ML101650168
| ML101650168 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/2010 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML101650168 (65) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
Candidates:
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDO due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST
- low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-OSP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-OSP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
2 (I) RO Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH=T TSI SRO per 3
See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3LT below D-7/4.
4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are TFE2Z52S = T (C TS) SRO evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
4a (R) SRO/RO Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action l BOP*
to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s!g b-b level. The crew
responds per 3-ONOP-089.
5 TVFACN3 = 01 (M) ALL Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M = T RO/SRO inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SO level TCF1009M=F
drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE=T performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE=T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SO if 3A SGFP started.
6 (M) ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC=T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SOs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
- BOP action to either manually close CV-3-201 1 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.
1 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-0-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
Candidates:
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
2 (I) RO Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH ~ T per 3-0NOP-059.8.
(TS,I) SRO 3
See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3L ~ T below 0-7/4.
4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are TFE2Z52S ~ T evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
(C, TS) SRO 4a (R) SRO/RO Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action (I) BOP*
to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.
5 TVFACN3 ~ 0.1 (M)ALL Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M ~T (C) RO/SRO inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level TCF1D09M ~ F drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE ~ T performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE ~ T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
6 (M)ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC ~
can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC~T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor
- - BOP action to either manually close CV-3-2011 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.
1
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1
- 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-DSP-Ui 9.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2
- Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Event 3
- PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Event 4
- Loss of 30 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Event 4a
- Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s/g b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089.
Event 5
- Dnce reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV 3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 30 SG if 3A SGFP started.
Event 6
- C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is DOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 30 feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EDP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2 - Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Event 3 - PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.
Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Event 4a - Automatic runback fails due to PT 1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.
Event 5 - Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Event 6 - C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
2
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.Isn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP
- AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)
SETUP
- 3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = 0FF (0) & TAQ5B2OP = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP
- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFKOO2 = 0.0, TAFFO1 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP
- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP
- 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE)
SETUP
- C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = T when F5OSIAFC EQ 6290)
Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Acknowledge annunciators F-912 & F-915 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-OSP-O1 9.3 and 3-ONOP-071.2 open to Att 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 1
- 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will start 3B ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-OSP-O 19.3 step 7.1.3.
Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.1
- Done by securing 3C ICWP.
Step 7.1.3.2
- Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.
3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP - AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPO LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE)
SETUP - C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = Twhen F50SlAFC EO 6290)
Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & F-9/5 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-0SP-019.3 and 3-0NOP-071.2 open to Att 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 1 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will start 38 ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.1 - Done by securing 3C ICWP.
Step 7.1.3.2 - Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.
3
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.3-Trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2GO5A = T)
Step 7.1.3.4
- Trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp).
Step 7.1.3.5
- Trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2GO5A = F).
Step 7.1.3.6
- NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.
Step 7.1.3.7
- Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.9
- Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.
Event 2
- PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-OSP-01 93 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2
- PRNI N-44 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1P4AH=T).
This actuates annunciators B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru5.1.1.7.
Step 5.1.1.1 actuates B-8/4.
Step 5.1.1.2 clears B-6/3.
Step 5.1.1.3 clears B-2/2.
Step 5.1.1.6 clears B-6/4.
Step 5.1.1.7.a
- Respond as AOM/l&C it asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.
Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except B-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.
Step 5.1.1.8
- Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.
Step 5.1.1.9
- Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-OSP-059.1 0(QPTR)
Step 5.1.1.10
- Not applicable.
Step 5.1.1.11
- Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.
Event 3
- PT-3-1 604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1 604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T).
PT 1604 failure causes CV-3-201 1 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV-3-1 900 closed. Click on Schema*
FEEDWATER HEATlNGHlGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKSreport CV-3-1 900 position (see far right side of mimic).
Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure > 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.
4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.3 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = T)
Step 7.1.3.4 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp).
Step 7.1.3.5 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = F).
Step 7.1.3.6 - NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.
Step 7.1.3.7 - Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.9 - Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.
Event 2 - PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PRNI N-44 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1 P4AH = T).
This actuates annunciators 8-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru 5.1.1.7.
Step 5. 1. 1. 1 actuates 8-8/4.
Step 5. 1. 1.2 clears 8-6/3.
Step 5. 1. 1.3 clears 8-2/2.
Step 5.1.1.6 clears 8-6/4.
Step 5.1.1.7.a - Respond as AOM/I&C if asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.
Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except 8-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.
Step 5.1.1.8 - Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.
Step 5.1.1.9 - Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-0SP-059.1 O(QPTR)
Step 5.1.1.10 - Not applicable.
Step 5.1.1.11 - Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.
Event 3 - PT-3-1604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T).
PT-3-1604 failure causes CV-3-2011 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.
Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV 1900 closed. Click on Schema~
FEEDWATER HEATING~HIGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKS~report CV-3-1900 position (see far right side of mimic).
Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.
4
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T).
This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 3B SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.
Since the PT 1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the BOP must manually run back load and the RO drive rods to reduce power
<60% per 3-ONOP-089. The crew should also respond per 3-ONOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP.
If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.
Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 mm, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.
Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.
Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.
Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-O1 1 regarding need for an ERT.
Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a> 15% power change.
Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-OP-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.
Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized <60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M T & TCF1 DO9M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV 1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.
5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T).
This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 38 SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.
Since the PT-3-1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the 80P must manually run back load and the RO drive rods to reduce power
< 60% per 3-0NOP-089. The crew should also respond per 3-0NOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP.
If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.
Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 min, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.
Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.
Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.
Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-011 regarding need for an ERT.
Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a > 15% power change.
Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-0P-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.
Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized < 60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M = T & TCF1D09M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.
5
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0 steps 1-4.
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is QOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &
bleed since SG levels are <32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-ONOP-075 Attachment 4),
respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.
If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.
Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1 409 (actuates TFFVVO9C = T) and report when complete.
3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level <[33%] wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 1 step 4 caution 2).
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A = 1.0, TAC2V02B 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 - Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-O steps 1-4.
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is ~OS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &
bleed since SG levels are < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-0NOP-07S Attachment 4),
respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.
If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.
Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1409 (actuates TFFVV09C = T) and report when complete.
3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level < [33%J wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 1 step 4 caution 2).
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
1 Page j_ of j_
Event
Description:
30 ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-OSP-01 9.3 step 7.1.3.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-OSP-01 9.3, section 7.1.
Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & s/d 3C ICWP per 3-OP-01 9 section 5.3.
BOP Obtains copies of 3-OSP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-OP-019, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
1.
Starts 3B ICWP & stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 a.
Verifies NSO understands 10W Ps to be started/stopped b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open c.
Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d.
Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff e.
Stops 30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero f.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2.
Has RO record 30 ICWP as inoperable.
3.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has signoffprocedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.
4.
Starts 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.
a.
Verifies NSO understands lOW Ps to be started/stopped b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 30 ICWP sightglass & 30 ICWP discharge valve open c.
Starts 30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d.
Directs NSO locally check 30 ICWP visible packing leakoff 5.
Has RO record 30 ICWP as back in service.
6.
Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3.
a.
Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 30 ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.
1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of _1_
Event
Description:
3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
Time
~===it=io=n=9================A=P=P=li=c=a=nt='s=A=C=t=io=n=s=o=r=B=e=h=a=v=io=r===============91 US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1.
Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & sid 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.
BOP Obtains copies of 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
- 1.
Starts 3B ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3
- a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
- b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open
- c.
Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero
- d.
Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff
- e.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero
- f.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check
- 2.
Has RO record 3C ICWP as inoperable.
- 3.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has sign off procedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.
- 4.
Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.
- a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
- b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass & 3C ICWP discharge valve open
- c.
Starts 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero
- d.
Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff
- 5.
Has RO record 3C ICWP as back in service.
- 6.
Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.
- a.
Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero
- b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 3C ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.
1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
2
Page 1
of Event
Description:
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.
annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-511, 5/2 N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high Performs immediate actions of 3-ONOP-059.8:
Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)
US Directs response per 3-ONOP-059.8 RO/
Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-059.8 as directed by US:
BOP 1.
Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.
2.
Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.
3.
Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
4.
Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
5.
Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.
6.
Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.
7.
Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &1 7 apply.
Actions 2 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028 RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028.
2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _2_
Page_1_of ~
Event
Description:
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.
annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-5/1, 5/2 N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high Performs immediate actions of 3-0NOP-059.8:
Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)
US Directs response per 3-0NOP-059.8 ROI Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-059.8 as directed by US:
- 1.
Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.
- 2.
Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.
- 3. Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
- 4.
Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
- 5.
Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.
- 6.
Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.
- 7.
Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &17 apply.
Actions 2 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028 RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028.
2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.: j Event No.:
2 Page 2
of.
Event
Description:
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Manually reduces turbine load as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028.
US 1.
Directs notification of I&C 2.
Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-OSP-059.10 (reactor power approx. 75%)
3.
Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.:
2 PageLofL Event
Description:
Power range NI channel N-44 uQQer detector fails high. The crew resQonds Qer 3-0NOP-059.8.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Manually reduces turbine load as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028.
US
- 1. Directs notification of I&e
- 3. Directs wee generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
3 Page j_ of j_
Event
Description:
PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.
Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
1.
Recognizes/reports CV-3-201 1 open and PT-3-1 604 failed.
2.
Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.
3.
Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-201 1 failure but still < 100%
4.
Determines SGFP suction pressure > 260 psig.
5.
When directed by US, closes CV-3-201 1.
NOTE:
CV-3-201 1 closure may be delayed pending plant stabilization and conduct ofpre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.
6.
Directs NSO verify CV-3-1 900 closed.
7.
Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>
450 MWe RD Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Considers closure of CV-3-201 1 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)
Determines effects of PT-3-1 604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1 604 failure.
Directs WCC have l&C investigate / fix PT-3-1 604 failure.
If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%
4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of _1_
Event
Description:
PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.
Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
- 1.
Recognizes/reports CV-3-2011 open and PT-3-1604 failed.
- 2.
Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.
- 3.
Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-2011 failure but still < 100%
- 4.
Determines SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig.
- 5.
When directed by US, closes CV-3-2011.
NOTE: CV-3-2011 closure may be delayed pending plant stabilization and conduct of pre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.
- 6.
Directs NSO verify CV-3-1900 closed.
- 7.
Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>
450 MWe RO Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Considers closure of CV-3-2011 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)
Determines effects of PT-3-1604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1604 failure.
Directs WCC have I&C investigate / fix PT-3-1604 failure.
If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%
4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: j_
Event No.: 4/4a Page 1
of 2
Event
Description:
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %
to avoid reactor trip on s/q b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089 and 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)
Annunciators 0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam > feed flow)
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations) 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0 Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.
US Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-ONOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:
BOP 1.
Manually reduces turbine load 2.
Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
3.
Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.
4.
Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).
RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:
1.
Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch 2.
Verifies PZR level & pressure control:
a.
Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level b.
PZR heaters / normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: 4/4a Page _1_ of ~
Event
Description:
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %
to avoid reactor trip on S/9 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSG FW P.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP US BOP Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)
Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations) 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0 Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.
Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-0NOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:
- 1.
Manually reduces turbine load
- 2.
Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
- 3.
Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.
- 4.
Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).
RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:
- 1.
Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch
- 2.
Verifies PZR level & pressure control:
- a.
Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level
- b.
PZR heaters 1 normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: j_
Event No.: 414a Page of 2
Event
Description:
Loss of 30 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %
to avoid reactor trip on s/q b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089 and 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.
NOTE:
Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.
BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.
1.
Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized 2.
Verifies steam dumps closed.
3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.
1.
Verifies Tavg matches Tref 2.
Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.
3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 30 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-ONOP-004.4:
1.
Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback 2.
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized 3.
Determines 30 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.
4.
Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 30 4kV bus lockout.
Determines no further actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 can be performed until 30 4kV bus lockout reset.
Directs SM to review 0-ADM-01 1 to see if ERT should be activated.
Directs System & DOS 0-ADM-1 15 notification about runback.
Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change)
Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 30 4kV bus.
6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4/4a Page -L of -.f.
Event
Description:
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and reguires manual action to reduce (2ower < 60 %
to avoid reactor tri(2 on s/g 10-10 level. The crew res(2onds (2er 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
NOTE: Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.
BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
- 1.
Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized
- 2.
Verifies steam dumps closed.
- 3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
- 1.
Verifies Tavg matches Tref
- 2.
Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.
- 3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 3C 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-0NOP-004.4:
- 1. Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback
- 2.
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized
- 3.
Determines 3C 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.
- 4. Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout.
Determines no further actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 can be performed until 3C 4kV bus lockout reset.
Directs SM to review 0-ADM-011 to see if ERT should be activated.
Directs System & DCS 0-ADM-115 notification about runback.
Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change)
Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3C 4kV bus.
6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
Page 1
of Event
Description:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinq an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 30 SG levels and feedwater flows Annunciators 0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam > feed flow)
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Ax trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.
Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure IXP>1 00 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs Mid & East GCBs open 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses 3.
Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling < 25[65]°F per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page.
7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: l Page _1_ of --+/--
Event
Description:
Once reactor 120wer stabilized < 60% 120wer, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor tril2 is reguired before any SG level drol2s < 10% since the automatic reactor tril2 is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is l2erformed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker tril2s & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed l2ath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 3C SG levels and feedwater flows Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
- 1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing
- 2.
Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure LlP> 100 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
- 1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs Mid & East GCBs open
- 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses
- 3.
Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling < 25[65]OF per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page.
7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
5 Page of Event
Description:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinci an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US 1.
Isolates AFW to 30 (faulted) SG 2.
Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.
US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
1.
Determines 3A, 3B, 30, 3D & 3H 480V LOs energized 2.
Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).
3.
Verifies FW isolation:
a.
Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP b.
Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.
c.
Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.
d.
Closes MOV-3-1 407 & 1408. Determines MOV-3-1 409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.
e.
Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off.
4.
Verifies at least 2 lOW Ps running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
5.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
6.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 EOFs running.
7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8.
Determines ROS pressure> 1600 psig (no HHSI flow) 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & shuts down both U4 HHSIPs 8
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: _5_ Page ~
of -A-Event
Description:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US
- 1.
Isolates AFW to 3C (faulted) SG
- 2.
Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.
US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 1.
Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized
- 2.
Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).
- 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
- a. Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP
- b. Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.
- c.
Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.
- d. Closes MOV-3-1407 & 1408. Determines MOV-3-1409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.
- e. Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off.
- 4.
Verifies at least 2 ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
- 5.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
- 6.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
- 7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running
- 8.
Determines RCS pressure> 1600 psig (no HHSI flow)
- 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & shuts down both U4 HHSIPs 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
5 Page 3
of Event
Description:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
1 1. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
- 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
13.
If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
- 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
- 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
- 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
- 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
- 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:
1.
Determines no AFWPs will be running.
a.
A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.
b.
BAFWPOOS c.
C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-ONOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).
2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.
Recognizes/reports SGs levels & decreasing AFW flow 4.
Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off.
5.
Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to 345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.
6.
Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed.
7.
Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: _5_
Page ~
of -L Event
Description:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
- 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
- 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
- 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
- 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
- 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
- 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
- 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:
- 1.
Determines no AFWPs will be running.
- b. BAFWPOOS
- c. C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-0NOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).
- 2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper
- 3.
Recognizes/reports SGs levels & decreasing AFW flow
- 4.
Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off.
- 5.
Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to ::::345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.
- 6.
Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed.
- 7.
Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
Page of...4..
Event
Description:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EQP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinq an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.
US 1.
If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
2.
Determines 3C SG faulted 3.
Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF) 4.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: _5_
Page --+/-- of --+/--
Event
Description:
Once reactor Qower stabilized < 60% Qower, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor triQ is reguired before any SG level droQs < 10% since the automatic reactor triQ is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is Qerformed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker triQs & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed Qath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.
US
- 1.
If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
- 2.
Determines 3C SG faulted
- 3.
Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF)
- 4.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
6 Page 1
of 2
Event
Description:
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead bafferv on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <
32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
Time Position
}
Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
RCO 1.
Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure 2.
Determines RCS Tavg >350°F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1.
Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32%
US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical 2.
Stops all running RCPs 3.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment 4.
Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical 5
Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path.
6.
Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment) 7.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset.
8.
Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby.
11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: _6_ Page_1_of ~
Event
Description:
C AFWP triQs on oversQeed Qrematurely at 6300 RPM (from setuQ}. The triQ can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts l but runs out of steam Qressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are Qrevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gQm and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <
32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
RCO
- 1.
Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure
- 2.
Determines RCS Tavg >350°F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32%
US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical
- 2.
Stops all running RCPs
- 3.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment
- 4.
Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical
- 6.
Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment)
- 7.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset.
- 8.
Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby.
11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
6 Page 2
of 2
Event
Description:
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup).
The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow
<345 qpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1 Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 (performed with same results as in event 5).
2.
Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-OP-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.
US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.
TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).
12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 1_ Event No.: _6 _
Page~of~
Event
Description:
C AFWP tri(2s on overs(2eed (2rematurely at 6300 RPM (from setu(2}.
The tri(2 can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam (2ressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are (2revented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSG FW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow
< 345 g(2m and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
......,,ro.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
,~
BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1. Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 (performed with same results as in event 5).
- 2.
Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-0P-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.
US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.
TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).
12
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
Candidates:
US RD BOP Initial Conditions:
Mode 1, 50% Power, MDL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.
Turnover:
Equipment DOS: 33 EDO due to failed fuel pump (DOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (DOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (DOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).
Known tube leak in 3A SIG (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) SROIBOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
2 (I) BOP First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS I) SRO per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
3 (C) ALL 1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6XO6F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9.
TCE6DHC=T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare nverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
4 TFCMM2A4 = T (C) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond.
TvHHSGA=
(TS) SRO The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2 4a (R) ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2 5
TVHHSGA=
(M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The
° (C) SRO/BOP reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSvv3SC=T requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EDP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A2OA=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDO output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T TFP1S38ST is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
Candidates:
Mode 1, 50% Power, MOL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type' Event Description No.
1 (N) SRO/BOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
2 (I) BOP First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS,I) SRO per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
3 (C) ALL 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6X06F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.
TCE6DI1C = T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
4 TFCMM2A4=T (C) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond.
TVHHSGA=
(TS) SRO The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 0.002 4a (R)ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2 5
TVHHSGA=
(M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The 0.4 (C) SRO/BOP reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSVV33C=T requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A20A=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T is manually closed and the crew transitions back to :3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D TFP1S38S = T 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-:3 is performed to cool down and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1
- Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Event 2
- First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
Event 3
- 1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Event 4
- The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Event 4a
- A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Event 5
- The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Event 6
- When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-
- 3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1 - Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
Event 2 - First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
Event 3 - 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Event 4 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Event 4a - A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Event 5 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Event 6 - When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-
- 3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
2
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.
Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP
- 3B EDG 005 (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF (0) & TAQ5B2OP = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP
- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFKOO2 = 0.0, TAFFO1 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP
- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP
- 3B CSP OOS (actuatesTAMlDPOB=RACKOUT (3)&TCM1D41M= FALSE)
SETUP
- 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6XO6F = T)
SETUP
- R-3-1 9 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T)
SETUP
- MOV-3-l 433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T)
SETUP
- 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TFQ5A2OA = T then = F when IMQ5A2OC)
Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.
Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Close CV-3-200B and stop 30 charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.
Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-612 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-OP-005 section 7.4 and 3-ONOP-071.2 Att 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.
Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41M = FALSE)
SETUP - 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6X06F = T)
SETUP - R-3-19 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T)
SETUP - MOV-3-1433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T)
SETUP - 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TF05A20A = T then = F when IM05A20C)
Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.
Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Close CV-3-200B and stop 3C charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.
Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-6/2 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-0P-005 section 7.4 and 3-0NOP-071.2 AU 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to TavglTref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
3
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1
- Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-OP-005 sect 7.4.
Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 30 ICWP per 3-OP-019.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on SchemaMAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION*4KV & 480V AC3D 4KV BUSReport voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.
Event 2
- PT-3-446 (channel Ill 1 st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-3-446 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1MABL=T).
Crew will respond per 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-ONOP-049. 1.
Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA = T then TCL4P1 BB T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-7/6. Report when complete.
Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify l&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.
Annunciator 0-8/3 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.
Annunciators 0-6/1, 6/2 & 6/3 alarm until ch v ls stage impulse pressure selected for control.
Annunciators C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 alarm due to tripping bistables.
4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1 - Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-0P-005 sect 7.4.
Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on Schema~MAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION~4KV & 480V AC~3D 4KV BUS~Report voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.
Event 2 - PT-3-446 (channel III 1st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-3-446 FAI LS LOW (actuates TFS1 MABL = T).
Crew will respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-0NOP-049. 1.
Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA = T then TCL4P1 BB = T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-716. Report when complete.
Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify I&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.
Annunciator C-813 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.
Annunciators C-611, 612 & 613 alarm until ch IV 1st stage impulse pressure selected for control.
Annunciators C-711, 712, 713 a/arm due to tripping bistab/es.
4
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3
- Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3
- LOSS OF 3D INVI3PO9 (actuates TCE6DI1 C = T).
This deenergizes 3D inverter. Since the auto transfer to CVT was failed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the DS inverter.
Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 mm, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB1 tripped.
Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. After 8-12 mm, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.
When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 mm then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-ONOP-003.9 Att. 1:
Step 1:
EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C = F)
Step 2a:
EVENT 3
- OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = T)
Step 2b:
EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE = F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 = F, TCCMP248 =
F, TCN14O9M=F, TCN141OM=F&TCN1411M=F)
Step 5a:
EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 = ALTERNATE)
Step 6:
Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.
Step 7:
EVENT 3-CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C=T, TCF1DA2M=T after 5 sec & TCH19O2M = T after 10 sec)
Step 8:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C = T, TCE6DP3C T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C = T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C = T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C = T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE = T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C = T after 40 sec, TCN1 911 M = T after 45 sec, TCN1 91 2M
= T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 = T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C = T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM = T after 80 sec &
TCE6D56C = T after 85 sec)
Step 9:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M = F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE = F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE = F after 20 sec, TCF1 DA3M F after 25 sec, TCK72407 = F after 30 sec, TCCMP248 = F after 35 sec, TCN14O9M = F after 40 sec, TCN141OM = F after 45 sec & TCN141 1 M = F after 50 sec)
Step 10:
EVENT 3
- 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 =
ALTERNATE)
Step 12:
Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressure/level control. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). If crew does not allow NSO to release LC459CX by end of this event, call to remind them.
Annunciator F-1/2 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter. Annunciator B-7/1 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset.
5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3 - Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3D INV 13P09 (actuates TCE6DI1 C = T).
This deenergizes 3D inverter. Since the auto transfer to CVT was failed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the OS inverter.
Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 min, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB 1 tripped.
Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. After 8-12 min, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.
When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 min then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-0NOP-003.9 Atl. 1:
Step 1 :
EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C = F)
Step 2a: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = T)
Step 2b: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE = F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 = F, TCCMP248 =
F, TCN1409M=F, TCN1410M=F&TCN1411M=F)
Step 5a: EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 = ALTERNATE)
Step 6:
Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.
Step 7:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C = T, TCF1DA2M = T after 5 sec & TCH1902M = T after 10 sec)
Step 8:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C = T, TCE6DP3C = T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C = T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M = T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C = T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C = T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C = T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE = T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C = T after 40 sec, TCN1911 M = T after 45 sec, TCN1912M
= T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 = T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C = T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C = T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM = T after 80 sec &
TCE6D56C = T after 85 sec)
Step 9:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M = F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE = F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE = F after 20 sec, TCF1 DA3M = F after 25 sec, TCK72407 = F after 30 sec, TCCMP248 = F after 35 sec, TCN1409M = F after 40 sec, TCN1410M = F after 45 sec & TCN1411 M = F after 50 sec)
Step 10: EVENT 3 - 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 =
ALTERNATE)
Step 12: Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressure/level control. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -
PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). If crew does not allow NSO to release LC459CX by end of this event, call to remind them.
Annunciator F-112 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter. Annunciator 8-711 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset.
5
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 414a - 3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002)
Crew should see R 15 & SJAE SPING readings increase and respond per 3-ONOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase. R 19 failure entered at setup means actions triggered by R 19 high rad alarm must be performed manually locally.
The crew should initiate downpower per 3-ONOP-071.2 to remove the unit from service.
Respond as NSO it asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SG5 and MS lines per 0-NCAP-104.
After 15-20 mm, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.
Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 mm, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4D01-28, after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F).
Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.
Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-ONOP-071.2 Att.
- 3. After 2-4 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 0.0, TAFFO2 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator D-4/6 will alarm during this process.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 & bypass valve 3-20-014.
After 1-3 mm, report both valves closed.
Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.
Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-115.
Event 5
- 3A SGTR I Reactor trip / Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (before reaching 25% power),
trigger lesson step EVENT 5
- 3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4).
The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to> charging pump capacity.
Per 3-ONOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0. MSR main steam stop MOV 1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.
Respond as NSO when directed to place U3 PAHMS in service. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5-PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAc2VO2A= 1.0, TAC2VO2B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACAOO5 = 0.0). Report when complete.
6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 414a - 3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002)
Crew should see R-3-1S & SJAE SPING readings increase and respond per 3-0NOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase. R-3-19 failure entered at setup means actions triggered by R-3-19 high rad alarm must be performed manually locally.
The crew should initiate downpower per 3-0NOP-071.2 to remove the unit from service.
Respond as NSO if asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs and MS lines per 0-NCAP-1 04.
After 15-20 min, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.
Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 min, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV 1403 by opening bkr 4001-28, after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F).
Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.
Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-0NOP-071.2 Att.
- 3. After 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 & bypass valve 3-20-014.
After 1-3 min, report both valves closed.
Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.
Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115.
Event 5 - 3A SGTR I Reactor trip I Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (before reaching 25% power),
trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4).
The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to > charging pump capacity.
Per 3-0NOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0. MSR main steam stop MOV-3-1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.
Respond as NSO when directed to place U3 PAHMS in service. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
6
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6
- Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT LOCKOUT! LOOP (actuates TFP1S38S = T)
A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EDG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 3B EDG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentaiy loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.
Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EDG. After 1-3 mm, report 3A EDG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EDG after manual output breaker closure, report EDG running satisfactorily.
Respond as System/SAC if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 mm delay, TAMH1 V37 = 0.0 after 2 mm
- delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 mm delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV 1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV41 7C = T & TFKV41 8C = T after 1 mm delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
- LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4D01-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 F). Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.
If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 0.0, TAFFO2 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator D-4/6 will alarm during this process.
If asked as NSQ to locally verify MOV-3-1 425 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.
The crew may tiy to reenergize 3B 4kV bus using 3-ONOP-004.3. Since 3B EDG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.
7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6 - Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT LOCKOUT I LOOP (actuates TFP1 S38S = T)
A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EOG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 38 EOG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentary loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EOG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.
Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EOG. After 1-3 min, report 3A EOG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EOG after manual output breaker closure, report EOG running satisfactorily.
Respond as System/SAO if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV 1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV417C = T & TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-11SC (actuatesTFBVC62=T). Report when complete.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4001-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F). Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.
If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.
If asked as NSO to locally verify MOV-3-1425 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.
The crew may try to reenergize 38 4kV bus using 3-0NOP-004.3. Since 38 EOG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.
7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
1 Page 1
of j_
Event
Description:
Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & s/d 3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 section 5.3.
BOP Obtains copies of 3-OP-005, section 7.4 & 3-OP-Ol 9, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
1.
Starts 3A ICWP & stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass & 3A ICWP discharge valve open c.
Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d.
Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff e.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter f.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2.
Opens 3AB19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are QOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2
- 7 day action statement & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.
3.
Closes 3ADO1 and then 3AA1 7 4.
Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.
5.
Starts 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.
a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 30 ICWP sightglass & 30 ICWP discharge valve open c.
Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d.
Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff 6.
As directed at turnover, stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 sect. 5.3.
a.
Stops 30 ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RD Assists BOP as directed by US.
1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _1_
Page _1_ of _1_
Event
Description:
Time Position US BOP RO Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & sId 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.
Obtains copies of 3-0P-005, section 7.4 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
- 1.
Starts 3A ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3
- a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
- b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass & 3A ICWP discharge valve open
- c.
Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter
- d.
Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff
- e.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter
- f.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check
- 2.
Opens 3AB 19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are DOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2 - 7 day action statement & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.
- 3.
Closes 3AD01 and then 3AA 17
- 4.
Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.
- 5.
Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.
- a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
- b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass & 3C ICWP discharge valve open
- c.
Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter
- d.
Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff
- 6.
As directed at turnover, stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 sect. 5.3.
- a.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter
- b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check Assists BOP as directed by US.
1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
2 Page 1
of 2
Event
Description:
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch Ill first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.
annunciators C-611, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)
C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure P1-3-446 indication on VPA fails low Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT-3-446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-ONOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4.
After PT-3-447 selected for 1 St stage pressure control, places rods back in auto 5.
Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)
US Directs WCC notify l&C of PT-3-446 failure.
Directs response per 3-ONOP-049. 1 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_
Page_1_of ~
Event
Description:
First stage imQulse Qressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew resQonds Qer 3-0NOP-028 to stoQ inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
~
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch III first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.
annunciators C-6/1, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)
C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure PI-3-446 indication on VPA fails low Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT 446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
- 1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref
- 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
- 3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail
- 4.
After PT-3-447 selected for 1st stage pressure control, places rods back in auto
- 5.
Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
- 1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref
- 2.
Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)
US Directs WCC notify I&C of PT-3-446 failure.
Directs response per 3-0NOP-049.1 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
2 Page 2
of 2
Event
Description:
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 as directed by US:
1.
Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1 604 and expected value based on turbine load.
2.
Verifies PT-3-447 selected for 1 St stage impulse pressure control 3.
Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS:
3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (lhr) in effect.
3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units if & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-ONOP-049.i Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-049.i as directed by US:
Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel Ill, rack 16:
BS-3-446-i (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)
BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)
BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)
BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)
BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)
Closes protection rack door when done.
Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.
US 1.
Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5 2.
Directs notification of l&C 3.
Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:
2 Page~ofL Event
Description:
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1604 and expected value based on turbine load.
- 2.
Verifies PT 447 selected for 1 st stage impulse pressure control
- 3.
Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS:
3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) in effect.
3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units 1 f & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-0NOP-049.1 Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US:
Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel III, rack 16:
BS-3-446-1 (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)
BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)
BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)
BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)
BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)
Closes protection rack door when done.
Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.
US
- 1. Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5
- 2. Directs notification of I&C
- 3. Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
3 Page 1
of Event
Description:
1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports loss of 3P09 1 2OVAC vital inst bus Annunciator F-1/2 Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO Recognizes / reports loss of 3P09 1 2OVAC vital inst bus Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1 Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-ONOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.
RO Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 as directed by US:
1.
Places rods in MANUAL 2.
Reduces charging flow to minimum reqd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control 3.
Determines PORVs closed 4.
Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 as directed by US:
1.
Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN 2.
Determines 3B SG in auto lockup, Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.
3.
Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page_1_of ~
Event
Description:
120VAC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus
- Annunciator F-1/2
- Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
- Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1
- Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
- Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves
- Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.
RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:
- 1.
Places rods in MANUAL
- 2.
Reduces charging flow to minimum req'd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control
- 3.
Determines PORVs closed
- 4.
Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN
- 2.
Determines 3B SG in auto lockup. Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.
- 3.
Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
Event No.: 3 Page 2 of Event
Description:
12OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
[
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:
1.
Determines PORVs closed 2.
Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX 3.
Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.
4.
Restores letdown a.
Determines B CCW header flow normal.
b.
Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed c.
Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460 d.
Manually controls PCV-3-1 45 to control letdown pressure e.
Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.
Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).
BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-ONOP-003.9 Aft 1.
1.
Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use 2.
When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters 3.
Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in 4.
Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE:
Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.
5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~
Page..£of ~
Event
Description:
120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:
- 1.
Determines PORVs closed
- 2.
Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX
- 3.
Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.
- 4.
Restores letdown
- a.
Determines B CCW header flow normal.
- b.
Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed
- c.
Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460
- d.
Manually controls PCV 145 to control letdown pressure
- e.
Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.
Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).
BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-0NOP-003.9 Att 1.
- 1.
Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use
- 2.
When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters
- 3.
Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in
- 4.
Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE: Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.
5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: j Page 3 of 3
Event
Description:
1 20VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Time
[
Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
1.
Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2 a.
Directs NSO release LC459CX b.
Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control 2.
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 3.
Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
1.
Returns 3B SG level control to automatic a.
Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%
and match feed flow = steam flow b.
Places 3B SG level control in auto 2.
Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO 3.
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: ~ Page~of -2 Event
Description:
120V AC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on Encl 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
- 1.
Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2
- a.
Directs NSO release LC459CX
- b.
Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control
- 2.
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions
- 3.
Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on Encl1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
- 1.
Returns 3B SG level control to automatic
- a.
Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%
and match feed flow = steam flow
- b.
Places 3B SG level control in auto
- 2.
Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO
- 3.
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
4 Page 1
of Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
R-3-1 5 SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)
NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)
US Directs performance of 3-ONOP-071.2 BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071.2 as directed by US:
1.
Checks R-3-1 5 validity a.
Checks readout on alarming R-3-15 ALARM SETPOINT b.
Checks channel operability:
1)
Depresses and holds FAIL/TEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-15.
2)
Checks readout = 288K OR 289K 3)
Releases FAIL/TEST pushbutton c.
Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6 2.
If R-3-1 9 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A1B/C &
LCV-3-6265B as directed by US.
RO Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071.2 as directed by US:
1.
Determines PZR level STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 EventNo.:~
Page _1_ of -.L Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
R-3-1S SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)
NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)
US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-071.2 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
1.
Checks R-3-1S validity
- a.
Checks readout on alarming R-3-1S;::: ALARM SETPOINT
- b.
Checks channel operability:
- 1)
Depresses and holds FAIUTEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-1S.
- 2)
Checks readout = 288K OR 289K
- 3)
Releases FAIUTEST pushbutton
- c.
Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6
- 2.
If R-3-19 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A/B/C &
LCV-3-626SB as directed by US.
RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
1.
Determines PZR level - STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2
Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-i 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-OSP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book*
not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking SIG:
a.
Monitors the following for SIG tube leak indications:
Unexplained increase in any SIG level High radiation detected on a SIG sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or SIG Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-.15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-i BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-07i.2 as directed by US:
b.
Directs Health Physics to perform the following:
Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors c.
Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:
Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION Increase SIG sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-i and SJAE SPING readings Determines SIG Tube Leakage > T.S. Limits TS 3.4.6.2.c action
- b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 6 hr & CSD following 30 hr)
US Determines need to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).
Goes to Step 10.
8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:..1...
Page-.£.of L Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-0SP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking S/G:
- a.
Monitors the following for S/G tube leak indications:
Unexplained increase in any S/G level High radiation detected on a S/G sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or S/G Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-1 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
- b.
Directs Health Physics to perform the following:
Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors
- c.
Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:
Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION Increase S/G sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-1 and SJAE SPING readings Determines S/G Tube Leakage> T.S. Limits - TS 3.4.6.2.c action
- b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 6 hr & CSD following 30 hr)
US Determines need to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).
Goes to Step 10.
8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
Page of Event
Description:
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction:
a.
Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction b.
Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page 1)
Specifies s/d rate (e.g.,1 5 MW/mm for 1 hr to s/d) 2)
Unit to be taken off line 3) 30 s/g leaking at 2 gpm 4)
Actions required after unit off-line 5)
Using control rods & boration c.
Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:
0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 0-ADM-1 15, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and S/G Tube Leakage UNUSUAL EVENT per O-EPIP-20101, End 1, Cat 2 Item A.2 now applicable.
Initiates boration per 3-ONOP-071.2:
a.
Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath 1)
Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE RO 2)
Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START 3)
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed b.
Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to desired amount of Boric Acid to be added as directed by US Determines amount of Boric Acid for desired power reduction US NOTE: For s/d from 50% MOL, up to 425 gal boric acid required 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page ~1_ of L Event
Description:
Position A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction:
RO US
- a.
Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction
- b.
Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page
- 1)
Specifies sid rate (e.g., 15 MW Imin for 1 hr to sid)
- 2)
Unit to be taken off line
- 3) 3C slg leaking at 2 gpm
- 4)
Actions required after unit off-line
- 5)
Using control rods & boration
- c.
Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:
0-EPIP-201 01, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and SIG Tube Leakage UN USUAL EVENT per 0-EPIP-201 01, Encl 1, Cat 2 Item A.2 now applicable.
Initiates boration per 3-0NOP-071.2:
- a.
Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath
- 1)
Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE
- 2)
Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
- 3)
Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed
- b.
Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to desired amount of Boric Acid to be added as directed by US Determines amount of Boric Acid for desired power reduction NOTE: For sid from 50% MOL, up to 425 gal boric acid required 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4a Page of Event
Description:
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:
a.
Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5°F)
BOP/RO b.
Monitors Control Rod Position (RO)> RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)
NOTE: For s/d from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RD NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGTR inserted When directed per 3-ONOP-071.2 1.
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2.
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3.
Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
5.
Places station service loads on U3 SUT 6.
Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG 7.
Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-1 0-007 8.
Determines turbine load <400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto 9.
Verifies both HDPs stopped <300 MWe
- 10. Stops 1 condensatepurnp<275MWe
- 12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
- 13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:
a.
Places rx rn/u selector switch in AUTO b.
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to directed value c.
Places RCS rn/u control switch to START
- 14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1 403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS) 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page ~
of L Event
Description:
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Time Position BOP/RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:
- a.
Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5°F)
- b.
Monitors Control Rod Position (RO) > RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)
NOTE: For sid from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RO NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGrR inserted When directed per 3-0NOP-071.2
- 1.
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service
- 2.
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)
- 3.
Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg-Tref per expected value as discussed in crew brief
- 4.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
- 5.
Places station service loads on U3 SUT
- 6.
Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG
- 7.
Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-10-007
- 8.
Determines turbine load < 400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto
- 9.
Verifies both HDPs stopped < 300 MWe
- 10. Stops 1 condensate pump < 275 MWe
- 12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
- 13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:
- a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO
- b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value
- c.
Places RCS m/u control switch to START
- 14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS) 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
5 Page 1
of 3
Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-ONOP-071.2 Foldout Page item 1 b RO Responds per 3-ONOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level:
1.
Starts 3 charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate 2.
Isolates letdown flow 3.
Determines PZR level still dropping 4.
Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-ONOP-071.2 due to inability to maintain PZR level.
Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPIs at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.
Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Attempts closing MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Recognizes MOV-3-1 433 failed to close & closes MSIVs Mid & East GCBs open 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page _1_ of -2 Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 g~m into a ru~ture. The reactor is tri~~ed and 3-EOP-E-O ~erformed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close reguiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-0NOP-071.2 Foldout Page item 1 b RO Responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level:
- 1.
Starts 3rd charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate
- 2.
Isolates letdown flow
- 3.
Determines PZR level still dropping
- 4.
Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-071.2 due to inability to maintain PZR level.
Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
- 1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing
- 2.
Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:
- 1.
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed Attempts closing MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Recognizes MOV-3-1433 failed to close & closes MSIVs Mid & East GCBs open
- 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
5 Page 2 of 3
Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs SOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
1.
Determines 3A, 3B, 30, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
a.
Places running SGFP switch in STOP.
b.
Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
c.
Closes FW isolation valves.
d.
Determines both SSGFWPs off.
4.
Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with lOW headers tied together.
5.
Verifies 3 COW HXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
6.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8.
Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & stops both U4 HHSIPs
- 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
- 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
- 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
13.
If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
- 14. Determines containment pressure remained <20 psig.
- 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _5_ Page ~
of -2 Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
I~
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 1.
Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized
- 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed
- 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
- a. Places running SGFP switch in STOP.
- b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
- c. Closes FW isolation valves.
- d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
- 4.
Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
- 5.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
- 6.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
- 7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running
- 8.
Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig
- 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & stops both U4 HHSIPs
- 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
- 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
- 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
- 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
- 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
5 Page 3
of 3
Event
Description:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
- 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
- 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
1.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified Critical 2.
Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed 1.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.
Determines at least 3A SG level > 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%
4.
Determines annunciators A-1/1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.
5.
Determines Tc stable.
6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing 9.
Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level)
US Based on SG tube rupture:
1.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.
13 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _5_
Page ~
of ~
Event
Description:
Position The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV 1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
- 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
- 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
Critical
- 1.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified
- 2.
Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed
- 1.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
- 2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper
- 3.
Determines at least 3A SG level> 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%
- 4.
Determines annunciators A-1 /1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.
- 5.
Determines Tc stable.
- 6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed
- 7.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified
- 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing
- 9.
Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level)
US Based on SG tube rupture:
- 1.
- 2.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.
13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
6 Page 1
of _4_
Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary secondary leak flow.
ime Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:
3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start.
3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG 005.
US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3 1.
Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0 2.
Determines RCS Tavg >350°F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
1.
Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated 2.
Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
1.
Determines 2 AFWPs running 2.
Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs 3.
Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2.
4.
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset 5.
Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS 6.
Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical 7.
Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _6_ Page_1_of ~
Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startul2 transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outl2ut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outl2ut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is l2erformed to cooldown and del2ressurize the RCS to stol2 I2rimary-secondary leak flow.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:
3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start.
3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG OOS.
US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3
- 1.
Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0
- 2.
Determines RCS Tavg >350°F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated
- 2.
Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
1.
Determines 2 AFWPs running
- 2.
Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs
- 3.
Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2.
- 4.
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset
- 5.
Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS
- 6.
Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical
- 7.
Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
6 Page 2
of 4
Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:
Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs 3B&3CECCs,3B&3CECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.
Defers performance of 3-ONOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-ONOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
1.
Determines RCPs not running 2.
Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
1
. Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1 606 closed 2.
Verifies AMSAC reset.
3.
Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical 4.
Closes MOV-3-1 403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1 403 closed (may already be done per event 4 using 3-ONOP-071.2 FOP guidance) 5.
Determines CV-3-6275A closed 6.
Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-ONOP-071.2 7.
Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1 427/1426/1425 already closed 8.
Determines 3A SG level > 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _6_
Page L of --A-Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3 1 the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close I and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:
Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC
- 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs 3B & 3C ECCs, 3B & 3C ECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.
Defers performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-0NOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines RCPs not running
- 2.
Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
1. Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1606 closed
- 2.
Verifies AMSAC reset.
- 3.
Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical
- 4.
Closes MOV-3-1403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1403 closed (may already be done per event 4 using 3-0NOP-071.2 FOP guidance)
- 5.
Determines CV-3-6275A closed
- 6.
Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-0NOP-071.2
- 7.
Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1427/1426/1425 already closed
- 8.
Determines 3A SG level> 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
6 Page 3
of Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
9.
Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated
- 10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 1 la table.
BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.
Critical BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.
1.
Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%
2.
Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure > 95 psig RD Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines power to one PORV block MDV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 2.
Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B not actuated) 3.
Determines RCS pressure > 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP 4.
Starts 3A or 30 charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.
5.
Opens LCV-3-1 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 1 5C 6.
Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 1 1 a table 7.
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
Determines 3A SO pressure stable/increasing.
16 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _6_
Page ~
of -- Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP,.E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
- 9.
Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated
- 10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 11 a table.
BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.
Critical BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.
- 1.
Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%
- 2.
Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open
- 2.
Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B not actuated)
- 3.
Determines RCS pressure> 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP
- 4.
Starts 3A or 3C charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.
- 5.
Opens LCV-3-115B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C
- 6.
Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table
- 7.
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1. Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table
- 2.
Determines 3A SG pressure stable/increasing.
16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
6 Page 4
of 4 Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3 1.
Determines normal spray not available Critical 2.
Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS 3.
Directs SI termination when criteria met RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1.
Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level >71% OR RCS CET subcooling <30°F.
2.
Determines RCS pressure increasing 3.
Determines SI termination criteria met.
4.
Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.
TERMHATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.
17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 2_ Event No.: _6 _
Page ~
of ---+/--
Event
Description:
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.
I~
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3
- 1.
Determines normal spray not available Critical
- 2.
Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS
- 3.
Directs SI termination when criteria met RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
- 1. Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level> 71 % OR RCS CET subcooling <30°F.
- 2.
Determines RCS pressure increasing
- 3.
Determines SI termination criteria met.
- 4.
Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.
TERMINATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.
CUE 17
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
candidates:
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST
- low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.
Known tube leak in 3A SIG (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV9O5A T
(N,TS) SRO ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.
2 (I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1TSCH = T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A=T TS\\ SRO NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T=T
service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9!6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or -9/4.
4 TAKPXA1=10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A1 Intake screen high p. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is TAKPXA2 = 4.0 secured.
4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high £xp. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2=1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
TAHUVBSB=22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches the trip setpoint the crew manually trips the reactor and TAHUVBMB=6
.immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.
TFE2Z51S=T (contd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB = 0 1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF=T (C)ALL applicable FRPs followed by3-EOP-E-1.
6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT = T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
Candidates:
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV905A ~ T ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared ~OS.
(N,TS) SRO 2
(I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1T8CH ~ T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A~ T (C,TS) SRO NCC ~OS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T ~ T service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
4 TAKPXA1~10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is TAKPXA2 ~ 4.0 secured.
4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2~1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
5 TAHUVBSB~22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1. Once TAHUVBMB~ 6 vibration reaches the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.
TFE2Z51S ~ T (cont'd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB ~ 0.1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF ~ T (C) ALL applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT ~ T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1
- 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.
Event 2
- TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Event 3
- Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
Event 4
- 3A1 intake screen high tsp. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is secured.
Event 4a
- 3A2 intake screen high p. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Event 5
- 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Event 6
- When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Event 6a
- Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 - 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.
Event 2 - TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 38 ECC, 38 ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
Event 4 - 3A 1 intake screen high b.p. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is secured.
Event 4a - 3A2 intake screen high b.p. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Event 5 - 38 RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Event 6 - When 38 RCP is tripped, 38 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Event 6a - Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
2
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP
- 3B EDO OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT)
SETUP
- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK0O2 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP
- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA=0.0000013)
SETUP
- 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE (0))
SETUP
- TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T)
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG 005). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-ONOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-OSP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 1
- 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6.
Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV9O5A = T). The crew performs 3-OSP-055. 1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A ECC beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required. Inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open. 3A ECC is stopped and declared OQS.
Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.
3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIILNRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT)
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41 M = FALSE (0))
SETUP - TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T)
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG OOS). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-0SP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 1 - 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6.
Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV905A = T). The crew performs 3-0SP-OSS. 1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A EGG beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required. Inlet valve GV-3-290S fails to open. 3A EGG is stopped and declared OOS.
Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.
3
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.
Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.
Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1 DM0 = F)
Event 2
- TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2
- TM 408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TELl T8CH = T).
This falls Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.
The operators respond per 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fall median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.
Respond as WCC when directed to have l&C investigate failure of rod control.
Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3
- Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay).
This causes a loss of 3H 480V LC and along with it 3C charging pump, 3B EGG, 3B ECF & 3D NCC.
The crew responds per 3-ARP-097. CR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and may enter 3-ONOP-04 1.6.
Since 30 charging pump was running, crew either starts 3B charging pump or closes CV-3-200B.
Failure also puts plant in a lhr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 ECC is left operable.
Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 mm, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesnt appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.
Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 mm, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.
4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.
Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.
Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1DMG = F)
Event 2 - TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - TM 408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TFL 1T8CH = T).
This fails Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.
The operators respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fail median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg-Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.
Respond as WCC when directed to have I&C investigate failure of rod control.
Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay).
This causes a loss of 3H 480V LG and along with it 3G charging pump, 38 EGG, 38 EGF& 3DNGG.
The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.GR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and may enter 3-0NOP-041. 6.
Since 3G charging pump was running, crew either starts 38 charging pump or closes GV-3-2008.
Failure also puts plant in a 1hr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 EGG is left operable.
Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 min, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesn't appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.
Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 min, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.
4
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.
Report all conditions normal.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema.COMMON SERVlCESCOMPONENT COOLlNG valve 834TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144---adjust value as desired and INSERT.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.
Event 414a 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0).
The crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-ONOP-Ol 1.
When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Ap, click on Schema*COMMON SERVlCESlNTAKE AREA & SCREEN WASH.report strainer Aps in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid.
When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Lp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.
ICW to CCW!TPCW flows and basket strainer 1ps can be determined by clicking on Schema÷COMMON SERVICES*INTAKE COOLING*report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.
If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic.
Respond if called as FSJWCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A1 traveling screen. To take 3A1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T).
Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A2 INTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 2.0).
The crew reduces power per 3-ONOP-100 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.
5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.
Report all conditions normal.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema~COMMON SERVICES~COMPONENT COOLlNG~
valve 834~TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144~adjust value as desired and INSERT.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.
Event 4/4a - 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0).
The crew responds per 3-0NOP-0 11. First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-0NOP-0 11.
When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Llp, click on Schema--+COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE AREA & SCREEN WASH--+report strainer Llp's in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid.
When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Llp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.
ICW to CCW/TPCW flows and basket strainer Llp's can be determined by clicking on Schema--+COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE COOLlNG--+report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.
If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A 1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A 1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic.
Respond if called as FS/wCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A 1 traveling screen. To take 3A 1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T).
Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A21NTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 = 2.0).
The crew reduces power per 3-0NOP-1 00 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.
5
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing p on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks.
Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002 I 004 (actuates TAFBOO2 = 0.0 then TAFBOO4 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.
Event 5
- 3B RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 mm ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 mm ramp).
The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.
Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 3B RCP motor &
shaft.
Event 6
- Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6-LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB =0.1 when H2OLO9G) and EVENT 6-3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = T when H20L09G)
The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A ECCS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV-3-1 407 (actuates TFVVO7C = F). Report when complete.
Respond as NSD if directed to locally open MOV-3-843B. After 1-3 mm., trigger lesson step EVENT 6
- OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVVO2O = T). Report when complete.
Respond as U4 RD when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
- ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 mm delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 mm
- delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 mmn delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV-3-1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, 6
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing Llp on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks.
Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002/004 (actuates TAFB002 = 0.0 then TAFB004 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.
Event 5 - 38 RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 min ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 min ramp).
The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.
Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 38 RCP motor &
shaft.
Event 6 - Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB = O. 1 when H20L09G) and EVENT 6 - 3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = Twhen H20L09G).
The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A EGGS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV-3-1407 (actuates TFVV07C = F). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally open MOV-3-8438. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVV020 = T). Report when complete.
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 AU 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1 V41 = 1.0, TAMH1 V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, 6
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6
- CLOSE PHASE A ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 mm delay, TFBV6O = T after 2 mm delay & TFSWVM5B T after 3 mm delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(aII of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
- CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 mm delay & TFKV730C = T after 2 mm delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSQ when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A = 1.0, TAC2VO2B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACAOO5 = 0.0). Report when complete.
Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-P. 1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.
Event 6a
- Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z 1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 mm., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &
discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.
Event 6b
- Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1 D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 mm., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (tailed bearing).
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 mm.
report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297A1B/C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297A1B1C (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B =
0.0 1 mm. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 mm. later.).
7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE A ISOL V ALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay, TFBV60 = T after 2 min delay & TFSWVM5B = T after 3 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 min delay & TFKV730C = T after 2 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-P. 1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.
Event 6a - Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z. 1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 min., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &
discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.
Event 6b - Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 min., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (failed bearing).
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 min.
report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297 AlBIC. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297 AlBIC (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B =
0.0 1 min. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 min. later.).
7
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates TFBVC62 T). Report when complete.
Respond as U4 RD when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling.
Respond as U4 RD when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 4B EDG5 per 314-OP-023.
Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B. After 1-3 mm., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B=
1.0). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when asked to verify MDV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 mm., report valve closed.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 & 1418. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV417O = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV418O = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema.*SAFETY SYSTEMSAFETY INJECTION PROCclick on 888 valve for running HHSIPTAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREAadjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EDP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.
8 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-115C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.
Respond as U4 RO when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling.
Respond as U4 RO when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 4B EDGs per 3/4-0P-023.
Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B =
1.0). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when asked to verify MOV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 min., report valve closed.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 & 1418. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV4170 = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV4180 = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema~SAFETY SYSTEM~SAFETY INJECTION PROC~click on 888 valve for running HHSIP~TAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREA~adjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.
8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Event No.:
1 Page 1
of 1
Event
Description:
3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1.
3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared 005.
Time Position [
Applicants Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A ECC monthly operability test per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.
BOP Obtains copy of 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6:
1.
Places 3A ECC switch to STOP 2.
Determines CV-3-2905, CV-3-2814 & CV-3-2908 all closed.
3.
Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.
4.
Starts 3A ECC & records start time on An. 1 5.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current 6.
Recognizes & reports CV-3-2905 did not open 7.
Stops 3A ECC fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A ECC QOS with CV-3-2905 failed closed 8.
Determines CV-3-2814 open & CV-3-2908 closed 9.
Determines CCW flow on Fl-3-1 470 is zero & records on An. 1 10.
Notifies US 3A ECC failed test due to CV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A ECC DOS Directs WCC have Mechanical investigate/fix CV-3-2905.
Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr)
May directs WCC place 3A ECC under ECO 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of _1_
Event
Description:
3A EGG monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1.
3A EGG inlet valve GV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A EGG is declared OOS.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A EGG monthly operability test per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.
BOP Obtains copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6:
1.
Places 3A EGG switch to STOP
- 2.
Determines GV-3-2905, GV-3-2814 & GV-3-2908 all closed.
- 3.
Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.
- 4.
Starts 3A EGG & records start time on Att. 1
- 5.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current
- 6.
Recognizes & reports GV-3-2905 did not open
- 7.
Stops 3A EGG fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A EGG OOS with GV-3-2905 failed closed
- 8.
Determines GV-3-2814 open & GV-3-2908 closed
- 9.
Determines GGW flow on FI-3-1470 is zero & records on Att. 1
- 10.
Notifies US 3A EGG failed test due to GV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A EGG OOS Directs WGG have Mechanical investigate/fix GV-3-2905.
Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr)
May directs WGG place 3A EGG under EGO 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
2 Page 1
of j_
Event
Description:
TM-3-408C (Tavci input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AC Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-ONOP-028 AC Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4.
Determines RCS Tavg Tl-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify l&C of rod control failure.
Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.
Performs applicable actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected 1.
Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed 2.
Determines no control switches require transfer 3.
Evaluates no impact per TS 4.
Determines no bistable switches require tripping per AU 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT-3-446/447 did not fail 5.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_
Page _1_ of _1_
Event
Description:
TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-0NOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
- 1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref
- 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
- 3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail
- 4.
Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
- 1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref
- 2.
Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify I&C of rod control failure.
Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.
Performs applicable actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected
- 1.
Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed
- 2.
Determines no control switches require transfer
- 3.
Evaluates no impact per TS
- 4.
Determines no bistable switches require tripping per Att 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT 446/447 did not fail
- 5.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
3 Page 1
of 1
Event
Description:
Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF
& 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 qpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-916, A-5/4, 1-913 or 1-9/4.
Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior
]
BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-511.
Recognizes/reports both 3H 480V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.
RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-8/1 (later A-5/4)
Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 480V MCC.
BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 1.
Determines 3H 480V LC auto bus transfer failed 2.
Determines 30 & 3D 480V LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 480V LC BOP Directs 3-ONOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-ONOP-041.6 RD Performs actions per 3-ONOP-041.6 as directed by US:
1.
Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.8.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)
On U3
- Action a. applies (8 hr)
On U4
- Table 3.8-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.8.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Evaluates TS 3.6.3 requires 7 day action to restore 3B ECF Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 480V LC & 3D 480V MOO and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant.
3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _ 3_
Page _1_ of _1 _
Event
Description:
Loss of 3H 4S0V LC. Also takes 3C charging [2um[2l 3B ECCl 3B ECF
& 3D NCC OOS. Reguires starting another charging [2um[2 or securing the in service 60 g[2m orifice. The crew res[2onds [2er 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6 1 A-S/4l 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-S/1.
Recognizes/reports both 3H 4S0V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.
RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-S/1 (later A-S/4)
Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 4S0V MCC.
BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6
- 1.
Determines 3H 4S0V LC auto bus transfer failed
- 2.
Determines 3C & 3D 4S0V LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 4S0V LC BOP Directs 3-0NOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.6 RO Performs actions per 3-0NOP-041.6 as directed by US:
- 1.
Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.S.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)
On U3 - Action a. applies (S hr)
On U4 - Table 3.S-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.S.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Evaluates TS 3.6.3 requires 7 day action to restore 3B ECF Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 4S0V LC & 3D 4S0V MCC and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant.
3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 4 Page 1
of 1
Event
Description:
3A1 Intake screen high p. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is secured.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Recognizes/reports rising tp on 3A1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms us Directs performance of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:
1.
Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running 2.
Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Isp 3.
Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear 4.
Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen Lp pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen Lp pegged high.
5.
Directs N50s report:
a.
lOW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Isps b.
lOW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Isps US Determines 3A1 traveling screen Isp still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A1 traveling screen waterfall height reported > 2.5 ft When 3A1 traveling screen waterfall reported > 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:
6.
Stops 3A1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall > 2.5 ft 7.
Determines ICWP secured in 3A1 intake well US Directs FS/WCC coordinate performance of Att. 1 to clean 3A1 intake well. Notifies plant management.
4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:.+/-.
Page _1_ of _1 Event
Description:
3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is secured.
Time Position BOP/RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes/reports rising Llp on 3A 1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-011 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US:
- 1.
Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running
- 2.
Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Llp
- 3.
Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear
- 4.
Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen iJ.p pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen iJ.p pegged high.
- 5.
Directs NSOs report:
- a. ICW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Llp's
- b. ICW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Llp's US Determines 3A 1 traveling screen Llp still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall height reported> 2.5 ft When 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall reported> 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US:
- 6.
Stops 3A1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall> 2.5 ft
- 7.
Determines ICWP secured in 3A1 intake well US Directs FS/wCC coordinate performance of AU. 1 to clean 3A 1 intake well. Notifies plant management.
4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
4a Page 1
of Event
Description:
3A2 intake screen hicih Lip. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securinQ 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavq failure.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Lip US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2 CWP.
Contacts FSIWCC and determines 3A1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.
Conducts crew brief per 3-ONOP-1 00 Attachment 3:
Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sld)
Target power level = offline Specifies load reduction rate Specifies boration amount & rate Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions Covers E-0 transition criteria Reviews reqd actions from 3-ONOP-071.2 Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.
RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-ONOP-1 00:
1.
Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed 2.
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A pot setting = 8.0 3.
Places Rx MIU Selector Switch to BORATE 4.
Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-ONOP-1 00:
1.
Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US 2.
Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~
Page _1 of..L Event
Description:
3A2 intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
I~
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Llp US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2nd CWP.
Contacts FS/wCC and determines 3A 1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.
Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-100 Attachment 3:
Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sid)
Target power level = offline Specifies load reduction rate Specifies boration amount & rate Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions Covers E-O transition criteria Reviews req'd actions from 3-0NOP-071.2 Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.
RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-0NOP-1 00:
- 1.
Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed
- 2.
Sets FC-3-113A pot setting = 8.0
- 3.
Places Rx M/U Selector Switch to BORATE
- 4.
Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-0NOP-100:
- 1.
Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US
- 2.
Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 4a Page 2 of 2
Event
Description:
3A2 intake screen high p. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
]
RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100:
1.
Checks for Tavg reduction from boration 2.
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-ONOP-1 00 at rate directed by US.
RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00:
1.
Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.
NOTE:
Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-ONOP-100, notifies SM to review 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-1 15 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-ONOP-1 00 1.
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2.
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3.
Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining TavgTret per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
5.
Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open 6.
When directed by US ( 60% power), secures boration:
a.
Places rx rn/u selector switch in AUTO b.
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to directed value c.
Places RCS rn/u control switch to START 7.
Stops one HDP when < 45OMWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%.
6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4a Page£of ~
Event
Description:
3A2 intake screen high ~!2. Fast load reduction !2er 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the !2ur!20se of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:
- 1.
Checks for T avg reduction from boration
- 2.
Sets FC-3-113A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-100 at rate directed by US.
RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:
- 1.
Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.
NOTE: Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-0NOP-1 00, notifies SM to review O-EPI P-201 01 & O-ADM-115 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-0NOP-1 00
- 1.
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service
- 2.
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)
- 3.
Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining Tavg-Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief
- 4.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
- 5.
Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open
- 6.
When directed by US (;::: 60% power), secures boration:
- a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO
- b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value
- c.
Places RCS m/u control switch to START
- 7.
Stops one HDP when < 450MWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%.
6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 5 Page j_ ofj Event
Description:
3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RD Recognizes / reports annunciator F-ill alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-ONOP-041 I foldout page Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-ONOP-041.1 due to RCP motor vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils.
RO Performs 3-ONOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US:
1.
Reporls when either motor vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils 2.
Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RD Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod boffom lights on & RPIs at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.
Actuates SI & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Mid & East GCBs open 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page _1_ of _1 Event
Description:
3B RCP high vibration. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor tril2 set12oint2 the crew manually tril2s the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are l2erformed.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports annunciator F-1/1 alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-041.1 due to Rep motor vibration> 5 mils or shaft vibration> 20 mils.
RO Performs 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Reports when either motor vibration> 5 mils or shaft vibration> 20 mils
- 2.
Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
- 1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing
- 2.
Actuates SI & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
- 1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Mid & East GCBs open
- 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6 Page 1
of Event
Description:
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a larqe break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position j
Applicant T
s Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.
BOP Recognizes I reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.
US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:
1.
Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus 2.
Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open 3.
Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06 4.
Closes 3ADO1 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:
1.
Determines only 3A & 30 480V LOs energized 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure) 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
a.
Places both SGFP switches in STOP.
b.
Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
c.
Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1 408 & 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 407.
d.
Determines both SSGFWPs off.
Critical 4.
Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP 5.
Determines POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_
Event No.: _6_ Page _1 of ~
Event
Description:
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
I~ rosltion Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.
BOP Recognizes / reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.
US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:
Critical
- 1.
Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus
- 2.
Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open
- 3.
Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06
- 4.
Closes 3AD01 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:
- 1.
Determines only 3A & 3C 480V LCs energized
- 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure)
- 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
- a. Places both SGFP switches in STOP.
- b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
- c. Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1408 & 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1407.
- d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
- 4.
Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP
- 5.
Determines POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6 Page 2
of 3
Event
Description:
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a larqe break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:
Critical 6.
Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.
7.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &
MOV-3-626 open (no power).
8.
Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 30 ECF. No power available to start a 2 ECC or ECF.
NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.
9.
Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.
- 10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure <250[650J psig.
- 11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
- 12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417,1418,1425 &381 closed
- 13. Determines train A SI valves in proper injection alignment
- 14. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig.
- 16. Determines containment pressure > 20 psig.
Critical a.
Manually starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open.
b.
Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 71 6B & 730 closed c.
Verifies all RCPs stopped
- 17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
9 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_
Event No.: _6_
Page..L of -L Event
Description:
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic Sl occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position BOP Critical Critical Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:
- 6.
Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.
- 7.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &
MOV-3-626 open (no power).
- 8.
Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 3C ECF. No power available to start a 2nd ECC or ECF.
NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.
- 9.
Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.
- 10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure < 250[650] psig.
- 11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
- 12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417,1418,1425 & 381 closed
- 13. Determines train A Sl valves in proper injection alignment
- 14. Resets Sl & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig.
- 16. Determines containment pressure> 20 psig.
- a. Manua"y starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open.
- b. Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed
- c. Verifies all RCPs stopped
- 17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6 Page of 3
Event
Description:
When 38 RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
- 20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
- 21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
1.
Determines containment conditions adverse (>180°F) 2.
Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling < 25[65]°F with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed 1.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV 1404 did not open.
3.
Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
4.
Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235°F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow 5.
Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to 345 gpm until any SG level > 6[32]%.
6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7.
Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page) 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing 9.
Determines no SG tube ruptures
10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_
Event No.: _6_ Page ~
of ~
Event
Description:
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
- 18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
- 20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
- 21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
- 1.
Determines containment conditions adverse (> 180°F)
- 2.
Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling < 25[65]OF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed
- 1.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
- 2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV 1404 did not open.
- 3.
Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
- 4.
Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235°F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow
- 5.
Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to ~ 345 gpm until any SG level> 6[32]%.
- 6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed
- 7.
Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page)
- 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing
- 9.
Determines no SG tube ruptures
- 10. Determines ReS not intact; containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal.
10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6a Page j_ of Event
Description:
Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320°F (orange) or 290°F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:
RO 1.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650} psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA)
Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication) us If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
1.
Determines all RCPs secured.
2.
Stops any running NCCs 3.
Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified 4.
Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
US Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9.
RD Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864A/B open 2.
Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP DOS 3.
Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed!
deenergized under ECO 4.
Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C) 5.
Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open.
6.
Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: --.fuL Page _1_ of -L Event
Description:
Once CSFSTs are monitored for im(2lementation l if containment (2ressure is still above 20 (2si9 1 the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange (2ath exists.
I~
Applicant's Actions or Behavior r"U;:'I.*
Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320°F (orange) or 290°F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA)
Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication)
US If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines all RCPs secured.
- 2.
Stops any running NCCs
- 3.
Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified
- 4.
Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
US Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9.
RO Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864A1B open
- 2.
Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP OOS
- 3.
Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed/
deenergized under ECO
- 4.
Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C)
- 5.
Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open.
- 6.
Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6a Page 2
of 2
Event
Description:
Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Periorms actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
1.
Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.
2.
Determines MSIVs closed 3.
Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ Page Lof-L Event
Description:
Once CSFSTs are monitored for iml2lementation, if containment I2ressure is still above 20 I2si9, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange l2ath exists.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.
- 2.
Determines MSIVs closed
- 3.
Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6b Page 1
of.
Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.
NOTE: Performance of 3-ONOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source ofpower and EOP actions are higher priority.
Conducts crew brief.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
1.
Determines RCPs not running 2.
Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 3.
Verifies SI reset 4.
Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.
5.
Places RCS makeup control switch to stop 6.
Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump 7.
Opens LCV-3-1 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-i 1 5C.
BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-i as directed by US:
1 Determines SGs not faulted.
2.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6{32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
3.
Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i 4.
Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines 5.
Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset.
6.
Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ Page_1_of ~
Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.
NOTE: Performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source of power and EOP actions are higher priority.
Conducts crew brief.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines RCPs not running
- 2.
Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open
- 3.
Verifies SI reset
- 4.
Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.
- 5.
Places RCS makeup control switch to stop
- 6.
Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump
- 7.
Opens LCV-3-115B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C.
BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
- 1. Determines SGs not faulted.
- 2.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
- 3.
Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1
- 4.
Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines
- 5.
Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset.
- 6.
Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6b Page 2
of 3
Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is runninc, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US.
1.
Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature> 122°F.
2.
Determines RCS pressure < 250{650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm 3.
Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines SG pressures stable 2.
Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergizec 3.
Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running 4.
Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.
Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.
us Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US:
1.
Determines RWST level > 60000 gallons 2.
Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical 3.
Aligns makeup to U3 RWST a.
Determines CVCS makeup stopped b.
Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B c.
Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV 3-113B & 114B in CLOSE d.
Determines MOV-3-350 closed.
e.
Places FCV-3-1 13A & 1 14A controllers in MANUAL f.
Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE g.
Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup h.
Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ PageLof~
Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US.
- 1.
Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature> 122°F.
- 2.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm
- 3.
Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines SG pressures stable
- 2.
Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergized
- 3.
Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running
- 4.
Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.
Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.
US Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines RWST level> 60000 gallons
- 2.
Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical
- 3.
Aligns makeup to U3 RWST
- a.
Determines CVCS makeup stopped
- b.
Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B
- c.
Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV-3-113B & 114B in CLOSE
- d.
Determines MOV-3-350 closed.
- e.
Places FCV-3-113A & 114A controllers in MANUAL
- 1.
Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE
- g.
Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup
- h.
Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6b Page 3
ofj Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US.
1.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6{32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
uS Determines RCS cooldown rate has exceeded 1 00°F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines only 1 ECC running & available.
a.
Determines phase A reset b.
Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418 c.
Resets & starts 2 available NCCs 2.
Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig.
RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump) 2.
Verifies SI reset Critical 3.
Stops 1 HHSIP 4.
Determines RCS pressure < 250{650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available 5.
Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV 862A (no power to 862B)
US 1.
Determines RCS subcooling inadequate for RCP start & SI termination.
Critical 2.
Determines minimum SI flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum SI flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum.
CUE 15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: -.illL Page~of -L Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP triQs. Since neither RHRP is running z transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US.
- 1.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
US Determines RCS cool down rate has exceeded 1 OO°F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines only 1 ECC running & available.
- a.
Determines phase A reset
- b.
Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418
- c.
Resets & starts 2 available NCCs
- 2.
Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig.
RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
- 1.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump)
- 2.
Verifies SI reset Critical
- 3.
Stops 1 HHSIP
- 4.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available
- 5.
Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV 862A (no power to 862B)
US
Critical
- 2.
Determines minimum SI flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum SI flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum.
CUE 15