ML072970102

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July-August Exam 50-325, 324/2007301 Final Simulator Scenarios (Scenario 4 of 4) (Section 1 of 2)
ML072970102
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/2007
From:
Progress Energy Carolinas
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2007-301, 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301
Download: ML072970102 (47)
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Text

INITIAL LICENSE EXAM 2007 SCENARIO FOUR Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 BRUNSWICK JULY-AUG EXAM - 325, 324/2007-301 FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIO (4 OF 4) oJ (Jt) :; - ~tJ!

1'>)//l L., ~U tJ .4~/O J/tJ,P ~. ~ Progress Energy

Brunswick 2007 NRC Scenario 4 Page 1 of 3

  • Facility:

Examiners:

BRUNSWICK Scenario No.: 4 Operators:

Op Test No.: 2007 NRC Initial Conditions: A plant startup is in progress. Reactor Power is approximately 4%

GP-2 has been completed with the exception of steps 5.3.55, 5.3.60, 5.3.61, and 5.3.62 The "B" SJAE is in Full Load; the "An SJAE is shut down Reactor Pressure is being held at 800 psig to support EHC electrical testing.

Power increase by control rod withdrawal has been authorized to provide additional bypass valve opening.

The Nuclear Engineer has been contacted and continuous rod withdrawal may be used.

Turnover: Continue plant startup lAW GP-2 at step 5.3.55 Place the SJAEs in half load. Currently in 20P-30.

Continue in GP-10 at Sequence A2X, step 24, Item 251 and raise power, using control rods, to achieve one bypass valve open. Do not exceed 8% power.

Critical Task: See Scenario Summary Event Malf. No. Event Event Description Type*

1 N/A N-SRO Place SJAEs in half load.

N-BOP 2 N/A R-SRO Increase reactor power R-RO 3 N1019F I-SRO IRM "C" Fails "Downscale" I-RO 4 Overrides TS-SRO HCU Alarm (TS) 5 C-SRO "A" SPE Fan Trips C-BOP 6 NI024F, I/C-SRO Seismic Event, spurious start of EDG, IRM upscale (TS) (AOP)

Overrides I-RO C-BOP

  • NOTES: 1)
2) *

=

S Satisfactory;

Critical Task/Step U - Unsatisfactory;

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

Brunswick 2007 NRC Scenario 4 Page 2 of 3

  • 7 NI018F RP011 F RW013F RW016F EE030M M-ALL Seismic aftershock, ATWS, RWCU Unisolable Leak (EOP) (AOP)

Overrides 8 CF035F C-SRO FW injection Valve FW-V120 or Startup Level Control Valve fails closed (dependent on which method of feed is chosen by the operator)

C-BOP

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
  • NOTES: 1) 2)

=

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

  • = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2007 NRC Scenario 4 Page 3 of 3

  • BRUNSWICK 2007 NRC Scenario #4 SCENARIO DESCRIPTION The plant is at approximately 4% power and a startup is in progress lAW GP-2. The SJAEs must be placed in half load.

As control rods are withdrawn, IRM "C" will fails Downsale The operator must recogize that the IRM "C" is failed. When diagnosed, the SRO will consult TS (3.3.1-RPS) and declare IRM "C" inoperable and direct the RO to bypass IRM "C".

Once the startup continues, Scram Accumulator 34-19 will alarm on low pressure. The crew will dispatch an AO to investigate/charge the HCU. The crew will reference Tech Spec 3.1.5.C.2.

and declare the control rod accumulator inoperable if it cannot be recharged within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

After TS are addressed for the accumulator the "B" Steam Packing Exhauster will trip requiring starting of the "A" Steam Packing Exhauster.

A seismic event will occur. This will cause the spurious start of the EDG 3 and a high alarm trip of IRM F. A half scram will not occur and this must be diagnosed by the crew. AOP-13 will be entered and the EDG can be secured. lAW Tech Specs (3.3.1), a half scram must be inserted due to the IRM high alarm trip and it will be successful. I&C will also be notified to pull fuses lAW 01-18.

  • A seismic aftershock will then occur causing IRM A to trip on high alarm but RPS will fail and a manual scram must be inserted. Numerous control rods will fail to insert and 2-EOP-1-LPC must entered for the ATWS Control Rods must be inserted manually and/or SLC injected (Critical Task) to shut down the reactor. Additionally, a leak will develop in the RWCU system, RWCU will fail to isolate on the SLC initiation and power will be lost to MCC 2XC.

Attempts to isolate the RWCU leak will be ongoing but will fail. The crew will enter OEOP SCCP as temperatures and sump levels begin to rise in the Reactor Building. When room flood levels in two areas of the Rx Building exceed max safe levels, Emergency Depressurization will be required (Critical Task). The crew must terminate and prevent injection prior to ED per 2EOP-01-LPC (Critical Task). NOTE: In the event the crew inserts control rods and enters 2EOP-01-RVCP prior to reflood, Terminate and Prevent would not be required and would not be a critical task.

After the ED, a failure will occur on either the RFPT S/U level control valve or the 2FW-V120 (High Pressure Feedwater Heaters bypass valve) to restore and control vessel level following emergency depressurization. The failure will occur on whatever method is first used by the operator to feed the vessel.

The scenario can be terminated once emergency depressurization occu'rs and reactor water level has recovered and is stable in the normal band

  • NOTES: 1) 2)

S = Satisfactory;

  • =Critical Task/Step U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
  • PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION 2007 NRC EXAM SCENARIO # 4
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4

~~~--_.. _------------

  • SCENARIO DESCRIPTION BRUNSWICK 2007 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at approximately 4% power and a startup is in progress lAW GP-02. The SJAE must be placed in half load.

As control rods are withdrawn, IRM "C" will fail Downscale. The operator must recognize that the IRM "C" is failed. When diagnosed, the SRO will consult TS (3.3.1-RPS) and declare IRM "C" inoperable and direct the RO to bypass IRM "C".

Once the startup continues, Scram Accumulator 34-19 will alarm on low pressure. The crew will dispatch an AO to investigate/charge the HCU. The crew will reference Tech Spec 3.1.5.C.2. and declare the control rod accumulator inoperable if it cannot be recharged within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

After TS are addressed for the accumulator the "B" Steam Packing Exhauster will trip requiring starting of the "A" Steam Packing Exhauster.

A seismic event will occur. This will cause the spurious start of the EDG 3 and a high alarm trip of IRM "F". A half scram will not occur and this must be diagnosed by the crew. AOP-13 will be entered and the EDG can be secured. lAW Tech Specs (3.3.1),

  • a half scram must be inserted due to the IRM high alarm trip and it will be successful.

I&C will also be notified to pull fuses lAW 01-18.

A seismic aftershock will then occur causing IRM "A" to trip on high alarm but RPS will fail and a manual scram must be inserted. Numerous control rods will fail to insert and 2-EOP-1-LPC must be entered for the ATWS. Control Rods must be inserted manually and/or SLC injected (Critical Task) to shutdown the reactor. Additionally, a leak will develop in the RWCU system, RWCU will fail to isolate on the SLC initiation and power will be lost to MCC 2XC.

Attempts to isolate the RWCU leak will be ongoing but will fail. The crew will enter OEOP-03-SCCP as temperatures and sump levels begin to rise in the Reactor Building.

When room flood levels in two areas of the Rx Building exceed max safe levels, Emergency Depressurization will be required (Critical Task). The crew must terminate and prevent injection prior to ED per 2EOP-01-LPC (Critical Task) NOTE: In the event the crew inserts rods and enters 2EOP-01-RVCP prior to reflood, Terminate and Prevent would not be required and would not be a critical task.

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 2

SCENARIO DESCRIPTION BRUNSWICK 2007 NRC Scenario #4 After the ED, a failure will occur on either the RFPT S/U level control valve or the 2FW-V120 (High Pressure Feedwater heaters bypass valve) to restore and control vessel level following emergency depressurization. The failure will occur on whatever method is first used by the operator to feed the vessel.

The scenario can be terminated once emergency depressurization occurs and reactor water level has recovered and is stable in the normal band SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC 182 Rx Pwr 4%

Core Age EOC n,..... vent Number EVENTS Trigger Trigger Description 1 NA NA Place both SJAE's in half load 2 NA NA Increase Reactor Power 3 1 Manual IRM "C" fails downscale 4 2 Manual HCU 34-19 Alarm 5 8 Manual Trip of "A" SPE 6 Seismic Event, spurious start of an Emergency Diesel Generator, 3 Manual IRM Upscale (Technical Specifications, AOPs) 7 4 Manual Seismic aftershock, ATWS, RWCU Unisolable Leak EOP, AOP 8 6/7 Manual Emergency Depressurization/Startup Level Control Valve failure 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 3

SIMULATOR SETUP Interventions Summary (Shaded entries = Active)

Malfunctions Summary IE]M"1t 10 Description Current Value Target Value Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig N1015F IRM B FAILS HI TRUE TRUE N1019F IRM C FAILS DOWNSCALE FALSE TRUE 1 N1024F IRM F FAILS HI FALSE TRUE 3 N1013F IRM A FAILS HI FALSE TRUE 4 EE030M 2XC INDIVIDUAL BUS FAILURE FALSE TRUE 4 RW016F G31-FOO4 FAILURE TO AUTO CLOSE TRUE TRUE RW013F RWCU BRK IN TRIANGLE ROOM 77' 0.00 100.0000 00:10:00 4 RP011F ATWS4 TRUE TRUE CF035F stu LVL CONT VLV FAILS CLOSED FALSE TRUE 7 RPOO5F AUTO SCRAM DEFEAT TRUE TRUE Remotes Summary Remf 10 Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig 10 Value Value EP_IAEOPJP1 BYPASS LL-3 GROUP 1 ISOL (SEP-10) OFF ON 5 Override Summary Tag 10 Description Position/ Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Target Value Value Q2BQQUAD ACCUM*ROD DISPLAY ONlOFF OFF ON 2 K4F14A DIESEL GEN. AUTO-MODE START START OFF ON 00:00:02 3 K1410A RWCU VLV G31-F004 NORM ON ON K1410A RWCU VLV G31-FOO4 CLOSE OFF OFF K1410A RWCU VLV G31-FOO4 OPEN OFF OFF K4511C STM PACKING EXHAUSTER B NORMAL ON OFF 8 K4511C STM PACKING EXHAUSTER B START OFF OFF 8 K4511C STM PACKING EXHAUSTER B STOP OFF ON 8 K4511C STM PACKING EXHAUSTER B CLOSE OFF ON 8 K4403A FW HEATER 4&5 BYPASS VLV OPEN OFF OFF 7 CLOSE 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 4

  • Window 6-1 SIMULATOR SETUP Annunciator Summary Description CRD ACCUM LO PRESS/HI LEVEL TaQname ZA761 Override Type ON OVal ON AVal OFF Actime Dactime TriQ 2

6-4 SEISMIC EVENT ZUA2864 ON ON OFF 3 1-4 SOUTH RHR RM FLOOD LEVEL ZUA1214 ON ON OFF 6 HI-HI 2-5 STM PACKING EXHAUSTER B ZUA225 ON ON OFF 8 OVLD TRIP Batch Files File TriQQer Description NRC Scenario S4.bat 9 Auto deletes annunciator A-7-6-1 and Control Rod 34-19 Accum lamp after 20 min NRC Scenario S4-1.bat 11 Auto deletes FW-V120 switch override and sets SULCV demand to zero Special Instructions Load scenario file 2007 NRC Scenario 4.scn Copy batch files NRC Scenario 54.bat and NCR Scenario s4-1.bat from memory stick E Drive to F Drive on bsimpcOO.

  • Bypass IRM "B" Provide GP-10 Seq A2X markup for startup continuation at Step 24, Item 251 Provide GP-02 with all steps marked complete except steps 5.3.55, 5.3.60, 5.3.61, and 5.3.62 .
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 5
  • SHIFT BRIEFING Plant Status A plant startup is in progress. Reactor power is approximately 4%.

OGP-02 has been completed with the exception of steps 5.3.55, 5.3.60, 5.3.61, and 5.3.62.

The "8" SJAE is operating in Full Load; the "A" SJAE is shut down.

Reactor pressure is being held at 800 psig to support EHC electrical testing.

Power increase by control rod withdrawal has been authorized to provide additional bypass valve opening.

Nuclear Engineer has been contacted and continuous rod withdrawal may be used.

Equipment Out of Service IRM "8" is bypassed and failed upscale Plan of the Day

  • Continue plant startup in accordance with OGP-02.

Following shift turnover, place both SJAEs in half load lAW 20P-30.

Continue in GP-10 at Sequence A2X, step 24, Item 251.and raise power, using control rods, to achieve one bypass valve open. Do not exceed 8% power.

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 6

J' *

  • SCENARIO INFORMATION Examiner Notes Procedures Used in Scenarios:

EVENT 1

  • 20P-30, Sections, 5.2 and 8.2 EVENT 2
  • OGP-02 EVENT 3
  • TRM 3.3 Table 3.3-1 EVENT 4
  • Annunciator Procedure UA-2 2-5, Steam Packing Exhauster B OVLD Trip
  • OAOP-13
  • OOP-39, Section 7.1
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 7
  • Procedures Used in Scenarios (continued):

EVENT 7

  • OEOP-04-RRCP (Radiological Release Control Procedure)

EVENT 8

Critical Tasks Control Rods must be inserted manually per OEOP-01-LEP-02 AND/OR SLC initiated to shut down the reactor.

  • Emergency depressurize the reactor when room flood levels in two areas of the Reactor Building exceed MAX SAFE levels.

Terminate and Prevent injection prior to ED such that there is no uncontrolled injection resulting in a power excursion of greater than 10%.

NOTE: Terminate and Prevent is only required prior to ED when an ATWS is present. IF control rods have been inserted and the crew has exited OEOP LPC (Level Power Control) prior to ED, then Terminate and Prevent is not required .

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 8
  • EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER, ALIGNING SJAE "A" AND "B" TO HALF LOAD The crew will align SJAE operation for both SJAE trains in-service in half load.

Malfunction required:

  • None Objectives:

SCO Directs BOP to place "A" and "B" SJAEs in half load in accordance with 20P-30.

BOP Aligns 2A and 2B SJAE Trains for half load operation lAW 20P-30.

Success Path:

2A and 2B SJAE trains are aligned for half load operation lAW 20P-30.

Simulator Operator Activities:

  • WHEN requested, adjust 2-CO-FV49 signal to adjust Condensate Header pressure.
  • IF contacted, as TBAO, for SJAE alignment, state all AO actions are complete including placing the H2/02 monitors in service.

Required Operator Actions SRO

  • Direct BOP to align SJAEs for half load operation lAW 20P-30, sections 8.2. and 5.2.

BOP

  • Aligns SJAEs for half load operation lAW 20P-30, sections 8.2. and 5.2.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 9
  • EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER, ALIGNING SJAE "A" AND "B" TO HALF LOAD APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 10
  • EVENT 2 INCREASE REACTOR POWER Malfunction required:
  • None Objectives:

SCO Directs RO to increase reactor power with control rods per GP-02.

RO Pulls control rods to increase reactor power.

Success Path:

Rx power increasing, RO monitors reactor parameters.

Simulator Operator Activities:

  • None Required Operator Actions
  • Directs increasing reactor power per GP-02.

RO

  • As directed, increases Rx power per GP-02 with control rods. Monitors Rx power, pressure, and level. Uses sequence (GP-1 0) A2X, step 251, Rod 38-15, from position 08-12 .
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 11
  • EVENT 2 INCREASE REACTOR POWER APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 12
  • EVENT 3 IRM "C" FAILS DOWNSCALE The crew will raise reactor power and respond to a failure of IRM "C".

Malfunctions required:

  • IRM "C" will fail "downscale".

Objectives:

SCO Recognizes the downscale failure of IRM "C," declares IRM "c" inoperable and determines the impact utilizing Technical Specifications. (3.3.1.1-RPS- Tracking LCO - not in an action statement) (TRM Rod Block- 3.3, Table 3.3-1)

During/following the assessment of IRM "C", directs the RO to place IRM "c" in bypass.

Contacts I&C for troubleshooting assistance on IRM "c" RO Stops control rod withdrawal.

While raising power, observes and reports that IRM "c" is downscale When directed, places IRM "c" in bypass.

References Annunciator Procedures Success Path:

During withdrawal of control rods for power ascension, IRM "c" is identified as failing downscale and declaration of inoperability and bypassing of it are accomplished. Part of the inoperability determination will be that there are adequate IRMs to meet minimum required.

Simulator Operator Activities:

  • WHEN control rod withdrawal is commenced and directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 1 (IRM "c" Fails Downscale).
  • WHEN asked, as I&C, to assist in the investigation of the failure, acknowledge the req uest.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 13
  • EVENT 3 IRM "C" DOWNSCALE Required Operator Actions Instrumentation Response - IRM "C" fails downscale SRO
  • Contacts I&C to request support in the investigation of the IRM "C" failure.
  • Recognizes the downscale failure of IRM "C," declares IRM "C" inoperable and evaluates Tech Spec impact:

Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 (RPS) Tracking LCO - no actions required TRM 3.3, Table 3.3-1 (Rod Block) Tracking TRM - no actions required

  • Directs RO to bypass IRM "C ".

A-5 1-4, IRM DOWNSCALE A-5 2-2, ROD OUT BLOCK

  • Identifies and reports the failure of IRM "C" to respond to the withdrawal of control rods.
  • When directed, bypasses IRM "C" per APP directions.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 14
  • EVENT 3 IRM "C" DOWNSCALE APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 15

Malfunction required:

  • HCU 34-19 will receive an accumulator low gas pressure/hi water level alarm-actual cause will be a low gas pressure.

Objectives:

SCO Correctly evaluates the condition of the accumulator as inoperable per TS 3.1.5.C. Control Rod will be inoperable if accumulator is not returned to operable within one hour (TS 3.1.5.C.2)

RO Responds to annunciator 2-A-7 6-1, CRD Accumulator Lo Press/Hi Level.

Success Path:

SCO obtains information regarding the HCU and correctly evaluates the HCU accumulator as being inoperable due to low accumulator gas pressure. (Technical

  • Specifications).

Simulator Operator Activities:

  • WHEN directed by the lead examiner, initiate TRIGGER 2 (HCU 34-19 low pressure alarm)
  • WHEN contacted as the building auxiliary operator, wait 3 minutes and report that the HCU alarm is due to low accumulator nitrogen pressure, and that the pressure is 930 psig.
  • WHEN directed as the auxiliary operator to recharge the HCU accumulator, acknowledge the request and activate TRIGGER 9 (Automatically deletes the accumulator lamp and annunciator overrides after 20 minutes)

2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 16

  • EVENT 4 HCU ALARM Required Operator Actions Normal Plant Operation - Assessing Technical Specifications due to a parameter outside establish bands (HCU accumulator alarm due to low nitrogen pressure)

SRO

  • Successfully evaluates that the low nitrogen pressure on HCU 34-19 as resulting in an inoperability on the associated HCU.

Tech Spec 3.1.5.C: One or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable with reactor steam dome pressure <950 psig C.1: Immediately verify rods with inoperable accumulators are fully inserted (affected rod is fully inserted)

C.2: Declare associated control rod inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (success path is to re-charge accumulator).

  • Dispatches AO to determine whether the alarm is due to low pressure or high level.

2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 17

  • EVENT 4 HCU ALARM APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 18
  • EVENTS "B" SPE FAN TRIPS The crew will respond to a trip of the "8" SPE and will place the "A" SPE in seNice Malfunctions required:

28 Steam Packing Exhauster Trip.

Objectives:

SCO Diagnoses trip of 28 Steam Packing Exhauster.

Directs placing the 2A Steam Packing Exhauster in seNice per OP-26.1, Section 8.1.

80P Responds to annunciators:

2-UA-2 2-5 STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER 8 OVLD TRIP 2-UA-2 4-5, GLAND SEAL VACUUM LOSS Diagnoses trip of 28 Steam Packing Exhauster.

As directed, places 2A Steam Packing Exhauster in seNice per OP-26.1 ,Section 8.1.

Success Path:

Places 2A SPE in seNice.

Simulator Operator Activities:

  • WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 8 (Trip of "8" Steam Packing Exhauster)
  • WHEN asked acknowledge MVD-V51 is open
  • WHEN asked acknowledge MVD-V52 is closed
  • IF asked, as AO, to investigate SPE "8" breaker, report that there are no indications of trouble with the breaker.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 19
  • EVENT 5 "B" SPE FAN TRIPS Required Operator Actions SCO
  • Diagnoses trip of 2B Steam Packing Exhauster.
  • Directs placing the 2A Steam Packing Exhauster per OP-26.1, Section 8.1.

BOP

2-UA-2 2-5 STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER B OVLD TRIP 2-UA-2 4-5, GLAND SEAL VACUUM LOSS

  • Diagnoses trip of 2B Steam Packing Exhauster.
  • As directed, places 2A Steam Packing Exhauster in service per OP-26.1 ,Section 8.1.

RO/BOP

  • Dispatches AO to investigate cause of SPE "B" trip.

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 20

Malfunctions required:

The seismic event annunciator will alarm, IRM "F" will fail upscale without a change in reactor power, the #3 Emergency Diesel Generator will receive a spurious automatic start signal.

Objectives:

SCO Enters OAOP- 13.0 and contacts the National Earthquake Center to verify the validity of the alarm.

Diagnoses the condition with IRM "F" and directs the RO to insert a manual scram signal on the liB" RPS channel Contacts I&C for assistance in investigating the start of #3 Emergency Diesel

  • Generator and the failure of IRM "F".

Directs the BOP to dispatch personnel into the field to investigate for potential damage due to the earthquake.

RO Observes and reports the upscale failure of IRM "F" and a failure of a scram signal to be generated on the liB" RPS channel When directed, inserts a manual scram signal on the "B" RPS channel.

BOP When directed, enters and executes OAOP- 13.

When directed, secures #3 Emergency Diesel Generator and places it in standby.

Success Path:

The crew will enter and execute OAOP-13, dispatch personnel to investigate for damage from the earthquake, insert a scram signal on the liB" RPS channel, and return

  1. 3 Emergency Diesel Generator to a standby condition.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 21
  • EVENT 6 SEISMIC EVENT, IRM UPSCALE, SPURIOUS DIESEL GENERATOR START Simulator Operator Activities:
  • WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 3 (Seismic Event, spurious start of Emerg DG #3, IRM "F" fails upscale)
  • WHEN contacted as AD to monitor and investigate DG# auto start, report that DG#3 is running properly and there is no indication of the cause of the auto start.
  • WHEN contacted as the National Earthquake Center, confirm that an earthquake has occurred with an epicenter at Charleston, SC. Also state that a magnitude has not yet been determined.
  • WHEN contacted as I&C to investigate IRM "F" failure, acknowledge request.
  • WHEN contacted as I&C to investigate the #3 Emergency Diesel Generator, acknowledge the request, wait 3 minutes, and report to the control room that the diesel start was due to spurious relay actuations caused by the seismic event and that investigation has confirmed that no damage to the diesel circuitry has occurred and that the diesel can be secured and returned to standby.
  • WHEN contacted as the auxiliary operators to enter the buildings and inspect for damage, acknowledge the request.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 22
  • EVENT 6 SEISMIC EVENT, IRM UPSCALE, SPURIOUS DIESEL GENERATOR START Required Operator Actions Abnormal Operating Procedures - Seismic Event SRO
  • Enters OAOP-13 and directs BOP to execute applicable steps to support investigation of the seismic event (includes contacting National Earthquake Center)
  • Recognizes that failure of "B" RPS to trip on the failure of IRM "F".
  • Contacts I&C to support investigation of IRM "F" failure.
  • References TS 3.3.1.1.A.1 - Place channel in trip per 01-18 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (Table 3.3.1.1-1.a.).
  • Contact I&C to investigate DG#3 auto start.

RO

  • Informs SRO of IRM "F" upscale and failure of the signal to cause a scram signal on the "B" RPS system.
  • Monitors Plant Parameters as directed by OAOP-13.

BOP

      • EVALUATOR NOTE: Opposite unit personnel will perform back panel actions for indications on seismic monitor.
  • When directed, enter and execute OAOP-13 in response to the seismic event.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 23
  • EVENT 6 SEISMIC EVENT, IRM UPSCALE, SPURIOUS DIESEL GENERATOR START Required Operator Actions (continued)

RO/BOP

  • Dispatch AO's to monitor DG#3 and perform walkdowns as required by OAOP-13.

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 24

Malfunctions required:

  • RPS Channel "A" will fail to initiate a scram signal when IRM "A" fails upscale, resulting in an ATWS condition. A leak will develop on the RWCU system in the Secondary Containment, and will not be able to be isolated due to a failure of the 2-G31-F004 and a loss of power to the 2-G31-F001.

Objectives:

SCO

, Enters 2EOP-01-LPC (Level Power Control) and directs the actions of the crew in response to the ATWS. Directs LEP-02 and SLC initiation.

Enters OEOP-03-SCCP (Secondary Containment Control Procedure) and directs the actions of the crew based on the unisolable leak from RWCU.

Enters OAOP-05.0 due to the unisolable leak from RWCU in the Secondary Containment.

RO Recognizes and reports the failure of IRM "A" to cause a reactor scram signal to be generated and attempts to manually insert a scram on the RPS "A" channel.

When directed, enters and executes LEP-02.

When directed, initiates SLC.

Initiates ARI per hard card and places mode switch to shutdown.

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 25
  • EVENT? SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Objectives (continued):

BOP Recognizes and reports a failure of RWCU to isolate and attempts to close the valves by operator action.

Recognizes and reports the failure of the 2-G31-F004 to close and the loss of power to the 2-G31-F001.

Observes and reports annunciators relating to Secondary Containment parameters, specifically relating to room flooding status for evaluation of Secondary Containment Control Procedure.

Success Path:

The crew will correctly diagnose the ATWS and the unisolable leak in the Secondary Containment and respond correctly according to 2EOP-01-LPC, OEOP-03-SCCP and OAOP-05 .

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 26
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Simulator Operator Activities:
  • WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 4 (Seismic aftershock, ATWS, RWCU Unisolable leak).
  • WAIT 1 minute and report to the control room that there is steam on the 50 ft of the Reactor Building and everyone is leaving the building.
  • IF directed to close FP-PIV-33, acknowledge request, wait 3 minutes, then report PIV-33 closed.
  • IF requested, as I&C, to perform surveys, acknowledge request.
  • IF requested to defeat the Low Level 3, Group 1 isolation signal lAW SEP 10, wait 3 minutes and actuate TRIGGER 5.
  • IF directed, as AO, to reclose Substation E7 feeder breaker to MCC 2XC, acknowledge request.
  • IF directed to attempt to reset the breaker on the 2-G31-F004, acknowledge the request, wait 1 minute, and notify the control room that the Reactor Building cannot be accessed due to the steam.

WHEN requested, wait 3 minutes and notify control room that the LEP-02, Section 3 jumpers are installed .

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 27
  • EVENT? SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, AlWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions:

SRO

  • Determines Reactor Power is >2% (ATWS) goes to Level-Power Control
  • Enters 2EOP-01-LPC (Level Power Control) and directs the actions of the crew in response to the ATWS.

NOTE: To shutdown reactor, directs LEP-02 to manually insert control rods and/or initiate SLC. (Critical Task) o Q leg of EOP-01-LPC if Reactor Power is >2%

  • Ensures/directs RO take the reactor mode switch to Shutdown when steam flow is <3Mlbm/hour
  • Ensures/directs that RO manually initiate ARI
  • Directs "RO to place Recirc Controllers to 10%

Determines power is >2%

Directs RO to trip both Recirc Pumps Determines power is >2%

Directs RO to initiate SLC (determines G31-F004 does not close)

  • Directs BOP to coordinate attempts to reset G31-F004 breaker
  • Recognizes G31-F001 does not have power
  • Monitors SLC Tank Level o Q leg of EOP-01-LPC if Reactor Power is <2%
  • Ensures/directs RO take the reactor mode switch to Shutdown when steam flow is <3MIbm/hour
  • Ensures/directs that RO manually initiate ARI
  • Directs "RO to place Recirc Controllers to 10%
  • Determines power is <2%
  • Evaluates if Reactor can be shutdown before Suppression Pool temperature exceeds 110°F.

2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 28

  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions (continued):

SRO (cont.)

  • If YES:
  • Monitors SLC Tank Level
  • If NO:
  • Directs RO to initiate SLC (determines G31-F004 does not close)
  • Directs BOP to coordinate attempts to reset G31-F004 breaker
  • Recognizes G31-F001 does not have power Directs BOP to inhibit ADS Directs RO to perform LEP-02 (Alternate Control Rod Insertion)

Monitors SLC Tank Level o L leg of EOP-01-LPC if power is >2%

o There are duplicate action of the RC/Q leg not listed o Bypass Group 1 Low Level isolation per (SEP-10) o Determines reactor power >2%

o Deteremines reactor level >90" o Directs terminate and prevent injection to suppress power

  • Condensate/Feedwater
  • Alternate Coolant Injection
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 29
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions (continued):

SRO (cont.)

o When level is at 90" assesses Table 3

  • Power >2%
  • Suppression Pool Temp >11 OaF
  • SRV Open/being used for pressure control or drywell pressure >1.7 psig o If Table 3 = YES then o Continue lowering level until any Table 3 condition is not met o Direct controlling of level between LL4 and the level deliberately lowered to for power suppression (variable, based on efficiency and promptness of actions)
      • NOTE: If reactor power is below 2%, lowering level to 90" is not required.

o L leg of EOP-01-LPC if power is <2%

  • There are duplicate action of the RC/Q leg not listed
  • Bypass Group 1 Low Level isolation per (SEP-1 0)
  • Assess Table 3 not met and control level between LL-4 and 200" o P leg of EOP-01-LPC
  • Direct RO/BOP stabilize maintain reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig using EHC pressure control (bypass valves) and/or SRVs
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 30
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions (continued):

SRO (cont.)

  • Enters OEOP-03-SCCP (Secondary Containment Control Procedure) due to high area temperatures (50 ft reactor building) and/or High Room Flood Levels and directs the actions of the crew based on the unisolable leak from RWCU.

o Direct actions lAW AOP-05.0 due to steam leak in the Reactor Building o Evaluates Ventilation exhaust rad has not exceeded 4 mr

  • If YES
  • Directs isolation of Rx Bid HVAC
  • Directs SBGT initiation o Evaluates if Rx Bid Vent Temp Hi annunciator (UA-03 6-2) is in alarm
  • o If YES Directs isolation of Rx Bid HVAC Directs SBGT initiation NOTE: If NO to vent rad and vent temp and Rx Bid Ventilation is isolated then directs restart of Rx Bid ventilation o Directs alignment of Service Water to the vital header o Evaluates if a primary system is discharging into the reactor building (Yes for these conditions) o Determines cooldown is not allowed if ATWS conditions exist (guidance on LPC flowchart) o Evaluates if area temperature alarms have reached their alarm points
  • 2-A-2, 5-7 Steam Leak Det Ambient Temp Hi
  • 2-A-2, 6-8 RB 20/50 Ft Elev Temp Hi o Directs BOP to investigate the alarms, if received o Evaluates Secondary Containment water levels and determines cannot anticipate Emergency Depressurization due to ATWS (guidance on LPC flowchart)
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 31

o When second area water level >Max Safe water level, recognizes Emergency Depressurization is required and utilizes Level-Power control for guidance.

Recognizes that N026A & B are not operable due to steam leak in the Rx Bldg (Caution 1)

  • Requests SEP-10 jumpers installed to defeat Low Level III Group One isolation.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 32
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions (continued):

RO

  • Recognizes and reports the failure of IRM "A" to cause a reactor scram signal to be generated and attempts to manually insert a scram on the RPS "A" channel.
  • When directed, inserts manual scram.

o Recognizes and reports failure of rods to insert (ATWS) o Places ARI to Trip (lAW SCRAM Hard Card)

  • Places Reactor Mode Switch to shutdown (immediate operator action or as directed by SRO)
  • Places Reactor Mode Switch to shutdown (immediate operator action or as directed by SRO)
  • Places Recirc Controllers to 10% (per scram hard card or as directed by SRO)
  • When directed, trips both reactor Recirc Pumps
  • When directed, initiates SLC o Identifies and reports the G31-F004 does not close on SLC initiation.
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 33
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions (continued):

BOP

  • When directed, controls reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig using Bypass Valves or SRV's,
  • When directed, controls reactor water level 170" to 200" using Feedwater and Condensate
  • Recognizes and reports the failure of the 2-G31-F004 to close and the loss of power to the 2-G31-F001.
  • Recognizes the failure of the RWCU isolation valves to close, attempts to close them through manual action, and reports the results to the SCO.

o Directs AO to attempt reclosure of Bus E7 feeder breaker to MCC 2XC.

  • Carries out actions necessary to control reactor level and pressure as directed by the SCO.

RO/BOP

  • When directed, inhibits ADS.
  • When directed, perform LEP-02, Alternate Control Rod Insertion
        • (Critical Task)**** When directed manually inserts control rods per LEP-02 and initiates SLC
  • Terminate/prevent injection of Condensate and Feed o Trip both reactor Feed Pumps o Close 2-FW-V6N8 (or FW-V118N119) o Place SULCV in Manual/Close
  • Terminate HPCI o Trip Turbine o When HPCI is at zero speed, place aux. oil pump in Pull-To-Lock (PTL)
  • If running, place RHR and Core Spray Pump "Control Switches to "OFF" 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 34
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK Required Operator Actions (continued):

RO/BOP (cont.)

  • When directed, start injection source to maintain level within the established level band (most probable system will be HPCI) o HPCI
  • Open E41-F059
  • Start Vacuum Pump
  • Open E41-F001
  • Start Aux Oil Pump
  • Open E41-F006 (auto open on valve is failed, but valve will open when control switch is operated.
  • Adjust Flow Controller to desired injection rate.
  • When directed, establishes and controls reactor pressure in a band 800 psig to 1000 psig.

o Using EHC Pressure control and/or SRVs

  • Per AOP-05.0 o Evacuates reactor building of unnecessary personnel o Directs Auxiliary Operator to unlock and close PIV-33 o Notifies E&RC to sample/survey/control area.

o Acknowledges and reports annunciators

  • 2-A-2, 5-7 Steam Leak Det Ambient Temp Hi
  • 2-A-2, 6-8 RB 20/50 Ft Elev Temp Hi o When directed, investigates high temperature annunciators
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 35
  • EVENT 7 SEISMIC AFTERSHOCK, ATWS, RWCU UNISOLABLE LEAK APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 36
  • EVENT 8 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION/START-UP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE The crew will respond to a flooding condition in two areas of the Secondary Containment requiring Emergency Depressurization, followed by a failure of the Startup Level Control Valve in the "Closed" position or the failure to open of valve 2-FW-V120.

Either of these valves will permit makeup to the reactor vessel via the Condensate and Feedwater system. The first one attempted for use by the operator will fail.

NOTE: Anticipating Emergency Depressurization with an ATWS is not allowed.

Malfunctions required:

Flooding will occur in two areas of the Secondary Containment with a primary system causing the flooding, requiring Emergency Depressurization. Upon depressurization, the Startup Level Control Valve OR 2-FW-V120 will fail closed.

Objectives:

SCO Direct actions associated with OEOP-03-SCCP (Secondary Containment Control Procedure) to Emergency Depressurize the reactor when two area flood levels reach max safe.

Directs BOP to open 7 ADS valves to Emergency Depressurize the reactor and to control injection sources.

BOP When directed, Emergency Depressurizes the reactor.

When attempting to restore feedwater flow, correctly diagnoses and reports either the failure of the Startup Level Control Valve OR the 2-FW-V120 has failed. Uses the one method that is available to feed the reactor.

Success Path:

Crew recognizes the flooding condition in the Secondary Containment requiring Emergency Depressurization, successfully depressurizes the reactor, recognizes the failure of the Startup Level Control Valve OR the 2-FW-V120 valve.

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 37
  • EVENT 8 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION/START-UP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE Simulator Operator Activities
  • WHEN directed by the lead examiner, initiate TRIGGER 6. This TRIGGER wiil cause the final HI-HI room level leading to the Emergency Depressurization.
  • ****NOTE: Do not activate trigger 7 if SULCV is open.****
  • WHEN 7 ADS valves are opened and injection condensate and feed has been terminated and prevented (SULCV is shut), then activate TRIGGER 7 (Fails SULCV and FW-V120 closed).
  • ***NOTE: WHEN the operator attempts to open the SULCV, the FW-V120 override will auto delete and if the operator attempts to open FW-V120, the SULCV malfunction will auto delete.***

Required Operator Actions SCO Direct actions associated with 2EOP-01-LPC (Level Power Control) to Terminate and Prevent injection (Critical Task) and then Emergency Depressurize the reactor when two area flood levels reach max safe (Critical Task).

o Direct RO/SOP to terminate and prevent injection from o Condensate and Feed o HPCI o RHR o Core Spray o Alternate Coolant Injection o When systems are terminated and prevented, directs opening of 7 ADS valves o When reactor pressure is below the Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure per Table 2 (120 psig with 7 SRVs open) o Directs RO/SOP to slowly increase injection to restore level above LL4 NOTE: Terminating and preventing of injection prior to depressurization is only required if in 2EOP-01-LPC. If all rods have been inserted and the crew is in EOP-01-RVCP (Reactor Vessel Control Procedure) terminate and prevent are not required .

2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 38

  • EVENT 8 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION/START-UP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE Required Operator Actions (continued)

BOP (Critical Task) When directed, terminates and prevents injection to prevent uncontrolled injection and power transient.

  • Trip Reactor Feed Pumps
  • Close FW-V6N8 ( or FW-V118N119)
  • Place SULCV in manual close
  • Trip HPCI, when turbine stops, place Aux Oil Pump in Pull-To-Lock
  • After receiving a start signal, stop the RHR and Core Spray Pumps by placing their respective control switches to stop.

NOTE: Terminate and prevent is only required if in 2EOP-02-LPC (Level Power Control) procedure.

(Critical Task) When directed, opens 7 ADS Valves to Emergency Depressurize the reactor When attempting to restore feedwater flow, correctly diagnoses and reports either the failure of the Startup Level Control Valve OR the 2-FW-V120 has failed. Uses the one method that is available to feed the reactor.

  • When reactor pressure is less than the minimum alternate flooding Pressure, recommence injection to restore level above LL4.

o Injecting with Condensate o Open the Startup Level Control Valve by inceasing the demand signal on the SULCV controller, OR o Partially open to 2-FW-V120 by turning the control switch to the open position (throttle valve).

NOTE: If Condensate is used, recognize the failure of the SULCV or the 2-FW-V120 to respond, requiring the candidate to go to the opposite valve

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 39
  • EVENT 8 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION/START-UP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:
  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 40
  • EVENT 8 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION/START-UP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE Simulator Operator Activities:

WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.

CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER

  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 41
  • # Title -

ATTACHMENT 1

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  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 42
  • # TITLE - NRC Scenario S4
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  • 2007 NRC Examination Scenario #4 43
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