greater than 200 Ibs) were demonstrated during the clean pool testing.

In addition to the clean pool testing already completed as described above, demonstration program installation testing is ongoing. This additional demonstration program testing is performed in the PBAPS spent fuel pool as a validation of the clean pool testing. In the same manner that a plant modification acceptance test verifies that the installed configuration meets the design, the demonstration testing in the PBAPS spent fuel pool is a confirmation that the inserts, once installed, meet the clean pool testing specifications. Additionally, the in-plant demonstration will aid in providing lessons learned for installation personnel when the actual insert installation begins.

In summary, the results of the clean pool testing confirmed the conclusions of the NETCO structural analysis and provide reasonable assurance that NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts will perform their intended safety function when installed.

ATTACHMENT 3 Non-Proprietary Version of Global Nuclear Fuel Response to RAI-05

ENCLOSURE 2 CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175 GNF Response to NRC Acceptance Review RAI 05 Non-Proprietary Information - Class I (Public)

INFORMATION NOTICE This is the non-proprietary version of CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175 Enclosure 1, which has the proprietary information removed. Portions of the document that have been removed are indicated by white space inside an open and closed bracket as shown here (( )).

CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175 Non-Proprietary Information - Class I (Public) Page 1 of 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analyses:

In Attachments 7 and 8 of the November 3, 2011, submittal the licensee included Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) reports NEDO-33672 2 and NEDO-33686 3 , respectively, to provide the technical basis for the amendment request. Attachment 1, Section 3.2.1, "Criticality Evaluation for Final Spent Fuel Pool Configuration," of the November 3, 2011, submittal notes that the NRC has previously approved the use of the MCNP-05PITGBLA06 code package for use in a similar spent fuel pool criticality analysis. The licensee referenced GNF Report NEDO-33374-A, "Safety Analysis Report for Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for ESBWR [Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor] Plants," Revision 4, September 2010,4 as supporting NRC approval. However, based on the acceptance review, the NRC staff noted that the treatment of the code validation uncertainties for the GNF analysis has changed from the previously accepted approach contained in GNF Report NEDO-33374-A.

RAI 05: In order to proceed with the review of the submittal, the NRC staff requests that the licensee provide a technical basis for the change in the analytical approach regarding the treatment of the code validation uncertainties.

GNF Response:

The MCNP-05P/TGBLA06 code package was used in the same manner in NEDO-33672, NEDO-33686, and NEDO-33374-A. The only difference in the analytical approach regarding the treatment of code validation uncertainties between NEDO-33374-A and the calculations in and 8 of the November 3, 2011 submittal for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) is in the treatment of some of the biases and uncertainties used to calculate the keff at a 950/0 probability and 95%) confidence level. ((

)). There are no other changes to the treatment of code validation uncertainties as approved in NEDO-33374-A.

2 Global Nuclear Fuel, NEDO-33672, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station: Fuel Storage Criticality Safety Analysis of Spent Fuel Storage Racks with Rack Inserts," September 2011, Revision 0 (Non- Proprietary Version).

3 Global Nuclear Fuel, NEDO-33686, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station: Fuel Storage Criticality Safety Analysis of Spent Fuel Storage Racks with Boraflex," September 2011, Revision 0 (Non-Proprietary Version).

4 ADAMS Accession No. ML102860687.

CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175 Non-Proprietary Information - Class I (Public) Page 2 of 2 In typical spent fuel pool criticality safety analyses, independent uncertainties are statistically combined to determine a single uncertainty adder to apply to the final in-rack reactivity. This approach is called out explicitly as acceptable in the Kopp Memo, which states:

"Uncertainties should be determined for the proposed storage facilities and fuel assemblies to account for tolerances in the mechanical and material specifications. An acceptable method for determining the maximum reactivity may be either (1) a worst-case combination with mechanical and material conditions set to maximize keff or (2) a sensitivity study of the reactivity effects of tolerance variations. If used, a sensitivity study should include all significant variations (tolerances) in the material and mechanical specifications of the racks; the result may be combined statistically provided they are independent variations. Combinations of the two methods may also be used."

The NRC Division of Safety Systems Interim Staff Guidance Document DSS-ISG-2010-01 provides further technical guidance in Section IV.2, which states:

"A reactivity uncertainty due to uncertainty in the fuel depletion calculations should be developed and combined with other calculational uncertainties. In the absence of any other determination of the depletion uncertainty, an uncertainty equal to 5 percent of the reactivity decrement to the burnup of interest is an acceptable assumption".

((

))

ATTACHMENT 4 Affidavit

ENCLOSURE 3 CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175 Affidavit

Global Nuclear Fuel- Americas AFFIDAVIT

[, Andrew A. Lingenfelter, state as follows:

(1) I am Vice President, Fuel Engineering, Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC (GNF-A),

and have been delegated the function of reviewing the information described in paragraph (2) which is sought to be withheld, and have been authorized to apply for its withholding.

(2) The information sought to be withheld is contained in Enclosure 1 of GNF's letter, CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175, C. Lamb (GNF-A) to T. Loomis (Exelon Nuclear), entitled "GNF Response to NRC Acceptance Review RAI 05 for the License Amendment Request for Use of Neutron Absorbing Spent Fuel Pool Rack Inserts for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3," dated December 16,2011. GNF-A proprietary information in Enclosure 1, which is entitled "GNF Response to NRC Acceptance Review RAI 05," is identified by a dotted underline inside double square brackets. ((J]Ji.~ .. ~~.l).t9.f.l.<;~ ..i~ .. f:l-n

~E~JllPJ9:_1_:~~)) In all cases, the superscript notation {3} refers to Paragraph (3) of this affidavit, which provides the basis for the proprietary determination.

(3) In making this application for withholding of proprietary information of which it is the owner or licensee, GNF-A relies upon the exemption from disclosure set forth in the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 USC Sec. 552(b)(4), and the Trade Secrets Act, 18 USC Sec. 1905, and NRC regulations 10 CFR 9.17(a)(4), and 2.390(a)(4) for "trade secrets" (Exemption 4). The material for which exemption from disclosure is here sought also qualify under the narrower definition of "trade secret", within the meanings assigned to those terms for purposes of FOIA Exemption 4 in, respectively, Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F2d 871 (DC Cir. 1992), and Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F2d 1280 (DC Cir. 1983).

(4) Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are:

a. Information that discloses a process, method, or apparatus, including supporting data and analyses, where prevention of its use by GNF-A's competitors without license from GNF-A constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies;

b. Information which, if used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing of a similar product;

c. Information which reveals aspects of past, present, or future GNF-A customer-funded development plans and programs, resulting in potential products to GNF-A;

d. Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may be desirable to obtain patent protection.

The information sought to be withheld is considered to be proprietary for the reasons set forth in paragraphs (4)a. and (4)b. above.

CFL-EXN-HEO-ll-l 75 Enclosure 1 Affidavit Page 1 of 3

(5) To address 10 CFR 2.390 (b) (4), the information sought to be withheld is being submitted to NRC in confidence. The information is of a sort customarily held in confidence by GNF-A, and is in fact so held. The information sought to be withheld has, to the best of my knowledge and belief, consistently been held in confidence by GNF-A, no public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties including any required transmittals to NRC, have been made, or must be made, pursuant to regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence. Its initial designation as proprietary information, and the subsequent steps taken to prevent its unauthorized disclosure, are as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) following.

(6) Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a document is made by the manager of the originating component, the person most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge, or subject to the terms under which it was licensed to GNF-A. Access to such documents within GNF-A is limited on a "need to know" basis.

(7) The procedure for approval of external release of such a document typically requires review by the staff manager, project manager, principal scientist or other equivalent authority, by the manager of the cognizant marketing function (or his delegate), and by the Legal Operation, for technical content, competitive effect, and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation. Disclosures outside GNF-A are limited to regulatory bodies, customers, and potential customers, and their agents, suppliers, and licensees, and others with a legitimate need for the information, and then only in accordance with appropriate regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements.

(8) The information identified in paragraph (2), above, is classified as proprietary because it contains details of the nuclear fuel criticality licensing methodology for the GEH Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). Development of these methods, techniques, and information and their application for the design, modification, and analyses methodologies and processes was achieved at a significant cost GNF-A.

The development of the evaluation processes along with the interpretation and application of the analytical results is derived from the extensive experience database that constitutes a major GNF-A asset.

(9) Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to GNF-A's competitive position and foreclose or reduce the availability of profit-making opportunities. The information is part of GNF-A's comprehensive BWR safety and technology base, and its commercial value extends beyond the original development cost.

The value of the technology base goes beyond the extensive physical database and analytical methodology and includes development of the expertise to determine and apply the appropriate evaluation process. In addition, the technology base includes the value derived from providing analyses done with NRC-approved methods.

The research, development, engineering, analytical, and NRC review costs compnse a substantial investment of time and money by GNF-A.

CFL-EXN-HEO-11-175 Enclosure 1 Affidavit Page 2 of 3

The precise value of the expertise to devise an evaluation process and apply the correct analytical lnethodology is difficult to quantify, but it clearly is substantial.

GNF-A's competitive advantage will be lost if its competitors are able to use the results of the GNF-A experience to normalize or verify their own process or if they are able to claim an equivalent understanding by demonstrating that they can arrive at the same or similar conclusions.

The value of this information to GNF-A would be lost if the information were disclosed to the public. Making such information available to competitors without their having been required to undertake a similar expenditure of resources would unfairly provide competitors with a windfall, and deprive GNF-A of the opportunity to exercise its competitive advantage to seek an adequate return on its large investment in developing and obtaining these very valuable analytical tools.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed on this 16th day of December 20 II.

Andrew A. Lingenfelter Vice President, Fuel Engineering Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC CFL-EXN-HEO-II-175 Enclosure I Affidavit Page 3 of 3