ML100980273
| ML100980273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1979 |
| From: | EDS Nuclear |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML100980274 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902150324, NYO-78-005, NYO-78-5 | |
| Download: ML100980273 (35) | |
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SUPPORT SYSTEM REDESIGN FOR PIPING RUNS ON NORTH HALF OF CONTAINMENT FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 Prepared For:
CONSOLIDATED EDISION COMPANY Prepared By:
EDS NUCLEAR, INC.
January, 1979 EDS Report No.
NYO-78-005, Revision I
EDS NUCLEAR LNC.
REPORT APPROVAL COVER SHEET Client:
Consolidated Edison Company Project:
Indian Point Unit 2 Report
Title:
Support System Redesign for Piping Runs on North Half of Containment Report Number:
NYO-78-005 Rev.
0 The work described in this Report was performed in accordance with the EDS Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.
The signatures below verify the accuracy of this Report and its compliance with applicable quality assurance requirements.
Prepared By:
Reviewed By:
(Engineer)
(
1 l~roject Engineer)
Approved By:
(Division Manager)
Date: -&A//7S Date:
-7 Date:
A REVISION RECORD Rev.
Prepared Reviewed Approved Approval Revision No.
Date 1/1/17/79 Incorporation of Consolidated Edison Comments
11 Revision 1 CERTIFICATION The undersigned, a registered Professional Engineer competent in the field of piping analysis, certifies to the best of his knowledge and be lief that the analyses presented herein for the Support System Redesign for Piping Runs on North Half of Containment for Indian Point Unit 2 are correct and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ANSI B31. 1 Power Piping Code.
s su o
\\Gary
.Shears STATE 0 NEW YORK
~
REGISTRATION NO. 053437 4'0 (Date)
NYO-78-005 Revision I SUPPORT SYSTEM REDESIGN FOR PIPING RUNS ON NORTH HALF OF CONTAINMENT FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Description
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 APPROACH1 3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA 2
4.0 CONFIGURATION AND LOADING DATA 4
5.0 ANALYTICAL METHOD 4
6.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 5
TABLES FIGURES
NYO-78-005 Revision 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report documents the analytical effort and results of a task involved in support system redesign for piping runs inside containment for INDIAN POINT UNIT 2.
The objective of the support system redesign task is to'improve the reliability of the subject piping runs by reducing the number of hydraulic snubb ers necessary to satisfy the piping design criteria. The scope of the effort reported herein involves piping runs on the north half of containment.
In addition, the support system redesign was limited for this effort to considering only snubber removal or replacement with struts.
Presentation of the documentation is as follows.
The approach used to assess and justify snubber removal or replacement with a strut is set forth. The design criteria and assumptions necessary to use the criteria in establishing the struct ural adequacy of the piping affected by change of restraint at snubbers is presented.
1he source for all piping configuration data and service requirements are referenced.
The analytical methods used to establish the stress in the affected piping are discussed.
Finally, the results of the snubber assessment with respect to removal or replacement with a strut are presented.
2.0 APPROACH Upon removing snubbers or replacing them with struts, in a pipirig run, ii is necessary to requalify the piping to the piping design criteria.
The requak.
tion approach is different depending upon which action (removal or repacemcnt) is taken.
In the case of removal, the dynamic character of the piping run has changed while the thermal expansion and static mechanical load character remains the same.
This means only that section of the design criteria involved with dynamic loadings must be addressed.
The requalification for this case can be accom plished in one of two ways:
i) by comparison, using the analogous INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 piping as the baseline.
7h-,is is possible since the building, location, and design criteria for the two units are essentially the same.
ii) by performing response spectra analysis and the associated code compliance evaluation for the new support configuration.
This requires a detailed computer model of each piping run and its support configuration be developed along with response spectra for the building.
NYO-78-005 Revision 1 For the snubber removal review, the first approach (comparison to a baseline) was used.
In the case of replacement with a, strut, the thermal expansion and static mechanical load character of the piping run has changed while the dynamic character remains the same.
This means only those portions of the design criteria involved with limitations on thermal expansion stresses-and static mechanical loads, other than pressure, must be addressed. As in the previous case, requalification -for this-case can be accomplished in one of two ways:
- 1) by comparison, using the analogous INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 piping as the baseline. This is possible since the systems and design criteria for the two units are essentially the same.
ii) by performing thermal expansion and static mechanical loads analysis and the associated code compliance evaluation for the new support configuration.
This requires a detailed computer model of each piping run and its support configura tion be developed.
Based upon the fact that the original support configurations were developed using chart methods, it was felt that significant margins were available with respect to thermal expansion stress allowables.
To take maximum adv.antage of this, the-detailed computer analysis approach was used.
3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA The design criteria and assumptions necessary to use the criteria in re qualifying the piping runs affected by change of restraint characteristics at currently existing snubber locations is dependent upon which action (removal or replacement with a strut) is used.
In the case of removal by comparison, the criteria is composed of the following requirements.
- 1) The routing of the UNIT 2 piping with respect to the baseline (UNIT 3) must be the same within acceptable engineering tolerances for a distance on both sides of the snubber in question. -The distance in either direction is dependent-upon both routing and support configuration. The combination of routing and support configuration must be such that varia tions between UNIT 2 and the baseline outside this distance will not significantly affect the dynamic response to seismic loading in the area affected by the snubber.
..NYO-78-005 Revision 1 ii) The support configuration within the region of interest for UNIT 2 must be the same as that for the baseline except for the snubber in qruestion.
This means upon removal the sup port configurations are the'same.
iii) The piping components and valves which comprise both UNIT 2 and the baseline within the region of interest must be the same.
For each snubber removed using this criteria,a written justification for each of the items'noted must be presented.
The use of this criteria involves the following assumptions:
The design seismic input for the baseline (UNIT 3) envelops the UNIT 2 design seismic input. The design seismic inputs are the same.
The dynamic character of the containment buildings for the baseline and UNIT 2 are the same with respect to seismic loading.
The design criteria used to establish the structural adequacy of the baseline conservatively bounds that used for UNIT 2.
The criteria for both units is essentially identical.
In the case of replacement with a strut, the criteria from PART 5: EXPANSION,.
FLEXIBILITY AND SUPPORTING;.USAS B 31.1.0 - 1967 POWER PIPING CODE was used. This criteria limits the range of stress of power piping systems sub-ject to thermal expansion and/or to similar movements imposed by other sources such as anchor movements.
The use of this criteria imposes restrictions on the method of analysis which must be followed.
In line with these analysis restrictions the following assumptions were made:
Gaps designed into supports were utilized as necessary, but only when and where specified in the support configuration design. Conservative assumptions with respect to thermal expansion stresses were made for supports where necessary.
Valves and flanges were modelled as twice the nominal pipe thickness.
All socket welded fitting dimensions were taken from the current ANSI standard (ANSI B16. 11).
NYO-78-005 Revision I All restraints were modelled as rigid.
Welds were assumed only at the ends of componentsand fittings.
Socket welded fittings were assumed to be as strong as the adjacent pipe.
In other words, the fillet weld would fail first.
Field fabricated branch connections were assumed as strong as the branch weld.
The only static mechanical load other than pressure which the piping in ques tionis subject to is dead weight. Any reductions in the dead weight stresses associated with the change in the support system were conservatively ignored.
4.0 CONFIGURATION AND LOADING DATA The piping run routing and support configuration for both INDIAN POINT UNITS 2 and 3 were obtained from the respective United Engineers and Constructors (UE & C) piping drawings.
In addition, those lines which require requalification by comparison also have listed the appropriate UNIT 3 drawings and revision numbers.
Support details were based upon the marked-up UE & C pipe support drawings for typical supports.
For non-typical supports the Dergen-Patterson drawings were used. Pipe schedule, material, Lnd fitting-type we.e t-aken from tne piping specification.
The UNIT 2 flow diagrams were used to verify the.
qualitative routing.
System boundaries and operating temperatures were based upon the United Engineers line list for UNIT 2.
TABLE I lists the operating temperatures used. Anchor movements for thermal expansion were taken from the UNIT 2 Reactor Coolant Loop Thermal Movements for lines attaching to the main coolant loop. Movements for other pieces of equipment were obtained from UNIT 3 piping isometrics.
5.0 ANALYTICAL METHOD In order to determine the gross thermal expansion stresses, the piping runs were modelled using EDS Nuclear's PISOL program. This program represents the piping as a beam type structure and applies the stress intensification and flexibility factors contained in Appendix D of USAS B 31.1.0 - 1967 POWER PIPING CODE. Where practical, piping runs were modelled in their entirety.
Otherwise, the piping model was extended to a point sufficiently past the last snubber in order that the piping omitted had an insignificant effect on the piping in the area of concern.
NYO-78-005 Revision 1 In cases where lines of similar stiffness attached to each other, part of the adjacent piping was included in the model to account for the interaction between the two.
Figures 1 thru 20 present the PISOL math models including the support configuration for the various piping runs considered.
Thermal expansion analysis, including the application of thermal expansion anchor movements, was performed on the above noted modele, replacing as many snubbers as possible with struts while meeting the requirements of the design criteria. The temperatures used are those listed in TABLE I.
For the final support configuration, the resulting PISOL stress output is summarized in Table III for each of the piping runs considered. The output contains pertinent configurational information, displacements, forces, moments, and stresses.
6.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS In the effort to redesign the support systems for piping with respect to snubber removal or replacement with a strut, the criteria for removal was applied first to all lines. Only snubber RCH-77 on line number 63 was removed by comparison with the analogous UNIT 3 configuration.
The routing and all restraints except the snubber in question are the same. Based upon this snubber RCH-77 of line 63 is recommended for removal.
Next all lines were modelled and thermal expansion anaiyis used to est&abish which snubbers in each line could be replaced with struts. TABLE II presents all snubbers considered for each line along with their final recom nended stats.
For those snubbers which are recommended for replacement wit I strii thle thermal expansion load in the strut is also listed to aid in. design sizing cf th-e strut.
It should be noted that the above recommended support sytem redesign, which has as its objective the reduction of the number of snubbers in INDIAN POINT UNIT 2, has only removed snubbers based upon the restrictions setforth in this report. There are additional margins in the design criteria and analytical approach which if applied have the potential for additional snubber removal or replacement with a strut.
5-
TABLE I LINE NUMBER VERSUS OPERATING TEMPERATURE lii Line Number 13
-"14 14A 17 43 44 52 53 61 62 73 74 78 93 94 293 318 350 Operating Temperature
( defrree F ~
A ere 120 120 120 300 130/175 130/175 120 120 140/t53 140/53 130
.130 350 120/350 120/350 270/350 120 120/B50
TABLE II RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SNUBBERS ON NORTH HALF OF CONTAINMENT-INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 2
Line Identification Snubber Identification Recommended Status Strut Load (,Pounds) 13 14 14A SR1027A SR1028 SR1028A SR1029A SR1030 SR1030A SR1031 SR1032 SR1037 SR1037A SR1051 SR1052 SR1053 SR1059 SR1060 SR1079 SR1080 SR1081 14-SR-2 SR1035 SR1036A SR1039A SR1040A SR1041 SR1042 SR1045A SR1048 SR1049 SR1050 SR1056 SR1057 SR1083 SR1084 SR1001 SR1002 SR1002A SR1003 SR1003A SR1010
-577.8
-160.1
+
8.1 Snubber Strut Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Snubber Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Strut Strut Snubber
+294.0 37.8
+ -85.5
-157.0
+ 47.4
+
3.5
+136.7
+166.9
+ 75.1 70.4 U
I TABLE H - continued 17 continued SR1015 SR1063 SR1065 SR1069 SR1020 SR1020A SR1021 SR1022 SR1024A
-SR1025A SR1026 SR1072 SR1073 52-SR-I 53-SR-1 53-SR-2 SR-881 SR-887 SR-888 SR-890 SR-922A SR-922B SR-924 SR-924A
- RCH-77 73-SR-I SR1016 SR1016A SR1017 SR1017A SR1017B SR1018A 74-SR-I SR1085 512.7 76.0
+ 440.6
+
9.7 34.0
+ 270.9
+1400.8 309.5
+
17.1
+ 458.
-1810.
+ 345.8
+ 40.1 29.9 Strut Strut Strut Snubber Strut Snubber Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Removed Strut Strut Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber Snubber
TABLE II - continued Line Identification 74 continued 78 93 94 293 318 350 Snubber Identification Recommended Status I
L SR1086 SR1087 SR1087A SR1088 SR1089 SR1090 SR 1092 78-SR-1
- SR-750
- SR-750A
- SR-751 SR-752 SR-752A SR-753
- SR-754
- SR-757
- SR-758
- SR...758A SR-759 SR-761 SR-762 SR-762A S1-763 SR-763A SR-764 318-SR-I 318-SR-2 318-SR-3 318-SR-5 PWR-156 Snubber Snubber Snubber Strut Snubber Strut Snubber Snubber Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Snubber Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Strut Load (Pounds) 16.4
+
10.1
-7022.6
-5668.8
+7017.5
+4062.4
-5910.5
+ 599.8 988.0
-6664.8
+8924.6
-3703.8
-1279.5
-9768. 0
-286.9
-1501.5
-4360.8
+ 764.8 261.5 669.9 105.8 662.5
+13,379.2
- Already modified to rigid by earlier analysis by others.
TABLE III STRESS
SUMMARY
FOR LINES ANALYZED FOR EXPANSION LOADS Line Location Stress Code Allowable Number Member #
Joint #
(PSI)
Stress Limit (PSI) 13 (pup,23)
C06 120 19,004.
22,-500.
.13 (pump 24) 23A 280 17, 115.
22, 500.
14 9
16 14,025.
22,500.
14 (pump 23) 31 45 16,356.
22,500.
14 (pump 24) 16 513 14, 010.
22, 500.
14A (pump 23) 2 1A 14,090.
22,500.
- 17 (pump 23) 16 33A 23,541.
27,088.
17 (pump 24) 2 2
17,093.
27,088.
43 2
2 18,500.
27,.609 44 C07 19 15,101.
27, 60 9.
52 C07 24 14,786.
22,500.
53 & 318 C07 1s 1,391.
22,500 61 & 62 24E 45 17,254.
2 6,338.
73
'8-52 15,925.
27, 919.
74 39 A53 10,235.
27,919.
78 1
1A 24,150.
27,088.
93 C02 14 13,863.
26,687.
94 C02 18 15,090.
26,687.
293 3
3 16,847.
26,687.
.350 C05 17 16,886.
28,063.
- NOTE:
For this line SR-1011 and SR 1L012 were considered rigid restraints in this analysis, but they actually don't exist. As a result, the expansion stresses for this line are conservative.
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