ML081830649

Watch Rebuttal to Entergys Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1

ML081830649
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	06/23/2008
From:	Lampert M Pilgrim Watch
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-293-LR, RAS J-151
Download: ML081830649 (99)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD DOCKETED USNRC June 23, 2008 4:50 pm OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF In the Matter of Entergy Corporation Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application Docket # 50-293 June 23, 2008 PILGRIM WATCH REBUTTAL TO ENTERGY'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PILGRIM WATCH CONTENTION 1 I.

INTRODUCTION Pilgrim Watch, by and through its pro se representative, Mary Lampert, herein answers and takes issue with certain statements of fact and conclusions of law in Entergy's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1. Entergy failed to show by a clear preponderance of the evidence that its Aging Management Program will ensure compliance with the CLB during license renewal, 2012-2032. Instead of supporting their statements with warranties, analyses, or other "hard evidence;".Entergy's "facts" turn out to be no more than unsubstantiated statements of opinion made by Entergy's employees or unproven, contradictory, or shown-to-be false statements by NRC Staff.

Pilgrim Watch demonstrates by going through their "facts" one by one, that Entergy failed to provide reasonable assurance by providing a clear preponderance of the evidence to establish the required 95% certainty. By so doing, Pilgrim Watch finds that Entergy has not satisfied its burden of showing that the Aging Management Program it proposes will be sufficient, and has thus failed to carry its burden of proof.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS Entergy Failed to Satisfy Its Burden of Proving Reasonable Assurance In an operating license proceeding, the licensee bears the ultimate burden of proof. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16 NRC 1265, 1271 (1982)

(citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.325). The Board cannot renew Pilgrim's license unless Entergy shows that its aging mahnagement program provides reasonable assurance that the Current Licensing Basis

("CLB") will be maintained [10 C.F.R. § 54.29]. Entergy has failed to do so. Licensing boards and courts have defined "reasonable assurance" with a showing of "clear preponderance" [North Anna Envtl., Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976)].

Proving "Reasonable Assurance" Pilgrim Watch finds that Entergy failed to satisfy its burden of proving reasonable assurance.

According to the Supreme Court and the NRC, a question of scientific fact - such as the technical design and the engineering protections and inspections will prevent failure of the buried pipes in a design base event - must be based on a 95% level of certainty' No Entergy or NRC expert testified that the engineering design, etc. of Pilgrim's buried pipes is such that there is 95% scientific/engineering certainty the pipes will not fail in such an event.

'The U.S. Supreme Court [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)] held that scientific evidence must conform to the accepted convention of 95 percent probability to be admissible. This 95% standard of proof was followed in state courts - for example, in the Texas Supreme Court in Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 723-24 (Tex. Sup. Ct 1997). Further, federal government scientists supported it as the minimum that is acceptable to prove each scientific fact in a case. [See, e.g., US. v. Chase, 2005 WL 757259, (Jan. 10, 2005 D.C.

Super); See generally, Frederika A. Kaestle, et al., Database Limitations on the Evidentiary Value of Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53 (2006) ]. Probably most important, the 95% confidence standard had been accepted and applied by the NRC as the measure of "reasonable assurance" [Tr., Exh., 17, Transcript of ACRS Meeting (Sept. 6, 2001)]

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Had there been such testimony, the question then would be whether Entergy, assisted by the NRC, had presented sufficient evidence - i.e., did it carry its burden of proving that there is a 95% engineering/scientific certainty that there will be no failure.

The required burden is, as both Entergy and NRC says, a "substantial preponderance;" a "substantial preponderance" of the evidence must support the conclusion that there is 95%

engineering/scientific certainty that that the pipes will not fail.

The reason that determining "reasonable assurance" requires a two step analysis - an initial determination of what facts must be proved and then weighing the evidence offered to prove them - is clear.

For example, did those living in Iowa and New Orleans have "reasonable assurance" that their

• levees, would stand in the face of a period of extremely heavy rain or a hurricane? If all the levee designers said was that there is a fifty-one percent level of scientific/ engineering certainty of no failure that would not meet the Supreme Court (or NRC standard). And no matter how strong the evidence, the resulting "assurance" of no failure could not be more than 51% -

hopefully not enough for even Brownie and FEMA to consider "reasonable assurance."

If, on the other hand, the levee designers said they had a 95% level of engineering/scientific certainty that the. levees would not fail, and a "substantial preponderance" (perhaps 70%) of the evidence supported this, then those living in New Orleans and Iowa would have 65.6% assurance that the levees would hold in a "design base" accident.

In sum - there are two reasons Entergy has not met its burden:

1. They provided no testimony that there is 95% engineering/scientific certainty of no failure. Only vague statements that there is some undefined level of certainty.

2. No matter what level of certainty they talked about, there is no clear preponderance' of the evidence. In fact, there is very little evidence.

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Scope of License Renewal Entergy, NRC Staff and the Board majority incorrectly view the scope of license renewal proceedings to be too limited. Pilgrim Watch finds that the scope is broader and that license renewal rules properly read allow a larger range of both components and functions to come under review in this adjudication process.

The Board narrowed our original contention2 down to 460 feet of piping in the SSW Discharge system; and to only whether or not the AMPs will provide assurance that there is redundancy in both "Loops" so that there is assurance that the system will perform its safety function specified in 10 CFR § 54.4, (i) -(iii). To put it another way, that in a design basis event, such as an earthquake, both SSW Discharge Loops, will not fail so that the discharge water becomes backed up and interferes with the heat exchanger.

10 CFR § 54.4 simply says how components are to be determined to be within scope. It is not a restriction on what can be looked at once they are determined to be within scope. 10 CFR § 54.21 [Contents of application--technical information] explains what has to be looked at in an aging management review of the components once they are determined to be within scope by 10 CFR § 54.4 (3).

It says, (3) "For each structure and component identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation."

The CLB (Current Licensing Basis) means that Entergy is required fully to comply with its license and all NRC regulations; not simply to show that the AMP assures that PNPS will perform the functions outlined in 54.4(a)(l)-(3). It does not exclude, as Entergy, NRC and the Board's majority claim, all other issues addressed by NRC regulations. This means compliance 2 Pilgrim Watch's original contention, filed May 25, 2006, said that, "The Aging Management program proposed in the Pilgrim application for license renewal is inadequate because (1) it does not provide for adequate inspection of all systems and components -that may contain radioactively contaminated water and (2) there is no adequate monitoring to determine if and when leakage from these areas occurs. Some of these systems include underground pipes and tanks which the current aging management and inspection programs do not effectively inspect and monitor."

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not simply with some of NRC's regulations but all of NRC's regulations that pertain to these important safety components. If Entergy or NRC Staff wish to change the license renewal rules the proper way to do is through the rule making process.

Pertinent regulations in the CLB for the buried components include, for example: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. According to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B leaks are required to be repaired and Entergy must look for leaks and fix them when found in order to comply with its CLB during the relicensed period. This regulation makes absolute sense because if there are any unidentified leaks in the aforementioned pipes, such leaks may jeopardize the design and intended function of safety related systems and components at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Corrosion cannot be assumed gradual; in fact, Dr. Davis, NRC Staff expert, said at the Hearing, "once corrosion starts it goes quickly" [Tr., page 729].

Also, current regulations require the Applicant to have in place an effective program for monitoring radiation on-site and off-site.3 Therefore, PW holds that the Board was incorrect to disallow adjudication on our original contention. Although on-site monitoring wells to detect radiation in groundwater are not specifically required in these regulations (unless the water on-site is used for drinking, which it is not at Pilgrim), recent events make such a scheme a natural addition to the Pilgrim Aging Management Plan.

10 CFR § 20.1302 'and §50 Appendix A Criterion 60 require that NRC's licensees demonstrate that effluents, including those from

'anticipated operational occurrences,'

do not expose members of the public to excessive radiation doses.'

Effective monitoring systems are required in order comply with these 3 10 CFR § 20.1302 Compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public: (a) The licensee shall make or cause, to be made, as appropriate, surveys of radiation levels in unrestricted and controlled areas and radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted and controlled areas to demonstrate compliance with the dose limits for individual members of the public in § 20.1301.

10 CFR § 50 Appendix A: Criterion 60--Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment. The nuclear power unit design shall include means to control suitably the release of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents and to handle radioactive solid wastes produced during normal reactor operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. Sufficient holdup capacity shall be provided for retention of gaseous and liquid effluents containing radioactive materials, particularly where unfavorable site environmental conditions can be expected to impose unusual operational limitations upon the release of such effluents to the environment.

Criterion 64--Monitoring radioactivity releases. Means shall be provided for monitoring the reactor containment atmosphere, spaces containing components for recirculation of loss-of coolant accident fluids, effluent discharge paths, and the plant environs for radioactivity that maybe released from normal operations, including anticipated operational occurrences, and from postulated accidents.

4 10 CFR § 20.1302 Compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public:(a) The licensee shall make or cause to be made, as appropriate, surveys of radiation levels in unrestricted and controlled areas and 5

regulations.

While leaks of radioactively contaminated water into the ground for extended periods may not have been operational occurrences anticipated when the facilities were initially designed and licensed, they can scarcely be "unanticipated" following the series of occurrences around the country. As those events demonstrated, unless nuclear facilities aggressively monitor for leaks both off-site and on-site, a leak can go undetected for years, and potentially life-threatening releases of radiation can migrate off-site before any problem are detected. The public is not provided with assurance from a voluntary program such as the BPTIMP - voluntary programs are not enforceable. The new (4) well monitoring program installed at Pilgrim, November 2007, does not meet accepted design criteria; and four wells are suited for a comer service station, not a nuclear reactor on the shores of Cape Cod Bay. [Tr., Exh. 2, Dr. Ahlfeld].

111.

WITNESSES Pilgrim Watch's expert witnesses include Mr. Arnold Gundersen and Dr. David AhIfeld. Their respective Curriculum Vitae are on record [Tr. Exh. 13, 14, 15]. -They based their Testimony on behalf of Pilgrim Watch on their technical and personal knowledge of the issues raised in Contention 1.

The Applicant [at 17] downplays Mr. Gundersen's "education, knowledge, or experience" with issues, that Entergy claim is central to PW Contention 1. Mr. Gundersen has vast and pertinent experience inside and outside the nuclear industry.

radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted and controlled areas to demonstrate compliance with the dose limits for individual members of the public in § 20.1301. (b) A licensee shall show compliance with the annual dose limit in § 20.1301 by--(l) Demonstrating by measurement or calculation that the total effective dose equivalent to the individual likely to receive the highest dose from the licensed operation does not exceed the annual dose limit; or (2) Demonstrating that--(i) The annual average concentrations of radioactive material released in gaseous and liquid effluents at the boundary of the unrestricted area do not exceed the values specified in table 2 of appendix B to part 20; and (ii) If an individual were continuously present in an unrestricted area, the dose from external sources would not exceed 0.002 rem (0.02 mSv) in an hour and 0.05 rem (0.5 mSv) in a year.

10 CFR § 50 Appendix A: Criterion 60--Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment. The nuclear power unit design shall include means to control suitably the release of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents and to handle radioactive solid wastes produced during normal reactor operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. Sufficient holdup capacity shall be provided for retention of gaseous and liquid effluents containing radioactive materials, particularly where unfavorable site environmental conditions can be expected to impose unusual operational limitations upon the release of such effluents to the environment. Criterion 64--Monitoring radioactivity releases. Means shall be provided for monitoring the reactor containment atmosphere, spaces containing components for recirculation of loss-of coolant accident fluids, effluent discharge paths, and the plant environs for radioactivity that may be released from normal operations, including anticipated operational occurrences, and from postulated accidents.

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Arnold Gundersen, for example, has a bachelor's and a Master's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) cum laude; and began his career as a reactor operator and instructor in 1971 and progressed to the position of Senior Vice President for a nuclear licensee. His more than 35 years of professional nuclear experience include, but is not limited to the following. Nuclear Plant Operation, Nuclear Management, Nuclear Safety Assessments, Reliability Engineering, In-service Inspection, Criticality Analysis, Licensing, Engineering Management, Thermo hydraulics, Radioactive Waste Processes, Decommissioning, Waste Disposal, Structural Engineering Assessments, Nuclear Equipment Design and Manufacturing, Prudency Defense, Employee Awareness Programs, Contract Administration, and Do6ument Control.

Entergy [at 17] finds that Dr. Ahlfeld "has no experience in the nuclear industry." Dr. David Ahlfeld is a Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

He has taught, conducted research and worked on projects in the area of groundwater flow and contaminant transport in the subsurface for over 20 years. He has served as a hydrological expert for plaintiffs in important cases such as in the now famous Civil Action case. He is very familiar with leaking buried components, irrespective of the nature of the facility.

In judging the credibility of experts, the Board must give weight to the fact that none of the Applicant's witnesses are independent; all four witnesses are employees of Entergy, testified as a condition of employment, and we presume wish to remain employed. In contrast, Pilgrim Watch's experts are independent and have no financial stake in the outcome of these proceedings; indeed, Dr. Ahlfeld is not being paid at all and Mr. Gunderson's hourly rate was only one-third of normal. The only real reason that either provided his time and expertise was their hope that risk will be decreased and public health and safety better protected.

We recognize that Mr. Gundersen and Dr. Alilfeld's opinions have been highly criticized by and unpopular to the chemical and nuclear industries; but that hardly leads to the conclusion that their opinions should be given less weight than should the testimony of current Entergy employees. In fact, Dr. Ahlfeld and Mr. Gundersen have been commended for their courage and the service they performed in protecting public health and safety. As Chairman Ivan Selin of the 7

NRC said, "It is true.., everything Mr. Gundersen said was absolutely right; he performed quite a service."

IV.

FINDINGS OF FACT Each "Statement of Fact" assembled by Entergy is reproduced below in italics and followed by Pilgrim Watch's answer. We apologize in advance for the repetition; however, Entergy's. "Facts" repeatedly say the same thing as if the "fifteenth" or "seventeenth" unsubstantiated statement will make it true.

1.

License Renewal Systems with Buried Pipe and Radioactive Liquids

1.

To fall within the scope of Contention 1, the buried pipes and tanks must (a) fall within the scope of license renewal, and (b) contain radioactively contaminated water.

PW Rebuttal: Pilgrim Watch agrees with (a) and disagrees with (b). The Board changed the order to "...whether Pilgrim's existing AMPs have elements that provide appropriate assurance as required under relevant NRC regulations that the buried pipes and tanks will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes and tanks to be unable to perform their intended safety functions." Leakage of radioactive liquid into the environment was determined by the Board's majority to be outside license renewal. Therefore, we find that whether the components contain radioactive fluid became irrelevant. All systems listed in number two below rightfully should be considered in this adjudication.

2.

Entergy identified six systems with buried pipes and tanks that meet, at the system level, the scoping criteria of 10 C.F.R. §'54.4. These are: (1) the CSS," (2) the fire protection water system; (3) the fuel oil system; (4) the SSW system; (5) the standby gas treatment system ("SGTS"); and (6) the station blackout diesel generator system.

PW-no dispute 8

3.

None of the parties claim that the fire protection water system, the fuel oil system, or the station blackout diesel system contain radioactively contaminated water. Therefore, these three systems are beyond the scope of Contention 1. Likewise, Entergy and the NRC Staff testified that the SGTS piping carries gas, not water, and is therefore beyond the scope of Contention 1. Mr. Gundersen's written testimony claimed that the buried SGTS piping could contain radioactive liquids. As Entergy pointed out however, and as the NRC Staff's testimony essentially confirms, Mr. Gundersen 's testimony pertains to a different system -

the off gas system - that is not within the scope of license renewal. At the hearing, Pilgrim Watch elected to "drop" this claim.

PW Rebuttal: Same as response to (1), above.

4.

The only system with buried pipe that Entergy identified as meeting the license renewal scoping criteria and containing radioactive liquid is the CSS. It is also possible that the SSW system could contain some radioactivity if a cross-contamination event were to occur.

- However, the SSW system has no history of cross contamination that would introduce radioactivity into the SSW discharge piping, and regular monitoring of the discharge has never indicated the presence of radioactivity.

PW Rebuttal: (a) The CSS is the only system that Entergy identified; however we disagree with their statement for the reasons stated above in 1. (b) The references provided by Entergy do not say that the SSW Discharge piping could not contain radioactivity; they say simply that "it is possible that" [A24]; "could become contaminated" [A32]; "small possibility" [NRC A6]; and "not normally" [A35]. (c) Entergy [A35] says that the discovery of tritium in the newly installed monitoring wells "provide no indication that the SSW system has been compromised."

PW explained previously that the monitoring well system is insufficient in number and does not meet accepted design criteria so that it provides no indication of whether there is, or is not leakage from the SSW Discharge [Tr. Exh., 15].

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2.

The CSS Buried Pipe Serves No License Renewal Intended Function

5.

In a boiling water reactor facility, such as PNPS, the CSS contains radioactively contaminated water. The CSS at PNPS consists of two 275,000 gallon condensate storage tanks ("CSTs") and associated piping and equipment. Through buried piping, the CSTs provide a "preferred" source of water for the reactor core isolation cooling ("RCIC") and the high pressure coolant injection ("HPCI") systems because of its higher quality and cleanliness. However, the CSS is not the assured (safety-related) source of water for the RCIC or HPCI systems. The assured source of water for the RCIC and HPCI systems is the suppression pool or torus.

PW - no dispute

6.

The RCIC system provides makeup water to the reactor vessel following reactor vessel isolation in order to ensure adequate core cooling.

The RCIC system is normally connected via piping to the two 2 75, 000 gallon CSTs. Each CST has a 75, 000 gallon reserve dedicated to the HPCI and RCIC systems. While the CSS is the preferred source of water for the RCIC pumps, because of its cleanliness, the assured safety supply of cooling water for the RCIC system is the suppression pool or torus. If water is unavailable from the CSTfor any reason, the safety function of the RCIC system is accomplished by using water from the torus.

PW - no dispute

7.

The function of the HPCI system is to ensure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the nuclear system which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI system is designed to maintain sufficient reactor vessel water inventory until the reactor vessel is depressurized to the point at which the low pressure coolant injection system or core spray system are used to maintain core cooling. Like the RCIC system, the preferred source of water for the HPCI system is the CSS. While the CSS is the preferred source of water for the HPCI pump because of its cleanliness, the assured safety supply of cooling water for the HPCI system is the suppression pool or torus. If water is unavailable from the CST for any 10

reason, the safety function of the HPCI system is accomplished by using water from the torus.

PW-no dispute

8.

The CSTs are connected to the RCIC and HPCI systems by stainless piping. Piping runs from the bottom of each of the two 275,000 gallon CSTs, which are above ground, to an underground CST vault where the pipes are connected to a common header. The header connects to a single stainless steel pipe that leaves the CST vault and runs underground to the reactor building auxiliary bay. The buried stainless steel pipe runs approximately sixty-four feet underground before entering the reactor building auxiliary bay. The buried pipe is approximately seven to ten feet below grade.

PW-no dispute

9.

Entergy performed scoping at the system level and conservatively included the CSS within the scope of its license renewal review because non-buried portions of the CSS piping are directly connected to portions of the HPCI and RCIC systems, even though the CSTs are not relied upon to mitigate accidents. This conservative scoping decision does not mean

• that each segment or component of the system performs a license renewal intended function. Thus, while Entergy conservatively included the CSS in scope, the buried CSS piping is not safety-related and is not relied upon to provide the assured source of water for HPCI and RCIC (indeed, the CSTs are not even seismically qualified). Therefore, the buried CSS piping serves no license renewal intended function under 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a) (1).

PW Rebuttal:

10 CFR § 54.4 Scope: the Board's majority chose a narrow interpretation of license review regulations. We believe that it was based upon an incorrect reading of 10 CFR § 54.4 that Pilgrim Watch finds simply says how components are to be determined to be within scope; it is not a restriction on what can be looked at once they are determined to be within scope

[PW Fact 35]. For proper functioning of the reactor during license renewal, the CST buried piping should not be degraded so as to be unable to provide the preferred source of water.

10 CFR § 54.21 [contents of application-technical information] explains what has to be looked at in an aging management review of the components once they, are determined to be within 11

scope by 10 CFR § 54.4 (3).

It says, (3) for each structure and component identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation [PW fact 36]. The CLB (Current Licensing Basis) means that Entergy is required to comply with its license and all NRC regulations. This means compliance not simply with some of NRC's regulations but all of NRC's regulations that pertain to these important safety components. Within this broader view, the CSS piping fits into the scope for PNPS' license review.

10.

Similarly, Entergy also conservatively credited the CSS under 10 C.FR. § 54.4(a)(3) because the HPCI and RCIC systems are relied upon in the Appendix R shutdown analyses However, the Appendix R shutdown analyses only credit the HPCI and RCIC functions and place no particular reliance on the CSTs as the source of water for these functions. Again, the assured source of water for the HPCI and RCIC functions is the torus. Thus, the buried CSS piping is not in fact relied upon for any of the 10 C.F.R. § 54.4functions.

PW -no dispute 1L The Staff agrees that the CSS is the only system within the scope of Contention 1 that contains radioactive liquid by design and that the system includes no buried tanks. The Staff also agrees that the CSS buried piping does not provide a credited safety function and does not provide accident mitigation.

PW Dispute: The SSW Discharge piping may not contain radioactive liquid by design but it certainly may outside of design; defense in depth/aging management plans purpose is to add protection when systems do not operate as intended.

12.

Pilgrim Watch's expert witness, Mr. Gundersen, conceded that the buried CSS piping is not relied upon to perform a safety function, but suggested that a failure of this piping might result in the introduction of contamination into the pumps and reactor. Mr.

Gundersen acknowledged, however, that this hypothesis was not based on any analysis.

Further, Entergy. testified that the possibility of debris being drawn in was not credible because of the considerable head in that pipe. In addition, the buried CSS piping is above the water table. Further, even if it were not, contamination could only be -drawn in 12

through the venturi effect if there were a loss of net positive suction head ("NPSH') but such a loss would cause the HPCI and RCIC pumps to trip. Moreover, Mr. Gundersen admitted that he did not question Entergy 's ability to maintain a safe shutdown condition.

PW Rebuttal: Pilgrim Watch's expert witness, Mr. Gundersen, conceded that the buried CSS piping is not relied upon to perform a safety function specified in 10 CFR § 54.4, (i) -(iii).

13.

Dr. Ahlfeld suggested that the presence of temporary perched water might result in a pressure head outside of the pipe. However, CST piping is buried in engineered fill which is very porous and does not retain water but allows it to percolate through.

PW Rebuttal: The Applicant provided no facts to demonstrate assurance that their conclusion, "engineered fill" would remain as originally placed and not retain water [PW Fact 48]. In addition, we find the accuracy of the 17 feet depth for the water table highly improbable. The most likely scenario is that the average water table starts at some elevation away from the shoreline and then slopes downward so that it is approximately equal to mean sea level. As the seasons change the water table will fluctuate up and down, a few feet. in each direction is typical.

Therefore, the "17 feet to the water table" has several problems. (1) It is a depth from some location on the ground surface, not an elevation above sea level; and (2) it is at just one location (presumably) so does not account for the slope of the water table. Entergy's statement is not supported by evidence.

14.

In summary, after closely reviewing the evidence presented at hearing, we conclude that the buried CSS pipe does not provide a safety or other license renewal intended function within the scope of 10 C.F.R. § 54.4. We therefore conclude that aging of this buried piping cannot result in the loss of an intended function required by 10 C.FR. § 54.4.

PW Rebuttal: The sameresponse as (8).

15.

We do note that, because Entergy has conservatively treated the entire CSS as being within the scope of license renewal, the buried stainless steel CSS pipe is subject to the applicable PNPS license renewal AMPs for external and internal* degradation. As discussed in Section IVB Lnfra, we find that these programs provide an acceptable aging management 13

program for the buried stainless steel CSS pipe even if it had an intended function as defined in the license renewal rules.

PW Rebuttal: The Aging Management Program for all. buried pipes and tanks is insufficient.

3.

Salt Service Water System

16.

The SSW system operates as the ultimate heat sink to transfer heat from safety-related plant equipment and non-safety-related plant equipment. The SSW system cools the reactor building closed cooling water ("RBCCW") system, which in turn cools safety-related equipment. The SSW system draws water through the intake structure and pumps this water to the RBCCW heat exchangers to cool the RBCCW system water. The SSW system then discharges the cooling water back into the bay. The RBCCW system separates the SSW system from systems normally containing radioactively contaminated water.

PW-no dispute

17.

The SSW system has two license renewal intended functions. Regarding 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(1), the SSW system is the ultimate heat sink for all of the systems cooled by the RBCCW system under transient and accident conditions, as well as normal operations, by continuously providing adequate cooling water flow to the RBCCW heat exchangers. This same function is also credited under 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a) (3) because the SSW is credited in the 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix R safe shutdown analysis for fire protection. The buried piping in this system does not meet the scoping criterion of 10 C.FR. § 54.4(a) (2).

PW Rebuttal: PW finds that the scope of license renewal extends beyond the functions in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(1-3).

18.

The SSW system includes two loops of buried intake pipes and two loops of buried discharge pipes and no buried tanks.

The two buried intake pipes do not contain radioactive water since they draw water from Cape Code Bay. Therefore, the buried intake piping is not within the scope of Contention 1.

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PW Rebuttal: PW provides the same response as number 1. The Board changed the order to

"...whether Pilgrim's existing AMPs have elements that provide appropriate assurance as required under relevant NRC regulations that the buried pipes and tanks will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes and tanks to be unable to perform their intended safety functions."

Therefore we hold that whether they contain radioactive fluid became irrelevant.

19.

The two loops of buried SSW system discharge piping are Loop A, which runs 240 feet from the reactor building auxiliary bay to the discharge canal that runs into Plymouth Bay, and Loop B, which runs 225 feet from the reactor building auxiliary bay to the discharge canal.

PW-no dispute

20.

The RBCCW loop is an intermediate loop between the SSW and the primary systems that contain radioactive liquid. In order for the SSW to become contaminated with radioactive fluid, the RBCCW system must first become contaminated due to leakage through heat exchanger tubes. Then, there must be cross contamination due to leakage through additional heat exchanger tubes from the RBCCW system to the SSW system. However, the SSW system has no history of cross contamination that would introduce radioactivity into the SSW discharge piping, and regular monitoring of the discharge has never indicated the presence of radioactivity. The NRC Staff confirmed that the SSW does not contain radioactive liquids by design.

PW Rebuttal: No factual data was presented to support either Entergy's or NRC Staff s statements that there has been no cross contamination or that regular monitoring of the discharge never indicated the presence of radioactivity. They are unsubstantiated. Furthermore, there is no evidence as to the capability of the monitoring to provide accurate and reliable information. The NRC Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons-Learned Task Force Final Report, Appendix B Consolidated Recommendations List [June 2006, Recommendation 3] indicated monitoring is outdated. It says, "The NRC should revise the radiological effluent and environmental monitoring program requirements and guidance to be consistent with current industry standards and commercially available radiation detection technology (Section 3.2.1)."

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21.

In summary, the uncontroverted testimony demonstrates that the SSW system is highly unlikely to contain radioactively contaminated water. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the SSW discharge piping constitutes buried pipes "that contain radioactively contaminated water." Therefore, there is no indication that this piping is within the scope of Pilgrim Watch's contention.

PW Rebuttal, Entergy's finding is unsubstantiated by fact. They state that, "there is no evidence in the record indicating that the SSW discharge piping "... contain(s) radioactively contaminated water. Therefore, there is no indication that this piping is within the scope of Pilgrim. Watch's contention."

The point is that there was no evidence provided by the Applicant that the SSW Discharge does NOT contain radioactive water; the Applicant is responsible to prove their case by providing evidence and they failed to provide evidence (facts) that it does NOT contain radioactive water.

The "facts" that they did provide, statements, clearly show that the SSW Discharge could contain radioactive water because that could be the only reason that they "regularly monitor for contamination."

B.

The PNPS Aging Management Programs for In-Scope Systems Provide Reasonable Assurance that Leaks Challenging License Renewal. Intended Functions Will Not Occur

1.

Summary Overview of AMP Findings

22.

Pilgrim implements multiple programs to manage the effects of aging on buried piping and tanks that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to aging management review.

The applicable AMPs for in-scope buried pipes and tanks that contain or potentially contain radioactively contaminated water are (1) the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program ("BPTIP")," (2) the Water Chemistry Control-BWR Program; (3) the Service Water Integrity Program, and (4) the One-Time Inspection Program. The BPTIP manages the loss of material due to external degradation of buriedpipes, while the other AMPs manage loss of material due to internal degradation of buried pipes.

16

PW -clarification: The programs listed are the programs Entergy says that they will use to "manage" aging. PW finds the programs insufficient. Entergy failed to provide adequate evidence to support a finding of sufficiency.

23.

We have reviewed the AMPs, the relevant testimony, and other evidence concerning the potential for buried pipe to develop leaks so significant that they cannot perform their license renewal intended function. As applied to buried pipes, the objective of these AMPS is to maintain the pressure boundary of the buried pipes and tanks in a manner so as to provide reasonable assurance that the associated systems can perform their intended functions. We have concluded, as set forth below, that the AMPs provide this reasonable assurance and that there is no credible evidence that in-scope buried pipes will develop leaks so great as to challenge their license renewal intended functions. We find that the AMPs, by themselves, are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that license renewal intended function challenging leaks will not occur and that the installation of monitoring wells is not necessary to achieve this objective.

PW Rebuttal: (a) Pilgrim Watch finds from facts presented and enumerated in PW's Facts and Conclusions Law that neither the Aging Management Program for buried pipes and tanks, nor the inspections and tests performed as part of routine maintenance and operation, provide reasonable assurance. Entergy did not provide facts to prove otherwise; and certainly they did not provide a clear preponderance of the facts. (b) PW has shown that the AMPs in order to become sufficient (defined as "enough") need supplements. Supplements are not limited to monitoring wells. The Memorandum and Order of October 17, 2007 said that "... at issue here is the following fundamental question: Do the AMPS for buried pipes and tanks, by themselves, ensure that such safety-function challenging leaks will not occur, or some sort of leak detection devices such as monitoring wells..."

The use of the words "such as" can only mean that supplements to the AMPs are not limited to monitoring wells. PW included as necessary supplements: base line inspections; enhanced inspections; cathodic protection; and monitoring wells for all buried components within scope so that they would provide reasonable assurance.

24.

Entergy's testimony in this proceeding describes Entergy's AMPs and demonstrates the adequacy of those programs to ensure that license renewal challenging leaks will not occur. Entergy testified, and the NRC Staff confirmed, that these AMPs are consistent with 17

the Generic Aging Lessons Learned ("GALL") Report, NUREG-1801. The GALL Report is referenced as the technical basis document for NUREG-1800, "Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants." It identifies AMPs that have been determined by the NRC to be acceptable programs to manage the effects of aging on systems, structures and components within the scope of license renewal as required by 10 C.FR. Part 54. The NRC Staff developed the GALL Report at the direction of the Commission to provide a basis for evaluating the adequacy of aging management programs for license renewal. The GALL Report is based on a systematic compilation of plant aging information and evaluation of program attributes for managing the effects of aging on systems, structures and components for license renewal. While subject to challenge in a hearing, compliance with NRC guidance is nevertheless substantial evidence of compliance with the NRC's regulatory requirements.

PW Rebuttal: PW's previous filings and testimony finds that the AMPs are insufficient. The GALL is simply guidance, does not have the force of legally binding regulations, and does not provide substantial evidence. Further, Entergy chose to comply with the section of GALL providing least assurance for this site - XI M34, as opposed to XI M-28 that includes cathodic protection [PW Findings 231-233].

2.

Aging Management of External Degradation -

The Buried Pipe and Tank Inspection Program

a.

Summary Overview of BPTIP Findings

25.

We will first discuss the sufficiency of the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program

("BPTIP") to protect against external degradation of license renewal buried pipe. The BPTIP is set forth in Section B. 1.2 of Appendix B to the PNPS license renewal application

("LRA").

The objective of the BPTIP is to manage the effects of aging on the external surfaces of buried components, specifically, the potential loss of material (i. e., the effect of aging caused by corrosion) from the external surfaces of components buried in soil.

PW - no dispute 18

26.

As explained in the PNPS LRA and by Entergy's witnesses, the BPTIP has two separate but interrelated prongs. The first is the use of preventive measures to inhibit the degradation of buried pipe surfaces exposed to soil, such as selection of corrosion resistant materials and/or application of protective coatings. PNPS uses corrosion resistant materials, such as stainless steel and titanium, as well as impermeable coatings to protect against the loss of material due to corrosion and other aging effects. The second is the use of inspections to manage the effects of external surface corrosion on the pressure-retaining capability of buried carbon steel, stainless steel, and titanium components. PNPS will conduct various inspections both before and during the period of extended operation to determine whether the protective coatings on the buried pipe are remaining in place so as to prevent external degradation of the pipe as designed.

PW Rebuttal:

Materials/Coatings: Entergy says that, "PNPS uses corrosion resistant materials, such as stainless steel and titanium, as well as impermeable coatings to protect against the loss of material due to corrosion and other aging effects." (a) They do not mention carbon steel; the SSW Discharge piping is made of carbon steel. PW's Facts 18-23 review materials, and find, for example, that the Brookhaven Report reported specifically that carbon steel corrodes. Site specific experience with carbon steel showed corrosion in both loops of the SSW discharge simultaneously degraded and the SSW Inlet piping carbon steel corroded. (b) Coatings are not "impermeable." PW finds

[PW Facts 62-67] that coatings can be breached exposing the metal underneath. For example, GALL XI M28 says that, ",preventive actions: a cathodic protection system is used to mitigate corrosion where pinholes in the coating allow the piping or components to be in contact with the aggressive soil environment." Mr. Davis NRC staff's expert said that, "...industry practice has shown that properly applied coatings will prevent corrosion as long as the soil is not extremely aggressive or unless there is damage during application of the coating and handling of the pipe"

[NRC's Staff Response to Entergy's Motion of Summary Disposition, June 28, 2007, admitted, at 16 [PW Tr., Exh. 34, emphasis added].

Coatings, like any material, may be subject to 19

potential manufacturing, installation or errors from later work done in the field.5 Last if coatings were in fact "impermeable" then there would be no need for the AMP.

BPTIP: The "second prong" that Entergy relies upon is the BPTIP. The BPTIP inspections are not adequate because they are on an unspecified sample of the piping and occur only one-time in ten years are inadequate [PW Facts 139-159]. To summarize the key reasons that the BBTIP does not provide the required assurance[PW Fact 159]:

a) There is not a requirement for a through baseline inspection prior to license renewal so that the Board, NRC and Entergy know the condition of each component in order to evaluate an appropriate Aging Management Plan for the renewal period.

b) Because corrosion cannot be assumed to be gradual and components wear out at a greater frequency as they age (Bathtub Curve describing degradation of living and non-living things), the required inspections are too infrequent. The components need to be inspected more frequently as time goes forward.

c) Entergy's AMP has no specificity in the program delineating what must be inspected.

Engineering experience shows that certain areas of piping are more susceptible than other areas to corrosion, like welds and elbows. Each Loop in the SSW Discharge piping has (3) 45 degree elbows and (1) 90 degree long-radius elbow; and there are (4) untested suspect flanges, identified as suspect by GAO in the SSW Discharge system [PW Facts 5 8-61].

d) There are no clear requirements for reporting, repair or replacement of degraded piping. [Tr.,Exh., 13, Gundersen A-17]

27.

Dr. Davis, expert witness for the NRC Staff, confirmed this two-pronged approach for managing the aging effects of external corrosion under the BPTIP. Dr. Davis testified that the BPTIP AMP calls for using "preventive measures to mitigate corrosion and periodic inspections to determine if corrosion is occurring that could affect the pressure-retaining capacity of the buried steel piping and tanks."

The SER, at 3-37 [Tr. Ex. 30] described a leak in the fire water underground distribution system and that the probable cause was induced, "most likely by fabrication anomalies compounded by marginal installation leaks."

20

PW Rebuttal: (a) Dr. Davis simply provided an unsubstantiated statement. PW does not know what Entergy means when they say Dr. Davis confirmed the use of this two-pronged approach."

If "confirmation" means an unqualified approval, then it would be directly contradictory to Dr.

Davis' previous actions and statements. If he "approved" then it would make no sense for him to testify that, "...industry practice has shown that properly applied coatings will prevent corrosion as long as the soil is not extremely aggressive or unless there is damage during application of the coating and handling of the pipe" [PW Tr., Exh.34].

(B) Dr. Davis testified that he was the author of GALL XI 28 - an aging management program that recognizes that coatings fail, metal corrodes and the need and value of cathodic protection.

Pertinent sections of that document go far beyond what Pilgrim's AMP's says, Scope of Program: "The program relies on preventative measures, such as coating, wrapping, and cathodic protection, and surveillance, based on NACE Standard RP-0285-95 and NACE Standard RP-0 169-96, to manage the effects of corrosion on the intended function of buried tanks and piping respectively."

Preventive Actions: "A cathodic protection system is used to mitigate corrosion where pinholes in the coating allow the piping or components to be in contact with the aggressive soil environment." Pilgrim's soil is corrosive, and Entergy has not provided any evidence to the contrary.

Detection of Aging Effects: "Coatings and wrappings can be damaged during installation or while in service and the cathodic protection system is relied upon to avoid any corrosion at the damaged locations. Degradation of the coatings and wrappings during service will result in the requirement for more current from the cathodic protection rectifier in order to maintain the proper cathodic protection protect potentials. Any increase in current requirements is an indication of coating and wrapping degradation. A close interval pipe-to-soil potential survey can be used to locate the locations where degradation has occurred."

21

Operating experience: "Corrosion pits from the outside diameter have been discovered in buried piping with far less than 60 years of operation. Buried pipe that is coated and cathodically protected is unaffected after 60 years of service. Accordingly, operating experience from application of the NACE standards on non-nuclear systems demonstrates the effectiveness of this program."

Dr. Davis only wrote the alternative program M34 in response to incorrect information by the nuclear lobby, NEI.

28. Dr. Davis and Entergy's expert, Mr. Spataro, have extensive experience in the use of protective coatings to protect against the external degradation of buried pipe. Both Dr.

Davis and Mr. Spataro have provided credible testimony, based on their many years of experience,, that the BPTIP provides reasonable assurance against the external degradation of the buried pipe. This testimony is supported by actual field experience at PNPS which revealed the coatings on 25-year old buried pipe to be in place as designed and the external surface of the piping to be in its original pristine condition. In contrast, Mr. Gundersen's testimony and resume shows no experience in the use of protective coatings for buried pipe. Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, we find, as set forth in detail below, that the BPTIP provides reasonable assurance that external degradation will not adversely affect the performance of license renewal intended functions for in-scope buried pipe.

PW Rebuttal: (a) PW has shown that protective coatings do not provide reasonable assurance against external degradation [PW Facts 62-67]; Pilgrim's soil is corrosive and Entergy did not prove otherwise [PW Facts 32-39]; manufacturing and handling error cannot be discounted [PW Facts 112-120]. Dr. Davis' testimony and actions discussed above (at 27) provide support that coatings can be breached exposing the piping underneath to corrosion from the environment.

They do not provide reasonable assurance.

(b) Mr. Spataro's CV [Tr. Exh. 1] shows no experience at Pilgrim Station.

(c) Contrary to Entergy's statement, Mr. Gundersen's testimony and CV show vast professional experience, for example, with radiological waste management and decommissioning. Both require an understanding of preventing degradation (waste management);

identifying 22

contamination at sites; and actually seeing where and when degradation occurs (decommissioning work). He has worked both inside and outside the industry.

b. PNPS Use of Corrosion Resistant Materials and Impermeable Coatings to Protect Against External Degradation of Buried Pipe

29.

PNPS uses several preventive methods as part of the BPTIP AMP to protect against the external degradation of buried pipe.6 First, the buried CSS piping and the SSW inlet piping are made of stainless steel and titanium, respectively. Second, PNPS wrapped the SSW and CSS buried piping with a permanent coal-tar or epoxy protective wrapping on the exterior to create a barrier between the pipe and the external environment. Third, PNPS has taken precautions to ensure that piping is not buried in corrosive soil and that when it is buried or excavated, the pipe is handled in a manner that does not damage the protective coatings.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy's facts are repetitive and we apologize for their remarks requiring repetitive responses.

(a) Materials: Again Entergy fails to mention SSW Discharge piping's material - carbon steel.

This is a clear indication that Entergy, too, recognizes that carbon steel will corrode, is more prone to corrosion than titanium and stainless steel - although all metals will eventually degrade in < 60 years.

(b) External wraps: Wraps will create a barrier as long as they do not corrode and/or become breached. The issue is that they do degrade or become damaged, like all materials, and are subject to manufacturing,

handling, and field errors. GALL XI, M-28 statements provide evidence.

(c) Installation practices: Entergy says that PNPS has taken measures so that piping is not buried in corrosive soil; and that when it is buried or excavated, the pipe is handled in a manner that does not damage the protective coatings. Entergy ignores human error. PW Fact 68 says, 6 Entergy Test. at A37.

23

"Entergy claimed that piping structures are, "excavated and handled in a manner that does not damage the coating." The statement is overboard; human and mechanical error have occurred at PNPS and are likely to occur again. For example, the SER, at 3-37 described a leak in the firewater underground distribution system and that the probable cause was induced, "most likely by fabrication anomalies compounded by marginal installation leaks." Although this example is not from the SSW Discharge system, the same PNPS personnel were involved.

(d) Entergy assumes that the sand bed that surrounded the piping when installed remains in place. First, they show no evidence that they have looked at 83-84% of the SSW Discharge piping in over 40 years since it was installed to support their statement [PW Fact 24]. Second, it is not rationale to assume that the sand bed that originally surrounded the piping when installed has remained in place. Third, sand retains moisture, anyway. For example, the dry well shell at Oyster Creek corroded quite badly in the sand bed area, and a more mundane example, children build sandcastles on the beach. Over the years sand washes down and silt and clay soils from above wash down to the area surrounding the pipes. Moisture increases from rain and snow percolating downwards. Water in the soil travels vertically and horizontally, and it is obvious that the adjacent ocean provides a moist environment due in part from the differential temperatures of the ocean water and land surface [PW Fact 39].

PW provides a factual basis' for our rebuttal; Entergy fails to evidence to support their statements.

(i)

Use of Corrosion Resistant Materials

30.

Entergy's and the Staff's expert witnesses agree that stainless steels are generally resistant to corrosion in soils. While pitting corrosion can occur on some grades of stainless steel under particular conditions (high temperatures, high concentrations of chloride, and low pH levels generally less than 4.5), the CSS buried pipe is not exposed to such conditions.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the corrosion resistant properties of stainless steel, the CSS buried pipe is wrapped with a permanent coal-tar enamel coating as described below.

PW Rebuttal: (a) "Generally resistant" is a meaningless term; all metals, including stainless steel corrode. (b) Some stainless steels are more subject to aging and corrosion than others types 24

of stainless steel. Entergy fails to indicate the exact type of stainless used. (c) Entergy failed to provide the soil testing protocol and test results taken from the soil surrounding the CSS pipes; nor indicate if such tests ever were performed. The soil tests referred to were done in 1991 at the mouth of the SSW discharge. Entergy's own BPTIMP says that, "Soil resistivity measurements must be taken at least once per 10 years unless areas are excavated or backfilled or if soil conditions are known to have changed for any reason" [PW Tr. Exh. 27, page 11].

31.

The SSW inlet pipe is made of titanium. Titanium is immune to corrosion in soils.

Titanium and its alloys are resistant to corrosion from all natural waters and steam to temperatures in excess of 600YF and exhibit negligible corrosion in seawater to temperatures as high as 500°F. Additionally, the buried external surfaces of the SSW inlet pipes at PNPS are also wrapped with permanent coal-tar enamel coating. to supplement the titanium pipe's already strong corrosion resistant properties.

PW Rebuttal: All metals corrode, including titanium [Brookhaven Report, PW Fact 15]. The rate of corrosion increases as materials age ["Bathtub Curve", PW Facts 24-31]. The fact that Entergy coated the piping indicates that they, too, are aware of the piping's susceptibility to corrosion and damage from manufacturing and handling. Coatings degrade and are not impenetrable [PW Facts 79-85].

Entergy's own documents shows that coatings have no specified life [PW Fact 80].

32.

As stated above, the SSW discharge pipe consists of loops A and B. Both loops of the SSW discharge pipe are made of carbon steel, and the exterior surfaces of both discharge loop pipes are covered with multi-layer permanent coal-tar enamel or epoxy coatings as described below. The coatings form a moisture and chemical resistant barrier that is permanently bonded to the outer surface of the pipe, creating a waterproof barrier between the soil and the pipe.

PW Rebuttal (a). Material: The pipes are made of carbon steel. Carbon steel corrodes, a fact discussed. in the literature [PW Fact 19]. There is site-specific evidence in PNPS' SSW inlet and discharge piping; both SSW discharge pipes degraded simultaneously [PW Facts 20-21]. Entergy 25

provided no evidence how soon corrosion occurred after the pipes were installed [PW Fact 23].

Pipes corrode more rapidly as they age, the "bathtub curve" [PW Facts 24-31]. (83-84%) of the SSW discharge pipes will be > 40 years old at the beginning of license renewal and > half-a century old when they receive their 10 year inspection of an unspecified piping sample. No reactor has operated 50 years.

(b) Coatings are not impenetrable [PW Facts 62-65]. Coatings form a "waterproof barrier" if properly manufactured/ installed and only until they are breached or if they deteriorate, as all materials will eventually do.

(ii)

Use of Protective Coatings on PNPS Buried Pipe

33.

Specification No. 6498-M-306, "Specification for External Surface Treatment of Underground Metallic Pipe for Unit No. 1 Pilgrim Station No. 600 Boston Edison Company," ("Specification M-306") specifies the application ofpermanent coatings to the external surfaces of buriedpiping at PNPS. This specification applied to the original SSW buried piping as well as the CSS buried piping.

PW Rebuttal: The specifications, dated May 1968, say what should be done; they do not provide proof as to what was done. The Tapecoat Company would not provide a warranty (one of the three Entergy disclosures PW discussed at the Hearing) because there were too many parties responsible for handling and installation. Entergy did not provide warranties or test analyses to support their statement. We are left with reasonable assurance based simply on what the applicant "said." They provided no clear preponderance of the evidence. PW, in contraft, supported our dispute totheir statement with factual evidence.

34.

As testified to by Mr. Woods, Specification M-306 provides procedures for installing and inspecting coatings applied in the shop as well as for coatings applied in the field at PNPS.

Regarding coatings applied in the shop, Specification M-306 requires the following eight steps: The pipe is first cleaned of all dirt, grease, mill scale, or any loose debris using some mechanical means, e impact wheel or wire brush; Following cleaning of the pipe, 26

a layer of primer is painted onto the exterior of the cleaned pipe; After applying the primer, a coal-tar enamel coating is applied to the clean dry surface of the pipe at the correct temperature to ensure that the primer bonds with the enamel to form a coating which cannot be peeled from the pipe; The enamel is then visually inspected for uniformity, Before the enamel cools, a fiber-glass pipe wrapping is applied over the enamel in a uniform wrap to cover the entire outside sulface of the enamel; Thereafter, an additional layer of coal-tar enamel is applied; The second layer of enamel is followed by an outer wrap of insulation; A final layer of heavy Kraft paper is wrapped around the entire pipe to complete the process.

PW Rebuttal:

PW does not dispute that is what the specification says; what we do dispute is that is what actually happened without any handling errors. If we lived in an error-free world, an aging management program would be unnecessary and the Challenger would have completed its mission, the Titanic reached shore, Indian Point's Cooling Towers left standing; and PNPS would not have blown their filters in 1982.

35.

Thus, Specification M-306 provides for double wrapping of buried pipe consisting of a permanent protective coal-tar coating, fiberglass wrapping, another layer of coal-tar, a layer of insulation, and'a final layer of heavy Kraft paper. This double wrapping specified for PNPS buried pipe exceeds the standard industry practice, which only requires a single wrapping for buriedpiping under normal soil conditions, such as those at PNPS.

The coal-tar enamel permanent coating and bonded double outer wrap used at PNPS is specifically designed for use on submerged lines, river crossings, or similar installations that experience aggressive environments, or where trench conditions are extraordinarily severe, conditions, which do not exist at PNPS.

PW Rebuttal:

PW does not dispute that the 1968 specification calls for double wrap for underground steel pipe-lines. PW disputes the assertion that PNPS' soil conditions are "normal" and not aggressive, although they do not define these terms. As both parties have discussed, Entergy's soil testing is neither current nor comprehensive [PW Facts 48-52]. Pilgrim's site-specific environment is corrosive [PW Facts 32-47].

27

36.

Specification M-306 also provides specific instructions on field installation of coatings at the joints where pipe segments are joined. Mr. Woods testified that, in accordance with Specification M-306, PNPS first cleans the piping by wire brushing to remove any rust, scale, dust, or dirt and by removing oil or grease with a solvent. Following cleaning of the pipe, PNPS applies a layer of primer to the exterior of the cleaned pipe, which is then allowed to dry. Next, PNPS applies coal-tar tape to the primed surface. The coal-tar tape is a 35-millimeter cold-applied tape coating consisting of a 7-millimeter polyethylene film backing and 28' millimeters of adhesive.

PW Rebuttal: Again, these are the instructions; Entergy ignores errors in field installation -

what happened in the field years ago is anyone's guess. [PW. Facts 68-78].

37.

The coatings were inspected at every stage in the installation process. Specification M-306 requires that all shop applied coatings be inspected in accordance with Specification A WWA C-203 before shipment. A WWA C-203 requires visual inspection of the coated piping for any misapplication of the coatings followed by an electrical inspection of the pipe coating by a high-voltage "holiday" detector to identify any voids in the coating. In the field, the pipes are visually inspected upon receipt to ensure that no damage occurred during shipment. After the pipes are fully joined and assembled in place and the field joints are wrapped, and before covering them with soil, the entire pipe is again tested for voids using a high voltage "holiday" detector to assure that the field joints were properly wrapped and that the shop applied coatings were not damaged during installation.

PW Rebuttal: (1) Again, there are no test reports provided and no warranties. (2) Today, it is 40 years later, and Entergy did not provide any test reports indicating their present condition.

38.

In 1999, PNPS replaced two forty-foot sections of the SSW discharge piping. The coatings used on the two forty-foot section of replacement SSW discharge piping were an aliphatic amine epoxy coating. A minimum of two coats were applied to each length ofpiping in the shop to achieve a dry thickness of at least 30 millimeters, and all coated areas were "holiday" tested after the curing was complete. The joints between the two forty-foot sections and the existing pipe were coated in the field. The epoxy coating used on the two forty-foot replacement pipes has excellent corrosion resistance equal to or superior to the original double wrapped coatings used on the original SSW discharge piping.

28

PW Rebuttal: (1) Again Entergy's testimony describes what was supposed to happen but takes no account of errors in manufacturing or application in the field. Entergy did not provide any test reports indicating their present condition. Entergy asks for out "trust" without providing factual evidence.

39.

Mr. Spataro testified that the coatings form a barrier resistant to moisture and chemicals that is permanently bonded to the outer surface of the pipe, creating a waterproof barrier between the soil and the pipe. As long as the protective coating remains in place, the buried piping is protected from external degradation. Pilgrim Watch provides no contrary evidence. Based on the evidence, we therefore find that the coatings form a impermeable, protective barrier resistant to moisture and chemicals that protects the buried piping from external degradation.

PW Rebuttal: (a) The key is Mr. Spataro's statement that, "As long as the protective coating remains in place, the buried piping is protectedfrom external degradation." Dr. Davis used the same qualifier. The issue is that they provide no factual evidence that it has remained in place on the surfaces of the buried components within scope. Entergy's documents say in very plain English that "coatings have no specified life" [PW facts 79-83]. Entergy did not provide any service life warranties for coatings [PW fact 84]. Based on the evidence before it, there is no basis upon which the Board can properly conclude that the coatings will remain in good condition - provide reasonable assurance - for any period of time [PW Fact 85].

(b) It is important to explain why a non-cathodically protected pipe will experience accelerated corrosion if the coating is damaged. The corrosion that occurs at a damaged pipe coating site is far more severe than the localized corrosion which occurs on an uncoated (bare) pipe in intimate contact with the same soil anomaly. In the case of a damaged pipe coating, the exposed steel substrate is a very small anode when compared to the surrounding large cathode area of the coated pipe. As such, corrosion of the area of damaged coating will occur at a greatly elevated rate, even if the soil anomaly (for instance, a small stone, < 6 inches) which caused the coating damage is no longer in contact with the pipe. In simpler terms, the corrosive forces along the surface area of the coated pipe focus on the small area of exposed steel and accelerate corrosion.

29

(iii)

Handling Precautions and Protective Environment for PNPS Buried Pipe

40.

PNPS took special. precautions in burying PNPS piping to ensure that the protective coating remains in place. PNPS utilizes dig-safe measures, safe handling procedures, control of the soil surrounding the pipe, and compaction testing to ensure the buried pipes will not corrode and develop leaks.

PW Rebuttal: PW does not dispute that this describes the procedure; however, it provides no assurance how the procedure actually was carried out in the field. Errors in field application cannot be ignored, as Entergy repeatedly and wrongly does.

4].

During installation of the buried pipe, Specification M-306 requires that the coated pipes be handled with non-abrasive canvas or leather straps, or nylon belts. Chains and other abrasive items are prohibited. Dr. Davis testified that PNPS used non-abrasive canvas or leather belts, controlled backfill, and compacted soil while handling the pipe at issue. The Staff agrees that Entergy takes sufficient precautions when burying piping to ensure that the protective coating remains in place.

PW Rebuttal: Once again, PW does not dispute that this describes the plan; however, it provides no assurance how the procedure was carried out in the field so as not to cause any installation error that may damage the protective coatings or that there were not manufacturing errors. [PW Facts 112-120]. The "Staff' referred to is a reference to Mr. Spataro. His resume indicates that he worked mostly in NY and there is no mention that he worked at PNPS, and certainly no indication that he worked for Boston Edison Co. when the pipes were installed. He has no first-hand knowledge. Dr. Davis* never worked at PNPS, either. He has no first -hand knowledge and does not purport to any.

42.

PNPS excavates the soil in layers in order to maintain control of the soil surrounding the pipe. Once a layer of soil is excavated, it is stockpiled separately from the other layers.

• Layers can be as small as six inches in depth. The pipe itself is placed on a bed of sand or

specially engineered fill, which consists mostly of fine aggregate sand and specified amounts offly ash and cement, of approximately 6 inches. The pipe is then covered with 30

another layer of sand or the specially engineered fill material before being covered by the contaminant-free, controlled soil. During backfilling, layers are replaced in the order in which they were removed Generally, soils are replaced and compacted every six inches, and after twelve inches of backfill is added, the soil is tested to ensure sufficient compaction.

PW Rebuttal: Again, we are told, "What the book says" but provided with (a) no evidence as to what actually happened in the field, and no allowance for it; and (b) no evidence of soil resistivity from recent soil inspections taken from soils surrounding all the piping. We find Entergy's statement-assurance-is not supported by the evidence; PW factual demonstrates that it is incorrect.

Water Table: Entergy says that they buried the pipes 7-10 feet above the water table. PW doubts that the water table is exactly at 17 feet, as Entergy claims. Judge Cole would appreciate that depending on site conditions and location that this could vary by at least several feet through the seasons. Entergy says that they buried the pipes "7-10 feet above the water table." They do not explain if this is an average figure and if so where it was taken. The land is not flat where the SSW discharge is buried. There is an elevation change of 22 feet. The numbers do not add up.

The SSW Discharge pipe goes from the reactor building to the Bay. The land slopes downward as it approaches the Bay. The most likely scenario is that the average water table starts at some elevation away from the shoreline and then slopes downward so that it is approximately equal to mean sea level. As the seasotis change the water table will fluctuate up and down - a few feet in each direction is typical. Therefore, the "17 feet to the water table" has several problems: (1) it is a depth from some location on the ground surface, not an elevation above sea level; and (2) it is at just one location (presumably) so does not account for the slope of the water table.

Basic geometry, and an ounce of commonsense, says that Entergy's numbers are not correct.

Vegetation/pH: Entergy said that in order to reduce the effects of oxygen from moisture and acidity from decaying organic material, they removed vegetation and surrounded the piping, top 31

and bottom layers, with a bed of sand the area over the SSW Discharge was paved. No date was provided so that we do not know if it was paved immediately after the piping or years later giving vegetation a chance to rejuvenate. The Board does not know if the pavement covers the entire area. This is pertinent because over a period of time vegetation reappears, decays and works its way down to the pipes. Further, the pipes could be exposed to organic matter from migration via water traveling down from up-gradient locations. Its effect cannot be ruled out as Entergy attempts to do. Water in the soil travels both vertically and horizontally, carrying moisture and other corrosive elements with it [PW Fact 39].

The Bed of Sand: Soil above the sand migrates downward mixing with the sand to provide a moist environment. [Tr. Exh., 13, Gundersen A-12]. The pipes have been in the ground a long time. Sand retains moisture. For example, the "drywell shell" at Oyster Creek corroded badly in the sand bed area and children build sandcastles on the beach. Moisture increases from rain and snow percolating downwards. Water in the soil travels both vertically and horizontally; and it is obvious that the adjacent ocean provides a very moist environment [PW Fact 39]. Also the supply of oxygen is high in sand and would further the cathodic reaction. Entergy's BPTIMP

[Exh., 27 at 26], says, "...the supply of oxygen is comparatively large above the ground water table" (and) "Oxygen takes part in the cathodic reaction and a supply of oxygen is therefore, in most circumstances, a prerequisite for corrosion in soil [BTIMP at 27].

Corrosion from the surrounding environment cannot be explained away as Entergy tries to do.

The low pH resulting from decayed organic matter, acid rain and stray electric currents will accelerate corrosion along with the oxygen from water seepage [PW Fact 51].

Mr. Gundersen concluded that, "Therefore, I believe that we (the NRC, Entergy, ASLB and the parties) are currently traveling "blind" [Gundersen at A12]. The SSW discharge piping is buried, 10' below grade [Tr., Sullivan, page 611 ]. Unfortunately, when a pipe is buried, its condition is not readily apparent.

Therefore, pipes must be inspected more frequently. [Tr., Exh. 13, Gundersen, A-12 and PW Fact 52].

32

43.

Based on this evidence in the record, the Board finds that PNPS has taken appropriate precautions to ensure that the coatings on the buried piping are not damaged during installation and will remain in place to protect the buried* piping from external degradation.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy failed to provide factual evidence to support their finding. Entergy, for example, failed to provide warranties showing the service life of the coatings. We suspect that they do not exist; and we know that they do not exist for the Tapecoat Company, the company responsible for the SSW Discharge wraps/coatings. Entergy failed to provide analyses to demonstrate the present condition of the coatings; failed to provide any recent test analyses from actual inspections. Entergy has the burden of proof and they did not provide it. So-called "engineering judgment" or testimony from their own employees does not provide reasonable assurance, unless that judgment is backed up with verification (facts) that have been established at the required 95% confidence level - or whatever level established beyond the bare flip of a coin [PW Conclusions Law, 11].

44.

PNPS has also taken precautions to ensure that piping is not buried in an aggressive soil environment. As stated, the buried pipe is placed on a bed of sand or specially engineered fill before it is covered by another layer of special engineered fill or sand. The sand and the engineered fill material do not retain water, but allow water to percolate through the soil and avoid the build-up of corrosive conditions next to the buried pipe.

PW Rebuttal: Same response as above (42)

45.

Additionally, during construction of PNPS, the site was excavated for the construction of the various PNPS buildings. During excavation, all rocks over six inches, shrubs, and trees were removed from the soil. Rocks can cause physical damage to buried structures and plants, as they biodegrade, release compounds that may increase soil pH.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy does not explain why rocks 5.9 inches and less do not present a problem; and why Entergy did not have to consider abrasion from the movement of sand over the surface for over 40 years. Soils tend to become acidic because of: (1) rainwater leaching away basic ions (calcium, magnesium, potassium and sodium); (2) organic acids formed from carbon dioxide from decomposing organic matter and root respiration dissolving in soil water; (3) the formation 33

of strong organic and inorganic acids, such as nitric and sulfuric acid, from decaying organic matter; and (4) pollution -acid rain and increased acidity in ocean water [PW Fact 42]. Ms. Pine DuBois, Jones River watershed, Kingston MA, testified at the public hearing, April 9, 2008. She provided factual data to the Board specifically on the high acidity in local soils [PW Fact 43].

Again Entergy makes a statement without evidence to support it; and PW provides evidence showing that their statement is not true.

46.

These two precautions serve to reduce the corrosivity of the soil surrounding the buried piping at PNPS. The resulting soil pH is 6.2-6.82 and the Cl content is 210 - 420 ppm, which constitutes a non-aggressive soil environment.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy fails to provide evidence; they put forward instead inadequate soil tests; and do not bother to provide the reports from the tests so that the test methodology and results may be verified. Instead Entergy wants the Board to rely on "Trust us" or hearsay.

(a) Entergy provided no documents showing that a recent analysis of the soils surrounding the specific pipes has occurred - no proof. Entergy mentioned, but failed to provide documentation for two tests. One test was a 1992 soil analysis taken near the SSW system loop "A" and Loop "B" -taken 16 years ago; and the other an October 2005 analysis of groundwater - claimed to be a good indicator of soil, with no explanation why [Entergy Prefiled Testimony at A87] [PW Fact 48].

(b) A 16-year old sample is not good enough for evidence. Entergy understands the importance of regular soil testing. Entergy' s Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program says that, "soil resistivity measurements... must be taken at least once per 10 years unless areas are excavated and backfilled or if the soil conditions are known to have changed for any reason,"

Tr. Exh., 8, at 11, [ PW Fact 49].

(c) Sampling - Entergy fails to say where along the SSW discharge piping the sampling was taken - location, depth, date; and no mention is made of the size of the sample.

34

(d) Last, even Entergy says that these "precautions serve to reduce corrosivity," not eliminate it and they do not indicate even by how much; however, the important point is that no studies/analyses. are provided.

PW asks once more, where is the "clear preponderance of the evidence?"

47. In addition to surrounding buried pipe with sand or special fill material, two other precautions taken at PNPS prevent high levels of moisture in the soils adjacent to buried piping. First, Entergy installed a storm drain system at construction to prevent the buildup of water. The storm drain system runs throughout the 90 acre PNPS site in order to carry away excess rainwater. Second, all buried pipes are buried above the water table, which ensures that the water percolates down, past the piping, and is taken away with the flow of ground water. The water table at PNPS where the CSS and SSW system piping is buried is approximately 17 feet below the surface. The CSS and SSW system pipes are buried 7 to 10 feet below the surface, well above the water table. Further, the entire area above the buried piping is covered by asphalt paving.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy here describes methods to prevent the piping to become submerged in water; Entergy's supportive "facts" do not stand up.

(a) Entergy says that the pipes are buried 7-10 feet above the water table; PW disputed that statement at (42) above. Further, even if it was true which basic geometry and commonsense indicate that it is not, this would not mean that the sand/soils surrounding the piping is not wet or moist, explained above and at PW Fact 39.

(b) Entergy cites a storm drain system installed to carry away excess rainwater; however, the Board was not shown a map indicting the location of the storm drain in relation to the piping with the necessary hydro-geological analyses needed for interpretation. The Board does not know if appropriate studies were performed to place the storm drains and if so their quality; nor does the Board know if today's meteorological projections make the storm drains placement appropriate now. Due to global warming, it is projected that during license renewal there will be increased number and severity of storms and rising sea levels. The drains are said to take away the rainwater.

35

(c) Moisture in the soil also arises from snowmelt and from thawing of frozen ground. In addition to moisture, corrosive elements in the soil include, for example: oxygen, ph, chloride ions, stray currents, and abrasion from soil and sand particles [PW Facts 41-47].

48.

The precautions taken by PNPS ensure the low moisture content of the soil surrounding the buried pipe. Because corrosion is an electrochemical process which requires the presence of an electrolyte, maintaining low moisture content of the soil ensures a non-aggressive environment for the buried pipe. Thus, considering the pH and high resistivity plus the low chloride concentration and low moisture content, Mr. Spataro testified that, f'at worst the soil is mildly corrosive."

PW Rebuttal: This is yet another example where Entergy repeats the same unsubstantiated and/or incorrect statements over and over, as if doing so would make them true. The precautions taken by PNPS do NOT ensure low moisture content of the soil surrounding the buried pipe, as explained above and in PW Facts 40-47. Additionally PW showed that Entergy's testing was neither current nor comprehensive enough to demonstrate assurance, PW Facts 48-52.

There is no "clear preponderance of the evidence" to support their statement.

49.

Pilgrim Watch's witness, Mr. Gundersen, makes general claims that oxygen, moisture, chloride, acidity, or microbes found in the soil, in one degree or another, corrode all piping materials, and that because Pilgrim is located adjacent to Cape Cod Bay, at a low elevation, and near salty water, the soil surrounding the piping is not 'friendly. However, other than his general assertions, Mr. Gundersen provides no evidence to contradict the testimony. or soil data Entergy provided which demonstrate the lack of aggressive conditions at PNPS.

PW Rebuttal: In an operating license proceeding, the licensee bears the ultimate burden of Proof [Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16 NRC 1265, 1271 (1982) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.325). Entergy has it backwards; the Petitioner does not bear the burden of proof. Pilgrim Watch provided ample evidence from references in addition to Mr. Gundersen. For example in PW's Prefiled Testimony, PW cited for support: the Brookhaven Report at 26 and at 3.4 [Tr. Exh. 21]; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Boston Edison 36

Company Docket No. 50-293, May 1972 -U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Radiological and Environmental Protection, Final EIS [Tr. Exh. 26]; and their own document, Buried Piping And Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program [Tr. Exh. 27].

50.

Mr. Gundersen does claim that precautions taken by Pilgrim to remove vegetation and place the piping on a bed of sand, are futile because "over a period of time vegetation reappears, decays and works its way down to the pipes," resulting in low pH and soil above the sand migrates downward mixing with the sand to provide a moist environment.

However, because the entire area above the buried piping is covered by asphalt paving, vegetation will not reappear above the buried pipe. Also, the soil data provided by Entergy's witnesses, which Mr. Gundersen does not challenge, show a pHfrom 6. 2 to 8.2 and a moisture content from 5.5% to 8.1%, which reflect a non-aggressive soil environment.

PW Rebuttal: Please refer to PW Rebuttal at 42. To summarize: (a) The asphalt paving does not prevent moisture, ph and other corrosive elements from affecting the piping that they claim is buried 7 feet beneath ground surface. Water travels both vertically and laterally in the ground; Pilgrim presented no hydro-geo studies to prove otherwise. Pilgrim's property slopes downward towards the ocean. The SSW Discharge piping has an elevation change of over 22 feet; water transporting other with corrosive substances flows from higher ground to lower ground. Stray currents travel beneath the ground. (2) Entergy does not say when the asphalt paving was installed. It may have been paved immediately after the piping was first installed or much later.

(b) Mr. Gundersen at A-13[Tr. Exh. 14] says that, "...the basic problem is that Entergy has not performed any recent and thorough hydro-geological studies; or if Entergy had performed such studies, the results of these studies have not been shared with the Board. Entergy's own Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program [provided in Entergy's Initial Statement as Exhibit 5] states that a corrosion risk evaluation should be performed within 9 months and that it should include soil resistivity measurements etc. and that "soil resistivity measurements must be taken at least every 10 years unless areas are excavated and backfilled or if soil conditions are known to have changed for any reason" [Exhibit 5, at 5.5]. Therefore, I believe that we (the NRC, Entergy, ASLB and the parties) are currently traveling "blind". Performing a Corrosion 37

Risk Assessment is critical before any appraisal or decisions are made regarding Entergy's license application. In my opinion, the ASLB does not have the information in hand to make an adequate assessment of the AMP and meet NRC regulations without knowing either the extent of corrosion risk caused by the local environment and without knowing the corrosion status of the affected components."

51.

Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, we find that PNPS has taken precautions to provide a non-aggressive soil environment for buried pipe. This non-aggressive soil environment provides further assurance that buried pipes will not degrade so as to cause leaks that could challenge their license renewal intended functions.

PW Rebuttal: Here, as in Entergy's "facts" regarding coatings, Entergy has the burden of proof and again they did not provide it. So-called "engineering judgment" from their employees does not provide reasonable assurance, at least unless that judgment is backed up with verification -

facts. Absent is a "clear preponderance of the evidence."

c.

PNPS and Industry Experience with Protective Coatings

52.

Both Entergy's and the NRC Staff's experts point to PNPS and industry experience which confirm the effectiveness of the external coating to prevent external degradation of buried pipe. Specific PNPS experience confirms the effectiveness of the PNPS coatings. In 1999, PNPS examined the external buried piping coatings on the two forty-foot sections of SSW system discharge piping that were being replaced more than 25 years after the plant had become operational. The exterior surface of the piping had been wrapped with reinforced fiberglass wrapping, coal-tar saturated felt, and heavy Kraft paper in accordance with Specification M-306 as described above. The exterior wrappings of the pipes were found to be in good condition and no external corrosion of the pipes was observed PNPS examined the removed piping after its wrapping was removed and found that the outside surface of the piping was in its original condition.

38

PW Rebuttal: No factual evidence is provided by Entergy, such as inspection reports that provide analysis of the actual condition of the coating and piping of the 40 - foot sections examined. Therefore, any opinion expressed about their condition is unsupported by facts [PW Fact 72].

Examination of the SSW Discharge piping was done simply from the inside; Entergy said that only visual examinations would yield useful information. At the Hearing, Judge Abramson said, "Sc, if I understand you correctly, ultrasonic testing would not yield any useful information. So what would the staff think is appropriate: Visual inspection of the liner?" Dr. Davis replied, "Yes, visual inspection." Mr. Gundersen explained the reason, "... a perpendicular ultrasound would be impossible to detect any problem because you are going through several layers of varying thicknesses and roughness and things like that." [Tr., 708]

Site-specific experience is absent. On what appears to have been its best, and only, opportunity to examine the exterior coatings and surface of the original SSW inlet piping, Entergy did not do so. Cox [Entergy's Motion for Summary Disposition at FN 6 (Tr. Exh., 24)] said that, "The inlet SSW carbon steel piping that was replaced with titanium piping in order to prevent corrosion was never removed from the ground so that the exterior coatings and surface of the original carbon steel SSW inlet piping were not examined," emphasis added [PW Fact 77]. Because the piping was not removed from the ground or analyzed, there is no site-specific historical experience. The Board is asked simply for their trust.

Industry experience nationwide similarly fails to provide the required assurance. Industry experience indicates that there has been a proliferation, of leaks from buried components around the country [PW Fact 205]. Entergy did not put forward any facts to show that reactors with leaks either did not have coatings or that somehow their coating were poorly installed whereas PNPS had no field or manufacturing error.

Again Entergy provides no "clear preponderance of the evidence" to support their statement.

39

53.

Staff witness Dr. Davis confirms PNPS's operational experience with external buried piping coatings. Dr. Davis states that "the coating and external surface on the two 40-foot sections of piping on the discharge loops were examined in 1999 when the two 40-foot sections were replaced The coatings were found to be in good condition and no external corrosion was noted Those coatings were then removed to inspect the outside surface of the piping which was also found to be in good condition."

Dr. Davis also noted that, after 36 years of inspections, Entergy has never seen any degradation of the exterior coating.

PW Rebuttal: Dr. Davis' commented that, "every time they have looked at the external coating, which is in the buried pipe and tanks inspection program, it has been intact after years with no degradation. The only degradation they have seen is from the inside" [Tr., at 642].

His statement is overboard and unsupported by fact. He had no previous work experience at Pilgrim; he was not there to observe when the coatings were applied or when the two 40' sections were removed. Absent evidence to support his statement; we assume that he is simply parroting the Applicant's words. The amount of "seeing" done by Entergy does not constitute an acceptable sample to be considered proof [PW Fact 74]. Mr. Davis does not bother to qualify his endorsement that Entergy has not shown that they looked at > 80% of the SSW Discharge piping exterior; neither Entergy or Dr. Davis have any factual basis for their statements.

Dr. Davis knows better; or perhaps he was once again "carried away" as he admitted being when he falsely claimed at the hearing that retrofitting cathodic protection was dangerous.

In NRC Staff's Response to Entergy's Motion of Summary Disposition, June 28, 2007 [Tr., Exh.

34, at 16] he said that, "...industry practice has shown that properly applied coatings will prevent corrosion as long as the soil is not extremely aggressive or unless there is damage during application of the coating and handling of the pipe." [Emphasis added].

He knows that current and representative soil tests are required; and that human error in manufacturing and field application must be considered. It appears that he blindly accepted the Applicant's judgment.

40

Dr. Davis' speculations are neither reassuring nor sufficient; without looking at the outside of the pipes there is no reasonable assurance of structural integrity. The Board's concern here is not about containing leaks but about the loss of structural integrity caused by the holes/wall thinning in the wrongplaces on the carbon steel pipe in a DBT that will cause the pipes to break [PW Fact 75].

54.

Mr. Spataro testified concerning industry experience on the use of coal tar and epoxy coatings used to protect the PNPS buried piping from. corrosion. This industry experience demonstrates that if, (1) there is a coal tar or epoxy coating on the outer surface, (2) the coating was properly applied, and (3) the coating was not damaged during installation, the protective coating will protect pipingfrom exterior degradation.

PW Rebuttal: No factual evidence was provided to support the statement. Theoretically Pilgrim Watch agrees that if all the pre-conditions ("Ifs") stated in (1-3) are in place, they will protect the metal from external corrosion. However, these were not factually demonstrated to be in place.

55.

Mr. Spataro also testified to his personal experience with investigating coatings that had been in use for 25 years on a buried gas transmission line that had been coated with coal-tar epoxy in accordance with the industry practice for buried piping described above.

Excavation showed that, where the coating had been properly applied and not damaged, both the pipe and coatings were essentially in the same condition as when the pipe was buried, and, as such, they were left in service.

PW Rebuttal: Mr. Spataro failed to explain how experience cited was remotely relevant. He did not offer evidence to show that the two situations were comparable - the soil environments, age and material of the pipes; and material, manufacturing and installation history of the coatings. He has no experience with PNPS.

56. Mr. Spataro also testified to his personal experience with investigating coatings that had been in use for 40 years on the hydroelectric dam spill gates for the St. Lawrence Seaway Power Project. These gates were coated with the same type of coal-tar used on buried 41

pipes at PNPS and had been submerged, completely or partially, in a flowing river water environment, subject to not just corrosion, but to erosion from water flow and impact damage caused by solid objects, such as trees and ice floes. After 40 years of service under such conditions, the protective coating on the gates was found to be in substantially the original condition and remained tightly adhered to the steel gates. Since the gates were in excellent condition and the coating manufacturer stated that the existing coating was good for another 40 years, those spill gates that did not require modifications were put back in service with their original protective coating.

PW Rebuttal: Mr. Spataro failed to explain how this experience was remotely relevant, same comment as above [at 55].

57.

Operating experience at nuclear plants also shows that properly applied coatings will protect buried piping from external corrosion for many years. Entergy's witnesses reference NUREG/CR-6876, "Risk-Informed Assessment of Degraded Buried Piping Systems in Nuclear Power Plants" (2005), which summarizes the operating experience of buried pipes, at 12 nuclear power plants that have undergone license renewal and refers to NUREG-1522, which reported on operating experience at six older nuclear plants licensed before 1977 (which did not report any external degradation of buried piping at these six plants). This operating experience confirms that the external surface of buried piping will not corrode during the life of a nuclear power plant if(l) there is a protective coating on the outer surface, (2) the coating was properly applied, and (3) the coating was not damaged during installation.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy cheery picked through NUREG/CR 6876, Table 2.2 Buried Piping Systems at Nuclear Power Plants Based on Twelve LRAs, and avoided pertinent examples of coating failures.

Catawba: The original interior coating was not properly applied and is failing. During the 2000 outage, the Nuclear Service Water System piping was cleaned to remove fouling buildup* Internal inspection revealed a row of through-wall pits. Excavation and examination of external coating revealed that the coating had been cut during construction allowing the 42

underground environment to contact pipe surface. Other instances of externally generated through-wall leaks of buried components have been identified and attributed to construction-related damage [Brookhaven at 13].

Hatch: Units 1 & 2: Leaking piping, deterioration of coatings within fire-water storage tank and fouling of lines due to corrosion product buildup have been reported. Two leaks occurred to date. One was a crack in a weld resulting from waterhammer events. The other was a pinhole that was larger on the outside than the inside, indicating that corrosion initiated on external pipe surface. Pinhole was repaired with a steel pipe plug.

Oconee: A small hole in branch line pipe observed in 1992. Root cause: galvanic or pitting corrosion at a pinhole coatings void.

Page 31: "It should be noted that a few of the LRAs indicate that some of the degradations were initially caused by improper application of coatings, construction methods, or in one instance waterhammer load. Although this listing of degradations is not extensive, it indicates that the primary manifestations of degradation are deterioration of the interior or exterior coating, through-wall pits or holes, and fouling."

58.

This operating experience is also confirmed by the "Operating Experience" review for buried piping and tanks in the GALL Report. The GALL Report states that "[o]perating experience shows" that a program of protective coatings and opportunistic and periodic inspections to confirm that the coatings are intact is effective in managing the "corrosion of external surfaces of buried steel piping and tanks."

PW Rebuttal: The key words are "to confirm the coatings are intact." This recognizes that coatings may not be intact. GALL XI M28 Buried Piping and Tanks Surveillance Program: The Gall Report acknowledges that coatings may fail, "Preventive Actions: A cathodic protection system is used to mitigate corrosion where pinholes in the coating allow the piping or components to be in contact with the aggressive soil environment."

Defense in depth demands layers, of protection such as supplementing the AMP with a robust inspection program, monitoring wells and cathodic protection. GALL XI M-34. appeared after 43

GALL XI M-28. From Dr. Davis' Testimony, we learned that he wrote M-34 in response to NEI'ss erroneous arguments that reactors would have to shut down if rectifiers malfunctioned.

[Pilgrim Watch Motion to Strike Incorrect and Misleading Testimony From the Record, May 15, 2008; and NRC Staff Response To Pilgrim Watch Motion To Strike Testimony And To Pilgrim Watch Motion To Admit Exhibits As Evidence, May 17, 2008, in which Dr. Davis retracted his statements].

59. Pilgrim Watch's witness, Mr. Gundersen, presented no evidence indicating that these coatings will be ineffective in protecting buried piping from degradation. Both Entergy's and the Staff's experts have extensive experience and knowledge concerning the capability ofprotective coatings to protect buried pipe against external degradation. Mr. Gundersen has none. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that industry operating experience establishes that properly applied coatings will protect the external surface of the pipe for many years.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy's experts may have knowledge and expertise about protective coatings; however, neither Mr. Spataro nor Mr. Cox have any site-specific experience at PNPS and Mr.

Sullivan and Mr. Woods chose not to share their knowledge regarding pertinent site-specific experience. This adjudication is concerned with whether the AMP is sufficient for Pilgrim - not for a hypothetical reactor. Mr. Gundersen summarized their testimony in one word, "infomercials." For example, Mr. Spataro testified to his personal experience with investigating coatings that had been in use for 40 years on the hydroelectric dam spill 'gates for the St.

Lawrence Seaway Power Project [Entergy fact 56]. Mr. Spataro also testified to, his personal experience with investigating coatings that had been in use for 25 years on a buried gas transmission line [Entergy Fact 55]. Neither experiences shed light on Pilgrim's coating. The same criticism applies to NRC's experts. Dr. Davis testified that [ Tr., Exh. 34] that, "...industry practice has shown that properly applied coatings will prevent corrosion as long as the soil is not extremely aggressive or unless there is damage during application of the coating and handling of the pipe" [emphasis added]. He never worked at PNPS, perhaps never set foot on the property until the license renewal review; neither did Dr. Davis reference specific PNPS documents to support his statements.

44

The Applicant, not the Petitioner, is required to prove their case. It is true Mr. Gundersen was never employed at Pilgrim Station; and there was a paucity of relevant material provided by Entergy to examine. He stated very clearly that Entergy failed to provide warranties and factual analyses. His nuclear engineering background and expertise in nuclear waste management and decommissioning qualify him to speak on the fact that metal components leak at nuclear facilities located adjacent to the ocean-including those that are lined and coated. For example, he has actually looked at aged, buried metal components during his decommissioning work.

d.

Sufficiency of the PNPS Periodic and Opportunistic Inspection Program for the Aging Management of PNPS Buried Piping

60.

The PNPS BPTIP provides for periodic and opportunistic inspection of the buried piping for the purpose of confirming the continuing integrity of the protective coatings to protect the exterior surface of the piping from degradation. The opportunistic and periodic inspections provided for by the PNPS license renewal BPTIP require that. Buried components will be inspected when excavated during maintenance, Prior to entering the period of extended operation, plant operating experience will be reviewed to verify that an inspection occurred within the past ten years. If not, an inspection will be performed prior to entering the period of extended operation, A focused inspection will be performed within the first 10 years of the period of extended operation, unless an opportunistic inspection (or an inspection via a method that allows an assessment of pipe condition without excavation) occurs within this ten-year period.

PW Rebuttal: (a) Inspection prior to extended operation: The timing of the inspections is "out of sync" with the Board's schedule to decide on this application. The LRA will be decided absent the data from the inspections. Data from those inspections is important to enable Petitioners and the Board to evaluate the adequacy of the AMP for this particular site. (b)

Inspection after license renewal: A focused inspection may not be performed within the first 10 years. The BPTIP says, "The one-time inspection, or any other action or program created to verify the effectiveness of the AMP and confirm the absence of an aging effect, is to be reviewed by the staff on aplant-specific basis." The inference is that only on a plant specific basis will a 45

"one time inspection, or any other action or program.., occur, depending upon the effectiveness of the AMP as determined and reviewed by the Pilgrim Station staff [PW Fact 156]. In other words, there is a loop-hole.

61.

Thus, the PNPS license renewal BPTIP requires a minimum of two inspections for buried PNPS pipes subject to the BPTIP between 2002 (within ten years prior to entering the period of extended operation) and 2022 (within the first 10 years of the period of extended operation). Notably, because the current operating license for Pilgrim expires in 2012 and no credit is being taken for prior opportunistic inspections, the in-scope buried piping must be inspected in the next four years, and then at least once more in the first 10 years of the period of extended operation.

PW Rebuttal: Explained directly above - response to (60).

62.

Mr. Cox and Mr. Spataro testified that the inspection regime provided for by the BPTIP is sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the continued integrity of the buried piping systems at PNPS to perform their intended functions during the period of extended operation. Both the industry experience and the PNPS experience show that properly applied coatings will not degrade to impair the integrity of the buried piping, particularly during the limited time span between inspections as providedfor by the BPTIP. Thus, the inspections are complementary to the inherent protective capabilities of the coatings and provide additional assurance that the coatings are remaining in place to serve their protective function. More frequent inspections would serve no purpose, and in fact, would create the potential for damage to the protective coatings on the pipes.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy's employees conclude that, "More frequent inspections would serve no purpose, and in fact, would create the potential for damage to the protective coatings on the pipes." This is a red herring; contradicted by fact. Inspections can be done by remote means.

Appendix A and B specifically say that it is permitted.7 Entergy's employee,. Mr. Sullivan, 7 Appendix B, Aging Management Program and Activities, 2006.Exceptions to NUREG-1801: The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program at PNPS will be consistent with program attributes described in NUREG-1801,Section XI.M34, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection, with the following exception. Attributes Affected 46

explained at the Hearing Entergy's objection to more frequent inspections (splitting the 10-year inspection into intervals by doing 1/6h of the component at each refueling outage), it "creates an undue burden" [Trans., 723]. Entergy's "Fact 62" is simply an unsupported statement -

contradicted by evidence.

PW finds the BPTIP is insufficient for the following reasons, supported by facts [PW Facts 139-159].

(a). Age of pipes/"Bathtub Curve": Entergy's claim that the Board should find assurance based on a one-time inspection in ten (10) years incorrectly assumes that corrosion is gradual, linear and predictable.

This Board finds that as components age they deteriorate more rapidly; the "Bathtub Curve" explains this phenomenon - proper and authoritative references to this phenomenon were provided.

The vast majority of SSW discharge pipe is already old. 83-84% of the pipes will be approximately 40-45 years old in 2012; and they will be 60-65 years old in 2032. Therefore, as the pipes enter the "wear-out" phase, they require inspections that are more frequent. The rationale that components are maintained so that they are "as good as new" lacks credibility.

Living and non-living material can be well maintained; but that only slows deterioration, it does not stop it. Evidence simply requires looking in the mirror. Additional uncertainty is added because there is no industry experience with reactors 40-60 years old; and because inspections are not, and cannot be, 100%.

(b) Sampling: Corrosion is not even across a component. Entergy's claim that the Board should find assurance based on a one-time inspection in ten (10) years of an unspecified sample incorrectly assumes that corrosion is even across a component.

Exception: Detection of Aging Effects Inspections via methods that allow assessment of pipe condition without excavation may be substituted for inspections requiring excavation solely for the purpose of inspection. 1.

Methods such as phased array UT technology provide indication of wall thickness for buried piping without excavation. Use of such methods to identify the effects of aging is preferable to excavation for visual inspection, which could result in damage to coating or wrappings.

47

However, the SSW discharge piping cannot be assumed the same throughout so that a sample here and there will accurately predict the status of a section in another part of the piping system.

For example, metals vary because of the manufacturing process itself; different sections of a component are more susceptible to stress, such as elbows and welds; the CIP liner in the (2)

SSW discharge loops is not identical in composition and installation history.

(c)

Site historical experience: Degradation occurred in both SSW Discharge Loops simultaneously, demonstrating no redundancy. There was a through-hole leak in one Loop and wall thinning in the other Loop. Past experience also shows that once degradation begins, it grows quickly; leaks in Pilgrim's SSW discharge piping developed within two years. NRC's witness, Dr. Davis, stated that once degradation begins, it grows quickly [Tr., page 729]. The odds of a once-in-ten year inspection coinciding with the appearance of a hole and/or significant wall thinning in aging piping are not good enough. Nobody knows when there could be a design basis event. Certainly there is no guarantee that the once in (10) year inspection will occur right before it. PW simply asks the Board to require that PNPS be better prepared by reasonably supplementing the AMP and not leave the public's safety to luck.

(d) Entergy's employees assume coating are properly applied: Entergy's employees, Mr. Cox and Mr. Spataro, justify their opinion that the BPTIP is sufficient by saying both industry and PNPS experience shows properly applied coatings will not degrade between the 10-year inspection intervals. PW demonstrated that there is no basis to (a) assume coatings will be properly applied and (b) that "application of the coatings" is the whole story-manufacturing, installation, and unintentional damage to the coatings from unrelated work done on the property cannot be ignored. Both industry and PNPS own historical experience shows coatings were damaged [PW Facts 112-120].

(e) Operating Experience: The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program at PNPS is a new program for which there is no operating experience [Appendix B: B. 1.2 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection].

63.

Dr. Davis of the NRC Staff agrees that the BPTIP requires that at least two inspections of the coating take place. one within 10 years prior to the period of extended operation and 48

at least one inspection during the. first 10 years of the period of extended operation. He further agrees that this inspection regime is sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the coatings are remaining in place and are protecting against degradation of the outer surfaces of the buried pipe.

PW Rebuttal: NRC parrots the Applicant, without adding the necessary factual evidence to support his conclusion. He never explains precisely why the program provides assurance at Pilgrim site as well or better than another. For example: why will Pilgrim's > 40 year old piping buried adjacent to the ocean provide more assurance not cathodically protected than with cathodic protection; why as the pipes age further is a one-time inspection in 1 0-years adequate; why is a sample at the inspection of one elbow indicative of the condition at the next elbow or inspection somewhere along one spool tell you the condition along the next spool or elbow?

PW's response is the same as to (62) above.

64.

Pilgrim Watch's witness, Mr. Gundersen, has raised numerous challenges to the adequacy of the inspection regime provided under the BPTIP. We have reviewed Mr. Gundersen's challenges and find that none have merit.

PW Rebuttal: This is an unsubstantiated statement of opinion.

65.

Mr. Gundersen initially claims that the BPTIP is "vague and non-specific" and cannot be used to conclude that Entergy will examine any buried piping during the license renewal period However,. as stated above, the BPTIP is very specific in requiring that a minimum of two inspections be performed with respect to buried pipes and tanks subject to the program, and that one of these inspections must occur within the first ten years after license renewal. Mr. Gundersen is incorrect in stating that the BPTIP requires no inspection of the buried piping. Moreover, the BPTIP is in conformance with the GALL Report, which identifies AMPs that the NRC has determined acceptable for managing the effects of aging on SSCs within the scope of license renewal.

49

PW Rebuttal: (a) Entergy says, "The BPTIP is very specific in requiring that a minimum of two inspections be performed with respect to buried pipes and tanks subject to the program, and that one of these inspections must occur within the first ten years after license renewal."

As stated above, PW read the fine print. It says, "The one-time inspection, or any other action or program, created to verify the effectiveness of the AMP and confirm the absence of an aging effect, is to be reviewed by the staff on a plant-specific basis." The inference is that only on a plant specific basis will a "one time inspection, or any other action or program"... occur, depending upon the effectiveness of the AMP as determined and reviewed by the Pilgrim Station staff. In plain English, the wording says that the inspection may not occur [PW Fact 156].

(b) Entergy says that, "Moreover, the BPTIP is in conformance with the GALL Report." The GALL is guidance, not regulation. The GALL can be challenged on a site-specific basis. The AMP is consistent with GALL XI M-34. PW argues that XI M28 is better suited for PNPS; it would provide greater assurance [PW Facts 195-198].

66.

In a similar vein, Mr. Gundersen erroneously asserts in his testimony that the BPTIP is voluntary. License renewal AMPs are in no way voluntary. The buried pipe AMP is a commitment made by Entergy in the license renewal application, which is reflected in a supplement to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as required by the NRC's regulations. Furthermore, implementation of the BPTIP is included in the NRC's license renewal Safety Evaluation Report as a commitment.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy is flatly wrong. Entergy *refers to Gundersen Testimony at 12.3. There, Mr. Gundersen is talking about the BPTIMP-Entergy's voluntary plan - not the BPTIP.

67.

Similarly, we find meritless Mr. Gundersen's suggestion that the entire length of the buried pipe must be inspected. The purpose of the inspections under the BPTIP is to provide additional assurances that the protective coatings remain in place, as would be expected based on previously described industry and PNPS experience, and are not experiencing some unexpected degradation. As reflected in, and confirmed by, the GALL Report, a sampling program to assess and verify the general condition of the coatings is sufficient to 50

provide this assurance.

The excavation that would be required to examine all underground piping poses unnecessary risk of damage to otherwise sound coatings.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy mischaracterizes Mr. Gundersen's recommended inspection schedule. He described it in his testimony [at 17.3.2] and at the Hearing. "The inspection cycle should be such that all pipes and tanks are inspected every ten years, however, I believe that the Applicant should be required to break the testing interval down such that one sixth of all pipes and tanks are inspected during each refueling outage. (This assumes 18 month refueling outages, or six every ten years.)"

This recognizes that a one-time-in ten-year inspection' of an unspecified sample is insufficient because it incorrectly assumes that corrosion is even across a component.

Coatings, metals, liners vary as a result of the manufacturing process itself; installation errors and accidents to the piping once installed cannot be assumed to be evenly distributed. Different sections of a component are more susceptible to stress, such as elbows and welds. Entergy persist in throwing out the "red herring" that, "excavation that would be required to examine all underground piping poses unnecessary risk of damage to otherwise sound coatings." The Board established and the LRA said that remote methods can be used for inspections. [LRA, A.2.1.2 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program (BPTIP): A focused inspection will be performed within the first 10 years of the period of extended operation, unless an opportunistic inspection (or an inspection via a method that allows assessment of pipe condition without excavation) occurs within this ten-year period.)].

68.

We also reject Mr. Gundersen's claim that the time interval between inspections proposed for the BPTIP is "too long" for reasons already stated above. Specifically, based on industry and PNPS experience with coated buried piping, such inspections are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the continued integrity and ability of the buried piping systems at PNPS to perform their intended functions during the period of extended operation. PNPS and industry experience demonstrate that coatings remain in good condition after many years of service and that coated materials are not expected to degrade with exposure to the PNPS soil environment. Coupled with ongoing operational monitoring, inspection of buried piping at the frequency specified by the BPTIP is 51

adequate to provide reasonable assurance that intended license renewal functions can be maintained - which is the purpose of the LRA AMPs.

PW Rebuttal: Industry and PNPS experience with coated buried piping: Entergy recycles the same unsubstantiated opinions regarding coatings. They seem to think if they say it repeatedly; it will somehow become true -without any facts on the record for support.

What is true?

(a) What is true is that the evidence on the record shows that there was failure in both SSW discharge loops simultaneously - a hole in one Loop, wall thinning in the other.

(b) What is true is that they have not examined the exterior coating and piping exterior surface of (83% and 84%) respectively of the SSW discharge piping; and that the piping is the original piping and will be > 50 years old by the end of the 10- year inspection interval, 2022.

(c) What is true is that they, "say"* without providing an ounce of evidence, that the coating on the remaining 17% of the SSW Discharge buried piping that they did replace was examined and found to be intact. The Board and Petitioner deserve to see an analysis; otherwise acceptance of what they say simply would be based on "hearsay" or a leap of faith.

(d) What is true is that when they had a chance to look at the exterior of carbon steel piping when they replaced the SSW inlet pipe with titanium, they simply left the pipe in place and did not bother to look [Tr. Exh.,24].

(e) What is true is that GALL XI M28 said at (f) that, "Operating experience: Corrosion pits from the outside diameter have been discovered in buried piping with far less than 60 years of operation. Buried pipe that is coated and cathodically protected is unaffected after 60 years of service."

(f) What is true is that there is little site-specific experience, according to the SER, 3-37, and the

-little site-specific evidence shows degradation.

(g) What is true is that there are reported leaks from buried components popping up at reactors around the country with increased frequency.

(h) What is true is that Entergy's own BPTIMP says at (Section 5.0) that, "The-risk of a failure caused by corrosion, directly or indirectly, is probably the most common hazard associated with buried piping and tanks."[PW Fact 173].

52

(i) What is true is that the BPTIMP says that, "Buried piping and tanks having high risk are.

specified as having an initial inspection period of 5 years with a re-inspection interval of 8 years"[PW Fact 179]. PW explains why even that time interval is too long, Entergy's own program recognizes that it is necessary to go further than the BPTIP. It does not matter that the BPTIMP focuses on radioactive leaks effect on the environment - a leak is a leak.

69.

Mr. Gundersen's claims that the BPTIP does not utilize opportunistic inspections are equally without merit. The LRA BPTIP expressly states in LRA Section B. 1.2 that "buried.

components are inspected when excavated during maintenance." Furthermore, the GALL Report, AMP XI.M34, expressly provides that "buried piping and tanks are opportunistically inspected whenever they are excavated during maintenance."

The BPTIP takes no exception to this provision of the GALL Report AMP. Therefore, buried piping must be opportunistically inspected whenever excavated during maintenance as part of the LRA BPTIP.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy is flatly wrong, again. As in PW's response to (66) above, Entergy confuses Mr. Gundersen's testimony regarding the BPTIMP with his testimony regarding the BPTIP. PW objects to their attempts to belittle our expert by falsely interpreting his testimony.

70.

As noted previously, Entergy developed a fleet-wide procedure, EN-DC-343, Rev. 0, "Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program " ("BPTIMP Procedure" or "the Procedure') to implement the PNPS license renewal AMP for the inspection of buried pipes and tanks, but it additionally implements inspections beyond the scope of the license renewal rules.

PW Rebuttal: Inspections 'that may occur by happenstance do not provide reasonable assurance for the public.

71.

Mr. Gundersen erroneously claims that BPTIMP acknowledges the validity of Pilgrim Watch's initial contention, based purely on ground water contamination unrelated to any intended license renewal functions. He points to the statement in the BPTIMP that the 53

"program shall include buried or partially buried piping and tanks that, if degraded, could provide a path for radioactive contamination of groundwater." However, Section of 5.2 of the BPTIMP clearly sets out the dual functions of the BPTIMP referred to above.

Subsection [2] of Section 5.2 states that the BPTIMP encompasses all buried pipes and tanks that fall within the scope of license renewal, for which it referencesSection XI.M34 of the GALL Report (Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection). Subsection [3] provides that the BPTIMP shall also include buried or partially buried piping and tanks that, if degraded, could provide a pathway for radioactive contamination of groundwater, and it references the NEI groundwater protection initiative. Accordingly, the BPTIMP addresses systems that are not even within the scope of license renewal and the procedure is plainly intended to go beyond implementing license renewal commitments. In addition to license renewal AMP functions, the BPTIMP is intended to implement the NEI groundwater initiative to prevent leakage and radioactive contamination of groundwater, which Entergy has voluntarily undertaken at all of its nuclear power plants.

PW Rebuttal: The BPTIMP demonstrates that Entergy and PW agree that the AMPs are not sufficient - a supplemental program is required. Entergy now disputes this even though the BPTIMP was written after these proceedings began and certainly well after the Gall Report.

If Entergy thought that the BPTIP were sufficient to identify degraded piping for buried components within scope, why would it not be equally sufficient for components with radioactive liquids not within scope? If they thought that it were a sufficient program, Entergy simply would have applied the BPTIP to all buried or partially buried components with radioactive liquids and be done with it.

Further, why does Entergy not believe that it is as important to have an equally stringent program to provide assurance that safety systems will not fail in a design base accident than to assure radioactive liquids do not leak and migrate unmonitored offsite?

72.

Mr. Gundersen also claims that the BPTIMP is inadequate because it does not address internal corrosion. However, as pointed out by both Entergy and the NRC Staff's 54

witnesses, the BPTIMP and the BPTIP are only intended to manage external degradation.

The BPTIMP states in Section 1. 0, "PURPOSE, " that "the Program consists of inspection and monitoring of selected operational buried piping and tanks for external corrosion."

Similarly, as stated in Entergy's pre-filed testimony, the BPTIP is the AMP established to manage external degradation of buried piping. Entergy has established other AMPs to manage internal degradation. The AMPs expressly established to manage internal corrosion are the Water Chemistry Control-BWR Program, the Service Water Integrity Program, and the One-Time Inspection Program discussed below in our discussion on the aging management for internal corrosion.

PW, no dispute: PW recognizes that corrosion results from both internal and external factors.

PW provides factual evidence why PNPS' programs are not sufficient.

73.

Mr. Gundersen also submits that the AMP and the Procedure are inadequate because neither requires a baseline review. However, as testified to by Dr. Davis and Entergy's witnesses, a baseline inspection for buried piping is not required under the BPTIP.

Furthermore, the installation inspections of the buried piping at PNPS serve as the baseline inspections, and the assumption of the inspections under the BPTIP and BPTIMP is that the coatings are not degraded from their original condition.

PW Rebuttal: PW asks for baseline inspections because the industry as a whole and Pilgrim, specifically, have experienced corrosion and leaks. The SSW Discharge piping had degradation in both Loops simultaneously. Basically, the rate of corrosion increases as components. age so that knowledge of what the component may have looked like when it was installed is hardly sufficient to predict what it will look like now or in 2020. Therefore, PW knows that it is important to have baseline data via a top to bottom examination of the buried components prior to final license approval. A baseline reference point is necessary to design a site-specific AMP and to establish a corrosion rate going forward. It is standard engineering practice. [PW Facts 228-230]. Home buyers get an inspection before making a purchase. This is not "rocket science."

The Board cannot reasonably judge the sufficiency of the AMP without knowing the precise level of degradation in the components today. It cannot be assumed that corrosion is gradual and predicable [PW facts 27-31]. It is absurd to say, as Entergy does, "The assumption of the 55

inspections under the BPTIP and BPTIMP is that the coatings are not degraded from their.

original condition."

If this were true, why bother with the BPTIP, BPTIMP and an aging management program?

74.

Mr. Gundersen also raises in several paragraphs of his testimony related claims regarding the alleged vagueness of acceptance criteria in the BPTIMP and the alleged failure of the BPTJP or BPTIMP to provide for condition reports to follow-up on deficiencies that may be identified by the inspections conducted under the BPTIP or BPTIMP. We also find these claims to be without merit.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy references Gundersen Testimony at 12.47-12.4.10. That testimony simply addresses inadequacies in the BPTIMP, not the BPTIP. We stand by statements, therein.

PW analyzed the BPTIMP only because Entergy included it as an attachment to their Prefiled Testimony. We assume they did so in order to convince the Board and public that they had other supplemental programs planned so that the obvious shortcomings of the BPTIP would appear less important. PW recognizes, as does the Board, that the BTIMP is not relevant for license renewal. In fact it is not even a definite program for PNPS. The BPTIMP is only a framework for Entergy-owned reactors to use as a blueprint to custom design one for each individual site.

75.

Both Dr. Davis and Entergy's witnesses emphasize that the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part Appendix B apply to license renewal AMPs. In this respect, Appendix B. 0. 3 of the LRA clearly sets forth that Pilgrim's Appendix B Corrective Action Program ("CAP") is applicable to all of the AMPs, including the BPTIP AMP. As reflected by this provision of the LRA, the full panoply of the PNPS corrective action program applies to PNPS aging management programs and activities.

PW Rebuttal: We do not dispute that 10 C.F.R. Part Appendix B applies to license renewal AMPs. PW Facts 32-38 argue that the license renewal rules properly should be interpreted to allow a larger range of components and functions to be under review [PW Fact 34].

10 CFR § 54.4 simply says how components are to be determined to be within scope. It is not a restriction on what can be looked at once they are determined to be within scope. 10 CFR § 56

54.21 [Contents of application--technical information] explains what has to be looked at in an aging management review of the components once they are determined to be within scope by 10 CFR § 54.4 (3). It says, (3) For each structure and component identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

The CLB (Current Licensing Basis) means that Entergy is required to comply with its license and all NRC regulations. This means compliance not simply with some of NRC's regulations but all of NRC's regulations that pertain to these important safety components.

Pertinent regulations in the CLB for buried components include, as Entergy's Fact (75) recognizes, are 10 C.F.R. Part Appendix B.

Repair of known leakages has always been part of on-going operation. However, repair of known leaks and detecting whether there is or might be a leak are two quite different things. The requirement for an aging management program is to manage the increased risk of failure of aging components within scope - to insure leakage of an aging component will be detected, and that necessary preventative repair of an aging component to prevent a leak will be accomplished.

This means that PNPS must be required to look to be able to "see" degradation (with sufficient frequency, and sampling) when it occurs in order to fix it.

76.

Thus, condition reports, corrective actions, and root cause analyses are all required under the BPTIP and BPTIMP in accordance with Pilgrim's Appendix B Quality Assurance Program. As testified to by Mr. Sullivan, if conditions adverse to quality were detected by inspections, corrective action would be required, which would include increased inspection frequency, if needed, to establish the effectiveness of the corrective action. The Staff's experts, Terrance Chan and Dr. Davis, testified to this fact stating that NRC resident inspectors would evaluate every condition report created by Entergy in response to the condition adverse to quality.

PW Rebuttal: Response is the same as directly above (75). PW adds that corrosion is not gradual or predictable. Therefore, it is necessary to require in the AMP increased inspections and 57

other precautionary measures to address aging in a 40-60 year old reactor for which there is no industry experience. The margin of safety decreases over time.

77.

Similarly, we find no merit to Mr. Gundersen's claim that the acceptance criteria for the BPTIMP and the BPTIP are unacceptably vague. As explained by Entergy 's witnesses, the acceptance criteria for the BPTIP are those set out in Section XI M-112 of the GALL Report. These criteria require inspection for "evidence of damaged wrapping or coating' defects, such as coating perforation, holidays, or other damage" and the reporting and evaluation of "[amny coating and wrapping degradation" in accordance with the PNPS corrective action procedures.

PW Rebuttal: Mr. Gundersen correctly explained why the acceptance criteria for the BPTIMP and the BPTIP are unacceptably vague [at Tr. Exh. 14, 12.4.6.4-12.6]. For example, BPTIMP sections]:

Section 5.7, on page 13, provides vague remarks about acceptance criteria for any degradation of external coating, wrapping and pipe wall or tank plate thickness. It says that they should be based on current plant procedures; and if not covered by plant.procedures then new procedures need to be developed before the inspections. The pass/fail grade should be clearly defined. For example what precisely constitutes an "unacceptable" from an "acceptable" degraded external wrapping? The LLTF was very specific that "significant" and other such descriptions need definition.

Section 5.8, Corrective Actions, page 14, says that "a condition report (CR) shall be written if acceptance criteria are not met. Pilgrim Watch knows that any and all inspections should generate a written 'condition report' regardless of what is or is not found to maintain a permanent paper trail of all inspections.

The corrective actions may include engineering valuations, scheduled inspections, and change of coating or replacement of corrosion susceptible components. Components that do not meet acceptance criteria shall be dispositioned by engineering. [Emphasis added].

This provides no assurance to public safety for the following reasons.

58

The corrective actions may include engineering valuations, scheduled inspections, and change of coating or replacement of corrosion susceptible components; and they just "may not." There are no guarantees.

The licensee's own engineering department will deal with it; but there is no clear definition of how they will deal with it. Who sees the Condition Reports - or to put it another way, where are the reports kept, who has access to those reports, do they have to be sent to the NRC and if so under 'what conditions and time schedule? A more basic issue is that Condition Reports are unlikely to be written or, if they are written, to actually say anything as explained directly below.

Section 5.12 Inspection Methods and Technologies/Techniques, subsection [1] on page 15 specifies steps to be taken for Visual Inspections of buried piping and tanks. Step (g) directs the workers: "A CR [condition report] shall be initiated if the acceptance criteria are not met." A review of steps (a) through (f) reveal a lack of-objective, or even subjective, acceptance criteria that could trigger a condition report:

a. When opportunities arise, buried sections of piping and tanks "should be examined to quantify deposit accumulation... and those results documented." As long as exposed piping is examined and damage chronicled, the acceptance criteria are met - no condition report.

b. "Look for signs of damaged coatings or wrapping defects"-as long as workers look the acceptance criteria are met. Only not looking would fail to meet the acceptance criterion and trigger a condition report.

c. "The interior of piping may be examined by divers, remote cameras, robots or moles when appropriate." The combination of "may" and "when appropriate" means the acceptance criterion is met when examinations are performed or not.

59

d.

"Use holiday tester to check excavated areas of piping for coating defects." When coating defects are found for exposed area of piping using a holiday tester, the acceptance criteria is met and no condition report is written.

e. If visual inspection reveals coatings or wrappings not to be intact, further inspection of piping for signs of pitting, MIC, etc is required. If the additional inspection is performed, the acceptance criterion is satisfied and no condition report is warranted whether damage is found or not.

f. Inspect below grade concrete for indication of cracking and loss of material. As long as the inspection is performed, the acceptance criterion is satisfied whether damage is found or not.

Section 5.12 subsection [2] on page 16 specifies the steps to be taken for Non-Destructive Testing of buried piping and tanks. No steps direct workers to initiate condition report(s) regardless of how extensive the piping and/or tank damage is identified.

Section 5.9 Preventive Measures, at 14, "...the existing cathodic. protection system may be updated or a new Cathodic Protection system may be installed. Pilgrim Watch has explained that cathodic protection should be installed. The emphasis should be on prevention not waiting to discover failures before acting.

78.

Based on the evidence in the record, we find that the periodic and opportunistic inspections of the buried piping provided for under the BPTIP provide reasonable assurance of the continuing integrity of the protective coatings to protect the exterior surface of the piping from degradation. We therefore find, based on a preponderance of credible evidence in the record as presented by Entergy and verified by the Staff that the BPTIP manages the effects of aging so as to provide reasonable assurance that intended functions can be accomplished as required by the NRC's license renewal regulations such that buried pipes carrying radioactively contaminated water will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes to be unable to perform their license renewal intended functions.

60

PW Rebuttal: (a) The BPTIP is inadequate. It does not provide assurance. It is based on a number of false or otherwise inaccurate assumptions, and previous experience does not provide the necessary assurance [PW Facts 139-159]. Entergy has the burden of proof factually to demonstrate that the BPTIP is sufficient; they failed to do so. Instead of proof, they made an exhaustive listing of unsupported, erroneous opinions by their employees as if by repeatedly saying so they become fact. Entergy did not,. as we have shown, support their statements with anything approaching a clear preponderance of the evidence. Instead, PW presented evidence to support our statements made throughout their filing of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that what Entergy said was "fact" in large measure turned out to be "fiction."

(b) Appendix B: B. 1.2 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection, "Operating Experience: The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program at PNPS is a new program for which there is no operating experience." Entergy's testimony adds no factual proof to demonstrate its sufficiency.

e.

Cathodic Protection is Neither Required nor Necessary

79.

Pilgrim Watch and Mr. Gundersen also claim, referring to the GALL Report § XIM28, that, in order to reduce corrosion rates, Entergy can and should backfit the SSW system and CSS buried pipes with cathodic protection. However, as the Board stated in our recent Memorandum and Order8 denying Pilgrim Watch's Motion to Strike Misleading and Inaccurate testimony, cathodic protection is at most a "peripheral" issue here. As we stated previously, and restated in our June 4 Memorandum and Order, "our responsibility is to determine whether the Applicant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that its AMPs are adequate as they currently exist, without monitoring wells,"

PW Rebuttal: Cathodic protection is not a "peripheral issue." The Board by Memorandum and Order of October 17, 2007 clarified the. appropriate focus of Contention 1 to be litigated, stating, "Thus at issue here is the following fundamental question: Do the AMPs for buried pipes and tanks, by themselves, ensure that such safety-function-challenging leaks will not occur, or must 8 Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Pilgrim Watch Motions Regarding Testimony and Proposed Additional Evidence Relating to Pilgrim Watch Contention 1) (June, 4, 2008).

61

some sort of leak detection devices such as the monitoring wells proposed by Intervenors be installed to meet that obligation?" [Emphasis added.]

The key phrases are "by themselves" and "such as." These two phrases could mean nothing other than there. may be additions necessary to ensure that such safety-function-challenging leaks do not occur. The phrases leave the door open.

Contention 1 concerns sufficiency. Sufficiency plainly means "enough;" whereas insufficient plainly means "not enough." Therefore, PW explains why the AMP is "not enough" by showing what it needs. This could not be any more obvious.

Cathodic Protection is appropriate for Pilgrim's site considering both the age of the components and the reactor's ocean-side location. A properly installed and administered cathodic protection system prevents corrosion, not simply hopes to find it in time.

Prevention makes sense.and provides assurance especially because the future rate of corrosion is unknown; the present condition of the piping is not known; and whether a design basis event will occur, 2012-2032, is unknown. Cathodic protection is far from peripheral.

GALL XIM28 Buried Piping and Tanks Surveillance Program's are reproduced below; (1) Scope of Program: The program relies on preventative measures, such as coating, wrapping, and cathodic protection, and surveillance, based on NACE Standard RP-0285-95 and NACE Standard RP-0169-96, to manage the effects of corrosion on the intended function of buried tanks and piping respectively."

(2) Preventive Actions: "A cathodic protection system is used to mitigate corrosion where pinholes in the coating allow the piping or components to be in contact with the aggressive soil environment. The cathodic protection imposes a current from an anode onto the pipe or tank to stop from corrosion from occurring at defects of the coating."

(3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected: "The effectiveness of the coatings and cathodic protection system, per standard industry practice, is determined by measuring coating conductance, by 62

surveying pipe-to-soil potential, and by conducting bell-hole examinations to visually examine the condition of the piping.".

(4) Detection of Aging Effects: "Coatings and wrappings can be damaged during installation or while in service and the cathodic protection system is relied upon to avoid any corrosion at the damaged locations. Degradation of the coatings and wrappings during service will result in the requirement for more current from the cathodic protection rectifier in order to maintain the proper cathodic protection protect potentials. Any increase in current requirements is an indication of coating and wrapping degradation. A close interval pipe-to-soil potential survey can be used to locate the locations where degradation has occurred."

(5) Monitoring and Trending: "Monitoring the coating conductance versus time or the current requirement versus time provides an indication of the condition of the coating and cathodic protection system when compared to predetermined values."

(6) Acceptance Criteria: "In accordance with accepted industry practice, per NACE Standard RP-0285-95 and NACE RP-0169-96, the assessment of the condition of the coating and cathodic protection system is to be conducted on an annual basis and compared to predetermined values."

(7) Corrective Actions: The site corrective action program, quality assurance (QA) procedures, site review and approval process, and the administrative controls are implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. As discuses in the appendix of this report, the staff finds the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B acceptable to address the corrective actions, confirmation process and administrative controls."

(8) Confirmation Process: See item 7 above."

(9) Administrative Controls: See Item 7, above" 63

(10) Operating experience: "Corrosion pits from the outside diameter have been discovered in buried piping with far less those.60- years of operation. Buried pipe that is coated and cathodically protected is unaffected after 60 years of service. Accordingly, operating experience from application of the NACE standards on non-nuclear systems demonstrates the

.effectiveness of this program."

Properly applied and maintained cathodic protection can prevent corrosion. PW has provided evidence to show that coatings can be damaged and fail for a variety of reasons. We know that non-cathodically protected pipe will experience accelerated corrosion if the coating is damaged.

The corrosion which occurs at a damaged pipe coating site is far more severe that the localized corrosion which occurs on an uncoated (bare) pipe in intimate contact with the same soil anomaly. In the case of a damaged pipe coating, the exposed steel substrate is a very small anode when compared to the surrounding large cathode area of the coated pipe. As such, corrosion of the area of damaged coating will occur at a greatly elevated rate, even if the soil anomaly, which caused the coating damage, is no longer in contact with the pipe. In simpler terms, the corrosive forces along the. surface area of the coated pipe focus on the small area of exposed steel and accelerate corrosion.

Cathodic protection is a "no-brainer." It can be retrofitted; and to do so is not dangerous. Stray currents are a design issue not a design constraint. Local service stations have cathodic protection on their buried fuel tanks. To deny the need for cathodic protection on buried piping at nuclear reactors where their failure may result in a disaster is beyond all comprehension.

80.

Entergy has not proposed cathodic protection as part of its AMP for buried pipes, and we have concluded, for the reasons previously stated, that Entergy's AMP, without cathodic protection, provides reasonable assurance that buried pipes carrying radioactively contaminated water will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes to be unable to perform their license renewal intended functions. Industry and PNPS experience show that, as long as the coatings remain in place, buried pipes will be protected from external degradation. Entergy has provided credible evidence that properly applied coatings will remain in place for many years. Entergy has established a reasonable inspection program 64

to confirm the continued integrity of the coatings, and we find that no additional facets, neither cathodic protection nor monitoring wells, are necessary to provide reasonable assurance the buried pipes will be capable of performing their license renewal intended functions during the period of extended operation.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy's AMPs do not provide reasonable assurance for all the facts put forward by PW Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. Entergy has failed to show by a "clear preponderance of the evidence." otherwise.

(a) A number of false and inaccurate assumptions concerning corrosion underlie Entergy's and NRC's claim that the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program (BPTIP) will provide reasonable assurance that the effects of aging will be managed such that applicable components will continue to perform their intended functions consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation.

(b) Entergy's claim that the Board should find assurance based on a one-time inspection in ten years incorrectly assumes that corrosion is gradual, linear and predictable. This Board finds that as components age they deteriorate more rapidly; the "Bathtub Curve" explains this phenomenon.

(c) The vast majority of SSW discharge pipe is already old. 83-84% of the pipes will be approximately 40-45 years old in 2012; and they will be 60-65 years old in 2032. Therefore, as the pipes enter the "wear-out" phase, they require inspections that are more frequent. The rationale that they are maintained so that they are "as good as new" lacks credibility. Living and non-living material can be well maintained; but that only slows deterioration, it does not stop it.

There is additional uncertainty because there is no industry experience with reactors 40-60 years old and because inspections are not and cannot be 100%.

(d) Entergy's claim that the Board should find assurance based on a one-time inspection in ten years based on unspecified sampling also incorrectly assumes that corrosion is even across a component.

(e) However, the SSW discharge piping cannot be assumed the same throughout so that a sample here and there will accurately predict the status of a section in another part of the piping system.

For example: metals vary as a result of the manufacturing process itself; different sections of a 65

component are more susceptible to stress, such as elbows and welds; the CIPP liner in the two SSW discharge loops are not identical in composition; and Entergy failed to mention to the Board failures encountered in the CIPPs installation-rips at the elbows.

(f) Previously, degradation occurred in both loops simultaneously, demonstrating that there is no reliable redundancy. Past experience also shows that once degradation begins, it grows quickly; leaks in Pilgrim's SSW discharge piping developed within two years.

(g) There was a through-hole leak in one loop and wall thinning in another loop, simultaneously.

The hole developed in two years. Therefore the odds of a once-in-ten year inspection coinciding with the appearance of a hole or significant wall thinning; and the once in ten year inspection occurring right before a design basis event are slim - leaving public safety to happenstance.

NRC's witness, Dr. Davis, stated that once degradation begins, it grows quickly [Tr., page 729].

(h) Industry experience show that coatings fail and systems corrode; reports of leaks have exploded across the country in recent years. Entergy did not offer proof that the reported industry-wide failures could not be attributed to degraded coatings.

(i) The GALL XI M28 says specifically at (4) that, "Detection of Aging Effects: Coatings and wrappings can be damaged during installation or while in service and the cathodic protection system is relied upon to avoid any corrosion at the damaged locations. XI,M28 at (10) says, "Operating experience: Corrosion pits from the outside diameter have been discovered in buried piping with far less that 60- years of operation."

(j) Entergy provided no credible evidence that "properly applied coatings will last for many years." They simply offered unsubstantiated opinions from their employees.

81.

In this respect, the GALL Report expressly recognizes that cathodic protection is but one option to manage corrosion on buried pipe such as the SSW or CSS buried pipe. Section XLM28 is one of the AMPS listed in Chapter 11 of the GALL Report. Another is the Section XLM34 AMP, which is the AMP that Entergy credits for the Pilgrim license renewal application. Dr. Davis, the author of the BPTIP AMP in the GALL Report,Section XI.M28, testified that the risks associated with the cathodic protection system causing an unscheduled plant shutdown led to the alternative in Section XIM34 which requires no 66

cathodic protection. Either of these two AMPs is acceptable for managing aging effects on buried pipe external surfaces.

PW Rebuttal: At the Hearing, Dr. Davis said, "They (NEI) were concerned that if they used a rectifier or put the rectifier in a safety-related and it went down for some reason they would go into a limited condition of operation and they would have to shut down the plant because the rectifier failed." (and) "So we negotiated with NEI to see what different program that we could come up with..." [Transcript, page 770, lines 10-14. 17-18].

NEI's statement is untrue. If the cathodic protection system is properly maintained, each rectifier will be inspected every month. If one is found to be out of operation, it will not have been out more than 30 days. Even if it took a week or more to get it back in service, only minute if any corrosion will occur in that length of time. There are cathodic protection rectifiers in other nuclear plants around the country. This is yet another "red herring."

Further Dr. Davis' actual testimony bears little resemblance to Entergy's Fact 81. Entergy says that, ". Dr. Davis, the author of the BPTIP AMP in the GALL Report,Section XI.M28, testified that the risks associated with the cathodic protection system causing an unscheduled plant shutdown led to the alternative in Section XI.M34 which requires no cathodic protection. " NEI is conspicuously missing.

82.

Based on the Testimony of Dr. Davis, as well as the alternative to cathodic protection offered in the GALL Report and incorporated into the PNPS BPTIP, we conclude that cathodic protection is not a required element of the PNPS BPTIP. Moreover, as clearly established by the record, cathodic protection is not necessary to provide reasonable assurance that PNPS buried pipes will be able to perform their license renewal intended functions during the period of extended operation.

PW Rebuttal: It is not required, true. Should it be part of the aging management program as GALL originally intended? Yes. The record-clearly shows that cathodic protection is a necessary to provide reasonable assurance because if properly installed, and maintained it can prevent further corrosion. Coatings, liners and the AMP cannot. Cathodic Protection can be retrofitted

[Tr., Gundersen, 722]. Retrofitting cathodic protection is not dangerous. It may introduce strays currents; however, this is a design issue not a design constraint [PW Fact 233]. Some nuclear 67

reactors already have cathodic protection on buried components. The local gas and Fire Station has cathodic protection on their buried fuel tanks.

3.

Aging Management of Internal Degradation Service Water Integrity Program and Corrosion Resistant Materials to Manage Aging of Internal Degradation of the SSW Buried Pipe

83.

PNPS uses the Service Water Integrity Program for the aging management of internal degradation of the SSW system buried pipe. The Service Water Integrity Program includes surveillance and control techniques to manage the effects of aging on the SSW system or structures and components serviced by the SSW system.

Under the program, the components of the SSW system are regularly inspected for internal loss of material and other aging effects that can degrade the system.

The inspection program includes provisions for visual inspections, eddy current testing of heat exchanger tubes, ultrasonic testing, radiography, and heat transfer capability testing of the heat exchangers. The periodic inspections include direct visual inspections and video inspections accomplished by inserting a camera-equipped robotic device into the SSW system piping. In addition, chemical treatment using biocides, chlorine, and periodic cleaning and flushing of infrequently used loops are methods used under this program.

PW Rebuttal: These routine maintenance programs address internal corrosion, and do not provide adequate assurance even in combination with the other programs the Applicant outlined.

Entergy's provides a laundry list. of provisions in the program but Entergy fails to provide necessary details and evidence to support their conclusion.

(a) The water chemistry program is a mitigation program and does not provide detection for aging effects. More frequent, complete inspections as part of the overall program are the only effective assurance that defects created by aging components will be uncovered. Tritium leaks at reactors across the country belie the effectiveness of water chemistry alone to prevent leaks.

Entergy refers to problems with the water chemistry program; and then they turn around and claim that because they found problems the program works fine. Entergy's Chemistry Program 68

Corporate Assessment, November 2003 [Tr. Exh. 72] indicates a list of "Areas for Improvement." Entergy never discusses the potential damage caused while operating under the older methodology, under recently identified errors and what remediation steps have been taken regarding any damage that occurred.

Furthermore, Entergy provides no factual evidence to validate its verbal assurance that the new program is effective [PW fact 162].

(b) The Service Water Integrity Program addresses internal corrosion. Entergy says that, "Under the program, the components of the SSW system are regularly inspected for internal loss of material and other aging effects that can degrade the system." What does "regularly inspected" mean? Entergy needs to enumerate how many inspections will occur; and the basis for that schedule. They failed to do so - no facts, simply a statement. We have no assurance.

Entergy lists various inspections methods. At the hearing, the Board was told that UT inspections from the interior would provide no useful information. Dr. Davis [Tr., pages 668-9] explained that UT could not go though all those layers (CIPP, remaining rubber, metal piping) to determine degradation. Judge Abramson [Tr., page 689] responded that, "So if I understand you correctly, ultrasonic testing would not yield any useful information. So what would the staff think is appropriate: visual inspection of the liner? Dr. Davis replied, "Yes, visual inspection" [PW fact 168].

Mr. Gunderson commented on the limitations of the machine used to go inside the pipe, the "Crawler." He said [Tr., page 708] that, "the technique they used would detect gross deformities in the wall. And by "gross," you know, I am thinking about a bubble that might be six inches around and maybe a half-inch. But smaller bubbles I'm not convinced would be detected by that technique, which would mean there is still moisture behind that rubber barrier. And given that we already have a history that do have a concern that a visual inspection of this pipe, which was done before this sock was applied -- we already have indications that the liner peeled. And it's not clear to me that there might not be moisture behind that liner in other places that were undetected; so that the possibility of a through-wall for moisture that remains there when the sock was put on to me is real" [PW fact 169].

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84.

PNPS also uses corrosion resistant materials to protect against the internal degradation of SSW system buried pipe. The SSW inlet pipe is made of titanium, which as previously discussed, is resistant to corrosion. As such, the SSW inlet pipe is not subject to internal corrosion.

PW Rebuttal: The piping under consideration is made of metal-all metals corrode, some more so than others: We know from the Brookhaven Report and everyday experience that these metals can fail by localized corrosion phenomena, which is accelerated by stress or may be initiated due to poor design, installation, or maintenance [Brookhaven Report at 26; Transcript Exh. 211. Here,

.as elsewhere, PW provides an authoritative resource as evidence; Entergy provides an unsupported statement of opinion.

The SSW Service discharge piping is made of carbon steel. Carbon steel has poor corrosion

• resistance [Brookhaven at 26]. The SSW inlet piping is made of titanium. Titanium fouls more easily from marine organisms [Brookhaven at 128]. The CSW piping is made of stainless steel; some stainless steels are inherently more susceptible than others. The Brookhaven Report says that most stainless steels used in buried piping at nuclear plants are Type 304 and 316. Type 304 is more susceptible than 316; the latter is lower in carbon. The Board did not determine what grade of stainless steel PNPS used. There is uncertainty.

The interesting observation is that Entergy chooses to focus simply on titanium - a tacit admission that carbon and stainless are far more corrosive. Entergy's statement that, "The SSW inlet pipe is made of titanium which as previously discussed, is resistant to corrosion. As such, the SSW inlet pipe is not subject to internal corrosion" is internally inconsistent and meaningless. It may be somewhat "resistant" to corrosion but that does not mean that it will not corrode and is not subject to internal corrosion. The Brookhaven report said otherwise, at 128, for example they say, Titanium fouls more easily from marine organisms.

Last, it is important to note that Entergy focuses on the SSW Inlet pipe throughout their Statement of Facts. This could only mean that Entergy agrees with PW that the focus of the 70

adjudication should be broader and include all buried components under scope [PW Conclusions Law 32-38].

85.

Because the SSW discharge piping is made of carbon steel, it is protected by an internal liner. As originally installed at PNPS, the internal liner for the SSW discharge pipe was a rubber sleeve that was put in place as part of pipe fabrication. This rubber sleeve or liner had an expected life of approximately 20 years. PNPS monitored the integrity of the original rubber lining under the Service Water Integrity Program established as part of the in-service inspection requirements for the SSW developed in response to Generic Letter 89-13.

PW Rebuttal: There is no dispute that the SSW Discharge pipes will corrode from the inside if either the interior liner or coating fails [PW Facts 86-94].

To manage internal and external corrosion at Pilgrim Station, Entergy stated further that they relied, in part, upon the rubber lining and epoxy coating to protect the metal piping from the interior [Entergy Initial Statement, 8]. The evidence submitted does not establish that the lining and coating will do so.

Site-specific experience described degradation of the rubber lining in the SSW piping system (inlet and discharge) exposing the metal underneath to corrosive elements in the environment.

The piping had been in place > 20 years; however, and this is the important point, there is no evidence how soon after installation the degradation began. Just because they addressed it 20 years after it was installed does not prove when degradation began; it could prove instead that they had a poor inspection program. PNPS was owned by BECO. Because of poor management PNPS was forced to shut down from 1987-1§90. This is not evidence of its expected lifespan simply a statement of when they came upon it and repaired it.

The SSW Discharge piping rubber liner degraded, delaininated and tore away in sections. At the Hearing, Mr. Woods (Entergy's employee) described it as follows, "In 1995, an inspection was done and noted a little bit of degradation on the existing rubber lining. And then it was 71

determined to go ahead and do another inspection in 1997 to monitor that area. And that was okay at the time. And then we looked at it again in 1999 and found that the rubber lining had actually -- a portion of the rubber had delaminated and actually torn away from it and, as a result, had the through-wall leak. So at that point in time, we~replaced that section of pipe." [Tr., 638]

As Mr. Gundersen said, moisture is likely to remain behind sections where the rubber liner was not removed prior to installing -the CIPP; the inspection method used (crawler) would detect gross deformities in the wall but unlikely to detect smaller anomalies-bubbles. The moisture then would be against the interior of the carbon steel pipe leading to corrosion from the inside of the piping. [Tr., Gundersen, 709]

Judge Young questioned Entergy about their inspection of the rubber lining prior to installing the CIPP liner and asked whether "they had left anything in place where there would be a possibility of that moisture being behind the rubber lining" [Ibid]. If so, this could introduce corrosion on the metal from the interior.

Entergy said that prior to installing the CIPP liner, they inspected the interior with a "smart pig" or crawler device. However, and as Mr. Gundersen said, a crawler was not as precise as "eyeballs." A crawler might detect a bubble that might be six inches around and maybe a half-*

inch, but there is no evidence that smaller bubbles would be detected by that technique, which could mean there is still moisture behind that rubber barrier. Once moisture gets behind that rubber, the pipe can degrade. A "crawler" can only "see" the interior surface, not behind it [Ibid].

Entergy has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that there is not moisture behind the rubber liner and against the metal piping that would cause the piping to corrode from the inside out. At the very least, we have one independent expert's opinion against an employee's opinion; PW's opinion relies on some evidence -. that the internal examination technique will not be able to detect corrosion on the metal pipe's underside.

86. As the original rubber liner approached the end of its expected life, PNPS undertook increasingly intensive inspections under the Service Water Integrity Program. In 1995, PNPS visually inspected the rubber liner using a robot crawler fitted with a camera, and 72

found minor age-related degradation. The rubber liner was re-inspected using this same method in 1997, which identified additional degradation. Consequently, in 1999 PNPS undertook inspections that are more intensive by sending an inspector into the pipe to do both visual and ultrasonic examinations with the intent to make any necessary replacements or repairs. Based on the findings of this inspection, PNPS replaced the two forty-foot sections of the carbon steel SSW discharge pipe in 1999, as previously discussed, and made other repairs. Entergy applied a protective epoxy coating to the interior and exterior of both replaced sections ofpipe.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy continues to say refer to "the expected life of the rubber liner;" however there is no basis for that statement or explanation of what it means. There are no warranties. A person of a certain age may be told that his age group has an "expected life" of twenty years; however that means half of his age group will be dead in 20 years.

Entergy failed to mention that they discovered failure in the liner in both SSW discharge Loops and the SSW inlet liner; and that the original rubber liner remains in >80% of the SSW Discharge piping.

87.

Shortly thereafter, in 2001, Entergy lined the interior of loop B with a cured-in-place pipe

("CIPP") liner. In 2003, Entergy applied a nearly identical liner to loop A. The CIPP liner, which is nominally Y21/2" thick, forms a rigid barrier to protect the carbon steel discharge pipe against internal corrosion. The liner material consists of a nonwoven polyester felt tube that is saturated with a resin and catalyst system in loop A, and an epoxy resin and hardener system in loop B, with a polyurethane or polyethylene inner membrane. Based on the service conditions and the design of the CIPP liner, the expected life of the CIPP is approximately thirty-five years.

PW Rebuttal: (a) Entergy neglected to mention, and the Board did not ask, what installation problems were encountered. Subsequently we learned that there were failures encountered installing Loop "B" that resulted in circumferential tears at each elbow.

(b) Entergy neglected to qualify that the CIPP is "designed" to protect the interior of the piping, not that there is any guarantee that it "will" protect the interior.

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(c) The CIPP's expected life is "approximately 35-years" based simply upon Entergy's "word."

Entergy provided no evidence - warranties or laboratory test results - to support their statement

[PW fact 98-104]. Again, what does expected life mean? If we referred to an expected life of a group of people of 35-years, that would mean half would be dead in 35 years. Clear preponderance of the evidence is absent.

(d) Mr. Gundersen testified at the Hearing that, "We have an EQ program, equipment qualification. I have -- well, I heard an infomercial this morning on how wonderful the pipe is. I haven't seen a quality assurance document that says that this is a 35-year product. It's not on the record, Your Honorn We have got testimony, based on a brackish waterý plant. And this is saltwater. That is a wonderful product. And, yet, in the nuclear industry on safety-related pipe, there is a procedure where one qualifies this stuff for the.-- I've heard 35 years. I haven't seen either manufacturer's qualifications or the Pilgrim qualifications on a pipe that -- on an old pipe that had an old liner that then on that liner had applied this epoxy coating to give me any bases to say it had a 35-year life. This is testable. You can do this in a lab. You can pull it out. You can check it and then say, "Okay. It's got a 35-year life." But that's not on the record. I mean, we have heard individuals speak about experience at Indian Point but not in this environment. And it is a testable thing. To my knowledge, that document's not on the record. So we're hanging our hat on an infomercial" [Tr., Gundersen, 700-701].

Therefore, Entergy wishes the Board to rely on a non-quality assured CIPP liner to perform the quality assurance function of maintaining SSW Discharge integrity. A non-QA part cannot perform a QA function.

(e) The metal pipe is ductile; however, Entergy says that the liner "forms a rigid barrier." The CIPP is not ductile. Implications: As the bay water warms and cools and as the service water warms and cools even more, the horizontal pipe will expand and contract, but the ends of the pipe will be "pinned" by any elbows where the direction changes, this builds up stress in the elbows. Enter'gy claims that the CIPP is firmly attached to the pipe; therefore the ductile metal under the CIPP deforms, but the CIPP is not ductile. If the CIPP were ductile, it would withstand an earthquake. As the elbow distorts the CIPP will crack at the joints. Entergy and test samples do not address ongoing distortion at the elbows.

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88.

Mr. Spataro testified to the corrosion resistance of the CIPP lined SSW carbon steel piping at PNPS. The Y2" thick CIPP liner, consisting of polyester felt material with a resin and catalyst system or an epoxy resin and hardener system, forms a smooth, hard surface that resists moisture intrusion and abrasion, and is resistant to most chemicals and all waters.

The CIPP liner is superior to the rubber liner since it is an epoxy and polyester thermosetting resin that cures in place and is resistant to biofouling and other forms of degradation. Such an impervious membrane forms an excellent protective barrier, protecting the carbon steelfrom internal corrosion.

PW Rebuttal: Proof is not provided by Entergy employee's unsubstantiated opinion. The product might "theoretically" be a good one; Entergy's "infomercial" said so. However, evidence is missing about PNPS' CIPP - its installation, testing, warranty, or lack thereof.

89.

CIPP liners such as those used at PNPS have been used for many years in many different applications, in power plants, public water supply systems, waste water treatment facilities, and anyplace where there is an aggressive environment.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy's employees listed the types of facilities that CIPPs were used; however, there is not one shred of hard evidence to demonstrate any specifics about those installations or proof of their effectiveness -when they were installed; whether the materials, installer were the same as PNPS; testing data; evidence of comparability of environment. Absent any data, the listing is useless.

90.

Mr. Spataro testified that, based on his professional experience with similar materials used under more aggressive conditions, he expects the PNPS CIPP liner to last at least thirty-five years. Mr. Spataro testified that the failure mechanism for the CIPP is by 'flaking" caused by the surface drying out due to a "volumetric airflow system or exposure to ultraviolet radiation." Mr. Spataro further testified that such an "environment" that would cause the CIPP to fail does not exist in the buried SSW pipe at PNPS. A wet environment, such as the environment inside the SSW discharge pipe causes "almost no 75

degradation at all." Hence, the CIPP liner is not subject to degradation during the license renewal period.

PW Rebuttal: (a) Again, Entergy's employee provides unsubstantiated opinion. Mr. Gundersen (PW Fact 100] said that, "This is testable. You can do this in a lab. You can pull it out. You can check it and then say, "Okay. It's got a 35-year life." But that's not on the record. I mean, we have heard individuals speak about experience at Indian Point but not in this environment. And it is a testable thing... So we're hanging our hat on an infomercial."

Regarding testing: Entergy did not discuss (and the Board did not ask for) any evidence concerning testing performed on PNPS' CIPP liner - the methodology and findings.

(b) There is no evidence, for example: (1) Whether, if testing was done, what were the testing assumptions - did they assume, for example that the SSW discharge pipe, was in either a "partially deteriorated condition" or "fully deteriorated condition" or "where the existing pipe is in a partially deteriorated condition, providing support but has a hole." If that assumption was made then the partially deteriorated pipe steel pipe condition would have been an admission that PNPS plant experience, inspection results, and observation of the intact condition of the pipe and external pipe wrap on previously excavated spools indicated degradation. If it were not so assumed, then the testing results would be bogus. (2)Whether, if testing was performed, was it meant to imply that the CIPP liner is designed in accordance with the totality of the ASME Code Section III criteria? (3) Whether, if testing was done, how many samples were taken; were they sufficient in number and taken from representative sections along the entire piping; and were specimens left in place to re-test as the material aged. (4) Whether, if tests were done, they evaluated flexural modulus, flexural strength and tensile strengths. If so, did any results fall below accepted values?

Absent evidence, facts, the Board cannot rule on the validity of what Entergy's employees simply said. There is no demonstration of a clear preponderance of the evidence.

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91.

Dr. Davis, the expert for the NRC Staff agrees that of the CIPP liners that were installed in loops B and A have an expected life of approximately thirty-five years. Moreover, Dr.

Davis stated that the CIPP liner is a "much better coating than the rubber lining, and that the based on his experience the replacement CIPP liner is far superior to the rubber liner. Dr. Davis goes on to say that "the rubber lining will oxidize with time and will degrade" and that the "epoxies are much more resistant. " Dr. Davis further notes failures of such epoxy liners of which he is aware have been "usually for mechanical reasons, "and not from corrosion or related degradation.

PW Rebuttal: Dr. Davis does not provide factual evidence either. His language is imprecise "much better," "far superior," "more resistant," "usually." Such imprecise language does not provide factual evidence. These words have no real meaning absent a base for comparison. For example, he fails to explain how much better; how far superior and what level that level of superiority reached; whether more resistant is resistant enough to go without inspections for 10 years; and how far beyond a flip of a coin is "usually."

92.

Mr. Gundersen makes clear on multiple occasions that he does not have any experience with CIPP liner. Despite this fact, Mr. Gundersen makes several assertions. First, he speculates that because the CIPP is applied in the field on top of the rubber sleeve in the SSW discharge pipe, the CIPP is somehow unreliable and he doubts the rubber sleeve is still bonded. Second, Mr. Gundersen questions the thirty-five year life of the CIPP, saying that he is "not aware of a manufacturer's guarantee that this is a 35-year process."

PW Rebuttal: (a) Witnesses: It seems obvious that Entergy's employees had no experience with PNPS' CIPP, either. If they did have any site-specific information, they hid any real facts about Pilgrim's CIPP installation and testing.

(b) Rubber Liner [PW Facts 91-93] Judge Young questioned Entergy about their inspection of the rubber lining prior to installing the CIPP liner and asked whether "they had left anything in place where there would be a possibility of that moisture being behind the rubber lining" [Ibid].

If so, this could introduce corrosion on the metal from the interior. Entergy said that prior to 77

installing the CIPP liner, they inspected the interior with a "smart pig" or crawler device.

However, and as Mr. Gundersen said, a crawler was not as precise as "eyeballs."

A crawler might detect a bubble that might be six inches around and maybe a half-inch, but there is no evidence that smaller bubbles would be detected by that technique, which could mean there is still moisture behind that rubber barrier. Once moisture gets behind that rubber, the pipe can degrade. A "crawler" can only "see" the interior surface, not behind it. Entergy has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that there is not moisture behind the rubber liner and against the metal piping that would cause the piping to corrode from the interior.

(c) Warranties: Entergy does not have any warranty [ Entergy Fact 95].

93.

We find that Mr. Gundersen's assertions concerning CIPP liner are contradicted by credible evidence. As testified to by the Entergy witnesses, prior to installing the CIPP liner, an inspection of the rubber liner was performed to ensure its integrity and, if degraded, to remove the liner. PNPS performed the inspection, via video camera or an inspector, to determine whether the rubber liner had separated from the carbon steel interior surface. When the integrity of the rubber liner is assured, the surface is then prepared by scraping away any debris or marine growth that might be on the surface of the rubber liner. The scraping not only cleans the surface, but creates a rough surface to which the CIPP epoxy can bond. Moreover, the CIPP is installed with an outward pressure. Therefore, when it hardens in place, it is exerting a radial outward pressure against the rubber sleeve pressing it against the carbon steel SSW discharge pipe. Thus, it becomes "literally a pipe within a pipe, " that "is not going anywhere.

PW Rebuttal: PW's response directly above to Item (92) justifies Mr. Gundersen's comments regarding the rubber liner.

The statement that the CIPP is a pipe within a pipe addresses a different issue. Mr. Gundersen's focus on the rubber liner was whether because it was degraded had moisture collected behind it; and if so, there is potential of corrosion of the metal pipe from the interior. He established that it is the metal pipe, not the CIPP or rubber liner, that forms the structural component of the SSW Discharge.

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94.

Thus, as stated in the PNPS Final FSAR, because the CIPP's final "configuration is rigid resin composite pipe within the original pipe" there is "no requirement for bonding between the pipes. " Accordingly, we find no basis for Mr. Gundersen's first assertion concerning potential lack of bonding.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy says that there "is no requirement for bonding between the pipes" - that is between the carbon metal pipe and the CIPP. This in fact is a problem because no bonding allows for places for moisture to "hide out." Moisture can seep down from a hole or crack above and then travel behind the CIPP and cause corrosion from the interior to weaken the piping.

Additionally there could be a crack in the CIPP especially at Loop B's elbows and any moisture would then hide out undetected behind the CIPP and againstthe metal pipe.

95.

Mr. Gundersen's second assertion that no manufacturer's warranty establishes the thirty-five year life of CIPP liner, is irrelevant. Entergy has never claimed nor offered any testimony which relies on a manufacturer's warranty. Entergy's witnesses, based on their professional experience with such liners, have concluded that a thirty-five year life is a reasonable life for the CIPP. Mr. Gundersen does not have any experience with epoxy resins and, therefore, cannot offer a professional opinion as to the useful life of SSW discharge pipe CIPP liner.

PW Rebuttal: What we have here is a non QA component (the CIPP) relied upon to protect a QA system. Warranties are far from irrelevant. They would provide the factual basis -

underpinnings-for Entergy employee's opinion. What Entergy is asking the Board to do is the equivalent of buying a car based simply upon a sales pitch. So-called Entergy employee "engineering judgment" does not provide reasonable assurance, at least unless that judgment is backed up with verification.

In order to approve the License Application this Board requires a clear preponderance of the facts to establish the required 95% confidence level - or some confidence level beyond the flip of a coin. "Engineering judgment'.' resulted in the bridge that collapsed in Minneapolis, the Big Dig in Boston with its leaking tunnels and falling ceiling tiles, the Challenger crash, Pilgrim blowing its filters; and Entergy's and NRC Staff's engineers failure to identify corrosion in Vermont Yankee's cooling tower wall before it collapsed [PW Conclusion Law 11].

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If all you needed was "engineering judgment" from employees then the industry could do away with all quality assurance programs.

96.

The Service Water Integrity Program will be used to monitor the newly installed CIPP. As described above, this program was effective in detecting degradation of the internal rubber lining in the original SSW system carbon steel piping by increasing inspections as the rubber liner approached its expected end of life. Entergy will undertake a more aggressive approach with respect to the CIPP liners. After the CIPP has been in service for 10 years

- well before the end of its expected 35-year life - PNPS will undertake a complete visual examination of the CIPP, analogous to those undertaken for the original rubber lining.9 Entergy has "gone with a ten-year frequency just to verify and assure that there are no changes in-the cured-in-place liner."

PW Rebuttal:

There are three parts of Entergy's statement. (a) Service Water Program, adequacy: Entergy claims that the SSW program's effectiveness is ascribed to the fact that there was serious corrosion in the SSW inlet piping, which was not identified until after 23 years of operations. It was identified only because of prodding from NRC, Generic Letter 89-13. Entergy has not explained how long the serious corrosion problems had existed, or how long there were significant corrosion problems and how long the licensee would have waited if it were not for the generic letter. The SSW discharge degradation was identified; once again, we do not know precisely when the degradation began [PW facts 162-4].

(b) CIPP 10-year inspection: Entergy says that they will take a more aggressive approach. They will examine the CIPP and perform a complete visual in 10 years. The Board was told that UT inspections from the interior would provide no useful information [Dr. Davis, Tr., pages 668-9];

instead a visual inspection will be performed [PW Fact 168]. Mr. Gunderson commented on the limitations of the machine used to go inside the pipe to perform the visual inspection. He said,

."the technique they used would detect gross deformities in the wall... thinking about a bubble that might be six inches around and maybe a half-inch [Tr., page 708]. It is not clear given the history of degradation of the rubber liner that there might not be moisture behind that liner in 9 Tr. at 648, 774 (Sullivan); Tr. at 776 (Cox).

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other places that were undetected. So that the possibility of a through-wall for moisture that remains there when the sock was put on to me is real.[PW Fact 169].

(c) 35-year life Expectancy: Entergy said there was no warranty. Entergy justifies the 10-year inspection on an unproven claim that the CIPP as an expected 35 life expectancy. Because Entergy says many times that the CIPP has an expected 35-year life expectancy, does not make it true. Absent facts, there is no proof of assurance.

97.

Thus, the CIPP liner for Loop B would be subject to a complete examination in 2011, before the period of extended operation actually commences. The CIPP liner for Loop A Loop B would be subject to a complete examination in 2013, shortly after the period.of extended operation commences.

PW Rebuttal: Loop "B" will not have its examination until 2013, after the Board's decision on this adjudication. This is backwards.- Facts should be before the Board in order for the Board to make a reasoned decision.

98. Mr. Sullivan testified that if the inspection of the CIPP liner in 2011 (or subsequent inspections) showed degradation, a condition report would be written under the PNPS corrective action program, and corrective action would be taken as may be required, including increased inspection frequency, to ensure that the SSW system continued to meet its safety function and licensing basis. The Staff's experts, Mr. Chan and Dr. Davis, testified that NRC resident inspectors would evaluate every condition report created by Entergy in response to the condition adverse to quality.

PW Rebuttal: PW believes what Entergy is saying here that despite the fact that we have provided no evidence that the AMP is sufficient that the Board and public should be satisfied because the corrective action program will provide assurance by identifying and picking up the pieces. If day-to-day maintenance sufficed, the Commission would not have required an aging management program. Relying on day-to-day maintenance is not a substitute for a sufficient aging management program. A corrective action program requires looking. The AMP does not provide a sufficient "looking" program - 10 years is too infrequent on unspecified samples.

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99.

Pilgrim Watch and Mr. Gundersen claim that a 1 0-year frequency for inspections of the CIPP liner is insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the SSW safety function will not be lost due to degradation of the CIPP liner and internal corrosion of the SSW discharge pipe. However, all the parties' witnesses agreed at the hearing that the only way that SSW pipe corrosion might trigger the loss of SSW safety function would be a total collapse that somehow blocked off the flow path. '0 Entergy's experts testified that this would be an incredible type offailure, and were not aware of any history suggesting that such a failure might occur.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy employees testified that this would be an "incredible type of failure, and were not aware of any history suggesting that such a failure might occur."

PW does not know of a design basis event to strike Pilgrim yet, either. However, we do not believe that we should wait until there is one to learn how better to prepare. Defense in depth requires putting in layers of defense before the event - that is what we expect and are asking the Board to require.

100. For such a failure to occur, one would have to assume that the 1/2V2 inch thick CIPP liner had degraded such that it no longer protected the carbon steel pipe from the seawater.

However, as testified to by Mr. Spataro the CIPP liner is not subject to degradation and failure in seawater. Moreover, the wearing or erosion of the CIPP liner is at such a slow rate that it would take many years for it to erode. Further, even if corrosion of the pipe were to occur, such corrosion would typically be localized and very unlikely to threaten the integrity of the pipe. Mr. Gundersen provided no credible evidence to the contrary.

PW Rebuttal [PW facts 2-14]: (a) Entergy ignores corrosion from the exterior. The pipe can become degraded to the point of failure from the outside. (b) Second, Mr. Gundersen is not responsible to prove Entergy's case. What Entergy, the NRC and the Board must remember is that Entergy is the plaintiff in a civil suit, and not the defendant in a criminal action. Entergy must prove that its AMP will provide reasonable assurance that the rules require. It is not Pilgrim Watch or Mr. Gundersen's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the AMP will not.

'0 Tr. at 610 (Cox).

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(c ) Entergy puts forward unproved statements and assumptions to support their position. (1) The CIPP is not subject to degradation. We are asked to believe that and assume tears or rips from stress or installation error are not possible. (2) The CIPP wear is at such a slow rate. We are asked to. believe that absent any evidence from testing. (3) Corrosion of the pipe would "typically" be localized and unlikely to threaten the integrity of the pipe. We are asked to believe that because an employee said so.

(d) Instead,, we offer these facts:

(1) The carbon steel pipe is the structural component of SSW Discharge piping system -

not the coating or liners. Therefore, it is the metal pipe that must provide assurance that the pipe will be able to perform its function in a design basis event - not the coating, rubber liner or CIP liner. (2)The coating does not have a specified life. Entergy's own disclosure, Exhibit 70 says that, "... since the coating does not have a specified life, aging effects are evaluated as if the quality of steel was not coated." [Emphasis added].

(3) The rubber interior liner does not have a specified life. Entergy's expert testified that it degraded in 20 years [Transcript, Spataro, page 861]; and it was removed from 40 foot sections on each SSW Discharge Loop; and from the SSW Inlet before.

(4) The CIP liner is not credited with being the structural component, either. The carbon steel pipe, and not the CIP liner, is the structural component of the pipe. The liner is there to keep the water inside under normal service, as long as it maintains its integrity. It is not ductile, nor earthquake proof. It is not seismically qualified [Tr., 618]. It has no warranty.

There are no test results. Installation problems cause rips at the elbows; an area subject to stress [PW Fact 25].

(5) The SSW Discharge pipe is not seismically qualified if it has through-wall leaks of undetermined size and locations; and/or the pipe wall has corroded so that it has minimum wall thickness of undetermined size and locations.

(6) SSW Discharge Piping had deteriorated in both Loop "A" and Loop "B",

simultaneously. Therefore there is factual evidence of no redundancy with both trains degraded [Gundersen, Tr., 696-97].

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(7) Leaks can develop in the SSW Discharge within (2) years of loss of liner integrity. The through-wall hole. [Tr. Exh., 66, photographs] developed in the SSW discharge pipe within 2 years [Tr., 638, lines 12-21].

(8) The other SSW discharge pipe loop had wall thinning, deterioration [Tr., 638].

(9) The simultaneous deterioration in both SSW Discharge loops was identified after 27 years of operations. There was no proof provided by Entergy that deterioration had not started to occur before that time; nor was there evidence that deterioration had not occurred in areas not inspected. Corrosion can occur quickly. Dr. Davis, NRC's expert witness, said at the Hearing that, "It really doesn't matter much. Once the corrosion starts, it goes quickly [Tr., 729].

(10) Both the "A" and "B" Loops are made of carbon steel that will corrode if either the CIPP or coating fails. (11) PW's facts clearly showed why the CIPP and coating do not provide requisite assurance from information provided.

101. Pilgrim Watch and Mr. Gundersen also referred to through wall corrosion about the size of a quarter that was discovered in 1999. However, this condition occurred after the rubber liner had reached, and indeed, exceeded its expected life. Here, the CIPP will be inspected far in advance of its expected end of life. Entergy and the NRC Staff witnesses agreed that the corrosion that was discovered in 1999 would not have led to the failure of the SSWpipe in the event of an earthquake. Mr. Gundersen suggested that the corrosion that was discovered in 1999 in the SSW buried discharge pipe could cause the pipe to collapse if there were a design basis event, but he has not done or seen any analysis that would support this assertion.

PW Rebuttal: (a) Employee opinions'are not based upon facts. (1) CIPP liner "will be inspected far in advance of its expected life;" they provide neither warranty nor test results to back the statement. (2)."Entergy and the NRC Staff witnesses agreed. that the corrosion that was discovered in 1999 would not have led to the failure of the SSW pipe in the event of an earthquake", based upon no evidence - test results. (b) Mr. Gundersen stated correctly that if the 84

pipe had a hole or thinning so that it was below "min" then it was not seismically qualified. Mr.

Gundersen's job is not to prove Entergy's case. It is Entergy's job; and they failed.

102. To sum up, the SSW discharge piping consists of very large pipes (22 inch outer diameter) protected by multiple barriers. Internally, the piping is protected both by the CIPP (which is nominally 1/2" thick and essentially constitutes a pipe within a pipe) and by the original lining (rubber, or for the sections that were replaced, epoxy). The discharge piping itself is 3/8" thick. Externally, the piping is protected by the coatings discussed earlier in this decision. These multiple barriers provide a high degree of assurance that the buried SSW discharge piping will perform its intended functions.

PW Rebuttal: The carbon steel pipe is the structural component of SSW Discharge piping system - not the coating or liners [PW Fact 5]. The coating does not have a specified life [PW Fact 6]. The rubber interior liner does not have a specified life [PW Fact 7]. The CIP liner is not credited with being the structural component, either [PW Fact 8]. The SSW Discharge pipe is not seismically qualified if it has through-wall leaks of undetermined size and locations; and/or the pipe wall has corroded so that it has minimum wall thickness of undetermined size and locations

[PW Fact 9].

Leaks can develop within 2 years of loss liner integrity [PW Fact 10]. Both Loops had simultaneous degradation [PW Fact 13]. Both the "A" and "B" Loops are made of carbon steel that will corrode if either the cured-in-place-pipe or coating fails. Facts describing carbon steel corrosion and the probability of coating and CIPP failure were provided by PW [PW Facts and Conclusions of Law].

103. Based on the credible evidence in the record, we therefore conclude that PNPS choice of materials and AMP for the SSW system provides reasonable assurance that the SSW discharge pipe will perform its intended safety function through the period of extended operation. The CIPP liner provides protection of the discharge pipe from corrosion and the Service Water Integrity Program has been successfully implemented at PNPS to 85

manage SSW system degradation from loss of material due to internal corrosion prior to the loss of its intended function.

PW Dispute: PW concludes that neither the Aging Management Program for buried pipes and tanks, nor the inspections and tests performed as part of routine maintenance and operation, provides reasonable assurance that the effects of aging will be managed such that the buried pipes within scope will perform their intended functions consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation. We supported our conclusion with evidence. Entergy has not satisfied its burden of proving that the Aging Management Program it proposes will be effective, and has thus failed to carry its burden of proving "reasonable assurance."

Entergy provides unsubstantiated opinion, often misleading and sometimes false, by employees, also acting as their experts. Absent is a clear preponderance of the evidence.

b. Programs and Design Features that Protect against Internal Degradation of the CSS Buried Piping 104. PNPS uses the Water Chemistry Control-BWR Program and the One-Time Inspection Program for the aging management of internal degradation of the CSS buried pipe.

Furthermore, the CSS buried pipe is made of stainless steel, which as previously discussed, is generally resistant to corrosion.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy says that, "CSS buried pipe is made of stainless steel, which as previously discussed, is generally resistant to corrosion." This is misleading and the use of the term "generally" makes the statement meaningless. Stainless steel and titanium are known as passive metals which form a "passive" oxide layer on their surface that makes it immune to general corrosion until the oxide layer is breached, which will eventually happen; then corrosion occurs on the bare metal underneath. Further, some stainless steels are inherently more susceptible than others are. The Brookhaven Report says that most stainless steels used in buried piping at nuclear plants are Type 304 and 316. Type 304 is more susceptible than 316; the latter is lower in carbon. If Pilgrim used in the CSS Type 304, it is especially susceptible to embrittlement and cracking. The Board did not determine what type of stainless steel was used in the CSS piping. We are left with uncertainty - suspicion. PW's statements are substantiated.

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(i).

Water Chemistry Chemistry-BWR Program 105. As testified to by Entergy's witness, Mr. Cox, and by Dr. Davis of the NRC Staff the Water Chemistry Control-B WR Program (the "WCC Program ") optimizes the water chemistry in the CSS (among other plant systems) to minimize the potential for loss of material and cracking due to internal corrosion of the system. The WCC Program operates by limiting the levels of contaminants in the CSS that could cause loss of material and cracking.

PW Rebuttal: PW Facts 161-169 explain that the routine maintenance program addresses internal corrosion, and does not provide adequate assurance even in combination with the other programs the Applicant outlined. For example, Entergy's Chemistry Program Corporate Assessment, November 2003 [Tr. Exh. 72] indicates a list of "Areas for Improvement." Entergy never discusses the potential damage caused while operating under the older methodology and any remediation taken with regard to any damage that occurred. Furthermore, Entergy provides no factual evidence to validate its verbal assurance that the new program is effective.

106. The WCC Program is an existing program at PNPS that has been confirmed as effective at managing the effects of aging on the CSS as documented by the operating experience review. The program uses EPRI BWR water chemistry guidelines, as specified in the GALL Report, which include chemistry recommendations for CSTs. The Staff also agrees that the WCC Program is consistent with the GALL Report XLM2, "Water Chemistry."

PW Rebuttal: The confirmation of its effectiveness is based upon the Applicant identifying problems with the program; not by demonstrating that the WCC had a history of performing problem free. The GALL is guidance and cannot be used as proof of the effectiveness of a site-specific program.

107. Under the WCC Program, water quality is continuously monitored and confirmed, and timely corrective actions are taken to address water quality issues to ensure that the Program is effective in managing corrosion for applicable components. The Program's 87

effectiveness has also been confirmed by industry operating experience as described in the GALL Report.

PW dispute: Entergy provide no new information - therefore we provide the same response as to the above (106).

108. Dr. Davis testified to the operating experience of the WCC Program at Entergy. From 1998 through 2004, several condition reports were issued by Pilgrim for adverse trends in parameters monitored by the WCC Program. The Pilgrim staff took appropriate actions to return the parameters to within administrative limits. Although the parameters had exceeded administrative limits for PNPS, they had not exceeded the EPRI acceptance limits. The administrative limits had been set by PNPS to be below the EPRI acceptance limits, so that the administrative limits could be exceeded for a short time and corrective actions could be taken before the EPRI acceptance limits had been exceeded.

PW Rebuttal: Entergy does not indicate whether the EPRI acceptance limits are based upon an assumption of 40 years of operations.

109. Mr. Gundersen asserts that the WCC Program is a mitigation program and does not provide detection for aging effects and that "[mI]ore frequent complete inspections as*part of the overall program are the only effective assurance that defects created by aging components will be uncovered.

However, both the GALL Report and the LRA expressly identify the WCC Program as an aging management program. Additionally, the One-Time Inspection Program, discussed below, also serves as a check on the effectiveness of the WCC. Thus, we find this claim by Mr. Gundersen to be without merit.

PW Rebuttal:

PW does not understand what point Entergy is trying to make here. Mr.

Gundersen is correct the AMP is divided into two parts - inspection programs and mitigation programs. The WCC is a mitigation program.

11 Gundersen Reb. Test. at A19.

88

110. Mr. Gundersen also asserts that, although Entergy alludes to problems within the WCC Program, it never discusses potential damage caused while operating under the older methodology, nor what remediation steps have been taken regarding any damage that occurred Dr. Davis testified that although the water chemistry parameters had exceeded administrative limits for PNPS, they had not exceeded the EPRI acceptance limits established by EPRI and industry experts. Thus, we find no merit in Mr. Gundersen's claim.

Rather, Entergy is aggressively managing the water chemistry to provide reasonable assurance that internal degradation will not impair the functioning of the CSS.

PW Rebuttal: Same response as to (106 and 108)

(ii)

One-Time Inspection Program 111. As testified to by Mr. Cox, the One-Time Inspection Program, as applied to the CSS, confirms the absence of significant aging effects for the internal surfaces of piping. The purpose of the One-Time Inspection Program, as applied to the Water Chemistry Control-BWR Program and the CSS, is to "verify the effectiveness of the water chemistry control

[AMPs] by confirming that unacceptable cracking, loss of material, and fouling is not occurring."

PW Rebuttal: The one-time inspection in (10) years is insufficient. It incorrectly assumes that corrosion is gradual, linear and predictable as opposed to increasing, as the component gets older. It also incorrectly assumes that if a component is well maintained over the years it is essentially as good as new. This is not true, either. Maintenance can slow degradation but not stop it.

112. The One-Time Inspection Program consists of an inspection of a representative sample (based on an assessment of materials of fabrication, environment, plausible aging effects, and operating experience) of the interior piping surface, which will be performed prior to the period of extended operation. The inspection locations will be chosen based on identifying locations most susceptible to aging degradation. The PNPS One-Time 89

Inspection Program comports with the NRC Staff guidance set forth in the GALL Report Section XI.M-105 for such inspection programs.

PW Rebuttal:

The one-time inspection program in (10) years is insufficient. It incorrectly assumes that corrosion is gradual and that it is even across a component so that a sample from one elbow, for example, is predictive of the condition at the next elbow.

113. Mr. Gundersen provides no testimony on the effectiveness of the One-Time Inspection Program PW no dispute: This is true. Mr. Gundersen found the program to be ineffective. He spent considerable time discussing why it was insufficient at Al 8.

(iii)

Finding of Reasonable Assurance 114. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that PNPS has effective AMPs in place for the aging management of internal degradation of the CSS buried pipe. The WCC Program has proven effective to maintain water chemistry parameters within EPRI acceptance limits. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the WCC Program to protect against internal degradation will be confirmed by the One-Time Inspection Program prior to the period of extended operation.

PW Rebuttal: PW concludes based on the absence of evidence and Entergy's reliance on false assumptions regarding corrosion that the AMP has not been shown to be sufficient. This has been exhaustively gone over. There was no demonstration of a clear preponderance of the evidence, as required.

90

C.,

Additional Surveillance Programs for the CSS and SSW Systems 115. While not credited as AMPs, Entergy maintains several additional surveillance programs for the CSS and SSW systems. These programs provide further assurance that in-scope buried pipes will not develop leaks so great as to challenge their license renewal intended functions.

PW Rebuttal: These programs do not provide added assurance, as addressed below.

1.

Service Water Integrity Program 116. Mr. Sullivan testified that Entergy monitors the integrity and functioning of the SSW system buried piping monthly via a flow rate test of the seawater flow through the SSW system. More specifically, Entergy tests the flow rate of the SSW system through the RBCCW heat exchanger. The minimum required flow for the test is 4500 GPM, which ensures that there is adequate water flow through the heat exchangers and piping. It confirms that a leak, should there be any, from the buried piping is not large enough to prevent the system from satisfactorily performing its intended function. Mr. Sullivan further testified that, if the acceptance criteria for the flow rate test are not met, corrective action will be taken - the problem will be investigated andfixed.

PW Rebuttal:

Flow rates tests are an adjunct but they only provide information for condition at the time of the test, not for the day after; and they cannot identify wall thinning. Pipes can fail in a design basis event if the "wrong" areas of the pipe are too thin.

2.

CSS Surveillance Monitoring Program 117. Mr. Sullivan further testified that Entergy ensures the continuing integrity and functioning of the CSS buried piping in two ways. First, a water level indicator in each of the two condensate storage tanks ("CST") is monitored every four hours. Second, the water flow rates from the HPCI and RCIC pumps are tested on a quarterly basis, which serves to confirm adequate flow rates through the buried CSS piping.

91

PW Rebuttal: The monitoring cannot identify a small leak (and leaks can grow rapidly once begun) nor can they identify wall thinning.

118. The water level in each of the two CST's is maintained above 30feet. Corrective action is required if the water level drops below 30 feet.

In contrast, only about 11 feet (corresponding to 75, 000 gallons) is reserved for the HPCI and RCIC. Consequently, there would have to be about a 20foot drop in tank level before the capability of the HPCI and RCIC to perform their system functions using water solely from the CSTs would be impaired Such a large drop would be detected by the established monitoring frequency of every four hours.

PW Rebuttal: Same as to (117) 119. Mr. Sullivan also described the method Entergy uses in monitoring the HPCI and RCIC system pumps. The Pilgrim plant safety analysis requires that the HPCI system maintain a water flow rate of 4,250 GPM and 400 GPMfor the RCIC system. Pursuant to 10 C. F. R.

§§ 50.55a(/)-(g) and the technical specification surveillance requirements, Entergy undertakes quarterly in-service testing of the HPCI and RCIC systems to confirm the system capability to deliver the minimum required water flows. These quarterly tests ensure that the required water flow rates of 4,250 GPM and 400 GPM, respectively, are met. The quarterly flow rate inspections can detect a leak in the CSS system piping large enough to prevent the HPCI or RCIC systems from performing their intended function..

PW Rebuttal: Same as to (117) 120. Mr. Sullivan also testified that the flow rates for the HPCI and RCIC systems are confirmed during system testing once every operating cycle following each refueling outage. These tests are in addition to the quarterly tests. As to the acceptance criteria for the flow rate tests, Mr. Sullivan testified that, if the flow rates are not met, Entergy takes corrective actions.

PW Rebuttal: Same as to (117) 92

3.

Conclusion 121. Based on credible evidence in the record, we find that Pilgrim's surveillance programs provide additional assurance that the SSW system and CSS will perform their intended functions. These programs are established to provide assurance that the systems can meet their intended functions in accordance with the licensing basis for the plant. Any leaks that could challenge the intended functions of the systems would be identified by these periodic surveillances.

PW Rebuttal: Based on the lack of real evidence in the record, PW surveillance programs have not been shown to make a sufficient program.

D.

Monitoring Wells Are Not Necessary 122. For the reasons set forth above, we find that Entergy's AMPs provide reasonable assurance that the SSW system and CSS will perform their intended function through the period of extended operation. Monitoring wells that would be used to detect and monitor radioactivity in the ground water in and around PNPS are therefore unnecessary to provide reasonable assurance during the period of extended operation.

PW Rebuttal: For all the reasons set forth in Dr. Ahlfeld's Testimony and PW's Facts 238-244 reasonable assurance will not be provided without adding to the AMP the supplements outlined by PW. A properly designed monitoring well program of sufficient number is among the necessary supplements in addition to baseline inspections, more robust inspection program during refueling outages as described, and cathodic protection.

PW Fact 238: If small leaks occur, they are indicative of corrosion that may be getting larger. If the corrosion rate is sufficiently rapid, then the structural integrity of the steel pipe may degrade to the point that it may be a safety risk in the event of an earthquake before the next 10 year inspection proposed by Entergy. [Tr., Dr. Ahlfeld, pages 852-3]

93

PW Fact 239: Leaks could be detected readily and inexpensively with a set of strategically placed monitoring wells because the ground water is fresh water so that if you had a leak from the SSW discharge piping, it would be salt water. [Tr., Dr. Ahlfeld, page 766]

PW Fact 240: A well designed monitoring well system could pick up a leak relatively quickly -

approximately within weeks or months after the initiation of a leak, depending on the rates of groundwater flow and other factors; information that is attainable with site-specific hydrological studies. Sampling wells is usually done about four times a year. [Tr., Dr. Ahlfeld, page 767]

PW Fact 241: Monitoring wells are "more that a nice thing to add but instead a crucial part of a full system." There is no assurance that the CIPP will not leak, there was no proof of a 35 year life expectancy, and once corrosion starts that it grows quickly.

[Tr., Dr. Ahlfeld, 856]

Monitoring wells provide the capability to detect leakagebefore the size of the leak becomes too great.

PW Fact 242: Pilgrim's monitoring well system: Entergy installed a (4) well monitoring system at Pilgrim Station as part of NEI's voluntary groundwater monitoring program. The well location is provided [Tr. Ex. 37]. These are generally located between the reactor and the shoreline. The wells are spaced approximately 200 feet apart; there is no evidence of any recent hydrogeologic studies that have been conducted to determine current groundwater flow directions and rates.

Hence, the suitability of these wells actually to intercept plausible leakage transport pathways is unknown; a 4-well monitoring system is more typical of that used for a retail gasoline station or a small municipal (non-hazardous) landfill. That it should be considered adequate for a large industrial facility such as PNPS is unrealistic. [Tr. Ex. 15, Dr. Ahlfeld]

PW Fact 243: The program at Pilgrim does not meet proper design criteria. A monitoring well program to supplement the AMP should be designed according to the general design criteria described by Dr. Ahifeld, [Ibid]

94

PW Fact 244: Groundwater monitoring networks can be used as part of a leak detection system and are widely used for this purpose. Well-established protocols exist for proper design of monitoring.networks including well and screen placement, sampling frequency and selection of sampled contaminants. The 4-well monitoring system apparently used by Entergy does not meet reasonable standards for monitoring network design. [Ibid, at 4]

V.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Entergy's application to relicense the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station should be denied. Entergy did not prove their case; much less by a "clear preponderance of the evidence. It does not meet the "not inimical" to public safety mandate of the AEA.

Respectfully submitted, Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, pro se 148 Washington Street Duxbury, Ma 02332 95

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket # 50-293-LR Entergy Corporation Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application June 23, 2008 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the following was served June 23, 2008, Pilgrim Watch Rebuttal to Entergy's Proposed Finding of Fact 'and Conclusions of Law on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1.

Administrative Judge Ann Marshall Young, Chair Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop - T-3 F23 US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative Judge Paul B. Abramson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop T-3 F23 US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop -T-3-F23 US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Secretary of the Commission Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop 0-16 C1 United Siates Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop 0-16 Cl United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop T-3 F23 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susan L. Uttal, Esq.

Kimberly Sexton, Esq.

James Adler, Esq.

David Roth, Esq.

Marcia Simon, Esq.

Office of General Counsel Mail Stop.15 D21 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Paul A. Gaukler, Esq.

David R. Lewis, Esq.

Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037-1 138 Mr. Mark Sylvia Town Manager, Town of Plymouth 11 Lincoln Street Plymouth MA 02360 Sheila Slocum Hollis, Esq.

Town of Plymouth MA Duane Morris, LLP 505 9 th Street, N.W. 1000 Washington D.C. 20004-2166 Richard R. MacDonald Town Manager, Town of Duxbury 878 Tremont Street Duxbury, MA 02332 Fire Chief & Director DEMA, Town of Duxbury 688 Tremont Street P.O. Box 2824 Duxbury, MA 02331 Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, pro se 148 Washington St.

Duxbury, MA 023332 June 23, 2008 2

Note: Diane Curran and Matthew Brock were'not listed on the original service list; however, an electronic copy was sent June 23, 2008 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket # 50-293-LR Entergy Corporation Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application June 23, 2008 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the following was served June 23, 2008, Pilgrim Watch Rebuttal to Entergy's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1.

Administrative Judge Ann Marshall Young, Chair Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop - T-3 F23 US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative Judge Paul B. Abramson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop T-3 F23 US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop -T-3-F23 US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Secretary of the Commission Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop 0-16 C1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop 0-16 C1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop T-3 F23 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susan L. Uttal, Esq.

Kimberly Sexton, Esq.

James Adler, Esq.

David Roth, Esq.

Marcia Simon, Esq.

Office of General Counsel Mail Stop - O-15 D21 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Paul A. Gaukler, Esq.

David R. Lewis, Esq.

Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037-1138 Mr. Mark Sylvia Town Manager, Town of Plymouth 11 Lincoln Street Plymouth MA 02360 Sheila Slocum Hollis, Esq.

Town of Plymouth MA Duane Morris, LLP 505 9h Street, N.W. 1000 Washington D.C. 20004-2166 Richard R. MacDonald Town Manager, Town of Duxbury 878 Tremont Street Duxbury, MA 02332 Fire Chief & Director DEMA, Town of Duxbury 688 Tremont Street P.O. Box 2824 Duxbury, MA 02331 Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg &Eisenberg 1726 M Street NW, Suite 600 Washington DC 20036 Matthew Brock, Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, pro se 148 Washington St.

Duxbury, MA 023332 June 23, 2008 2