ML112660278

Initial Exam 2011-301 Final Administrative Documents

ML112660278
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/22/2011
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:
References
05-400/11-301
Download: ML112660278 (76)

Text

ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: Harris 201 1-301 Date of Examination: 07/11/2011 acilitli NRC Examinations Developed by:

Written / Operating Test Written / Operating Test T Chief L Task Description (Reference) Examiners Initials

-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C. 1 .a; C.2.a and b) 08/17/2010

-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) 03/08/2011

-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) 03/08/2011

-120 4. Corporate_notification_letter_sent_(C.2.d)

[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)1 05/27/2011

{-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES 301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-ls, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as 04/27/2011 applicable (C.l.e and f; C.3.d)

{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility 05/05/2011 licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}

{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, 05/27/2011 ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f g and h; C.3.d)

-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398s) due (C.1.l; C.2.g; ES-202) 06/13/2011

-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202) 06/27/2011

-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review 2/7/201 1 (C.2.h; C.3.f)

-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C. 1 .j; C.2.f and h; C.3 .g) 2/7/2011

-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor 07/01/2011 (C.2.i; C.3.h)

-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if>10) applications audited to confirm qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent 07/01/2011 (C.2.i;_Attachment 4;_ES-202,_C.2.e;_ES-204)

-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee 07/01/2011 (C.3 .k)

-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to 07/01/2011 NRC examiners (C.3.i)

Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.

[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Date of Examination:

. Initials Item Task Description 1.

R

a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.

b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with

,4/

I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled. e

c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.

d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.

2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, 4 S and major transients.

M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number u and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using ,4 -

A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative 1 J

R and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.

,(

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:

(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.

b. Verifythatthe administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:

(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.

b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.

N c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.

d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.

A e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. .i.

f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). 41

a. Author

b. Facility Reviewer (*)

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)

d. NRC Supervisor Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines ES-201, Page 26 of 28

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: HARRIS Date of Examination: JULY 2011 Initials Item Task Description

1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.

R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with T

I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled. 12? 14 T--

T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. 9 ff4

d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.

7L

2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients.

M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number u and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301 -4 and described in Appendix D.

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -2:

(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:

(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. ill i4

b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. ,ø 59

c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. 4?? 3 R ..

d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.

. rrr (4 p1 ij9 A j-L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. #1 ff3 rn Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).

f.

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a. Author /)f,/4

b. Facility Reviewer (*) *,/f /9 , /7 /7

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) (tV. t4s?ck / 9//cu/c,

d. NRC Supervisor UMLDLJd 7 WIDAAAAJA I / fiN

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Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administratio n, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g. acting as a simulator booth operator or communicato r is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromed.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7ZZlof. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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PA-2 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of q I/ip /z as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of tne examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7-g1.pil From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 27 of 28

ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of /Ybtoas of the date 9

of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7-22-i I. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 27 of 28

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ES-201 Examination Security_Agreement Form ES-201 -3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of /Y 25 of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instwct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, excepi as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g. acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of $i4f 1. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 27 of 28

PA2 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of I&Z IV as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered from this date until completion of examination administratio n, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC these licensing examinations (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 741.lp From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not noted instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 27 of 28

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of -/s ias of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7-22-i (. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE

• 1,yi4 NOTES.

ES-201, Page 27 of 28

FuJAL ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline - Form ES-30-lI Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: July 11, 2011 Examination Level: RO I SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/2011301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Determine Rod Height Misalignment Using Conduct of Operations Thermocouples (JPM CR-i 39) Common P, R K/A G2.1.7 2011 NRC_RO Al-i Determine the Target Rod Height and the Boron Conduct of Operations Required for a Rapid Power Reduction lAW AOP-038 M, R K/A G2. 1.25 2011 NRC_RO Ai-2 Review the Completed OST for Auxiliary Feedwater Equipment Control Pump lB-SB N, R (JPM ADM-103)

K/AG2.2.12 2011 NRC ROA2 Using Survey Maps determine stay times while Radiation Control performing a clearance activity.

M, R (JPM ADM-100) Common K/A G2.3.4 2011 NRCROA3 NOT SELECTED FOR RO Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A 2011 NRC ROA4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (4)

(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & AC retakes) (0)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams ( i; randomly selected) (1) 6/28/2011 Rev. Final

2011 NRC RO Admin JPM-Summary 2011 NRC RO Al-i Determine Rod Misalignment Using Thermocouples Previous 2009A NRC Exam JPM *randomly selected from bank K/A G2. 1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.12/45.13) RO 4.4 SRO 4.7 The plant is at 90% power with a load decrease in progress when a control rod is observed indicating 12 steps higher than group demand. The candidate must perform Attachment 2 of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System, to calculate the temperature difference between the affected thermocouple and its symmetric thermocouples.

NOTE: Two thermocouple temperatures were changed with the resulting calculation now indicating a difference of greater than 10°F, indicating that the rod is misaligned. The 2009a JPM thermocouple temperatures resulted in a calculation of <10°F. During the 2009a exam the <10°F difference resulted was a rod position indication problem. For the 2011 exam the temperature difference of >10°F will have a concluding result of a rod misalignment.

2011 NRC RO Al-2 Determine the Target Rod Height and the Boron Concentration Change Required for a Rapid Power Reduction lAW AOP-038 MODIFIED K/A G2. 1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.12)RO 3.9 SRO 4.2 With plant conditions requiring a rapid power reduction to 65% power the candidate will be required to determine the target rod height, the time in core life and the amount of boric acid required for the power reduction.

This JPM was modified by changing the initial power level conditions and final power level.

2011 NRC RO A2 Review the Completed OST for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 B-SB NEW (JPM ADM-103)

K/A G2.2. 12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) RO 3.7 SRO 4.1 The candidate will be supplied a completed copy of OST-1 076, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 B-SB Operability Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4 and be assigned the task of performing a peer check of the procedure prior to approval from the CRS.

2 6/28/2011 Rev. Final

2011 NRC RO Admin JPM Summary (continued) 2011 NRC RO A3 (Common) Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps and valve lists, determine stay times while performing a clearance activity. MODIFIED K/A G2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12/43.4/45.1O)RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 The candidate will be supplied a survey map of a location in the RAB and a clearance mission to complete in this radioactive area. The location also contains one or more hot spots. They must determine the individual stay times for two Auxiliary Operators (AO) without exceeding the annual administrative dose limits. They will be provided Survey Maps, Simplified plant drawings to locate valves, Plant Maps of the area and a plant valve list to determine the location of the valves they will be hanging a clearance on. The given information will supply the accumulated annual whole body doses for the two AOs, one of which recently worked for another utility. They must perform their calculations based on Progress Energy Administrative Dose Limits.

This JPM was modified by changing the location of the clearance and values of radiation areas.

2011 NRC RO A4 Not selected 3

6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final

ES-SQl Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-3014 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: July 11, 2011 Examination Level: RO SRO

• Operating Test Number: 05000400/2011301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Determine Rod Height Misalignment Using Conduct of Operations Thermocouples (JPM CR-i 39) Common P, R K/A G2.1.7 2011 NRC SRO Al-i Determine Subcooling with the Subcooling Margin Monitor Unavailable Conduct of Operations (JPM ADM-031)

M,R K/AG2.1.23 2011 NRC SRO Ai-2 Review (for approval) a completed surveillance D, R procedure for PORV block valves.

Equipment Control (JPM ADM-035 SRO)

K/A G2.2.12 2011 NRC SRO A2 Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps M, R and Valve Lists, determine stay times while performing Radiation Control a clearance activity.

(JPM ADM-100) Common K/A G2.3.4 2011 NRC SRO A3 Given a Set of Plant Conditions Classify An Event and N, R manually complete an Emergency Notification Form.

Emergency Procedures/Plan K/A G2.4.41 2011 NRCSROA4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (5)

(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (1) 6I9Xt2fl1 I Rev. FinI

2011 NRCSRO Admin JPMSummary 2011 NRC SRO Al-i Determine Rod Misalignment Using Thermocouples Previous 2009A NRC Exam JPM *randomly selected from bank K/A G2. 1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) RO 4.4 SRO 4.7 The plant is at 90% power with a load decrease in progress when a control rod is observed indicating 12 steps higher than group demand. The candidate must perform Attachment 2 of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System, to calculate the temperature difference between the affected thermocouple and its symmetric thermocouples.

NOTE: Two thermocouple temperatures were changed with the resulting calculation now indicating a difference of greater than 10°F, indicating that the rod is misaligned. The 2009a JPM thermocouple temperatures resulted in a calculation of <10°F. With <10°F difference the result was a rod position indication problem. With the temperature difference of >10°F the result is a rod misalignment. In the current JPM the SRO will need to determine Tech Spec requirements for a rod misalignment.

2011 NRC SRO Al-2 Determine Subcooling with the Subcooling Margin Monitor Unavailable (JPM ADM-031) Bank MODIFIED-K/A G2. 1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.2/45.6) RO 4.3 SRO 4.4 The applicant will be informed that a Small Break LOCA has occurred with SI actuated.

They will be provided with copies of the EOP Users Guide and multiple plant parameters.

They will be required to determine the RCS Subcooling margin lAW the EOP Users Guide directions.

This JPM was modified by changing the initial conditions to where the Containment pressure will be > 3 psig requiring the candidate to use adverse Containment values. In addition to this change the ERFIS computer will not be available. These two changes will require using different indicators and the results will be completely different values.

2011 NRC SRO A2 Review (for approval) a completed surveillance procedure for PORV block valves. (JPM ADM-035 SRO) Direct K/A G2.2. 12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10/45.13) RO 3.7 SRO 4.1 The applicant will be provided with a handout of a completed copy of a PORV Block Valve full stroke quarterly surveillance. The procedure contains three (3) errors that the candidate must identify.

2 6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final

2011 NRC SRO Admin JPlvrSummary (continued) 2011 NRC SRO A3 (Common) Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps and valve lists, determine stay times while performing a clearance activity.

(2009B NRC Admin JPM) MODIFIED-k/A G2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12/43.4/45.10) RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 The applicant will be supplied a survey map of a location in the RAB and a clearance mission to complete in this radioactive area. The location also contains one or more hot spots. They must determine the individual stay times for two Auxiliary Operators (AO) without exceeding the annual administrative dose limits. They will be provided Survey Maps, Simplified plant drawings to locate valves, Plant Maps of the area and a plant valve list to determine the location of the valves they will be hanging a clearance on. The given information will supply the accumulated annual whole body doses for the two AOs, one of which recently worked for another utility. They must perform their calculations based on Progress Energy Administrative Dose Limits.

This JPM was modified by changing the location of the clearance and radiation area intensities.

2011 NRC SRO A4 Classify an Event (NEW)

K/A G2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.11) RO 2.9 SRO 4.6 Given a set of initial conditions and the EAL Flow Path, the candidate must classify the appropriate Emergency Action Level for the event in progress. After completing the EAL classification the candidate will then manually complete an Emergency Notification Form (EN F).

3 6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 07/11/2011 Exam Level: RO SRO-l SRO-U (bold) Operating Test No.: 05000400/2011301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF bold) -

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. Malfunction of RMU Control D, L, S 1 (AOP-003) (JPM-CR-048)

K/A 004 A4.13

b. Loss of Seal Injection To The RCPs take corrective actions lAW AOP-018 A , N , EN , 2 (AOP-018) (NEW JPM-CR-245)

K/A APE 0151017AA2.10

c. SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control A, M, S 3 (EOP-EPP-022) (JPM-CR-1 50)

K/A G2.1.20

d. Loss of RCS Inventory While on RHR MODE 5 A, D, EN, S 4P (AOP-020) (JPM-CR-60)

K/A 005A4.01

e. Using ESW System As A Backup Source Of Water To AFW P, C or S 4S (PATH-i and OP-i 37) (JPM-CR-107)

K/A 054 AA1.01

f. Manually Align Containment Spray A, D, EN, S 5 (PATH-i) (JPM-CR-106) RO ONLY K/A 026 A4.01

g. LOSP While Paralleling a Emergency Diesel Generator from A, D, EN, 5 6 the Main Control Room for Testing (OP-i 55) (JPM-CR-203)

K/A 056 A2.14

h. Respond to a Rupture in the Instrument Air Header at A, D, S 8 50% power (AOP-01 7) (JPM-CR-234)

K/A APE 065 AA2.06 6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final

In-Plant Systems° (3 for AC); (3 for SRO-l); (3 or 2 for SRO-U BOLD)-

Reset the Turbine Driven AFW Pump Mechanical Overspeed (pump tripped on start)

(OP-i 37) (JPM-IP-OOl)

K/A 061 K4.07

j. Align the Train A Battery Charger to the Alternate Power Supply K/A APE 058 AA1.01

k. Perform Local Actions For Placing a Failed Pressurizer N 3 pressure Channel In TEST (OWP-RP-02)

K/A APE 027 AA2. 16

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and n-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-l / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (6, 5, 2)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8 / 4 (7, 6, 3)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 I 1 / 1 (2, 2, 2)

(EN)gineered safety feature - I - / 1 (4, 3, 1)

(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1 I? 1 I 1 (1, 1, 1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 2I 2I 1 (4, 4, 2)

(P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3 I 2 (1, 1, 0)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (1,1,1)

(S)imulator 6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final 2

2011 NRC Control Room/In-Plant JPM Summary JPM a Malfunction of Rx Makeup Control (JPM CR-237) SRO Upgrade K/A 004 A4. 13 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: VCT level control and pressure control (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 3.3/SRO 2.9 This bank JPM has been revised by changing the initial power level and revising the required boration flow rates based on the current core cycle boron concentrations. I am still considering this a direct from the bank JPM.

With the unit operating at 4% power steady state conditions, a VCT makeup was required when level reached the low level auto makeup setpoint of 20%. The makeup system malfunctioned and a makeup did not occur. When the operators attempted a manual makeup the Reactor Makeup Mode Selector switch stayed in the STOP position. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control was entered and the crew has performed steps 1-14 of section 3.2. The applicant will be directed to continue from this point. This will require the applicant to select from the procedure table what attachment to perform from the given conditions. After making the selection (Attachment 2) the applicant will have to calculate the amount of flow for a local manual makeup to the VCT based on current RCS boron concentration from the status board. They will then need to perform a lineup on the MCB and start a Boric Acid pump. Next they will have to coordinate the actions of a local operator to throttle open boration and dilution valves to the correct positions based on MCR indications until VCT level has reached 40% (normal full auto makeup setpoint).

JPM b Loss of Seal Injection To The RCPs (ASI pump running, align and start standby CSIP)

(NEW JPM-CR-245) SRO Upgrade K/A APE 015/017 AA2. 10 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection (CFR43.5/45.13) RO 3.7/SRO 3.7 The candidate will assume the Operator at the Controls (OAC) responsibilities with the plant operating at 100% power. After taking the watch the A CSIP will trip requiring the candidate to identify that AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, entry conditions are met. The candidate will then perform the immediate action of Check any CSIP running answer NO and perform the RNO action of isolating letdown. After completing the immediate action the candidate will obtain a copy of AOP-01 8 and begin the actions of the AOP. Without any CSIP running a loss of seal flow to the RCPs is occurring.

A new CVCS positive displacement pump named the Alternate Seal Injection pump (ASI pump) will auto start 2 minute and 45 seconds after 2 out of 3 flow switches detect RCP seal flows <4.0 gpm. The candidate with start the B CSIP but this pump will immediately trip.

Since there are no CSIPs running AOP-018 directs to the operator to trip the Reactor if only the ASI pump is operating. Since the ASI pump suction tank boron concentration is required to be 3800 4200 ppm any time the ASI pump is in operation a large amount of negative reactivity will be added to the RCS. The candidate is expected to carry out the RNO actions of the procedure and perform a manual Reactor trip. They will then perform the immediate actions of PATH-i. When the immediate actions are completed they will be directed to continue with AOP-01 8 actions to isolate the Seal Return flow path. The JPM is complete when RCP seal water return valves are isolated.

6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final 3

2011 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary JPM c SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control (Modified JPM-CR-150)

K/A G2. 1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.12) RO 4.6/SRO 4.6 The candidate will be informed that EOP-EPP-022 has just been entered after a transition from PATH-2. The plant conditions are: a SGTR occurred on the A SG, offsite power has been lost, and neither the PZR PORVs or PZR Auxiliary spray is functional. The SG tube rupture will be increasing A SG level (current start level will be < 78%) as the candidate proceeds through EPP-022. Continuing through the procedure the candidate will get to step 15 to open normal minif low isolation valves. The common valve (1CS-214) will not open requiring the candidate to use the RNO action of going to Step 9. Step 9 will establish minimum charging flow and isolate BIT flow. The JPM is complete after the candidate has shut the BIT outlet valves 1 Sl-3 and 1S1-4 and verified Cold Leg and Hot Leg Injection valves are shut.

JPM d Loss of RCS Inventory While on RHR MODE 5 (JPM-CR-60)

K/A 005 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Controls and indication for RHA pumps (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 3.6/SRO 3.4 The candidate will be assigned the role of OAC and be directed to maintain current plant conditions of: the plant in Mode 5 with Containment integrity established, on RHR and a bubble in the PZR, RCS temperature stable at 140°F and all RCPs operating. Soon after assuming the watch a RCS leak will develop requiring the candidate to enter AOP-020, Loss of RCS Inventory or RHR While Shutdown. The candidate will obtain a copy of AOP-020 and perform steps to attempt leak isolation. When unable to isolate the leak the procedure directions are to isolate RHR and secure both RHR pumps (this will isolate the leak). The JPM is complete after RHR is isolated and both A and B RHR pump is secured.

JPM e Using ESW System As A Backup Source of Water To AFW (JPM-CR-1 07)

PREVIOUS 2009a NRC Exam (NOTE: Cues have been added to the JPM to allow simulation of performance of this JPM in the Main Control Room)

K/A 054 AA 1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater AFW controls, including the use of alternate AFW sources (CFR41.7/45.5/45.6) R04.5/SRO4.4 Following a LOCA the operator is informed that a leak developed in the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). The CST level has decreased to < 10%. The candidate is directed to supply ESW from the A Header to both the A AFW Pump and the Turbine Driven AFW pumps.

This will require shutting down the B MDAFW Pump and A Train of Containment Fan Coolers in addition to the ESW valve alignment.

6/28/2011 Rev. Final 4

2011 NRC Control Room/In-Plant JPM Summary JPM fManually Align Containment Spray (JPM-CR-106) RO ONLY k/A 026 A4. 01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS controls (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 4.5 SRO 4.3 The candidate will be assigned the OAC position with a large break LOCA in progress.

Containment pressure has exceeded 10 psig and automatic actuation of Containment Spray has not occurred (> 10 psig on 2/4 Containment pressure channels). The candidate will be instructed that an RCS break has occurred inside Containment and a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have been initiated. PATH-i is being implemented and step 10 Check Containment Pressure has remained < 10 psig has just been reached. They will then proceed in PATH-i and discover that the Containment Spray System should have actuated but has not. They will attempt to manually actuate Containment Spray by initiating the Spray logic but this will fail. They will then have to manually start each Containment Spray pump and manually align each flow pumps flow path. They will then be required to secure all running Reactor Coolant Pumps. This JPM is complete when all RCPs are secured.

JPM g LOSP While Paralleling a Emergency Diesel Generator from the Main Control Room for Testing (JPM-CR-203) Alternate Path and Engineered Safety Feature k/A 056 AA2. 14 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Operational status of ED/Gs (A and B)

(CFR: 43.5/45.13) RO 4.4 SRO 4.6 The candidate will be informed that they are the 3 Board Operator (extra operator) and will be directed by the CRS to parallel the 1 B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to the grid from the Main Control Board lAW section 5.3 of OP-i55. The candidate will exercise the EDG voltage and governor controls then parallel the EDG. After parallel operations have been achieved a Loss of Off Site Power will occur. The loss of power will require the candidate to manually open the EDG output breaker lAW OP-155 precaution and limitation

1. 24.

JPM h Respond to a Rupture in the Instrument Air Header at 50% power (JPM-CR-234)

Alternate Path SRO Upgrade K/A APE 065 AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is decreasing (CFR: 43.5/45.13) RO 3.6 SRO 4.2 The candidate will be assigned the OAC position and be directed to maintain current plant conditions of steady state 50% power. The plant is on hold for chemistry concerns. Soon after taking the watch an Instrument Air leak will develop. The candidate will be expected to respond to the low pressure annunciators and enter AOP-0i7. Air pressure will decrease requiring a manual Reactor Trip. The candidate will be expected to perform the immediate actions of PATH-i then be directed to continue with AOP-017. They will have to contact Auxiliary Operators to vent and depressurize the remaining air from the system. Continuing with the procedure requires the candidate to locate and place multiple MCB controls to manual and zero demand.

6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final 5

2011 NRC Control Room/In-Plant JPM Summary JPM i Reset the Turbine Driven AFW Pump Mechanical Overspeed pump tripped on -

start (JPM-IP-OO1) SRO Upgrade K/A 061 K4. 07 Knowledge of AFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Turbine trip, including overspeed (CFR:41.7)R03.1 SR033 NOTE: This JPM is inside the RCA The candidate will be informed that the plant has tripped from 100% power. The Turbine Driven AFW pump started and has tripped on overspeed. The pump is needed for plant cooldown efforts. The cause of the overspeed trip has been identified and corrected by Maintenance. The CRS has directed the candidate to reset the Turbine Driven AFW mechanical overspeed trip linkage. 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 (steam supply valves to the TDAFW pump) are indicating shut from the MCB. The CRS also notifies the candidate that the Trip and Throttle Valve will be reopened from the Control Room.

JPM i Align a Train A battery Charger to the alternate Power Supply NEW SRO Upgrade K/A APE 058 AA 1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Cross-tie of the affected dc bus with the alternate supply (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) RO 3.4 SRO 3.5 The candidate will be informed that the plant is in Mode 3 following a Reactor Trip from a Loss of Off-Site power and failure of both Emergency Diesel Generators to energize their respective Emergency Buses. The Crew will be implementing EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses, they have verified that the Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator has started, loaded and is now supplying 1 D23 bus. The CRS will be directing the candidate to align the 1A-SA battery Charger to the alternate Power Supply lAW EOP-001 step 22 using OP-i 56.01, AC Electrical Distribution, Section 8.15 with initial conditions met.

NOTE: This is a new component was installed during the RFO1 7 refueling outage.

JPM k Perform Local Actions For Placing a Failed Pressurizer pressure Channel In TEST K/A APE 027 AA2. 16 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Actions to be taken if PZR pressure instrument fails low (CFR: 43.5/45.13) RO 3.6 SRO 3.9 The candidate will be informed that the plant was operating at 100% when Pressurizer Pressure Channel 455 failed low. They will be directed to perform the local actions per OWP-RP-02 for troubleshooting and tripping bistable for PT-455 to meet Technical Specifications. They will be required to perform actions at PlC 17 and PlC ito place the failed channel in TEST. They will then have to report to the Main Control Room and select an operable Pressurize Pressure recorder channel and verify the correct bistable status lights are lit for placing the channel in test.

6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final 6

2011 NRC Control Room/In-Plant JPM Summary Rev. 1 Summary Simulator JPM A - NRC review resulted in request for replacement

• Simulator JPM A has been replaced. Original JPM A was Continuous Rod Withdrawl of a Control Bank Pull to POAH / Take Corrective Actions lAW AOP-001. Review statement of JPM said: Does not appear to be very discriminating/Some actions are the same as the actions that will be required in JPM b. Suggest replacing JPM A.

Simulator JPM C NRC review stated not alternate path

• Simulator JPM C has been modified. During the restoration lineup of the CSIP the common minif low valve 1 CS-21 4 will not open. Since the valve does not open this will require the candidate to use the RNO action to manipulate CVCS valves and controllers.

Simulator JPM F - NRC review resulted in request for replacement

• Simulator JPM F has been replaced. Original JPM F was Reduce Containment Spray Flow. Review statement of JPM said: While performing this task, the applicant will be using EPP-01 2. The 401-2 outline states that tasks using this procedure are related to safety function 4(P). You have this listed as safety function 5 (this would be the second 4P that you have in the control room/simulator portion of the outline.

Only 1 is allowed. Not very discriminating as written, will observe on prep week.

(RO ONLY).

A discussion with the Lead NRC Examiner about the association of the K/A for the original JPM has taken place. The NRC Examiner was correct by stating the K/A is not appropriate for this JPM and therefore will be replaced JPM titled Manually Align Containment Spray which has been verified as a Safety Function 5 JPM.

Simulator JPM G - NRC review during Prep Week resulted in request for replacement

• Simulator JPM G has been replaced. Original JPM G was to start a Emergency Diesel Generator. Following the start the local operator was to report that oil was coming out of the crank case vent. This report indicates that a major malfunction has occurred on the Diesel and lAW the starting procedure precautions and limitations the operator should immediately secure the Diesel. The NRC Examiner determined that the feedback should be from indications not from a local report. The Main Control room indications do not support this level of detail.

A new JPM has been selected still dealing with operating the Emergency Diesel Generator and securing the Diesel based on the procedure precaution and limitiations.

Simulator JPM K NRC review resulted in request for replacement

• In-Plant JPM K has been replaced. Original JPM K was locally tripping the Reactor.

The NRC lead examiner determined the JPM lacked discriminatory value and therefore has been replaced with a JPM dealing with local actions required for a Pressurizer Pressure transmitter failure.

6/28/20 1 1 Rev. Final 7

ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Date of Examination: Operating Test Number:

Initials

1. General Criteria a b*

a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution). ¶( .I_

b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.

c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1 .a.) .

d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.

e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent -

applicants at the designated license level.

2. Walk-Through Criteria -- --

a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:

• initial conditions

• initiating cues

• references and tools, including associated procedures

• reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee

• operationally important specific performance criteria that include:

detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable

b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.

3. Simulator Criteria -- --

The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.

Printed Name I Signature Date

a. Author /te4i .523/ /

b. Facility Reviewer(*)

c. NRC Chief Examiner(#) ttC4 f1.tV /ts/1f

d. NRC Supervisor a 4 NOTE:

• The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-301, Page 24 of 27

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 Facilty: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: 07-11-2011 Scenario Numbers: 1 /2 / 3 / 4 (Spare)

Operating Test No.: 05000400/2011301 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b*

1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.

2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events.

3. Each event description consists of

. the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

. the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible, to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position)

Z ,4f

. the event termination point (if applicable)

4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. -

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. T

7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.

Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.

Cues are given.

8. The simulator modeling is not altered.  ?

9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.

10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.

All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.

11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).

12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).

13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.

Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes --

1. Total malfunctions (58) 9 / 9 / 8 / 8 47

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 2 / 3 I 2 / 12. 4

3. Abnormal events (24) 3 / 3 / 3 / 3

4. Major transients (12) 1 I 1 / 2 / 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 2 / 1 / 3 / 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 0 / 1 / I / 1

7. Critical tasks (23) 2 / 2 / 3 / 2 j V ES-301, Page 25 of 27

SCENARIOS 2-4 ES3O1 Triiit Evant Chacklist -

Form S2O1 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 07-1 1-11 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2011301 A E Scenarios P V 1-SPARE 2 T M 3 4 P E I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T

I T POSmON POSrrION POSmON POSfl1ON A C S A B S A B S A B S A B L A T R T 0 R T 0 A T 0 R T 0 M(*)

N Y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RU T P E

RO-1 RX 1 1 1

• NOR 1 1 1 SRO-l I/C 3 4 7 4 Ao-u MAJ 1 1 2 2 TS 00 RO-2 RX 1 1 1 U NOR 1 1 21 SRO-l I/C 3 4 4 11 4 o-u MAJ 1 2 1 4 2 j TS 00 RO-3 RX 1 1 1 U NOR 1 1 1 SRO-l I/C 3 4 7 4 Ao-u MAJ 1 2 3 2 TS 00 RO-4 RX 1 1 1 U NOR 1 1 1 SRO-l I/C 5 2 7 4 o-u MAJ 1 2 3 2 TS 00 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

June 28, 2011 Rev. Final Page 1 of5

SCENARIOS 2-4 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301 -5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 07-11-11 Operating Test No.: 05000400/201 1301 A E Scenarios P V 1-SPARE 2 3 T 4 M P E o L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T

i I POSmON POSrrION POSmON posmo A C S A B S A B S A B S A B L A T A T 0 R T 0 R T 0 A T 0 M*

N y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P R IU T P E

RO-5 RX 1 1 1

• NOR 1 1 1 SRO-l I/C 5 2 7 4 o-u MAJ 1 2 3 2 TS 00 RO-6 RX 1 1 1

• NOR 1 1 1 SRO-l I/C 5 2 7 4 MAJ 1 2 3 2 TS 00 RO-7 RX 1 1 1 S NOR 1 1 21 SRO-l I/C 4 3 7 4 ko-u MAJ 2 1 3 2 TS 00 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

June 28, 2011 Rev. Final Page 2 of 5

SCENARIOS 2-4 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 A E Scenarios P V 1-SPARE 2 3 4 T M P E L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T

I T POSfl1ON POSON POSmON A C S A B S A B S A B S A B L u A T R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M*

N Y o C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P R IU T P E

NOR o-D SRO-Ui I/C 8 62 MAJ 1 2 3 1 I TS 2_ 4 6 2 NOR cl +/-___

D SRO-U2 I/C 8 6 14 2 MAJ 1 2 3 1 I TS 2_ 4 6 2 NOR 1 SRal1

• I/C 8 634 SRO-U MAJ 1 2 1 4 2 TS 2 4 6 2 Instructions:

3. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-i event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position, If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

4. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

June 28, 2011 Rev. Final Page 3 of 5

SCENARIO # 1 Spare ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-aol-S Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 07-1 1-11 Operating Test No.: 05000400/201 1301 A E Scenarios P V 1-SPARE T 2 3 4 M P E o I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T

i POSmON POSrrlON POSmON POSON A C S A B S A B S A B S A BL A T R T 0 A T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M*

N y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P R lU T P E

NOR SRO-l El I/C 835 SRO-U MAJ 1 1 1 El TS 4--

RO RX El SRO-l NOR I/C El SRO-U MAJ El TS NOR El SRO-U IC MAJ El TS NOR SRO-l El SRO-U I/C MAJ El TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

June 28, 2011 Rev. Final Page 4 of 5

Revision Summary Page ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Rev. 1 Scenario #1 Event #6 did not identify a Technical Specification call for the SRO. It was identified during Operator validation which occurred after the submittal of the NRC outlines. Due to this identification each SRO Transient and Event Checklist for SRO Tech Specs has been updated.

An additional Component Failure was identified during Operations Validations Event #7 A CSIP trip and subsequent AOP-0 18 entry should have been identified but was not. Event #7 was originally listed as just the Major event which included the A CSIP trip and the Small Break LOCA. These are 2 separate events. Each RO in the ATC position and the SROs will be given credit for one additional Component Failure.

Scenario #2 Identification of a change will be captured here for tracking There is no affect on the Transient and Event Checklist totals because the Component and Instrument failures are counted together.

Event 5 was been miss-identified as an Instrument Failure it should have been classified as a Component Failure.

This was discovered during Scenario Based Testing simulator validation. The correct classification is now identified in the scenario and scenario outline.

Rev. Final During Prep Week the Chief NRC Examiner determined that Scenario #1 would be better suited as the SPARE. All values have been re-calculated based on Scenario #1 as the spare.

Archie Lucky 6/28/2011 June 28, 2011 Rev. Final Page 5 of 5

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 07-11-11 Operating Test No.: 0500040012011301 APPLICANTS RD RD (BOP) SRO-U SRD-I SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO Competencies 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Interpret/DiagnoseEvents 2/4 2/4 2/4 1/3 3/6 3/5 2/3 0 2/3 2/3 3/6 2/3 and Conditions 5/7 5/7/8 6/7/8 6/8 7/9 7/8/9 4/5 4/5 4/5 7/9 4/5 8/9 10 10 6/7 6/7 6/7 10 6/7 8/9 8/9 8/9/10 8/9 10 Comply With and 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 0 1/2 1/2/3 1/3 1/2 Use Procedures (1) 4/5 415 4/6 6/8 6/7 5/7 3/4 3/4 4/5/6 6/7 3/4 7/8/9 7/8 7/8 10 9/10 8/9 5/6 5/6 7/8/9 9/10 5/6 7/8 7/8/9 10 7/8/9 9/10 Operate Control 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 Boards (2) 4/5 4/5 4/6 6/8 6/7 5/7 6/7 9 7/8/9 7/8 7/8 10 9/10 8/9 10 Communicate 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 0 1/2 1/2/3 1/3 1/2 and Interact 4/5 4/5 4/6 6/8 6/7 5/7 3/4 3/4 4/5/6 6/7 3/4 7/8/9 7/8 7/8 10 9/10 8/9 5/6 5/6 7/8/9 9/10 5/6 7/8 7/8/9 10 7/8/9 9/10 Demonstrate Supervisory 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 1/2/3 0 1/2 Ability (3) 3/4 3/4 4/5/6 3/4 5/6 5/6 7/8/9 5/6 7/8 7/8/9 10 7/8/9 9/10 Comply With and 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 3/4 1/3 0 3/4 Use Tech. Specs. (3) 4/6 = 5/6 4/6 5/6 Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an S RD-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.

ES-301 Page 27 of 27 1

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 07-11-11 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2011301 APPLICANTS RO RO (BOP) SRO-U SRO-I SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO Corn petencies 4 Interpret/DiagnoseEvents and Conditions 5/7 2/3/4 2/3/4 2/3/4 8/11 8/9/10 5/6/7 5/6/7 8/9/10 8/9/10 Comply With and 1/5/7 1/2/3/4 1/2/3 1/2/3 Use Procedures (1) 8/11 8/9/10 4/5/6 4/5/6 7/8/9/10 7/8/9/10 Operate Control 1/5/7 1/2/3/4 1/2/3 1/2/3 Boards (2) 8/11 8/9/10 4/5/6 4/5/6 7/8/9/10 7/8/9/10 Communicate 1/5/7 1/2/3/4 1/2/3 1/2/3 and Interact 8/11 8/9/10 4/5/6 4/5/6 7/8/9/10 7/8/9/10 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3) 0 0 1/2/3 1/2/3 4/5/6 4/5/6 7/8/9/10 7/8/9/10 Comply With and 0 0 2/3/4 2/3/4 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

SCENARIO # 4 submitted as a SPARE Scenario Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate eveiy applicable competency for every applicant.

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 2

ES-401, Rev. 9E PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Harris 2011-301 Date of Exam: July 2011 RO K/A Category Points SRO-OnIy Points Tier Group KKKKK KAAAAG A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal Plant 2 1 2 2 N/A 1 2 N/A 1 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 5 4 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 32313233233 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 01111111111 10 1 1 1 3 Systems TierTotals 33424344344 38 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 Note:1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

e. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers I and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401, Rev. 9 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE #1 Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

OO7EK1 .05 Knowledge of the operational 000007 (BW/E02&E1 0; CE/E02) Reactor Trip X 3.3/3.8 implications of the following concepts as they

- Stabilization Recovers / 1 apply to the reactor trip:

Decay power as a function of time.

000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 009EG2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational 000009 Small Break LOCA /3 X 3.8/4.3 implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

O11EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations 000011 Large Break LOCA I 3 X 2.6/2.7 between the and the following Large Break LOCA: Pumps O1IEG2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown 00001 1 Large Break LOCA / 3 (SRO) X 3.8/4.2 implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

015AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000015/17 RCPMalfunctions/4 X following responses as they apply to the 3.7/4.0 Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Sequence of events for manually tripping reactor and RCP as a result of an RCP malfunction 022AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X 3.1/3 6 following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller 025AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 (SRO) X 4.0/4.2 following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Leakage of reactor coolant from RHR into closed cooling water system or into reactor building atmosphere 025AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X 2.7/2.9 following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Proper amperage of running LPI/decay heat removallRHR pump(s) 026AA1 .06 Ability to operate and I or monitor the 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X 2.9/2.9 following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Control of flow rates to components cooled by the CCWS 027AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System X 3.1/3.4 implications of the following concepts as Malfunction /

they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Definition of saturation temperature

029EK2.06 Knowledge of the interrelations 000029 ATWS / 1 X 2.9/3.1 between the and the following an ATWS:

Breakers, relays, and disconnects 029EA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret the 000029 ATWS I 1 (SRO) X 4.2/4.4 following as they apply to a ATWS:

Reactor trip alarm 038EA1 .36 Ability to operate and monitor the 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 X 4.3/4.5 following as they apply to a SGTR: Cooldown of RCS to specified temperature WE12EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) Steam X implications of the following concepts as they 34/37 Line Rupture Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators) Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators).

054AA1 .01 Ability to operate and I or monitor the 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X 4.5/4.4 following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): ARN controls, including the use of alternate AFW sources 000055 Station Blackout / 6 056AG2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 (SRO) X Technical Specifications for limiting conditions 3.2/4.2 for operations and safety limits.

000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus! 6 058AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the 000058 Loss of DC Power! 6 (SRO) X 3.7/4.1 following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:

That a loss of dc power has occurred; verification that substitute power sources have come on line 062K3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X 3.5/3.7 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Effect on the

. nuclear service water discharge flow header of a loss of CCW 065AG2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 000065 Loss of Instrument Air /8 X 4.2/4.4 indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

077AG2.2.37 Ability to determine operability 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid X and/or availability of safety related equipment 3.6/4.6 Disturbances / 6 WEO4EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment /3 X the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside 34/43 Containment) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

WEO4EG2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment /3 (SRO) X and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

WE1 1 EK3.4 Knowledge of the reasons for the W/E1 1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 X following responses as they apply to the (Loss 3.6/3.8 of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

WEO5EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - X between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and 37/3.9 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink/4 the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

K/A Category Totals: 3 3 [ 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 18 SRO K/A Category Totals: = = = 3 3 Group Point Total: 6

ES-401, Rev. 9 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evoluhons Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO) 1 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR i212_

000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal! 1 001AK2.01 Knowledge of the X 2.9/3.2 interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: Rod bank step counters 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 x 028AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer 2.6/2.9 Level Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and Positioners 028AA2.04 Ability to determine and 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 (SRO) x interpret the following as they apply to 2.6/3.1 the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Ammeters and running indicators for CVCS charging pumps 000032 Loss of Source Range Nl/7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 037AA1 .02 Ability to operate and I or 3.1/2.9 monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Condensate exhaust system 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 051AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for X 2.8/3.1 the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum /4 (SRO) X 051AG2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal 3.8/4.5 operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 x 059AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:

Termination of a release of radioactive liquid 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms /7 000067 Plant Fire On-site /8

068AA2.03 Ability to determine and 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 X 40/4.2 interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: T-hot, T cold, and in-core temperatures 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 mad. Core Cooling /4 X 074EA2.07 Ability to determine or (WIEO6&E07) 4.1/4.7 interpret the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling: The difference between a LOCA and inadequate core cooling, from trends and indicators 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagriosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E1 5 Containment Flooding /5 (SRO) X WE1 5EG2.4. 18 Knowledge of the specific 3.3/4.0 bases for EOPs W/E16 High Containment Radiation 1 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BWIAO5 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BWIAO7 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown Depress. WEO3EG2.1 .32 Ability to explain and

- / 4 X 3.8/4.0 apply system limits and precautions.

BW/E09; CE/Al 3; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. WEO9EK1 .2 Knowledge of the operational

/4 X 3.3/3.7 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations) Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/All; W/E08 RCS Overcooling PTS / 4 (SRO) WEO8EA2.1 Ability to determine and

- X interpret the following as they apply to 3.4/4.2 the (Pressurized Thermal Shock) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery =

K/A Category Point Totals: 1 2 2 1 2 Group Point Total: 9 K/A Category Point Totals: (SRO)

= 1212 Group Point Total: 4

ES-401, Rev. 9 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems Tier 2IGrou 1(RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1234561234 003G2.2.42 Ability to recognize system 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X 39/4.6 parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

003K6.14 Knowledge of the effect of a 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X 2.6/2.9 loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS:

Starting requirements 004A2.22 Ability to (a) predict the 004 Chemical and Volume Control X 3.2/3.1 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Mismatch of letdown and changing flows 005 Residual Heat Removal X 005K2.03 Knowledge of bus power 2.7/2.8 supplies to the following: RCS pressure boundary motor-operated valves 005K3.07 Knowledge of the effect that 005 Residual Heat Removal X 3.2/3.6 a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following: Refueling operations 006A1 .07 Ability to predict and/or 006 Emergency Core Cooling X 3.3/3.6 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: Pressure, high and low 006A2.10 Ability to (a) predict the 006 Emergency Core Cooling (SRO) X impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Low boron concentration in SIS 006 Emergency Core Cooling X 006A4.04 Ability to manually operate 3.7/3.6 V andlor monitor in the control room:

RHRS

007A1 .01 Ability to predict andlor monit 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X 2.9/3.1 changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated wit operating the PRTS controls including:

Maintaining quench tank water level within limits 008 Component Cooling Water X 008K2.02 Knowledge of bus power 3.0/3.2 supplies to the following: CCW pump, including emergency backup 008K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that 008 Component Cooling Water X a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following Loads cooled by CCWS 010K6.04 Knowledge of the effect of a 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X 2.9/3.2 loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: PRT 012A3.06 Ability to monitor automatic 012 Reactor Protection X operation of the RPS, including: Trip logic 013K1.18 Knowledge of the physical 013 Engineered Safety Features X 3.7/4.1 connections ancuor cause effect Actuation relationships between the ESFAS and the following systems: Premature reset of ESF actuation 022A2.O3Ability to (a) predict the 022 Containment Cooling (SRO) X 2.6/3.0 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation 022A4.05 Ability to manually operate 022 Containment Cooling X 3.8/3.8 and!or monitor in the control room:

Containment readings of temperature, pressure, and humidity system 025 Ice Condenser N/A 026A4.01 Ability to manually operate 026 Containment Spray X andlor monitor in the control room:

CSS controls 039K5.08 Knowledge of the operational 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 3636 implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS: Effect of steam removal on reactivity

039A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the 039 Main and Reheat Steam (SRO) X 2.4/2.7 impacts of the following mal-functions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves 059A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the 059 Main Feedwater X 3.4/3.6 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Feedwater actuation of AFW system 059 Main Feedwater X 059A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic 2.5/2.6 operation of the MAN, including:

Turbine driven feed pump K/A changed to 059A3.03 02/01/2011 2.5/2.6 061K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X 3.6/3.9 implications of the following concepts as the apply to the AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer 061A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X 3.4/3.8 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: pump failure or improper operation 062K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a 062 AC Electrical Distribution X loss or malfunction of the ac distribution system will have on the following: DC system 063A1 .01 Ability to predict andlor 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.5/3.3 monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the DC electrical system controls including:

Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate 063K1 .02 Knowledge of the physical 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.7/3.2 connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: AC electrical system 064G2.4.34 Knowledge of RO tasks 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X 4.2/4.1 performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

073K5.02 Knowledge of the operational 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X 25/3.0 implications as they apply to concepts as they apply to the PRM system:

Relationship between radiation intensity and exposure limits 076K4.06 Knowledge of SWS design 076 Service Water X 2.8/3.2 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Service water train separation 076G2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and 076 Service Water (SRO) X 4.2/4.2 recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

078G2.1.19 Ability to use plant 078 Instrument Air X 3.1/3.1 computers to evaluate system or component status.

103K1.08 Knowledge of the physical 103 Containment X 3.6/3.8 connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: SIS, including action of safety injection reset 103G2.2.36 Abilitytoanalyzetheeffect 103 Containment (SRO) X 3.1/4.2 of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 311 3 2 3 32 3 3 Group Point Total: 28 K/A Category Point Totals: (SRO) = = = = = = = 3 = = 2 Group Point Total: 5

ES-401, Rev. 9 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR 1234561234 001 G2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance 001 Control Rod Drive (SRO) X 3.7/4.1 procedures.

002 Reactor Coolant X 002G2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical 3.4/3.7 Specifications for a system.

011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication X 014A4.01 Ability to manually operate 3.3/3.1 and/or monitor in the control room: Rod selection control 015A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X 3.2/3.5 impacts of the following malfunctions or (SRO) operations on the NIS; and (b based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Xenon oscillations 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X 2.7/3.0 loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components: Sensors and detectors 027K2.01 Knowledge of bus power 027 Containment Iodine Removal X 3.1/3.4 supplies to the following: Fans 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic 029 Containment Purge X 3.8/4.0 operation of the Containment Purge System including: CPS isolation 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034K1 .04 Knowledge of the physical 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 2.6/3.5 connections and/or cause-effect (SRO) relationships between the Fuel Handling System and the following systems: NIS 034K4.03 Knowledge of design 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 2.6/3.3 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Overload protection 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control

045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071A1 .06 Ability to predict and!or 071 Waste Gas Disposal X 2.5/2.8 monitor changes in parameters(to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Waste Gas Disposal System operating the controls including: Ventilation system 072K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X 3.1/3.5 loss or malfunction of the ARM system will have on the following: Fuel handling operations 075A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the 075 Circulating Water X 2.5/2.7 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Safety features and relationship between condenser vacuum, turbine trip, and steam dump 079 Station Air 086K5.04 Knowledge of the operational 086 Fire Protection X 2.9/3.5 implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Fire Protection System: Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection KIA Category Point Totals: 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Group Point Total:

K/A Category Point Totals: (SRO) 1

[J 1 1 Group Point Total: 3

Facility: J Harris Date of Exam: 201 1 RO SRO-Only Category K/A # Topic JR Q# IR Q#

Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside 2.1.8 the control room. 34 4.1 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high Conduct of 2.1.26 temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, 3.4 3.6 Operations oxygen and hydrogen).

Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of 2 1 35 SRO5.(SRO) 39 Subtotal 2 1 Knowledge of the process for controlling 2.2.14 equipment configuration or status. (SRO) 4.3 Knowledge of the process for managing 2.2.20 2.6 3.8 troubleshooting activities.

2. 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the Equipment Control facility license. (SRO) 45 Ability to recognize system parameters that are 2.2.42 entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications. 39 4.6 Subtotal 2 2 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under 2.3.4 normal or emergency conditions 3.2 3.7 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable 2.3.5 survey instruments, personnel monitoring 2.9 equipment, etc. (SRO)

Ability to comply with radiation work permit 2.3.7 requirements during normal or abnormal 3.6 conditions. (SRO)

3. Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as Radiation Control response to radiation monitor alarms, containment 2 3 13 entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, 3.4 3.8 access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or 2 3 14 emergency conditions or activities. 3.4 3.8 Subtotal 3 2 Knowledge of general operating crew 2.4.12 responsibilities during emergency operations. 4.0 4.3 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety 2.4.22 functions during abnormallemergency operations. 3.6 4.4 2.4.27

4. Knowledge of fire in the plant procedures. (SRO) 3.9 Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions. (SRO) 4.3 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of 2.4.45 each annunciator or alarm. 4.1 4.3 Subtotal 3 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

Harris Nuc1er Phuit 2011 NRC Exam Outline ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs Form ES-401-4 Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A T2/G1 059A3.04 HNP does not have Turbine drive Main Feedwater Pumps.

Replaced with 059A3.06, provided by random selection from Gerald Laska via telecom on 2/1/201 1 Ti/Gi 062 AK3.04 The effects at HNP on nuclear Service Water discharge flow header with loss of CCW are negligible.

Replaced with 062AK3.03, provided by random selection from Gerald Laska via telecom on 3/29/2011 T2/G1 073 K5.02 Informed Gerald Laska that we could not create a question dealing with HNP Process Radiation Monitors associated with a source distance relationship with liquid or gaseous monitors.

On 3/29/ 2011 via telecom with Gerald Laska it was stated that I could write a question on an area monitor that monitors system piping such as Letdown Radiation monitoring. This type of monitor could be considered a process monitor.

T2/G1 039 A2.03 Could not meet SRO level question. Requested new KJA from Gerald Laska and one was provided by random selection on 6/22/2011. New K/A is 039 A2.03 Could not write a question at the SRO level for this K/A.

T3 G2 4 17 Requested a new K/A. On 6/29/2011 Gerard Laska provided a new randomly generated K/A which is G2.4.18 T21G2 001 G2.2.12 Could not write a question at the SRO level for this K/A.

Requested a new K/A. On 7/6/2011 Gerard Laska provided a new randomly generated K/A which is 001 G2.2.40

ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6

[ Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Test No. 05000400/2011301 Date of Exam: 07-11-2011 Exam Level: RO SRO Initial Item Description a b

1. Questions and answers are technically aocurate and apphcable to the facility. -

Q

2. a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions. -

b. Facility teaming objectives are referenced as available.

..,, */

3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401

4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions ,,./

were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).

5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:

the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independenily; or ...-

7

... the licensee certifies that there is no duplication: or other (explain)

6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRO-only 43 I 12 1 I 1 31 I 12 I

question distribution(s) at right,

7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory C/A

• exam are written at the comprehensioni analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter 33 I 10 42 I 15 h.. .

the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.

8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers ..i or aid in the elimination of distractors, .

9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified.

I

10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.

11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet. s Printed Name / Signature ,, Date

a. Author Jw/

ky / 7/7/l

b. FacilityReviewer() Sf Iir/. I )t CIf

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) W L4.4/ 1/7J1(

ci. NRC Regional Supervisor FIA&k- 4t.1k3r /--2 Note: The facility reviewers initials/signature are not appticable for NRC-developed examinations,

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-401, Page 29 of 33

ES-401, Rev. 9 Harris 2011-301 RO Written Examination Review Worksheet FINAL Form ES-401-9 1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD i (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S Instructions

[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LCD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2

- 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

. The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

. The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

. The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

. The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

. One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

. The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

. The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

. The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

. The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check Questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

7. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

1 F 2 S 007EK5.O1 Question appears to match the K/A. SAl has a calculated -1/3 dpm rate been determined?

What was this time?

NEW

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 2 F 2 S 009EG2.4.20 Question appears to match the K/A.

SAT NEW V H 2 X E 011 EK2.02 Question appears to match the K/A.

3 Distractor D is not plausible. With a large break LOCA in progress, a yellow path is not plausible.

Need to develop another distractor for d, or use a two by two with the other distractors, and maybe including a reason for taking the actions.

NEW Made changes to stem. SAT. 612912011 H 2 X E 0015AK5.03 Question appears to match the K/A.

4 Raise reactor power in the stem to 55%, and change the 49%s in the distractors to greater than P8.

NEW Made changes SAT. 612912011 H 2 X E 022AA2.03 Question appears to match the K/A.

5 Change distractor D to read: FCV114B.. .had a loss of air during the auto make-up. (The way it is stated now, this is teaching in the distractor). The applicant should know the valve fails closed.

BANK Made changes SAT. 612912011 H 2 S 025AA2.01 Question appears to match the K/A. SAl 6

NEW

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus j Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S H 2 X E 026AA1 .06 Question appears to match the K/A.

7 Distractors A is not totally plausible. It the applicant believed (as in your example of distractor analysis) that the TCV would go full open (High CCW flow) why would you secure letdown, it would be cooler than normal, this could cause an RCS dilution (colder water through the demins causing boron to be kept in the demins) causing Tave to rise. Need tc do something to the A and B distractors.

BANK Made some changes to stem, added noun names. Then SAT 612912011 8 F 2 S 027AK101 Question appears to match the K/A.SAT BANK H 2 S 029EK2.06 Question appears to match the K/A.

9 Distractor D should be changed to read fails to energize. Otherwise SAT.

NEW Left as is SAT 612912011 H 2 S 038EA1.36 Question appears to match the KIA.SAT 10 BANK H 2 S WEI2EKI.3 Question appears to match the 11 KIA.SAT NEW

1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only S H 2 X U 054AA1 .01 Question appears to match the K/A.

12 Distractors B and C are not plausible. Based on WOG usage, H.5 is never required to be entered.

Conditions are not close for implementation of C.2 Core exit TCs must be around 700 °F to be required to enter.

BANK Changed stem and distractors now SAT 612912011 13 F 2 X E 062AK303 Question appears to match the K/A.

(Leave the plant conditions as is)

Which one of the following describes the reason for isolating ESW to the A train containment fan coolers?

BANK Made changes as requested SAT 6I29I2011 H 2 X E 065AG2.2.44 Question appears to match the K/A.

14 This question is kind of confusing. You should separate out the two parts in the stem. Someone could read the question to state what pressure is the instrument air system at the time of the alarm.

NEW SAT 612912011 15 H 3 S 077AG2.2.37 Question appears to match the K/A.

SAT. One page states the question is an LOR Bank question, and the LXR test item states it is new.

NEW

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 16 H 2 X U WEO4EA2.1 Question appears to match the K/A.

Distractors A, C, and D are not plausible as written.

Not all of the SI termination values are listed in the stem. If I did not know what subcooling was, why would I transition to SI termination? SIG levels are Iso not present, they could be above the required amount, and reducing AFW was prudent, why would I go to H.1? With the stem stating that aux building rad monitors are in alarm and containment pressure at 0.2 psig why would I go to a post LOCA cooldown? This Question needs some work.

NEW Add radiation monitor alarms for locations in the aux building. Then SAT 17 F 2 S WEIIEK3.4 Question appears to match the K/A. In some of the distractors, containment is capitalized and in some it is not. They should all be the same.

Otherwise SAT.

NEW 18 H 2 X U WEO5EK2.1 Question appears to match the K/A.

Distractors A and C are not plausible. (A) Main feedwater is normally in service at 100% power NOT and NOP. Why would I think I would need to depressurize to allow it to supply feed flow after the unit was tripped? (C) I know of no place in the procedures that have you maintain the PORVs closed and the block valves closed. This does not make sense. There are many questions out there on H.1. This question needs to be re-written.

BANK Made some changes but still need to work on C C could still be considered correct. 612912011

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD 1

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link ward K/A Only S Changed distractors C and D SAT 613012011 19 H 2 X U OOIAK2OI Question appears to match the K/A.

Distratctors A and B are not plausible, as stated in your distractor analysis rod would be going in with high Tave. Would a failure high of impulse pressure work better (rods would initially step out at 72 steps per minute) that would make for a better distractor, this question will not work as written.

BANK Made changes as requested SAT SAT 6I30I2011 20 H 1 X S 028AK2.03 Question appears to match the K/A, but with no transient in progress and pressurizer level failed at the programmed level, why would any thing change? This is not really testing anything that can be identified. We either need to have a transient or the instrument needs to fail off of program. I understand the malfunction present, but if this happened in the plant, it would not be seen until a transient occurred, so essentially there is not malfunction. As written the question is not testing the malfunction, and really does not meet the K/A.

BANK After discussion, left question as is SAT 6I30/201 I

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1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- 0= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 25 H 2 S 074EA2.07 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT NEW 26 H 2 S WEO3G2.1.32 Question appears to match the K/A.

SAT BANK 27 H 2 X E WEO9EKI .2 Question appears to match the K/A. To make distractor A more plausible, have one of the CRDM fans fail to restart/trip on the loss of off site power, (only two fans are required.) Also in distractor D use the correct version of this, to ensure SG pressures are less than 50°F above RCS. to .

add plausibility. (this is not why the caution is there).

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 28 H 2 S 003G2.2.42 Question appears to match the K/A.

SAT NEW 29 F 1.5 S 003K6.14 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK (not very discriminating) 30 H 2 X X E 004A2.22 Question kind of meets K/A in a backwards fashion. A charging / letdown mismatch is evident but not stated. Distractor B is not plausible in that this malfunction causes pressurizer level to increase and VCT level to trend down. The correct answer also causes the applicant to make an assumption (direction of charging flow control failure), or select this answer by eliminating the

3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S others. Need to rewrite to correct these issues. As it stands now one could state the question does not have a truly correct answer.

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 31 H 2 X U 005K2.03 As written the question does not match the K/A. The operator does not need to know the power supply to the valves as stated in the K/A. The operator need only know that valves are in series and powered from a different train, and would automatically select either c or d. Recommend changing the question to read; Same Stem A. 1RHI is powered from 1A21-SA, IRH2 is powered from 1B21-SB. Breakers are open.

B. 1RH1 is powered from 1A21-SA, IRH2, is powered from 1B21-SB. Breakers are closed.

C. IRH1 is powered from 1B21-SB, 1RH2, is powered from 1A21-SA, Breakers are open.

D. 1RHI is powered from 1B21-SB, 1RH2, is powered from 1A21-SA, Breakers are closed BANK SAT 6I30!2011 32 H 2 X U 005K3.07 As written the question does not match the K/A. The K/A asks for the effect on refueling operations, To address this K/A with Harris TS it appears that refueling could continue for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, unless core reload is considered to be an increase in reactor decay heat load. If refueling is considered an

Q# LOK fI 2.

LOD

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link unitsj ward K/A Only S j__

increase in reactor decay heat load, then is should be suspended immediately. Need to work on this question at least to the point of addressing the K/A.

NEW Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 33 F 2 X E 006A1 .07 Question kind of matches K/A. May need to reword the second part, it appears we have a subset issue. Greater than 2200, is greater than 2000, D could also be argued as a correct answer.

NEW Made changes to stem, Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 34 F 2 S 006A4.04 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 35 F 1.5 E 007A101 Question appears to match the K/A. This question is a repeat of #34 on the Harris 2009B exam. Change some of the items, including, change small break LOCA to safety or PORV leaking. How is this water transferred, what pump is used? This would change it up a little.

BANK Harris 2009B exam Made changes as requested Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 36 F I X U 008K2.02 As written the question does not match the K/A.. Like the previous power supply question, the operator does not really need to know the power supply, only the voltage the pumps are designed for.

You give applicant a swing component in this case and both power supplies for that voltage. Distractors C and D do not appear to be plausible. If a pump

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S can be powered from two power supplies at either voltage level one breaker would not be feasible.

Need to find another distractor for the second part of C and D.

NEW Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 37 F 2 X X X E 008K3.01 Question appears to match the K/A. Is this an inadvertent phase B? If not, distractor A could be considered correct lAW path-i.

Distractor C should read: RCP operation may continue provided that normal seal injection flow is maintained.

This question should either be tied to a particular procedure, or stated per system design, etc.

BANK Changed to AOP 18.0 and changed distractor D SAT 613012011.

38 F I X X E 01 0K4.06 Question does not appear to match the K/A. How does the malfunction affect the Pressurize pressure control system? Distractor analysis for A and C states the applicant may think that temperature will rise, but that distractors state remains the same, need to have the distractors agree with the analysis. Did you intend to have the distractors state temperature will rise? Distractor C and D do not appear to be plausible, industry standard is psig. Will discuss. I will have another examiner review also. As written not very discriminating.

BANK Changed C and 0 to 150 psig based on seal injection relief. Made changes as requested. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 613012011 39 F 2 X E 01 2A3.06 Question appears to match the K/A.

Distractor A is not plausible. Try using a two by two with distractors C and D, and also ask what the trip protects against. (i.e. DNB etc.)

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 6I30I201 I 40 H 2 S 013K1.18 Question appears to match K/A. SAT NEW 41 F 2 X X E 022A4.05 Question appears to match the K/A. First column (time) is not needed. DistractorA is not plausible, if neither value is above 120°F why would applicant pick it.

NEW Made changes as requested. SAT 6I30I2011 42 F 2 S 026A401 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 43 H 2 X E 039K5.08 Question appears to match the K/A.

Distractors A and B first part is not plausible. Need to develop another first part distractor, or develop a two by two question using another parameter.

BANK Made changes (SIG Level) Modified. Made changes as requested. SAT 6I30I201 I

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 44 H 2 S 059A201 Question appears to match the K/A.

Change distractors C and D to Currently AFW pumps must be manually started. Otherwise SAT NEW 45 H 2 X E 059A3.06 Question appears to match the K/A.

Change the conditions in the stem to C S/G level reaches 80%. An automatic reactor trip and turbine trip occurs. Then leave the current conditions as is.

Informing the applicant that the trip occurred as a result of high SIG level is cuing.

NEW Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 46 F I X U 061 K5.01 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question does not appear to be discriminating. All of the distractors seem to NOT be plausible. Need different distractors or a different way of testing this topic. Will consider changing the K/A. (Will get another examiners opinion) Second opinion agreed, there are not any distractors that are plausible.

BANK Completely changed the question. SAT 6I30I2011 47 H 2 S 061A2.04 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT NEW 48 F 2 X E 062K303 Question appears to match the K/A. The second part of distractors A and C are not plausible.

I do not know of battery charger that automatically aligns itself. Several will automatically be repowered if the normal AC source is lost, but a battery charger not in service will not align itself.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 49 F 2 S 063A 1.01 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 50 F 1 S 063K1.02 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK( Not very discriminating) 51 F 2 S 064G2.4.34 Question appears to match the K/A.

SAT BANK 52 H 2 S 073K5.02 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT NEW 53 H 2 S 076K4.06 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 54 H 2 S 078G2.1.19 Question appears to match the K/A.

(This is a tough K/A, and this is about as good as you could do) SAT NEW 55 H 2 S 103K1.08 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- 0= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 56 H 2 S 002G2.2.40 Question appears to match the K/A.

Distractor analysis does not match up with distractors. Otherwise SAT BANK 58 H 2 S 017K6.O1 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 59 F 2 S 027K2.O1 Question appears to match K/A. SAT NEW 60 H 2 S 029A3.O1 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 61 F 2 X E 034K4.03 Question appears to match K/A Do not believe 4000 lbs to be plausible. Change to 3000 lbs. Then SAT NEW Changed to 3000 lbs. Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link 1u1ts ward K/A Only S 62 F 2 X X U 071A106 Not sure this question matches the K/A.

Will get a second opinion. Based on second opinion question does not meet the K/A. (nothing to do with ventilation). Does the gas release flow pass through distractors B and C? If not, they are not plausible.

Key operated switch? Is this listed like this in the procedure? If not this is cuing.

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 63 H 2 X E 072K3.02 Question appears to match K/A. SAT.

Change the first part of distractors A and B to receives an auto start signal, and C and D to Does NOT receive an auto start signal. The way the question is worded now it implies that the fan must be started, so why would it not start automatically.

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 64 H 2 5 075A2.03 Question appears to match K/A. SAT NEW 65 F 2 5 086K5.04 Question appears to match K/A. SAT NEW 66 H 2 X E G2.1.8 Question appears to match K/A. With the noise coming from the FHB, would AOP-41 .0 be more appropriate. Should it just be stated that Reactor cavity and Fuel pool level are observed lowering? Just dont want any confusion.

NEW SAT 6I30I2011

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD 1

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 67 F 2 S G2.1.26 Question appears to match K/A. SAT NEW 68 F 2 S G2.2.20 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 2009A Harris NRC exam F 1.5 x U G2.2.24 Question appears to match K/A. Do not believe distractors A and B are plausible.

Attachment 1 of GP-007 states that above 350°F, the limit for cooldown is 1 00°F/hr. Not very discriminating as written.

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 F 1 x E G2.3.4 Question appears to match K/A. Not very discriminating. Do you have a bank question where A is the correct answer (admin limit and dose for protecting a piece of equipment? If not, the stem of this question could be changed and this would bea modified question.

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 613012011 E G2.3.13 Question appears to match K/A. As written the question leads the applicant to believe that only one of the items below could have happened. (either purge, or containment ventilation isolation) But there are two alarms in. If the applicant knows that AOP 5 has actions for 3502, but not for 3561, then the applicant would choose A. Second part of distractor B is not plausible.

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD[

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S BANK Explained why distractors were plausible.

SAT 613012011 72 F 2 X X U G2.3.14 Question kind of matches the K/A.

Distractors C and D are not plausible as written.

How can setting a PORV to 88% prevent atmospheric dump actuation? In fact all of the distractors state prevent either code safety valves or atmospheric dump, and setting the PORV for this value will not prevent lifting/actuation of either. Need to work on this question.

BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 6I30I201 I 73 H 2 X E G2.4.12 Question appears to match K/A. Distractor B is not plausible.

BANK Changed distractor B. SAT 6I30I201 I 74 F 1 E G2.4.22 Question appears to match K/A. Distractor C is not plausible. Not very discriminating.

BANK Made changes as requested to distractor C. SAT 613012011 75 H 2 X X U G2.4.45 Does not really meet the K/A. There is not any prioritization taking place. (Only One annunciator). Distractors A and B are not plausible, the rod being withdrawn is in group 1 so how could all group 1 lift coils be de-energized?

BANK Wrote a new question. SAT 6I30I201 I

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 35 Sats, 13 Unsats, and 27 Enhancements General statement: all bank questions should have the answers rearranged.

How were the repeat questions from the last two Harris NRC examinations selected?

ES-401, Rev. 9 Harris 2011-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet FINAL Form ES-401-9

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S Instructions

[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a I - 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2

- 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

. The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

. The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

. The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

. The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

. One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

. The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

. The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

. The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

. The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check Questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

7. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the AppencflxB psychometric attributes are not being met).

76 H 2 X E 011 EG2.4.9 Question appears to match K/A.

Question does have an SRO aspect to it. Both procedures entry conditions are met. Does the operator always enter AOP-20 first?

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 ( Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link unitsi ward K/A Only S What is the capacity of the charging pumps when shutdown? Distractors A and C are not plausible unless the capacity of the charging pump is approached. With level stable and temperature not rising, why would BIT flow be initiated? I could not find a step in the initial entry point in to AOP-20, or in section 3.4 that directed the operator to align BIT flow as stated in the distractor analysis.

Need to attempt to find something that is plausible under these conditions, or change the conditions.

This question is very similar to question 77. Although under different conditions, I might be better to ask this question closer to conditions that apply to using E-O (path-I) Mode 4 for instance, does Path -1 apply?

BANK Made changes to stem to improve distractor plausibility SAT 612312011 77 H 2 X U 025AA2.02 Question appears to match K/A.

Question does have an SRO aspect to it. Actions are very similar to question 76. I could not find a reference in AOP16.O to align flow through the BIT, nor could I find actions in the procedure for securing RHR pumps and isolating RHR. Also, if pressurizer level is stable, why would I initiate BIT flow?

Therefore, these distractors do not appear to be plausible.

BANK Made changes as requested SAT 6I23I201 I

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S H 2 X X E 029EA2.02 Question does not meet the K/A at the 78 SRO level. Does not appear to be SRO only. The first part of the question is RO knowledge. (First out annunciators, conditions requiring a reactor trip. The second part asks when to perform an attachment.

This attachment is directed by a foldout page, and foldout pages are considered to be RO knowledge.

(RO monitor and take actions based on the foldout page) When would you have an SI and not verify the actuation? (Discussed with a second examiner)

Made several changes to stem and distractors (foldout is not applicable until after step 10.

NEW SAT 612912011 F 2 X E 056AG2.2.25 Question appears to match the K/A.

79 Appears to have an SRO aspect to it. The stem of the question asks which one of the following satisfie the bases requirements for offsite power distribution with the plant in mode 1. It looks like you have three correct answers to the stem. (I understand that only is in the responses, but a and b could be considered a subset of d. Need to rewrite the stem to allow only one correct response.

Removed either through the switchyard or directly from D. Added numbers to other distractors.

BANK SAT 612912011 H 2 S 058AA2.01 Question kind of matches the K/A will 80 allow based on plant design. SAT NEW

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/I-i) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/

Focus I Explanation Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S H 1 S WEO4EG2.1.23 Question appears to match the K/A.

81 Appears to have an SRO aspect to it. Not very discriminating.

BANK H 2 X U 028AA2.04 Question appears to match K/A.

82 Question is not SRO only. The answer can be determined using RO knowledge. The indications that are given indicate that a failure of LK 459F has occurred. Only one distractor has this control listed. No SRO knowledge is required to answer this question. Need to develop a question that tests the SRO5 required knowledge as well. Maybe a two by two with two different plausible attachments.

NEW Rewrote question SAT 612312011 83 H 2 X X X E 051AG24.8 Question appears to match the K/A.

Appears to have a SRO aspect. Kind of backwards logic and wordy stem focus. Some teaching in stem.

Try wording it like this:

Unit is at 100% power.

. Degrading condenser vacuum was observed.

. CTMP-7-1 Cooling Tower 1 Level HI/LO is in alarms

. AOP-12 Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum has been entered

. lAW AOP-12, the reactor has been tripped and EOP Path -1 has been entered Which one of the following describes a parameter that would require the operator to continue taking actions in accordance with AOP-12, and when will it be appropriate to take those actions?

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F Cred. IPartial Job- Minutia #/ Back-Dist. Link units ward Q= I SRO U/E/

S Explanation K/A Only A. Condenser Pit High Level alarm annunciates; continue performing the actions of AOP-12.O only after EPP-004 is exited.

B. Condenser Pit High Level alarm annunciates; continue performing the actions of AOP-12.O during the performance EPP-004 -as time allows.

C. Continuous running of both Industrial Waste Sump pumps is observed; continue performing the actions of AOP-12.O only after EPP-004 is exited.

D. Continuous running of both Industrial Waste Sump pumps is observed; continue performing the actions of AOP-12.O during the performance EPP-004 -as time allows.

NEW Made changes as requested, then question was altered. Requested licensee to change back to suggested version. Made changes as requested. SAT 0612912011 H 2 S WEI5EG2.4.19 Question appears to match the K/A, 84 and appears to be SRO knowledge. SAT NEW H 2 S WEO8EA2.1 Question appears to match the K/A, 85 and appears to be SRO only knowledge. SAT BANK

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link 1ht5 ward K/A Only S H 2 X X E 006A2.iO Question appears to match the K/A.

86 Question appears to have an SRO aspect to it.

Typically for a time frame greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> a

- reference is provided. A reference with this question would be a direct look up. Change the times to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (RO knowledge) and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Leave the second part as is. Need to change the stem so that the applicant knows that the inoperability is based on just the line-up required by OP-il 0. Leave off the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in the second part (teaching in stem)

NEW Made changes as requested SAT 612012011 H 2 X E 022A2.03 Question appears to match the K/A.

87 Question appears to have an SRO aspect to it. It does not appear to me that selecting AH-3A-SA as the lead fan is plausible. Each fan AH-1, AH-2, AH 3, and AH-4 must be operable, so why would selecting AH-3A-SA as the lead fan make AH-2 operable. Need to find a better distractor.

BANK Discussed the system, and decided that due to the control board layout, and applicant could select the 3 fan by mistake. Will allow as written.

SAT 6I29I201 I 88 H 1 X S 039A2.02 Question appears to match the K/A. It is not SRO only. The conditions listed are procedure entry level conditions, and are therefore RO knowledge. The second part of the question is systems knowledge.

NEW Gave licensee a new KIA. Rewrote question to new KIA. SAT 612912011

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD 1

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F Dist. Link I

Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-unitsf ward Q SRO U/E/ Explanation K/A Only S H 1 E 076G2.4.47 Question appears to match the K/A.

89 Question does have an SRO aspect to it. Why is page 8 of the AOP needed as a reference? Not a very discriminating question. What can be done to make it more discriminating?

NEW Removed reference, SAT 612912011 90 F 2 X E 103G2.2.36 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question does have an SRO aspect to it. I am assuming this valve is an MOV. Again a question is asked that involves two different technical specifications and two completion times greater than one hour. With the technical specification provided as a reference the question becomes non discriminating. This idea is good. We need to develop it further (maybe include basis for this tech spec. Stem is wordy NEW Made changes as requested. Shortened stem and all distractors. SAT 6129I201 1.

91 F 2 X X U/S 001G2.2.12 Question appears to match the K/A. Do not believe it is testing SRO only knowledge. Will get a second opinion. Second opinions stated if ROs perform this test, then this is RO knowledge.

DRPI usually indicates 3 step increments, distractor C DRPI indication should change some (like to 213 on the final.) Rod steps indicated 6 steps, on drpi NEW Discuss with Boss. Changed KIA to 001G2.2.40 7106I2011 New Question

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only S 92 H 2 X X U 015A2.03 Question appears to match the K/A. Do not believe it is testing SRO only knowledge. Will get a second opinion. Second opinions determined question to be borderline SRO. (may not have enough information to determine) Does the computer alarm ARP have the RO check to see if two channels are out? First part of question is GFE.

Distractors C and D are subsets of A and B, and could be considered correct as question is written (br more) need to put minimum in the stem. NEW Replaced Question SAT 612912011 93 F 2 X U 034K1 .04 Question does not appear to match the K/A. Question does have an SRO aspect to it.

The K/A asks for the cause-effect relationship between fuel handing system and NIS. The question already gives the applicant the cause/effect in that fuel handling is stopped due to inoperable source range detectors. The appropriate way to test this question is to have some malfunction of NIS (out of service) and ask if fuel handling can continue. Will get a second opinion on the K/A match.

NEW Rewrote question Now SAT 6I29I2011 94 F 2 X X E G2.1.35 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question appears to be testing SRO knowledge. The stem should state: In accordance with FHP-020.

FHP-020 also states that the Superintendent-Shift Operations must concur. This question states shift manager. Need to determine which is correct.

BANK Completely changed the question (part of stem and all distractors). SAT

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 95 F 2 S G2.2.14 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question appears to be testing SRO knowledge.

SAT NEW 96 F 2 S G2.2.38 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question appears to be testing SRO knowledge.

SAT NEW 97 F 2 X E G2.3.5 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question appears to be testing SRO knowledge. Do not believe the second part of distractors B and D are plausible. (hot standby for rad monitor mop?)

MOD Explained that several radiation monitors (rcs leakage) does require hot standby in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Plausibility OK. SAT 612912011 98 F 2 X E G2.3.7 Question kind of matches K/A, will allow as discussed. Question does have an SRO aspect. If the RCC would give approval for this after the TSC is manned, then the question is sat, if not we may need to develop a more plausible approval authority.

NEW Changed RCC to RCD (gives approval for emergency doses) at other times. SAT 6I29I201 I 99 H 2 X E 02.4.27 Question appears to match the K/A.

Question does have an SRO aspect to it. Distractor analysis is confusing. It states that AOP-36 is exited but the sub-procedures are not. The way this is word in the distractors, one could argue A is also

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S correct. Need to make this clear.

NEW Replaced with a previous used question 2009A NRC Exam (modified slightly) SAT 612912011 100 F I X S G2.4.17 Question appears to match the K/A. Does not appear to be SRO only knowledge will have another examiner review and give second opinion.

Distractor A and C are not plausible. (not enough information in A for someone to determine if it could be done) C is not plausible because no one starts equipment until the sequencer has completed its loading sequence.

BANK Still need to work not SRO only Changed K!A to 2.4.18 (Unable to write an SRO question to original KIA.

8 Sats, 5 Unsats, and 12 Enhancements

ES-403, Rev. 9 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: Date of Exam: 2c 20(1 Exam LevelOISRO )

Initials Item Description a b c

1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading

2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented JfJ

3. Applicants scores checked for addition errors fr (reviewers_spot_check_>_25%_of_examinations)

4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail -

5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are Justified 4 Pp ) -

6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions_missed_by_half or more of the_applicants Printed Name/Signature / Date

a. Grader

b. Facility Reviewer(*)

c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) -

1 (Z

d. NRC Supervisor (*)

(*) The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.