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Inside this issue:
Safety Snippet of the Day.....1 Todays Focus Area...............1 ACEMAN review..................2 Plant Status.............................2 CAP process improved.........3 HU stoplight...........................3 Nothing is routine..................3
All Hands Meeting.................2 Industry OE............................4 Signage reminder....................4 Coworker Coaching...............4 Laptop locks...........................4 Team Notes Prairie Island July 15, 2010
= Face to Face (D-15)
= Self read
= Nice to know Unused hazardous materials, such as solvents, pesticides and motor oil, should not go into the ground, the garbage collection or the sewer system. For safety reasons, they shouldn't sit around too long awaiting disposal.
Todays Focus Area: Top Ten List item nearly complete
Equipment reliability improved through upgraded radiation monitors E-mail Team Notes Prairie Island articles to DL-PI-Communications by 10:00 a.m. the day before publication.
Site Event Free Days:
64 Safety Snippet of the Day
The Engineering Change (EC 7776) package for the two atmospheric ra-diation monitors (R11 and R12) in Containment has been approved and installation is underway this week for Unit One and planned for early Au-gust for Unit Two. The installation will enhance equipment reliability at Prairie Island. The primary scope of this modification is to replace the ex-isting radiation monitor skids, Con-trol Room switches, indication, and analog readout meters with new equipment including digital display units and its associated software. The major tasks associated with this pro-ject include the following:
Replace the existing Unit One and Unit Two monitoring skids.
Remove old Control Room chan-nel drawers and install new bin as-semblies including digital rate-meters in the existing radiation monitoring rack locations.
Modify the Simulator radiation monitoring racks to reflect new con-figuration.
Add approximately 100 items to the equipment database.
Add more than 140 engineering documents to the design database.
Completed more than a dozen calcula-tions.
The R11/12 skids contain two radiation monitors. R11 is a radiation monitor that detects particulate. It uses special paper to collect any particles and a detector (R11) to detect the level of radioactivity.
Its paper drive has been unreliable and generates a Paper not in motion alarm frequently causing Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) entries and operator distractions. R12 is a radiation monitor that samples the gases (air) to detect the level of radioactivity. These monitors notify the Control Room of radioactivity from the area sampled inside Contain-ment. This is part of the required reactor coolant leakage detection system. Both the R11 and R12 monitors are obsolete which makes obtaining spare parts diffi-cult and doing repairs even more diffi-cult. The original equipment manufac-turer no longer supports the equipment.
These monitors are in operation 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> each day, 365 days a year to help ensure the health and safety of the pub-lic. The new installation will greatly in-crease the reliability and availability of (Continued on page 2)
NSP000026
A Accident Free C
Control Dose E
Event Free Reason: The metal nozzle of a heat-shrink gun contacted an exposed electrical connection causing a short circuit and auto-matic transfer of 12 Inverter power supply.
CAP#: 1241213 Enablers Missed: Plan-ning/Preparation, Supervisor Oversight, Worker Practices.
M Meet Commitments Reason: Could not perform the boron sample Containment entry as 1R11 prevents environmental sampling prior to the entry.
CAP#: 1241263 Enablers Missed: Job Plan-ning/Preparation.
A Attend Training Picture of Xcellence Plant ACEMAN Today
N No Rework Reason: During fabrication of Radiation Monitor support, one hole was drilled in the wrong location. This required the sup-port to be repaired.
CAP#: 1241228 Enablers Missed: Worker Prac-tices, Verification/Validation, Supervisor Oversight.
Reason: Grouting activites did not meet the temperature re-quirements of Procedure D75.
CAP#: 1241226 Enablers Missed: Proce-dures/Work Instructions, Worker Practices, Supoervisor Over-sight.
Team Notes July 15, 2010 Page 2 Site leadership updates employees
More than 600 employees and contrac-tors met July 13 for Prairie Islands sec-ond All Hands Meeting this year.
Site Vice President Mark Schimmel and Site Operations Director Brad Sa-watzke updated attendees on Prairie Islands performance, its current chal-lenges, and its focus areas for 2010.
They also used this opportunity to thank employees for their contribu-tions to a successful refueling outage. Your hard work and support dur-ing the 2R26 refueling outage demonstrates the teamwork and commit-ment necessary to continue making station improvements. said Schimmel.
Highlights of the meeting included:
2R26 Outage updates on safety, Human Performance, accomplish-ments and lessons learned.
NRC and INPO interface with findings, inspections, regulatory con-ferences, license renewal.
Discussion on the three-phase approach to site improvements.
Updates on the 2010 site focus areas of Human Performance, Equip-ment Reliability, and the Corrective Action Program.
Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment results.
Using the Picture of Xcellence to guide actions.
Schimmel stressed the importance of the site gathering regularly for All Hands Meetings to allow the organization to work effectively. The next All Hands Meeting is scheduled to be held in September. A link to the All Hands meeting presentation is on the PI Net home page.
Plant Status
Go to the Prairie Island Plant Status sheet for plant status.
the R11/12 skids. The equipment uses currently available technology and components. Many unplanned LCOs will be prevented with this modifi-cation. Some key milestones for the project are listed below.
Activity Status Design submitted for Final Design Review Board:
Completed Final Design Review Board Completed Plant Operation Review Committee Completed EC Approved Completed Unit One skid installation July 11-19 Unit One skid installation August 2-9 The following groups will be working around the clock to support the project through its completion: Instruments & Controls, Quality Control, Radiation Protection, Operations, Project Management, Project Engineer-ing, Warehousing, and Chemistry. Day & Zimmerman electricians and pipe fitters will also support the project.
R11/R12 (Continued from page 1)
Team Notes July 15, 2010 Page 3 CAP process improved
Edward Malarkey, Nuclear Passport Software Product Manager For many people working at Xcel Energy nuclear sites, writing a CAP can seem a daunting challenge. Much time and frustration could be saved if, instead of stepping through several PassPort screens to write and submit a CAP, one could simply click on a web link from any computer station, zip through a few questions and automatically generate and submit a CAP for approval.
Furthermore, if the condition identified was due to an equipment or system failure and the related and cross-referenced work request could also be auto-generated at the same time, it would enhance efficiencies even more. The answer lies in the Single Point of Entry (SPOE)
Wizard which is currently in a pilot phase at Monticello and Prairie Island. This is the first effort to create a simplified process using the new tools available in PassPort Foundation Architecture. The SPOE Wizard allows the user to create a CAP by answering a few simple questions and has the ability to create an associated Work Request linked to a piece of equipment. Both can be routed automatically to the appropriate individual or group. The entire process is outlined in the Foundation Architecture User Guides. Fleetwide deployment is scheduled for July 21. The SPOE Wizard does not replace the current practice of writing CAPs and WRs.
This is an alternate means to input the same information. Whether logging onto PassPort or using the Foundation Architecture link, the information goes to the same place.
For additional information, please contact Lori Engesser or David Garcia.
STOPLIGHT on Human Performance
The site stoplight was changed to yellow yester-day. The following information is preliminary and may not be complete; it is intended for the pur-pose of disseminating as much information in as short amount of time as possible in order to pre-vent similar incidents from occurring.
Incident: During the installation of 1R11 Radia-tion Monitor 12, the instrument inverter trans-ferred to the alternate source causing entry to an unplanned Technical Specification Action Statement.
Date: July 13, 2010 CAP#: 1241213
==
Description:==
While installing wire labels for the new radiation monitor 1R11, the metal nozzle of a heat-shrink gun contacted an exposed electri-cal connection. This caused a short circuit and automatic transfer of 12 Inverter power supply. The unplanned transfer of 12 Inverter to the alter-nate source resulted in a Technical Specification Action Statement being entered.
What went wrong? A Pre-job brief was conducted prior to commencing work. The Pre-job Brief was inadequate in that electrical insulating barri-ers were not identified as required to prevent inadvertent contact with known exposed and energized components in the cabinet. Additionally, a breakdown in worker practices occurred because the workers did not stop when the heat gun was observed to be in close proximity to unprotected energized terminals.
What went right? Workers immediately stopped work, placed equipment in a safe condition, and contacted operations when the heat gun contacted the terminal. All subsequent actions were performed in accordance with procedures.
Takeaway Message: Pre-job Briefs and job site hazard analysis should include the identification and use of robust barriers to prevent or mitigate Nothing is routine
When a task appears to be routine
- STOP! Take time to consider what could go wrong. Even though it may seem routine, it does NOT mean there are no risks involved.
The Practicing Perfection Institute defines a questioning attitude as:
An engaged state of mind that challenges given conditions to identify discrepancies in the status quo that might result in error or inappropriate action. Visit When Mistakes are not an Option for additional information.
Last weeks Human Performance Tool of the week was Coworker Coaching. Below are some examples from recent I Care cards of how this tool was used to coach one another to prevent injuries and events.
Coached operators on the locations of hot feed-water piping.
Coached person to use handrail on steps and not to skip steps.
Reminded a person to use gloves while adjusting a file cabinet.
Coached a person working outside to use sun screen.
Coached a person to remove trip hazard that had been place in the walkway.
Coached a person who had not completed all the fields on a work re-quest.
Coached a person to place glove in the SAM before clearing Access Control.
Everyone should take a minute or two to fill out an I Care card after coaching or being coached by someone. Coworker coaching helps achieve positive results in all the ACEMAN categories.
The RIGHT picture for signage.
Coworker Coaching
The WRONG picture for signage.
The Right Picture
Pictured below is an example of a sign that was placed over a confined space entry sign. Confined space signs are clearly marked as danger as seen in the second photo. Danger signs should NEVER be covered with another sign or any other object. If the space available is unable to accom-modate additional signage, contact the Safety Department consultants for assistance.
Team Notes July 15, 2010 Page 4 Industry OE
Subject:
OE30952 unexpected induced voltage encountered Plant: Millstone Event Date: 02/03/2010
==
Description:==
120vac was introduced into a newly constructed DC circuit without other affected department per-sonnel being aware. The Conduct of Maintenance Job Briefing procedure states job briefings are mandatory and "are provided as an aid for all types of maintenance work, and with any number of workers or departments involved in the work." All affected personnel were not involved in the pre-job brief. Fur-ther investigation indicated there was 120vac on the affected leads. The new wiring was traced back into the up-stream control panel for the new "C" transformer. From there the 120vac was traced from the control cabinet and into the T-medic cabinet. The "C" T-medic cabinet was opened and there a two-wire jumper from the AC supply breaker to the DC supply breaker was found. The T-medics cabinets on all three new transformers had jumpers installed from the AC supply breaker to the DC supply breaker. Each jumper has a manila tag indicating it was installed back in the fall of 2009 by test personnel.
Cause: The failure to involve all person-nel in the pre-job brief. There should not have been any live voltages intro-duced into any new circuit without the clear communication from the testing department to the construction crew installing the cabling for the new cir-cuits. Prior to energizing portions of new circuits, the testing department should have clearly communicated their intent to the construction crew and any other potentially affected personnel and verified there was no conflict. Once test-ing was complete, the testing voltage should have been removed and declared safe. This should have also been clearly communicated to all affected pThe Practicing Perfection Institute de-fines a questioning attitude as: An Laptop locks
IT currently is striving to fully comply with Xcel En-ergy Corporate Policy 9.20 requiring users of laptops to physically secure them when left unattended. To obtain a laptop lock, please contact Betsy McMorrow at exten-sion 4700. The laptop lock cables may be placed around desk supports or legs. Periodic walkthroughs will be conducted to ensure full compliance with this policy. For addi-tional information about this policy, please contact Rick Schuster at exten-sion 7314. The policy is available on XpressNet.