Text

2010-06-DRAFT-Ops Test Scenarios
	ML101450236
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	06/25/2010
From:	Garchow S; NRC Region 4
To:	; Entergy Operations
References
	50-416/10-301, ES-D-1
	Download: ML101450236 (100)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 06/10 Examiners: _________________________ Operators:__________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Place the second Reactor Feed Pump (A) on the Master Level Controller.

2. Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods.

3. Respond to a control rod drifting out.

4. Respond to a spurious HPCS initiation followed by HPCS pump trip.

5. Respond to loss of Service Transformers 11 and 21.

6. Respond to a trip of Division 1 Diesel Generator.

7. Respond to LOCA in the Drywell.

8. Respond to a failure Division 2 ECCS to automatically initiate.

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 50%.

INOPERABLE Equipment None Turnover:

The plant is at 50% power during startup. Reactor Recirc pumps are in fast speed with core flow 60%. Plans are to place RFP A on the Master Level Controller per IOI 03-1-01-2 step 5.16.1 and SOI 04-1-01-N21 section 4.6.4 immediately following turnover. Then, power ascension is to continue with withdrawing control rods in accordance with the Control Rod Movement Sequence per IOI 03-1-01-2 and the Reactivity Management Plan for startup. There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green. A Division 1 work week is in effect.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N(BOP)

Place Reactor Feed Pump A on the Master Level Controller (IOI 03-1-01-2 step 5.16.1 and SOI 04-1 N21-1 section 4.6.4) 2 R(ACRO)

Raise reactor power to approximately 55% by withdrawing control rods. (Control Rod Movement Sequence) 3 z161161_40_25 C(ACRO)

Respond to control rod 40-25 drift out (ONEP 05-1-02-IV-1 sections 2.2/3.2; Tech Spec 3.1.3) 4 e22052 C(SS) e22053 Respond to a spurious HPCS initiation and HPCS pump trip (02-S-01-27 step 6.6.3, ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-16A-H3, Tech Spec 3.5.1) 5 r21133a M(ALL) r21133b Respond to a trip of Service Transformers 11 and 21 (ONEPs 05-1-02-I-4, 05-1-02-I-1, 05-1-02-I-2; EP-2) 6 n41141a C (BOP)

Respond to trip of Division 1 Diesel Generator (ONEP 05-1-02-I-4) 7 rr063a@4.92 M(ALL)

Respond to a LOCA in the drywell (EP-2, EP-3) 8 rr040f@0 I(ACRO) rr041f@100 Respond to failure of Division 2 ECCS to automatically initiate (EN-OP-115)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 2 of 28

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Critical Tasks

- Open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -210 Fuel Zone Range.

- Manually initiate Division 2 ECCS prior to RPV pressure going below 300 psig.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 CREW TURNOVER The plant is at 50% power during startup. Reactor Recirc pumps are in fast speed with core flow 67 Mlbm/hr. The next step in the Control Rod Movement Sequence is step 155a.

Plans are to place RFP A on the Master Level Controller per IOI 03-1-01-2 step 5.16.1 and SOI 04-1-01-N21 section 4.6.4 immediately following turnover. The BOP operator is to perform this task.

Then, power ascension is to continue with withdrawing control rods in accordance with the Control Rod Movement Sequence and IOI 03-1-01-2 per the Reactivity Management Plan for startup.

There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR SETUP Start the process from a new simulator load.

Reset to IC-14.

Verify or perform the following:

IC: 14 OOS: none Active malfunctions: rr040f @ 0 DW Pressure transmitter B21N094F fails low Active overrides none Pending overrides none Pending malfunctions: z161161_40_25 Control Rod 40-25 drift out (TRG 3) e22053 Spurious HPCS initiation (TRG 4) e22052 HPCS pump trip (TRG 4) delay 3 sec r21133a ST11 lockout trip (TRG 5) r21133b ST21 lockout trip (TRG 5) n41141a Div 1 DG trip (TRG 5) delay 150 sec rr063a @ 4.92 Recirc loop A rupture (TRG 5) delay 420 sec rr041f @ 100 WR Reactor Level transmitter B21N091F fails high (TRG 5) Delay 30 sec Startup all PDS / SPDS screens. Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

Setup cyclops display and verify it is functional.

Ensure the correct control rod movement sequence is available at the P680.

Mark IOI 03-1-01-02 Attachment I for startup complete up to step 5.16.1, leave 5.16.1 incomplete. Also mark steps 5.16.3, and 5.17 complete, as appropriate.

Close N21-F014A RFPT A Discharge Valve.

Reset RFPT A and raise RFPT Speed to > 200 rpm to get RFPT A Speed Controller SPEED AUTO pushbutton flashing, then depress SPEED AUTO. SPEED AUTO, RAISE and LOWER pushbuttons should be back lit. This completes 04-1-01-N21-1 section 4.5.4 Mark 04-1-01-N21-1 section 4.5.4 complete and notate the starting point as section 4.6.4.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Place a copy of 04-1-01-N21-1 section 4.6.4 in the simulator booth for reference.

Verify Control Rod 40-45 is withdrawn to full out.

Verify Control Rod Movement Sequence Step.

Place/position turnover guide on the CRO desk.

Insert the Reactivity Management Plan for startup in the front the pull sheet book.

Erase all temporary markings from control room panels, posted operator aids, switch covers, and indicators.

Erase all prior markings from procedures and hard cards expected to be referenced by the crew during this scenario.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens are inking properly.

(APRM chart recorders must be turned on and settings for scales on pens 0 - 125 scale)

ENSURE Horns are ON.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATION Once simulator is reinitialized and setup complete take the simulator out of Freeze.

Once the Crew has taken control, note the simulator time.

Place RFP A on the Master Level Controller (SOI 04-1-01-N21-1 section 4.6.4)

The BOP will place RFPT A on the Master Level Controller in Automatic.

Simulator Operator: when requested, insert remote functions fw101 and fw103 to CLOSE.

Provide role play as the Turbine Building Operator when asked to close RFP A steam drains on H22P175 per 04-1-01-N21-1 step 4.6.4a(8).

Raise reactor power to 55% by withdrawing control rods (Control Rod Movement Sequence Sheet)

Provide the following role play as the Reactor Engineer: If asked, tell the crew you are ready for them to raise power by withdrawing control rods in accordance with the pull sheets beginning at step 155a.

The CRS may elect to provide a separate reactivity brief.

The ACRO will withdraw control rods monitoring Reactor Power per the Control Rod Movement Sequence.

The BOP will verify Control Rod selection and monitor RPV Level and Turbine Loading.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 3, Control Rod 40-25 drift out.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond Control Rod 40-25 drift out (ONEP 05-1-02-IV-1)

The ACRO should announce 1H13-P680-4A2-E4 CONT ROD DRIFT and identify the drifting rod by depressing the ROD DRIFT status pushbutton on P680-6C and observing the red LED beside rod 40-25 on the RC&IS full core display. He should identify the rod is moving by observing the position indication change to double dashes.

The CRS should announce entry into the Control Rod Drive/Malfunctions ONEP.

The ACRO should select control rod 40-25 using the matrix pushbuttons on P680-6C and then apply a continuous insert signal using the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton until the rod reaches full in. If it was recognized that the drift was inward, the operator may release the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton when the rod is fully inserted. If the direction of the drift was not observed, the operator should continue to apply the insert signal until the building operator has isolated valves 103KF and 105KF to disarm the drive.

The ACRO should depress the RESET DRIFT pushbutton on P680-6C once rod 40-25 is full in to reset the drift annunciator.

When requested to close C11-103KF and 105KF wait approximately 3 minutes, then delete the drift malfunction, and as the building operator report using the PA, you have closed C11-103KF and 105KF for control rod 40-25 KF.

The CRS should declare rod 40-25 inoperable per TS 3.1.3 Condition C.

The CRS should contact Reactor Engineering to analyze the affects of control rod 40-25 being inserted per the ONEP.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 4, Spurious HPCS initiation followed by HPCS pump trip.

Respond to a Spurious HPCS initiation followed by HPCS pump trip (ARI 04-1 1H13-P601; Tech Specs; EN-OP-115)

The BOP should observe annunciator P601-16A-C3 HPCS INIT and logic white light on above HPCS INIT RESET pushbutton (16B) and announce the HPCS initiation to the crew.

The ACRO should monitor Reactor water level and Feedwater response.

The BOP should verify by two independent means that reactor water level is above -41.6 and drywell pressure is below 1.39. He can do this by any of numerous indications such as absence of scram, isolation, and low pressure ECCS signals or by observing indications such as wide range level recorders on P601, drywell pressure recorders on P870, or SPDS.

The BOP should override HPCS injection MOV E22F004 once it is fully open by placing its handswitch to CLOSE on P601-16C. He will not be able to respond quickly enough to override HPCS pump before it trips (the trip has only a 3 second time delay after initiation).

The BOP should recognize and announce HPCS pump trip indicated by annunciator HPCS PMP MTR INCM FDR 152-1702 TRIP (P601-16A-H3) and the amber and green lights above the pump handswitch illuminated.

The crew should dispatch an operator and electrical maintenance to investigate.

The BOP should provide TS references to the CRS from ARIs P601-16A-C3, H3, H5. The BOP should verify proper operation of SSW C and should send an operator to monitor DG13.

The CRS may direct securing DG13 within 2 minutes using Emergency Stop on P601-16C.

If the crew attempts to reset the HPCS initiation logic, it will not reset, and I&C should be called to investigate.

The CRS should dispatch the Control Building Operator to investigate the trip of the HPCS Pump and may additionally dispatch Electrical Maintenance.

Report as Control Building Operator that the lockout is tripped and Phase A and C over-current trip flags are dropped.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

If asked for the status of trip units on H13P625 (not modeled), inform the crew all trip units for reactor water level indicate approximately 20 and trip units for drywell pressure indicate 0 psig. No gross fail or trip LEDs are on.

The CRS should enter TS 3.5.1 Condition B to restore HPCS within 14 days. Additionally, Tech Spec 3.3.5.1 Condition B, declare HPCS INOP. (Already met.)

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 5, Service Transformers 11 and 21 Lockout trip.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to Service Transformers 11 and 21 Lockout trip (ONEP 05-1-02-I-4; Various ARIs; EP-2)

This fault is distinguished from a total loss of offsite power in that the 115KV line from Port Gibson and ESF Transformer 12 remains available in this event. Loss of ST11 and ST21 will result in permanent loss of power to all BOP AC loads and temporary loss of ESF AC power, resulting in MSIV closure, a reactor scram, loss of condensate/feedwater, and closure of all air operated isolation valves.

The ACRO should announce reactor scram and MSIV closure from alarms and indications on P680 and the ISB.

The BOP should announce trip of ST11 and ST21 from alarms on P807. The BOP should verify buses 15AA, 16AB, and 17AC are automatically re-energized by their respective emergency diesel generators.

(NOTE: If DG13 was emergency stopped during the previous event, bus 17AC will not be re-energized.)

The CRS should enter EP-2 and 05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power. BOP buses will be incapable of being re-energized. The ACRO should provide a scram report, then move to P601 and initiate RCIC for level control. The CRS should establish reactor water level and pressure control in accordance with EP-2. RCIC, which may be supplemented by maximizing CRD flow, will be capable of maintaining reactor water level. The CRS should direct a level band of -30 to +30 and a pressure band of 800 psig to 1060 psig. The CRS may direct placing suppression pool cooling in service since SRVs are being used to control reactor pressure. Instrument air cannot be recovered before ESF powered components needed are locked out due to the LOCA signal in a subsequent event.

Respond to Division 1 Diesel Generator trip (ONEP 05-1-02-I-4)

(automatically occurs 150 seconds after Loss of Offsite Power The BOP should respond to and report alarms on P864 indicating loss of power to bus 15AA and DG11 trip. He should re-energize bus 15AA by manually closing breaker 152-1511, BUS 15AA FDR FM ESF XFMR 12, in accordance with 05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power. A building operator should be dispatched to check the DG11 trip.

If asked, report as the building operator or electrical maintenance the cause of the DG11 trip appears to be a generator lockout.

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Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to Recirc LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2 / EP-3)

(automatically occurs 5 minutes after Loss of Offsite Power)

Multiple alarms will occur in quick succession indicating high energy input to drywell sumps and rising drywell pressure. The CRS should announce LOCA conditions to the crew. The BOP or ACRO should verify ECCS actuations occur when drywell pressure 1.39 psig alarms are received and should recognize automatic Division 2 ECCS initiation failed based on the logic white light not illuminated above the RHR B/ RHR C INIT RESET pushbutton on P601-17B and RHR B (if suppression pool cooling B had not been started) and C pumps not running. The BOP/ACRO should arm and depress RHR B/RHR C MAN INIT pushbutton on P601-17B. Level will lower to -160 wide range in approximately 11 minutes.

When RPV level reaches -160 wide range and cannot be recovered, the CRS should enter the Alternate Level Control Leg of EP-2 and proceed to emergency depressurization.

Emergency Depressurization is required before RPV level reaches -192.

The crew will open 8 ADS SRVs and ALL low pressure ECCS will inject when reactor pressure drops below their discharge pressures.

The crew will control ECCS systems to restore and maintain level -30 to +30 on wide range level indicators.

The CRS should execute all legs of EP-3, resulting in starting hydrogen igniters on P870 and suppression pool cooling, if RHR A and/or RHR B are not being used for level control.

EP Attachments that may be requested Time to install Att 12 - Defeat RHR Shutdown Cooling interlocks 6 minutes Att 1 - Defeat RCIC High Supp Pool Level Suction Transfer 8 minutes Att 3 - Defeat all RCIC Isolations 8 minutes REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 12 of 28

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 TERMINATION Once emergency depressurization and re-flooding has occurred, and as directed by the Lead Evaluator, terminate the scenario by placing the simulator in freeze and turning the horns off.

Critical Tasks

- Open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -210 Fuel Zone Range.

- Manually initiate Division 2 ECCS prior to RPV pressure going below 300 psig.

Emergency Classification Site Area Emergency per EAL Loss of two fission product barriers, FS1, based on RC1/RC2 and FC2.

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: _06/10____ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___1__

Event

Description:

Place Reactor Feed Pump A on the Master Level Controller (IOI 03-1-01-2 step 5.16.1 and SOI 04-1-01-N21-1 section 4.6.4)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

With RFPT A in SPEED AUTO, DEPRESSES the RAISE BOP pushbutton (P680 section 2C) for RFPT A to until FW AUTO pushbutton for RFPT A is blinking. RFPT A speed should be approximately 2100 rpm.

WHEN the FW AUTO pushbutton for RFPT A blinks, THEN DEPRESSES the FW AUTO pushbutton for RFPT A. RFPT A Speed is now being controlled by 1C34-LV-R613, RFPT A SP CONT in MANUAL (P680 section 2D).

OBSERVES the FW AUTO pushbutton for RFPT A backlights steady, and the SPEED AUTO, RAISE, and LOWER pushbuttons extinguish

RAISES speed of RFPT A with RFPT A SP CONT by depressing the OUT pushbutton until RFPT A discharge pressure is 5 to 10 psig above discharge pressure of RFPT B. Do not exceed 5300 rpm. (This will be done in a slow manner and the candidate may have to lower speed as necessary.)

Using VAR SEL pushbutton, SELECTS OUT on both RFPT A SP CONT and RFPT B SP CONT.

Slowly JOGS OPEN F014A, RFP A DISCH VLV (P680 section 2C). WHEN the digital indication (selected to OUT) on RFPT B SP CONT decreases to within 5% of the RFPT A SP CONT, THEN TRANSFERS the RFPT A SP CONT to AUTOMATIC.

Slowly OPEN F014A, RFP A DISCH VLV, closely observing RFPT suction flows begin to equalize and Reactor level is stable.

Directs building operator to close Reactor Feed Pump Steam Line drains on H22P175.

Candidate will adjust RFPT A and B Controller indications.

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___2__

Event

Description:

Raise reactor power to approximately 55% by withdrawing control rods. (Control Rod Movement Sequence)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Provides Reactivity Brief ACRO In accordance with the Control Rod Movement Sequence, selects control rods using the rod matrix pushbuttons on P680 and withdraws them using the WITHDRAW pushbutton.

Monitors reactor power on APRMs and proper feedwater response on P680. Allows verifier time to verify and interject, if necessary. Gang rod movement is allowed at this stage.

ACRO Announces control rod block produced by the Rod Withdrawal Limiter, which will occur every four notches below the high power setpoint. Clears the rod withdrawal block by either depressing the SEQUENCE pushbutton twice or by depressing ROD SELECT CLEAR pushbutton then reselecting the current rod/gang.

NOTE: CRS may allow Control Rod Block annunciator to fast flash, if requested.

BOP Verifies each rod selection and movement are correct and initials as verifier on the pull sheets BOP Raises Load Demand as power is raised by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND RAISE pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/-25 MW of the load demand limited value during the power ascension ACRO Notifies CRS when the target power level is attained (~55%)

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___3__

Event

Description:

Respond to control rod 40-25 drift out (ONEP 05-1-02-IV-1 sections 2.2/3.2)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Announces CONT ROD DRIFT alarm (P680-4A2-E4).

Identifies the drifting rod by depressing the ROD DRIFT status pushbutton on P680-6C and observing the red LED beside rod 40-25 on the RC&IS full core display, ensuring only one rod is affected. He should identify the rod is moving by observing the position indication change to double dashes and announce the actual rod drift to the CRS.

CRS Enters ONEP 05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod Drive/Malfunctions.

ACRO The ACRO should select control rod 40-25 using the matrix pushbuttons on P680-6C and then apply a continuous insert signal using the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton until the rod reaches full in. If it was recognized that the drift was inward, the operator may release the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton when the rod is fully inserted. If the direction of the drift was not observed, the operator should continue to apply the insert signal until the building operator has isolated valves 103KF and 105KF to disarm the drive. The ACRO should depress the RESET DRIFT pushbutton on P680-6C once rod 40-25 is full in to reset the drift annunciator.

BOP/CRS Dispatch a building operator to containment to isolate drive water valves C11-103KF and C11-105KF for HCU 40-25 CRS Enters TS 3.1.3 Condition C to insert the rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months (already done) and disarm control rod 40-25 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (done, except a red tag is procedurally required also).

CRS Notifies Reactor Engineering of rod 40-25 drift and its subsequent insertion and disarming.

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___4__

Event

Description:

Spurious HPCS initiation followed by HPCS pump trip (02-S-01-27, ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-16A-C3, H3)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports HPCS initiated by observing annunciator P601-16A-C3, HPCS INIT, and logic white light on above HPCS INIT RESET pushbutton (P601-16B)and HPCS INJ SHUTOFF VLV E22F004 (P601-16C) opening.

May observe HPCS pump running (if within 3 seconds of the initiation).

BOP Recognizes and reports HPCS pump trip by observing annunciator P601-16A-H3 and amber and green lights above the pump handswitch (P601-16C).

BOP Per 02-S-01-27, Operations Philosophy, step 6.6.3/EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, verifies by two independent means that the HPCS initiation is spurious by observing reactor water level is above -41.6 and drywell pressure is below 1.39. He can do this by any of numerous indications such as absence of scram, isolation, and low pressure ECCS signals or by observing indications such as wide range level recorders on P601, drywell pressure recorders on P870, or SPDS.

ACRO Monitors reactor water level and feedwater system response (HPCS injection is minimal since the pump trips after only 3 seconds, so level is essentially unaffected).

BOP Overrides HPCS injection MOV E22F004 once it is fully open by placing its handswitch to CLOSE on P601-16C CRS Dispatches building operators to check HPCS pump in the auxiliary building and HPCS pump breaker 152-1702 in the control building. May dispatch electrical maintenance to check the breaker also.

CRS Enters TS 3.5.1 Condition B to verify RCIC operable administratively (no LCO for RCIC currently entered) and restore HPCS operable within 14 days. May enter TS 3.3.5.1 Condition B for HPCS initiation instrumentation, which is bounded by the TS 3.5.1 requirement to declare HPCS inop.

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___4__

Event

Description:

Spurious HPCS initiation followed by HPCS pump trip (02-S-01-27, ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-16A-C3, H3) ( Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Dispatches operator/I&C to check HPCS instrumentation status on panel H13P625 to determine the cause of the initiation.

CRS Dispatches operator to monitor DG13 operation.

CRS When reported no cause for the HPCS initiation is apparent, may direct resetting HPCS initiation logic.

BOP If directed, attempts to reset HPCS initiation by depressing HPCS INIT RESET pushbutton (P601-16B). When the white light above the pushbutton does not extinguish, reports logic will not reset.

CRS Should contact work control to stop any Division 1 work since it is a Division 1 work week. Requests work control/planning run a new EOOS calculation.

CRS May direct emergency stop of DG13, if within two minutes of its starting to prevent having to load it per the SOI.

BOP If directed, stops DG13 by depressing HPCS DSL ENG EMERG STOP pushbutton (P601-16C).

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Service Transformers ST11 and ST21 Lockout trip (ONEPs 05-1-02-I-4, 05-1-02-I-1, 05-1-02-I-2, 05-1-02-V-7)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports loss of ST11 and ST21 Lockout by alarms and indications on P807.

CRS Announces entry into Loss of AC Power and Automatic Isolations ONEPs.

BOP Verifies DG11, DG12, and DG13 (unless emergency stopped previously) re-energizes buses 15AA, 16AB, and 17AC respectively, by indications on P864 and P601.

ACRO Recognizes and reports reactor scram and loss of condensate/feedwater. Places Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN. Provides scram report:

Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN

All control rods inserted

Power lowering

Reactor water level and trend

Reactor pressure and trend

Feedwater status - FW unavailable

Bypass valves unavailable CRS Announces entry into Loss of AC Power ONEP, Reactor Scram ONEP, Turbine and Generator Trips ONEP and EP-2.

Potentially, Feedwater System Malfunctions ONEP.

ACRO Moves to P601 for level control duties and initiates RCIC, if not already running, by arming and depressing RCIC MAN INIT pushbutton (P601-21B).

CRS Assigns level band of -30 to +30 using RCIC and CRD.

BOP Restarts one CRD pump per 05-1-02-IV-1 as follows:

PLACES CRD SYS FLO CONT in MANUAL and REDUCES output to zero

STARTS one CRD pump

RETURNS CRD SYS FLO CONT to AUTO with tape set at 54-66 gpm CRS Assigns pressure band of 800 psig to 1060 psig using SRVs REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 19 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Service Transformers ST11 and ST21 Lockout trip (ONEPs 05-1-02-I-4, 05-1-02-I-1, 05-1-02-I-2, 05-1-02-V-7)

(Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Controls pressure in band as directed. If Suppression Pool Cooling is not in service, rotates SRVs from different steam lines to equalize heating in the Suppression Pool. Uses ADS/SRVs since instrument air is not available to containment.

CRS May direct placing one or two loops of Suppression Pool Cooling in service in anticipation of exceeding 95°F Suppression Pool Temperature, an EP-3 entry condition.

BOP/ Places Suppression Pool Cooling in service using the hard ACRO card by performing the following:

Verifies SSW A(B) Pump running on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F001A(B), SSW PMP A(B) DISCH VLV is Open on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F005A(B), SSW LOOP A(B) RTN TO CLG TWR A(B) is Open on P870 1C(7C)

OPENS P41-F014A(B), SSW INL TO RHR HX A(B) on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F006A(B), SSW PMP A RECIRC VLV Closes on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies E12-F003A(B), RHR HX A(B) OUTL VLV is open on E12R611A(B) on P601-20B(17B)

START RHR PMP A(B) on P601-20C(17C)

OPENS E12-F024A(B), RHR A(B) TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL on P601-20C(17C)

CLOSES E12-F048A(B), RHR HX A(B) BYP VLV on P601-20C(17C)

Verifies E12-F064A(B), RHR A(B) MIN FLO TO SUPP POOL on P601-20C(17C) closes when flow exceeds 1000 gpm REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 20 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Service Transformers ST11 and ST21 Lockout trip (ONEPs 05-1-02-I-4, 05-1-02-I-1, 05-1-02-I-2, 05-1-02-V-7)

(Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS May direct maximizing CRD flow for level control per EP-2.

This may have occurred when giving the level band.

BOP/ If directed, maximizes CRD flow by performing the following:

ACRO

Ensures AUX OIL PUMP for the CRD pump to be started is running on P601-22C

WITH one CRD pump already running, THEN STARTS standby CRD PMP A(B) on P601-22C

PLACES CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in MANUAL on P601-22B and fully OPENS C11-F002A(B), CRD FLO CONT VLV

Fully OPENS C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV on P601-22C REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 21 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___6__

Event

Description:

Division 1 Diesel Generator trip (ONEP 05-1-02-I-4)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Reports loss of power to bus 15AA and DG11 trip by observing indications on P864.

CRS Re-enters Loss of AC Power ONEP BOP** Re-energizes bus 15AA by manually closing breaker 152-1511 BUS 15AA FDR FM ESF XFMR 12.

CRS/ Dispatches operator to investigate DG11 trip.

BOP REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 22 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

Recirc LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2, EP-3)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Reports drywell pressure rising on SPDS.

ACRO Reports DRWL PRESS HI alarms P601-16A-B4, P601-21A-E7, P601-17A-E1 and Division 1 ECCS Initiation.

ACRO** Recognizes failure of automatic Division 2 ECCS initiation (Event 8) based on the logic white light not illuminated above the RHR B/ RHR C INIT RESET pushbutton (P601-17B) and RHR B (if suppression pool cooling B had not been started) and C pumps not running. Manual initiates Division 2 ECCS by arming and depressing RHR B/RHR C MAN INIT pushbutton (P601-17B).

CRS Assigns ACRO reactor level monitoring with frequent updates as a critical parameter with action criteria at -160 wide range.

CRS Assigns BOP ECCS status as a critical parameter ACRO Monitors and provides frequent reports of reactor water level and trend BOP Assess ECCS status and reports to the CRS, all ECCS except HPCS, RCIC, CRD, and SLC are available.

CRS May direct starting SLC A and B for level control.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 23 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

Recirc LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2, EP-3) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP If directed, initiates Standby Liquid Control A(B) using 04 01-C41-1 Att. I (hard card):

Inserts key and turns SLC Pump A(B) pump key switch to START.

Checks system initiation by observing the following:

C41-F001A(B) Tank Outlet Valve is open.

F004A(B) Squib valve fired:

White SQUIB VALVE READY light off.

Annunciator SBLC SYS A OOSVC.

Amber status light SQUIB A LOSCONT OR PWR LOSS is on.

SBLC pump A(B) running.

SLC pump discharge pressure exceeds reactor pressure.

SLC Tank Level decreasing.

ACRO Reports when Wide Range reactor water level reaches -160 (offscale low)

CRS** Enters the Emergency Depressurization leg of EP-2 when level drops below -160 wide range and level cannot be maintained above -191 compensated fuel zone. Directs opening ADS valves.

BOP** Opens 8 ADS valves as directed. Valves should be open before level drops to -210 compensated fuel zone.

CRS Directs monitoring for ECCS injection as pressure decreases.

ACRO Reports as ECCS systems begin to inject by monitoring testable check valve status and system flow meters on P601.

Reports when a sustained level trend upward is achieved.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 24 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

Recirc LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2, EP-3) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS May request EP Attachments 1, 3, 12 for level control CRS Directs level control band of -30 to +30 using ECCS systems.

ACRO** Restores and maintains level above -160 wide range using available injection systems.

ACRO Attains and controls -30 to + 30 by closing/opening injection valves and stopping/starting pumps as necessary. If Attachment 12 is installed, throttles RHR A(B) SHUTDN CLG RTN TO FW E12F053A(B) to stabilize level in band.

ACRO/ If Attachment 3 is not installed, reports RCIC isolation at 60 BOP psig reactor pressure as pressure falls.

CRS Directs starting both divisions of Hydrogen Igniters per EP-3 BOP Starts Hydrogen Igniters using handswitches H2IGNITER SYS A(B) on P870-4C(10C)

CRS Directs Suppression Pool Cooling per EP-3 if RHR A and/or B are not being used to maintain reactor water level.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 25 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

Recirc LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2, EP-3) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Places Suppression Pool Cooling in service using the hard card by performing the following:

Verifies SSW A(B) Pump running on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F001A(B), SSW PMP A(B) DISCH VLV is Open on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F005A(B), SSW LOOP A(B) RTN TO CLG TWR A(B) is Open on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F014A(B), SSW INL TO RHR HX A(B) on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies P41-F006A(B), SSW PMP A RECIRC VLV is Closed on P870 1C(7C)

Verifies E12-F003A(B), RHR HX A(B) OUTL VLV is open on E12R611A(B) on P601-20B(17B)

STARTS RHR PMP A(B) on P601-20C(17C)

OPENS E12-F024A(B), RHR A(B) TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL on P601-20C(17C)

CLOSES E12-F048A(B), RHR HX A(B) BYP VLV on P601-20C(17C)

Verifies E12-F064A(B), RHR A(B) MIN FLO TO SUPP POOL on P601-20C(17C) closes when flow exceeds 1000 gpm REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 26 of 28

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __2___ Event No.: ___8__

Event

Description:

Failure of Division 2 ECCS to automatically initiate (EN-OP-115)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Reports DRWL PRESS HI alarms P601-16A-B4, P601-21A-E7, P601-17A-E1 and Division 1 ECCS Initiation.

ACRO** Recognizes failure of automatic Division 2 ECCS initiation based on the logic white light not illuminated above the RHR B/ RHR C INIT RESET pushbutton (P601-17B) and RHR B (if suppression pool cooling B had not been started) and C pumps not running. Manual initiates Division 2 ECCS by arming and depressing RHR B/RHR C MAN INIT pushbutton (P601-17B).

ACRO Verifies RHR B and C pumps start and logic white light above the RHR B/ RHR C INIT RESET pushbutton illuminates

- denotes critical task REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 2 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 27 of 28

CREW TURNOVER The plant is at 50% power during startup. Reactor Recirc pumps are in fast speed with core flow 67 Mlbm/hr. The next step in the Control Rod Movement Sequence is step 155a.

Plans are to place RFP A on the Master Level Controller per IOI 03-1-01-2 step 5.16.1 and SOI 04-1-01-N21 section 4.6.4 immediately following turnover. The BOP operator is to perform this task.

Then, power ascension is to continue with withdrawing control rods in accordance with the Control Rod Movement Sequence and IOI 03-1-01-2 per the Reactivity Management Plan for startup.

There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 06/10 Examiners: _________________________ Operators:__________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Lower reactor power to 90% using Recirc Flow Control Valves.

2. Start RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling.

3. Respond to failure of RHR Heat Exchanger A Bypass valve E12F048A.

4. Respond to trip of SSW A Cooling Tower Fan P41C003A.

5. Respond to failure of Heater Drain Tank level control and trip of both Heater Drain Pumps.

6. Respond to Feedwater Line A rupture in the drywell with inability to isolate.

7. Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start.

8. Respond to ATWS below 4% power (four control rods stuck out).

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 100%.

INOPERABLE Equipment None Turnover:

The plant is at rated power. Reactor power is to be reduced to 90% immediately following turnover in order to perform 06-OP-1C11-M-0001, Control Rod Operability.

When power has been reduced to 90% and before commencing 06-OP-1C11-M-0001, place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling to lower Suppression Pool temperature to 80°F. SSW A is in standby. There is no out of service equipment and EOOS is green. A Division 1 work week is in effect.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 1 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 R(ACRO)

Lower reactor power to 90% using Recirc Flow Control Valves (06-OP-1C11-M-0001, IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII) 2 N(BOP)

Start RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling. (SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2) 3 e12188h C(SS)

Respond to failure of RHR Heat Exchanger A Bypass valve E12F048A (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-20A-H6, TS 3.6.1.7, 3.6.2.3) 4 p870_1a_b_1 C(BOP) lo_1p41r701h Respond to trip of SSW A Cooling Tower Fan P41C003A (ARI lo_1p41m600a_g 04-1-02-P870-1A-B1, TS 3.7.1) lo_1p41m600a_r di_1p41m600a 5 ltn23n079_a C(ACRO)

Respond to failure of Heater Drain Tank dump (level) control and trip of both Heater Drain Pumps (ONEP 05-1-02-V-5, ARI-04-1-02-P680-1A-A7,A8) 6 fw171a M (ALL) b21f065a_i Respond to Feedwater Line A rupture in the drywell with inability rr063a@4 to isolate (ONEPs 05-1-02-V-7, 05-1-02-I-1) 7 e51043 I(ACRO)

Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start (EN-OP-115).

8 z022022_24_09 C (ALL) z022022_40_57 Respond to ATWS below 4% power due to four control rods z022022_56_25 stuck out (EP-2A) z022022_08_41

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 2 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Critical Tasks

- When it is determined that reactor water level cannot be restored and maintained above -

191, opens at least seven SRVs.

- When Reactor pressure decreases to MSCP, restores RPV level greater than -191".

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 3 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 CREW TURNOVER The plant is at rated power.

SSW A is in standby.

Immediately following turnover, reactor power is to be reduced to 90% in accordance with 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII, Temporary Down power, in order to perform 06-OP-1C11-M-0001, Control Rod Operability. All notifications required per 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII step 12.1 are complete.

When power has been reduced to 90% and before commencing 06-OP-1C11-M-0001, place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling to lower Suppression Pool temperature to 80°F.

There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 4 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 SIMULATOR SETUP Start the process from a new simulator load.

Reset to IC-23.

Verify or perform the following:

IC: 23 OOS: none Active malfunctions: e12188h E12F048A loss of power on stroke b21f065a_i B21F065A loss of power on stroke z022022_24_09 Control rod 24-09 stuck at position 48 z022022_40_57 Control rod 40-57 stuck at position 48 z022022_56_25 Control rod 56-25 stuck at position 48 z022022_08_41 Control rod 08-41 stuck at position 48 e51043 RCIC auto start failure Active overrides none Pending overrides lo_1p41r701h on P41C003A protective trip status light (TRG 4) lo_1p41m600a_g on P41C003A handswitch green light (TRG 4) lo_1p41m600a_r off P41C003A handswitch red light (TRG 4) di_1p41m600a stop P41C003A handswitch (TRG 4) ior_fwoutn23r054 0 N23R054 output to 100 (TRG 5) io swn23r054_opn N23R054 (TRG 5)

Pending malfunctions: p870_1a_b_1 P41C003A trip annunciator (TRG 4) ltn23n079_a Heater Drain Tank dump xmtr upscale (TRG 5) fw171a@100 FW line A rupture in the DW (TRG 6) (ramp 10 seconds) rr063a@4 Recirc loop A rupture in the DW (TRG 6) (start at 0, ramp to 4 over 180 seconds)

Startup all PDS / SPDS screens. Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

Setup cyclops display and verify it is functional.

Ensure the correct control rod movement sequence is available at the P680.

Place/position turnover guide on the CRO desk.

Raise Suppression Pool Temperature to 83°F REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 5 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Mark up IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII to indicate step 12.1 (notifications) complete.

Erase all temporary markings from control room panels, posted operator aids, switch covers, and indicators.

Erase all prior markings from procedures and hard cards expected to be referenced by the crew during this scenario.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens are inking properly.

(APRM chart recorders must be turned on and settings for scales on pens 0 - 125 scale)

ENSURE HORNS are ON.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 6 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATION Once simulator is reinitialized and setup complete take the simulator out of Freeze.

Once the Crew has taken control, note the simulator time.

Reduce power to 90% (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII)

Provide role play as the Reactor Engineer. When 90% power is reached, tell the crew you want to run a predict case to ensure margin to the preconditioning envelope, which will take about 30 minutes.

The CRS may provide a Reactivity Brief.

The ACRO will lower power per IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII, Temporary Down power, by closing Recirc FCVs in slow detent, maintaining loop drive flows matched to within 2230 gpm.

The BOP will lower load demand to maintain demand and actual load within +/- 25 MWe.

Place Suppression Pool Cooling A in service (SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2)

The CRS should declare LPCI A INOP per SOI NOTE Tech Spec 3.5.1.

The BOP will align RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling in accordance with 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2.

The BOP will startup SSW A per SOI 04-1-01-P41-1 section 4.2.

When he attempts to maximize cooling by closing the RHR Hx A Bypass valve, E12F048A, its breaker will trip. No alarm will be received since RHR A OOSVC should be already sealed in due to the operator placing the RHR A MOV Test switch in TEST; however, a MOV overload/power loss status light will illuminate and the position indication meter on P601 for E12F048A will not lower from 100%.

Provide the following role play as the Auxiliary Building Operator if dispatched to check breaker 52-153128 for E12F048A. Report the breaker is tripped.

If dispatched as electrical maintenance, tell the crew you will need a work order to troubleshoot the problem.

The CRS will review Tech Specs and determine actions from TS 3.6.1.7 Condition A and 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

The CRS may decide to secure RHR A.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 7 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 4, SSW A Cooling Tower Fan P41C003A trip Respond to SSW A Cooling Tower Fan P41C003A trip (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P870-1A-B1)

The BOP should announce 1H13-P870-1A-B1 SSW CLG TWR FAN A TRIP. He should recognize and report status light CLG TWR FAN A PROT TRIP illuminated on P870-1B and handswitch indication for SSW CLG TWR FAN A on P870-1C shows the fan stopped. The crew should dispatch an operator to check breaker 52-15505.

If dispatched, as the Outside operator report breaker 52-15505 has an overcurrent trip.

If dispatched as electrical maintenance, tell the crew you will need a work order to troubleshoot the problem.

The BOP should provide references to TS 3.7.1 from the ARI to the CRS.

CRS should direct monitoring of SSW Pump A Discharge Temperature computer point.

The CRS should review Tech Specs. Tech Spec 3.7.1 condition A.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 5, Failure of Heater Drain Tank dump (level) control and trip of both Heater Drain Pumps.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 8 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to Failure of Heater Drain Tank dump control and trip of both Heater Drain Pumps (ONEP 05-1-02-V-5, ARI 04-1-02-P680-1A-A7,A8)

When this event is triggered Heater Drain Tank (HDT) Dump valves N23F518A-E will fully open due to sensing high level in the HDT. Actual HDT level will then decrease to the low-low level setpoint, resulting in trip of both Heater Drain Pumps (HDPs). The ACRO should recognize and report both heater drain pumps have tripped by observing annunciators P601-1A A7 and A8. The CRS should enter the Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP due to loss of both HDPs, and he should enter the Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP due to the required power/flow reduction to the Monitored Region of the Power/Flow Map. The ACRO should lower power by reducing core flow to 67 mlbm/hr using Recirc FCVs in fast detent per the ONEP. The core flow reduction will result in power reduction to approximately 80%. ARIs 04-1-02-P680-A7 and A8 require reducing power below 70% due the loss of input to the Reactor Feed Pumps. The crew will have to insert approximately four steps of cram rods per the Control Rod Movement Sequence for shutdown to reach 70% power.

Loss of both HDPs results in only about a 2°F reduction in FW temperature if core flow is not reduced. However, FW temperature will decrease due to the core flow/power reduction. The CRS will plot FW Temperature vs. Power in Region I of the curve in ONEP 05-1-02-V-5.

If requested, as the Reactor Engineer and acknowledge their actions.

If dispatched as the Turbine Building operator and/or I&C to H22P171, report HDT Dump Controller N23R054 indicates high level and is calling for 100% open, although HDT Drain Controller N23R053 is indicating low level and zero output.

If asked to take manual control of the dump controller and close the HDT dump valves, activate trigger 15, ior fwoutn23r054 0 to cause N23R054 output to go to zero.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 6, Feedwater Line B rupture in the Drywell.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 9 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to Feedwater Line A rupture in the Drywell (ONEPs 05-1-02-V-7, 05-1-02-I-1)

When this event is triggered, multiple alarms indicating high energy input into the drywell floor drain sump, rising drywell pressure, and reactor water level falling will be received. The ACRO should recognize the disparity between FW A and B line flows (A will go upscale and B downscale, eventually) and in conjunction with high drywell pressure indications, diagnose the A FW line is ruptured in the drywell and place the Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN. The BOP should secure all three Condensate pumps while the ACRO is providing the scram report, then he should attempt to close FW INL SHUTOFF VLV B21F065A. The BOP should report loss of power to B21F065A and dispatch an operator to check its breaker, 52-153111.

If dispatched, as the building operator and/or electrical maintenance, report breaker 52-15311 is tripped and will not reset.

Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start (EN-OP-115)

The ACRO should then assume level control from P601, since Condensate/Feedwater are unavailable due to the unisolable leak. By the time the ACRO reaches P601, reactor level will have gone below Level 2, -41.6. The ACRO should recognize RCIC failed to automatically start and manually initiate it using the RCIC MAN INIT pushbutton in accordance with Conduct of Operations guidance for failures of automatic safety functions.

Respond to ATWS below 4% power due to four control rods stuck out (EP-2A)

The ACRO should identify four control rods have failed to insert, but that power is downscale, below 4%. The CRS should enter and direct actions using EP-2A. HPCS should be overridden. CRD flow should be maximized and SLC A and B initiated. With HPCS injection not allowed, RCIC, CRD, and SLC will not be able to make up for the rate of inventory loss through broken FW line (FW check valve leakage is assumed), and level will lower to below -

192 compensated fuel zone within about 12 minutes from the onset of the leak. The CRS should anticipate the need for high volume injection using RHR injection via B FW line and request EP Attachment 12 for RHR B as the highest priority. The CRS should direct installation of EP Attachments 18, 19, and 20 to allow individual insertion of the four stuck control rods.

Five minutes after Attachment 12 is requested, or as directed by the lead evaluator, make its status DONE and immediately take the booth copy of Att. 12 to the CRS and report I&Cs portion complete.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 10 of 24

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

When the CRS determines level cannot be maintained above -191, directs emergency depressurization. When reactor pressure decreases to MSCP, 219 psig, directs level restoration to the normal band using RHR B via E12F053B.

EP Attachments that may be requested Time to install Att 12 - Defeat RHR Shutdown Cooling interlocks 5 minutes Att 18 - Defeat ATWS ARI 5 minutes Att 19 - Defeat RPS 5 minutes Att 20 - Defeat RCIS 5 minutes Att 8 - Defeat MSIV Level 1 Isolation 4 minutes Att 1 - Defeat RCIC High Supp Pool Level Suction Transfer 8 minutes Att 3 - Defeat all RCIC Isolations 8 minutes TERMINATION Once emergency depressurization has been conducted and reactor water level restored above TAF using RHR A/B via E12F053A/B, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, terminate the scenario by placing the simulator in freeze and turning the horns off.

Critical Tasks

- When it is determined that reactor water level cannot be restored and maintained above -191, opens at least seven SRVs.

- When Reactor pressure decreases to MSCP, restores RPV level greater than -191".

Emergency Classification Site Area Emergency per EAL Loss of two fission product barriers, FS1, based on RC1/RC2 and FC2.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 11 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: _06/10____ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___1__

Event

Description:

Reduce power to 90% (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Conducts reactivity brief for the planned power reduction.

ACRO Lowers power by closing Recirc FCV A and B using loop flow controllers B33K603A and B in slow detent on P680-3B BOP Lowers Load Demand as power is reduced by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND LOWER pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/-25 MW of the load demand limited value during the power reduction.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 12 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___2__

Event

Description:

Start RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling. (SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Declares LPCI A INOP per SOI NOTE Tech Spec 3.5.

BOP Places Suppression Pool Cooling A in service using the hard card or the SOI by performing the following:

SOI 04-1-01-P41-1 section 4.2.2.

P870 section 1C

Places SSW A MOV Test Switch to TEST P870 1B and verifies receipt of status light and SSW A OOSVC alarm on P6870-1A-D2, C2.

Verifies P41-F006A, SSW PMP A RECIRC VLV is Open.

START SSW A Pump

OPEN P41-F001A, SSW PMP A DISCH VLV

OPEN P41-F005A, SSW LOOP A RTN TO CLG TWR A

OPEN P41-F014A, SSW INL TO RHR HX A

Checks open P41-F068A, RHR HX OUTL VLV

Verifies P41-F006A, SSW PMP A RECIRC VLV Closes

START SSW CLG TWRFAN A & B.

SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2.2a P601 section 20C (Event 3)

Places RHR A MOV TEST switch on P601-20B in TEST and verifies receipt of status light and RHR A OOSVC alarm on P601-20B, 20A.

Verifies E12-F003A, RHR HX A OUTL VLV is open on E12R611A on P601-20B

START RHR PMP A on P601-20C

OPENS E12-F024A, RHR A TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL on P601-20C

CLOSES E12-F048A, RHR HX A BYP VLV on P601-20C

. OBSERVES indication of E12F048A trip.

Verifies E12-F064A , RHR A MIN FLO TO SUPP POOL on P601-20C closes when flow exceeds 1000 gpm REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 13 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___3__

Event

Description:

Failure of RHR Heat Exchanger A Bypass valve E12F048A (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-20A-H6, TS 3.6.1.7, 3.6.2.3)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When attempting to close E12-F048A, RHR HX A BYP VLV on P601-20C, observes position indication on E12R612A does not change and status light RHR A MOV OVERLD/PWRLOSS illuminates on P601-20B. Reports to CRS and refers to RHR A OOSVC ARI P601-20A-H6.

CRS Directs actions of the ARI. Dispatches operator and/or electrical maintenance to check breaker 52-153128 for E12F048A.

BOP Provides TS references from ARI to the CRS.

CRS Enters TS 3.6.1.7 Condition A (Containment Spray A) and TS 3.6.2.3 Condition A (Suppression Pool Cooling A) to restore E12F048A operable within 7 days.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 14 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___4__

Event

Description:

Trip of SSW Cooling Tower Fan A (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P870-1A-B1, TS 3.7.1)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Announces 1H13-P870-1A-B1 SSW CLG TWR FAN A TRIP.

Refer to ARI and report actions.

CRS Directs actions of the ARI. Dispatches operator and/or electrical maintenance to check breaker 52-15505 for P41C003A SSW Cooling Tower Fan A.

BOP Provides TS references from ARI to the CRS.

CRS Enters TS 3.7.1 Condition A restore Cooling Tower Fan to operable within 7 days.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 15 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Failure of Heater Drain Tank dump (level) control and trip of both Heater Drain Pumps (ONEP 05-1-02-V-5, ARI-04-1 P680-1A-A7,A8)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Recognizes and reports HDT level low alarm followed immediately by Heater Drain Pump A and B trip alarms on P680-1A.

CRS Enters Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP and Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP ACRO Reduces core flow to 67 mlbm/hr by closing Recirc FCV A and B using Recirc Loop Manual controllers in FAST detent.

ACRO Plots region of operation in the Monitored Region on the Power/Flow Map ACRO Assumes monitoring for THI with no concurrent duties BOP Verifies plot in Monitored Region on P/F Map.

BOP Calls up PED for Loss of FW Heating ONEP on PDS.

Diagnoses HDT low level is due to HDT dump valves fully open.

CRS Plots region of operation in Region I of the Feedwater Temperature vs. Power Curve of 05-1-02-V-5.

BOP Refers to HDP trip ARIs 04-1-02-1H13-P680-1A-A7, A8.

Advises CRS power must be reduced to 70%.

CRS Conducts reactivity brief for power reduction by insertion of CRAM rods.

BOP Inserts control rods in accordance with the Control Rod Movement Sequence for shutdown until power is less than or equal to 70% (approximately four steps required)

ACRO Verifies control rod movements while monitoring for THI REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 16 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Failure of Heater Drain Tank dump (level) control and trip of both Heater Drain Pumps (ONEP 05-1-02-V-5, ARI-04-1 P680-1A-A7,A8) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Dispatches building operator / I&C to H22P172 to investigate HDT level controllers CRS Notifies Reactor Engineering of the emergency power reduction REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 17 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___6__

Event

Description:

Feedwater Line A rupture in the Drywell (ONEPs 05-1-02-V-7, 05-1-02-I-1)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Recognizes and reports drywell floor drain sump level and temperature high alarms on P680-8A, drywell pressure alarms on P680-5A and feedwater parameters indicative of FW line A break in the drywell.

ACRO Places Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. Provides scram report:

Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN

Four control rods not fully inserted

Reactor power below 4%

Reactor water level and trend

Reactor pressure and trend

Feedwater not available

Bypass valves available BOP Stops all three condensate pumps using handswitches on P680-1C. May also trip both Reactor Feed Pumps and all three Condensate Booster Pumps.

BOP Attempts to close B21F065A. Recognizes loss of power to valve indicated by loss of red and green indicating lights above the handswitch on P680-2C and reports to CRS.

BOP Dispatches building operator to check breaker 52-153111 for B21F065A ACRO/ Verifies initiation of Division 1, 2, 3 ECCS on P601, Diesel BOP Generators on P864 and P601, SSW A, B, and C on P870, and isolations on drywell pressure high and reactor water level low, Level 2, on P870.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 18 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start (EN-OP-115)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO/ Recognizes reactor water level low, Level 2 was received by BOP receipt of annunciator RX LVL 2 (-42) LO (P601-16A A4) and/or trends on wide range level recorders B21R623A/B on P601. Recognizes RCIC failed to initiate on Level 2 by observing white logic light not illuminated above RCIC INIT RESET pushbutton (P601-21B).

ACRO/ Manually initiates RCIC by arming and depressing RCIC BOP MAN INIT pushbutton on P601-21B NOTE: Whichever operator is available will verify ECCS Status and may observe RCIC not operating and attempt to manually initiate the system per the Feedwater Malfunctions ONEP.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 19 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___8__

Event

Description:

ATWS less than 4% power (EP-2A)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters EP-2A via EP-2. Directs ARI-RPT initiation BOP Initiates ARI/RPT by arming/depressing ARI/RPT INIT channel 1 and channel 2 pushbuttons on P680 CRS Directs ADS inhibited BOP Inhibits ADS by placing channel A and Channel B handswitches to INHIBIT on P601 CRS Directs HPCS initiated and overridden.

BOP Overrides HPCS by placing HPCS pump handswitch to stop and placing handswitch for E22-F004 in CLOSE on P601.

CRS Directs level control band of 11.4 to 53.5 with RCIC CRS Directs BOP to monitor/control reactor pressure 800-1060 psig using bypass valves (in automatic)

CRS Orders installation of EP Attachment 12.for RHR B as the highest priority CRS Directs preventing low pressure ECCS injection BOP Prevents LP ECCS injection by arming/depressing Div 1 and Div 2 ECCS INIT pushbuttons and placing handswitches for LPCS, RHR A, RHR B, RHR C pumps to STOP and injection valves to CLOSE Verifies associated manual override alarms seal in on P601.

CRS Orders Standby Liquid Control initiated due to anticipation of Emergency Depressurization and resulting heat addition to the Suppression Pool REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 20 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___6__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When ordered, initiates Standby Liquid Control A(B) using 04-1-01-C41-1 Att. I (hard card):

Inserts key and turns SLC Pump A(B) pump key switch to START.

Checks system initiation by observing the following:

C41-F001A(B) Tank Outlet Valve is open.

F004A(B) Squib valve fired

White SQUIB VALVE READY light off.

Annunciator SBLC SYS A OOSVC.

Amber status light SQUIB A LOSCONT OR PWR LOSS is on.

SBLC pump A(B) running.

RWCU isolates:

G33-F004 closed (SLC A Initiated)

G33-F001, F251 closed (SLC B Initiated)

SLC pump discharge pressure exceeds reactor pressure.

SLC Tank Level decreasing.

Nuclear instrumentation decreasing.

CRS Directs restoring instrument air to containment following L2 /

high drywell pressure isolation BOP** Reopens P53-F001 on P870 (section 3C) following Level 2/High DW Pressure isolation REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 21 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___6__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Directs CRD flow maximized BOP Restarts one CRD pump per 05-1-02-IV-1 as follows:

PLACES CRD SYS FLO CONT in MANUAL and REDUCES output to zero

STARTS one CRD pump

RETURNS CRD SYS FLO CONT to AUTO with tapeset at 54-66 gpm BOP Maximizes CRD flow by performing the following:

Ensures AUX OIL PUMP for the CRD pump to be started is running on P601-22C

WITH one CRD pump already running, THEN STARTS standby CRD PMP A(B) on P601-22C

PLACES CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in MANUAL on P601-22B and fully OPENS C11-F002A(B), CRD FLO CONT VLV Fully OPENS C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV on P601-22C CRS** Orders installation of Attachments 18, 19, and 20 of EP-2.

ACRO Provides frequent updates of reactor water level and trend.

Reports when Level 1 (-150.3) is reached and when offscale low on wide range level indication (-160). Advises CRS of inability to stabilize or raise level with RCIC, CRD, and SLC.

CRS** When determined level cannot be maintained above -191 by RCIC, CRD, and SLC, enters Emergency Depressurization leg of EP-2A. Directs opening 8 ADS SRVs.

BOP** Opens 8 ADS SRVs on P601-19C, as directed REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 22 of 24

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __3___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Assigns reactor pressure as a critical parameter with MSCP, 219 psig, as the action point to commence injection.

ACRO Monitors reactor pressure and provides frequent updates of pressure and trend. Should go ahead and start RHR pump B on P601-17C. Marks and reports when 219 psig is reached.

CRS** When reactor pressure decreases to 219 psig, directs injection with RHR B via E12F053B at 4000 gpm. Raises injection flow rate in increments of 1000 gpm until level begins rising. Then directs level control band of 11.4- 53.5 ACRO** When reactor pressure decreases to 219 psig, starts RHR pump B, if not already running, and throttles open RHR B SHUTDN CLG RTN TO FW E12F053B on P601-17C to achieve the directed flow rate, indicated on E12R603B on P601-17B. Restore level above TAF.

ACRO Using available injection systems, achieves and controls level in the directed band, 11.4 to 53.5. Secures RHR B, RCIC, CRD as necessary to maintain the band.

CRS When Attachments 18, 19, and 20 are reported installed, directs resetting scram and maximizing CRD drive water pressure.

ACRO Resets RPS A by placing RPS Div 1 & 3 or 2 & 4 Reset switches to RESET on P680.

BOP Maximizes CRD drive water pressure by fully closing C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV on P601 BOP Attempts to insert Control Rods by scramming rods using RPS scram arm/depress pushbuttons and/or by selecting control rods on RC&IS and depressing IN TIMER SKIP or INSERT pushbutton on P680. Reports control rods will not move.

- denotes critical task REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 3 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 23 of 24

Crew Turnover:

The plant is at rated power.

SSW A is in standby.

Immediately following turnover, reactor power is to be reduced to 90% in accordance with 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII, Temporary Down power, in order to perform 06-OP-1C11-M-0001, Control Rod Operability. All notifications required per 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII step 12.1 are complete.

When power has been reduced to 90% and before commencing 06-OP-1C11-M-0001, place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling to lower Suppression Pool temperature to 80°F.

There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 06/10 Examiners: _________________________ Operators:__________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Raise reactor power to 100% using Recirc Flow Control Valves.

2. Respond to HPCS Jockey Pump trip.

3. Respond to Thyristor Voltage Regulator (TVR) trip to manual.

4. Respond to Recirc Pump A trip.

5. Respond to Thermal Hydraulic Instability.

6. Respond to a failure of the Reactor Mode Switch to initiate Scram.

7. Respond to Hydraulic Block ATWS above 4% power.

8. Respond to a SLC piping rupture.

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 90%.

INOPERABLE Equipment None Turnover:

The plant is at 90% power. Reactor power is to be raised to 100%. Pre-conditioning conditions are established for 100% power operation. There is no out of service equipment and EOOS is green. A Division 1 work week is in effect.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 1 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 R(ACRO)

Raise reactor power to 100% using Recirc Flow Control Valves (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment VIII) di_1e22m611_stop C(SS) 2 lo_1e22m611_r off Respond to a trip of HPCS Jockey Pump. (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-lo_1e22m611_g off P601 16A-E4, H5; Tech Spec 3.5.1).

lo_1e22m611_a on lo_1e22ads2 on p601_16a_h_5 on p601_16a_e_4 on 3 n41102 C(ACRO)

Respond to TVR trip from Automatic to Manual (ARI 04-1 1H13-P680-9A-C15, SOI 04-1-01-N40-1 section 5.2) 4 rr012a C(ACRO)

Respond to trip of Recirc Pump A (ARI 04-1-02-P680-3A-B4, ONEP 05-1-02-III-3; Tech Spec 3.4.1) 5 rr165 @ 5 - 100 C(ACRO) over 5 minutes Respond to Thermal Hydraulic Instability (ONEP 05-1-02-III-3, c71162 05-1-02-I-1, 05-1-02-I-2) 6 di_1c71m602 C(ACRO)

RUN Respond to a failure of the Reactor Mode Switch to scram the Reactor. (EN-OP-115) 7 c11164 @ 30 M(ALL)

Respond to ATWS to insert control rods with power above 4%

(EP-2A) 8 c41263 @ 60 C (BOP)

Respond to leak in SLC piping (EP-2A)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 2 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Critical Tasks

- When Thermal Hydraulic Instability is observed, inserts a manual scram.

- Insert control rods by manual scram and/or normal rod insertion via RCIS.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 3 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 CREW TURNOVER The plant is at 90% power.

Reactor power is to be raised to 100%.

Pre-conditioning conditions are established for 100% power operation.

There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 4 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR SETUP Start the process from a new simulator load.

Reset to IC-23.

Verify or perform the following:

IC: 23 OOS: none Active malfunctions: c11164 @ 30 SDV Hydraulic Block (ATWS) c41263 @ 60 SLC piping leak c71162 RPS Auto & Manual Fail to Scram Active overrides di_1c71m602 RUN Reactor Mode Switch in RUN.

Pending overrides lo_1e22m611_a_ON HPCS Jockey Pump amber trip light (TRG 2) lo_1e22m611_r_OFF HPCS Jockey Pump red light (TRG 2) lo_1e22m611_g_OFF HPCS Jockey Pump green light (TRG 2) lo_1e22ads2_ON HPCS Jockey Pump Status light (TRG 2) di_1e22m611_stop HPCS Jockey Pump E22C003 handswitch (TRG 2)

Pending malfunctions: p601_16a_h_5 ON HPCS SYS OOSVC annunciator (TRG 2) p601_16a_e_4 ON HPCS JKY PMP DISCH PRESS LO annunciator (TRG 2) n41102 Thyristor Voltage Regulator (TVR) trip to manual (TRG 3) rr012a Reactor Recirc Pump A trip (TRG 4) rr165 @ 5 Thermal Hydraulic Instability (TRG 5) ramp to 100 over 5 minutes Pending Remote Function: e22644_out HPCS Pump Breaker 152-1702 rack out (TRG 10)

Startup all PDS / SPDS screens. Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

Setup cyclops display and verify it is functional.

Ensure the correct control rod movement sequence is available at the P680.

Place/position turnover guide on the CRO desk.

Lower Reactor Power and Turbine Load Demand to 90% with Recirc Flow Control.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 5 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Ensure Turbine Load Demand is 25 MWe above actual load.

Mark up IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II to indicate step 6.7 complete.

Erase all temporary markings from control room panels, posted operator aids, switch covers, and indicators.

Erase all prior markings from procedures and hard cards expected to be referenced by the crew during this scenario.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens are inking properly.

(APRM chart recorders must be turned on and settings for scales on pens 0 - 125 scale)

ENSURE HORNS are ON.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 6 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATION Once simulator is reinitialized and setup complete take the simulator out of Freeze.

Once the Crew has taken control, note the simulator time.

Raise power from 90% to 100% (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II)

Provide role play as the Reactor Engineer as needed.

The ACRO will raise power per IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II, by opening Recirc FCVs in slow detent, maintaining loop drive flows matched to within 2230 gpm. The BOP will raise load demand to maintain demand and actual load within +/- 25 MWe.

When the Lead Evaluator is satisfied with the reactivity change or 2 minutes after 100%

power is reached, activate TRIGGER 2, HPCS Jockey Pump Trip.

HPCS Jockey Pump Trip (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601 16A-E4; H5; Tech Specs 3.5.1)

The BOP will announce P601 annunciators and determine HPCS Jockey Pump has tripped.

The BOP will consult the Alarm Response Instruction.

The CRS will dispatch an operator /electrical to the circuit breaker (52-170105 111 ft Control Building MCC 17B01)

The CRS will dispatch an operator to the HPCS Jockey Pump.

Respond as the Control Building Operator, circuit breaker 52-170105 is tripped free.

Respond as the Auxiliary Building Operator, HPCS Jockey Pump Motor is extremely hot to the touch.

The CRS will dispatch an operator to rack out the HPCS Pump circuit Breaker (152-1702).

Activate Trigger 10 for e22644_out.

Respond as the Control Building Operator, circuit breaker 152-1702 is racked out.

The CRS will refer to Tech Specs 3.5.1 and determine Condition B.

If contacted as Work Week Manager report, there is no work scheduled for RCIC.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 3, TVR Trip from Automatic to Manual.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 7 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Thyristor Voltage Regulator (TVR) Trip from Automatic to Manual (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-9A-C15; SOI 04-101-N40-1)

The ACRO should announce 1H13-P680-9A-C15 EXCITER TVR CAB FAIL. He should recognize and report the TVR has tripped to Manual.

The CRS should dispatch the Turbine Building Operator to the TVR Cabinet H13-P149 (Turbine Building 133 ft. elevation). He may also dispatch Electrical maintenance to aid in the investigation.

If dispatched, as the Turbine Building Operator report Module X2 has a fault light illuminated.

The ACRO/BOP should monitor operation of the Main Generator Voltage Regulator.

CRS should direct the Turbine Building Operator to depress the lamp test pushbutton beneath the fault light to check function of the lights, then direct the operator to reset the fault using the black reset pushbutton on module X1.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: DELETE malfunction n41102.

When directed, as the Turbine Building Operator report the fault on Module X2 has a cleared.

The CRS should direct the ACRO to return the TVR to Automatic per SOI 04-1-01-N40-1 section 5.2.

Once the TVR is in automatic and the lead evaluator concurs, activate TRIGGER 4, Recirc Pump A Trip REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 8 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Recirc Pump A Trip (ONEP 05-1-02-III-3; Tech Spec 3.4.1)

The ACRO should announce the trip of the Recirc Pump A.

The ACRO will monitor RPV level and power.

The CRS will enter the Reduction in Recirc System Flow Rate ONEP.

The ACRO should plot the Power to Flow point and determine operation in the Monitored Region.

The ACRO will assume the Thermal Hydraulic Instability (THI) monitoring WITHOUT concurrent duties.

The BOP should peer check the plot.

The CRS should direct the BOP operator to close B33-F067A, Recirc Pump Discharge Valve.

The BOP closes B33-F067A.

Note: Core flow should be around 64 Mlbm/hr and power around 70%.

The CRS should verify at least one channel of PBDS is operable The CRS should contact Reactor Engineering for control rod movement to exit the Monitored Region. As Reactor Engineer, tell the CRS to perform steps 1 - 4 of the Control Rod Movement Sequence as needed to exit the Monitored Region.

The CRS will have the operator verify Recirc Loop B flow <44,600 gpm.

The BOP may have to lower Recirc Loop B flow to <44,600 gpm.

The CRS will direct the BOP operator to insert control rods to exit the Monitored Region of the Power to Flow Map per the Control Rod Movement Sequence.

The CRS should provide a Reactivity Brief.

The BOP will insert Control Rods per the Control Rod Movement Sequence.

The ACRO will continue THI Watch, but will provide Control Rod Movement peer checking.

The CRS should consult Tech Spec 3.4.1 Condition A.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 9 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Five minutes after B33-F067A is closed it will be re-opened.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 5, Thermal Hydraulic Instability This malfunction takes time to build in.

Thermal Hydraulic Instability (ONEP 05-1-02-III-3)

Upon recognition of symptoms of THI, the ACRO will place the Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.

Failure to Scram (EN-OP-115)

- When ACRO recognizes THI, DELETE malfunction c71162 RPS Auto & Manual Fail to Scram.

The ACRO will recognize the failure of the Reactor Mode Switch to activate RPS.

The ACRO will attempt to manually scram the reactor using the Manual Scram Pushbuttons P680 5C1 & 7C1.

Control Rods will insert partially revealing the Scram Discharge Volume Hydraulic Block.

- Once manual scram is inserted and hydraulic block is revealed, DELETE override di_1c71m602 RUN Reactor Mode Switch in RUN to allow Reactor Mode Switch to be seen in Shutdown to prevent MSIVs from closing.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 10 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

ATWS (EP-2A)

When the ACRO manually scrams the reactor, he will recognize and report that rods did not fully insert and diagnose a hydraulic block of the scram discharge volume exists.

The CRS will enter EP-2A and direct actions to insert rods.

Power will be above 4% requiring the ACRO to terminate Feedwater injection to lower level to

-70 to -130 in order to reduce power. RFPs will be operating in auto following the scram, and the ACRO will have to lower its output to lower reactor level.

The BOP operator will terminate and prevent injection from ECCS.

Bypass valves will be available to automatically control pressure.

The BOP operator will attempt SLC initiation but a piping rupture will prevent pressure capable of injection to the RPV, and the CRS will be forced to call for Alternate Boron Injection EP Attachment 28.

After EP Attachments 18 and 19 are installed, control rod insertion via repetitively scramming will be possible. Then after Attachment 20 is installed, control rods can be driven in.

Suppression Pool Cooling will be required by EP-3.

Five minutes after Attachment 12 is requested, or as directed by the lead evaluator, make its status DONE and immediately take the booth copy of Att. 12 to the CRS and report I&Cs portion complete.

EP Attachments that may be requested Time to install Att 12 - Defeat RHR Shutdown Cooling interlocks 5 minutes Att 18 - Defeat ATWS ARI 5 minutes Att 19 - Defeat RPS 5 minutes Att 20 - Defeat RCIS 5 minutes Att 8 - Defeat MSIV Level 1 Isolation 2 minutes Att 1 - Defeat RCIC High Supp Pool Level Suction Transfer 8 minutes Att 3 - Defeat all RCIC Isolations 8 minutes Att 28 - Alternate Standby Liquid Control Not Modeled REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 11 of 26

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

TERMINATION Once control rods are being inserted using EP Attachments and RPV level is stable, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, terminate the scenario by placing the simulator in freeze and turning the horns off.

Critical Tasks

- When Thermal Hydraulic Instability is observed, inserts a manual scram.

- Insert control rods by manual scram and/or normal rod insertion via RCIS.

Emergency Classification Site Area Emergency per EAL Failure of RPS to complete control rod insertion and Reactor Power above 4%; SS2.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 12 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: _06/10____ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___1__

Event

Description:

Raise power to 100% (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Conducts reactivity brief for the planned power ascension.

ACRO Raises power by opening Recirc FCV A and B using loop flow controllers B33K603A and B in slow detent on P680-3B BOP Raises Load Demand as power is reduced by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND RAISE pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/-25 MW of the load demand limited value during the power ascension.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 13 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___2__

Event

Description:

Respond to HPCS Jockey Pump trip. (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601 16A-E4; H5; Tech Specs 3.5.1)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Announces P601 annunciators and determine HPCS Jockey Pump has tripped.

BOP Consults the Alarm Response Instruction. (ARI 04-1 1H13-P601 16A-E4; H5)

CRS Dispatches an operator to the circuit breaker (52-170105 111 ft Control Building MCC 17B01)

CRS Dispatches an operator to the HPCS Jockey Pump.

CRS When fault determined to be uncorrectable, orders the operator to rack out the HPCS Pump circuit Breaker (152-1702).

CRS Refers to Tech Specs 3.5.1 and determine Condition B.

Declares HPCS INOP.

CRS Orders HPCS OOSVC switch placed in OOSVC position.

BOP Places HPCS OOSVC switch in OOSVC position.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 14 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___3__

Event

Description:

Thyristor Voltage Regulator (TVR) Trip from Automatic to Manual (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-9A-C15; SOI 04-101-N40-1)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Announces 1H13-P680-9A-C15 EXCITER TVR CAB FAIL.

He should recognize and report the TVR has tripped to Manual.

CRS Dispatches the Turbine Building Operator to the TVR Cabinet H13-P149 (Turbine Building 133 ft. elevation). May also dispatch Electrical maintenance to aid in the investigation.

ACRO Monitors operation of the Main Generator Voltage Regulator.

CRS Directs the Turbine Building Operator to depress the lamp test pushbutton beneath the fault light to check function of the lights.

CRS Directs the operator to reset the fault using the black reset pushbutton on module X1.

CRS Directs the ACRO to return the TVR to Automatic per SOI 04-1-01-N40-1 section 5.2.

Returns the TVR to Automatic per SOI 04-1-01-N40-1 section ACRO 5.2.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 15 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___4__

Event

Description:

Respond to Recirc Pump A Trip (ONEP 05-1-02-III-3; Tech Spec 3.4.1)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Announces the trip of the Recirc Pump A.

ACRO Monitors RPV level and power.

CRS Enters Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP.

(05-1-02-III-3)

ACRO Plots the Power to Flow point and determine operation in the Monitored Region.

ACRO Assumes the Thermal Hydraulic Instability (THI) monitoring WITHOUT concurrent duties.

BOP Peer check the plot on Power to Flow Map.

CRS Directs the BOP operator to close B33-F067A, Recirc Pump Discharge Valve.

BOP Closes B33-F067A, Recirc Pump Discharge Valve. (P680 3C)

CRS Verifies at least one channel of PBDS is operable.

CRS Contacts Reactor Engineering for control rod movement to exit the Monitored Region.

Directs the BOP operator to insert control rods to exit the CRS Monitored Region of the Power to Flow Map per the Control Rod Movement Sequence..

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 16 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___4__

Event

Description:

Respond to Recirc Pump A Trip (ONEP 05-1-02-III-3; Tech Spec 3.4.1) (Continued)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Checks Recirc Loop B flow and lowers to <44,600 gpm.

CRS Conduct a reactivity brief.

BOP Inserts Control Rods per the Control Rod Movement Sequence ACRO Continues THI Watch, but will provide Control Rod Movement peer checking.

CRS Consults Tech Spec 3.4.1 Condition A.

BOP Five minutes after B33-F067A is closed it will be re-opened.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 17 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Respond to Thermal Hydraulic Instability (THI) (ONEP 05-1 III-3)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Recognizes the symptoms of THI and announces indications

- and places the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 18 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___6__

Event

Description:

Respond to failure to Scram (EN-OP-115)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Recognizes the failure of the Reactor Mode Switch to activate

- RPS.

ACRO Arms and Depresses Manual Scram Pushbuttons. Provides

- scram report:

Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN

Hydraulic Block ATWS

Reactor power above 4%

Reactor water level and trend

Reactor pressure and trend

Feedwater is available

Bypass valves available REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 19 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __0610___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters EP-2A via EP-2. Directs ARI-RPT initiation ACRO Initiates ARI/RPT by arming/depressing ARI/RPT INIT channel 1 and channel 2 pushbuttons on P680 CRS Directs ADS inhibited BOP Inhibits ADS by placing channel A and Channel B handswitches to INHIBIT on P601 HPCS is already overridden due to pump breaker already NOTE racked out. CRS may order E22-F004 closed.

Aligns Startup Level Control per 04-1-01-N21-1 Att. VII:

ACRO

On P680, closes the following valves:

N21-F009A, FW HTR 6A OUTL VLV

N21-F009B, FW HTR 6B OUTL VLV.

On P870, opens the following valves:

N21-F001, SU FCV OUTL ISOL VLV.

N21-F010A, HP FW HTR STRNG A SU OUTL VLV.

N21-F010B, HP FW HTR STRNG B SU OUTL VLV.

On P680, verifies the following valves are closed:

N21-F513, X WTR LVL SU CONTR Valve (via controller 1C34-LK-R602)

N21-F510, FW CU RECIRC VLV

N21-F040, FW SU BYP VLV REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 20 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __0610___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Takes manual control of RFP per 04-1-01-N21-1 Att. VI at P680:

Selects Speed Auto or Manual.

Adjusts N21-F513, RX WTR LVL SU CONT valve, as necessary in MANUAL to stabilize Reactor level if not yet directed by the CRS to lower level. N21-F040 and/or N21-F009A(B) may be OPEN/CLOSED as necessary to augment flow.

CRS Orders installation of EP Attachment 8.

CRS Directs terminating condensate/feedwater injection to a band of -70 to -130 wide range.

ACRO Terminates Feedwater injection by closing startup level control valve N21-F513 on P680. When reactor level drops below -70 WR, injects by opening the startup level control valve and attempts to stabilize level in the middle of the prescribed band, approx. -100 WR. Controls Feedwater to maintain level in band.

CRS Determines Main Condenser is available and orders Pressure Reference Setpoint lowered to 900 psig.

BOP Lowers Pressure Reference Setpoint to ~ 900 psig.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 21 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __0610___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Directs preventing low pressure ECCS injection BOP Prevents LP ECCS injection by arming/depressing Div 1 and Div 2 ECCS INIT pushbuttons and placing handswitches for LPCS, RHR A, RHR B, RHR C pumps to STOP and injection valves to CLOSE. Verifies associated manual override alarms seal in on P601.

BOP Reports reactor Level 2 as level lowers and resulting isolation BOP Reports drywell pressure 1.23 psig due to DW Purge Compressor operation and resulting isolation CRS Directs restoring instrument air to containment following L2 /

high drywell pressure isolation BOP** Reopens P53-F001 on P870 (section 3C) following Level 2/High DW Pressure isolation CRS Orders Standby Liquid Control initiated due to power above 4%.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 22 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __0610___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A/3) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When ordered, initiates Standby Liquid Control A(B) using 04-1-01-C41-1 Att. I (hard card):

Inserts key and turns SLC Pump A(B) pump key switch to START.

Checks system initiation by observing the following:

C41-F001A(B) Tank Outlet Valve is open.

(Event 8)

F004A(B) Squib valve fired:

White SQUIB VALVE READY light off.

Annunciator SBLC SYS A OOSVC.

Amber status light SQUIB A LOSCONT OR PWR LOSS is on.

SBLC pump A(B) running.

RWCU isolates:

G33-F004 closed (SLC A Initiated)

G33-F001, F251 closed (SLC B Initiated)

SLC pump discharge pressure exceeds reactor pressure. (Discharge pressure below RPV Pressure)

SLC Tank Level decreasing.

Nuclear instrumentation decreasing.

BOP When SLC A and B are initiated, identifies the failure of SLC (Event 8) Pumps to inject, informs CRS of SLC Failure to Inject.

CRS Orders implementation of Attachment 28 Alternate Boron Injection.

CRS Enters EP-3 and directs starting two loops of Suppression Pool Cooling, as the BOP is available.

REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 23 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __0610___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

ATWS (EP-2A) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Starts RHR A and B in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW the hard card, as time allows, and not to the detriment of pressure control.

CRS Directs CRD flow maximized BOP Maximizes CRD for flow: 04-1-01-C11-1 Att.

Places CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in MANUAL.

USING CRD SYS FLOW CONT C11-R600, fully opens C11-F002A(B), CRD FLO CONT VLV.

Fully opens C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV CRS ** Orders installation of Attachments 18, 19, and 20 of EP-2.

CRS When Attachments 18, 19, and 20 are reported installed, directs resetting scram and maximizing CRD drive water pressure.

ACRO ** Resets RPS A by placing RPS Div 1 & 3 or 2 & 4 Reset switches to RESET on P680.

BOP ** Maximizes CRD drive water pressure by fully closing C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV on P601 BOP ** Inserts Control Rods by scramming rods using RPS scram arm/depress pushbuttons and/or by selecting control rods on RC&IS and depressing IN TIMER SKIP or INSERT pushbutton on P680 REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 24 of 26

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Op-Test No.: __0610___ Scenario No.: __5___ Event No.: ___8__

Event

Description:

SLC piping rupture (04-1-01-C41-1 Att. VI, EP-2A)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When ordered, initiates Standby Liquid Control A(B) using 04-1-01-C41-1 Att. I (hard card):

Inserts key and turns SLC Pump A(B) pump key switch to START.

Checks system initiation by observing the following:

C41-F001A(B) Tank Outlet Valve is open.

F004A(B) Squib valve fired:

White SQUIB VALVE READY light off.

Annunciator SBLC SYS A OOSVC.

Amber status light SQUIB A LOSCONT OR PWR LOSS is on.

SBLC pump A(B) running.

RWCU isolates:

G33-F004 closed (SLC A Initiated)

G33-F001, F251 closed (SLC B Initiated)

SLC pump discharge pressure exceeds reactor pressure. (PRESSURE will be below RPV pressure.)

SLC Tank Level decreasing.

Nuclear instrumentation decreasing.

BOP When SLC A and B are initiated, identifies the failure SLC pump discharge pressure to be above RPV pressure. And reports to CRS.

CRS Upon notification of SLC Failure will order EP Attachment 28, Alternate SLC.

- denotes critical task REVISION 4/14/2010 SCENARIO 5 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 25 of 26

Crew Turnover:

The plant is at 90% power.

Reactor power is to be raised to 100%.

Pre-conditioning conditions are established for 100% power operation.

There is no out of service equipment, and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Scenario No.: 6 Op-Test No.: 06/10 B/U Examiners: _________________________ Operators:__________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Raise reactor power to 85% using Recirc Flow Control Valves.

2. Place the third Condensate and Condensate Booster Pump in service.

3. Respond to APRM A failed upscale.

4. Respond to trip of bus LCC 15BA5.

5. Respond to a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum.

6. Respond to a LOCA with reduced injection systems.

7. Respond to failure of RCIC to auto start.

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 80%.

INOPERABLE Equipment None Turnover:

The plant is at 80% power. Reactor power is to be raised to 85%. Pre-conditioning conditions are established for 100% power operation.

Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B pre-start checks are complete.

Condensate Cleanup is ready for the third Condensate and Booster Pump operation.

IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II step 6.6 is complete.

There is no out of service equipment and EOOS is green. A Division 1 work week is in effect.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 1 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 R(ACRO)

Raise reactor power to 85% using Recirc Flow Control Valves (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II) 2 N(BOP)

Place the third Condensate and Condensate Booster Pump in service. (SOI 04-1-01-N19-1 section 4.3).

3 c51009a C(ACRO)

Respond to APRM A failed upscale (ARI 04-1-02-P680-5A-A11; B10; Tech Spec/TR 3.3.1.1; TR 3.3.2.1) 4 r21142v C(BOP)

Respond to trip of bus LCC 15BA5. (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P864-1A-F3, ONEP 05-1-02-I-4; SOI 04-1-01-R21-15; OSP 02-S-01-17; Tech Spec 3.8.7; Various) 5 fw163a @ 5 ramp C(ACRO) to 100 over 10 Respond to a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum (ONEP 05 minutes 02-V-8) 6 rr063a@ 10 over M(ALL) 2 minutes Respond to a LOCA with reduced injection systems. (EP-2/3) e22159a 7

e51043 C(ACRO)

Respond to failure of RCIC to auto start (EP-2; SOI 04-1 E51-1)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 2 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Critical Tasks

- When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and -191, open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -210.

- Restore and maintain RPV level above -191 using available injection systems.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 3 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 CREW TURNOVER The plant is at 80% power.

Reactor power is to be raised to 85%.

Pre-conditioning conditions are established for 100% power operation.

Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B pre-start checks are complete.

Condensate Cleanup is ready for the third Condensate and Booster Pump operation.

IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II step 6.6 is complete.

There is no out of service equipment and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 4 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR SETUP Start the process from a new simulator load.

Reset to IC-23.

Verify or perform the following:

IC: 23 OOS: none Active malfunctions: e51043 RCIC Auto Start failure e22159a E22-F004 HPCS Injection valve fail to open Active overrides none Pending overrides none Pending malfunctions: c51009a APRM A failure Upscale (TRG 3) r21142v LCC 15BA5 Trip (SSW A Basin) (TRG 4) fw163a@ 5 Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum (TRG 5) (ramp over 10 minutes to 100%)

rr063a@10 ramp over 2 minutes Recirc loop A rupture in the DW (TRG 6)

Remote Function: p75057 DG 11 to Maintenance (TRG 8)

Startup all PDS / SPDS screens. Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

Setup cyclops display and verify it is functional.

Ensure the correct control rod movement sequence is available at the P680.

Place/position turnover guide on the CRO desk.

Mark up IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II to indicate step 6.6 complete.

Lower Reactor Power to 80% with Recirc Flow Control.

Secure Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B and close their Discharge Valves.

Erase all temporary markings from control room panels, posted operator aids, switch covers, and indicators.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 5 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Erase all prior markings from procedures and hard cards expected to be referenced by the crew during this scenario.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens are inking properly.

(APRM chart recorders must be turned on and settings for scales on pens 0 - 125 scale)

ENSURE HORNS are ON.

SIMULATOR OPERATION Once simulator is reinitialized and setup complete take the simulator out of Freeze.

Once the Crew has taken control, note the simulator time.

Raise power from 80% to 85% (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II)

Provide role play as the Reactor Engineer. When 85% power is reached, tell the crew you want to run a predict case to ensure margin to the preconditioning envelope, which will take about 30 minutes.

The ACRO will raise power per IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II, by opening Recirc FCVs in slow detent, maintaining loop drive flows matched to within 2230 gpm. The BOP will raise load demand to maintain demand and actual load within +/- 25 MWe.

Place additional Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps in service (SOI 04-1 N19-1 section 4.3)

The CRS should direct placing in service the final Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps.

The BOP will verify Prerequisites for starting Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B have been completed.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond the Oil levels for Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B are within specifications and TBCW is in operation to both pumps.

The BOP will contact Radwaste to ensure Condensate Deep Bed Demineralizers are ready for service.

As Radwaste Operator, respond that Condensate Deep Bed Demineralizers are ready for service to support three Condensate pumps in service.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 6 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

The BOP will contact the Turbine Building Operator to verify the Condensate Pump Min Flow Controller N19-FK-R001 and Condensate Booster Pump Min Flow Controller N19-FK-R003 on H22-P171 are in cascade.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond the Condensate and Condensate Booster Pump Min Flow Controllers on H22-P171 are in cascade.

The BOP will have the Turbine Building Operator isolate Condensate Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R002B.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond the Condensate Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R002B is isolated.

The BOP will make an announcement and start Condensate Pump B by depressing the START pushbutton. (P680 1C) He will observe Condensate Pump Discharge Valve N19-F024B open (P680 1C), discharge pressure on N19-PI-R607 rise, CNDS PMPS MIN FLO N19-FI-R621 rise (P680 1B).

The BOP will have the Turbine Building Operator un-isolate Condensate Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R002B.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond the Condensate Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R002B is un-isolated.

The BOP will have the Turbine Building Operator isolate Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R005B by closing N19-FX212.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond the Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R005B is isolated.

The BOP will make an announcement and start Condensate Booster Pump B by depressing the START pushbutton. (P680 1C) He will observe Condensate Booster Pump Discharge Valve N19-F046B open (P680 1C).

The BOP will have the Turbine Building Operator open N19-FX212 for Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond N19-FX212 is open.

The BOP will observe Condensate Booster Pump discharge pressure on N19-PI-R610 rise, CNDS BST PMP MIN FLO N19-FI-R659 rise (P680 1B).

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 7 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

The BOP will have the Turbine Building Operator throttle N19-F234 to adjust condensate flow through Hydrogen Water Chemistry between 110 - 150 gpm.

As Turbine Building Operator, respond Condensate flow is reading 135 gpm on P73-FIS-N001.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 3, APRM A Upscale Trip Respond to APRM A Failed Upscale (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680 5A-A11; B10; Tech Specs3.3.1.1; TR 3.3.2.1)

The ACRO will announce the failure of APRM A upscale and Division 1 Half Scram.

The BOP will respond to the back panels to investigate. When asked what he sees on the Upper Control Room Panel, UPSCALE ALARM, UPSCALE NEUTRON, and UPSCALE NEUTRON FIRST and the meter is indicating upscale.

The CRS will contact I & C to investigate.

The CRS should refer to Tech Specs and the TRM TS/TR3.3.1.1and TR3.3.2.1. He will determine with no other instruments INOP only a Potential LCO TR is required.

The CRS should direct the ACRO to bypass APRM channel A and reset the Division 1 half scram.

The ACRO will bypass ARPM A and reset Division 1 Half Scram on P680 5C1.

The CRS should request a CAUTION Tag be generated.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 4, LCC 15BA5 Trip REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 8 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to LCC 15BA5 trip (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P864-1A-F3; ONEP 05-1-02-I-4; SOI 04 01-R21-15 Load List; Tech Spec 3.8.7; Various)

The BOP should announce 1H13-P864-1A-F3 LCC 15BA5 under-voltage (trip).

The CRS will enter the Loss of AC Power ONEP.

The CRS should dispatch the Outside Operator to SSW A to investigate LCC 15BA5.

If dispatched, as the Outside operator report breaker 52-15501 has an overcurrent trip and will not reset.

If dispatched as electrical maintenance, tell the crew you will need a work order to troubleshoot the problem.

The BOP/CRS should reference SOI 04-1-01-R21-15 15BA5 Load List.

The CRS should refer to Tech Specs and 02-S-01-17 Attachment II Support vs Supported Matrix for SSW INOP.

Tech Specs Impacted:

3.8.7 Distribution 3.8.1 Division 1 Diesel Generator 3.4.9 RHR Shutdown Cooling 3.5.1 ECCS Division 1 3.5.3 RCIC 3.6.1.7 Containment Spray A 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling A 3.6.3.3 Drywell Purge Compressor A 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air A 3.7.4 Control Room A/C A The Lead Evaluator may proceed and pick up Tech Specs as a followup.

The CRS should direct an operator to Division 1 Diesel Generator to place the Diesel in Maintenance.

The Outside Operator should contact the BOP Operator and coordinate placing DG 11 in Maintenance. DG 11 to Maintenance, TRIGGER 8.

When the lead evaluator is ready to proceed, activate TRIGGER 5, Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 9 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum (ONEPs 05-1-02-V-8, 05-1-02-III-3; ARI 04-1-02-H13-P845; ONEP 05-1-02-I-1 and 05-1-02-I-2)

The ACRO will announce P845 Offgas panel Trouble Alarm.

The BOP will investigate and inform the CRS of rising Offgas flow.

The ACRO will observe Main Condenser Vacuum getting worse.

The CRS should enter the Loss of Condenser Vacuum ONEP and Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP.

The ACRO should lower Reactor Power with Recirc Flow in Fast Detent on the Flow Control Valves to 67 Mlbm/hr Core Flow.

The ACRO should plot Power to Flow Map conditions in the Monitored Region.

The ACRO should assume the Thermal Hydraulic Instability (THI) watch without concurrent duties.

The BOP should monitor Main Condenser Vacuum.

The CRS will assign a critical parameter of Main Condenser Vacuum and assign to the BOP operator and establish criteria for inserting a manual scram.

The CRS will dispatch operators to investigate cause of Main Condenser Vacuum problem in the Turbine Building.

As Main Condenser Vacuum degrades and the scram criteria is met, the BOP/ACRO will insert a manual reactor scram and give the CRS a status report.

The CRS should enter the Reactor Scram and Turbine Trips ONEPs.

The ACRO will align Condensate and Feedwater on Startup Level Control.

When RFPT Low Vacuum trip is received, the CRS will grant permission to override the trip and maintain injection with Condensate and Feedwater as long as MSIVs remain open.

The BOP/ACRO will monitor Main Steam Bypass valves.

When Main Steam Bypass Valves isolate, the CRS will direct the BOP to control RPV pressure using SRVs in a band 800 - 1060 psig.

Four (4) minutes after the Reactor Scram, activate TRIGGER 6, LOCA in the Drywell REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 10 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

Respond to LOCA (Recirc Line) in the Drywell (EP-2; EP-3)

High Drywell Pressure will be received and announced.

The CRS will enter EP-2 and EP-3.

The BOP will ensure Isolations and Initiations for High Drywell Pressure have occurred.

The BOP should note the failure of E22-F004, HPCS Injection Valve and dispatch an operator to investigate and correct.

RPV level will be maintained by Condensate and Feedwater until the Reactor Feed Pumps trip on Low Condenser Vacuum.

When RFPT Low Vacuum trip is received, the CRS will grant permission to override the trip and maintain injection with Condensate and Feedwater as long as MSIVs remain open.

Once Main Condenser Vacuum degrades to the point the MSIVs close, RPV level control will be with ECCS Systems.

When Main Steam Bypass Valves isolate, the CRS will direct the BOP to control RPV pressure using SRVs in a band 800 - 1060 psig.

When RPV level drops to less than -41.6 inches, the BOP/ACRO will note the failure of RCIC to automatically start and take actions. (Event 7)

The CRS will direct ADS inhibited.

The BOP will inhibit ADS (P601).

RPV level will continue to lower until conditions require emergency depressurization to allow low pressure systems to inject.

When RPV level drops to less than -160 inches, the CRS will direct emergency depressurization.

The BOP will open 8 ADS/SRVs on command to emergency depressurize the RPV.

The ACRO will establish RPV level control using either Condensate on Startup Level Control or RHR. Division 1 systems should be avoided due to the lack of Standby Service Water A.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 11 of 22

Appendix D Simulator Operation Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATION (Continued)

ALTERNATE PATH At some point the CRS may decide to lower RPV pressure using either the Main Steam Bypass Valves if available or SRVs to ensure injection capability with Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps. This is acceptable per Operations Philosophy 02-S-01-27 section 6.6.8.d Pressure Control Table. If the CRS does this action this will become the Critical Task and eliminate the Critical Tasks for Level below Top of Active Fuel.

Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start (EN-OP-115)

The ACRO should then assume level control from P601, since Condensate/Feedwater are unavailable. By the time the ACRO reaches P601, reactor level will have gone below Level 2,

-41.6. The ACRO should recognize RCIC failed to automatically start and manually initiate it using the RCIC MAN INIT pushbutton in accordance with Conduct of Operations guidance for failures of automatic safety functions.

EP Attachments that may be requested Time to install Att 12 - Defeat RHR Shutdown Cooling interlocks 5 minutes Att 1 - Defeat RCIC High Supp Pool Level Suction Transfer 8 minutes Att 3 - Defeat all RCIC Isolations 8 minutes TERMINATION Once emergency depressurization has been conducted and reactor water level restored above TAF using Condensate or RHR A/B via E12F053A/B, or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, terminate the scenario by placing the simulator in freeze and turning the horns off.

Critical Tasks

- When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and -191, open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -210.

- Restore and maintain RPV level above -191 using available injection systems.

Emergency Classification Site Area Emergency per EAL Loss of two fission product barriers, FS1, based on RC1/RC2 and FC2.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 12 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: _06/10____ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___1__

Event

Description:

Raise power to 85% (IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Conducts reactivity brief for the planned power reduction.

ACRO Raises power by opening Recirc FCV A and B using loop flow controllers B33K603A and B in slow detent on P680-3B BOP Raises Load Demand as power is raised by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND RAISE pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/-25 MW of the load demand limited value during the power ascension.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 13 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___2__

Event

Description:

Place additional Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps in service (SOI 04-1-01-N19-1 section 4.3)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Directs placing in service the final Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps.

BOP Performs the following:

Verifies Prerequisites for starting Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B have been completed.

Contacts Radwaste to ensure Condensate Deep Bed Demineralizers are ready for service.

Contacts the Turbine Building Operator to verify the Condensate Pump Min Flow Controller N19-FK-R001 and Condensate Booster Pump Min Flow Controller N19-FK-R003 on H22-P171 are in cascade.

Directs the Turbine Building Operator isolate Condensate Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R002B.

Makes an announcement and start Condensate Pump B by depressing the START pushbutton. (P680 1C)

Observes Condensate Pump Discharge Valve N19-F024B open (P680 1C), discharge pressure on N19-PI-R607 rise, CNDS PMPS MIN FLO N19-FI-R621 rise (P680 1B)

Directs the Turbine Building Operator un-isolate Condensate Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R002B.

Directs the Turbine Building Operator isolate Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator N19-PI-R005B by closing N19-FX212.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 14 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___2__

Event

Description:

Place additional Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps in service (SOI 04-1-01-N19-1 section 4.3) (Continued)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs the following:

Makes an announcement and start Condensate Booster Pump B by depressing the START pushbutton. (P680 1C)

Observes Condensate Booster Pump Discharge Valve N19-F046B open (P680 1C).

Directs the Turbine Building Operator open N19-FX212 for Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge Pressure indicator.

Observes Condensate Booster Pump discharge pressure on N19-PI-R610 rise, CNDS BST PMP MIN FLO N19-FI-R659 rise (P680 1B).

Directs the Turbine Building Operator throttle N19-F234 to adjust condensate flow through Hydrogen Water Chemistry between 110 - 150 gpm.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 15 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___3__

Event

Description:

Respond to APRM A Failed Upscale (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680 5A-A11; B10; Tech Specs3.3.1.1; TR 3.3.2.1)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Announces the failure of APRM A upscale and Division 1 Half Scram.

BOP Investigates APRM A.

CRS Contacts I & C to investigate.

Refers to Tech Specs and the TRM TS/TR3.3.1.1and TR3.3.2.1. Determines with no other instruments INOP only a Potential LCO TR is required.

Directs the ACRO to bypass APRM channel A and reset the Division 1 half scram.

ACRO Bypasses ARPM A P680 5C1.

ACRO Resets Division 1 Half Scram on P680 5C1.

CRS Requests a CAUTION Tag be generated REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 16 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___4__

Event

Description:

Respond to LCC 15BA5 trip (ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P864-1A-F3; ONEP 05-1-02-I-4; SOI 04-1-01-R21-15 Load List; Tech Spec 3.8.7; Various)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Announces 1H13-P864-1A-F3 LCC 15BA5 under-voltage (trip).

CRS Dispatches the Outside Operator to SSW A to investigate LCC 15BA5.

CRS/BOP Refers to SOI 04-1-01-R21-15 15BA5 Load List.

CRS Refers to Tech Specs and 02-S-01-17 Attachment II Support vs Supported Matrix for SSW INOP.

CRS Determines the following Tech Specs Impacted:

3.8.7 Distribution 3.8.1 Division 1 Diesel Generator 3.4.9 RHR Shutdown Cooling 3.5.1 ECCS Division 1 3.5.3 RCIC 3.6.1.7 Containment Spray A 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling A 3.6.3.3 Drywell Purge Compressor A 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air A 3.7.4 Control Room A/C A CRS Directs placing Division 1 Diesel Generator (DG 11) in Maintenance.

BOP Coordinates with the operator at DG 11 and places DG 11 in Maintenance. P864 1C CRS Enters TS 3.7.1 Condition A restore Cooling Tower Fan to operable within 7 days.

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 17 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Respond to Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum (ONEPs 05-1 V-8, 05-1-02-III-3; ARI 04-1-02-H13-P845; ONEP 05-1-02-I-1 and 05-1-02-I-2)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO Announces P845 Offgas panel Trouble Alarm.

BOP Investigates and informs the CRS of rising Offgas flow.

ACRO Observes Main Condenser Vacuum getting worse.

CRS Enters Loss of Condenser Vacuum ONEP and Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP ACRO Reduces core flow to 67 mlbm/hr by closing Recirc FCV A and B using Recirc Loop Manual controllers in FAST detent.

P680 3B ACRO Plots region of operation in the Monitored Region on the Power/Flow Map ACRO Assumes monitoring for THI with no concurrent duties BOP Verifies plot in Monitored Region on P/F Map.

BOP Monitors Main Condenser Vacuum. P680 10B CRS Assigns a critical parameter of Main Condenser Vacuum and assign to the BOP operator and establish criteria for inserting a manual scram.

CRS Dispatches operators to investigate cause of Main Condenser Vacuum problem in the Turbine Building.

BOP/ Upon Scram Criteria met, places Reactor Mode Switch in ACRO Shutdown. Provides scram report:

Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN

Four control rods not fully inserted

Reactor power below 4%

Reactor water level and trend

Reactor pressure and trend

Feedwater not available

Bypass valves available REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 18 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6__ Event No.: ___5__

Event

Description:

Respond to Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum (ONEPs 05-1 V-8, 05-1-02-III-3; ARI 04-1-02-H13-P845; ONEP 05-1-02-I-1 and 05-1-02-I-2) (Contd)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters the Reactor Scram and Turbine Trips ONEPs ACRO Aligns Condensate and Feedwater on Startup Level Control.

P680 1C / P870 6C CRS When RFPT Low Vacuum trip is received, grants permission to override the trip and maintain injection with Condensate and Feedwater as long as MSIVs remain open.

ACRO Overrides the RFPT Low Vacuum Trip and maintain injection with Condensate and Feedwater as long as MSIVs remain open. P680 2C BOP Monitors Main Steam Bypass valves.

CRS When Main Steam Bypass Valves isolate, directs the BOP to control RPV pressure using SRVs in a band 800 - 1060 psig.

BOP Controls RPV pressure using SRVs in a band 800 - 1060 psig. (P601 19C)

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 19 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___6__

Event

Description:

Respond to LOCA (Recirc Line) in the Drywell (EP-2; EP-3)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO/BOP Recognizes and reports High Drywell Pressure.

CRS Enters EP-2 and EP-3.

BOP Ensures Isolations and Initiations for High Drywell Pressure have occurred.

BOP Determines the failure of E22-F004, HPCS Injection Valve and dispatches an operator to investigate and correct and reports to CRS.

Event BOP/ACRO When RPV level drops to less than -41.6 inches, will note the 7 failure of RCIC to automatically start and take actions.

CRS Directs ADS Inhibited.

BOP Inhibits ADS. (P601 19B)

CRS Decides to lower RPV pressure using either the Main Steam Bypass Valves if available or SRVs to ensure injection capability with Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps.

(OPTIONAL)

BOP Lowers RPV pressure using either the Main Steam Bypass Valves if available or SRVs to ensure injection capability with Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps. (OPTIONAL)

(P680 9C)

CRS ** When RPV level drops to less than -160 inches, directs emergency depressurization.

BOP ** Opens 8 ADS/SRVs on command to emergency depressurize the RPV. (P601 19C)

ACRO ** Establishes RPV level control using either Condensate on Startup Level Control or RHR. (P680 1B/C, 2C) or (P601)

REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 20 of 22

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 6 Op-Test No.: __06/10___ Scenario No.: __6___ Event No.: ___7__

Event

Description:

Respond to failure of RCIC to automatically start (EN-OP-115)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACRO/ Recognizes reactor water level low, Level 2 was received by BOP receipt of annunciator RX LVL 2 (-42) LO (P601-16A A4) and/or trends on wide range level recorders B21R623A/B on P601. Recognizes RCIC failed to initiate on Level 2 by observing white logic light not illuminated above RCIC INIT RESET pushbutton (P601-21B).

ACRO/ Manually initiates RCIC by arming and depressing RCIC BOP MAN INIT pushbutton on P601-21B.

NOTE: Whichever operator is available will verify ECCS Status and may observe RCIC not operating and attempt to manually initiate the system per the Feedwater Malfunctions ONEP.

- denotes critical task REVISION 4/15/2010 SCENARIO 6 NUREG 1021 REVISION 9 Rev 1 PAGE 21 of 22

CREW TURNOVER The plant is at 80% power.

Reactor power is to be raised to 85%.

Pre-conditioning conditions are established for 100% power operation.

Condensate Pump B and Condensate Booster Pump B pre-start checks are complete.

Condensate Cleanup is ready for the third Condensate and Booster Pump operation.

IOI 03-1-01-2 Attachment II step 6.6 is complete.

There is no out of service equipment and EOOS is green.

A Division 1 work week is in effect.

ML101450236

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