ML100490992
| ML100490992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/2010 |
| From: | Caniano R Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Flores R Luminant Generation Co |
| References | |
| EA 09-306, IR-09-004 | |
| Download: ML100490992 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000445/2009004
Text
February 18, 2010
EA 09-306
Rafael Flores, Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Attention: Regulatory Affairs
Luminant Generation Company LLC
P.O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO COMANCHE PEAK DISPUTED NON-CITED VIOLATION 05000445/2009004-05; 00500446/2009004-05
Dear Mr. Flores,
This letter provides the results of Region IV's review of your letter, dated November 23, 2009
(ML093350541), regarding Non-cited Violation 05000445/2009004-05; 00500446/2009004-05,
Failure to Assure that One Train of Equipment is Free from Fire Damage. In your letter, you
denied that a violation had occurred and requested the NRC to further review the issue. The
NRC has reviewed the information provided in your letter and all applicable supporting
documentation, and has concluded that the issue did involve a violation. Specifically, the NRC
did not approve of using operator actions to restore the required functions provided by auxiliary
feedwater or charging in lieu of providing the required separation or protection.
The violation involved the failure to ensure that at least one of the redundant trains needed to
achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition would be free of fire damage by providing
separation, fire barriers, and/or alternative shutdown capability. The examples cited involved
components from the auxiliary feedwater and the charging and volume control systems that
might not be available to perform the functions credited in your fire safe shutdown analysis
because of potential fire damage. Specifically, the auxiliary feedwater system was credited to
perform the decay heat removal function, and the charging and volume control system was
credited to perform the reactor makeup and reactivity control functions.
The examples described in the violation were recognized as being susceptible to potential fire
damage during the fire safe shutdown analysis. Our reviews indicate that this recognition was
not clearly documented, nor was it identified to the NRC in docketed licensing submittals. The
fire safe shutdown analysis was documented or discussed in seven different documents, only
three of which were submitted for NRC review. The manner in which this susceptibility to fire
damage was documented was inconsistent in the different documents. In particular, the
docketed licensing submittals contained statements that at least one of the redundant trains
needed to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition would be free of fire damage by
providing separation, fire barriers, and/or alternative shutdown capability. However, in non-
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
R E GI ON I V
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125
Luminant Generation Company LLC
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docketed support documents, it becomes apparent that when the required methods of
protection and separation alternative means were not met, the analysis documented local
alternative acceptance criteria, rather than using an approved method. In the examples cited,
your alternative to separation and protection was to use operator actions to restore the required
functions after fire damage occurred.
Our review has concluded that, for the examples cited, Comanche Peak failed to meet the
requirements for separation and/or protection of the required functions. Your contention that the
NRC approved the use of manual actions in lieu of protection was not supported by the
docketed material that comprises the current licensing basis for your fire protection program.
Your letter contained a position that Comanche Peaks fire protection program was approved to
allow operator actions as a compliance methodology. However, the NRC safety evaluation
reports that document the review and approval of your fire protection program clearly indicate
the criteria used to determine that acceptability of your program, and those criteria did not
include operator actions as an alternative to separation and/or protection. Our review indicated
that Comanche Peak was approved for 30 specific deviations where these criteria were not met.
Each deviation properly identified the requirements that were not met and demonstrated how
the alternative strategy met the underlying intent to the criteria. While some of your approved
deviations involved alternative separation or protection strategies, none involved reliance on
operator actions in lieu of meeting the separation and protection criteria. On the contrary, two
requested deviations that proposed reliance on operator actions were not approved, and the
NRC required modifications to the plant in order to provide the proper equipment protection.
Your letter indicated that in 1987 and 1988, inspectors reviewed the non-docketed calculations
that documented your alternatives to meeting the NRCs separation and protection criteria.
Inspection Reports 87-22 and 88-39, as well as Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 21
support that claim. These documents reflect an inspection focus on whether manual actions
needed to respond to spurious operation of associated circuits that were taken in the same area
as the postulated fire could be reliably performed. Inspection Report 87-22 contained
comments on the lack of clarity of the intent and timing of the operator actions in the fire safe
shutdown analysis calculation. However, Inspection Reports 87-22 and 88-39, as well as
Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 21 do not state an approval of the use of operator
actions in lieu of meeting the protection and separation criteria. NRC Management Directive
8.4, "Management of Facility-Specific Backfitting and Information Collection," defines tacit
acceptance/approval as being: "when the NRC's silence to a licensee request is, by rule,
deemed to be approval. Instances of tacit acceptance are rare; silence or lack of comment by
the NRC staff where the NRC's rules do not require an NRC response does NOT constitute tacit
acceptance." Therefore, the review of the non-docketed calculation by inspectors did not
constitute NRC approval of the use of those operator actions.
The operator actions associated with examples in the violation involved locally positioning air-
operated valves. The instrument air system is the support system that provides the air supply to
operate the valves. Our review concluded that your fire safe shutdown analysis failed to identify
that instrument air was required to be available in order to support the charging and auxiliary
feedwater functions, and therefore failed to classify this system as a system needed to achieve
a post-fire safe shutdown condition.
Luminant Generation Company LLC
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Your letter indicated that the violation referred to the NRC's approval of the pertinent part of the
fire protection program in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 12, which was issued before
you made changes to the fire safe shutdown analysis. Our review indicated that the changes
were reviewed in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 21, Section 9.5.1, but this supplement
did not supersede the previous discussion in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 12.
Instead, it treated the revision to the program as an update. Although the Fire Hazards Analysis
Report conclusions and the staff's conclusions were the same after the changes, it would have
been more appropriate to refer to the staff's conclusions in both Supplemental Safety Evaluation
Reports 12 and 21 in the statement of the violation.
Your letter stated that the NRC's contention in the violation is different from what was approved
during licensing, and if the NRC maintains this position, this may constitute a backfit. In a
conversation with Mr. Neil O'Keefe on February 1, 2010, Mr. F. Madden, Director of Regulatory
Affairs, stated that it was not Luminant's intention to claim a backfit or request an NRC review of
whether the violation involved a backfit. Mr. Madden stated that the intention was to mention
the possibility that a backfit might be involved. Therefore, no backfit review was performed as
part of this enforcement review.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Roy J. Caniano, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Dockets: 50-445; 50-446
Luminant Generation Company LLC
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Mike Blevins, Chief Operating Officer
Luminant Generation Company LLC
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station
P.O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Mr. Fred W. Madden, Director
Oversight and Regulatory Affairs
Luminant Generation Company LLC
P.O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Timothy P. Matthews, Esq.
Morgan Lewis
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004
County Judge
P.O. Box 851
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Mr. Richard A. Ratliff, Chief
Bureau of Radiation Control
Texas Department of Health
P.O. Box 149347, Mail Code 2835
Austin, TX 78714-9347
Environmental and Natural
Resources Policy Director
Office of the Governor
P.O. Box 12428
Austin, TX 78711-3189
Honorable Walter Maynard
County Judge
P.O. Box 851
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Mr. Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
Austin, TX 78711-3326
Luminant Generation Company LLC
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Ms. Susan M. Jablonski
Office of Permitting, Remediation
and Registration
Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality
MC-122
P.O. Box 13087
Austin, TX 78711-3087
Anthony Jones
Chief Boiler Inspector
Texas Department of Licensing
And Regulation
Boiler Division
E.O. Thompson State Office Building
P.O. Box 12157
Austin, TX 78711
Chief, Technological Hazards
Branch
FEMA Region VI
800 North Loop 288
Federal Regional Center
Denton, TX 76209
Luminant Generation Company LLC
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Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)
DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, ACES (William.Jone@nrc.gov)
Senior Enforcement Specialist (Mark.Haire@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kramer@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Brian.Tindell@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer (David. Proulx@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/A (Wayne.Walker@nrc.gov)
CP Site Secretary (Sue.Sanner@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
OEMail.Resource (OEMail.Resource@nrc.gov)
OEDO RIV Coordinator (Leigh.Trocine@nrc.gov)
OE Director (Roy.Zimmerman@nrc.gov)
OE Deputy Director (Belkys.Sosa@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, Enforcement Branch, OE (Nick.Hilton@nrc.gov)
G. Gulla (Gerry.Gulla@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, Fire Protection Branch, NRR (Alex.Klein@nrc.gov)
Team Leader, Fire Protection Branch, NRR (Dan.Frumkin@nrc.gov)
P. Qualls (Phil.Qualls@nrc.gov)
M. Ashley (MaryAnn.Ashley@nrc.gov)
J. Mateychick (John.Mateychick@nrc.gov)
R:\\Reactors\\CP Response-disputed NCV - NFO
ADAMS: No ; Yes
- NFOSUNSI Review Complete
Reviewer Initials: NFO
- Publicly Available
- Non-Sensitive
Category A.
Non-publicly Available
Sensitive
KEYWORD:
EB 2
C:EB2
SEC: ACES
C: PBA
D: DRS
J. Mateychick N. O'Keefe
R. Kellar
W. Walker
R. Caniano
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
2/11 /2010
2/ 16 /2010
2/ 17 /2010
2/ 16 /2010
2/ 18 /2010
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax