Text

Initial Exam 2008-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML090780273
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	07/21/2008
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Florida Power & Light Co
References
	Download: ML090780273 (104)
	v • d • e

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-1 100% power, MOC 2B AFW Pump OOS. 2C Charging pump OOS for overhaul SJAE Radiation Monitor OOS.

Turnover: 100% Power MOL. The 2B MFW Pump has developed a oil leak and MM is standing by to add oil. 2B AFW pump OOS for bearing repair for the past 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Expected return to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . SJAE Radiation Monitor OOS for past 7 days. 2C Charging pump is OOS for packing replacement.

Critical Tasks:

Close Both MSIV's

Stabilize RCS temperature after 2A SG has blown dry

Restore Feedwater to 2B SG using 2A AFW pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R Power reduction from 100% power to 45% power (RO/BOP) 2 1 C PCV-8801, SBCS drifts open (RO/BOP) 3 2 C (All) 2MA Instrument Inverter fails T.S. SRO 4 3 T.S. SRO RPS Channel MA High Pressure bistable does not reset after Instrument bus re-energized.

5 4 C (RO) HCV-09-2A fails closed, reactor trip 6 5 2B MFW pump bearing failure post trip 7 6 M (ALL) MSSV V8201 (2A SG) stick fully open on trip 8 7 C (BOP) 2C AFW pump trips after AFAS. Restore AFW to 2B SG using 2A AFWpump 9 Isolate 2A SG

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 st. Lucie The crew assumes the shift at 100% power. The 2B AFW pump has been out of service for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for bearing repair. Expected to be out of service for 8 more hours. The 2C Charging pump has been out of service for packing replacement for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Expected to be out of service for 4 more hours. SJAE Radiation Monitor is out of service for the past 7 days. No estimated time for return to service.

2B Main Feedwater pump has an oil leak and needs to be removed from service. The crew is to reduce power to 45% and remove 2B Main Feedwater from service. An urgent call from the NPO stating the oil leak has gotten worse should result in the crew using 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' During the downpower SBCS PCV-8801 drifts open requiring the crew to manually isolate PCV-8801 referring to 2-0NP-08.01 Steam Leak Off-Normal Operating Procedure to terminate the uncontrolled cooldown.

MA Instrument Inverter fails requiring the crew to place the MA Instrument bus on the Bypass bus using 2-0970030 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) / QSPDS. As a result of the Instrument Inverter failure the 2A BAM pump stops and 2B BAM pump is unavailable and cannot be restarted until the Instrument Bus is re-energized. Also, as a result of the Instrument bus failure all Pressurizer heaters will de-energize and will need to be restored in accordance with 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level. When the Instrument bus is re-energized RPS channel MA High Pressurizer pressure bistable does not reset (remains tripped). T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 should be addressed and the channel placed in bypass.

Main Feedwater Isolation valve HCV-09-2A fails closed during the down power. The crew should manually trip the Unit due to low SG level on the 2B SG, prior to the RPS automatic trip.

Post trip, if the crew does not stop the 2B Main Feedwater pump, the pump will trip on overcurrent due to bearing failure.

Upon the trip, the MSSV's will open and MSSV 8201 (2A SG) does not close. 2A and 2B SG will continue to depressurize. The 2A 15% MFV 15% bypass does not open upon trip. The crew should close both MSIV's. This will terminate blowing down the 2B SG. 2A SG will continue to depressurize until dry. AFAS lockout will occur on the 2A SG due to ~ steam pressure between 2A and 2B SG. The crew should stabilize RCS temperature when the 2A SG blows dry. The 2C AFW pump trips when triggered.

The crew should enter 2-EOP-05 Excess Steam Demand upon completion of 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. The crew may decide to enter 2-EOP-15 Functional Recovery.

Major mitigation strategy is to stabilize RCS temperature after the 2A SG has blown dry and isolate the 2A SG in accordance with 2-EOP-99 Appendix R.

The Crew should also enter 2-0NP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater to open the AFW crossties and feed the 2B SG with the 2A AFW pump.

The scenario should conclude with RCS temperature stabilized, 2A SG isolated in accordance with 2-EOP-99 Appendix R, and AFW restored to the 2B SG using the 2A AFW pump via. AFW crosstie valves. Five Off Normal procedures and two EOP's should be used during the scenario.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # Page 3 of 13 Event

Description:

Unit downpower Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate modification to Ie set and verify equipment 005.

Booth Operator Instructions: If crew does not initiate down power in timely manner inform SRO oil leak is getting worse.

Supervise/Coordinate Power reduction in accordance with 2-SRO ONP-22.01 Rapid Down Power:

Direct Boration per Appendix C 2-0NP-22.01 Rapid Down Power Direct Lead group CEA insertion of 6 inches step 6.1.2 Direct DEH programmed for load rate step 6.1.3 When Tave decrease noted direct GO on the turbine step 6.1.4 May direct additional Charging pump started lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D.

May direct Pzr. Placed on recirc lAW 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Appendix E.

RO Begin Boration per Appendix C, ONP-22.01 (attached)

Insert Lead CEA Group 6 inches If directed start additional Charging pump lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D. (attached)

If directed place Pzr. On recirc. lAW 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Appendix E. (attached) 3

14A RAPID DOWN POWER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C RCS BORATION GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE The steps in this Appendix are applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress. If other than normal alignment, use guidance of 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

1. BORATE the RCS by the following:

A. START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.

B. PLACE FCV-2210Y control switch in AUTO.

C. If borating to the VCT, Then OPEN V2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

D. If borating to the Charging Pump suction, Then OPEN V2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

E. ADJUST FRC-2210Y to the desired flowrate.

NOTE Ensure a minimum of 10 gpm of boric acid flow at all times while BAM pump recirc valve is closed.

F. If desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, Then CLOSE the running BAM pump recirc valve.

G. MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

H. If necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position.

NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these chan es on a new Operator Aid placecard.

END OF APPENDIX C

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

14A RAPID DOWN POWER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX D CHARGING PUMP GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

1. !f Charging Pump(s) are to be started, Then PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE that each Charging pump that is desired to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.

B. !f associated Charging Pump Recirc Valve is operable, Then ENSURE that it is OPEN prior to starting the Charging Pump.

NOTE Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow which may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration Room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed 1000 mr/hr (Locked High Radiation Area limit) due to reduced transport time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.

C. START the Charging pump.

D. NOTIFY Health Physics of the charging pump alignment.

E. ADJUST the bias on HIC-1110, Level, using the upper knurled knob to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer Level to program RRS Pressurizer Level for current plant conditions, if required.

F. !f FIA-2212, Chg Flow to Regen Hx, is in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-2212 raise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

G. !f FIA-2212, Charging to Regen Hx, is NOT in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

H. ENSURE the running Charging Pump Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

I. PLACE the Chrg Pump Sel Running-B/U switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard on RTGB-205. (Charging pump combinations vs. selector switch)

END OF APPENDIX D

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

14A RAPID DOWN POWER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX E PRESSURIZER RECIRCULATION GUIDELINES (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.

From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:

Time (in min.) to correct mismatch = [(pzr ppm - RCS ppm) -

25 ppm] x 3

1. To place the Pressurizer on recirculation:

A. PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.

B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on PIC-11 OOX or PIC-11 OOY, the selected "Pressurizer Pressure" controller, to maintain normal operating pressure.

C. OBSERVE HIC-1100, "Pressurizer Spray" output and PCV-1100E 11100F, "Pressurizer Spray Valve" position indication to verify Main Spray flow.

NOTE Normally, the required number of Backup Bank heaters in service is dependent upon:

1. The magnitude of thermal losses from the system, including leakage to the Quench Tank.

2. The number of heater elements out of service.

The normal configuration is to have enough Backup Bank heaters in service to keep the Proportional Bank heaters at approximately 50% output.

END OF APPENDIX E

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # Page 4 of 13 Event

Description:

Unit downpower Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Program the DEH per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.3 for the desired BOP load reduction rate.

Notify Plant Dispatcher When Tave decrease is noted start Turbine down per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.4 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 5 13 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event #

2 Page of Event

Description:

PCV-8801 drifts open Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Upon cue from Examiner, initiate 'PCV 8801 Drifts Open'.

Booth Operator Instructions: When directed initiate 'Isolate PCV 8801' Indications: Red I Green light on PCV-8801 BOP Recognize dual indication on PCV-8801 Recognize Tave lowering faster than expected for the given RO downpower Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-0NP-08.01 Steam SRO Leak Off-Normal Operating Procedure step 6.2.2.L

Direct Manual control and attempt to close PCV-8801

Direct SBCS permissive taken to OFF

Direct Emergency Off

Direct closure of V08359 manual isolation for PCV-8801 When PCV-8801 manually isolated direct SBCS permissive SRO switch and EM off switch placed back to on. (NOTE: SBCS will not be available if not placed back to ON/Auto)

BOP Place PCV-8801 in manual and attempt to close Place SBCS permissive switch to off. Annunciator L-4 SBCS unavailable.

Contact NPO to close V08359 manual isolation valve for PCV-8801 Place SBCS EM and permissive back to on/auto when directed.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 3,4 Page 6 of 13 Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter Fails. Loss of 2A BAM pump and Pressurizer Heaters.

Four TGB's open.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Upon cue from Examiner, initiate '2MA Inverter Fails Input Breaker' Booth Operator Instructions: If input breaker asked to be re-closed, state breaker is tripped and will not re-close.

Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, initiate '2MA on Bypass - Alt to source to load' Evaluator Note: When Instrument bus placed on bypass, RPS Channel MA High Pressurizer Pressure bistable remains in trip condition.

Indication available: key alarm B-43 MA inst. Bus trouble Recognize numerous alarms, 4 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers SRO/BOP open. Channel A RPS and ESFAS de-energized. 2MA IRO Instrument bus de-energized.

Direct implementation of 2-0970030 '120V Instrument AC SRO (Class 1E) I QSPDS step 7.2

Direct Instrument bus placed on its respective maintenance bypass bus 2-0970030 step 7.2.1.C

Recognize entry into T.S. 3.8.3.1 Action b (24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to energize from inverter connected to DC bus)

Direct review of Table 1 when bus restored. Step 7.2.1.F RPS Hi Press Bistable did not reset. Recognize entry into T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1. Directs bypassing MA Pressurizer SRO Pressure. lAW 2-0NP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation' RO Recognize loss of 2A BAM pump Recognize loss of Pressurizer heaters Insure plant parameters stable step 7.2.1.B 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 3,4 Page 7 of 13 Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter Fails. Loss of 2A BAM pump and Pressurizer Heaters.

Four TCB's open.

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct implementation of 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure SRO and Level to restore Pressurizer heaters. Step 7.2.2.G Recognize Annunciator L-20 Pzr. Press. Hi did not clear when bus restored.

As directed, close 2A 4.16KV Pressurizer Heater BOP transformer breaker Brk. 20204 As directed, notify SNPO to place MA Instrument bus on bypass lAW 2-0970030 step 7.2.1.C.1

Direct SNPO to close Bkr. 2-41207 Static Inverter 2A Maint. Bypass X-fmr 2A As directed, close TCB's 1, 5, 2, 6 Recognize High Pressurizer Pressure bistable did not reset As directed, reset all 480V Pressurizer heater breakers. 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level to restore RO Pressurizer heaters. Step 7.2.2.G. Energize heaters as necessary to restore pressure and maintain pressure >2225 psia ..

Verify 2A BAM pump restarted.

Recognize Annunciator L-20 Pzr. Press. Hi did not clear when bus restored. RPS Hi pressure bistable did not reset 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 5,6 Page 8 of 13 Event

Description:

HCV-09-1A Closes, Reactor trip enter 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions.

MSSV V8201 (2A SG) stick open.

Time Jl Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When Directed initiate 'B' train MFIV Fails Closed' Booth Operator Instructions: Shortly after being asked to perform Appendix 'X' inform the Control Room there is one MSSV open on the 2A SG.

Indications available: Annunciator P-26 HCV-09-2A DC Fail Accum Press Low, L-48 DCS, G-9 2B SG level Hi I Lo Recognize HCV-09-2A 'B' train MFIV closed. Annunciator P-26 RO HCV-09-2A DC Fail Accum Press Low BOP Recognize 2B SG level rapidly lowering SRO Direct manual Reactor trip as SG level approaches 40% NR.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

SRO Direct closing MSIV's when SG pressures less than or Critical approaching 750 psi a Step Direct one RCP stopped when Tcold approaches 500°F Direct Emergency boration due to uncontrolled cooldown at 500°F.

Direct throttling of AFW to appx. 220 gpm when AFAS -2 actuated (about 5 minutes after trip) 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 5,6 Page 9 of 13 Event

Description:

HCV-09-1A Closes, Reactor trip enter 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions.

MSSV V8201 (2A SG) stick open.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Close MSR reheat block valves Notify NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Close Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 Recognize increasing motor Amps on 2B Main Feedwater pump. (about 10 minutes after trip) Manually stop 2B Main Feedwater pump.

Throttle AFW to appx. 220 gpm when directed NOTE: AFAS-1 will lockout about 17 minutes after trip due to SG ~P.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 10 of 13

- - - Page Event

Description:

. MSSV V8201 (2A SG) stick open. Enter 2-EOP-05 Excess Steam Demand.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Critical Close MSIV's when directed.

Step RO Emergency borate when directed.

Ensure V2525 Load control valve closed

Start 2A or 2B BAM pp

Close V2650 Tank 2A Recirc valve

Close V2651 Tank 2B Recirc valve

Open V2514 Emergency Borate valve Stop one RCP when directed as Tcold approaches 500°F 10

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 8 Page 11 of 13 Event

Description:

2C AFW Pump Trips.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger '2C AFW Pump trips' when directed (recommend to trigger when crew enters EOP-05)

As NPO: If asked to investigate 2C AFW T&T valve MV-08-03 state the linkage is bent SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart

Direct BOP perform SFSC's

Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's NOTE: SIAS will come in about 13 minutes post trip. RCP's may be stopped in EOP-01.

If SIAS present verify SI flow lAW Figure 2

Direct one RCP/LOOP stopped when SIAS received

Direct CCW restored to RCP's per Appendix J 2-EOP-99.

SRO Critical

Direct RCS temperature stabilized within Figure 1A, using 2B ADV's when 2A SG blown dry.

Step BOP Perform SFSC's EOP-05 when directed.

Perform EOP-99 Appendix J CCW restoration to RCP's when directed (attached)

Perform Appendix A when directed (attached)

Verify SI flow lAW Figure 2 (attached) 11

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300 1200 p

R E

1100 t S

S 1000 *fI U

R 900 I

Z E 800 R

p 700 R

E 600 S 1 Full Train s in Operation u 500 I ~. I R

E 400 +_. '-If+--++---~ l -~~~..........

I L' 2 Full Trains in Operation

.....+....... .

300 p

s i 200 a

100 a+1-..... -!_.+... -t-......f-, ** -+I--+---+--+--+-

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (PJOPSI2.EOP-OOIFIQ2IRev.OItir)

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (-V) o 1. !f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. !f SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

HCV-14-8B

HCV-14-10

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) o 3. If CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE / OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

o 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

o 5. If S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND cao TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2)

D 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-1S-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards si nals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-SA (HCV-14-SB) starts to open.

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset.

D 2. .If SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-SA 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-9 'N' Hdr Isol Suction OR

HCV-14-SB 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-10 'N' Hdr Isol Suction D 3. ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

D HCV-14-1, CCWTo RC PUMP D HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP D HCV-14-7, CCW To RC PUMP D HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP D 4. .If CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

APPENDICES / FIGURES I TABLES / DATA SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND cao TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

D 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

D HCV-14-11-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler D HCV-14-11-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler D HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler D HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler D 6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario # Event # 12 13 Op Test No.:

- - - Page of Event

Description:

2C AFW Pump Trips.

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize the 2C AFW pump T&T valve MV-08-03 tripped as RO indicated by Annunciator G-46.

RO Open '8' ADV's to stabilize RCS temperature within Figure 1A Critical (attached) when 2A SG blown dry Step Stop one RCP/LOOP when directed 12

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

2400 2200 2000

., 1600

§.

e i

(l, 1400

.~

1200

~

(l, 1il

~ 1000 S

800 600 . . . . . . . . . . . -_*******!_***+**. **....1 400 O,--*L. +~,.--,.----..*........-.. -+ *. -..-.....L---i---'-----

o 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Indicated ReS Temperature (F)

RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 1000 psia to 500 psi a 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Event # 13 13 Op Test No.: Scenario #

8,9 Page of Event

Description:

Crosstie AFW, Isolate the 2A SG.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed initiate 'Open AFW Cross Tie Valves' Booth Operator Instructions: When directed initiate 'Isolate 2A SG per App R SRO Implement 2-0NP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Appendix C Critical

Direct opening MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie Step valves to feed 2B SG using 2A AFW pump

Direct feeding 2B SG using 2A AFW pump Direct isolation of 2A SG, 2-EOP-99 Appendix R BOP Establish AFW to 2B SG per 2-0NP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Critical Appendix C, when directed.

Step

Ensure closed MV-09-10 2B Dish. To 2B SG

Ensure 2A AFW pump running

Open SE-09-2 2A AFW pump Disharge to 2A SG

Coordinate with NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves.

Throttle MV-09-10 2B Dish.To 2B SG not to exceed 150 gpm for 5 minutes or until SG level has risen.

Perform Appendix R to isolate the 2A SG when directed (attached)

Terminate when 2A SG isolated, RCS temperature is stabilized and AFW is restored to 2B SG.

13

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CEC)URE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6) ction 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

1. ENSURE HCV-OB-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

D 2. If HCV-OB-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

D 3. ENSURE MV-OB-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED ..

D 6. If BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

D MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA r<UvICUU"C NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6) on 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

9. ENSURE MV-OB-1BA, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

10.CLOSE MV-OB-14, 2A S/G ADV Isol.

11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.

12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

13. ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

o 14. PLACE MV-OB-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

o 1S.ENSURE MV-OB-19A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 16.CLOSE MV-OB-15, 2A S/G ADV Isol.

o 17. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o C. CLOSE SE-OB-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

o D. If SE-OB-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE VOBBB4, SE-OB-2 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page)

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

17. (continued)

D E. If MV-08-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

D a. CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

D V08622, CB #67 Drain D V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 1501 D V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 1501 End of Section 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 5% power preparing for turbine roll. 2C Charging Pump OOS.

Turnover: 5% power Mode 1 preparing for Turbine roll. The unit is returning from a SNO to repair the seal injection line on the 2B1 RCP. Power was raised to 25% with the unit on line, when a DEH leak necessitated bring the unit off. The Reactor remained critical. Xenon is building in at appx. 7 pcm/min with a constant dilution. 2C Charging Pump is out of service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for suction accumulator bladder replacement, expected back by the end of shift, Direction for the crew, roll the turbine and place on line.

Critical Tasks:

Terminate uncontrolled dilution

Trip the Turbine

Isolate the 2A SG Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R/RO Power increase, roll the Turbine N/BOP 2 1 IIRO FRC-221OX fails to full output. FCV-221OX does not close 3 2 C/RO CEA #59 slips >15" TS/SRO 4 3 C/BOP # 1 Throttle valve drifts open 5 4 T.S. SRO 2A SGTL (5 gpm ramping to 300 gpm)

M/AII 2ASGTR 6 5 C SIAS 2B HPSI does not start 7 Isolate 2A Steam Generator

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 St. Lucie The crew assumes the shift at 5% power. The unit is returning from a SNO to repair the seal injection line on the 2B1 Rep. Power was raised to 25% with the unit on line, when a DEH leak necessitated bring the unit off. The Reactor remained critical. Xenon is building in at appx. 7 pcm/min with a constant dilution. A leak was discovered in the 2C Charging Pump suction accumulator bladder during re-pressurization. It was taken out of service 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago and is expected back by the end of shift.

A constant dilution is in progress due to xenon building in. The direction to the crew is to increase power to 10% -12%, roll the turbine and place the unit on line.

The crew will initiate a power ascension lAW 2-GOP-201, "Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.

Shortly after the turnover and the power ascension has begun, the primary water flow controller FRC-221OX will go to full output. This failure will not cause an alarm and will cause reactor power to increase at a greater rate than expected. The applicants will be required to determine the reason for the reactivity anomaly and attempt to manually close FCV-221 OX. FCV-2210X will not close. The dilution will be terminated when the RCO closes V-2525. Depending on the length of time from start to discovery, the SRO may have to enter ADM-09.11, ""Reactivity Management". After notifications are made and I&C contacted, the failure will be corrected in a short period of time and the power ascension allowed to resume.

After the power ascension is resumed, CEA #59 (lead bank) will slip >15" when the lead bank is withdrawn. The SRO will be required to consult Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 and enter Off-Normal procedure 2-0110030, "CEA Off-Normal and Realignment". The CEA will be realigned to the lead group and the power ascension resumed.

When the crew stabilizes at 10%-12% power and attempts to latch the turbine, #1 Throttle valve will drift open and the turbine will increase speed. The candidates will be required to manually trip the Turbine. At the current power level, the reactor will not trip on the turbine trip signal, but they may opt to trip the reactor at this time.

A SGTL of appx. 5 gpm developes on the 2A SG. SRO to evaluate T.S. If the crew trips the reactor on event 4, a 300 gpm tube rupture on the 2A S/G will occur on the reactor trip signal. If they do not opt to trip the reactor, the same tube leak will be initiated and they will be required to enter Off-Normal procedure 2-0830030, "Steam Generator Tube Leak". The procedure will require them trip the unit when pressurizer level cannot be maintained. After performance of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions", the crew will transition to 2-EOP-04, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture".

An additional failure will occur when the 2B HPSI Pump doe not start on SIAS and the candidates will be required to manually start the pump.

The scenario will conclude with the isolation of the 2A Steam Generator lAW 2-EOP-99

. Appendix R and a cooldown and depressurization to shutdown cooling entry conditions in progress.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # Page 3 of 13 Event

Description:

Power increase to 10%-12%

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate IC and ensure 2C Charging Pump out of service Direct power increase to 10-12% lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.10 in SRO preparation to roll the Turbine.

Commence Dilution for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 6.5.12, 13, 14 (attached)

Withdraw Rods to control Rx power Prepare the Turbine to be Latched lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.34 BOP (attached) 3

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

22C BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

CAUTION To preclude lifting the VCT relief valve while using V2525, do NOT allow PMW f10wrate to exceed the runnin Char in ump(s) capaci .

12. D D D D ADJUST FRC-221 OX to the desired f10wrate (and if using V2525 do NOT exceed the f10wrate for the number of running Charging Pumps).

13. D D D D MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

14. D D D D 11 necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position:

A. D D D D ENSURE V2500 VCT Divert Valve indicates OPEN.

B. D D D D When the desired VCT level is reached, PLACE V2500 in AUTO.

C. D D D D ENSURE V2500 indicates CLOSED.

15. D D D D When the desired amount of primary water has been added, Then CLOSE FCV-221 OX, Reactor Makeup.

16. D D D D 11V2512 Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv was opened, Then PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

17. D D D D 11V2525 Boron Load Control Valve was opened, Then PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

18. D D D D REDUCE FRC-2210X, Makeup Water Flow controller output to ZERO.

19. D D D D MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tave.

20. D D D D §1 RECORD on Data Sheet 1, Boration I Dilution Log, the number of gallons of Primary Makeup Water added as indicated on FQI-2210X, Water Flow Totalizer.

21. D D D D 11 additional dilutions are desired, or if the expected changes to Tave or Boron concentration are NOT achieved, Then REPEAT Steps 6.5.1 through 6.5.20.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

1-------;

52A REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 CAUTION During turbine latching activities, if Emergency Trip Header pressure increases above 1000 psig and then decreases below this value, the Feed Reg System will sense a turbine trip. This will cause the 15% feedwater bypass valves to open to the 5% post trip position and the main feed reg valves to close.

NOTE Problems latching the Main Turbine may require I&C personnel assistance.

To minimize the delay in latching the Main Turbine, if problems are encountered, ensure I&C personnel are available to offer assistance if required.

6.34 LATCH the Turbine as follows:

1. ENSURE CLOSED MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve.

2. ENSURE CLOSED MV-09-6, Stm Gen 2B Reg Block Valve.

3. ENSURE FIC-9011, 2A HIGH PWR MIA Station, is in MANUAL with zero DMD output.

4. ENSURE FIC-9021, 2B HIGH PWR MIA Station, is in MANUAL with zero DMD output.

5. ENSURE the Main Transformer and Main Generator Protective Relays located behind RTGB 201 Flags are reset.

6. ENSURE the following Generator Lockout Relays are RESET:

A. Gen Primary Lockout (86GP/883).

B. Gen Secondary Lockout (86GB/885).

C. Gen Underfrequency Lockout (86UF/882).

7. RESET 20/ET.

8. ROTATE and HOLD V22395, Overspeed Trip Mechanism Overspeed Trip, to RESET.

9. When Auto Stop Oil pressure increases to a value between 90 and 100 psig as indicated on PI-22-143, Turb Manual Overspeed Press, Then RELEASE V22395.

REVISI 52A REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.34 (continued)

10. ,-r5 VERIFY locally the Turbine Vacuum Trip Latch is in the DOWN position.

NOTE Changes in Steam Chest temperature may affect the GV position calibration of the DEH computer which may prevent the GVs from opening.

Timing of GV position calibration should be closely coordinated with WC and I&C to ensure changes in turbine temperatures do not invalidate the calibration.

6.35 VERIFY the Intercept Valves and Reheat Stop Valves OPEN and the Governor Valves and Throttle Valves remain CLOSED.

NOTE

The Turbine may roll off Turning Gear if the Throttle Valves are leaking.

The valve position limit pushbutton will drive the signal output exponentiall as Ion as the ushbutton is de ressed .

.36 1f the Turbine re-tripped, Then PERFORM the following after Turbine is re-Iatched:

1. DEPRESS the 2A Trip Manual Override pushbutton.

2. DEPRESS the 2B Trip Manual Override pushbutton.

3. PLACE LlC-9005, SG 2A LOW PWR MIA STATION in AUTOMATIC.

4. PLACE LlC-9006, SG 2B LOW PWR MIA STATION in AUTOMATIC.

5. VERIFY SG NR levels being maintained between 60% to 70%.

Set the Valve position limit to 115 as indicated on the Reference LEDs by depressing and releasing the Valve position limit raise pushbutton (and lower pushbutton, if reference indicated an overshoot of 115).

VERIFY the Valve Position Limit remains at 115% for at least 15 seconds.

9 1f the Valve Position Limit continues to increase, Then DEPRESS the Turbine Manual pushbutton and NOTIFY I&C.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

52A REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.40 VERIFY the Governor Valves OPEN and the Throttle Valves remain CLOSED.

6.41 VERIFY that Turbine speed is NOT increasing.

6.42 TEST the Overspeed Protection Controller (OPC) as follows:

1. INSERT the key into the OPC key switch.

2. TURN the OPC key switch to the OPC TEST.

3. VERIFY the Intercept Valves and Governor Valves CLOSE.

4. RETURN the OPC key switch to the IN SERVICE.

5. VERIFY Intercept and Governor Valves OPEN.

6. REMOVE the OPC Test Key .

.43 !f maintenance has been performed on the Trip Block, Then PERFORM Appendix X of 2-GOP-502, Turbine Trip Test, for ALL of the following Turbine Trips:

1. Thrust Bearing Trip

2. Low Bearing Oil Pressure Trip

3. Low Vacuum trip DEPRESS the Accel RPM/Min pushbutton.

ENTER desired acceleration rate.

DEPRESS Ref.

ENSURE 0000 is in the demand display.

ENTER 520 RPM in the demand display.

VERIFY Hold Light LIT.

VERIFY proper vacuum in the Main Condenser.

VERIFY eccentricity is less than or equal to .003 inches double amplitude movement as indicated on VBR-22-1A, point 10.

NO.: DURE TITLE:

52A REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 CAUTION Personnel shall stand clear of the Turning Gear operating lever.

NOTE

Speed measurement circuits are unreliable below approximately 250 RPM. Operation below this value may cause fluctuations in indicated speed.

To minimize vibration on the number nine bearing, Hydrogen Side and Air Side Seal Oil differential tern erature should NOT exceed 2°F.

6.52 DEPRESS GO.

6.53 VERIFY Reference display begins counting.

6.54 When the Turbine reaches 520 RPM, Then PERFORM the following:

1. WALK down the Turbine and Generator and VERIFY there is NO indication of rubs or other anomalies.

2. MONITOR the Turbine Supervisory Instruments.

3. VERIFY eccentricity indicates a value less than .003 inches as indicated on VBR-22-1A, point 10.

4. ENSURE turbine bearing oil temperature is between 900 F and 1000 F as indicated on TIS-22-5, Bearing Oil Temperature, prior to ::0 c.n N

proceeding with the turbine roll.

CAUTION Tripping the turbine will cause the 15% feedwater bypass valves to open to the 5% post trip position and the main feed reg valves to close.

6.55 TEST the 20/ET and 20/AST solenoid valves as follows:

1. ROTATE and HOLD V22379, Overspeed Trip Mechanism Overspeed Trip Test, on the Turbine Front Standard from NORMAL to TEST.

2. DEPRESS and HOLD the Turbine Trip pushbutton on RTGB-201.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 4 of 13 Event

Description:

FCV-2210X drifts open Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger FRC*2210X fail full output open on examiner cue

when I&C contacted, report to the Control Room. Go behind the RTGB and report back the connection was loose on the controller and will go to FCV*2210X and investigate. After 5 minutes, tell CR repaired loose wire to the air solenoid.

Indications Available: primary water flow increasing, reactor power increasing, RCS temperature increasing Recognize FRC-2210X full output:

SRO

Primary water flow rate about 90 gpm

Reactor Power increasing

RCS temperature increasing Direct RO to attempt to manually close FCV-2210X. Direct RO Critical to close MV-2525 when FCV-2210X does not close (may direct Step the RO to turn off primary water pump)

Direct RO to stabilize RCS parameters by boration or CEA insertion.

May refer to ADM-09.11 Appendix A, "Reactivity Management" Contacts I&C to repair FCV-221 OX Notifies management of event Directs RO / BOP to resume power ascension when FCV-2210X problem resolved RO Recognize excessive dilution in progress:

PMW flow meter FIC-221 OX increasing 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 5 of 13 Event

Description:

FCV-221 OX drifts open Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Manually close MV-2525 or turn off primary water pump as Step directed RO Operates CEA's or borates to stabilize plant Monitors primary plant parameters during transient Commences dilution for power increase, when directed after FCV-2210X problem resolved as directed BOP Monitors secondary plant parameters during transient:

SG levels

SG pressures

SBCS operation 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 2 6 13 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event #

- - - Page of Event

Description:

CEA # 59 slips> 15" Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger CEA 59 slips on examiner cue Indications Available: Multiple alarms on K annunciator panel, CEA #59 indication lower than group on ADS SRO Recognize CEA # 59 slipped> 15" (not dropped)

Direct RO to place CEDMCS control panel in off if needed Direct BOP to place DEH control panel on hold Implement 2-0110030, "CEA Off-Normal and Realignment",

Appendix D T.S. Consult Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 for CEA misaligment Contact Reactor Engineering Determines F/ from Physics curve C.3 to be 1.544 Consult COLR and determines 63 minutes time to retrieve Direct RO to determine operability lAW Appendix A 2-0110030 Direct RO to recover CEA lAW Appendix H 2-0110030 Notify management of event Direct RO to resume power ascension when CEA recovered RO Recognize CEA # 59 slipped> 15" (not dropped) 6

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 7 13 Scenario # Event #

- - - Page of Event

Description:

CEA # 59 slips> 15" Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Place CEDMCS control panel in off as directed Determine operability lAW Appendix A 2-0110030 (attached)

Recover CEA lAW Appendix H 2-0110030 (attached)

Resume power ascension when directed Monitor plant parameters while event in progress:

BOP

Monitors SBCS to ensure operation commensurate with plant conditions.

When directed, reset CEA 59 on DCS. 2-NOP-102.01 'DCS Operations step 6.2.1' A-F (attached).

7

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

56C CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A CEA INVESTIGATION FOR OPERABILITY (Page 1 of 3)

CAUTION

Reactor Power shall NOT be increased above the stable power level established following the CEA(s) misalignment.

Criticality shall be anticipated any time CEAs are being withdrawn.

1. For the affected CEA(s), perform the following to determine operability:

A. Place the mode select switch in the manual individual mode.

B. Select the affected CEA on the individual CEA selection switches.

C. Select the group of the affected CEA on the group select switch.

D. If CEA motion inhibit is present, Then:

1. Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton.

2. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton.

E. If the CEA was dropped, Then first withdraw the affected CEA until core mimic CEA bottom light and lower electrical limit lights both deenergize.

CAUTION Do NOT exceed +/- 10 inches of the original position without permission from the US.

F. Insert and withdraw the affected CEA and check for smooth operation and normal indications.

G. If CEA is determined to be operable proceed to the applicable appendix for CEA realignment.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A CEA INVESTIGATION FOR OPERABILITY (Page 2 of 3)

NOTE Tripped CEA disconnect and I or loss of CEA subgroup logic function will cause dropped CEAs.

2. 1f the CEA(s) does NOT operate (move), Then check the status of the CEDM coil power supply panels in the cable spreading room:

A. Symptoms:

1. CEA disconnect in OFF; red light off, green light on.

2. CEA disable lights are red for the affected CEA.

3. Timer failure lights are red for the affected CEA.

B. Trouble Shooting:

1. 1f CEA disconnect is off, Then:

a. Turn ON disconnect switch.

b. Reset ACTM card toggle switch. (located inside cabinet, top switch, UG ENGD light should remain on).

2. 1f CEA disconnect is not off, Then:

a. Reset ACTM card toggle switch.

C. Check the air conditioning system for proper operation.

D. Check the cooling fans for proper operation.

E. Contact the I&C Dept. for assistance and notify them of the problem and any abnormalities found.

1. Check the CEDMCS and CEA drive system for alarms that might indicate the CEA problem.

CAUTION Do NOT exceed +/- 10 inches of original position without permission from the US.

2. Withdraw and insert the CEA(s) in manual individual or manual group at the direction of I&C to support troubleshooting.

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

56C CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND ENO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A CEA INVESTIGATION FOR OPERABILITY (Page 3 of 3)

2. (continued)

F. Have I & C perform the following as necessary.

1. Check associated power supplies and fuses.

2. Obtain coil current traces and voltage measurements to determine the location of trouble.

NOTE Two or more CEAs simultaneously transferring to the lower gripper could indicate CEDMCS noise caused b s stem rounds.

3. !f two or more CEAs simultaneously transfer to the lower gripper, Then perform the following:

a. Direct I&C to troubleshoot for possible system grounds.

b. Minimize movement of CEAs.

G. Proceed to the applicable Appendix for CEA realignment or to Appendix B if CEA is determined to be inoperable.

END OF APPENDIX A

CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H CEA REALIGNMENT (MODES 1! 2 AND 3)

(Page 1 of 2)

While realigning CEAs, observe the following:

A. Regulating CEAs shall be withdrawn in sequence and overlap between groups shall NOT exceed 54 inches.

B. Do NOT exceed a sustained SUR of 1.4 DPM (alarm 1.3 DPM).

C. Criticality shall be anticipated any time CEAs are being withdrawn.

D. If deviation between CEAs in any group approaches 3 inches, stop group withdrawal and realign CEAs.

E. While CEA is misaligned, individual CEA positions within the group shall be determined at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months except when the CEA position deviation circuit is out of service, then verify CEA positions at least once every four hours.

Misaligned CEA(s) while in Modes 2 and 3 (subcritical).

A. Place the mode select switch in the manual individual mode.

B. Select the misaligned CEA on the individual CEA selection switches.

C. Select the group of the misaligned CEA on the group select switch.

D. 1f CEA motion inhibit is present then:

1. Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton.

2. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton.

E. REALIGN the CEA by performing ONE of the following:

INSERT the remainder of the group to the misaligned CEA and then withdraw the group to the pre-misaligned position.

ALIGN the misaligned CEA to the remainder of the group.

F. Check the position of all CEAs in the group for proper alignment (CEDMCS and DCS).

56C CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H CEA REALIGNMENT (MODES 1, 2 AND 3)

(Page 2 of 2)

Misaligned CEA(s) while in Modes 1 and 2 (critical).

CAUTION Reactor Power shall NOT be increased above the stable power level established following the CEA(s) misalignment.

A. Prior to realigning of CEA, contact Reactor Engineering and supply them with the following information.

1. Power level at which recovery is to be made.

2. Rate of CEA movement during recovery.

3. Movement of other CEAs to support recovery.

B. Place the mode select switch in the manual individual mode.

C. Select the misaligned CEA on the individual CEA selection switches.

D. Select the group of the misaligned CEA on the group select switch.

E. 11 CEA motion inhibit is present, Then:

1. Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton.

2. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton.

F. Realign CEA to the group position while borating as necessary to maintain Reactor Power at or below the power level which resulted from the CEA insertion.

G. Check the position of all CEAs in the group for proper alignment (CEDMCS and DCS).

H. Using manual group mode, readjust the group positions for proper automatic sequencing as necessary.

END OF APPENDIX H

7 DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEM (DCS) -

PROCEDURE NO.: OPERATIONS 2-NOP-102.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Changing CEA Positions

1. Changing Individual CEA Positions A. From the Main Menu, SELECT the CEA Group that contains the individual CEA to be changed.

B. SELECT the Realign button located at the bottom of the screen.

C. SELECT the input box located just right of the current CEA position value.

D. ENTER the new CEA position in the input box and press the enter key.

E. SELECT the Adjust button and verify that the CEA Position value has changed to the new value.

F. SELECT Close to return to the CEA group screen

2. Changing all CEA positions in a single group A. From the Main Menu, SELECT the CEA Group to be changed.

B. SELECT the Realign button located at the bottom of the screen.

C. SELECT the input box located at the bottom of the screen.

D. ENTER the new CEA position in the input box and PRESS the Enter key.

E. SELECT the Adjust All This Group button.

F. VERIFY that the all of the CEA Position values have changed to the new value.

G. SELECT Close to return to the CEA group screen.

END OF SECTION 6.2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 8 of 13 Event

Description:

Throttle valve open, turbine roll Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger:

Latch the Turbine when called

Throttle valve open Turbine is latched Examiners note: To save time consider telling applicant step 6.42 (OPC) and 6.43 (trip test) does not need to be preformed.

Indications Available: Turbine speed indication increasing.

SRO Direct BOP to latch Turbine lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.34 SRO Direct Turbine roll step 6.44 Recognize turbine anomaly (Turbine RPM increasing when SRO latched)

Direct RO to secure dilution Critical Direct BOP to trip turbine Step RO Secures dilution if directed Monitors primary plant parameters during transient Latch the turbine lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.34 steps 1-7. Direct BOP the NPO perform steps 8, 9, 10. (attached)

Verify Intercept valves and reheat valves open, Gov and BOP throttle valves closed.

BOP Roll Turbine lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.37 - 6.52 (attached) 8

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 4 of 13 Event

Description:

Throttle valve open, turbine roll Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize turbine anomaly (Turbine RPM increasing when BOP latched)

BOP Critical Trips turbine as directed Step Recognizes MFW 15% bypass now in 5% flow position when BOP Turbine tripped.

Inform SRO and resets 15% bypass valves. Places valves back to Auto.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 10 of 13 Event

Description:

SGTL EOP-01 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger tube leak on examiner cue Booth Operator Instructions: When SGTL actions complete or examiner direction, trigger SGTR Indications Available: Steam Jet Air Ejector alarm, pressurizer level decrease SRO Recognize Steam generator tube leak occurring on 2A SG

SJAE radiation alarms

SG blowdown radiation alarms

Mismatch Chg. / Letdown Implement 2-0830030, "Steam Generator Tube Leak"

Implement Appendix A

Contact HP and inform of present plant conditions, conduct secondary surveys

Direct Chemistry to implement COP-06.05 High activity in a SG

Step 11, Consider isolating U-1 Vac drag

Step 12 Verify SGBD not aligned to Discharge Canal

Direct field operator to perform step 13 SGBTF Door /

Ventilation Determines Primary leak rate of appx. 10 gpm.

Determine T.S. 3.4.6.2 HSB within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Contact Chemistry for secondary sampling Direct RO to isolate letdown, trip reactor when PZR. Level cannot be maintained with leak exceeding capacity of Chg.

Pps.

10

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 11 14 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event #

- - - Page of Event

Description:

SGTL EOP-01 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, SRO Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

RO Recognize Steam generator tube leak occurring

SJAE radiation alarms

SG blowdown radiation alarms

Mismatch Chg. I Letdown Determines approximate leak rate of 10 gpm Isolate letdown when directed Manually trips reactor as directed. Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal BOP Monitors and maintains SG levels 60-70%

Communicate with NPO I SNPO to perform Appendix A directions from SRO (attached)

Communicate with HP and Chemistry as directed by SRO Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Upon unit trip, notify NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

11

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE 1 THROUGH MODE 3 SIAS NOT BLOCKEiO (Page 10 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

10. REVIEW procedures and CONDUCT shift briefs as needed for plant shutdown.

11. CONSIDER isolating blowdown and vac drag on Unit 1.

12. VERIFY steam generator blowdown is not aligned to the discharge canal.

13. DIRECT a field operator to the SGBTF to perform ALL of the following:

A. ENSURE SGBTF Truck Bay (roll-up) door is CLOSED.

B. ENSURE SGBTF ventilation systems are in operation:

Supply Fans HVS-10A or HVS-10B 41 Exhaust Fans HVE-41A or HVE-41B

SGBTF Ventilation Process Monitor

14. VERIFY RCS water inventory balance 14. RETURN TO Step 6.B of and / or Chemistry samples indicate Appendix A.

primary to secondary leak rate is less than or equal to 30 gpd.

15. If RCS Inventory balance and / or 15. RETURN to Step 6.B of Chemistry samples indicate primary to Appendix A.

secondary leak rate is less than 5 gpd, Then EXIT this procedure and continue with the normal monitoring program.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A i':

ACTIONS IN MODE 1 THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 11 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Downpower load rate should be consistent with allowed time. Use of most of the time allowed for the downpower will minimize possible plant perturbation.

16. PERFORM ALL of the following:

If necessary, Then INITIATE the Emergency Plan.

CONTINUE to monitor process monitors for changing conditions due to Steam Generator tube leakage every 15 minutes.

CONSULT with Chemistry to implement Contaminated Water Plan.

17. DIRECT a field operator to the SGBTF to perform ALL of the following:

A. ENSURE SGBTF Truck Bay (roll-up) door is CLOSED.

B. ENSURE SGBTF ventilation systems are in operation:

Supply Fans HVS-10A or HVS-1 OB

Exhaust Fans HVE-41A or HVE-41 B

SGBTF Ventilation Process Monitor

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 (Page 12 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION To reduce the release of potentially radioactive steam from turbine auxiliary feedwater pump exhaust, motor driven auxiliary feedwater or main feedwater pumps should be used. If the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are not available, steam from the unfaulted or least affected steam generator should be used to drive the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

18. Capture the CTCS sponge ball in accordance with 2-NOP-21.01, Condenser Tube Cleaning System Operation.

19. Ensure condenser air ejector is aligned to the plant vent.

20. Locally isolate auxiliary steam to auxiliary priming ejectors by closing V08245.

21. When the turbine is tripped and the reactor 21. 1f the reactor is shutdown, Then go is NOT shutdown, Then shutdown the to Step 22 of Appendix A.

reactor as follows:

A. REFER TO 2-GOP-203, Reactor Shutdown.

B. Verify that shutdown margin is within the limits specified in COLR in accordance with 2-NOP-100.04, Surveillance Requirements for Shutdown Margin Modes 2, 3, 4 & 5 Subcritical.

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 12 14

-5, -

6, 7

--- Page of Event

Description:

SGTR EOP-04, 2B HPSI doesn't start, Isolate 2A SG Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluate diagnostic flow chart of 2-EOP-01 Determines SGTR EOP-04 Directs entry to 2-EOP-04, "Steam Generator Tube SRO Rupture" Direct BOP to perform SFSC's of EOP-04 Direct performance of EOP-99 Appendix A, sampling SG's Directs RO to start 2B HPSI Pump after SIAS Direct BOP to verify Si flow per Figure 2 Direct one RCP/LOOP stopped when SIAS received Direct EOP-99 Appendix J, CCW restoration to RCP's after SIAS Directs RO to perform controlled cooldown using SBCS not to exceed 100°F in anyone hour period.

Direct RO to depressurize RCS lAW step 11 EOP-04

Within Figure 1A

<930 psia

Above RCP minimum pressure

Appx. Equal to 2A SG pressure (within 50 psia)

Direct MSIS blocked when block permissive received at 685 psia.

Critical Directs BOP to isolate 2A Steam Generator when Thot is Step <510°F lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix R 12

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 13 14 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event #

-5,6,7

Page of Event

Description:

SGTR EOP-04, 2B HPSI doesn't start, Isolate 2A SG Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Manually start 2B HPSI Pump as directed Perform controlled cooldown using SBCS not to exceed 100°F RO in anyone hour period when directed. Place SBCS permissive switch to Man. during cooldown.

Depressurize RCS using main or aux. spray when directed

Within Figure 1A (attached)

RO * <930 psia

Above RCP minimum pressure

Appx. Equal to 2A SG pressure (within 50 psia)

RO Stop one RCP/LOOP when directed Perform EOP-99 Appendix J CCW restoration to RCP's when BOP directed (attached)

Perform EOP-99 Appendix A, sampling SG's when directed (attached)

Verify Figure 2 SI flow when directed (attached)

Perform safety function status check for 2-EOP-04 every 15 minutes Block MSIS when directed.

13

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

2400 2200 2000 1800 "iii 1600 S.

i!!

~

a..

1400

~

c

" 1200 gj i!!

a..

'0

~ 1000

~

800 600 400 200 0

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Indicated ReS Temperature (F)

RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 180°F 1000 psia to 500 psia 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300 T .................. + . . . *. . *. .-r. . . . . . . . . . , . ..;.. *. . . *. *. . . . -r-**. . . ******+**. * . 'T"-.;.**,....*,..**--.... .;..*....*....*..,,,....*.........." ............*'1"'* ..' .....*1-...*..-1""..-+....--...**""**.--* ...;........*. *-"-.. .4*..*,.......*T...... *.. *4..- ..*.. j""*..***4 ........**,

1200 +--+-1--+----+---+---+ 1 This curve SI Flow. If measured flow is less than repres~n~T~inimum expected P

R 1100 .- figure, Then SI System lineup should be verified.

E S 1000 + .. + ....'"\+..... . . . +..........-....-+......._. . . . . . 1..................-t-......

S U

R 900 +-.--+--t+---+----f---+-+_

I Z

E 800 +--+-+-\--+---+----!-----

R 700 +~- .. t-.-_+....- \ _ _ _ + _ -......+-..---.~.f----.- ...-

p R

E 600 +---++--l-+---t---+---t---+---+---f---

S 1 Full Train S

U 500 +-.~-..+ ..---i.... -~"""" in Operation .... -~J-.~.-+-. . .-..+-----.---

R ! !

E 400 ....-t.!...- .......,.A---i .......... -+------+--.J2 Full Trains !

. .--J .

in Operation !,

300 i - - *....-

p s

i 200 + .....

a I--r==t---t-_

100 +----+-------------+------- :::~~.-r==t====~J_=-

I o +-.-.+.....-.~-+..-+--.---+-... '---+-+i---+-1-1--+---+

1000 2000 3600 4000 6000l TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (P/OPSI2.EOP-99IFig2IRev.OItif)

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (-/) B Train (-/)

o 1. If a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. If SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

HCV-14-8B

HCV-14-10

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) o 3. If CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

o 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

o 5. If S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDlXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2) o 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-18-1 to CLOSE / OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW IN' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards si nals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open.

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW IN' header valves, until SIAS is reset.

o 2. !f SIAS has closed the IN' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER lA' or IB' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRI DE:

HCV-14-8A 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-9 'N' Hdr Isol Suction OR

HCV-14-8B 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-10 'N' Hdr Isol Suction o 3. ALIGN CCW to / from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

o HCV-14-1, CCW To RC PUMP o HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP o HCV-14-7, CCW To RC PUMP o HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP o 4. !f CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

o 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

o HCV-14-11-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler o 6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

o 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

o 2. 11 HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

o 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

o 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

o 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

o 6. 11 BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

o MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve o LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass o MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass o B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

o 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6) on 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued) o 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

o 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A S/G ADV 1501.

o 11.PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.

o 12. ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

o 13.ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

o 14. PLACE MV-08-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

o 1S.ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 16.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A S/G ADV 1501.

o 17. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

o D. !f SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884, SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page)

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

17. (continued) o E. If MV-08-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

o 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

o a. CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

o b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

o V08622, CB #67 Drain o V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol o V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 1

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 14 14 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event #

-5,6,7

Page of Event

Description:

SGTR EOP-04, 2B HPSI doesn't start, Isolate 2A SG Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Isolates 2A Steam Generator lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R when Critical directed (attached)

Step Terminate when 2A SG is isolated, cooldown in progress and RCS is depressurized to within 50 psia of isolated SG.

14

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-15, 45% power, MOL 2A HPSI, 2A Containment Spray Pump OOS, 2B AFW pump OOS for bearing repair.

Turnover: 45% Power, MOL, 2A HPSI and 2A Containment Spray pump OOS for CCW to seal cooler line modifications. 2B AFW pump OOS for bearing repair. 2B MFW Pump returned to service after oil leak repair. Increase power to 100%.

Critical Tasks:

Manually Actuate B train SIAS

Manually start 2B Containment Spray Pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R-AII Power increase from 45% to 100% power 2 1 T.S. SRO 2A5 Undervoltage Relay failed. Relay 27N-B2A5/1833 3 2 I-BOP 2A SG Level DCS failure.

4 3 T.S. SRO LlC 90130 fails high from DCS failure 5 4 I-RO H IC 1100 Spray Controller drifts high 6 5 C-RO 2A2 MCC de-energizes (Manually stop Charging Pumps)

BOP Restore Charging and Letdown 7 6 M-AII SGTR, Manual Trip ESD Post trip 8 7 I-RO B SIAS train fails to actuate 9 8 C-RO 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to Start post CSAS

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 1 of 16

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 St. Lucie The crew assumes the shift at 45% power. The unit has been at reduced power for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to repair an oil leak on the 2B Main Feedwater pump. The oil leak has been repaired and the pump has been returned to service. Engineering has identified non-class parts on the new modifications to the 2A HPSI and 2A Containment Spray pump seal coolers. Both pumps were taken out of service 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago for part replacement, scheduled back in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . 2B AFW pump is OOS for bearing repair. Not expected back on this shift.

The crew will initiate a power ascension lAW 2-GOP-201 , "Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1" The SNPO will call the Control room with a failed 2A5 undervoltage relay. Relay 27N-B2A5/1833 has failed. The SRO will implement 2-0NP-99.01. The relay will be required to be placed in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . EM supervisor will be required to assist. T.S. 3.3.2 and table 3.3-3 should be referenced.

2A Steam Generator experiences a reference leg failure that causes level to decrease, requiring the candidates to place the 2A Feedwater system in manual and control Steam Generator level manually during the power ascension. Off-Normal procedure 2-0700030, "Main Feedwater" will be implemented. LlC-9013D, Steam Generator 2A Narrow Range indication will eventually fail high, requiring the Unit Supervisor to enter 2-0NP-99.01 , "Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation" and implement TSAS 3.3.2a.

HIC-1100 Pressurizer Main Spray controller fails high causing the main spray valve to go fully open. The candidates will be required to place the controller in manual and control pressurizer pressure manually for the remainder of the scenario. Off-Normal Operating Procedure 2-0120035 "Pressurizer Pressure and Level" will be implemented. If action is not taken promptly, the Unit Supervisor will be required to enter TSAS 3.2.5 for DNB margin (RCS pressure <2225 psia).

2A2 MCC (non-vital) de-energizes causing the letdown pressure and level control valves to isolate. The candidates will be required to stop charging pumps and then troubleshoot to determine which electrical bus has failed, since there are no alarms associated with the MCC failure. Two Off-Normal Operating Procedures, 2-0NP-47.02, "Loss of a Non-Safety Related AC Bus" and 2-0NP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown" will be required to be implemented. The BOP will have to take action to restore charging and letdown.

After Charging and Letdown has been restored, a 400 GPM tube leak will ramp in on the 2A Steam Generator. This will require the candidates to manually trip the reactor and turbine.

Upon the trip, a moderate excess steam demand on the same steam generator (2A) will occur inside containment. After performance of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions", the crew will transition to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" due to the dual event.

When pressurizer pressure decreased to <1736, SIAS on the "B" side will not actuate, so no HPSI pumps will be available initially. The candidates will have to manually initiate SIAS and ensure 2B HPSI pump is running in order to meet RCS and Core heat removal safety function.

When containment pressure increases to 5 psig, the 2B Containment Spray Pump will fail to start requiring the candidates to manually start the pump. If the pump is not started, Containment Temperature and Pressure safety function will not be met.

Page 2 of 16

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 The scenario will conclude with the isolation of the 2A Steam Generator lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R and a cooldown and depressurization to shutdown cooling entry conditions in progress.

Page 3 of 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 1,2 Page 4 of 16 Event

Description:

Power increase from 45% to 100% Relay failure Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate IC set and ensure 2A HPSI and 2A CS pumps are OOS. Start 2B MFW pump Booth Operator Instructions: At direction of examiner, trigger 2A5 relay fail.

Booth Operator Instructions: Call the control room as SNPO and state the undervoltage relay 27N-B2A5/1833 has failed (tripped).

Examiners note: Relay failure does not result in alarm. Logic is 2/3.

Inform the crew 2-GOP-21 0 step 6.129 has been signed off by RE and power ascension approved.

SRO Direct power increase lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.130 Implement 2-0NP-99.01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation, Appendix B step 3. Notify EM supervisor to jumper (trip) relay.

Verify minimum channels operable within 1 (one) hour. T.S.

3.3.2 and table 3.3-3.

Commence Dilution for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 6.5 (attached)

Withdraw CEA's to control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-1 01 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached)

Program DEH for power increase at a rate lAW 2-GOP-1 01 BOP step 6.1.2 (attached)

Page 4 of 16

22C BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL IPR()CEDUF~E NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution NOTE

An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205 PNL "N". Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard.

The Operations Supervisor SHALL be notified and a CR submitted of any unexplained or unplanned Reactivity change in accordance with OPS Policy 105 (Le., >.5 deg Tcold change or >.5% power change).

If a Reactivity management issue occurs, refer to procedure ADM-09.11, Reactivity Management.

If constant dilution is desired then ensure flow on FRC-2210X is observable.

1. DODD ENSURE Section 3.0, Prerequisites is completed at least once per shift.

2. DODD ENSURE Section 4.0, Precautions / Limitations, has been reviewed at least once per shift.

3. DODD 1[2 ENSURE calorimetric power is less than 100.00% prior to any dilutions by obtaining a DCS calorimetric power.

4. DODD DETERMINE the desired volume of primary water to be added.

5. DODD PLACE the Makeup Mode Selector switch in MANUAL.

6. DODD ENSURE FRC-221 OX, Water Flow, is in MANUAL and REDUCE the controller output to ZERO.

7. DODD ENSURE FRC-2210Y, Boric Acid Valve Control Switch is CLOSE.

8. DODD ENSURE either Primary Makeup Water Pump is running.

9. DODD PLACE FCV-221 OX, Reactor Makeup Control Switch in Auto.

10. DODD !f diluting to the VCT, Then OPEN V2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

11. DODD !f diluting to the Charging Pump suction, Then OPEN V2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

0 N

N

REVISION NO.:

22C BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

12. DOD 0 ADJUST FRC-221OX to the desired flowrate (and if using V2525 do NOT exceed the flowrate for the number of running Charging Pumps).

13. 0 0 0 0 MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

14. DOD 0 li necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position:

A. DO DO ENSURE V2500 VCT Divert Valve indicates OPEN.

B. 0 0 0 0 When the desired VCT level is reached, PLACE V2500 in AUTO.

C. 0 0 0 0 ENSURE V2500 indicates CLOSED.

15. 0 DOD When the desired amount of primary water has been added, Then CLOSE FCV-221 OX, Reactor Makeup.

16. 0 DOD liV2512 Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv was opened, Then PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

17. 0 DOD liV2525 Boron Load Control Valve was opened, Then PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

18. 0 0 0 0 REDUCE FRC-2210X, Makeup Water Flow controller output to ZERO.

19. 0 0 0 0 MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tave.

20. 0 0 0 0 §1 RECORD on Data Sheet 1, Boration / Dilution Log, the number of gallons of Primary Makeup Water added as indicated on FQI-2210X, Water Flow Totalizer.

21. 0 0 DOli additional dilutions are desired, or if the expected changes to Tave or Boron concentration are NOT achieved, Then REPEAT Steps 6.5.1 through 6.5.20.

'-V-lJ'" NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

9 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY IPRc)CE[)URit;NroO~.:-~ STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INSTRUCTIONS Power Level Escalations NOTE CEAs should be above the Long-term Steady State Insertion Limit (102 inches withdrawn on Group 5) before reaching 20% core power and at a position to begin controlling ASI at the ESI between 20% and 50% power.

Refer to NOP-100.02 Axial Shape Index Control, for further uidance.

1. As Main Generator loading commences, MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref by:

A. CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

AND/OR B. Boron concentration changes in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

2. At or above 50% power:

A. All planned reactivity additions should be made by boration or dilution in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

B. USE CEAs for ASI control, CONSIDER the reactivity effect of CEAs when adjusting ASI.

C. REFER to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for specific instructions regarding ASI control during power escalations.

D. ~1 When raising Reactor power, all power escalation rates should be within the following fuel preconditioning guidelines:

Max Equivalent Turbine Category Max Core Power Escalation Rate Generator Load Rate 1 3%/HR at or above 15% Power .42 MW/MIN 2 3%/HR above 50% Power .42 MW/MIN 3 20%/HR above 50% Power 2.80 MW/MIN 4 30%/HR above 50% Power 4.2 MW/MIN

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

9 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY I-P-RO-C-E-DU-R....;E;...NO-.-:- - - I STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)

2. D. (continued)

NOTE To determine the correct category for a power escalation, Appendix B, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines Worksheet, may be used. Contact Reactor En ineerin if further assistance is re uired.

Category Definitions:

1. Category 1:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been previously sustained in this core cycle for at least 72 continuous hours.

2. Category 2:

a. INCREASE in power following 30 continuous days or more at a power level less than 70% of rated thermal power.

OR

b. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for more than 3 continuous hours during the past 60 days.

3. Category 3:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

4. Category 4:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

3. If available, Then ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating.

If necessary, START an additional Charging Pump in accordance with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and Letdown.

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation in accordance with Appendix A, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load the Main Generator in accordance with 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.

END OF SECTION 6.1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 5 16 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event #

3,4 Page of Event

Description:

2A SG Reference leg failure Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 2A Feedwater failure on cue from examiner.

Indications Available: 2A S/G level decreasing, LlC-90130 slowly trending up SRO Recognizes 2A S/G level trending down Directs BOP to take manual control of 2A S/G level May direct hold on power increase Refers to 2-0700030, "Main Feedwater" step 6.2.1

Actual Level lowering, Safety Channel Rising

Directs DCS NR level bypassed Notifies Management of event Directs BOP to stabilize 2A S/G level in manual Refers to Technical Specifications / 2-0NP-99.01, "Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation" step 6.3.2

RPS T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Bypass or trip/one hour

ESFAS T.S.3.3.2 Table 3.3-1 Bypass or trip/one hour Directs RO / BOP to bypass D channel RPS S/G level trip and D channel AFAS 1, and Hi Level Override.

RO Recognizes 2A S/G level trending down Page 5 of 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 3,4 Page 6 of 16 Event

Description:

2A SG Reference leg failure Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Secures dilution if directed by SRO Monitors plant parameters while event in progress BOP Recognizes 2A S/G level trending down Places DEH control panel on hold if directed by SRO Places 2A S/G feedwater control in manual as directed Bypass SG DeS NR level as directed by 2-0700030 step 6.2.1.B.1 (attached)

Restores 2A S/G level to normal value as directed Bypasses D channel RPS S/G level trip and D channel AFAS 1, and D Hi Level Override when directed Page 6 of 16

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

36A MAIN FEEDWATER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (less than 60% or greater than 70%)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. VERIFY SG level by comparing DCS indicated level with NR Level Safety Channels MA - MD on RTGB 202.

A. 1f DCS and Safety Level channels agree in direction, Then PROCEED to Step 2.

B. 1f the DCS WR and VALIDATED SG NR level indicators are High and/or rising and the majority of the NR level channels are indicating low and/or are lowering, Then PERFORM the following:

1. GO TO the 2A (2B) S/G FW INPUTS screen.

2. SELECT BYPASS for the NR Control Channel that is indicating High Level.

3. VERIFY the VALIDATED SG level Output signal approximately matches the majority of the Safety Level Channels.

4. VERIFY that the Feedwater Control valves are Opening to return SG level back to setpoint.

5. CHECK all Safety Level Channels and TAKE appropriate actions for any deviating channels.

6. INFORM I&C and Engineering.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 7 16 Op Test No.:

Page of Event

Description:

PIC-11 OOX fails high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger PIC*11 OOX output fail high on cue from examiner.

Indications Available: Pressurizer pressure decreasing and both main spray valves fully open.

Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down / main spray SRO valves fully open Directs RO to take manual control of HIC-1100 (may direct swapping pressurizer pressure control channel to 'V')

Refers to 2-0120035, "Pressurizer Pressure and Level" step 7.2.1 May direct hold on power increase (if still in progress)

Directs RO to control RCS pressure by energizing additional heaters, if available and manual control of spray valves.

Notifies Management of event Refers to Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB) if pressure <2225 psia.

Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down / main spray RO valves fully open Places HIC-1100 in manual or swaps to operable pressure channel 'V' as directed Secures dilution if directed by SRO (if still in progress)

Energize additional heaters as necessary to control pressure

>2225 psia.

Page 7 of 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 5 of 16 Event

Description:

PIC-1100X fails high Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Places DEH control panel on hold if directed by SRO (if still in BOP progress)

Monitors secondary plant parameters while event in progress Page 8 of 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 9 16

- - - Page of Event

Description:

Loss of 2A2 MCC I Restoration of Charging and Letdown Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Loss of 2A2 MCC on cue from examiner Booth Operator Instructions: When SNPO asked to investigate, report breaker 40121 feeder breaker is open. It appears a worker handling scaffolding piping tripped the breaker.

If EM called, report back in 5 minutes, no apparent damage and recommend attempt to close breaker.

Close breaker when directed.

Indications Available: Letdown pressure and level control valves close, letdown indication goes full scale low. Loss of indication on various equipment.

Annunciator F*15 PW dish. Press Lo Lo Recognizes letdown flow lost / 2A2 MCC is lost (will have to SRO recognize de-energized equipment to determine which MCC is lost) Refer to 2-ADM-03.01 C Power Distribution Breaker List Directs RO to stop Charging Pumps upon loss of Letdown, step 6.1 of 2-0NP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown May direct hold on power increase (if still in progress)

Refers to 2-0NP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown" Refers to 2-0NP-47.02, "Loss of a Non Safety Related AC Bus" Appendix G Notifies Management of event Direct SNPO one attempt to close breaker.

Directs BOP to restore Charging and Letdown lAW 2-0NP-02.03 step 6.0.11. when power restored.

Page 9 of 16

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 10 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of 2A2 MCC / Restoration of Charging and Letdown Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes letdown flow lost I 2A2 MCC is lost (will have to RO recognize de-energized equipment to determine which MCC is lost)

Stops all running Charging Pumps as directed Secures dilution if directed by SRO (if still in progress) although previous running PMW pump will be off.

Monitors plant parameters while event in progress BOP Recognize loss of 2A Primary water pump Restore 2A2 MCC per 2-0NP-47.02 (attached)

Restores Charging and Letdown lAW 2-0NP-02.03 step 6.0.11.A-V as directed (attached)

Conducts board walkdown when power restored to assure lost equipment re-energized.

Page 10 of 16

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE 2 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC. BUS PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-47.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXG RESTORATION OF 2A2 480V MCC (Page 1 of 1)

CHECK

1. .If the deenergized bus is the 2A2 480V MCC, Then PROCEED as follows:

CAUTION

Various instruments and equipment that are normally used for the assessment of critical safety functions may not be operable. Use all available indications.

DO NOT ATTEMPT to reset and close the Feeder Breaker 2-40121 UNLESS an emer enc situation exists.

Table 1 contains a listin A. START 2B Waste Gas Compressor (if not already in AUTO).

B. START 2B Closed Blowdown Cooling Water Pump (if not already running).

C. INVESTI GATE and ANALYZE the cause of the bus deenergization.

D. NOTIFY Electrical Maintenance of the current condition of the MCC.

E. When conditions on the 2A2 MCC are cleared and the MCC is ready to be restored, Then PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE 2-40121 (MCC 2A2 Supply).

2. RESTORE normal loads as directed by Unit Supervisor.

END OF APPENDIX G

REVISION NO.:

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. If letdown is unavailable, Then MAINTAIN pressurizer level by temporarily cycling charging pumps.

NOTE

§3 If one or more charging pumps have lost pumping ability, gas binding may have occurred. This can result from pumping the VCT dry (hydrogen binding) or rupture of a charging pump suction accumulator (nitrogen binding). If this occurred, the charging pumps must be vented after restoring a source of water to the suction.

10. If the charging pumps are gas bound, Then REFER TO Appendix C, Venting a Gas Bound Charging Pump.

11. ltcharging and letdown has 11.

been lost and can be restored, Then RE-ESTABLISH charging and letdown flow as follows:

A. ENSURE adequate VCT A.1 RESTORE the VCT level is indicated. to a normal level in accordance with 2-0NP-02.01, Boron Concentration Control. -

B. ENSURE the Level Control Valve selector switch and the Pressure Control Valve selector switch are selected to the level and pressure control valves presently in service.

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

c. PLACE HIC-111 0, Level, controller in MANUAL.

D. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is in AUTO and set to maintain 150 psig.

E. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch in the BYPASS position.

F. ENSURE the Level Control Valves are CLOSED.

G. BYPASS Letdown Ion Exchangers by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the BYPASS RESET POSITION.

H. START one charging pump I. VERIFY charging flow is indicated.

NOTE If V2515 closed due to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temp High, it may be necessary to cycle V2515 while opening the PZR Level control valve until flow is ade uate to clear the hi h temperature alarm.

J. VERIFY the regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm, SIAS or CIS alarms are NOT present.

ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

K. OPEN V2515, Stop Valve-IC.

L. OPEN V2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

M. OPEN V2522, Containment Isol Valve-OC.

N. SLOWLY OPEN the Level Control Valve and ESTABLISH approximately 5 gpm letdown flow.

CAUTION Prolonged use of charging without letdown could result in the pressurizer going solid. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

NOTE TI-2229, Charging Temp Outlet Regen HX should NOT be allowed to increase more than 60°F er minute.

O. WHEN Letdown 0.1 !f letdown cannot be temperature stabilizes on restored, TIC-2221, Temp Regen Then INITIATE charging Hx Tube Out, as required for restoring Then RAISE letdown pressurizer level, or flow at a rate NOT to boration.

exceed 5 to 10 gpm over at least a 4 minute period.

P. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is maintaining letdown pressure at 150 psig.

RE TITLE:

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

Q. When PZR level is at its setpoint, Then PERFORM the following:

1. BALANCE HIC-1110, LEVEL, controller AUTO to MAN UAL output signals, using the BIAS control knob while previewing the AUTO signal.

2. PLACE HIC-1110, LEVEL, controller to AUTO.

3. MONITOR pressurizer level for abnormal trends.

R. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch to the NORM position.

CAUTION V2345, LTDN CNTL VLV STATION SAFETY RELIEF, will open at 600 psig.

s. SLOWLY RAISE PIC-2201, Pressure, setpoint to 430 psig.

T. ENSURE letdown pressure is being maintained at 430 psig.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

U. NOTIFY Health Physics that dose rates near CVCS ion exchangers and piping may change when ion exchanger is placed in service.

V. PLACE the Letdown Ion Exchangers back in service by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the AUTO Position.

12. If Letdown Level control is 12.

malfunctioning, Then PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE HIC-1110 in MANUAL by HIC-1110, LEVEL, is performing the following:

responding as expected to current plant

1. BALANCE HIC-1110 MANUAL to AUTO conditions.

controller output signals by previewing and using the MAN UAL control knob to match the manual and auto controller output signals.

2. PLACE HIC-1110 to MANUAL.

3. ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

4. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves.

B. VERIFY the selected B.1 PLACE the Alternate Level control level control valve is valve in service in accordance responding as expected with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and to HIC-1110 output. Letdown.

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 11 of 16 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE, Manual Trip EOP-01 Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger SGTR and ESDE on cue from examiner Indications Available: Pressurizer level decreasing rapidly, containment pressure increasing on reactor trip SRO Recognizes pressurizer level decreasing rapidly Directs RO to isolate letdown (if re-established)

Directs RO to start 3rd Charging pump Directs RO to trip reactor when Pressurizer level cannot be maintained Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

Recognizes MSIS on Containment pressure. MSIV's closed Directs RO to trip 1 RCP in each loop on SIAS Recognize B train SIAS did not actuate Critical Directs RO to manually actuate B train SIAS step Directs RO to re-establish CCW to RCP lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J or trip all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes.

Page 11 of 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 12 of 16 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE, Manual Trip EOP-01 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize 2B Containment Spray Pump did not start on CSAS Critical Directs RO to manually start 2B Containment Spray Pump step RO Recognizes pressurizer level decreasing rapidly Isolates letdown (if re-established) as directed Starts 3 rd Charging Pump as directed Manually trips reactor as directed. Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Critical Manually start 2B Containment Spray Pump when directed step Stops 1 RCP in each loop on SIAS initiation as directed Page 12 of 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9 Page 13 of 16 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes B train SIAS did not actuate Critical Manually actuates B train SIAS as directed / verify all pumps step and valves actuated Re-establish CCW to RCPs lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J as BOP directed or stop all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes. (attached)

Recognize 2B Containment Spray Pump did not start on CSAS Critical Manually start 2B Containment Spray Pump as directed Step Stabilizes RCS temperature if 2A S/G blows dry as directed Recognizes increasing trends on SJAE radiation monitor, Main BOP Steam Line Monitor and SG Blowdown monitor Verify turbine trips on reactor trip Upon unit trip, notify NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

Manually close MSR block valves Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Manually close Spillover bypass valve MV-08-814 Page 13 of 16

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 14 of 16

-8,9- - - - Page Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Time II Position .11 AJlplicant's Actions or Behavior Directs entry to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" due to dual SRO event (SGTR I ESDE)

Direct RO to perform Table 13 RCP operating limits.

Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's Direct Hydrogen Analyzers placed in service per Appendix L EOP-99 Direct BOP to perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 Direct SFSC's performed every 15 minutes Identify Success paths in service per Attachment 3 as:

RC-1 MVA-DC-1 MVA-AC-1 IC-2 PC-1 (Close to PC-3)

HR-2 CI-1 (not met until 2A SG Isolated)

CTPC-3 (if 2B Containment Spray started)

CCGC-1 Performs success path instructions for CI-1 (attached) first due to Safety Function not being met until 2A SG isolated.

Refers to HR-2 (step 4.6.19) to address isolation of 2A SG, then returns to CI-1 when the 2A SG isolated.

Page 14 of 16

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - Autom Isolation INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. Ensure Containment Isolation and Cooling If ANY of the following conditions exist,

Containment pressure greater than 3.5 psig

Containment radiation greater than 10 R/hr

SIAS is ACTUATED Then PERFORM ALL the following:

A. ENSURE BOTH the following:

1. ENSURE CIAS has 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN CIAS ACTUATED. components.

REFER TO Table 2, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.

2. If Containment pressure is 2.1 Manually START/ALIGN MSIS greater than 3.5 psig, components.

Then ENSURE MSIS has REFER TO Table 5, Main Steam ACTUATED. Isolation Actuation Signal.

B. ENSURE ALL available Emergency Containment HVAC systems are RUNNING:

At least ONE train of SBVS

At least ONE train of Containment Fan Coolers

SION NO.: PROCEDURE 29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - Autom (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION If there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.

o 2. Determine If SGTR Present If a SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,

S/G activity

Main steam piping radiation

S/G level change when NOT feeding

S/G blowdown activity

ONE S/G level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same for BOTH

Feedflow mismatch between S/Gs

Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a S/G PRIOR to the trip Then IDENTIFY and ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.

REFER TO Heat Removal Success Path HR-1 or HR-2, and RETURN TO this success path when the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS . CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION 11 there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.

o 9. Determine If ESD Present 11 an ESD has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,

High steam flow from S/G

Lowering S/G pressure

Lowering S/G level

Lowering RCS cold leg temperature

Lowering Pressurizer pressure

Lowering Pressurizer level Then DETERMINE the MOST affected steam generator.

D 10. If No ESD, GO TO Step 15

!f there are NO ESD indications, Then GO TO Step 15.

o 11. Isolate the MOST Affected SIG 11 MSIS has NOT isolated the leak, Then ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.

REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation.

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - Autom (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 3. Verify No RCS to CCW Leak 3.1 !f RCS to CCW leakage is suspected, VERIFY NO RCS leakage into the Then ISOLATE the leak.

CCWsystem: REFER TO 2-0NP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.

A. Absence of CCW Surge Tank high level alarm (Annunciator LB-1 0).

B. ENSURE sample flow to the CCW radiation monitors and NO indication of activity.

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - Autom (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 4. Verify CI-1 Satisfied 4.1 !f Containment Isolation is still in jeopardy, VERIFY CI-1 (Automatic/Manual Then PURSUE Containment Isolation) is satisfied by ANY of the Isolation following conditions being satisfied: and other jeopardized safety functions simultaneously.

Condition 1: 4.2 CONTINUE efforts to establish Containment Isolation by A. if ANY secondary plant activity evaluating further actions based on monitor alarms ALL of the following:

or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is

The urgency of other ISOLATED. jeopardized safety functions B. Containment pressure is less

The risk to plant personnel than 3.5 psig. and the public of leaving certain containment C. NO containment area penetrations unisolated or atmospheric radiation monitor alarms

The feasibility of isolating or unexplained rise. containment penetration(s) by alternate means D. If a SGTR exists, Then the isolated S/G pressure is less than 915 psig (930 psia) and NOT steaming via ADV.

Condition 2:

A. if ANY secondary plant activity monitor alarms or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.

B. CIAS is ACTUATED.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2) o 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-1S-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards si nals are still resent.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-SA (HCV-14-SB) starts to open.

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will 0 en the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset.

o 2. 11 SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRI DE:

HCV-14-SA 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-9 'N' Hdr Isol Suction OR

HCV-14-SB 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-10 'N' Hdr Isol Suction o 3. ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

o HCV-14-1, CCW To RC PUMP o HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP o HCV-14-7, CCW To RC PUMP o HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP o 4. 11 CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CE[)URE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

o 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

o HCV-14-11-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler o 6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9 Page 15 of 16 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior When T hot <510°F direct isolation of 2A SG lAW Appendix R SRO EOP-99.

Determines CI-1 satisfied by Condition 2

Most affected SG isolated

CIAS actuated When CI satisfied refer to IC-2 May direct manual AFW start due to trip at low power, no Main Feedwater due to MSIS.

Critical Directs BOP to isolate 2A S/G lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R Step RO Perform Table 13 RCP Operating limits (attached)

Perform Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's, when directed BOP (attached)

Perform Appendix L EOP-99 Hydrogen Analyzers when directed (attached)

Perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 (attached) when directed Perform SFSC's of EOP-15 every 15 minutes RO Manually start AFW and feed 2B SG when directed.

Isolate 2A S/G lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix R as directed BOP (attached)

Page 15 of 16

REVISION NO.:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 TABLE 13 RCP OPERATING LIMITS (Page 1 of 1)

ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF ACTIONS WHEN CONDITIONS ARE OPERATION OUTSIDE ACCEPTABLE RANGE T COLD must be greater than 500°F for 4 If T COLD is approaching or is less than 500°F, RCPs to be RUNNING. Then ENSURE at least ONE RCP is STOPPED.

RCS Pressure Temperature is above MONITOR RCP instrumentation for and to the left of the RCP NPSH cavitation or seal failure requirement curve of Figure 1A or 1B,

If cavitation or multiple seal failure is RCS Pressure Temperature. indicated, Then STOP the affected RCPs Guide bearing temperatures are less STOP the affected RCPs.

than 185°F.

Thrust bearing temperatures are less STOP the affected RCPs.

than 200°F.

CCW flow greater than 200 gpm. If CCW flow is lost and can NOT be re-established within 10 minutes Then STOP the affected RCPs.

Oil Reservoir Levels +2 to -2 inches. If valid, rapidly changing or full scale high or low indicated level in either the upper or lower oil reservoir Then STOP the affected RCPs.

Controlled Bleedoff and Lower Cavity If Controlled Bleedoff or Lower Seal Cavity Seal temperature is less than 250°F. temperature is greater than or equal to 250°F, Then STOP the affected RCPs.

END OF TABLE 13

PROCEDURE TITLE:

APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (-V) B Train C.J) o 1. 1f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will 0 en the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. 1f SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRI DE:

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

HCV-14-8B

HCV-14-10

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) o 3. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

o 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

o 5. !f S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA IPR()CEIDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 1 of 2)

A Train C") B Train (-.,j)

1. SELECT ONE sample point by PLACING the sample valve selector switch in the desired position. FSE-27-8 FSE-27-12 (Upper Cntmt. Dome) (Lwr. Cntmt.)

FSE-27-9 FSE-27-13 (pzr. Area) (2B2 RCP)

FSE-27-10 FSE-27-14 (2A1 RCP) (2B1 RCP)

FSE-27-11 (2A2 RCP)

2. OPEN the Containment Isolation Valves. FSE-27 -15 FSE-27 -17 (Sample in to H2 Analyzer)

AND FSE-27-16 FSE-27-18 (Sample out of H2 Analyzer)

3. ENSURE the function selector switch is in the SAMPLE position.

4. PLACE the OFF / STANDBY / ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.

NOTE If power is interrupted and then restored to an in-service Hydrogen Analyzer (such as after an ESFAS or Undervoltage Relay actuation) the remote control selector pushbutton must be depressed to allow for continued operation of the anal zer from the Control Room.

5. DEPRESS the remote control selector pushbutton.

6. VERIFY the red sample light energizes.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2)

A Train (--J) B Train (--J)

7. START the Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder. (switch located inside recorder)

8. Allow five to ten minutes for the Hydrogen Analyzer to stabilize as indicated by the (%) indication leveling off.

END OF APPENDIX L

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6) on 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

o 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

o 2. If HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

o 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

o 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

o 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

o 6. If BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

o MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve o LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass o MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass o B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

o 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued) o 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

o 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A S/G ADV Isol.

o 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.

o 12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

o 13.ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

o 14. PLACE MV-08-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

o 1S.ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 16.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A S/G ADV Isol.

o 17.PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

o D. if SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884, SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page)

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6) on 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

17. (continued) o E. !f MV-08-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

o 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

o a. CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

o b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

o V08622, CB #67 Drain o V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol o V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Terminate the exercise when 2A SG is isolated, ReS temperature and pressure are stabilized and all Safety Functions are met in EOP-15 Page 16 of 16

ML090780273

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