ML112700860

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2011-08-Draft Outlines
ML112700860
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 08/26/2011
From:
NRC Region 4
To:
References
50-482/11-08
Download: ML112700860 (47)


Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Examination: Aug.- Sept.

2011 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

R.A.1.a Refuel/ Reduced Inventory: Perform the time N, R to core uncovery estimation using the OFN EJ-015, LOSS OF RHR COOLING, step 31. Requires use of Conduct of Operations Figures 5 (time to boil) and 6 (time to uncovery).

R.A.1.a 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves tables, etc. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO =

3.9 SRO = 4.2)

M, R S.A.1.a Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor S.A.1.a Operators completed manual calculation of RTP; STS SE-002, MANUAL CALCULATION OF REACTOR THERMAL POWER. Requires discovery of errors made by Reactor Operator.

2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO = 4.6 SRO = 4.6)

R.A.1.b Determine the shutdown margin using STS N, R RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or R A.1.b limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)

N, R S.A.1.b Review/Approve/Verify the Reactor Operators S.A.1.b completed manual calculation of the shutdown margin per STS RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.

2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)

DRAFT 1 of 3

R.A.2 Complete STS AL-211, TURB DRIVEN AUX N, R FDWTR SYS FLOW PATH VERIFICATION &

INSERVICE CHEC VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Equipment Control Sheet.

R.A.2 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)

S.A.2 S.A.2 Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor N, R Operators completed STS EF-100B, ESW SYSTEM INSERVICE PUMP A & ESW A DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Sheet.

2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)

S.A.3 The Containment Purge permit that was in N, R progress was stopped. Determine/Authorize the restart for the Containment Purge Permit. (AP 07B-001, Radiation Control Radioactive Releases, see section 6.2.4.6)

S.A.3 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits (CFR 41.13/43.4/45.9 RO = 2.0 SRO = 3.8) and/or 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases (CFR 41.11/43.4/45.10 RO = 3.8 SRO = 4.3)

DRAFT 2 of 3

R.A.4 Determine percentage of Control Room N, R annunciator loss using OFN PK-029, LOSS OF NON-VITAL 125VDC BUS PK01, PK02, PK03, PK04, AND Emergency Procedures/Plan ANNUNCIATORS.

R.A.4 2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.13 RO = 3.6 SRO

= 4.0)

S.A.4 (In the classroom setting) Determine the E-Plan classification and Protective action recommendations, if S.A.4 D, R any.

2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.11 RO = 2.9 SRO = 4.6) and 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR 41.10/41.12/43.5/45.11 RO =

2.4 SRO = 4.4)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

DRAFT 3 of 3

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Examination: Aug. -Sept.

2011 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Bolded is an Alternate Success Path JPM.

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. S1: 001 - Control Rod Drive System N, S 1 Perform the actions of STS SF-001, CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN ROD OPERABILITY VERIFICATION, for Control Bank A.

001 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (3.7/4.1)

RO/SRO-I

b. S2: 013 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation M, EN, A, S 2 System (ESFAS)

Perform actions to ensure CRVIS actuation using EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Attachment F, Automatic Signal Verification (step F9, RNO).

PRA: ESFAS is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

013 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate. (4.5/4.8)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U DRAFT 1 of 6

c. S3: 006 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) D, A, S 3 Perform actions to increase level in an Accumulator using a Safety Injection Pump per procedure SYS EP-200, SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR OPERATIONS (see sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 or 6.4), however, gas voiding is diagnosed due to SIP oscillations and OFN BG-045, GAS BINDING OF CCPS OR SI PUMPS, is entered and performed.

SOER 97-1, Potential Loss of High Pressure Injection and Charging Capability from Gas Intrusion 006 A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper discharge pressure. (3.4/3.8) 006 A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper amperage to the pump motor.

(3.4/3.5) 006 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: pumps. (4.1/3.9)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U

d. S4: 041 - Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass M, L, S 4S Control Perform actions to establish a maximum rate cooldown using the ARVs per EMG E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.

041 A4.06 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Atmospheric relief valve controllers. (2.9/3.1)

RO/SRO-I DRAFT 2 of 6

e. S5: 003 - Reactor Coolant Pumps System M, L, S 4P Perform the actions of ALR 00-070B, RCP VIB/SYS ALERT and OFN BB-005, RCP MALFUNCTIONS, to secure an RCP.

(High frame vibration requires a Controlled Shutdown per Attachment C of OFN BB-005, RCP MALFUNCTIONS).

003 A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions of operations on the RCPs; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP. (3.7/3.9)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U

f. S6: 103 - Containment Systems D, S 5 Perform actions to startup the Containment Purge System per SYS GT-120, CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE SYSTEM OPERATIONS, sections 6.1 and 6.2.

103 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including:

Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity. (3.7/4.1)

RO

g. S7: 015 - Nuclear Instrumentation D, S 7 Perform actions to bypass a failed Power Range nuclear instrumentation channel using OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, Attachment R (see step R4).

015 A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip bypasses. (3.8/3.9)

RO/SRO-I DRAFT 3 of 6

h. S8: 008 - Component Cooling Water System (CCW) M, A, S 8 Perform actions of ALR 00-052A, CCW TO RCP FLOW LO, to respond to a loss of a CCW pump.

A4.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCW indications and controls. (3.3/3.1)

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of a CCW pump. (3.3/3.6)

PRA: Component Cooling Water is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

RO/SRO-I In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. P1: 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System D, A, R, E 1 Perform local actions to borate the Reactor Coolant System. (See OFN BG-009, EMERGENCY BORATION, Attachment A, Establishing Alternate Boration Flowpath.)

004 A2.14 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations. (3.8/3.9)

APE 024 AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Manual boration valve. (3.6/3.7)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U DRAFT 4 of 6

j. P2: 061 - Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System N 4S Perform actions of STN FC-002, AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE OVERSPEED TEST section 8.1.6.

061 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(4.4/4.6))

PRA: Auxiliary Feedwater (AL) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

RO/SRO-I D, A 6

k. P3: 064 - Emergency Diesel Generators Perform actions of ALR 00-020D, DG NE01 TROUBLE alarm. Local alarm response procedure ALR 501, STANDBY DIESEL ENGINE SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL KJ-121, Attachment A, Fuel Oil Press Low and Attachment C, Fuel Strain Diff Press High, are performed.

064 K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationship between the ED/G system and the following systems: Diesel fuel oil supply system.

(3.6/4.0)

PRA: Diesel Fuel Oil (JE) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U DRAFT 5 of 6

(A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator DRAFT 6 of 6

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Exam: Aug - Sept 2011 Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I

M C S A B S A B S A B S A B L U A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M(*)

N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P R I U T P E

RO RX 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 1&4 I/C 1256 26 27 8 4 4 2 MAJ 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 SRO-U TS 12 0 0 2 0 2 2 RO RX 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 2&5 I/C 256 1235 236 11 4 4 2 6

SRO-U MAJ 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 TS 0 123 0 3 0 2 2 RO RX 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 3&6 I/C 1 135 2367 8 4 4 2 MAJ 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 SRO-U TS 0 0 23 2 0 2 2 RO 1 RX 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 256 26 27 7 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 1 TS 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 DRAFT 1 of 5

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Exam: Aug - Sept 2011 Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I

M C S A B S A B S A B S A B L U A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M(*)

N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P R I U T P E

RO 2 RX 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1 135 236 7 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 RO RX 3 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1256 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 4 1 2 2 1 1 TS 12 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1235 5 4 4 2 6

SRO-U 2 MAJ 4 1 2 2 1 TS 123 3 0 2 2 RO RX 0 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2367 4 4 4 2 SRO- MAJ 5 1 2 2 1 U3 TS 23 2 0 2 2 DRAFT 2 of 5

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Exam: Aug - Sept 2011 Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 Backup T M P E O I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I

M C S A B S A B S A B S A B L U A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M(*)

N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P R I U T P E

RO RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1267 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 38 2 2 2 1 TS 123 3 0 2 2 RO RX 4 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 0 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 267 1 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 38 38 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 DRAFT 3 of 5

Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.

If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

DRAFT 4 of 5

DRAFT 5 of 5 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Wolf Creek Printed:

Date of Exam: 08/29/2011 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 0 0 0 Emergency 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 9 0 0 0

& N/A N/A Abnormal Tier Plant Totals 4 5 5 4 5 4 27 0 0 0 Evolutions 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 28 0 0 0 2.

2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 Plant Systems Tier 0 0 0 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 38 Totals 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

3. Generic Knowledge And 10 0 Abilities Categories 3 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 Note:
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

1

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery X EK2.03 - Reactor trip status panel 3.5 1

/1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X AK2.02 - Sensors and detectors 2.7* 1 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EK2.03 - S/Gs 3.0 1 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X EA2.04 - Significance of PZR readings 3.7 1 000015/000017 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X AA2.01 - Cause of RCP failure 3.0 1 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X AK1.02 - Relationship of charging flow 2.7 1 to press. diff. between charging and RCS 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X AK3.02 - Isolation of RHR low-pressure 3.3 1 piping prior to pressure increase above specified level 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X 2.4.2 - Knowledge of system set points, 4.5 1 interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System X 2.2.22 - Knowledge of limiting conditions 4.0 1 Malfunction / 3 for operations and safety limits.

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X EA1.15 - AFW source level and capacity 3.9 1 (chart) 000040 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat X AK1.03 - RCS shrink and consequent 3.8 1 Transfer / 4 depressurization 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X AK1.02 - Effects of feedwater 3.6 1 introduction on dry S/G 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X EA1.01 - In-core thermocouple 3.7 1 temperatures 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X 2.1.28 - Knowledge of the purpose and 4.1 1 function of major system components and controls.

000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid X AA2.04 - VARs outside the capability 3.6 1 Disturbances / 6 curve W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X EA1.2 - Operating behavior 3.6 1 characteristics of the facility W/E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and 3.7 1 emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 2

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 X EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and 3.5 1 emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 18 3

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X AK2.06 - T-ave./ref. deviation meter 3.0* 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X AA2.02 - Signal inputs to rod control 2.7 1 system 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X AK3.01 - Boration and emergency 4.0 1 boration in the event of a stuck rod during trip or normal evolutions 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X AK2.03 - Controllers and positioners 2.6 1 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X AA1.05 - Radiation monitor for auxiliary 3.3 1 building exhaust processes 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 2.4.31 - Knowledge of annunciator 4.2 1 alarms, indications, or response procedures.

000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 X AK3.02 - Guidance contained in alarm 3.4 1 response for ARM system 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X AK1.01 - Effect of pressure on leak rate 2.6 1 W/E01 Rediagnosis / 3 X EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate 3.3 1 procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments K/A Category Totals: 1 2 2 1 2 1 Group Point Total: 9 4

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X K2.01 - RCPS 3.1 1 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X A4.05 - RCP seal leakage 3.1 1 detection instrumentation 004 Chemical and Volume Control X K3.07 - PZR level and 3.8 1 pressure 005 Residual Heat Removal X K2.03 - RCS pressure 2.7* 1 boundary motor-operated valves 005 Residual Heat Removal X A4.01 - Controls and 3.6* 1 indication for RHR pumps 006 Emergency Core Cooling X K3.01 - RCS 4.1* 1 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X 2.1.32 - Ability to explain 3.8 1 and apply system limits and precautions.

007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X A2.01 - Stuck-open PORV or 3.9 1 code safety 008 Component Cooling Water X K1.02 - Loads cooled by 3.3 1 CCWS 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X K5.01 - Determination of 3.5 1 condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables 012 Reactor Protection X K4.08 - Logic matrix testing 2.8* 1 013 Engineered Safety Features X K4.09 - Spurious trip 2.7 1 Actuation protection 022 Containment Cooling X A1.04 - Cooling water flow 3.2 1 022 Containment Cooling X A3.01 - Initiation of 4.1 1 safeguards mode of operation 026 Containment Spray X A2.07 - Loss of Ctmt Spray 3.6 1 pump suction when in recirc.

mode 039 Main and Reheat Steam X K5.08 - Effect of steam 3.6 1 removal on reactivity 059 Main Feedwater X K4.17 - Increased feedwater 2.5* 1 flow following a reactor trip 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X K6.01 - Controllers and 2.5 1 positioners 062 AC Electrical Distribution X A1.03 - Effect on 2.5 1 instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies 063 DC Electrical Distribution X K3.02 - Components using 3.5 1 DC control power 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.1.31 - Ability to locate 4.6 1 control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

5

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X K6.08 - Fuel oil storage tanks 3.2 1 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X 2.1.30 - Ability to locate and 4.4 1 operate components, including local controls.

073 Process Radiation Monitoring X K1.01 - Those systems served 3.6 1 by PRMs 076 Service Water X A1.02 - Reactor and turbine 2.6* 1 building closed cooling water temperatures 078 Instrument Air X A3.01 - Air pressure 3.1 1 078 Instrument Air X K1.04 - Cooling wtr to comp. 2.6 1 103 Containment X A2.04 - Containment 3.5* 1 evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)

K/A Category Totals: 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 Group Point Total: 28 6

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 002 Reactor Coolant X K4.01 - Filling and draining 2.7 1 the RCS 011 Pressurizer Level Control X K6.04 - Operation of PZR 3.1 1 level controllers 014 Rod Position Indication X A1.04 - Axial and radial 3.5 1 power distribution 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X K3.02 - CRDS 3.3* 1 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X K5.01 - Separation of control 2.7* 1 and protection circuits 027 Containment Iodine Removal X K2.01 - Fans 3.1* 1 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and X A2.01 - Hydrogen recombiner 3.4* 1 Purge Control power setting, determined by using plant data book 029 Containment Purge X A4.01 - Containment purge 2.5 1 flow rate 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 2.2.12 - Knowledge of 3.7 1 surveillance procedures.

035 Steam Generator X A3.01 - S/G water level 4.0 1 control K/A Category Totals: 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10 7

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek Form ES-401-3 Generic Category KA KA Topic Imp. Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, 3.6 1 records, status boards, and reports.

2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved 3.0 1 in core alterations.

2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications 4.3 1 to validate the response of another indication.

Category Total: 3 Equipment Control 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and 3.5 1 mechanical drawings.

2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable 3.0 1 alarms.

Category Total: 2 Radiation Control 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit 3.5 1 requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles 3.2 1 pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Category Total: 2 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.9 Knowledge of low power /shutdown implications in 3.8 1 accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.

2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to 4.0 1 assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an 4.2 1 accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

Category Total: 3 Generic Total: 10 8

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Wolf Creek Printed:

Date Of Exam: 08/29/2011 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total

1. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 Emergency 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4

& N/A N/A Abnormal Tier Plant Totals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 10 Evolutions 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 2.

2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 Plant Systems Tier 5 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Totals 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

3. Generic Knowledge And 0 7 Abilities Categories 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 Note:
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

9

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000029 ATWS / 1 X EA2.02 - Reactor trip alarm 4.4 1 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X AA2.03 - Operational status of safety 3.9 1 injection pump 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X 2.4.8 - Knowledge of how abnormal 4.5 1 operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X 2.4.3 - Ability to identify post-accident 3.9 1 instrumentation.

000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X AA2.01 - Cause and effect of low- 3.2 1 pressure instrument air alarm W/E12 - Uncontrolled Depressurization of all X 2.4.18 - Knowledge of the specific bases 4.0 1 Steam Generators / 4 for EOPs.

K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 3 3 Group Point Total: 6 10

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X 2.2.25 - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety 4.2 1 limits.

000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X EA2.01 - Subcooling Margin 4.9 1 W/E 13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate 3.4 1 procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 X 2.4.1 - Knowledge of EOP entry 4.8 1 conditions and immediate action steps.

K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 2 2 Group Point Total: 4 11

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 006 Emergency Core Cooling X 2.4.6 - Knowledge of EOP 4.7 1 mitigation strategies.

008 Component Cooling Water X A2.05 - Effect of loss of inst. 3.5 1 and cont. air on the position of the CCW valves 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X A2.03 - PORV failures 4.2 1 062 AC Electrical Distribution 2.1.25 - Ability to interpret 4.2 1 X

reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

064 Emergency Diesel Generator X A2.06 - Operating unloaded, 3.3 1 lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 Group Point Total: 5 12

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 045 Main Turbine Generator X A2.17 - Malfunction of 2.9* 1 electrohydraulic control 068 Liquid Radwaste X 2.1.20 - Ability to interpret 4.6 1 and execute procedure steps.

079 Station Air X A2.01 - Cross-connection 3.2 1 with IAS K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 Group Point Total: 3 13

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek Form ES-401-3 Generic Category KA KA Topic Imp. Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator 3.8 1 responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of 3.9 1 SROs.

Category Total: 2 Equipment Control 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the 4.5 1 facility license.

Category Total: 1 Radiation Control 2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as 2.9 1 fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.

2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures 3.8 1 pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Category Total: 2 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility 4.4 1 emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of 4.3 1 each annunciator or alarm.

Category Total: 2 Generic Total: 7 14

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A S1/1 056 AA2.02 Components not installed at WC. Randomly selected AA2.03 2/1 005 A4.05 Component not utilized at WCNOC. Randomly selected A4.01 S2/1 008 A2.01 No real actions for SRO Question. Randomly selected A2.05 2/1 026 A2.02 Not applicable to WC, replaced with A2.07 2/1 078 K1.05 Not applicable to WC, replaced with K1.04 1/2 059 2.4.31 Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced topic with 051, kept same generic S1/2 076 AA2.01 Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced with E13 EA2.2 S1/2 E16 2.4.1 Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced topic with E15, kept same generic 1/1 022 AK1.01 Due to overlap with other RCP K/As, replaced with AK1.02 2/1 004 K3.08 Due to overlap with other RCP K/As, replaced with K3.07

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ___Wolf Creek_______________ Scenario No.: ___1_____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: MOL, 100%

Turnover: Red train CCW (pumps A/C secured due to leakage). TS 3.7.7 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet. Expected return in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. TS 3.5.2 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). (ESFAS alarms are illuminated). Red train ECCS pumps are DNOd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW A (DNO), CCW C (DNO), CCP A (TC), SIP A (TC) and RHR A (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV-11 and 13, and EG ZL-15 and 53.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 mAB01D I - BOP, Steam Generator D pressure channel AB PT-545 fails low 2 SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1e and 4e.

Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

2 mBB21B I - ATC, Pressurizer pressure channel BB PI-456 fails high SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 8.

Cond A (Immediately) and E (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P-11)).

3 R- The Crew commences a turbine load reduction to 900 MWE NET CREW (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN AF-025, UNIT LIMITATIONS, per Attachment D, TURBINE /GENERATOR DECREASE USING STEAM DUMPS.

4 mBB06C M- Large Break LOCA: cold leg break on Loop C CREW 5 mEJ13B C - ATC, Post trip malfunction #1: Autostart failure of RHR B pump.

SRO Manual start is available.

6 mSA27E C- Post trip malfunction #2: Auto closure of EC HIS-12, SFP HX B C02 ATC, CCW OUTLET VLV, failure to close. Manual closure available.

SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor DRAFT 1 of 5

Scenario summary:

The unit is at 100% power, middle of life. Turnover items include CCW pumps A and C (Red train) are secured due to leakage. Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet is ongoing. Technical Specification 3.7.7 Condition A was entered (72 hrs to restore). Expected return to service is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Red train ECCS pumps are DNOd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW A (DNO), CCW C (DNO), CCP A (TC), SIP A (TC) and RHR A (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV-11 and 13, and EG ZL-15 and 53.

Event 1: Steam Generator D pressure channel AB PT-545 fails low. Meter indications change, and Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00-111C, SG D FLOW MISMATCH or 00-111B SG D LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment C performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 2: Pressurizer (PZR) pressure channel BB PI-456 fails high. The PZR spray valves close, meter indications change and various Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00-034B, PZR PRESS HI, 00-034C, PZR PORV BLOCK; 00-034E, PRT PRESS HI; 00-035B, PORV OPEN; 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI; 00-083C, RX PARTIAL TRIP annunciate. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment K performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: Booth cue: Topeka Dispatch/System Operator calls to inform Wolf Creek that 345-50 KV Benton line will be removed from service in 20 minutes for four hours. We will be performing Directive #300. Per Directive #300 we will be divorcing Wolf Creek from the Athens line (also opening 69-14 Breaker). Please reduce turbine load to less than 900 MWE NET.

If necessary, Call Superintendent cue: Maintain reactor power and use Attachment D, TURBINE

/GENERATOR DECREASE USING STEAM DUMPS.

The Crew commences a turbine load reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN AF-025, UNIT LIMITATIONS.

Event 4: The Main Event is a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident.

Diagnostics include: PZR level decreases and RCS pressure decreases. OFN BB-007, SG/RCS LEAKAGE HIGH, may be entered & performed. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occur. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered & performed.

RCPs are tripped per EMG E-0 Foldout page criteria.

EMG-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT is entered & performed.

Eventually 36% Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is achieved and Main Control Board alarm ALR 00-047C, RWST LEV LOLO 1 AUTO XFR actuates. ALR 00-047C directs performance of EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

The crew transitions to EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. The procedure is performed through step 10 to establish cold leg recirculation/ECCS recirculation.

DRAFT 2 of 5

Post trip malfunctions:

Event 5: Autostart failure of RHR B pump. Manual start is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in Attachment F of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

However, the pump can be started after the Immediate Actions of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, are performed and concurrence of the CRS is obtained.

Event 6: Auto closure of EC HIS-12, SFP HX B CCW OUTLET VLV, fails to close. Manual closure is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, at step 3.

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):

Event 1: CT: take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4: CT: using EMG ES-12, steps 1 through 10, transfer to cold leg recirculation to establish ECCS recirculation Event 5: CT: start RHR B pump, as this is the only low head injection pump available for decay heat removal for a Large Break LOCA.

DRAFT 3 of 5

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Core Damage CDF Percent Initiating Event Frequency (/yr) Frequency (/yr) Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51%

Small LOCA 29.63%

3.00E-03 5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69%

Very Small LOCA 7.03%

6.20E-03 1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67E-03 8.77E-07 4.86%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04%

Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95%

Systems Available Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 6.86E-06 8.30E-08 0.46%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.64E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%

Top Risk Significant Systems EF Essential Service Water KJ/NE Onsite Emergency Power EG Component Cooling Water AL Aux Feedwater EJ Residual Heat Removal JE Diesel Fuel Oil NB Lower Medium Voltage NK 125 V DC BB Reactor Coolant System GM Diesel Building HVAC GD ESW HVAC GL Aux Building HVAC BN Refueling Water Storage Tank SA/SB ESFAS/Reactor Protection DRAFT 4 of 5

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 1: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1e and 4e. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

Event 2: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 8. Cond A (Immediately) and E (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P-11)).

DRAFT 5 of 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _________Wolf Creek_________ Scenario No.: ____2____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: Middle Of Life, ~74%

Turnover: Monitor MFP B vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74%

waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 mBB01E I - ATC, Loop A, BB TI-411, Tcold fails high SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) 2 mAE15C I - BOP, Steam Generator C controlling level channel AE LI-553 failure 4 SRO high TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately),

Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable) 3 msovBB C- PORV BB PCV-455A fails to 0.25% open due to control circuitry PCV455 ATC, problems, PZR pressure begins to decrease A SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to de-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to repair PORV) 4 mAB03A M- Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator A)

CREW Adverse Containment 5 mSNF01 C- Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection: LOCA A ATC, Sequencer A failure at five second time.

SRO 6 mNF01A C- Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection: Main Generator BOP, and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip.

SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor DRAFT 1 of 4

Scenario Summary:

The unit is at ~74% power, middle of life. Monitor MFP B vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74% waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.

Event 1: RCS Loop A BB TI-411 Tcold fails high. Meter indication changes and the Control Rods insert - the Reactor Operator (RO) places control rods in MANUAL, stopping the insertion.

Many Main Control Board alarms annunciate: 00-065C, 00-065E, 00-066B, 00-067D, 00-068D, 00-069D, 00-082B and 00-083C. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment L performed. This procedure will diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 2: Steam Generator C controlling level channel AE LI-553 fails high. Meter indications change and Main Control Board alarms, 00-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO and 00-110B, SG C LEV DEV, annunciate. ALR 00-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO, or 00-110B, SG C LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment F is performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) BB PCV-455A fails to 0.25% open due to control circuitry problems. Diagnostic parameters include dual indication on hand indicating switch BB HIS-455A, and alarms 00-035B, PORV OPEN, 00-035C, PZR SFTY DISCH TEMP HI, 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI, 00-034E, PRT PRESS HI annunciating. ALR 00-035B may be entered and performed to close the PZR Seal Iso Valve using BB HIS-8000A. This action mitigates the event.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 4: The Main Event is a Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator A).

Diagnostic parameters include Secondary steam flow to feed flow meters mismatch, increasing SG steam flow, Containment pressure and humidity while it decreases Main Turbine load and RCS pressure and temperature. OFN AB-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE LEAK may be entered. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occurs. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered and performed. The faulted SG is identified and isolated (EMG E-0 foldout page criteria). Adverse Containment is identified and setpoints for various parameters are used. The Crew transitions to EMG E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

Eventually the Crew transitions to EMG ES-03, SI TERMINATION, to mitigate PZR overfill and RCS high pressure.

Post trip malfunctions:

1. Event 5: LOCA Sequencer A failure at five second time interval frame. This component failure requires the Crew to start ECCS equipment per EMG E-0 Attachment F.
2. Event 6: Main Generator and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip. This component failure requires the BOP to permit MA HS-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT switch, BEFORE opening the breakers per EMG step 6RNO. (NOTE: MA HS-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT is a new switch added to Panel RL005 during Refuel 18).

DRAFT 2 of 4

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT)

Event 1: CT - place rods to manual prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 2 - CT - take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4 - CT - isolate the faulted Steam Generator before an Orange path integrity challenge develops DRAFT 3 of 4

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Core Damage CDF Percent Initiating Event Frequency (/yr) Frequency (/yr) Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51%

Small LOCA 29.63%

3.00E-03 5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69%

Very Small LOCA 7.03%

6.20E-03 1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67E-03 8.77E-07 4.86%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04%

Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95%

Systems Available Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 6.86E-06 8.30E-08 0.46%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.64E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 1 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)

Event 2 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately), Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable)

Event 3 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to de-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to repair PORV)

DRAFT 4 of 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ______Wolf Creek____________ Scenario No.: ____3____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: BOL ~10% power Turnover: Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N- Per GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step CREW 6.40 through step 6.46.

Step 6.40 directs SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP (synchronize Main Generator to grid).

GEN 00-003 steps 6.41 through 6.46: valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, verify Permissive states etc.

2 mNN02 C- Loss of NN02 (White train)

CREW TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1 - Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).

TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)

TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours) 3 mAB07 C- Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) C fails PARTIALLY open; manual G BOP, control unavailable SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days) 4 Precursor: Seismic event Main Feed Pump trip Reactor trip 5 mSF17A M- Reactor fails to trip in automatic or manual. Anticipated Transient CREW Without Trip (ATWT) mSF17B 6 mAC02B C- Post trip malfunction #1: Turbine will not manually trip.

BOP, SRO 7 p01024 C- Post trip malfunction #2: BG HV-8104 does not open (see step 6 of C ATC, EMG FR-S1) RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump SRO suction

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor DRAFT 1 of 4

Scenario summary:

Unit is at ~ 10 % power, beginning of life. Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid.

Event 1: The Crew, using GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step 6.40 through step 6.46 will synchronize Main Generator to the grid, verify valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, and verify Permissive states etc.

Event 2: Loss of NN02 occurs. White train meter indications change and many Main Control Board alarms annunciate aid in diagnosing the component failure. The Crew may enter ALR 00-026A, NN02 INST BUS UV. The Crew enters OFN NN-021, LOSS OF VITAL 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS, and performs Attachment B to restore power.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) C fails PARTIALLY open and manual control is unavailable. The Crew enters OFN AB-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE BREAK to mitigate the component failure. An Operator is dispatched to locally close the valve.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 4: A Seismic event occurs. Main Control Board alarms 00-098D, OBE and 00-098E, SEISMIC RECORDER ON, annunciate. OFN SG-003, NATURAL EVENTS, is entered. The only running Main Feed Pump trips three minutes later. Main Control Board alarm 00-123A, MFP B TRIP, annunciates. The Crew determines a Reactor trip is necessary. A Reactor trip condition occurs; only the reactor fails to trip.

Event 5: The Main Event is an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT).

The Crew enters either EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and from step 1RNO transitions to EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS or the Crew enters EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS directly to mitigate the Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT).

Event 6: The turbine will not trip manually - the BOP must manually trip the turbine within thirty seconds to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require (2RNO EMG FR-S1 and EMG E-0).

Event 7: When aligning emergency boration, BG HV-8104 does not open. The ATC aligns Refueling Water Storage Tank to charging pump suction instead (6RNO of EMG FR-S1).

Successful mitigation strategy requires the Crew continues performance of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS, transitions to EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and finally EMG ES-02, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.

DRAFT 2 of 4

Post trip malfunction:

1. Event 6: Post trip malfunction #1: The turbine will not trip manually. As part of Immediate Actions of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS, step 2RNO, the BOP must trip the turbine.
2. Event 7: Post trip malfunction #2: EMER BORATE TO CHG PUMP SUCT BG HIS-8104 does not open (see step 6 of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS). RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump suction.

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):

Event 5: CT: Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before the Steam Generators dry-out:

  • Manually insert control rods Event 6: CT: Manually trip the turbine within thirty seconds to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require.

DRAFT 3 of 4

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Event Tree Core Damage Percent Event Tree Frequency (/yr) Contribution Station Blackout 6.46E-06 35.79%

Small LOCA 5.35E-06 29.65%

Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.68%

Very Small LOCA 1.27E-06 7.05%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 8.77E-07 4.86%

Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling Following a Transient Initiator 5.91E-07 3.28%

Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 3.30E-07 1.83%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.88E-07 1.40%

Transients Without Power Conversion Systems Available 1.71E-07 0.95%

Medium LOCA 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 8.30E-08 0.46%

Anticipated Transient Without Scram 6.67E-08 0.37%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Offsite Power 4.98E-08 0.28%

Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling With At Least One CCW Train Available 5.03E-08 0.28%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 2.06E-08 0.11%

Stuck Open Pressurizer PORV Following a Transient Initiator 3.14E-08 0.17%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 1.12E-08 0.06%

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 2: TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1 - Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).

TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)

TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours)

Event 3: TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days)

DRAFT 4 of 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ___Wolf Creek_____________ Scenario No.: ___4 Backup_____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: ~74%, EOL Turnover: LaCygne line returned to service. CCP A is DNOd (TEST CAUTION tag) and in Pull to Lock (PTL) for Preventative Maintenance activities (motor PMs). TS 3.5.2 Cond A, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Expect return to service in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Boron Thermal Regeneration System (BTRS) is in service. Control Rods are in Manual.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description st 1 trACPT0 I - BOP, High Pressure Turbine 1 Stage Pressure AC PT-505 fails high 505 SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Fu 18f. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond T (verify P-13 interlock in correct state within one hour) are entered.

2 mSF13K C- Control Rod M4 drops to 96 steps 6 ATC, SRO DRPI indicates changes in control rod position.

mSF04K 6

TS determined & entered. TS 3.1.4 Cond B (restore rod to within alignment limits within one hour) 3 mBB02A M- Primary to Secondary leak on Steam Generator A.

CREW Initially, a 10-gpm leak.

TS determined & entered. TS 3.4.13 d exceeded; Cond A (reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) 4 R- Decrease power per OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at CREW 1%/min rate.

5 mBB02A M- Primary to Secondary leakrate increases requiring Reactor trip and CREW Safety Injection signal actuation.

200-350 gpm 6 mBG27 C- Post trip malfunction #1: CCP B autostart failure upon receipt of B ATC, Safety Injection SRO DRAFT 1 of 5

7 mSA27E C- Post trip malfunction #2: Autoclose feature for Service Water/ESW F01 ATC, Train A Cross Connect valves EF HV-0023 and EF HV-0025 fails SRO and the valves remain open.

mSA27E F03 vmodAB Preloaded: These ensure the MSIVs remain open, allowing HV0011 transition to EMG C-31, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED from step vmodAB 5RNO of EMG E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE HV0014 vmodABHV0011 - SG D MSIV fails open vmodAB HV0017 vmodABHV0014 - SG A MSIV fails open (ruptured SG) vmodAB vmodABHV0017 - SG B MSIV fails open HV0020 vmodABHV0020 - SG C MSIV fails open 8 M- Transition to and perform EMG C-31, SGTR WITH LOSS OF CREW REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor DRAFT 2 of 5

Scenario summary:

The unit is at ~74% power, end of life. Turnover items include the LaCygne line has been returned to service. CCP A is DNOd (TEST CAUTION) and in Pull to Lock (PTL) for Preventative Maintenance activities (motor PMs). Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 Condition A was entered (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore). CCP A return to service expected within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Boron Thermal Regeneration System (BTRS) is in service. Control Rods are in Manual.

st Event 1: High Pressure Turbine 1 Stage Pressure AC PT-505 fails high. Meter indication change. MCB alarms 00-065D, T REF/T AUCT HI, and 00-130F, LO TEMP AVG/ERR annunciate. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS is entered, and Attachment D performed. OFN SB-008 diagnoses and mitigates the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 2: Control Rod M4 drops to 96 steps. DRPI indicates changes in control rod position. The Crew determines that no load rejection in progress and stops rod motion. Main Control Board alarms 00-078A, PR CHANNEL DEV, 00-078B, PR UPPER DETECTOR FLUX DEV PR LOWER DETECTOR DEV, 00-079A, ROD CTRL URG FAIL and 00-080C, RPI ROD DEV annunciate.

OFN SF-011, REALIGNMENT OF DROPPED, MISALIGNED ROD(S) AND ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and performed. Instrumentation & Calibration technicians report a loose cable was discovered (regulation failure) and has been restored. The dropped control rod is recovered.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: The Main Event is a Primary to Secondary leak that becomes a rupture on Steam Generator A. The event is complicated when the MSIVs fail open (see Event 8 below).

Main Control Board alarms 00-061B, PROCESS RAD HI and 00-061A, PROCESS RAD HIHI annunciate. Process radiation monitor GE RE-92, Condenser Off gas monitor, is in Alert/High alarm. A primary to secondary tube leak is suspected and OFN BB-07A, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE, is entered and performed.

Event 4: A plant shutdown is required. The Crew enters and performs OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN, to perform a power decrease at 1%/min rate.

Event 5: The Crew determines the leak rate has increased and utilizes OFN BB-07A, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE, Foldout page criteria #1 to direct a Reactor trip and Safety Injection signal actuation.

EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered and performed. The Crew transitions to and performs EMG E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE. The ruptured Steam Generator is identified and isolated.

Event 8: Preloaded into the scenario: all four MSIVs remain open. The MSIVs will not close, requiring a transition to EMG C-31, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT -

SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED. In EMG C-31, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, the Crew will initiate an RCS cooldown and depressurization.

Post trip malfunctions:

Event 6: CCP B autostart failure upon receipt of Safety Injection signal actuation. Manual start is available. Recall CCP A was tagged out for preventative maintenance activities. This component failure is addressed by either post Immediate Actions performance/ Equipment concerns or during performance of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Attachment F, step 4RNO.

DRAFT 3 of 5

Event 7: Autoclose feature for Service Water/ESW Train A Cross Connect valves EF HV-0023 and EF HV-0025 fails and the valves remain open. Manual closure is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed during the performance of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Attachment F, step F14RNO.

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):

Event 5: CT: Isolate feed flow to the ruptured SG before Steam Generator overfills. Performed at EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Foldout page # 4 or EMG E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE step 3.

Event 8: CT: Initiate Cooldown of the RCS to Cold Shutdown conditions at the highest rate achievable but less that 100°F per hour to minimize leakage of Reactor Coolant and radiological releases from the ruptured Steam Generator. Performed at EMG C-31 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, step 22.

DRAFT 4 of 5

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Core Damage CDF Percent Initiating Event Frequency (/yr) Frequency (/yr) Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51%

Small LOCA 29.63%

3.00E-03 5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69%

Very Small LOCA 7.03%

6.20E-03 1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67E-03 8.77E-07 4.86%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04%

Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95%

Systems Available Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 6.86E-06 8.30E-08 0.46%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.64E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 1: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Fu 18f. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond T (verify P-13 interlock in correct state within one hour) are entered.

Event 2: TS determined & entered. TS 3.1.4 Cond B (restore rod to within alignment limits within one hour)

Event 3: TS determined & entered. TS 3.4.13 d exceeded; Cond A (reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />)

DRAFT 5 of 5