ML103550256

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Revision 5 to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification
ML103550256
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/13/2010
From: Glander L
Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0181, FOIA/PA-2011-0262 IP-EP-120, Rev 5
Download: ML103550256 (32)
v • d • e


Text

December 13, 2010 DISTRIBUTION CONTROL LIST Document Name: IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN CC# NAME DEPARTMENT LOCATION CC/STMP CROULET, DON INSTRUC TECH TRNG (E-PLAN ONLY) 48-2-A CC/STMP IRAOLA, TONY FOR THE JIC EOF CC/STMP SHIFT MANAGER OPERATIONS IP3 CC/STMP CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS IP3 CC/STMP EOF E-PLAN (ALL EP'S) EOF CC/STMP PEREZ, ROSE E-PLAN (ALL EP'S) WPO-12D CC/STMP TSC (IP3) EEC BUILDING IP2 CC/STMP BARR, STEVE NRC (ALL EP'S) OFFSITE CC/STMP BARR, STEVE NRC (ALL EP'S) OFFSITE CC/STMP DOC CONTROL DESK NRC (ALL EP'S) OFFSITE CC/STMP DOC CONTROL DESK NRC FOR (E-PLAN ONLY) OFFSITE (USE ATTENTION TO DIRECTOR OF SPENT FUEL ADDRESS)

CC/STMP CULLINAN, P J A (PLAN ONLY) OFFSITE CC/STMP E-PLAN STAFF E-PLAN (ALL EP'S) GSB-2ND FL CC/STMP BRUNELLE, GREGORY ST. EMERG. MGMT. OFFICE (ALL) OFFSITE CC/STMP DELBORGO, D (PLAN ONLY) DISASTER & EMERGENCY OFFSITE CC/STMP LONGO, N (PLAN ONLY) EMERGENCY SERVICES OFFSITE CC/STMP KARSTEN,C (PLAN ONLY) DISASTER & CIVIL DEFENSE OFFSITE CC/STMP STIEBELING A (PLAN ONLY) OFF OF EMERG MANAGEMENT OFFSITE CC/STMP GRANT, LEAH SIMULATOR (TRAINING) 48-2-A CC/STMP GRANT,LEAH LRQ TRAINING 48-2-A CC/STMP CONTROL ROOM OPERATONS IP2 CC/STMP CHIUSANO, J SIMULATOR (TRAINING 5 COPIES) EEC CC/STMP CHIUSANO, J CLASSROOM 2 EEC CC/STMP CHIUSANO, J TRAINING 48-2-A CC/STMP NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR US NRC (88' ELEVATION) IP2 TONY IRAOLA GETS:.... E-PLAN, IP-EP-115 (FORMS), IP-EP-260(JOINT CENTER INFORMATION) "NO FORMS GO TO THE OFFSITERS"

      • CC/STMP.....CONTROL COPY STAMP***

EFFECTIVE IW DATE:

AIT

Entergy CONTROLLED DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM - PROCEDURES IPEC, P.O. Box 308, Buchanan, NY 10511 TO: DISTRIBUTION DATE: 12/13110 TRANSMITTAL NO:

Circle one)

FROM: IPEC DOCUMENT CONTROL: EEC or IP2 53'EL PHONE NUMBER: (914) 271-7054 AFFECTED DOCUMENT: IPEC EMERGENCY PROCEDURES DOC # REV # I TITLE INSTRUCTIONS THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE HAS BEEN REVISED, PLEASE REMOVE YOUR CURRENT COPY AND REPLACE WITH ATTACHED REVISIED PROCEDURE:

IP-EP-120 REV.5

                      • PLEASE NOTE EFFECTIVE DATE***********

RECEIPT OF THE ABOVE LISTED DOCUMENT(S) IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED. I CERTIFY THAT ALL SUPERSEDED, VOID, OR INACTIVE COPIES OF THE ABOVE LISTED DOCUMENT(S) IN MY POSSESSION HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM USE AND ALL UPDATES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EFFECTIVE DATE(S) (IF APPLICABLE) AS SHOWN ON T-DOCUMET(S).

NAME~~~~~ (PITeINTUEDT C NAME (PRINT) SIGNATURE DATE CC#

CONTROLLED ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED Ent EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 5 PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 1 of 30 Emergency Classification Prepared by: Lori Glander V/_ I * -0 Print Name Sig bat6 Brian Sullivan ** * , _

Approval: Print Name - L* g'ftwe*: '-

Date Effective Date: December 15, 2010 IP-EP-120 (Class)R5.doc

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED Revision 5 1-En~tergy IMPLEMENTING EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 30 Table of Contents Section Paqge 1 .0 P UR P O S E .............................................................................................. .......... 3 2 .0 R E F E R E NC E S ............................................................................................ .. 3 3 .0 D E F INIT IO NS ............................................................................................. .. 3 4.0 R E S P O N S IB ILIT IES .................................................................................... 3 5 .0 D E TA ILS ................................................................................................ .. ... 5 5.1 Recognizing an Emergency ............................................................... 5 5.2 Initial Emergency Declaration from the Control Room ........................ 5 5.3 While In a Classified Emergency ........................................................ 6 5.4 Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications ............................ 6 5.5 Compensatory Measures of Out-of-Service EAL Instruments ............. 7 6 .0 INT E R FA C E S ............................................................................................. .. 7 7 .0 R E C O R D S .................................................................................................. .. 7 8.0 REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS .................................................... 7 9.0 ATTA C HME NT S ...................................... ..................................................... 7 9.1:Emergency Action Levels ........................................................................ 8 9.2:Fission Product Barrier Thresholds ........................................................ 29

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE IPEP-20 Revision 5 PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 30 Emergency Classification 1.0 PURPOSE To describe the method for classification of emergencies at IPEC as a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE), Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE) or General Emergency (GE). It also described actions to take regarding Out-of-Service instruments that are used to evaluate EAL's.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan 2.2 NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 2.3 IP-EP-AD13 IPEC Emergency Action Level Technical Bases 2.4 Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action, May 2005 (Revised November 18, 2005) 2.5 IP-EP-AD40 Equipment Important to Emergency Response 3.0 DEFINITIONS Refer to Reference 2.3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) of the affected unit shall implement this procedure for the initial emergency classification. For classifiable events that potentially impact both units (security, natural or man-made events), the Shift Managers for each unit shall confer about the need to classify the event. If it is determined that emergency classification is warranted, the Unit 2 Shift Manager shall declare the event in accordance with this procedure. Once an initial emergency classification has been made, the unit Shift Manager making the initial declaration shall be responsible for any subsequent emergency classifications, regardless of which unit is affected, until such time as relieved by the on-call Emergency Director.

4.2 The Shift Manager, upon initial emergency classification, shall assume the role of Emergency Director and shall act as the Emergency Director until relieved by the On-Call Emergency Director or other qualified Emergency Director (Plant Operations Manager).

4.3 The Emergency Director is responsible for overall command and control of the emergency response, including classifications; notifications, PARs and ensuring all resources are available to mitigate emergency conditions. The Emergency Director is the final authority for determining the emergency classification level (initial

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED IP-EP-120 Revision 5 EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE Enterg)(, IPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 30 classification, upgrading, or terminating to recovery). This authority may not be delegated.

4.4 Initial and subsequent emergency classification shall be made within 15 minutes following the identification of a classifiable event to ensure that prompt notification, mobilization, protective and corrective actions are taken.

4.5 Upon becoming aware of any condition or event that they believe may warrant an upgrade in emergency classification, Emergency Response Organization members shall promptly inform the Emergency Director via their chain of command.

4.6 A broad spectrum of discretion in classifying events is provided under Category 9.0 "Other". In using the Category 9.0 "Other" and in classifying emergencies under circumstances which are not a straight-forward use of the EALs, ERO members should be mindful than an approach is needed which is conservative with respect to public, plant, and personnel safety and with respect to ensuring the adequacy of personnel and technical support. Conservative decisions must be made if the Emergency Director has any doubt regarding the health and safety of the public.

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED IP-EP-120 Revision 5 EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE PROEDREIMPLEMENTING PRCDRSREFERENCE USE Page 5 of 30 5.0 DETAILS 5.1 Recognizing an Emergency NOTE All classifications are to be based upon VALID indications, reports or conditions.

Indications, reports or conditions are considered VALID when they are verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

5.1.1 When indications of abnormal conditions or events are received, personnel will verify the symptoms/indications and then compare with the Emergency Action Levels (Attachment 1) and Fission Product Barrier Thresholds (Attachment 2).

5.1.2 Identify the highest applicable emergency classification level (if multiple EALs are exceeded) for which an EAL has been met or exceeded considering the following:

(a) The plant condition existing at the time the abnormal condition exists:

  • Defueled (no irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel)

(b) IF conditions warrant the issuance of offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs), THEN the classification of General Emergency is required.

(c) IF plant conditions indicate a possible radiological release or a release is in progress or suspected, THEN evaluate the applicability of offsite dose-based EALs (IP-EP-310, Dose Assessment).

(d) IF a classification level was met or exceeded but the classifiable condition no longer exists (a lesser classification level may or may not still be appropriate), THEN refer to Section 5.4, Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications.

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED IP-EP-120 Revision 5 EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTING PEEnEteV 01 PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 30 5.2 Initial Emergency Declaration from the Control Room NOTE IF the condition or event requiring initial classification potentially affects both units (security, natural or man-made events), THEN the Unit Shift Managers shall contact each other and confer on the need to declare. Upon concurrence, the Unit 2 Shift Manager shall make the appropriate emergency classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

5.2.1 The Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) shall announce to the Control Room operating staff:

(a) That an emergency has been declared.

(b) The emergency classification level.

(c) That the (Unit 2 or Unit 3) Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) has assumed the role of Emergency Director.

5.2.2 Implement procedure IP-EP-210 "Central Control Room" 5.3 While in a Classified Emergency 5.3.1 Emergency response personnel shall continuously review the Emergency Action Levels (Attachment 1) and Fission Product Barrier Thresholds (Attachment 2) to ensure appropriate event classification.

5.3.2 If an Emergency Action Level threshold is exceeded for an emergency classification higher than currently declared, the Emergency Director shall re-classify the event to the appropriate level and initiate all required notifications.

5.4 Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications 5.4.1 Transitory events that result in exceeding the Emergency Action Level criteria for event declaration, but which are terminated before they are declared, should still be identified, documented and reported (10CFR50.72), but not declared to implement the Emergency Plan.

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED IP-EP-120 Revision 5 EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE En~terx IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 30 5.4.2 In the case of a "spike" in a plant indication or event which rapidly exceeds and then decreases below an Emergency Action Level threshold, entry into the Emergency Plan or escalation to a higher classification "in retrospect" is not appropriate unless the "spike" is indicative of continuing degrading conditions which will lead to an escalated emergency classification level.

Examples include momentary steam generator level shrink following reactor trip or brief wind gusts in excess of classifiable levels.

5.4.3 Spurious alarms or parameters, which are known to be invalid indicators of actual plant conditions or of the emergency classification, should not be used to declare emergency classifications.

5.5 Compensatory Measures for Out-of-Service EAL Instruments.

5.5.1 IP-EP-AD40 provides guidance when planning to take an instrument OOS (Out of Service) that is used to determine an EAL condition or following an unplanned loss of the instrument.

6.0 INTERFACES 6.1 IP-EP-210, Central Control Room 6.2 IP-EP-220, Technical Support Center 6.3 IP-EP-310, Dose Assessment 6.4 IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations 6.5 IP-EP-510, Meteorological, Radiological & Plant Data Acquisition System 6.6 IP-EP-340, Meteorological Information & Data Acquisition System (MIDAS) 6.7 IP-EP-520, Modular Emergency Assessment & Notification System (MEANS) 6.8 IP-EP-AD40, Equipment Important to Emergency Response 7.0 RECORDS Any logs or forms completed by members of the ERO during an actual declared emergency are permanent quality records.

8.0 REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS NONE 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 Emergency Action Levels 9.2 Fission Product Barrier Thresholds

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 1.0 CSFST STATUS Categoryi GnrlK SiteArea KAlertUusaEen 1.1 1.1.3 {> 2000 F) 1.1.2 {> 200-F) 1.1.1 {> 200-F}

Subcriticality RED path in F-0.1, Subcriticality RED path in F-0.1 Subcriticality Any Failure of an automatic AND AND trip signal to reduce power range < 5%

Actual or imminent entry into either: ALL manual attempts at tripping the AND reactor from the Control Room have RED Path in F-0.2, Core Cooling failed to reduce power range < 5% Manual trip is successful OR Red Path in F-0.3, Heat Sink 1.2 1.2.2 (> 2000 F) 1.2.1 (> 200-F}

Core Cooling RED path in F-0.2,Core Cooling ORANGE or RED path in F-0.2, AND Core Cooling Functional restoration actions taken and procedures not effective within 15 min.

1.3 1.3.1 {> 200°F)

Heat Sink RED path in F-0.3, HEAT SINK AND Feed & Bleed is required 1.4 1.4.1 (> 200°F}

Integrity RED Path on F-0.4, Integrity 1.5 1.5.1 {> 200°F}

Containment RED Path F-0.5, Containment resulting from loss of coolant.

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 2.0 REACTOR FUEL Caegry:Gnea Site Area  : AetUnusual,.Event' 2.1 2.1.3 {> 200°F) 2.1.2 {> 200°F) 2.1.1 {All)

Coolant Activity Coolant activity> 300 pCi/cc 1-131 equivalent Coolant Activity > 300 pCi/cc 1-131 equivalent Coolant sample activity and any of the following: in excess of Technical Specification limits RED path on F-0.4, INTEGRITY Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a single charging pump RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage

[Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 pCi/cc or R-42 off-scale due to RCS leakage

[Unit 3] R-1 1 > 1.2E-5 pCi/cc or R-12 > 0.05 pCi/cc 2.2 2.2.3 {> 200 0 F} 2.2.2 (> 2000 F} 2.2.1 {> 200 0 F)

Containment Containment Radiation Containment Radiation monitor [Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 pCi/cc or Radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 > 17 R/HR R-42 off-scale due to RCS R-25 or R-26 leakage

> 68 R/HR

[Unit 3] R-1 1 > 1.2E-5 pCi/cc or R-12 > 0.05 pCi/cc

I ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency-Action Levels CATEGORY 2.0 REACTOR FUEL CatgoyGnealSite Are z 2AltUnusua Event.ý,

2.3 2.3.2 {All} 2.3.1 {All}

Refueling Confirmed sustained alarm on any of the [Unit 2] or [Unit 3]

Accidents or following radiation monitors resulting Spent fuel pool Other Radiation from fuel damage caused by an (reactor cavity during Monitors uncontrolled fuel handling process: refueling) water level cannot be restored

  • R-2/R-7 Vapor Containment Area and maintained:

Monitors Mabove the Technical

  • R-5 Fuel Storage Building Area Specification Monitor minimum water 0 R-25/26 Vapor Containment High level [Unit 2]

Radiation Area Monitors

  • above the spent
  • R-12 Containment Gas Activity fuel pool low water

[Unit 3] level alarm setpoint

[Unit 3]

2.3.3 {All}

Report of visual observation of (Unit 2 or Unit 3) irradiated fuel uncovered

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING

  • Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM o Genra Siterea UusualtEvept,

."..'A49,~

3.1 0 3.1.3 (>200 F, _ 200°F } 0 3.1.2 {>200 F} 3.1.1 {>200 0 F)

RCS Leakage RVLIS cannot be maintained [Unit 2] Primary system leakage exceeding Unidentified or pressure

> 41% [Unit 3] > 33% with no RCPs running capacity.(> 75 gpm) of single charging boundary leakage OR pump > 10 gpm With the reactor vessel head removed, it is OR reported that water level in the Reactor Identified leakage Vessel is dropping in an uncontrolled manner > 25 gpm and core uncovery is likely 3.2 3.2.2 {>200°F) 3.2.1 {>200°F)

Primary to Unisolable release of secondary side to Unisolable release of secondary Secondary Leakage atmosphere from the affected steam side to atmosphere from the generator(s) with primary to secondary affected steam generator(s) with leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a primary to secondary leakage >

single charging pump Technical Specifications limit in any steam generator 3.2.3 {>200°F)

Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage > Technical Specification limit in any steam generator AND Coolant activity > 300 pCilcc of 1-131 equivalent 3.3 3.3.1 {>200 0 F}

RCS Subcooling RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT Cateory. Geera Sie AraAert Unusual'Event:

4.1 4.1.4 {>200°F) 4.1.2 {>200°F) 4.1.1 {>200°F)

Containment Confirmed Phase "B" isolation signal following confirmed Rapid uncontrolled decrease in Both doors open on a VC Integrity Status LOCA with less than minimum containment cooling safeguards containment pressure following initial airlock for > 4 hrs.

equipment operating, Table 4.3 increase due to RCS failure OR AND OR Inability to close Any indicators of fuel clad loss, Table 4.1 Loss of primary coolant inside containment pressure relief containment with containment or purge valves which pressure or sump level response not results in a radiological 4.1.5 {>200°F) consistent with LOCA conditions release pathway to the EITHER: environment for > 4 hrs.

Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure OR following initial increase due to RCS failure Any Phase "A" or Phase OR "B" or containment Loss of primary coolant inside containment with containment ventilation isolation valve(s) not closed when required pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA which results in a conditions radiological release AND pathway to the environment Any indications of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels-CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT S General SitArea -Alert ': Unusual Event 4.1 4.1.6 {>200°F} 4.1.3 {>200-F}

Containment EITHER: EITHER:

Integrity Status Any Phase "A" or Phase "B" or Containment Any Phase "A" or Phase "B" (cont.) Ventilation Isolation valve(s) not closed when required or Containment Ventilation following confirmed LOCA Isolation valve(s) not closed OR when required following confirmed LOCA Inability to isolate any primary system discharging OR outside containment AND Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside Radiological release to the environment exists as a result containment AND AND Any indicators of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2 Radiological release to the environment exists as a result 4.2 4.2.2 {>200-F} 4.2.1 {>200°F}

SG Tube Rupture Unisolable faulted (outside VC) ruptured steam generator Unisolable faulted (outside VC) w/Secondary AND ruptured steam generator Release Any indicators of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 {>200°F}

Combustible Gas >4% Hydrogen concentration in containment Concentrations

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING z Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT Table 4.1 Fuel Clad Loss Indicators Coolant activity > 300 jICilcc of 1-131 equivalent Containment radiation monitor R-25/R-26 reading > 17 R/hr RED path in F-0.2, CORE COOLING Table 4.2 Fuel Clad Damage Indicators ORANGE or RED path in F-0.2, CORE COOLING RED path in F-0.3, HEAT SINK AND Heat sink is required Coolant activity > 300 I.CI/cc of 1-131 equivalent Containment radiation monitor R-25/R-26 reading > 17 R/hr Table 4.3 Minimum Containment Cooling Safeguards Equipment Fan Cooler Units Operating Spray Pumps Required

<3 2 3 1 5 0

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE

.atenry General Site, Area Alert * .Unusual Event 5.1 5.1.4 {Al1) 5.1.3 (All) 5.1.2 {All} 5.1.1 (All)

Effluent Monitors A valid reading on any A valid reading on any A valid reading on any monitors Table A valid reading on any monitors Table 5.1 column monitors Table 5.1 column 5.1 column "Alert for > 15 min. unless monitors Table 5.1 column "GE" for > 15 min. unless "SAE" for > 15 min. unless dose assessment can confirm "NUE" for > 60 min. unless dose assessment can dose assessment can confirm releases are below Table 5.2 column sample analysis can confirm confirm releases are below releases are below Table 5.2 "Alert" within this time period, release rates Table 5.2 column "GE" column "SAE" within this time < Table 5.1 column "NUE" within this time period. period. within this time period.

5.2 5.2.5 {All) 5.2.4 (All) 5.2.2(AII} 5.2.1 (All)

Dose Projections/ Dose projections or field Dose projections or field Confirmed sample analysis for Confirmed sample analysis for Environmental surveys resulting from an surveys resulting from an gaseous or liquid release rates gaseous or liquid release Measurements/ actual imminent release actual imminent release which >Table 5.1 column "Alert" limits for > rates Release Rates which indicate doses/dose indicate doses/dose rates > 15 min. > Table 5.1 column "NUE" rates > Table 5.2 column Table 5.2 column "SAE" at the 5.2.3 (All) limits for > 60 min.

"GE" at the site boundary or site boundary or beyond. Dose projections or field surveys beyond. resulting from an actual imminent release which indicate doses/dose rates > Table 5.2 column "Alert" at the site boundary or beyond.

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING 7Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Caego Geea"ke ra~ lert, Jn~usual-Event 5.3 5.3.2 {All} 5.3.1 {All)

Area Radiation Sustained area radiation levels Any sustained direct ARM Levels > 15 mRemlhr in EITHER: readings > 100 x alarm or Control Room offscale high resulting from an O._R uncontrolled process Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station 5.3.3 (All}

Sustained abnormal area radiation levels > 8 R/hr within any areas, Table 5.3 AND Access is required for safe operation or shutdown

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Table 5.1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Monitor GE SAE Alert UE R-27 44 pCi/cc 4.4 pCi/cc 4.4E-1 pCi/cc 4.4E-3 pCi/cc (1200 Ci/sec) (120 Ci/sec) (12 Ci/sec) (1.2E-1 Ci/,sec)

R-44 N/A N/A N/A 4.4E-3 pCi/cc R-54 N/A N/A Off Scale 2.5E-3 pCi/cc

(>4E-2 uCi/cc)

R-49 N/A N/A 2.7E-2 pCi/cc 2.7E-4 pCi/cc R-27 44 pCi/cc 4.4 pCi/cc 4.4E-1 pCi/cc 4.4E-3 pCi/cc (1200 Ci/sec) (120 Ci/sec) (12 Ci/sec) (1 .2E-1 Ci/sec)

R-14 N/A N/A N/A 4.4E-3 ipCi/cc

( -C R-18 N/A N/A Off Scale 2.5E-3

(>4E-2 uCi/cc)

R-19 N/A N/A 2.7E-2 2.7E-4 Table 5.2 Dose Projection/Env. Measurement Classification Thresholds GE SAE Alert TEDE 1000 mRem 100 mRem 10 mRem CDE Thyroid 5000 mRem 500 mRem N/A External Exposure Rate 1000 mRem/hr 100 mRem/hr 10 mRem/hr Thyroid exposure rate (for 1 5000 mRem/hr 500 mRem/hr N/A hr. of inhalation)

0 0 I ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING

~Entergy REFERENCE USE PROCEDURES 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Table 5.3 Plant Areas UNIT 2 J[ UNIT 3

  • Condensate Storage Tank
  • Auxiliary Feedpump Building 0 RWST
  • P.A.B.
  • Fuel Storage Building
  • Control Building
  • Fuel Storage Building
  • Primary Auxiliary Building/Fan House
  • Refueling Water Tank
  • 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Control 0 Diesel Fuel Tank Building)
  • Vital Area Access to Containment 0 Cable Spreading Room/Electrical
  • Appendix R Diesel Generator Tunnel
  • Diesel Generator Building/Fuel Tank Area

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 6.0 ELECTRICAL FAILURES

ýCeg*ory General:-,., . ' Area.-I"

-Site - UnusualEvent, 6.1 6.1.5 {>200-F} 6.1.4 {>200°F} 6.1.2 {_!200 0 F, Defuel) 6.1.1 {All}

Loss of AC Power Loss of all 480 volt Loss of AC power to all 480 Loss of AC power to all 480 volt busses Unplanned loss of offsite power Sources safeguards bus (5A, volt safeguard busses (5A, (5A, 2A13A, 6A) for > 15 min. capability to all 480V safeguard 2A/3A, 6A) AC power 2A/3A, 6A) for > 15 min. 6.1.3 {Hot) busses (5A, 2A/3A, 6A) for > 15 min.

AND EITHER: AND AC power capability to 480 volt Power restoration to Inability to power required safeguard busses (5A, 2A/3A, 6A) required core cooling core cooling systems with reduced to only one Table 6.1 source for systems is not likely in alternate power sources for > 15 min.

< 4 hrs. > 15 min.

OR Actual or imminent entry into ORANGE or RED path on F-0.2, "CORE COOLING" 6.2 6.2.2 {> 200°F} 6.2.1 {_200°F}

Loss of DC Power Loss of bus voltage (< 105 [Unit 2] Unplanned loss of bus Sources vdc) for > 15 min. on all of voltage (< 105 vdc) for > 15 the DC Busses. min. on any DC Bus resulting in the loss of decay heat removal capability

[Unit 3] Unplanned loss of bus voltage (< 105 vdc) for > 15 amin. on all of the DC Busses

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING

~Enterboy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 6.0 ELECTRICAL FAILURES Table 6.1 Safeguard Bus AC Power Sources UNIT 2 ] UNIT3

  • 480VEDG21
  • 480VEDG31
  • 480VEDG22
  • 480VEDG32
  • 480VEDG23
  • 480VEDG33
  • Unit Auxiliary transformer* 0 Unit Auxiliary transformer
  • Station Auxiliary transformer*
  • Station Auxiliary transformer
  • 13.8 KV gas turbine auto
  • 13W92 feeder transformer* a 13W93 feeder
  • With 86P or 86BU tripped, all offsite e Appendix R Diesel power supplies must be considered as one power supply.

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 7.0 EQUIPMENT FAILURES Category General Site Area Alr ~Unusual Event.

7.1 7.1.1 (>200°F}

Technical Plant is not brought to required Specifications/ operating mode within Technical Requirements Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

7.2 7.2.5 {All) 7.2.2 {>200°F} 7.2.1 {>200°F}

System Control Room Turbine failure generated missiles Report of main turbine failure Failures or evacuation which causes or potentially causes requiring turbine trip resulting in:

Control Room AND any required safety related system or Damage to turbine generator Evacuation Plant control cannot be structure to become inoperable, seals causing a release of established per AOP- 7.2.3 {All} lubricating oil or hydrogen SSD-1 in [Unit 2] < 15 Entry into AOP-SSD-1 OR min. 7.2.4 {_<200 0 F} Turbine casing penetration

[Unit 3]:* 30 min. Reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained < 200OF

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 7.0 EQUIPMENT FAILURES Categ Gener l Site.Ara,. .. Al*et*  : Unusual Event -

7.3 7.3.4 {>200 0 F} 7.3.3 {>200 0 F} 7.3.1 {>200 0 F}

Loss of Loss of most (approx. Unplanned loss of most (approx. 75%) Unplanned loss of most (approx.

Indications/ 75%) safety system safety system annunciators or 75%) safety system annunciators Alarms/ annunciators or indications on Control Room Panels or indications on Control Room Communicatio indications on Control for > 15 min. Panels for > 15 min.

n Capability Room Panels AND AND AND Increased surveillance is required for Increased surveillance is required Loss of ability to safe plant operation for safe plant operation monitor critical safety AND EITHER:

function status A significant plant transient in 7.3.2 {All}

AND progress Loss of all communications A significant plant OR capability affecting the ability to transient in progress [Unit 2] PICS [Unit 3] CFMS and EITHER:

QSPDS are unavailable Perform routine operations OR Notify offsite agencies or personnel

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Category General Site.Area ..... IAlert Unus ual Event 8.1 8.1.10 (All) 8.1.7 (All) 8.1.4 (All) 8.1.1 {All)

Security Threats A Hostile Force Intrusion into a plant Vital Any security event which represents an Notification of any credible site has taken control Area by a Hostile Force actual substantial degradation of the level specific security threat by the Security of plant equipment 8.1.8 (All) of safety of the plant Shift Supervisor or outside agency.

such that plant 8.1.5 (All) 8.1.2 (All) personnel are Any security event.which unable to operate represents actual or likely A validated notification from NRC of an Indication of attempted sabotage equipment failures of plant systems airliner attack threat < 30 minutes away within the plant Protected Area required to needed to protect the public. 8.1.6 (All) 8.1.3 (All) maintain safety 8.1.9 (All) Notification from the site security force A validated notification from NRC functions. Notification from the site that an armed attack, explosive attack, providing information of an aircraft security force that an armed airliner impact or other Hostile Action is threat.

attack, explosive attack, occurring or has occurred within the airliner impact or other OCA.

Hostile Action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Eterrgy PROCEDURES 9 -REFERENCE USE A L 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Categry Gneral Site Area Ae~7:V'sa vn 8.2 8.2.3 {All} 8.2.1 {Aii}

Fire or explosion in any plant area, Confirmed fire in or contiguous to Fire or any plant area, Table 8.1 not Table 8.1, which causes or potentially Explosion extinguished in causes any required safety related system or structure to become <15 mi. of Control Room inoperable notification.

8.2.2 {Al}

Report by plant personnel of an explosion within Protected Area boundary resulting in visible damage to non-vital permanent structures or equipment.

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING EnIe rgy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Category j General- SieAe lr j nsa vnt 8.3 8.3.4{AII) 8.3.1 {All}

Man-Made Vehicle crash or projectile impact Vehicle crash into or projectile Events which causes or potentially causes which impacts plant safety related any required safety related system or structures or systems within structure to become inoperable, Protected Area boundary Table 8.1 8.3.2 {All}

8.3.5 {All} Report or detection of toxic or Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter flammable gases within a plant area, or have entered within the Table 8.1, in concentrations that will Protected Area boundary in be life threatening to plant personnel amounts that could affect the or preclude access to equipment health of plant personnel or safe (even when using personal protective plant operation equipment) needed for safe plant OR operation Report by local, county or state officials, for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event 8.3.3 {All}

Accident Conditions affecting a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDRY Cask Tip-Over OR Dropped Cask Resulting in Cask Tip-Over

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Enterviy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Acti-on Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Category General Site Area~ Alert ,Unusual -Event-8.4 8.4.4 (All) 8.4.1 (All)

Earthquake felt inplant based upon a Earthquake felt in plant based Natural Events consensus of Control Room upon a consensus of Control Operators on duty Room Operators on duty AND AND EITHER Kinemetrics Strong Motion Kinemetrics Strong Motion Accelographs in the Unit 3 VC Accelographs in the Unit 3 VC produce an alarm in the Control produce an alarm in the Room Control Room AND OR Amber and red Peak Shock At least one amber Peak Shock Annunciators indicate seismic activity Annunciator is lit 8.4.5 (All) 8.4.2 (All)

Sustained winds > 90 mph onsite Report by plant personnel of OR tornado within plant Protected Tornado strikes a plant vital area, Area boundary Table 8.1 8.4.6 (All) 8.4.3 (All)

Assessment by the Control Room River level _>14.5' (0 MSL) personnel that a natural event has OR occurred which causes or potentially Service water bay (intake causes any required safety system or structure) level < -4'5" (0 MSL) structure to become inoperable, Table 8.1 8.4.7 (All)

River level > 15' (0 MSL)

OR Low service water bay (intake

_* rfinzrtr IPvAI r** iiltinn in : In-,-, nf

ENN IPEC I-P10Rvso EMERGENCY PLAN NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 5 EntIMPLEMENTING REECEECEUSPg 27Po EteW IPLMNTN REFERENCE USE Page 27 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Table 8.1 Plant Areas Unit 2 Unit 3

  • Condensate Storage Tank
  • Auxiliary Feedpump Building 0 RWST 0 P.A.B.
  • Fuel Storage Building 0 Control Building
  • Primary Auxiliary Building/Fan 0 Control Room House
  • Vapor Containment Building 0 Refueling Water Tank
  • 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Control
  • EDG Rooms Bldg.) 0 Diesel Fuel Tanks 0 Cable Spreading Room/Electrical
  • Vital Area Access to Tunnel Containment
  • Central Control Room 0 Appendix R Diesel Generator
  • Diesel Generator Building/Fuel
  • Battery Room (Control Bldg. 33'0" ele.)

1 Central Alarm Station

I ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING

-~En tergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 9.0 Category General Site Area Alert nuaIEet 9.1 9.1.7 {All} 9.1.5 {All} 9.1.3 {All) 9.1.1 {All}

Other As determined by the Shift As determined by the Shift Manager Any event, as Any event, as Manager or Emergency or Emergency Director, events are in determined by the determined by the Director, events are in progress progress which indicate actual or Shift Manager or Shift Manager or which indicate actual, or likely failures of plant systems needed Emergency Director, Emergency Director, imminent core damage and the to protect the public. Any releases that could cause or that could lead to or potential for a large release of are not expected to result in has caused actual has led to a potential radioactive material in excess of exposures which exceed EPA PAGs. substantial degradation of the EPA PAGs outside the site degradation of the level of safety of the boundary. 9.1.6 {>200 0 F) level of safety of the plant.

9.1.8 {>200°F) Any event, as determined by the Shift plant. 9.1.2 {>200 0 F}

Manager or Emergency Director, that 9.1.4 {>2000 F}

Any event, as determined by could lead or has led to EITHER: Any event, as the Shift Manager or Any event, as determined by the Emergency Director, that could Loss or potential loss of both fuel A determined by the Shift Manager or lead or has led to a loss of any clad and RCS barrier, Attachment A. Shift Manager or Emergency Director, two fission product barriers and OR Emergency Director, that could lead to or loss or potential loss of the Loss or potential loss of either fuel that could lead or has has led to a loss or third, Attachment 2. clad or RCS barrier in conjunction led to a loss or potential loss of with a loss of containment, potential loss of either containment, Attachment 2. fuel clad or RCS Attachment 2.

barrier, Attachment 2.

9.2 - Fission Product Barrier Thresholds FUEL CLADDING BARRIER Potential Loss Loss

  • ORANGE path in F-0.2, CORE COOLING
  • RED path in F-0.2, CORE COOLING
  • RED path in F-0.3, HEAT SINK AND Heat sink is required
  • Coolant activity > 300 pCilcc 1-131 equivalent
  • Core Exit Thermocouple Readings [Unit 2] > 700OF
  • Core Exit Thermocouple Readings > 1200 IF

[Unit 3] > 715 OF

  • 41% [Unit 3] < 33% w/ no RCPs running
  • Containment radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 > 17 R/hr
  • Emergency Director Judgment
  • Emergency Director Judgment RCS BARRIER Potential Loss Loss
  • RED path on F-0.4, INTEGRITY
  • RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage
  • RED path on F-0.3, HEAT SINK AND Feed & Bleed is required " Unisolable faulted (outside VC) ruptured steam generator

" Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a [Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 pCilcc or single charging pump R-42 off-scale due to RCS leakage

[Unit 3] R-1 1 > 1.2E-5 pCilcc or R-12 > 0.05 pCilcc

  • Emergency Director Judgment
  • Emergency Director Judgment

ENN IPEC IP-EP-120 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE 9.2 - Fission Product Barrier Thresholds CONTAINMENT BARRIER Potential Loss Loss

" RED path F-0.5, CONTAINMENT

  • Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following initial increase due to RCS failure

" EITHER:

Core exit thermocouples >12000 F

  • EITHER:

Any Phase "A" or Phase "B" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s)

OR not closed when required following confirmed LOCA Core exit thermocouples [Unit 2] >700 OF [Unit 3] > 715 OF OR with RVLIS [Unit 2] <41% [Unit 3] <33% w/ no RCPs Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside containment AND AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. Radiological release to the environment exists as a result

" Confirmed phase "B" isolation signal following confirmed LOCA

  • Both doors open on a VC airlock for > 4 hrs.

with less than minimum containment cooling safeguards OR equipment operating Fan Cooler Units Oper. Spray Pumps Req'd Inability to close containment pressure relief or purge valves which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment for > 4 hrs.

<3 2 3 1 OR 5 0 Any Phase "A" or Phase "B" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s) not

" Containment pressure 47 psig and increasing closed when required which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment

  • _4 % hydrogen concentration in containment

" Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam

  • Containment radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 reading generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage > Technical Specifications

>68 R/hr limit in any steam generator

  • Emergency Director Judgment
  • Loss of primary coolant inside containment with containment pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA conditions
  • Emergency Director Judgment
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