ML100980273
| ML100980273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1979 |
| From: | EDS Nuclear |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML100980274 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902150324, NYO-78-005, NYO-78-5 | |
| Download: ML100980273 (35) | |
Text
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SUPPORT SYSTEM REDESIGN FOR PIPING RUNS ON NORTH HALF OF CONTAINMENT FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 Prepared For:
CONSOLIDATED EDISION COMPANY Prepared By:
EDS NUCLEAR, INC.
January, 1979 EDS Report No. NYO-78-005, Revision I
EDS NUCLEAR LNC.
REPORT APPROVAL COVER SHEET Client: Consolidated Edison Company Project: Indian Point Unit 2 Report
Title:
Support System Redesign for Piping Runs on North Half of Containment Report Number: NYO-78-005 Rev. 0 The work described in this Report was performed in accordance with the EDS Nuclear Quality Assurance Program. The signatures below verify the accuracy of this Report and its compliance with applicable quality assurance requirements.
Prepared By: Date: -&A//7S (Engineer)
Reviewed By: Date: -7
( 1 l~roject Engineer)
Approved By: Date: A (Division Manager)
REVISION RECORD Rev.
No. Prepared Reviewed Approved Approval Date Revision 1/1/17/79 Incorporation of Consolidated Edison Comments
11 Revision 1 CERTIFICATION The undersigned, a registered Professional Engineer competent in the field of piping analysis, certifies to the best of his knowledge and be lief that the analyses presented herein for the Support System Redesign for Piping Runs on North Half of Containment for Indian Point Unit 2 are correct and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ANSI B31. 1 Power Piping Code.
su s \Gary o .Shears STATE 0 NEW YORK
~ REGISTRATION NO. 053437 4'0 (Date)
NYO-78-005 Revision I SUPPORT SYSTEM REDESIGN FOR PIPING RUNS ON NORTH HALF OF CONTAINMENT FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Description
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 APPROACH1 3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA 2 4.0 CONFIGURATION AND LOADING DATA 4 5.0 ANALYTICAL METHOD 4 6.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 5 TABLES FIGURES
NYO-78-005 Revision 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report documents the analytical effort and results of a task involved in support system redesign for piping runs inside containment for INDIAN POINT UNIT 2. The objective of the support system redesign task is to'improve the reliability of the subject piping runs by reducing the number of hydraulic snubb ers necessary to satisfy the piping design criteria. The scope of the effort reported herein involves piping runs on the north half of containment. In addition, the support system redesign was limited for this effort to considering only snubber removal or replacement with struts.
Presentation of the documentation is as follows. The approach used to assess and justify snubber removal or replacement with a strut is set forth. The design criteria and assumptions necessary to use the criteria in establishing the struct ural adequacy of the piping affected by change of restraint at snubbers is presented.
1he source for all piping configuration data and service requirements are referenced. The analytical methods used to establish the stress in the affected piping are discussed. Finally, the results of the snubber assessment with respect to removal or replacement with a strut are presented.
2.0 APPROACH Upon removing snubbers or replacing them with struts, in a pipirig run, iiis necessary to requalify the piping to the piping design criteria. The requak.
tion approach is different depending upon which action (removal or repacemcnt) is taken.
In the case of removal, the dynamic character of the piping run has changed while the thermal expansion and static mechanical load character remains the same.
This means only that section of the design criteria involved with dynamic loadings must be addressed. The requalification for this case can be accom plished in one of two ways:
i) by comparison, using the analogous INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 piping as the baseline. 7h-,is is possible since the building, location, and design criteria for the two units are essentially the same.
ii) by performing response spectra analysis and the associated code compliance evaluation for the new support configuration.
This requires a detailed computer model of each piping run and its support configuration be developed along with response spectra for the building.
NYO- 78-005 Revision 1 For the snubber removal review, the first approach (comparison to a baseline) was used.
In the case of replacement with a, strut, the thermal expansion and static mechanical load character ofthe piping run has changed while the dynamic character remains the same. This means only those portions of the design criteria involved with limitations on thermal expansion stresses-and static mechanical loads, other than pressure, must be addressed. As in the previous case, requalification -for this-case can be accomplished in one of two ways:
- 1) by comparison, using the analogous INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 piping as the baseline. This is possible since the systems and design criteria for the two units are essentially the same.
ii) by performing thermal expansion and static mechanical loads analysis and the associated code compliance evaluation for the new support configuration. This requires a detailed computer model of each piping run and its support configura tion be developed.
Based upon the fact that the original support configurations were developed using chart methods, it was felt that significant margins were available with respect to thermal expansion stress allowables. To take maximum adv.antage of this, the- detailed computer analysis approach was used.
3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA The design criteria and assumptions necessary to use the criteria in re qualifying the piping runs affected by change of restraint characteristics at currently existing snubber locations is dependent upon which action (removal or replacement with a strut) is used.
In the case of removal by comparison, the criteria is composed of the following requirements.
- 1) The routing of the UNIT 2 piping with respect to the baseline (UNIT 3) must be the same within acceptable engineering tolerances for a distance on both sides of the snubber in question. -The distance in either direction is dependent-upon both routing and support configuration. The combination of routing and support configuration must be such that varia tions between UNIT 2 and the baseline outside this distance will not significantly affect the dynamic response to seismic loading in the area affected by the snubber.
..NYO-78-005 Revision 1 ii) The support configuration within the region of interest for UNIT 2 must be the same as that for the baseline except for the snubber in qruestion. This means upon removal the sup port configurations are the'same.
iii) The piping components and valves which comprise both UNIT 2 and the baseline within the region of interest must be the same.
For each snubber removed using this criteria,a written justification for each of the items'noted must be presented. The use of this criteria involves the following assumptions:
- The design seismic input for the baseline (UNIT 3) envelops the UNIT 2 design seismic input. The design seismic inputs are the same.
- The dynamic character of the containment buildings for the baseline and UNIT 2 are the same with respect to seismic loading.
- The design criteria used to establish the structural adequacy of the baseline conservatively bounds that used for UNIT 2.
The criteria for both units is essentially identical.
In the case of replacement with a strut, the criteria from PART 5: EXPANSION,.
FLEXIBILITY AND SUPPORTING;.USAS B 31.1.0 - 1967 POWER PIPING CODE was used. This criteria limits the range of stress of power piping systems sub-ject to thermal expansion and/or to similar movements imposed by other sources such as anchor movements. The use of this criteria imposes restrictions on the method of analysis which must be followed. In line with these analysis restrictions the following assumptions were made:
Gaps designed into supports were utilized as necessary, but only when and where specified in the support configuration design. Conservative assumptions with respect to thermal expansion stresses were made for supports where necessary.
- Valves and flanges were modelled as twice the nominal pipe thickness.
- All socket welded fitting dimensions were taken from the current ANSI standard (ANSI B16. 11).
NYO-78-005 Revision I
- All restraints were modelled as rigid.
- Welds were assumed only at the ends of componentsand fittings.
Socket welded fittings were assumed to be as strong as the adjacent pipe. In other words, the fillet weld would fail first.
- Field fabricated branch connections were assumed as strong as the branch weld.
The only static mechanical load other than pressure which the piping in ques tionis subject to is dead weight. Any reductions in the dead weight stresses associated with the change in the support system were conservatively ignored.
4.0 CONFIGURATION AND LOADING DATA The piping run routing and support configuration for both INDIAN POINT UNITS 2 and 3 were obtained from the respective United Engineers and Constructors (UE & C) piping drawings. In addition, those lines which require requalification by comparison also have listed the appropriate UNIT 3 drawings and revision numbers. Support details were based upon the marked-up UE & C pipe support drawings for typical supports. For non-typical supports the Dergen-Patterson drawings were used. Pipe schedule, material, Lnd fitting- type we.e t-aken from tne piping specification. The UNIT 2 flow diagrams were used to verify the .
qualitative routing.
System boundaries and operating temperatures were based upon the United Engineers line list for UNIT 2. TABLE I lists the operating temperatures used. Anchor movements for thermal expansion were taken from the UNIT 2 Reactor Coolant Loop Thermal Movements for lines attaching to the main coolant loop. Movements for other pieces of equipment were obtained from UNIT 3 piping isometrics.
5.0 ANALYTICAL METHOD In order to determine the gross thermal expansion stresses, the piping runs were modelled using EDS Nuclear's PISOL program. This program represents the piping as a beam type structure and applies the stress intensification and flexibility factors contained in Appendix D of USAS B 31.1.0 - 1967 POWER PIPING CODE. Where practical, piping runs were modelled in their entirety.
Otherwise, the piping model was extended to a point sufficiently past the last snubber in order that the piping omitted had an insignificant effect on the piping in the area of concern.
NYO- 78-005 Revision 1 In cases where lines of similar stiffness attached to each other, part of the adjacent piping was included in the model to account for the interaction between the two. Figures 1 thru 20 present the PISOL math models including the support configuration for the various piping runs considered.
Thermal expansion analysis, including the application of thermal expansion anchor movements, was performed on the above noted modele, replacing as many snubbers as possible with struts while meeting the requirements of the design criteria. The temperatures used are those listed in TABLE I.
For the final support configuration, the resulting PISOL stress output is summarized in Table III for each of the piping runs considered. The output contains pertinent configurational information, displacements, forces, moments, and stresses.
6.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS In the effort to redesign the support systems for piping with respect to snubber removal or replacement with a strut, the criteria for removal was applied first to all lines. Only snubber RCH-77 on line number 63 was removed by comparison with the analogous UNIT 3 configuration. The routing and all restraints except the snubber in question are the same. Based upon this snubber RCH-77 of line 63 is recommended for removal.
Next all lines were modelled and thermal expansion anaiyis used to est&abish which snubbers in each line could be replaced with struts. TABLE II presents -.
all snubbers considered for each line along with their final recom nended stats.
For those snubbers which are recommended for replacement wit I strii thle thermal expansion load in the strut is also listed to aid in. design sizing cf th-e strut.
It should be noted that the above recommended support sytem redesign, which has as its objective the reduction of the number of snubbers in INDIAN POINT UNIT 2, has only removed snubbers based upon the restrictions setforth in this report. There are additional margins in the design criteria and analytical approach which if applied have the potential for additional snubber removal or replacement with a strut.
TABLE I LINE NUMBER VERSUS OPERATING TEMPERATURE lii Line Number Operating Temperature
( defrree F ~
A ere 13 120
-"14 120 14A 120 17 300 43 130/175 44 130/175 52 120 53 120 61 140/t53 62 140/53 73 130 74 .130 78 350 93 120/350 94 120/350 293 270/350 318 120 350 120/B50
TABLE II RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SNUBBERS ON NORTH HALF OF CONTAINMENT-INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 U
2 Line Identification Snubber Identification Recommended Status Strut Load (,Pounds) 13 SR1027A Snubber SR1028 Strut -577.8 SR1028A Strut -160.1 SR1029A Strut + 8.1 SR1030 Snubber SR1030A Snubber SR1031 Snubber SR1032 Snubber SR1037 Snubber SR1037A Snubber SR1051 Snubber SR1052 Snubber SR1053 Snubber SR1059 Strut +294.0 SR1060 Snubber SR1079 Snubber SR1080 Snubber SR1081 Strut - 37.8 14 14-SR-2 Strut + -85.5 SR1035 Snubber SR1036A Snubber SR1039A Snubber SR1040A Snubber SR1041 Strut -157.0 SR1042 Snubber SR1045A Strut + 47.4 SR1048 Strut + 3.5 SR1049 Snubber SR1050 Snubber SR1056 Strut +136.7 SR1057 Snubber SR1083 Snubber SR1084 Snubber 14A SR1001 Snubber SR1002 Snubber SR1002A Strut +166.9 SR1003 Strut + 75.1 SR1003A Strut - 70.4 SR1010 Snubber
I TABLE H - continued 17 continued SR1015 Strut - 512.7 SR1063 Strut - 76.0 SR1065 Strut + 440.6 SR1069 Snubber SR1020 Strut + 9.7 SR1020A Snubber SR1021 Strut - 34.0 SR1022 Strut + 270.9 SR1024A Snubber
-SR1025A Snubber SR1026 Snubber SR1072 Snubber SR1073 Snubber 52- SR- I Strut +1400.8 53-SR-1 Strut - 309.5 53-SR-2 Strut + 17.1 SR-881 Snubber SR-887 Snubber SR-888 Strut + 458.
SR-890 Strut -1810.
SR-922A Snubber SR-922B Snubber SR-924 Snubber SR- 924A Strut + 345.8
- RCH-77 Removed 73-SR-I Strut + 40.1 SR1016 Strut - 29.9 SR1016A Snubber SR1017 Snubber SR1017A Snubber SR1017B Snubber SR1018A Snubber 74- SR- I Snubber SR1085 Snubber
TABLE II - continued Line Identification Snubber Identification Recommended Status Strut Load (Pounds)
I L 74 continued SR1086 Snubber SR1087 Snubber SR1087A Snubber SR1088 Strut - 16.4 SR1089 Snubber SR1090 Strut + 10.1 SR 1092 Snubber 78 78-SR-1 Snubber 93 *SR-750 Strut -7022.6
- SR-750A Strut -5668.8
- SR-751 Strut +7017.5 SR-752 Strut +4062.4 SR-752A Strut -5910.5 SR-753 Strut + 599.8
- SR-754 Strut - 988.0 94 *SR-757 Strut -6664.8
- SR-758 Strut +8924.6
- SR...758A Strut -3703.8 SR-759 Strut -1279.5 293 SR-761 Strut -9768. 0 SR-762 Strut -286.9 SR-762A Strut -1501.5 S1- 763 Strut -4360.8 SR-763A Snubber SR-764 Strut + 764.8 318 318-SR-I Strut 261.5 318-SR-2 Strut 669.9 318-SR-3 Strut 105.8 318-SR-5 Strut 662.5 350 PWR-156 Strut +13,379.2
- Already modified to rigid by earlier analysis by others.
TABLE III STRESS
SUMMARY
FOR LINES ANALYZED FOR EXPANSION LOADS Line Location Stress Code Allowable Number Member # Joint # (PSI) Stress Limit (PSI) 13 (pup,23) C06 120 19,004. 22,-500.
.13 (pump 24) 23A 280 17, 115. 22, 500.
14 9 16 14,025. 22,500.
14 (pump 23) 31 45 16,356. 22,500.
14 (pump 24) 16 513 14, 010. 22, 500.
14A (pump 23) 2 1A 14,090. 22,500.
- 17 (pump 23) 16 33A 23,541. 27,088.
17 (pump 24) 2 2 17,093. 27,088.
43 2 2 18,500. 27,.609 44 C07 19 15,101. 27, 60 9.
52 C07 24 14,786. 22,500.
53 & 318 C07 1s 1,391. 22,500 61 & 62 24E 45 17,254. 2 6,338.
73 '8- 52 15,925. 27, 919.
74 39 A53 10,235. 27,919.
78 1 1A 24,150. 27,088.
93 C02 14 13,863. 26,687.
94 C02 18 15,090. 26,687.
293 3 3 16,847. 26,687.
.350 C05 17 16,886. 28,063.
- NOTE: For this line SR-1011 and SR 1L012 were considered rigid restraints in this analysis, but they actually don't exist. As a result, the expansion stresses for this line are conservative.
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