ML100670496

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Final Outlines (Folder 3)
ML100670496
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/15/2010
From: D'Antonio J
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Operations Branch I
To:
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
Hansell S
Shared Package
ML092400035 List:
References
50-336/10-301, ES-401, ES-401-2, TAC U01799, FOIA/PA-2011-0115 50-336/10-301
Download: ML100670496 (12)


Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Exam: 01/29/10 RO KJA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group

~

1 ~

K 3

K K 4 5 K A 6 1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G

" r A2 G" Total I

'~

1. 1 /' 18 2 6 Emergency &

Abnormal Plant 2

/' ~ 9 2 2 4 .i

1

/~""

Evolutions Tier Totals 27 4 6 10 1 28 1 4 5 2.

Systems Plant 2

,/

/V 10 N/A 1 2 3 :1 I

Tier Totals 1/ ~ 2 6 8 !i Ii

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1- ~ ~ ~ --10 1 2 3 4 Iii!

Note: 1, Categories

~ ---- ---------

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2 2 2 1 Ensure that at least 2 topics from every KJA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KJA category shall not be less than 2).

7 Ii I!

11 2, Tho point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match those specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

I;

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility Ii,I should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are included on the outline should be II added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KJA statements. I:
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a sec:ond topic for any system or evolution,
5. Absent a plant specific, only those KJAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2,5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO II ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively. r
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KJA categories.
7. " Tho generic KJAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KJA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KJAs.
8. On the following pages, enter the KJA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable ,I license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of column A2 for Tier 2 I!

Group 2 (Nole #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO*only exams. I!

I'

9. For Tier 3, sBlect topics form Section 2 of the KJA catalog, and enter the KJA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES*40103. Limit SRO selections to KJAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43. II

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 01 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO E/APE # I Name I Safety Function K K K A A G KIA Topic(s) IR 1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BWIE02&E 10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 11 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident 13 000009 Small Brea~: LOCA I 3 2.1.31 ,A.bility toloeate eOBtFol FOOIH switehes, eOBtFols, aBEl iBElieatioBs, aBEl to E1eteFlHiBe that they eOFFeetly Fefleet the E1esiFeEi JJlaBt IiBeuJJ.

Does not adequately test SRO knowledge or 4.6/4.6 ability.

2.1.20 - Ability to interpret and execute 000011 Large Break LOCA 13 1;;1\2.06 Ability to E1eteFlHiBe OF iBteFJJFet 3.7*14.0* 2 the followiBg as they aJJJJly to a LaFge BFeal(

LOCA: That faR is iR slaw speed aRd dalfl!3ers are iR aeeideHt made dtiriRg LOCA Does not adequately test SRO knowledge or ability.

EA2.10 - Ability to determine or interpret 4.5/4/7 the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Verification of .

000015/17 RCP Malfunctions 14 2.1.7 - Ability to evaluate plant 4.41417 3 performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 12 000025 Loss of RHR System 14 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction I 3 000029 ATWS I 1 000038 Steam Gen . Tube Rupture I 3 2.1.30 - Ability to locate and operate 4.414.0 4 components, including local controls.

000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer I 4

000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater 14 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus I 6 2.4.35 - Knowledge oflocal auxiliary 3.8/4.0 5 operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

000058 Loss of DC Power I 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water 14 ES-401

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/G E/APE # 1 NamE! 1 Safety Function KKK A A G KIA Topic(s) IR #

12312 000065 Loss of Instrument Air 18 M2.06 - Ability to determine and interpret 3.6*/4.2 6 the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is de-creasing 000077 Generator Voltagl3 and Electric Grid Disturbances 1 6 KIA Category Totals: Group Point Total: 6 ES-401

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO 1

============~~========~=====9r=91 E/APE # 1 Name 1 Safety Function KKK A KIA Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal 11 000003 Dropped Control Rod 1 1 AA2.04 - Ability to determine and 3.4*/3.6* 7 interpret the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Rod motion stops due to dropped rod 0000051 Boration 1 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction 1 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI 1 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI 1 7 000036 Fuel Handli Accident 1 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak 1 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 14 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste ReI. 19 000060 Accidental GaseoLis Radwaste ReI. 1 9 2.4.18 - Knowledge ofthe specific 3.3/4.0 8 bases for EOPs.

000061 ARM System Alarrns 1 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. 1 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity 15 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling 14 2.4.30 - Knowledge of events 2.7/4.1 9 related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity 1 9 AA2.07 - Ability to determine and 2.4/2.7* 10 interpret the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: WlieR demiReralizer resiR Reeds te Be refllaeed.

Does NOT distinguish between a competent and incompetent SRo.

AA2.02 - Corrective Actions required 2.8/3.4 for high fission product activity in RCS BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. 14 CE/A11; W/E08 ReS Overcooling - PTS 14 CE/A16 Excess RCS e/2 KIA Category Point Totals: Group Point Total: 4 ES-401

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 Form ES-401-2 Plant :---"

---"....,,<orr1'"

System # / Name K K KKK K KIA Topic(s) IR #

1 2 345 6 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 2.1.23 - Ability to perform specific 4.3/4.4 11 system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

004 Chemical and Volume A2.15 - Ability to (a) predict the 3.5/3.7 12 Control impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the eves; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High or low PZR level 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 006 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection 2.4.4 - Ability to recognize 4.5/4.7 13 abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooli 026 Containment Spray 2.4 .50 Ability to verify system systelH 14 alarm alaflH setIJoints and 8IJeFItte 8IJef'ltte centF81s eentf'8ls identified in the olaFm olaf'1H FeSIJ8Rse f'eSIJ8nse mORsal.

Does not adequately test SRO knowledge or abilityfor ability for this system.

2.4.9 - Knowledge of low 3.6/4.2 power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater ES-401

ES-401 6 Form ES*401*2 ES-401 PWR Examination Out! .~_.... Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (

1F==========='======9==T=9==~9=~=9== ~~~~==============~====9F==91 System # / Name KKK KKK KIA Topic(s) IR #

1 234 5 6 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Dleslel I Generator 073 Process Radiation Mon.tnr.nn 076 Service Water 3.7/4.1 15 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment 5

ES-401

ES-401 7 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 System # / Name KKK KKKKKK K K KJA Topic(s) IR #

1 23 2 3445 56 6 001 Control Rod Drive 014 Rod Position Indication ication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temp~~rature Monitor 028 Hydrogen Rec:ombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 2.1.32 - Ability to explain and 3.8/4.0 16 apply all system limits and precautions.

033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handlin Equipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine 1-\\/1"1<>.' Control Bypass 045 Main Turbine Generator 2.2.36 ABility ta IlBlilyze the ~ 17 effeet af mlliBteBIiBee Iletivities, Ileth'ities, sueh liS degrllded degFlided pawer saUl'ees, aB the stlitUS af limitiBg IimitiBg eaBditiaBs farfaF 9peratioBs.

9peFlitisBS.

NO Technical Specifications exist for the Main Turbine Generator; therefore, NO Limiting Conditions for Operation exist.

2.4.47 - Ability to diagnose and 4.2/4.2 recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate densate 068 Liquid uid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal Dis 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 1\1If'l,nitIrir.n 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air ES-401

ES-401 8 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 Form ES-401-2 Plant "\"~T<>'rn System # / Name KKK KKK KIA Topic(s) IR #

1 234 5 6 086 Fire Protection A2.03 - Ability to (a) predict 2.7/2.9 18 the impacts of the following mal- functions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Inadvertent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or welding KIA :l'IT,pn/"'Ir\f Point Totals: Group Point Total: 3 ES-401

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401*3 Date of Exam: 01/29/10 Category KJA# Topic RO SRO KBe:wledge ef faeility requirements fer eentrelling 2.1.13 "ital/eefttrelled aeeess.

Rejected by NRC on previous exam. Only General Employee or item.

1.

Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity Conduct of 2.1.43 of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, Operations fuel etc.

2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of SROs.

Subtotal Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities 2.2.17 during power operations, such as risk assessments, work

2. prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system Equipment Control nowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

2.2.38 Subtotal 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

3. 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may Radiation arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or Control activities.

ity to prioritize and interpret the significance of each

4. 2.4.45 nciator or alarm.

Emergency Procedures and Plan Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total ES-401

ES**401 Record of Rejected K1As Form ES-401-4 r;:i;1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA I 1/1 009 2.1.31 Does NOT adequately test SRO knowledge or ability. Unable to develoQ a reasonable SRO guestion to test this KIA.

1/1 011 EA2.06 Does NOT adequately test SRO knowledge or ability. Determining that CAR Fans shift to slow is a basic RO function and there are NO dampers that shift during a LOCA.

076 - AA2.07 Does NOT distinguish between a competent and incompetent SRO.

2/1 026 - 2.4.50 Does NOT adequately test SRO knowledge or ability for this system.

This system only has one alarm and the response is very basic.

2/2 045 -2.2.36 No Technical Specifications exist for the Main Turbine Generator; therefore, no Limiting Conditions for Operation exist.

3/0 2.1.13 Rejected by NRC on previous exam. Only General Employee or Security knowledge item.

ES-401, Page 27 of 33

SROEl:~ht Questions ()Illy (No)'Parents f t Or "Oiiginals U )

Question #: 1 Question ID; 9000018 [] RO ~ SRO D Student Handout? D Lower Order?

I-SRO Ques. # 1 Rev. 1 ~ Selected for Exam Origin; New D Past NRC Exam?

The plant automatically tripped on High Pressurizer Pressure due to an inadvertent closure of the Main Turbine Control Valves.

During the performance of EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, the crew reported that Bus 24D is deenergized due to a fault and that Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV), RC-404, is stuck open. All other equipment operated as designed. Upon entry into EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident, the following conditions <<~xist:

- Containment pressure is 4.5 psia and slowly rising.

- Reactor vessel is 43% and slowly going down

- CET temperatures are 568°F and stable

- RCS pressure is 1210 pSia and stable

- Pressurizer level is 100%.

- RWST level is 9fi% and slowly going down.

- Steam generator levels are both 41 % and going up slowly.

Which of the following actions must the Unit Supervisor/Shift Manager perform to preserve a Safety Function?

D A Direct the Tecl1nical Support Center to develop a plan to restore RWST level.

D B Direct the Balance of Plant Operator to align 24E to receive power from Unit 3.

D C Direct the Reactor Operator to place the SI/CS Pump Miniflow switches in "OPERATE".

~ D Direct the crew to commence a controlled cooldown and depressurization .

..Justification Justification I o IS CORRECT; With Res pressure stable at 1310 psi psia a and the PORV still open, RCS inventory is being lost faster than Charging can restore it. The steps for the cooldown and subsequent depressurization must be pulled forward (performed out of sequence) to allow RCS pressure to be reduced below HSPI shut off head to allow adequate Safety Injection flow.

A is incorrect; Although RWST level is lowering, there is NO need to develop a plan to restore RWST level at this time (perform step out of sequence).

Plausible because step 8 of EOP 2532 directs the US or SM to have the TSC develop a plan for restoring level in the RWST if the LOCA is determined to be outside of Containment. Examinee may not remember that this step is required ONLY if the LOCA is outside of Containment.

B is incorrect; Although the loss of 240 makes the "C" HPSI pump unavailable, the one available HPSI pump should be enough to mitigate the event, provided an RCS cooldown and depressurization is accomplished.

Plausible the e)(aminee may believe that starting a second HPSI pump is necessary to recover vessel level because the given conditions indicate that SI flow is presently inadequate (vessel level going down).

C is incorrect; The SI/CS Pump Miniflow switches are not placed in 'OPERATE" until RWST level is ~20%.

Plausible because the examinee may feel that a Sump Recirc Actuation Signal is imminent; therefore, it would be appropriate to perform this step out of s,equence.

References I EOP 2532, "LOCA" and OP 2260, "EOP Users Guide" Comments and Question Modification History NRC (comments on original question) - Distracter "8" does not relate to a Safety Function; Replace. Distracter "A" would be acceptable if an RWST ~evel were added to the stem.

RLC -In the stem: changed CET temp. from 578°F to 568°F, changed RCS pressure from 1310 psia to 1210 psia, and added "RWST level is 96% and slowly going down.". Also, changed choice "B" from realigning Condo Air Removal to aligning 24E to Unit 3. [12/30109)

Bruce F... 0-3/C, No comment NRC KIA SystemtEtA System 009 Small Break LOCA

~CKJA -Selected]

NRC KtA Generic System 2.1 Conduct of Operations Page 1 of 75 Printed on 1/7/2010 at 16:49

Question #: 1 Question ID: 9000018 D RO ~ SRO D Student Handout? D Lower Order?

I-SRO Ques. Ii Rev. 1 ~ Selected for Exam Origin: New D Past NRC Exam?

Number 2.1.20 RO 4.6 SRO 4.6 CFR Link (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.12)

Ability to interp'et and execute procedure steps.

l\1.illstone Unit 2 EOP 2532 Revision 029 Loss of' Coolant Accident Page 21 of 95 INSTRUCilONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE I. Res cooldown should be initiated \vithin one hour after the event to conserve condensate inventory and comply with the Long Term Cooling Analysis.

2. Res cooldown rate greater than 40C Flhr should hc maintaincd until the steam dump/bypass ~alves or atmospheric dump valves are full open.
3. The ~tarting point for the RCS cooldown should be the T c or CET temperatures where RCS has stabilized.
4. Tc should be w;ed for monitoring ReS eooldown if in forced or natural circu Hati on. CET.~ should be used for all other cases.

NOTE Technical Specification cooldown rates should be observed during the cooldown. The cooldown rates are as follows:

1. ReS T c greater than 2200 F the cooldown rate is lOWF/hr.
2. ReS T c less than or equal to 220" F the cooldown rate is 500 F/hr.

Perform Controlled Cooldown "l7.INITIATE a controlled coolom\'n 17.1 INITIATE a controlled cooldown using the steam dllmps to establish using the ADVs to establish shutdown shutdown cooling entry conditions. cooling entry conditions.

STOP THINK ACT REVIEW Page 2 of 75 Printed on 1/7/2010 at 16:49