ML072200608

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7/23/07 Draft Request for Additional Information from A. Wang to Entergy Operations, Inc. Re License Amendment Request to Delete Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System
ML072200608
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/2007
From:
NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLIV
To:
Entergy Operations
Wang A, NRR/DORL/LPL4, 301-415-1445
Shared Package
ML072200618 List:
References
TAC MD5379, TAC MD5380
Download: ML072200608 (1)


Text

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO DELETE THE FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM (FHAVS)

AND ASSOCIATED FILTER TESTING PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TAC NOS.: MD5379 AND MD5380 Fuel Handling Accident Analysis: [DRAFT] Request for Additional Information (RAI)

RAI #1:

Please explain if any non-safety systems were credited in the analysis of the postulated design basis fuel handling accident (FHA) in the spent fuel pool (SFP) area, which concluded that the Fuel Handling Ventilation System (FHAVS) is not needed to perform a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and if so please justify crediting such systems in this design basis accident (DBA) analysis.

RAI# 2:

A) Please provide the dose consequence analyses or all equations, assumptions, and input parameters used to determine the offsite and control room doses at ANO-1 and ANO-2 following the postulated design basis FHA, which supports the assertion that the FHAVS does not perform a safety function.

B) Please describe the bases for all equations, assumptions, and input parameters used in the FHA dose consequence analysis for ANO-1 and ANO-2.

RAI# 3:

Please explain what, if any, deviations from RG 1.25 were taken in your analysis of the DBA.

RAI# 4:

Please provide the dose acceptance criterion, and the justification for this criterion, that was used for the post DBA dose consequence to the ANO-1 &

ANO-2 control rooms following the postulated FHA.

RAI# 5:

The number and exposure history of fuel assemblies assumed to be damaged directly affects the total amount of activity available for immediate release following the postulated FHA. In reference to ANO-1, Section 4.1 of the License Amendment Request (LAR) states the following results assumed 82 fuel rods failed with no filtration through the fuel handling ventilation filtration system. In reference to ANO-2, Section 4.2 of the LAR states the following results assumed the failure of 60 fuel rods with no credit for the fuel handling ventilation filtration system. Please explain and justify why an approximate 35% difference in fuel rods damaged is assumed between ANO-1 and ANO-2 for the postulated FHA.