ML090570198
| ML090570198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/2009 |
| From: | Darrell Roberts Division of Reactor Safety I |
| To: | Spina J Calvert Cliffs |
| References | |
| EA-08-323, EA-08-351 IR-08-502 | |
| Download: ML090570198 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000317/2008502
Text
February 26, 2009
Mr. James A. Spina, Vice President
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Calvert Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702
SUBJECT:
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT 05000317/2008502 AND
05000318/2008502; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING
Dear Mr. Spina:
On January 14, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
Emergency Preparedness inspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
(CCNPP). The inspection included on-site inspection on November 17 through 21, 2008,
and in-office inspection through January 14, 2009. The enclosed inspection report
documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 14, 2009, with Mr.
D. Bauder, Plant General Manager, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety
and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of
your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed
activities and interviewed personnel.
This letter transmits one licensee-identified finding that has preliminarily been determined
to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance, which may require
additional NRC inspection. The finding is associated with emergency preparedness
planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Specifically, for the period of August 31, 2005,
until April 10, 2008, the Calvert Cliffs emergency action level (EAL) tables fission
product barrier matrix contained an inaccurate threshold associated with the potential
loss of the containment barrier. Constellation evaluated this condition and took prompt
actions to correct the inaccurate EAL. This finding was assessed using the emergency
preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP). The final resolution of this
finding will be conveyed in separate correspondence.
The finding is also an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered
for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which can
be found on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/enforcement.
J. Spina
2
In accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, we intend to
complete our evaluation using the best available information and issue our final
determination of safety significance within 90 days of the date of this letter. The
significance determination process encourages an open dialogue between the NRC staff
and the licensee; however, the dialogue should not impact the timeliness of the staffs
final determination. Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you
with an opportunity (1) to attend a Regulatory Conference where you can present to the
NRC your perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the
finding and assess its significance, or (2) submit your position on the finding to the NRC
in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the
receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least
one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and
effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you
decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC
within 30 days of your receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a Regulatory
Conference or submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final
SDP determination, in that by not doing either you fail to meet the appeal requirements
stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation Sections of Attachment 2 of IMC 0609.
Please contact James Trapp at 610-337-5186, and in writing, within 10 days from the issue date
of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days,
we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision, and you will be
advised of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being
issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and
characterization of the apparent violation may change as a result of further NRC review.
Additionally, based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a licensee-
identified Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being
treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement
Policy. This NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or
significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to: (1) the Regional
Administrator, Region I; (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and (3) the NRC Resident Inspector at
the CCNPP.
J. Spina
3
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible
from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
Sincerely,
/RA by Eugene W. Cobey for/
Darrell Roberts, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-317, 50-318
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502
J. Spina
3
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible
from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
Sincerely,
/RA by Eugene W. Cobey for/
Darrell Roberts, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-317, 50-318
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502
SUNSI Review Complete: JMT (Reviewer=s Initials)
ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML090570198
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRS\\Plant Support Branch 1\\Perry\\CC EP REPORT.doc
After declaring this document AAn Official Agency Record@ it will be released to the Public.
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE
RI/DRP
RI/DRS
RI/DRP
RI/DRS/SRA
RI/ORA
NAME
NPerry/NSP**
JTrapp/JMT**
GDentel/GTD**
WCook/WAC**
DHolody/DH**
DATE
01/30/09
02/02/09
02/04/09
02/05/09
02/05/09
OFFICE
OE/NSIR*
RI/DRS
NAME
SLaVie/SL*
DRoberts/EWC for
DATE
02/11/09
02/26/09
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
- OE/NSIR provide review - pending DRS incorporation of comments received 2/5/09; S. LaVie,
OE reviews at 2/11/09
- See Previous Concurrence Page
J. Spina
4
cc w/encl:
M. Wallace, Vice-Chairman, Constellation Energy
H. Barron, President, CEO, & Chief Nuclear Officer, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC
W. Parran, President, Calvert County Board of Commissioners
C. Fleming, Esquire, Sr. Counsel - Nuclear Generation Group, LLC
J. Gaines, Director, Licensing, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
S. Gray, Program Manager, Power Plant Assessment Program, Maryland Department of
Natural Resources
K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel
P. Birnie, Esquire, Co-Director, Maryland Safe Coalition
R. Hickok, NRC Technical Training Center
L. Larragoite, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Security, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
G. Detter, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Security, Constellation Energy
M. Griffen, Maryland Department of the Environment
S. Pattison, SLO (2)
J. Spina
5
DISTRIBUTION w/encl:
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OEWEB
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E Leeds, NRR
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NRR Project Manager
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G Pangburn, FSME
R Lewis, FSME
J. Luehman, FSME
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Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV (C Evans, K O=Brien, K Fuller)
E Hayden, OPA
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R1DRPMailResource
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F. Congel, OE (RIDSOEMAILCENTER)
D. Holody, ORA
R. Urban, ORA
J. Spina
6
S. Figueroa, OE
K. Farrar, ORA
S. Collins, RA
M. Dapas, DRA
S. Williams, RI OEDO
R. Nelson, NRR
D. Roberts, DRS
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Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
ROPreports Resource
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket Nos.:
50-317, 50-318
License Nos.:
Report No.:
05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502
Licensee:
Constellation Generation Group, LLC (Constellation)
Facility:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Lusby, MD
Dates:
November 17, 2008, through January 14, 2009
Inspectors:
Neil Perry, Senior Project Engineer
Approved by:
James Trapp, Chief
Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502; 11/17/08 - 1/14/09; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes.
This inspection was conducted by one regional inspector. One apparent violation (AV) with
potential low to moderate safety significance was identified (Preliminary White). The
significance for most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings
for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC
management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4,
dated December 2006.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Preliminary White: Constellation identified an apparent violation associated with the
failure to meet emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). For the
period of August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, the emergency action level (EAL) tables
fission product barrier matrix contained an inaccurate threshold associated with
identifying the potential loss of the containment barrier. The error was not identified by
Constellation prior to implementation of the revised EAL table. Constellation evaluated
this condition and took prompt actions to correct the inaccurate EAL.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality
(EAL changes) attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and affected the
associated cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing
adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a
radiological emergency. This finding is associated with risk significant planning standard
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions." The NRC
determined that the finding is preliminarily White, a finding with low to moderate safety
significance, that may require additional NRC inspection. Using Emergency
Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, Failure to Comply, the finding was determined to be a risk
significant planning standard (RSPS) problem and an RSPS degraded function (White).
Additionally, IMC 0609, Appendix B contains an example of Loss of RSPS Function for
10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4); more than one Alert, or any Site Area Emergency would not be
declared that should be declared, resulting in a White finding. There is no crosscutting
aspect associated with this finding since it is not reflective of current licensee
performance. (Section 1EP4)
B.
Licensee-Identified Findings
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by Constellation, has
been reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by Constellation
have been entered into their corrective action program. This violation and corrective
actions (IRE-027-361) are listed in Sections 4OA2 and 4OA7 of this report.
Report Details
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
a.
Inspection Scope (71114.04 - 1 Sample)
As discussed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000317/2008005 and
05000318/2008005, the inspector conducted a review of Constellations 10 CFR 50.54(q)
screenings for all the changes made to the Calvert Cliffs EALs implemented from
December 2006 through October 2008. The review was conducted to identify any EAL
change that could potentially result in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
Attachment 4, and the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.
b.
Findings
Introduction: Constellation identified an apparent violation of emergency preparedness
planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) for the failure to maintain emergency plans which
meet the requirements in 50.47(b) and Appendix E, IV.B. Specifically, for the period of
August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, an inaccurate EAL threshold had the potential to
impact Calvert Cliffs ability to accurately and timely classify an emergency condition
associated with the fission product barrier matrix. In accordance with Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, this licensee-identified
potentially greater than Green finding is being evaluated and documented as if it was an
NRC-identified finding.
Description: A project was initiated in 2004 to revise the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power
Plant emergency action level (EAL) scheme from NUMARC/NESP-007 based EALs to
NEI 99-01 based EALs. The revised EALs were reviewed using the 10 CFR 50.54(q)
process and were not submitted to the NRC for review and approval because
Constellation identified no deviations from the NEI 99-01 bases intent document.
Therefore, Constellation concluded that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness
of the emergency plan EALs. The new EALs became effective on August 31, 2005.
After the August 31, 2005, revision, the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Plan EAL Basis
Document for potential loss of containment barrier correctly described the barrier
threshold as containment pressure greater than 4.25 psig and the inability to meet any of
the following conditions: (1) two containment spray pumps operating, (2) three
containment air coolers (CACs) operating, or (3) one containment spray pump and two
CACs operating. However, the EAL tables fission product barrier matrix for containment
barrier, incorrectly omitted the first two conditions, and incorrectly documented the third
condition. This error resulted in allowing fewer containment cooling systems available
than necessary to maintain adequate containment cooling, and therefore, had a
nonconservative impact on the EALs.
2
The following table provides the criteria that were documented in the EAL Basis
Document (correct information per NEI 99-01) and the incorrect information that was
provided in the EAL Table. During an event, operators refer to the EAL Table in order to
correctly classify an event; they normally do not refer to the basis document unless they
need clarification or other help in order to correctly classify the event.
Emergency Action Level Basis Document
Emergency Action Level Table
Containment pressure > 4.25 psig AND
Cannot meet any of the following conditions:
2 Containment Spray Pumps Operating
3 CACs Operating
1 Containment Spray Pump and 2
CACs Operating
Containment pressure > 4.25 psig and NO
Containment spray pumps and < two CAC
units operating
During the Constellation 10 CFR 50.54(q) review of the change, a decrease in
effectiveness of the Emergency Plan EALs was not identified since the intended wording
for the EAL table was to be consistent with the information documented in the basis
document. The error occurred during implementation of the change when the EAL table
was developed, which for this change was done in parallel with the review of the change.
When taken in conjunction with the thresholds for the reactor coolant system (RCS) and
fuel clad barriers, this deficiency had the potential to prevent or impede the accurate and
timely declaration of an Unusual Event (UE), a Site Area Emergency (SAE) and a
General Emergency (GE). The error was not identified by Constellation prior to
implementation of the revised EAL table. In April 2008, Calvert Cliffs operations training
staff identified the inaccurate EAL. Constellation evaluated this condition and took
appropriate corrective actions to restore the EAL table to be consistent with the basis
document.
For the EAL Fission Product Barrier Matrix, Table H.5-1, the potential loss of containment
barrier alone requires declaration of a UE. The potential loss of containment barrier with
the loss of, or potential loss of, another barrier (either fuel clad or RCS) requires
declaration of an SAE. The potential loss of containment barrier with the loss of the
other two barriers (fuel clad and RCS) would require declaration of a GE.
Analysis: The performance deficiency is that Constellation did not establish and maintain
adequate emergency action levels (EALs), which led to the potential to adversely impact
Calvert Cliffs ability to accurately and timely classify an emergency condition associated
with the fission product barrier. The finding was more than minor because it was
associated with the procedure quality (EAL changes) attribute of the Emergency
Preparedness cornerstone and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure
that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health
and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. This finding is
associated with risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50
Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions."
3
Following identification of this EAL error, Constellation performed an assessment of the
incorrect EAL impact on Calvert Cliffs capability to declare a Site Area Emergency
(SAE) and a General Emergency (GE). They concluded that a GE would have always
been promptly declared under alternate EAL thresholds (core exit thermocouple >
1200°F, and containment dose rate at 14,000 rem/hr). For the SAE, Constellation
concluded that, for a number of accident types, the declaration would be delayed (more
than 15 minutes from containment pressure reaching > 4.25 psig). The Constellation
assessment concluded the SAE would have been ultimately declared based on an
adverse trend in containment (pressure approaching containment design pressure) and
using Emergency Director (ED) judgment. The ED judgment threshold addresses any
other factors relevant to determining if the containment barrier is potentially lost. Such a
determination should include imminent barrier degradation (degradation will likely occur
within two hours), barrier monitoring capability (loss or lack of reliable indicators) and
dominant accident sequences (degradation of all fission product barriers and likely entry
into Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-8, Functional Recovery Procedure).
The inspector reviewed the Constellation assessment and found it provided an adequate
basis to conclude that the GE declaration would have been made in a timely manner
under existing alternate EAL thresholds. However, the inspector was unable to reach a
similar conclusion regarding the SAE declaration. The assessment credited the
operations shift manager making the SAE declaration using the ED judgment threshold.
Constellations proposal relies upon the shift manager: (1) recognizing that containment
cooling was less than 100 percent of the cooling requirement; (2) noting an adverse
containment pressure trend; (3) referring to the EAL technical basis for potential loss of
containment; (4) identifying the discrepancy between the basis and the EAL; and (5)
concluding that the EAL basis was correct. Although the shift managers are trained in
the EALs and the supporting information in the technical bases, Calvert Cliffs does not
have a procedure or training lesson plan that requires the shift manager to consult the
EAL technical bases during an emergency. The NRC finds that it is not reasonable to
conclude that the declaration would always have been made; it could have been missed
due to the shift manager not referring to the basis since there is no requirement to do so,
or by not recognizing the discrepancy. Additionally, the inspector noted that the analysis
determined that it was unlikely the shift manager would make the SAE declaration in a
timely manner. Although NRC regulations do not explicitly establish a timeliness criterion
for completing classifications, the NRC expects that licensees will complete the
classification assessment and declare the emergency promptly within 15 minutes (in the
absence of extenuating circumstances). Delays in declaring an emergency
inappropriately delays notification of the offsite response organizations and may delay
the initiation of response activities necessary for the protection of the public.
This finding affected the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone, and is associated with
planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment
Actions." Although this condition resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency
plan, the condition is not the result of an inadequate review of the proposed change since
the review was performed using the correct intended change and the review was accurate.
The error occurred during implementation of the change. As such, traditional enforcement is
not appropriate for this findings assessment.
4
Using Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, IMC 0609, Appendix
B, Sheet 1, Failure to Comply, the finding is a failure to comply with a risk significant
planning standard (RSPS). Since the SAE classification could be made in a delayed
manner, the finding is not a Loss of RSPS function but rather a Degraded RSPS function
(White). Additionally, IMC 0609, Appendix B contains the following example of Loss of
RSPS Function for 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4): The EAL classification process would not declare
more than one Alert, or any Site Area Emergency that should be declared (White finding).
There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this finding since it is not reflective of current
licensee performance.
The inspector determined an RSPS degraded function occurred because Calvert Cliffs
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 3.0, Immediate Actions, Revision 39, which
contains the EAL table, deviated from the licensees approved licensing basis and
degraded the capability to perform a function in a timely manner. Specifically, it
degraded the capability to declare one UE, one SAE, and one GE. As a result,
Constellation might not have classified several events at the same level that would have
resulted from use of the correct EAL criteria. The finding did not present an immediate
safety concern, and was expeditiously corrected by Constellation.
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50.54(q) states in part, A holder of a nuclear power reactor
operating license under this part shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans
which meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this part.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part, A standard emergency classification and action level
scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by
the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on
information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite
response measures.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions," states in part, "The means to be
used for determining the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the
release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels
that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of
local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the
emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of
protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect
health and safety."
Contrary to the above, on August 31, 2005, Constellation failed to maintain Emergency
Plans which meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E, IV.B.
Constellation failed to maintain a standard emergency classification scheme, which
included facility system and effluent parameters, in use that the State and local response
plans can rely on for information to determine minimum initial offsite response measures.
Specifically, for the period of August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, the emergency action
level (EAL) table for the fission product barrier matrix contained an inaccurate EAL
threshold associated with potential loss of containment barrier. This is a degraded, not
failed, risk significant planning standard (RSPS) function. The finding had no actual
safety consequences, since no events occurred at Calvert Cliffs related to the
5
containment barrier, during the period in question. The issue was entered into the
corrective action program at Calvert Cliffs (IRE-028-981) for resolution. Pending final
determination of significance, this finding is identified as an apparent violation. (AV
05000317 & 318/2008502-01: Failure to Maintain Emergency Plans)
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 - 1 Sample)
Annual Sample: Calvert Cliffs Implementation of Emergency Action Levels
a.
Inspection Scope
This inspection reviewed Constellations identification and resolution of deviations from
the standard NEI 99-01 based emergency action level (EAL) scheme in the Calvert Cliffs
EALs. The deviations resulted from the 2004 project to revise the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Power Plant EAL scheme to the NEI 99-01 based EALs.
Reviews of the revised EALs and their bases were conducted by Calvert Cliffs staff and
consultants, as part of the follow-up to issues identified at another power plant in 2007.
Calvert Cliffs identified a number of deviations from the NEI 99-01 guidance, and
evaluated each individually to determine if a decrease in effectiveness (DIE) had
occurred. The inspector reviewed the disposition of identified deviations and discussed
these with Constellation emergency preparedness personnel.
Two similar EAL changes were determined by Constellation to have resulted in a non-
conservative change to the EALs; these two changes were also determined to have
resulted in a DIE, in that the change could have caused incorrect event classification, or
could have delayed the classification, for Alert level conditions, such that required
notifications would not have been timely. The licensee evaluated this condition and took
appropriate corrective actions to restore its EALs to comply with the requirements.
b.
Findings and Observations
A licensee-identified violation associated with the two changes involving a decrease in
effectiveness (DIE) is discussed in Section 4OA7. As identified in Constellations causal
analysis report, the root cause was determined to be that the processes and tools used
to identify and validate information transferred from the NEI 99-01, Rev. 4 basis
document to the plants technical basis document lacked sufficient rigor to identify a
misinterpretation. Specifically, changes made to emergency action levels (EALs) using
the 10 CFR 50.54(q) process were not adequately reviewed to ensure that a DIE did not
exist. The inspectors determined that the remaining emergency action level deviations
were in accordance with the licensing basis.
Corrective actions included generating an Operations Night Order notifying operators of
the EAL issue, and the EALs were restored to their original intent. Constellation initiated
a Category 1 Condition Report - root cause required, and additional Condition Reports.
The inspector determined Calvert Cliffs properly identified the root cause of the event
6
and provided adequate long-term corrective actions which included revising procedures
to require a challenge board for any regulatory significant change to the Emergency
Response Plan and for EAL changes. The inspector determined the licensees initial
and long-term corrective actions were timely and appropriate.
40A6 Meetings, including Exit
On January 14, 2009, the inspector conducted an exit meeting and presented the
preliminary inspection results to Mr. D. Bauder, Plant General Manager, and other
members of the Calvert Cliffs staff. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information
was not provided or examined during the inspection.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) was identified by
the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI
of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV):
10 CFR 50.54(q) states in part, A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear
power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the
standards in §50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this part. The nuclear
power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval
only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as
changed, continue to meet the standards of §50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix
E to this part. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part, A standard emergency classification
and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent
parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee... Contrary to the above, on
August 31, 2005, the licensee decreased the effectiveness of their emergency plan as a
result of revising classifiable conditions in two emergency action levels (EALs) and did
not request Commission approval. The two EALs affected the capability to make Alert
declarations as a result of a fire, explosion or tornado affecting one train of equipment or
structure(s) required for Safe Shutdown. Constellation entered this issue in their
corrective action program under IRE-027-361.
Changing an emergency plan resulting in a decrease in effectiveness (DIE) of the plan
without prior Commission approval impacts the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory
function and is therefore processed through traditional enforcement, as specified in
Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy, issued April 18, 2005. In accordance with
Enforcement Policy Supplement VIII, this violation is appropriately characterized as
Severity Level IV because, although these two EALs could not have been implemented
as approved and were not part of a standard emergency classification scheme, planning
standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) was met. These changes directly affected the planning
standard for assessment capability at Calvert Cliffs, but this problem was isolated to two
EALs and was not indicative of a functional problem with the EAL scheme. Because this
violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered
into the licensee=s corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an NCV,
consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy (EA-08-323).
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
Doug Bauder, Plant General Manager
Steven Speer, Director Emergency Preparedness
Greg Rudigier - Senior EP Analyst
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000317/318/2008502-01
Failure to maintain emergency plans
(Section 1EP4)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
CRs: IRE-028-435, IRE-027-551, IRE-028-981
Section 4OA2 and 4OA7:
EAL Disposition Plan, Rev. 6
IRE-027-361, Rev. 2, IRE-028-440, IRE-028-082
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plat Emergency Preparedness Challenge Board
Emergency Action Level (EAL) Review, Rev. 3 - September 19, 2008
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
Containment Air Cooler
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CR
Condition Report
Decrease in Effectiveness
Emergency Action Level
Emergency Director
Emergency Operating Procedure
General Emergency
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
OA
Other Activities
Non-cited Violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PS
Planning Standard
Risk Significant Planning Standard
Site Area Emergency
Significance Determination Process
Unusual Event