ML072140851

Relief Request from Immediate ASME Code Flaw Repair of Charging Pump Discharge Line Valve 1NV-240

ML072140851
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	07/24/2007
From:	Gordon Peterson Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Power Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
07-MN-001, INV-240
Download: ML072140851 (109)

Text

DukeGARY R. PETERSON Powere Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station A Duke Energy Company Duke Power MG01VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.

Huntersville, NC 28078-9340 704 875 5333 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy. com July 24, 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Power Company LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke)

McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-369 Relief Request 07-MIN-001 Relief Request from Immediate ASME Code Flaw Repair of Charging Pump Discharge Line Valve INV-240 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), Duke requests relief from the 1998 Edition, through the 2000 Addenda, of the ASME Section XI Code requirement as stipulated in Paragraph IWC-3122.2 on the basis that compliance with the specified requirements would result in a hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. Accordingly, please find attached Relief Request 07-MIN-001. This relief request is submitted because a through-wall flaw was discovered in a Chemical &

Volume Control (NV) System, 3-inch cast stainless steel valve body located in the Auxiliary Building. A subsequent inspection of both units' NV accessible piping from charging pump suction to the containment isolation valves did not identify any other through-wall leakage. The NRC was informed of this problem by telephone conference calls on June 21, 22, and 25, 2007.

This flaw was not found during the performance of an ASME Section XI Code inservice inspection; therefore,Section XI requirements do not technically apply until repair/replacement activities are conducted to correct the flaw. However, using conservative decision making and for flaw evaluation review expediency, Duke is pursuing NRC acceptance of our system operational position through the formal relief request process.

This relief request contains the following regulatory commitments:

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 24, 2007 Page 2

1. Operations personnel shall observe and measure the valve flaw leakage rate and record a value in a retrievable format once every shift to ensure early detection of an increased leak rate and to ensure the assumptions used in the component operability evaluation remain valid.

2. Non-Destructive Examination personnel shall conduct a "best effort" ultrasonic volumetric examination of the flaw location every 90 days until the valve is repaired.

3. A Code repair shall be performed during the next scheduled refueling outage, lEOC19 RFO, which is currently scheduled to begin in September 2008. If a condition leads to a forced outage of sufficient duration before lEOC19 RFO, the repair will be performed during this forced outage.

Duke is requesting that the NRC review and approve this relief request at your earliest convenience. Please direct questions pertaining to this request to P. T. Vu of Regulatory Compliance at (704) 875-4302.

Sincerely, G. R. Peterson Attachment

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 24, 2007 Page 3 xc w/attachment:

W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. F. Stang, Jr., Senior Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-8 H4A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J. B. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station

ATTACHMENT RELIEF REQUEST NO. 07-MN-001

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Relief Requested In Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a (a)(3)(ii)

-- Compliance with the Specified Requirements of this Section Would Result in a Hardship or Unusual Difficulty Without a Compensating Increase in the Level of Quality and Safety --

1. ASME Code Component(s) Affected The component is a Class 2, manually-operated, 3-inch cast stainless steel, flex-wedge, gate valve manufactured by Walworth (Duke Energy valve number INV-240). The valve body is made of SA351, CF8M cast stainless steel material.

The valve is a component within the Chemical & Volume Control (NV) System which.has a design pressure and temperature of 2,735 psig and 189 0F, respectively. The valve is situated within the common charging header downstream from the Reciprocating Charging Pump. Both the valve and pump are located outside of containment in the Auxiliary Building. The valve provides piping system isolation for maintenance, but it does not provide any active safety-related function.

2. Applicable Code Edition and Addenda

ASME Section XI Code, 1998 Edition through the 2000 Addenda.

3. Applicable Code Requirement

ASME Section XI Code, subsection 1WC, "Requirements for Class 2 Components of Light-Water Cooled Power Plants", subparagraph IWC-3122.2, "Acceptance by Repair/Replacement Activity".

4. Reason for Reiuest Active leakage from two small pinhole defects located on the valve body neck was found. The pinholes are in close proximity in a weld repair area. The pinholes appear to be located at small depressions. More careful inspection of the valve suggests that the flaw may actually be associated with a small thumbnail-shaped defect interconnecting the two primary leak sites. Subsequent examinations determined that the leak is located near the center of a 2.5 inch diameter circular-shaped weld repair. This weld repair area was one of numerous documented weld repair areas performed on the valve body.

The following NDE examination methods were performed to locate and characterize the flaw. An eddy current exam revealed nine areas on the valve body where the base metal had been repaired by welding. A computed radiography exam with the source placed in two different positions revealed no large voids. Also, "best effort" ultrasonic scans using four (4) beam angles from four (4) directions (2 axial and 2 circumferential) were made of each valve body weld repair area without revealing any planar flaws. Recognizing the particular Page 1 of 3

component limitations affecting each examination method, no flaws of significant size were detected.

Performing a Code repair/replacement activity now to correct flaws that have such a minor leak rate (< 0.01 gpm) would create a hardship based on the following overriding concern: the potential risks associated with unit cycling and emergent equipment issues incurred during shutdown and startup evolutions.

No compensating increase in the level of quality and safety would be gained by immediate repair of the flaws. Engineering calculations and judgment provide the basis to state that the NV system valve body is very robust and capable of performing its design function through the end of the current fuel cycle.

5. Proposed Alternative and Basis for Use

Alternative: Referencing ASME Section XI Code subparagraph IWC-3122.3, "Acceptance by Analytical Evaluation", Duke Energy Corporation proposes to temporarily accept the as-found relevant condition (i.e. through-wall flaw) to allow continued service (operation through the current unit run cycle) instead of performing immediate flaw correction by a repair/replacement activity described in Code subparagraph IWC-3122.2, "Acceptance by Repair/Replacement Activity". This proposed alternative is based on Duke performing the following actions.

1. Operations staff addressed the potential extent of condition issue by conducting a thorough inspection of both trains of both units' NV piping from the suction of the pumps to the containment penetrations for the normal charging header, the Reactor Coolant (NC) System seal supply headers, and the NV cold leg injection headers. All accessible components, including cast valves were inspected. No through-wall leakage was identified during these inspections.

2. Operations personnel shall observe and measure the valve flaw leakage rate and record a value in a retrievable format once every shift to ensure early detection of an increased leak rate and to ensure the assumptions used in the component operability evaluation remain valid.

3. NDE personnel shall conduct a "best effort" ultrasonic volumetric examination of the flaw location every 90 days until the valve is repaired.

4.' A Code repair shall be performed during the next scheduled refueling outage, 1EOC19 RFO, which is currently scheduled to begin in September 2008. If a condition leads to a forced outage of sufficient duration before IEOC19 RFO, the repair will be performed during this forced outage.

Basis: Please reference Enclosure 1, "Operability Evaluation - Valve 1NV-240" as the basis for considering the valve Operable But Degraded/Non-conforming to ASME Section XI requirements. The Operability Evaluation and its referenced documents, provided as attachments, present the basis for the requested relief from Code requirements.

Page 2 of 3

6. Duration of Proposed Alternative

The requested Code relief shall be used until Code repair/replacement activities are performed on the valve body either during 1EOCI9 RFO or during a forced outage of sufficient duration before IEOC19 RFO.

Page 3 of 3

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 ENCLOSURE 1 Operability Evaluation - Valve INV-240

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PUP M-07-03610 Relief Request 07-MN-00 I Enclosure I Page I of II

1. Statement of Problem Active through-wall pinhole leakage was identified on the body of valve 1 NV-240 (UNIT 1 SEAL WATER INJ FLOW CONTROL INLET ISOL) (WR 927504). The purpose of this evaluation is to evaluate the integrity of this valve body as an ASME Class B pressure boundary with respect to ECCS operability, NC pressure boundary and radiological dose limits.

The initial (pre-cleaning) through-wall leak-rate was determined to be 1 drop every minute & 55 seconds. Nominal leakage has subsequently remained stable at one drop every 40-50 seconds.

2. Relation to QA Condition 1NV-240 is an ASME Class II component, and the valve pressure boundary serves to support the Emergency Core Cooling System function.

Thus the evaluation is QA condition 1.

3. Applicable codes, Standards, Regulations a) ASME Section III, Subsection NC, 1971 Edition, W'71 addenda.

b) ASME Code Section Xl, Division 1 ASME Xl, 1998 Edition, 2000 Addenda (IWC-3000 & IWA-4000).

c) NRC Generic Letter 90-05.

d) General Design Criterion 19 - Control Room

4. Evaluation Inputs/Methods Used Flaw characterization was performed using the results of RT and UT examinations.

Fracture mechanics analyses were performed to determine the limiting crack size, and predicted flaw growth size.

The flaw evaluation is based on the criteria prescribed in Section Xl, Appendix C assuming the valve body neck may be modeled as a pipe and using a flaw depth to wall thickness ratio of unity (similar to the ASME Code Case N-513-1 approach). Allowable flaw sizes were determined using Limit Load criteria specified in Article C-5000 in both the axial and circumferential directions. Flaw growth evaluation considering fatigue as a possible mechanism is performed using the methodology in ASME Code Section Xl, Appendix C for stainless steel components.

5. Other Evaluation Criteria 5.1 Radiological dose limits are evaluated based on comparison of total ECCS Auxiliary Building leakage and the input assumptions in the dose calculation of record.

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-036 10 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page 2 of I1

6. Applicable Licensing References a) Technical Specifications: 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage), 3.5.2, 3.5.3 (ECCS Operability) b) UFSAR 6.2.4.2 (Containment Isolation Systems System Design) c) UFSAR 6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System d) UFSAR 9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Control System e) UFSAR 15.4.6 Boron Dilution Event f)

UFSAR 15.6 Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory g) UFSAR 3.9.2 ASME Code Class 2 and 3 Components h) SLC 16.5.9 (RCS Structural Integrity) i) SLC 16.9.9, 16.9.11, 16.9.12, 16.9.14 (Boration Flowpath, Sources) j)

SLC 16.9.7 (Standby Shutdown System).

7. Assumptions a) Service Level A/B safety factors are conservatively applied.

b) 1 NV-240 valve body neck is modeled as a pipe and using a flaw depth to wall thickness ratio of unity (similar to the ASME Code Case N-513-1 approach).

The pipe assumption model is justified because:

i) there is minimal bending stress contribution, ii) the flaw is remotely located from any structural discontinuities and/or end restraints, therefore localized stresses do not appreciably affect the flaw region, iii) there is no appreciable thermal stress contribution.

8. References a) MCS-1554.NV-00-0001, Rev. 17 (NV DBD) b) MCFD-1554-03.00 (Rev. 9), -01.02 (Rev. 10), -03.01 (Rev. 17) (NV Flow Diagrams) c) MCM-1 205.00-1186-001, Rev. DD (Valve Drawing for Duke Item 04J-01 7) d) MCC-1206.02-83-0018, Rev. 9, NVA Stress Analysis Calculation Pipe Stress Results (Problem NVA) for Valve 1 NV-240).

e) MCM 1205.00-0577, 'Walworth Seismic Analysis No. 180 and Design Stress Report No. W/AN-24-76" Revision 3.

f)

MCC-1 227.00-00-0048, Rev. 10, Chapter 15 LOCA Offsite Dose Analysis g) MCC-1227.00-00-0095, Rev. 1, Calculation of Post LOCA Radiation Doses for Operability of Control Room Unfiltered Leakage.

h) MCC-1227.00-00-0094, Rev. 1, Radiological Consequences of Design Basis LOCA 15.6.2.3.

i) Structural Integrity Calculation, MNS-05Q-301, Rev. 0, "Flaw Evaluation of Charging System Valve Pinhole Leak."

j)

NRC RIS 2005-20, Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and On Operability k) NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900 Technical Guidance, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-03610 Relief Request 07-MN-00 I Enclosure I Page 3 of I I I) June 22, 2007 Email from Mc Ardle III, James J, TO: Alley, Charles T Jr; Pyne, Mark A; Arey, Melvin L Jr.

m) ASME Section XI, Division 1, Code Case N-513-1, "Evaluation Criteria or Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping.

n) Structural Integrity Calculation, MNS-05Q-302, Rev. 0, "Flaw Evaluation of Charging System Valve Pinhole Leak."

o) MCS-1108.00-00-0002, Rev. 9, Specification for the Response Spectra and Seismic Displacements for Category I Structures.

9. Calculation/Evaluation This evaluation will evaluate the integrity of 1 NV-240 valve body as an ASME Class B pressure boundary with respect to ECCS operability, LOCA dose limits, and Reactor Coolant System Operational leakage limits SSC DESIGN & FUNCTIONS 1 NV-240 is a 3 inch, manual operator, flex-wedge gate valve manufactured by Walworth (Duke Item # 4J-01 7).

1 NV-240 has a SA351 CF8M cast stainless steel valve body.

The valve is located in the Aux Bldg 716 Mechanical Penetration Room. 1 NV-240 has a design pressure and temperature of 2890 psig and 1890F. The system design pressure

& temperature are 2735 psig and 189°F. The minimum wall thickness is 0.638 inches in the body neck region.

This valve provides isolation for outage maintenance, but does not provide any active safety-related functions.

1NV-240 is located on the common charging header downstream of the charging flow control valve (1 NV-238). It remains normally open to provide charging flow & enable operation of NCP seal injection backpressure control valve (11NV-241).

This valve is located upstream of the outboard charging header Containment Isolation Valves (1NV-244A & -245B).

1 NV-240 is a Class 2 pressure boundary component.

Since 1NV-240 is outside containment, not part of the containment isolation system, and is not a Class I pressure boundary, this valve is not part of the Tech Spec defined Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

Thus, the requirements of Tech Spec 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage) Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage are not applicable.

1NV-240 is in the flow path typically credited for Boration Flowpath requirements per SLC 16.9.9 & 16.9.12.

1NV-240 pressure boundary also functions to support ECCS operability. Specifically, any external leakage from 1NV-240 could result in ECCS flow diversion, and further contribute to post-LOCA dose consequences.

RCS/ECCS/Dose Analysis Leakaqe Limits:

The current licensing basis allows 0.35 gpm leakage into the Auxiliary Building (Reference 8.f); however, the future Alternate Source Term licensing basis will limit Auxiliary Building leakage to 0.25 gpm (reference 8.h).

Thus, to maintain the assumptions of the LOCA dose analysis valid, the overall ECCS system leakage inclusive of 1 NV-240 external leakage must be maintained below 0.25 gpm. The current Unit 1 ECCS system total leakage, inclusive of 1 NV-240 thru wall leakage is <<0.05 gpm. Thus, the allowed LOCA dose analyses limits are not currently challenged.

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-036 10 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page 4 of I I 1NV-240 current external leakage rates are insignificant with-respect to the flow-rates necessary to degrade ECCS and boration flow-path capability. External leakage rates necessary to challenge RCS Operational Leakage, ECCS and boration functions would be significantly higher than that allowed by the LOCA dose analysis.

Flaw Initiation Failure Mechanisms for 1 NV-240:

Valve 1 NV-240 normally operates with a nominal internal pressure of 2500 psi (borated water).

Operating temperature is normally below 120°F as it is upstream of the regenerative heat exchanger. The valve has likely been in service for 30 years or longer (i.e., since plant startup).

The leakage is from two small pinhole defects, located on the valve body neck. The pinholes are in close proximity in a weld repair area. The pinholes appear to be located at small depressions. More careful inspection of the valve suggests that the flaw may actually be associated with a small thumbnail-shaped defect interconnecting the two primary leak sites. Subsequent examinations determined that the leak is located in near the center of a 2.5 inch diameter circular-shaped weld repair. Per the Certified Mill Test Report (CMTR) for 1NV-240, the weld filler material used for the repair was E316-16.

This weld repair area was one of numerous documented weld repair areas performed on the valve body.

The flaw appears to be curved and discontinuous where it is breaking the OD surface of the valve body. This is not consistent with a mechanically initiated crack. Furthermore, the process application is not prone to cyclic pressure pulsations/cycles, and the body neck stresses are very low relative to code allowables.

The valve stress analyses documented that under 4g seismic acceleration, the valve stresses were -20% of the code allowable stresses (Reference 8.e). This acceleration force readily envelopes the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (Reference 8.h).

This valve is located on the charging header, which is not subject to high vibration. Thus, the likelihood of fatigue cracking is remote.

Although the presence of a weld repair would increase the localized residual stresses, and potentially increase sensitization in the weld heat affected zone (HAZ), stress corrosion cracking (SCC) also seems improbable due to the low susceptibility of this material in a deoxygenated, low temperature borated water process.

Additionally, the materials are welded and cast austenitic stainless steel, both of which contain a small percentage of delta-ferrite in their microstructure; this structure is inherently more resistant to SCC than wrought materials.

The valve is constructed of cast stainless steel (SA-351, CF-8M) which has high ductility and is not prone to brittle fracture.

1 NV-240 is not subject to water hammer, as the system is maintained water solid during normal operation, and there is no possibility of steam formation.

Based on the shape and surface morphology of the defect, as well as being located in near the center of a weld-repaired area, the most likely cause of the leak is a weld flaw.

The weld flaw may also have been influenced by the presence of a pre-existing casting flaw. Possible weld and/or casting flaws include shrinkage cracks, hot tearing, porosity,

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-03610 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page 5 of II and/or entrapped slag/inclusions - alone or in combination.

Based on review of the CMTR, the weld procedure and filler material used for the valve repair were appropriate.

Due to the geometry of the valve body, complexity of the cast microstructure, roughness of the casting surface and other factors, detection of such flaws can be difficult, if not impossible.

Although the repair may have been leak tight following the weld repair, through repeated pressure and temperature cycles over time, and slow removal of any entrapped slag or oxidation products within the defect, a tortuous leak path was eventually created. This type of flaw is consistent with the very low observed leak rate, and would also be unlikely to develop into a rapid increase in leak rate.

The rust staining observed on the exterior of the valve body is most likely a result of dissolved iron (e.g., soluble iron hydroxides) contained in the leaking borated water which re-precipitated out upon cooling and drying on the OD valve surface.

Flaw Evaluation Method:

There is not an ASME Code Case to evaluate flaws in a Class 2 valve body, therefore ASME XI Appendix C (Evaluation of Flaws in Austenitic) and Code Case N-513-1 (Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section Xl, Division 1) will be used as a guide to perform the valve body flaw evaluation.

Summary of NDE Performed:

After the discovery of two-pin hole leaks in the valve neck, a straight beam ultrasonic examination was performed in the area of the leak. This examination did not reveal any flaw indications but only the back surface of the valve. The back surface was confirmed at several locations on the valve.

A surface Eddy Current examination using a pencil probe was performed which located nine areas where the base material had been repaired by welding. One such area was at the leak location. The locations of the repairs were recorded on a roll-out drawing on the valve neck.

Informational radiography was performed using Computed Radiography (CR) technology on valve 1 NV-240 using an Ir-1 92 source of 25.1 curies. The source was positioned in 2 directions (90 and 190 degrees) in relation to the leak point visible on the neck of the valve; making 2 exposures each. Due to material thickness of the valve neck, gate thickness and water inside the valve resulting equivalent thickness that the energy from the source has to penetrate was estimated to be -4.50" of steel. This thickness is at or above the upper limits for Ir-1 92. The radiographs did not record any large voids in the area of interest.

A second ultrasonic examination using an angle beam technique was performed after the radiography. The angle beam scanning covered nine base metal weld repair areas in various locations that were mapped using Eddy Current inspection. Each weld repair area was scanned with four angle beams from four directions (2 axial and 2 circumferential). In addition to the four scan directions, the area at the leak site received

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-036 10 Relief Request 07-MN-00 I Enclosure I Page 6 of I I a radial scan 360' around the location. No planar flaw indications were detected. The largest through-wall planar flaw that could have gone undetected would reasonably be expected to be no greater 1/3 the valve neck thickness and no greater than 1.5" length.

There is reasonable assurance that the ultrasonic examination techniques used are capable of detecting planar flaws once they grow beyond the inner 1/3 material wall thickness and have a measured length of 1.5" or greater.

These examinations represent the best nondestructive examination technology that can be applied to detect cracking without disassembly of the valve.

1 NV-240 FLAW EVALUATION:

Analysis 1 Structural Integrity Associates (SIA) performed a fracture mechanics analysis to determine the limiting allowed crack size (MNS-05Q-301, Attachment 4).

The analysis determined the allowable length of a 100% through wall planar flaw in both the axial and circumferential directions.

Allowable flaw sizes were determined using ASME safety factors against failure for Service Levels A/B, and included a safety factor of 2.77 and 3.0 for the circumferential and axial, respectively. (Levels A/B are Normal/Upset. The safety factors for Levels A/B are higher than for Levels C/D, Emergency/Faulted.)

The geometry model used was an infinitely long pipe to represent the affected section of the valve body and the crack evaluation was performed with a limit load analysis as specified in ASME Section XI Appendix C. Stainless steel piping is not subject to the same brittle fracture as carbon steel reactor vessels, hence a different methodology is used to assess margin to failure.

Analysis 1 Results Based on the cast material, a design thickness of 0.875, 2500 psi operating pressure and a nominal mechanical load stress (representing seismic), the analysis shows the allowable flaw sizes are:

3.9 inch long 100% through wall axial flaw or 5.4 inch long 100% through wall circumferential flaw Analysis 2 Structural Integrity performed a second fracture mechanics analysis to determine the limiting allowed crack size (MNS-05Q-302R0, Attachment 7) for different conditions.

In this second analysis, the design pressure of 2735 psig, design temperature of 189F, a reduced nominal wall thickness of 0.8125 inches, and the weaker of either the cast material or the weld material was used.

In this case, the limiting flaw sizes were determined using not just a single axial or circumferential 100% through wall crack, but a compound crack. That is, for various assumed depths of 360 degree (full circumferential) ID initiated cracks (corresponding to

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-036 10 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page 7 of II the deepest undetectable full circumferential ID cracks), allowable lengths of a 100%

through wall circumferential crack were determined.

Again, Section X1, Appendix C methodology was used.

For the axial crack, an analogous but different problem was solved. There is no closed form solution methodology to allow for compound axial flaws (two flaws superimposed, one part through wall, one 100% through wall), so for various assumed amounts of 360 degree (full circumferential) ID wall thinning (corresponding to the deepest undetectable full circumferential ID cracks), allowable lengths of a 100% through wall axial crack were determined. A methodology similar to that used in Code Case N-513-1 was employed.

Also in this analysis, a crack growth evaluation was performed to determine the largest allowable presently existing axial flaw that would not grow to exceed the allowable size within 100 cycles of 0 to 2735 psig, many more than expected for one fuel cycle. This analysis was made only for the axial flaw (not subject to seismic stresses) since it was the controlling (smaller) size from the above described analyses. Seismic stresses were not considered, as the associated stresses would not be transmitted to the valve body neck region.

The fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steels exposed to water environments was used.

Analysis 2 Results The following tables are quoted from the SIA calculation:

Table 1: Allowable Through-wall Flaw Lengths Case Description Axial Circumferential (in)

(in) 1 Through-wall assuming NDE 3.95

> 6 through entire thickness 2

Through-wall assuming NDE

>6 through 66% of wall thickness 3

Through-wall assuming NDE 1.17

> 6 through 60% of wall thickness 4

Through-wall assuming NDE 0.78

> 6 through 55% of wall thickness 5

Through-wall assuming NDE

>6 through 50% of wall thickness

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-036 10 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page 8 of I I Table 2: Critical Through-wall Flaw Lengths Case Description Axial Circumferential (in)

(in) 1 Through-wall assuming NDE 13.50

> 9 through entire thickness 2

Through-wall assuming NDE 7.21

> 9 through 66% of wall thickness 3

Through-wall assuming NDE through 60% of wall thickness 4

Through-wall assuming NDE 5.32

> 9 through 55% of wall thickness Through-wall assuming NDE through 50% of wall thickness The difference between Table 1 and 2 is that Table 1 includes a safety factor of 2.77 and 3.0 for the circumferential and axial, respectively. Table 2 terms the failure sized crack as "critical". The size ratios between the two tables is neither 2.77 nor 3.00 because the relationship between safety margin and flaw size is not linear when using limit load criteria.

In both cases, it is seen that for a co-existing up to 50% through wall 360 degree ID initiated circumferential flaw (corresponding to being able to detect flaws in only the outer 50% of the wall), the allowable/critical length of a 100% through wall circumferential flaw exceeds 6 inches for allowable and 9 inches for critical.

For an axial crack (most limiting), up to an ID wall thinning of 33% (corresponding to being able to detect flaws in only the outer 2/3 of the wall), the allowable length of a 100% through wall flaw is 1.64 inches, and the critical length is 7.21 inches. These sizes drop as more of the inner wall is assumed un-inspectable.

Figure 1 below, taken from the SIA calc, shows that the fatigue crack growth is negligible for any credible size flaw. (An initial axial flaw length of 4 inches is used.) Thus the allowable present flaw size is nearly or is equal to the allowable flaw sizes given above in Table 1, as shown in the below Table 3, taken from the SIA calc.

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-03610 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page 9 of II Figure 1.

Typical Crack Growth Evaluation Results (Axial Flaw with Full Thickness)

I ii II 2.010 2.008______

2.006______-

2.0014-2.002 2 OW 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

%0 100 Cyles Table 3:

Typical Crack Growth Evaluation Results (Axial Flaw with Full Thickness)

Case Description Axial (in)

Through-wall assuming NDE 393 through entire thickness 2

Through-wall assuming NDE 1.64 through 66% of wall thickness 3

Through-wall assuming NDE 1.17 through 60% of wall thickness 4

Through-wall assuming NDE 0.78 through 55% of wall thickness 5

Through-wall assuming NDE 0.06 through 50% of wall thickness Summary of Fracture Mechanics Evaluations:

Structural Integrity Associates fracture mechanics analysis demonstrated with reasonable confidence that the critical flaw size exceeds the expected NDE detectable flaw size.

The analysis utilized appropriate factors of safety, and conservative design parameters.

OPERABILITY EVALUATION PIP M-07-03610 Relief Request 07-MN-001 Enclosure I Page lO of I I 1 NV-240 Periodic Inspections:

Periodic leakage inspections will be performed within the Boric Acid Corrosion Program, and frequent monitoring will also be performed to monitor 1NV-240 leak-rate.

Additionally, periodic volumetric inspections will be performed to detect unexpected flaw growth. These actions will be addressed by the corrective action program.

10. Compensatory Actions Required for Operability No compensatory actions are required to maintain operability.

11. Conclusions The evaluation concluded that 1 NV-240 is Operable But Degraded/Non-Conforming to ASME Section Xl requirements. 1 NV-240 body thru-wall leakage is non-conformance with IWC-3000 for acceptable flaw characteristics, and IWA-4000 for acceptable repair/replacement requirements.

The fracture mechanics analysis demonstrated with reasonable confidence that the critical and allowable flaw size exceeds the expected NDE detectable flaw size.

The potential failure modes were evaluated with-respect to the cause of the valve body leakage, and it was concluded that the leakage likely resulted due to a weld repair flaw, and possibly a casting flaw may have been an additional contributor. The probability of a catastrophic body failure is not deemed credible, based on the following:

• The fracture mechanics analyses included significant safety factors, and overly conservative pressure cycles allowances.

S1 NV-240 body casting and weld repair materials have high fracture toughness.

A localized weld/casting flaw would not be expected to experience a rapid increase in leakage.

No credible failure mechanisms were identified, which could propagate a pre-existing crack.

• The surface appearance of the flaw does not appear crack-like, and thus would not be expected to be prone to rapid propagation.

S1 NV-240 was originally hydrostatically tested to 5625 psig.

• The valve stress report documented that under 4g seismic acceleration, the valve stresses were -20% of the code allowable stresses 1 NV-240 body leakage does not constitute Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary leakage as defined by Tech Spec 3.4.13, as the valve is located upstream of the charging header containment isolation valves.

The ECCS and boration flowpath capability are fully OPERABLE. Similarly, the assumptions of the LOCA dose analyses remain valid, based on total ECCS Auxiliary Building leakage (including 1 NV-240 body external leakage) being substantially less than 0.25 gpm.

Routine Reactor Coolant System Leakage surveillances and the ECCS Auxiliary Building Leakage Program provide assurance of continued operability. It is further concluded that the NV system is capable of fulfilling all its credited functional requirements as stated in the UFSAR and Technical Specifications.

OPERABILITY EVALUATION Pm M-07-03610 Relief Request 07-MN-OO1 Enclosure I Page II of II Prepared By:

Bryan D. Meyer Date:

6/25/07 Checked By:

Robert W. Kirk Date:

6/25/07 Reviewed By: Victor J. Thompson Date:

6/25/07 Approved By:

Scott H. Karriker Date:

6/25/07 ATTTACHMENTS:

1) 1 NV-240 UT Results, 6/20/07

2) 1 NV-240 UT Results, 6/21/07

3) 1 NV-240 Body Neck UT Thickness Mapping, 6/22/07

4) Structural Integrity Calculation, MNS-05Q-301, Rev. 0, "Flaw Evaluation of Class 2 Isolation Valve 1 NV-240 Pinhole Leak in Charging Supply Piping."

5) 1 NV-240 Vendor Drawing, MCM-1 205.00-1186-001.

6) Valve 1 NV-240 Ultrasonic Examination Report, 6/24/07.

7) Structural Integrity Calculation, MNS-05Q-302, Rev. 0, "Compound Flaw Evaluation of Class 2 Isolation Valve 1 NV-240 Pinhole Leak in Charging Supply Piping."

8) Metallurgical Report, Nuclear Generation Materials Engineering & Lab Services, "Speculated Failure Mode for MNS 1 NV-240."

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 1 INV-240 UT Results 6/20/07

S0 CL C=7 C).

DUKE POWER COMPANY FORM NDE-940B ULTRASONIC THICKNESS MEASUREMENT REPORT REVISION I Station:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit:

I Date:

6-20-07 Sheet Number:

I of 1 Procedure:

NDE 940 Rev.:

2 F/C:

N/A Cou plant:

ULTRAGEL-2 Batch No:

06125 Examiner:

Russel E. Jones Level:

III Calibration Block ID:

Pyrometer S/N:

N/A Examniner:

Lonnie Cochran Level:

III Cal ibration Block Temp:

AMýBIENT Cal.Due:

N/A INSTRUMENT TRANSDUCER Model No:

USN 60 Type:

Single E-I" Dual Z]

Frequency:

4.0 Mhz Size:

.3.5 X 10 Serial No:

01 IMBT Manufacturer:

KRAUTKRAMER Manufacturer:

KBA Serial No:

57462-8558 SKETCH OF EXAMINED ITEM ACCEPTANCE STANDARD:

PER ENGINEERING CABLES RESULTS:

RG62 El

\\.V UT READINGS CAN NOT BE COMFIRMED 100 PERCENT RG 174 ACCURATE DUE TO CAST STAINLESS STEEL MATERIAL NOT BEING COMPATIBLE WITH UT TECHNIQUES. READINGS IN AREA OF LEAK RANGED FROM.773" TO.903". SUSPECT j-AiL. A(CA READINGS TO BE BACKWALL INDICATION (ID OF PIPE).

Length:

6 ft.

Initial Calibration Time:

1850 Cal Checks STAINLESS STEEL CAL BLOCK 03-7088 USED IN LIEU OF CAST STAINLESS STEEL CAL BLOCK. NO CAST STAINLESS Time Initials STEEL CAL BLOCK AVAILABLE.

1930 LOOKING EAST DRAWING NOT TO SCALE REMARKS: WORK ORDER 0 1757969-02 Component/ltem No: MC I NV VA 0240 VALVE: INVESTIGATE LEAK Sheet I of I REVIEWED BY:

/

LEVEL:..-$

DATE:,-

/1

/- -

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 2 INV-240 UT Results 6/21/07

E ' ~

DUKE POWER COMPANY FORM NDE-940B ULTRASONIC THICKNESS MEASUREMENT REPORT REVISION I Station:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit:

I Date:

6-21-07 Sheet Number:

I of I Procedure

e NDE 940 Rev.:

2 F/C:

N/A Couplant:

ULTRAGEL-2 Batch No:

06125 Examiner Pyoee SN

/

Lonnie Cochran Level:

III Calibration Block ID:

Pyrometer S/N:

N/A Examiner N/A Level:

N/A Calibration Block Temp:

AMBIENT Cal.Due:

N/A INSTRUMENT TRANSDUCER Model No:

USN 60 Type:

Single E] Dual Z

Frequency:

4.0 Mhz Size:

.3.5 X 10 Serial No:

OOTJXY Manufacturer:

KRAUTKRAMER Manufacturer:

KBA Serial No:

57462-8558 SKETCH OF EXAMINED ITEM ACCEPTANCE STANDARD:

PER ENGINEERING CABLES RESULTS:

RG62 UT READINGS CAN NOT BE COMFIRMED 100 PERCENT RG174 ACCURATE DUE TO CAST STAINLESS STEEL MATERIAL NOT SEE ATTACHED SKETCH FOR AREA BEING COMPATIBLE WITH UT TECHNIQUES. READINGS LOCATIONS AND UT RESULTS.

TAKEN IN AREAS IDENTIFIED BY EDDY CURRENT. READINGS RANGED FROM.612" TO.919". SUSPECT READINGS TO BE STAINLESS STEEL TO CAST STAINLESS STEEL INTERFACE Length:

6 ft.

AND/OR BACKWALL INDICATION (ID OF PIPE).

Initial Calibration Time:

1905 Cal Checks

• STAINLESS STEEL CAL BLOCK MFB005 USED IN LIEU OF CAST STAINLESS STEEL CAL BLOCK. NO CAST STAINLESS ime Initials STEEL CAL BLOCK AVAILABLE.

2127 Q

REMARKS: WORK ORDER 01757969-18 Component/Item No: MC I NV VA 0240 VALVE: INVESTIGATE LEAK Sheet I of 3 REVIEWED BY:

LEVEL:

DATE:

07

Relief Request 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation Page 2 of 3 S

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McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 4 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

File Number: MNS-05Q-301, Rev. 0 Calculation

Title:

"Flaw Evaluation of Class 2 Isolation Valve INV-240 Pinhole Leak in Charging Supply Piping"

Structural Integrity CALCULATION File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Associates, Inc.

PACKAGE Project No.: MNS-05Q PROJECT NAME: Flaw Evaluation of Charging System Valve Pinhole Leak Contract No.: 00091090 CLIENT: Duke Energy PLANT: McGuire CALCULATION TITLE: Flaw Evaluation of Class 2 Isolation Valve 1NV-240 Pinhole Leak in Charging Supply Piping Project Mgr.

Preparer(s) &

Document Affected Revision Description Approval Checker(s)

Revision Pages Signature &

Signatures &

Date Date 0

1-10 Original Issue Al -A3 Computer

,2'

,*z 7

Robert McGill File Robert McGill 06/21/07 06/21/07 Nat Cofie 06/21/07 Soo Bee Kok 06/21/07 (Checker)

£ L

Page 1 of 10 SI Form F2001 R2a

Table of Contents 1 I IN T R O D U C T IO N................................................................................................................................

3 2

M E T H O D O L O G Y................................................................................................................................

3 3

ASSUMPTIONS / DESIGN INPUTS............

I............................... 3 4

CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS................................................................................................

4 4.1 Allowable Flaw Size Determination....................................................................................

4 4.1.1 C ircumferential F law........................................................................................................

4 4.1.2 A x ia l F la w.................................................................................................................................

5 4.2 Flaw G row th A nalysis.........................................................................................................

6 5

C O N C L U S IO N S...................................................................................................................................

7 6

REFERENCES..................................................................

10 APPENDIX A AXIAL AND CIRCUMFERENTIAL PLANAR FLAW CALCULATION DETAIL. Al List of Tables Table 1: A llow able Flaw Sizes Calculated...........................................................................................

5 List of Figures Figure 1: Location of Flaw in Valve INV-240....................................................................................

8 Figure 2: Crack Growth Evaluation Results.........................................................................................

9 Structural integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 2 of 10

1 INTRODUCTION A pinhole leak was discovered in manual isolation valve lNV-240. This valve is located in the Class 2 segment of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) supply line. The leak is near the bonnet closure in the cast stainless steel portion of the valve. The location of the leak is shown in Figure 1 [1].

The operating temperature of the system is 100 to 1 lOF with an operating pressure of 2500 psi.

Although a formal root cause evaluation has not been completed, it is believed that this defect is a fabrication defect associated with the casting. Possible degradation mechanisms such as stress corrosion cracking and localized corrosion mechanisms such as pitting and microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) are considered very unlikely due to the combination of the material of the valve and the operating conditions. Hence it is believed that there are no active degradation mechanisms that could have initiated the flaw and that the most likely cause of the leak is a fabrication defect.

The objective of this calculation is to determine allowable flaw sizes in both the axial and circumferential directions modeling the affected section of the valve body neck as a pipe to demonstrate structural stability. A flaw growth analysis considering fatigue is also performed to predict the flaw size at the end of the current cycle.

2 METHODOLOGY The flaw evaluation is based on the criteria prescribed in Section XI, Appendix C [2] assuming the valve body neck may be modeled as a pipe and using an flaw depth to wall thickness ratio of unity (similar to the ASME Code Case N-513-1 [3] approach). Allowable flaw sizes will be detennined using Limit Load criteria specified in Article C-3000 [2] in both the axial and circumferential directions. Flaw growth evaluation considering fatigue as a possible mechanism is performed using the methodology in ASME Code Section X1, Appendix C for stainless steel components.

3 ASSUMPTIONS / DESIGN INPUTS The following assumptions are made for the analysis:

1. Service Level A safety factors are conservatively applied.

2.

Dead weight and thermal loading are assumed negligible. Both a zero and conservative bending stress of 10 ksi (assumed for seismic OBE loading) is used in the analysis.

The following design inputs are used for the analysis (material properties are taken at the given operating temperature):

1. The valve material is SA-351 Grade CF8M cast austenitic stainless steel [4].

2.

Operating pressure = 2500 psig [4].

3. Operating temperature = 11 0°F [4].

4. Valve body neck ID = 4.313 inches [5].

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 3 of 10

5.

Valve body thickness at neck = 0.875 inch [5].

6.

Design stress intensity, Sm = 20 ksi [6, p. 316].

7. Code yield strength (interpolated), Sy = 29.5 ksi [6, p. 506].

8.

Code tensile strength, S, = 70.0 ksi [6, p. 438].

4 CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS 4.1 Allowable Flaw Size Determination Since the defect is a pinhole leak, the ASME Section XI allowable through-wall flaw size is determined in both the axial and circumferential directions in order to determine the limiting case.

4.1.1 Circumferential Flaw The material of the valve body is Type F316, Grade CF8M cast austenitic stainless steel. Therefore, the net section collapse methodology described in Reference 7 and implemented in ASME Code Section XI, Appendix C [2] is used in this evaluation. The technical approach consists of determining the allowable flaw size (circumferential extent and through-wall depth) in the pipe that will cause the flawed pipe section to collapse.

Based on equilibrium of longitudinal forces and moments about the pipe axis, the relation between the applied loads and flaw size at incipient plastic collapse is given by:

P11'b u 2 sin 6 -

asin a(1 where the angle, 13, defining the location of the neutral axis is:

=8

r--a-.--

(2) 2 t

o-a

=

half flaw angle t

=

pipe thickness a

=

flaw depth P,

=

primary membrane stress P'b bending stresses corresponding to plastic collapse o-f

=

flow stress at net section plastic collapse (3 Sm).

For longer flaws penetrating the compressive bending region where (a +8) > 7r, the relation between the applied loads and the flaw depth at incipient plastic collapse is given by:

Structural integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 4 of 10

P b =

2-f sinfi (3) where:

I 1 a_ P,,

(4) a-t 0f 2 -

t An iterative process is used to calculate the critical flaw size using Equations 1 through 4. The above equations were solved for a through-wall flaw (a/t = 1). Details of the analysis are provided in Appendix A and the results are presented in Table 1.

4.1.2 Axial Flaw The allowable axial through-wall flaw length, Jail, is determined using the relationship form Reference 8 which is given as:

2 2

1,11 =

58Vf SF

) Ii (5) where:

R

=

mean pipe radius t

=

pipe thickness 07

=

material flow stress = (Sy+Su)/2 SF

=

safety factor = 3.0 a,,

=

hoop stress = pDo/2t, where p = operating pressure and Do = outside diameter.

The above expression is also used in Code Case N-513-1 for the evaluation of axial through-wall flaws.

Using the assumptions and design inputs described above an allowable flaw size is calculated in both the axial and circumferential directions per Section XI, Appendix C (see Appendix A for details). Calculation details are provided in the Excel file: MNS-O5Q Analysis.xls (included with the project computer files).

Table 1 summarizes the output.

Table 1: Allowable Flaw Sizes Calculated Flaw Direction Allowable Flaw Size (in)

Axial 3.89 Circumferential 9.88*

Circumferential 5.36**

• Applying no bending stress.

• • Applying a bending stress of 10 ksi.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 5 of 10

4.2 Flaw Growth Analysis In this section, a conservative fatigue analysis is perforlned by assuming an initial through-wall flaw with a length of 0.25 inches. This is a very conservative assumption since the defect is a pinhole leak. An axial flaw was considered in this evaluation since it is bounding. The material of the valve body is cast stainless steel. As such, the fatigue crack growth evaluation is performed using the methodology in ASME Code Section XI, IWC-3640 for stainless steel components using the QA software package pc-CRACK [9].

Since the defect is through-wall, the end of life flaw size due to fatigue crack growth is calculated using the fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steels exposed to water environments. Per Reference 7, the fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steel in air environment along with an environment factor of 2.0 for PWR water environment can be used.

From Subarticle C-3200 of Reference 2, the fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steel in air environments is given by:

da

-N

= Co(AK )n (6) dN

where, AKI stress intensity factor range (Kmax - Kmin) n

=

3.3 Co

=

CxS where, C is a scaling parameter to account for temperature and is given by:

C = 1 0 [ - 1 0 "0 0 9 + 8 "1 2 '1 0 -4T - I 'I3 I O -6T 2 + 1 'O2

-,, 1 0 -9 T ' ]

where, T is the metal temperature in 'F (for T < 800TF), and S is a scaling parameter to account for R ratio and is given by:

S= 1.0 R<0

= 1.0 + 1.8R 0< R< 0.79

= -43.35 + 57.97R 0.79 < R < 1.0

with, R = Kmin / Kmax The maximum operating metal temperature of 1 lOF is used in the calculation of the scaling factor C. At a temperature at 1 10F and for R < 0 as assumed in this case, Co was calculated as 1.17x10-10 for an air environment. A value of Co of 2.34x I 10 was, therefore, used for the PWR water environment to determine crack growth.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 6 of 10

At the location of the flaw, there are no thennal transients other than heat-up and cooldown cycles. Hence the evaluation is performed by assuming 500 heat-up and cooldown cycles which is conservative relative to the time that this flaw is expected to be in service.

The results of this fatigue crack growth evaluation are shown in Figure 2. Assuming an initial through-wall flaw length of 0.25 inches, the crack growth after 500 cycles is less than 1 mil with a maximum final crack depth of approximately 0.26 inch. This final crack depth is significantly below the allowable flaw depth of 3.89 inches calculated above for an axial flaw. These results indicate that the valve body exhibits a very high flaw tolerance and should be acceptable for continued operation for at least one cycle.

5 CONCLUSIONS

" The allowable flaw size at the location of the defect is at least 5.36 inches in the circumferential direction and 3.89 inches in the axial direction.

Flaw growth assuming a conservative initial flaw size of 0.25 inch is less than 1 mil resulting in a maximum final flaw size of 0.26 inch, which is well below the allowable flaw sizes in either the circumferential or axial direction.

" Based on the above, it is concluded that the defect in the valve is acceptable for continued operation for at least one cycle.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 7 of 10

IFL.~"-1 r

1%V 71r.

£:v$L a pp 4 LWO4 Figure 1: Location of Flaw in Valve 1NV-240 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

Fatigue Crack Growth - Axial Flaw

(.C

'I.

0.1 0.125M 0.125015 0.12510 0.125DD 0.125n 0

50 100 150 200 250 3W 350 4CW 450 500 Na dCydes Figure 2: Crack Growth Evaluation Results I

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 9 of 10

6 REFERENCES 1, Email attachment "1nv240.bmp," from Bryan Meyer (Duke) to Bob McGill (SI), "

Subject:

Valve Vendor Drawings - 1NV-240 with flaw location," dated Wednesday, June 20, 2007, 7:12PM, SI File No. MNS-05Q-202.

2I ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1998 Edition (2000 Addenda).

3, ASME Code Case N-513-1, "Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or Class 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1," Cases of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, March 28, 2001.

4. E-mail from Robert Kirk (Duke) to Bob McGill (SI), "

Subject:

RE: P.O Issuance for Structural Integrity-Fracture Mechanics evaluation for 1 NV-240," dated Thursday, June 21, 2007, 10:42AM, SI File No. MNS-05Q-203.

5. Email attachment "0577.pdf," from Robert Dixon (Duke) to Bob McGill (SI), "

Subject:

FW:

0577," dated Wednesday, June 20, 2007, 7:12PM, SI File No. MNS-05Q-201.

6. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Part D - Properties, 1998 Edition (2000 Addenda).

7. ASME Section XI Task Group for Piping Flaw Evaluation, 'Evaluation of Flaws in Austenitic Steel Piping,' Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol. 108, August, 1986.

8. "Evaluation of Flaws in Austenitic Steel Piping," EPRI NP-4690-SR, Electric Power Research Institute, July 1989.

9. Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., "pc-CRACKT M Fracture Mechanics Software," Version 3.1 -

98348, 1998.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 10 of 10

APPENDIX A AXIAL AND CIRCUMFERENTIAL PLANAR FLAW CALCULATION DETAIL Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page Al of A3

Description of Solution Methodology:

The through-wall flaw is evaluated as two independent planar through-wall flaws: one oriented in the axial direction and one oriented in the circumferential direction. For the axial planar analysis using the inputs provided, the hoop stress and material flow stress are calculated from Reference [8] and then used in the allowable flaw length equation from Reference [8]. For the circumferential planar analysis using the inputs provided, ASME Section Xl Appendix C (1998) [2], Section C-3320 is used. An iterative approach is used on theta (half crack angle) to determine the allowable flaw size conforming to the allowable pipe bending stress and allowable pipe membrane stress.

AXIAL ANALYSIS Flow Stress =

Hoop Stress =

Safety Factor =

Allowable Flaw Length =

49,750 psi Cf= (SY + Sý )/2 Reference o 8,861 psi a, = pDo /12t Reference 0 3

Section XI Appendix C. Section C-3420 3.89 in

= 1.58-fRIt" SFJ 2 -

21 Reference l

• (SFa CIRCUMFERENTIAL ANALYSIS Theta + Beta =

Design Stress Intensity, S. =

Primary Membrane Stress =

2.27 radians

= ý-Cf2 sinf

- tsin 0]

C-3320 Equation 3 used when (0 + 1) < /

23*

t C,

20,000 psi 4,331 psi 0.64 radians 7,665 psi Pr, = pDo / 4t Section Xl Appendix C, Section C-3310 (points to NB-3652, Equation 9)

Theta adjusted until failure bending stress equals equation below P, = SF (Po + Pb ) - PrM Section Xl Appendix C, Section C-3320 (Equation 5)

Section Xt Appendix C, Section C-3320 (normal operating conditions)

Safety Factor =

2.77 Piping Bending Stress =

0 psi Failure Bending Stress =

7,665 psi Allowable Flaw Length =

9.88 in I.,, = OD.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A2 of A3

CIRCUMFERENTIAL ANALYSIS (10 ksi Bending)

Theta + Beta =

1.90 radians b2 L2sinp-tsino]

C-3320 Equation 3 used when (0 + P3) < E Design Stress Intensity, S,=

Primary Membrane Stress =

j3=

20,000 4,331 psi psi 1.02 radians 35,365 Psi Pm = PDo / 4t Section Xl Appendix C, Section C-3310 (points to NB-3652, Equation 9)

Theta adjusted until failure bending stress equals equation below P' = SF (Pa, + Pb ) -

Section XI Appendix C, Section C-3320 (Equation 5)

Section XI Appendix C, Section C-3320 (normal operating conditions)

Safety Factor =

2.77 Piping Bending Stress =

lO0OOO psi Failure Bending Stress =

35,365 psi Allowable Flaw Length =

5.36 in Oal

= 0Do Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-301 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A3 of A3

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 5 INV-240 Vendor Drawing MCM-1205.00-1186-001

> u

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 6 Valve INV-240 Ultrasonic Examination Report

Relief Request 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation Page 1 of 3 McGuire Unit 1 Valve 1NV-240 Ultrasonic Examination Report INTRODUCTION Ultrasonic examinations were performed to investigate a through wall leak in the stainless steel valve body. The initial ultrasonic examination was performed by Duke Energy NDE personnel using a 4 Megahertz, 10 mm diameter straight beam search unit. Subsequent ultrasonic examinations were performed using 2 Megahertz dual element refracted longitudinal wave (RL) probes and OD Creeping waves. As there is no qualified procedure for cast stainless steel examination, guidance for the angle beam technique was sought from the available documents listed below:

EPRI Report TR-107481, "Status of the Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Loop Cast Stainless Steel Materials" Table 4-1. This table indicates that RTD 60', 70' and Creeping wave search units produced the highest signal-to-noise ratio when detecting a through-wall crack.'

Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. "Review of Draft White Paper: Current Inspection Capabilities for Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping", Prepared by L.D. Nottingham, R.A.

Hermann, A. J. Giannuzzi and N.G. Cofie.

Inspection From Outside of the Pipe "In spite of the limitations posed by current available UT techniques, the general feeling is that large circumferential flaws (about 25% to 50% through-wall) could probably be found from the OD inspections. However, it is felt that detection of axial defects from the OD would be difficult. Axial flaws are not limiting. Large axial flaws though can be tolerated without exceeding the Section XI safety margins."

USNRC Safety Evaluation for Catawba Relief Request 04-CN-001, (docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414). This SER states that inspection of the outer 2/3 of the cast stainless steel piping material using RTD 600, 700 and Creeping wave search units provides reasonable assurance of structural integrity.

A review of research to date indicates that planar flaws initiating at the inside surface and having through wall extents no greater than 1/3 of the wall thickness have a low probability of detection while planar flaws which have grown beyond this limit have a higher probability of detection.

CALIBRATION and EXAMINATION The 450, 60' and 70' beam angles were calibrated with a Krautkramer USN-60. As no cast stainless steel calibration block was available a SA-240 stainless steel plate with a 2 mm diameter side drilled hole at a depth of 1.0" was used to calibrate for the 450, 600 and 70' beam angles. The Creeping Wave probe was calibrated using a 1/16" diameter side drilled hole at a These search units were used to inspect cast piping welds at CNS under Relief Request 04-CN-001 which is also referenced.

2 This paper deals with cast austenitic piping inspection

Relief Request 07-MN-00 I Operability Evaluation Page 2 of 3 depth of 0.2". Reference sensitivity was established using the applicable hole signal set at 80%

full screen height. Scanning was performed at + 12dB over reference sensitivity for the 450 probe and +6dB over reference sensitivity for 600 and 700 probes. The scanning gain for the Creeping wave probe was set to reference sensitivity due to excessive front surface noise at higher gain levels. With the 450 scan it was possible to monitor the inside surface noise level at 10% full screen height assuring that some sound energy was reaching the ID. There was little internal noise indicating grain sizes on the order of one wave length or larger were not present.

As there was no qualified procedure, detection and length sizing of the flaw would be challenging and dependent on variations in grain structure within the casting. Length measurement of suspected flaws was determined by past experience with similar materials indicating that true crack lengths can be longer than that which can be seen on an ultrasonic display. Therefore any indication determined to be a flaw would have been conservatively length sized from peak amplitude down to the baseline and in no case measured less than least twice the search unit width (1.5").

ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS The thickness of the valve in the area of the leak measured 0.773" to 0.874". Using the maximum thickness of 0.874" the ultrasonic examination was designed to interrogate the valve body starting at 0.600" deep to within 0.1" of the outside surface.

The following RL probes were used:3 Manufacturer Model Size (mm)

Frequency (MHz)

Focal Distance (MM)

RTD 450 TRL2-Aust 2(8x 14) 2 27 RTD 600 TRL2-Aust 2(7x10) 2 25 RTD 700 TRL2-Aust 2(7x 10) 2 20 RTD TRCr2-Aust 2(6x13) 2 10 The straight beam examination revealed only the back wall of the valve body and no other indications. The angle beam scanning covered nine base metal weld repair areas in various locations that were mapped using Eddy Current inspection. Each weld repair area was scanned with four angle beams from four directions (2 axial and 2 circumferential). In addition to the four scan directions, the area at the leak site received a radial scan 360' around the location. The examiners were able to maintain the inside surface reflection with the 450 search unit even while scanning over the cast base material. No planar flaw indications were detected.

The recording criteria were based on prior experience with other cast stainless steel materials and with planar flaws in general. Typically the indication would only be recorded if they have a 3:1 signal to noise ratio, planar characteristics such as indication movement in the through wall direction and a length greater than the width of the search unit in order to avoid a false call. No signals with these characteristics were found.

3 Similar but larger search units were used at Catawba.

Relief Request 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation Page 3 of 3 CONCLUSIONS The ability to detect planar flaws in cast austenitic material is dependant on the shape, size and orientation of the grains. This was a "best effort" examination because of the absence of a qualified procedure and a calibration block of cast stainless steel and does not purport to be a Code acceptable examination. Use of the 450 beam enabled monitoring of the ID surface while all ultrasonic displays were relatively noise free. The 4 M-z straight beam search unit showed similar low noise levels. Therefore a relatively small, uniform grain size can be assumed.

Because of these conditions there is reasonable assurance that the ultrasonic examination techniques used are capable of detecting planar flaws once they grow beyond the inner 1/3 volume of material and have a measured length of 1.5" or greater.

Investigations in the area of the leak and other eight weld repair areas did not show any evidence of a planar flaw.

Prepared By: James J. Mc Ardle III/Principal NDE Level III UT Date: 6/24/07 Verified By Russel E. Jones / NDE Level III UT Date: 6/24/07

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 7 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

File Number: MNS-05Q-302, Rev. 0 Calculation

Title:

"Compound Flaw Evaluation of Class 2 Isolation Valve INV-240 Pinhole Leak in Charging Supply Piping"

Structural Integrity CALCULATION File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Associates, Inc.

PACKAGE Project No.: MNS-05Q PROJECT NAME: Flaw Evaluation of Charging System Valve Pinhole Leak Contract No.: 00091090 CLIENT: Duke Energy PLANT: McGuire Unit I CALCULATION TITLE: Compound Flaw Evaluation of Class 2 Isolation Valve 1NV-240 Pinhole Leak in Charging Supply Piping Project Mgr.

Preparer(s) &

Document Affected Revision Description Approval Checker(s)

Revision Pages Signature &

Signatures &

Date Date 0

1-16 Original Issue Al - A13 BI -AB26 Robert McGill CI -C2 Robert McGill 06/24/07 Computer 06/24/07 File Nat Cofie 06/24/07 Marcos Herrera 06/24/07 (Checker)

Page 1 of 16 SI Form F2001 R2a

Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................

3 2

METHODOLOGY............................................................................................

3 3 ASSUMPTIONS / DESIGN INPUTS.......................................................................

3 4

CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS........................................................................

4 4.1 Determination of Stresses............................................................................

4 4.1.1 Circumferential Flaw...................................................................................

4 4.1.2 Axial Flaw................................................................................................

5 4.2 Allowable Flaw Size Determination................................................................

5 4.2.1 Circumferential Flaw...................................................................................

5 4.2.2 Axial Flaw................................................................................................

8 4.3 Flaw Growth Analysis...............................................................................

8 5 CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................

10 6

REFERENCES...............................................................................................

16 APPENDIX A ANSC OUTPUT FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL COMPOUND FLAW EVALUATION.........................................................................................

Al APPENDIX B pc-CRACK OUTPUT.........................................................................

BI APPENDIX C CITED EMAIL REFERENCE.............................................................B...13 List of Tables Table 1: Allowable Through-wall Flaw Lengths...........................................................11..I Table 2: Critical Through-wall Flaw Lengths..............................................................

11..I Table 3: Beginning of Cycle Allowable Axial Through-wall Flaw Lengths...............................

12 List of Figures Figure 1. Location of Flaw in Valve I1NV-240................................................................

13 Figure 2. Loading and Stress Distribution of a Cylindrical Section at Net Section Collapse............. 14 Figure 3. Typical Crack Growth Evaluation Results (Axial Flaw with Full Thickness)..................

15 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 2 of 16

1 INTRODUCTION A pinhole leak was discovered in a manual isolation valve I NV-240 at McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

This valve is located in the ASME Class 2 segment of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) supply line. The leak is near the bonnet closure in the cast stainless steel portion of the valve and its location is shown in Figure 1 [1].

Although a formal root cause evaluation has not been completed, it is believed that this defect is a fabrication defect associated with the casting. Possible degradation mechanisms such as stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and localized corrosion mechanisms such as pitting and microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) are considered very unlikely due to the combination of the material of the valve and the operating conditions. Hence, it is believed that there are no active degradation mechanisms that could have initiated the flaw and that the most likely cause of the leak is a fabrication defect.

The objective of this calculation is to detenmine allowable and critical flaw sizes in both the axial and circumferential directions modeling the affected section of the valve body neck as a pipe to demonstrate structural stability. A flaw growth analysis considering fatigue is also performed to predict the flaw size at the end of the current cycle. Design conditions are used for the evaluation.

2 METHODOLOGY Non destructive examinations of the affected area of the valve were perfonmed using ultrasonic techniques.

Because of the difficulty in ultrasonically inspecting cast material, these inspections could only penetrate the valve body to a certain distance through the valve thickness. Hence in this evaluation, a compound flaw is assumed consisting of the through-wall pinhole leak and a portion of the valve body that could not be inspected. This approach to modeling the pinhole leak will bound the actual flaw.

The flaw evaluation is based on the criteria prescribed in Section XI, Appendix C [2] assuming the valve body neck may be modeled as a pipe and using an flaw depth to wall thickness ratio of unity for the pinhole leak (similar to the ASME Code Case N-513-1 [3] approach). In addition, a flaw is assumed for the inner portion of the valve body that could not be inspected. Allowable flaw sizes will be determined using Limit Load criteria specified in references 8 and 2 for both the axial and circumferential directions, respectively. Flaw growth evaluation considering fatigue as a possible mechanism is performed using the methodology in ASME Code Section XI, Appendix C for stainless steel components. No other mechanisms are deemed to be possible at this location.

3 ASSUMPTIONS / DESIGN INPUTS The following assumptions are made for the analysis:

1. Service Level A/B safety factors are conservatively applied for the allowable flaw lengths.

2. Dead weight and thermal loading are assumed negligible.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, 1IW.

Page 3 of 16

3.

The flaw growth evaluation is conservatively based on 100 full pressure cycles (0 to design pressure) since there are no thermal transients other than pressure cycles.

4. The valve body neck thickness is assumed to be 0.8125 inch.

The following design inputs are used for the analysis (material properties are taken at the given design temperature):

1. The valve material is SA-351 Grade CF8M cast austenitic stainless steel [4].

2.

Design pressure = 2735 psig [4].

3.

Design temperature = 189°F [4].

4. Valve body neck ID = 4.313 inches [5].

5. Design stress intensity, Sm = 20 ksi [6, p. 316].

Note that the cast austenitic stainless steel has an equivalent design stress intensity to that of the weld filler metal E316-16 SFA 5.4 [11]. The analysis presented herein applies to either material.

4 CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS 4.1 Determination of Stresses 4.1.1 Circumferential Flaw For a circumferential flaw, the stresses of interest are the axial stresses resulting from internal pressure and the bending stress resulting from seismic loads. The axial stress resulting from pressure is given by:

PD, _ 5.0 ksi 4t where:

P = design pressure = 2735 psi Do = outside diameter = 5.938 inches t = thickness = 0.8125 inches.

The bending stress (ob) is calculated as:

b =MR = 1.14 ksi S

where:

S = section modulus -

= 14.83 in3 32D0 MR = 16.87 in-kips = resultant moment conservatively calculated by applying an assumed 5g load at the end of the valve in the lateral direction with a moment arm of 25 inches and valve weight of 135 lbs. Note that the moment arm length and valve weight were taken from Reference I (marked-up drawing) and assumed accurate.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

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4.1.2 Axial Flaw For an axial flaw, the stress of interest is the hoop stress resulting from pressure loading. This is given by the expression:

ahoop

= PDo 2t The thickness of the valve is varied corresponding to the NDE threshold for detection in determining the allowable and critical flaw sizes in the axial direction. For the full thickness of the valve, 0.8125", the hoop stress is 10.0 ksi.

4.2 Allowable Flaw Size Determination Since the defect is a pinhole leak and the flaw cannot be characterized with accuracy through the wall, the ASME Section XI allowable through-wall flaw size is determined in both the axial and circumferential directions in order to determine the limiting case.

4.2.1 Circumferential Flaw The material of the valve body is SA-351 Grade CF8M cast austenitic stainless steel. Therefore, the net section collapse methodology described in Reference 7 and implemented in ASME Code Section XI, Appendix C [2] is used in this evaluation. The technical approach consists of determining the allowable flaw size (circumferential extent and through-wall length) in the pipe that will cause the flawed pipe section to collapse.

For a more generalized case of a compound flaw, a closed form solution is not possible and as such, an iterative solution must be used. This iterative solution for solving the net section plastic collapse equation for a compound flaw has been incorporated in SI QA computer software Arbitrary Net Section Collapse (ANSC)

[10]. Two cases are evaluated in the software: Case 1 for when the crack face will not take compression (on the compressive side of the neutral axis when a bending moment is present) and Case 2 for when the crack will take compression. The solution approach for Case 1 is as follows:

1) Based on a thin shell formulation (consistent with Reference 7), the area of the undegraded cylinder (remote fi-om a flawed section) and the degraded cylinder (at the flawed section) as shown in Figure 2 are determined:

A nondegraded = 2 71 r t,,

(1)

A degraded f rt(O)dO (2) 0 where:

r

=

mean radius of cylinder

=

thickness of nondegraded cylinder Structural integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 5 of 16

t(O)

=

thickness degraded cylinder as a function of angle 0

=

angle from reference point, radius.

2) The area of metal at the degraded section which is in tension and the area that is in compression are detennined:

Aiension, = Adegraded - A compression (3)

A tension = 0.5 x [m Anondegraded + Adcgraded (4) a'f where:

am

=

axial membrane stress in remote unflawed section, 0-

=

flow stress, see Figure 2.

After this is determined, an axis across the cylinder section, above which tension exists and below which compression exists, may be determined for any arbitrary angle as shown in Figure 2.

3) By changing the angle of the tension-to-compression axis (cc), the moments about both the x-axis and the y-axis (or x'-axis and y'-axis) that will produce the state of stress may be determined. These may be combined to yield a resultant moment (Mr) that may be in a direction different than that of the tension-to-compression axis:

M 2=

r-, cos (0- a) t(O)dO (5) 0 2;r M =

,S rsin (0- oa) t(O)dO (6) 0 Mr =

M. + M;,,

(7) 2 = tan-'Mj (8) where:

A

=

angle of direction of resultant moment from the x' -axis, S

=

+ o-f above the tension-to-compression axis, and

- o'i otherwise.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 6 of 16

4) The maximum bending stresses in the remote unflawed section may be determined. As in Reference 7, thin shell theory is used to solve all equations.

Pb.,'= M._

(9)

Z r2 t Pb. v' -- My (10)

P b. m..

M (1 1 )

In ANSC, for a specified Pm and a given geometry and set of flaws, Pb..,', Pb. ' and Pb. f,,; are calculated, where Pb.,,,m is equal to the limiting bending stress at a point remote from the flawed section.

For the case where the section below the neutral axis, which may be flawed, is assumed to take compression, the determination of the position of the compression-to-tension axis must be iteratively detem-ined.

Otherwise, the solution technique is identical.

5) To determine the position (6) of the tension-to-compression axis from x', the following equation must be iteratively solved:

( K-/ )-a if-a rt (0) dO = 2 rt, d 0 + 'Tm Aodegraded (12)

-[(*r-l

)a J(Ir-fl

)-a O'f where:

13

=angle to x' axis from bottom

=

cos' (13)

6) The moment equations are identified, except that it nmst be recognized that the effective thickness below the tension-to-compression axis is the full nondegraded thickness.

Using ANSC, five compound flaw configurations were considered:

Case 1 - Through-wall flaw of 6 inches (flaw angle = 1160) assuming NDE through entire thickness of remaining circumference

• *Case 2 - Through-wall flaw of 6 inches (flaw angle = 1160) assuming NDE through 66% of wall thickness for remaining circumference Case 3 - Through-wall flaw of 6 inches (flaw angle = 1160) assuming NDE through 60% of wall thickness for remaining circumference Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 7 of 16

Case 4 - Through-wall flaw of 6 inches (flaw angle = 1160) assuming NDE through 55% of wall thickness for remaining circumference Case 5 - Through-wall flaw of 6 inches (flaw angle = 1160) assuming NDE through 50% of wall thickness for remaining circumference The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the allowable through-wall flaw cases with an ASME Code safety factor of 2.77 for service levels A/B (note that service levels A/B bounds service levels C and D for this location). Table 2 presents the results of the critical through-wall flaws. A separate Case 6 ANSC run was performed similar to the limiting Case 5 except with a through-wall length of 9 inches. This resulted in a safety factor of greater than unity. Longer critical flaws would be expected for the other cases.

Details of the analysis are provided in Appendix A.

4.2.2 Axial Flaw The allowable and critical axial through-wall flaw lengths, lall, are determined using the relationship from Reference 8 which is given as:

~ l,/.58,R--t

-f

-1]

(14) where:

R

=

mean pipe radius t

=

pipe thickness material flow stress = 3 Sm SF

=

safety factor = 3.0 for allowable flaw size and 1.0 for critical flaw size C,,

=

hoop stress = pDo/2t, where p = design pressure and D. = outside diameter.

The above expression is also used in Code Case N-513-1 for the evaluation of axial through-wall flaws. For the compound flaw, the above equation is used and the hoop stress is calculated using the thickness corresponding to the depth that the NDE can interrogate. The five case considered for the circumferential flaw were also considered for the axial flaw and the results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for the allowable and critical through-wall flaw lengths, respectively. Details of the calculations are provided in the Excel file: MNS-05Q-302 Analysis.xls.

4.3 Flaw Growth Analysis In this section, a conservative fatigue analysis is performed to determine the beginning of cycle through-wall flaw length that will not reach the allowable through-wall flaw length in one operating cycle. An axial flaw was considered in this evaluation since it is bounding. The material of the valve body and weld filler metal are stainless steel. As such, the fatigue crack growth evaluation is performed using the Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 8 of 16

methodology in ASME Code Section XI, Appendix C [2] for stainless steel components using the QA software package pc-CRACK [9].

Since the defect is through-wall, the end of life flaw size due to fatigue crack growth is calculated using the fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steels exposed to water environments. Per Reference 7, the fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steel in air environment along with an environment factor of 2.0 for PWR water environment can be used.

From Subarticle C-3200 of Reference 2, the fatigue crack growth rate for austenitic steel in air

-environments is given by:

da

= Co (AK1 )

(15) dN where:

AKI

=

stress intensity factor range (Kniax - Knin) n

=

3.3 CO CxS.

C is a scaling parameter to account for temperature and is given by:

C = 1 0 [-0.009+8.12*

1*-'T-I 3A _'°T2+*.°2xl°-T3]

where, T is the metal temperature in 'F (for T < 800'F), and S is a scaling parameter to account for R ratio and is given by:

S= 1.0 R<O

= 1.0 + 1.8R 0 < R < 0.79

= -43.35 + 57.97R 0.79 < R < 1.0

with, R = Kmin / Krnax.

The maximum design metal temperature of 189°F is used in the calculation of the scaling factor C. At a temperature at 189°F and for R < 0 as assumed in this case, Co was calculated as 1.29x10-10 for an air environment. A value of Co of 2.58x 0-10 was, therefore, used for the PWR water environment to determine crack growth.

At the location of the flaw, there are no thenral transients other than pressure cycles. Hence, the evaluation is performed by assuming 100 full pressure cycles (0 to 2735 psig) which is conservative relative to the time that this flaw is expected to be in service.

Typical results of this fatigue crack growth evaluation are shown in Figure 3 for the case where the entire thickness is assumed in the evaluation. Assuming an initial through-wall half flaw length of 2.0 inches (or total flaw length of 4.0 inches), the crack growth after 100 cycles is approximately 0.011 inch with a Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 9 of 16

maximum final half crack length of approximately 2.011 inches. This crack growth (0.022 inches on the total flaw length) should be subtracted from the allowable flaw length of Case 1 in Table 1 to determine the beginning of cycle flaw length. Crack growth evaluations were performed for all five cases in Table 1 and Table 3 shows the beginning of cycle allowable axial flaw lengths for each of the five cases.

Appendix B provides the pc-CRACK output for each case.

5 CONCLUSIONS The allowable flaw sizes at the location of the defect are as shown in Table 1. Based on the inspection capabilities in the depth direction, the allowable flaw length can be determined from this table.

The critical flaw sizes at the location of the defect are as shown in Table 2. Based on the inspection capabilities in the depth direction, the critical flaw length can be determined from this table.

The beginning of cycle allowable axial flaw sizes at the location of the defect are as shown in Table 3. Based on the inspection capabilities in the depth direction, the allowable flaw length can be determined from this table.

The allowable, critical and beginning of cycle through-wall flaw lengths listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are conservative in view of many conservative assumptions made in the evaluation:

o The valve wall that could not be inspected was assumed to be completely flawed, o

Design conditions were used in the analysis in lieu of operating conditions as is typically done in ASME Section XI flaw evaluation, and

• o A conservative bending stress associated with seismic load was used in the analysis based on 5g lateral acceleration.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

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Table 1: Allowable Through-wall Flaw Lengths Case Description Axial Circumferential (in)

(in)

Through-wall assuming 1

NDE through entire 3.95

> 6 thickness Through-wall assuming 2

NDE through 66% of wall 1.64

> 6 thickness Through-wall assuming 3

NDE through 60% of wall 1.17

> 6 thickness Through-wall assuming 4

NDE through 55% of wall 0.78

> 6 thickness Through-wall assuming 5

NDE through 50% of wall 0.06

> 6 thickness Table 2: Critical Through-wall Flaw Lengths Case Description Axial Circumferential (in)

(in)

Through-wall assuming 1

NDE through entire 13.50

> 9 thickness Through-wall assuming 2

NDE through 66% of wall 7.21

> 9 thickness Through-wall assuming 3

NDE through 60% of wall 6.11

> 9 thickness Through-wall assuming 4

NDE through 55% of wall 5.32

> 9 thickness Through-wall assuming 5

NDE through 50% of wall 4.56

> 9 thickness Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 11 of 16

Table 3: Beginning of Cycle Allowable Axial Through-wall Flaw Lengths Case Description Axial (in)

Through-wall assuming 1

NDE through entire 3.93 thickness Through-wall assuming 2

NDE through 66% of wall 1.64 thickness Through-wall assuming 3

NDE through 60% of wall 1.17 thickness Through-wall assuming 4

NDE through 55% of wall 0.78 thickness Through-wall assuming 5

NDE through 50% of wall 0.06 thickness Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 12 of 16

,-,mmM

-4 u-u -...L LAM

,P

ý1 W*

I4.1 LM Figure 1. Location of Flaw in Valve 1NV-240 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 13 of 16

Stress

-~af Change Axis Flawed Section Nondegraded End Nominal stress at non-degraded section of pipe

-*4

+ Pb II t = thickness = f(e) x Flawed Section Figure 2. Loading and Stress Distribution of a Cylindrical Section at Net Section Collapse Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 14 of 16

a U

C

'U U-0' 2

I-

'U 2.010 2.008-2.006- -00 2.004 9M~9 2.000 I

0 10 20 30 40 50 Cycles 60 70 80 90 100 Figure 3. Typical Crack Growth Evaluation Results (Axial Flaw with Full Thickness)

Structural integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 15 of 16

6 REFERENCES

1. Email attachment "lnv240.bmp," from Bryan Meyer (Duke) to Bob McGill (SI), "

Subject:

Valve Vendor Drawings - 1NV-240 with flaw location," dated Wednesday, June 20, 2007, 7:12PM, SI File No. MNS-05Q-202. [This reference was unverified by Duke Energy and assumed accurate.]

2. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1998 Edition (2000 Addenda).

3.

ASME Code Case N-513-1, "Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or Class 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1," Cases of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, March 28, 2001.

4. E-mail from Fred Setzer (Duke) to Bob McGill (SI), "

Subject:

RE: P.O Issuance for Structural Integrity-Fracture Mechanics evaluation for 1 NV-240," dated Thursday, June 21, 2007, 12:08PM, SI File No. MNS-05Q-203. [Provided in Appendix C]

5. Duke Energy File Number MCM 1205.00-0577, Document Control Date August 4, 1981, SI File No. MNS-05Q-201.

6. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Part D - Properties, i998 Edition (2000 Addenda).

7. ASME Section XI Task Group for Piping Flaw Evaluation, 'Evaluation of Flaws in Austenitic Steel Piping,' Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol. 108, August, 1986.

8.

"Evaluation of Flaws in Austenitic Steel Piping," EPRI NP-4690-SR, Electric Power Research Institute, July 1989.

9. Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., "pc-CRACKTM Fracture Mechanics Software," Version 3.1 -

98348, 1998.

10. SI Computer Program ANSC, Version 2.0, SI QA File QA-1900, April 1994.

11. Chemical and Mechanical Test Report for Gate Valve 1 NV-240, Walworth Company, 1976, SI File No. MNS-05Q-204.

StructuraI Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page 16 of 16

APPENDIX A ANSC OUTPUT FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL COMPOUND FLAW EVALUATION Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

PageAl of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 11:39:48 Page 1

DESCRIPTION:

Case 1 MNS-05Q Valve Body -

1NV-240 Pipe with 116 degree thru-wall crack, Pm=5ksi Crack not assumed to take compression WARNING:

RADIUS TO THICKNESS RATIO < 10 THIN SHELL THEORY NOT A GOOD REPRESENTATION RADIUS (IN)

=

2.969 WALL THICKNESS (IN)

=

.8125 TENSION STRESS

=

5.000 KSI MATERIAL FLOW STRESS

=

60.000 KSI ANGLE FOR MOMENT ITERATION =

10 FLAWS DEFINED 1

(AS FOLLOWS) 1 ANGLES:

0.0000 TO-116.0000 (DTHETA 116.000) DEPTH (IN) 0.813 TOTAL AREA (IN2)

=

15.15701 REMAINING DEGRADED SECTION AREA (IN2)

=

10.27308 (APPROX.

DEGRADED METAL AREA

=

10.27334 AREA IN TENSION

=

5.768211 AREA IN COMPRESSION =

4.504871 Program Output:

Angle = Angle that tension-to-compression axis x' is rotated t

= Thickness in wall at position corresponding to angle delta = Distance from center to tension-to-compression axis Pb,x'

= Bending stress due to moment about tension-to-compression axis Pb,y'

= Bending stress due to moment perpendicular to tens./comp.

axis Pb,max = Maximum bending stress due to total limit moment Anglemax

= Angle for total limit moment relative to original Y axis Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A2 of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 11:39:50 Page 2

Angle Wall t Delta Pb,x' Pb,y' Pb,max AngleMax 0.00 0.406 1.766 44.243

-27.419 52.051 328.21 10.00 0.000 1.766 39.733

-24.021 46.430 338.84 20.00 0.000 1.766 35.882

-19.892 41.027 351.00 30.00 0.000 1.766 32.807

-15.156 36.139 5.20 40.00 0.000 1.766 30.601

-9.959 32.181 21.97 50.00 0.000 1.766 29.331

-4.457 29.667 41.36 60.00 0.000 1.766 29.035 1.182 29.059 62.33 70.00 0.000 1.766 29.723 6.786 30.488 82.86 80.00 0.000 1.766 31.374 12.186 33.658 101.23 90.00 0.000 1.766 33.938 17.217 38.055 116.90 100.00 0.000 1.766 37.336 21.726 43.197 130.20 110.00 0.000 1.766 41.466 25.578 48.720 141.67 120.00 0.813 1.766 46.202 28.654 54.365 151.81 130.00 0.813 1.617 51.285 27.114 58.011 157.86 140.00 0.813 1.160 55.205 17.802 58.004 157.87 150.00 0.813 0.668 57.447 7.950 57.995 157.88 160.00 0.813 0.155 57.944

-2.144 57.984 157.88 170.00 0.813

-0.362 56.680

-12.173 57.973 157.88 180.00 0.813

-0.868 53.695

-21.832 57.963 157.87 190.00 0.813

-1.088 49.404

-24.013 54.931 164.08 200.00 0.813

-1.088 45.554

-19.884 49.704 176.42 210.00 0.813

-1.088 42.478

-15.148 45.098 190.37 220.00 0.813

-1.088 40.272

-9.950 41.483 206.12 230.00 0.813

-1.088 39.002

-4.449 39.255 223.49 240.00 0.813

-1.088 38.706 1.190 38.725 241.76 250.00 0.813

-1.088 39.394 6.795 39.976 259.79 260.00 0.813

-1.088 41.045 12.194 42.818 276.55 270.00 0.813

-1.088 43.609 17.225 46.888 291.55 280.00 0.813

-1.088 47.007 21.735 51.789 304.81 290.00 0.813

-1.088 51.137 25.586 57.180 316.58 300.00 0.813

-0.668 55.091 18.093 57.986 318.18 310.00 0.813

-0.155 57.396 8.253 57.986 318.18 320.00 0.813 0.362 57.957

-1.839 57.986 318.18 330.00 0.813 0.868 56.757

-11.875 57.986 318.18 340.00 0.813 1.348 53.833

-21.551 57.986 318.18 350.00 0.813 1.766 49.275

-29.982 57.679 318.68 MINIMUM STRESS (Pb,x')

=

29.035 AT 60.00 DEGREES MINIMUM TOTAL STRESS (Pb,max)

=

29.059 AT 62.33 DEGREES Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 11:39:54 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A3 of A 13

Page 1

DESCRIPTION:

Case 2 MNS-05Q Valve Body -

1NV-240 Pipe with 116 degree thru-wall crack, Pm=5ksi Crack not assumed to take compression WARNING:

RADIUS TO THICKNESS RATIO < 10 THIN SHELL THEORY NOT A GOOD REPRESENTATION RADIUS (IN)

=

2.969 TENSION STRESS MATERIAL FLOW STRESS WALL THICKNESS (IN)

=

.8125 5.000 KSI 60.000 KSI ANGLE FOR MOMENT ITERATION =

10 FLAWS DEFINED 1 ANGLES:

=

2 (AS FOLLOWS) 0.0000 TO 116.0000 (DTHETA =

116.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.813 2 ANGLES:

116.0000 TO 360.0000 (DTHETA

=

244.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.271 TOTAL AREA (IN2)

=

15.15701 REMAINING DEGRADED SECTION AREA (IN2)

=

6.849143 (APPROX.

DEGRADED METAL AREA

=

6.849338 AREA IN TENSION

=

4.056211 AREA IN COMPRESSION

=

2.792933 Program Output:

Angle = Angle that tension-to-compression axis x' is rotated t = Thickness in wall at position corresponding to angle delta = Distance from center to tension-to-compression axis Pb,x'

= Bending stress due to moment about tension-to-compression axis Pb,y'

= Bending stress due to moment perpendicular to tens./comp.

axis Pb,max = Maximum bending stress due to total limit moment Anglemax = Angle for total limit moment relative to original Y axis Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0

-Associates, Inc.

Page A4 of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 Page 2

11:39:56 Angle 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 210.00 220.00 230.00 240.00 250.00 260.00 270.00 280.00 290.00 300.00 310.00 320.00 330.00 340.00 350.00 Wall t 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 Delta 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.918 1.507 1.040 0.541 0.026

-0.490

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.905

-0.793

-0.285 0.233 0.743 1.231 1.682 1.918 (Pb, x')

Pb, x' 27.429 24.422 21.854 19.804 18.333 17.486 17.289 17.748 18.849 20.558 22.824 25.577 28.734 32.200 35.306 37.341 38.240 37.978 36.562 34.057 31.490 29.440 27.969 27.122 26.925 27.384 28.484 30.193 32.459 35.175 37.265 38.222 38.019 36.660 34.188 30.783 Pb, y'

-18.315

-16.050

-13.297

-10.140

-6.674

-3.006 0.753 4.489 8.090 11.444 14.450 17.018 19.069 20.540 14.765 8.406 1.791

-4.789

-11.311

-16.050

-13.297

-10.140

-6.675

-3.007 0.753 4.489 8.089 11.444 14.450 15.113 8.776 2.172

-4.498

-11.031

-17.230

-20.024 Pb, max 32.982 29.224 25.582 22.249 19.510 17.743 17.306 18.307 20.511 23.528 27.013 30.721 34.486 38.193 38.270 38.275 38.282 38.279 38.271 37.650 34.182 31.137 28.754 27.288 26.935 27.749 29.611 32.289 35.530 38.284 38.284 38.284 38.284 38.284 38.284 36.723 AngleMax 326.27 336.69 348.68 2.89 19.99 40.24 62.49 84.20 103.23 119.10 132.34 143.64 153.57 162.53 162.69 162.69 162.68 162.81 162.81 164.77 177.11 190.99 206.58 223.67 241.60 259.31 275.85 290.76 304.00 313.25 313.25 313.25 313.25 313.25 313.25 316.96 MINIMUM STRESS 17.289 AT 60.00 DEGREES 62.49 DEGREES MINIMUM TOTAL STRESS (Pb,max) =

17.306 AT Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 11:40:00 Structurai Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A5 of A13

Page 1

DESCRIPTION:

Case 3 MNS-05Q Valve Body -

1NV-240 Pipe with 116 degree thru-wall crack, Pm=5ksi Crack not assumed to take compression WARNING:

RADIUS TO THICKNESS RATIO < 10 THIN SHELL THEORY NOT A GOOD REPRESENTATION RADIUS (IN) 2.969 TENSION STRESS MATERIAL FLOW STRESS WALL THICKNESS (IN)

=

.8125 5.000 KSI

=

60.000 KSI ANGLE FOR MOMENT ITERATION =

10 FLAWS DEFINED 1 ANGLES:

0.813

= 2 (AS FOLLOWS) 0.0000 TO 116.0000 (DTHETA

=

116.000)

DEPTH (IN) 2 ANGLES:

116.0000 TO 360.0000 (DTHETA =

244.000) DEPTH (IN) 0.325 TOTAL AREA (IN2) 15.15701 REMAINING DEGRADED SECTION AREA (IN2)

=

6.16385 (APPROX.

DEGRADED METAL AREA

=

6.164037 AREA IN TENSION

=

3.713561 AREA IN COMPRESSION =

2.450289 Program Output:

Angle = Angle that tension-to-compression axis x' is rotated t = Thickness in wall at position corresponding to angle delta = Distance from center to tension-to-compression axis Pb,x'

= Bending stress due to moment about tension-to-compression axis Pb,y'

= Bending stress due to moment perpendicular to tens./comp.

axis Pb,max = Maximum bending stress due to total limit moment Anglemax = Angle for total limit moment relative to original Y axis Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A6 of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 Page 2

11:40:02 Angle 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 210.00 220.00 230.00 240.00 250.00 260.00 270.00 280.00 290.00 300.00 310.00 320.00 330.00 340.00 350.00 Wall t 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 Delta 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.967 1.617 1.160 0.668 0.155

-0.362

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.843

-0.668

-0.155 0.362 0.868 1.348 1.787 1.967 Pb, x' 24.030 21.324 19.013 17.168 15.844 15.082 14.905 15.317 16.308 17.846 19.885 22.363 25.205 28.323 31.247 33.234 34.210 34.147 33.047 30.944 28.634 26.789 25.465 24.703 24.525 24.938 25.929 27.467 29.506 31.901 33.610 34.298 33.943 32.558 30.183 27.048 Pb, y'

-16.453

-14.415

-11.937

-9.096

-5.977

-2.676 0.707 4.070 7.310 10.328 13.034 15.345 17.190 18.514 14.206 8.568 2.669

-3.311

-9.190

-14.407

-11.929

-9.088

-5.969

-2.668 0.715 4.078 7.318 10.336 13.042 12.631 6.900 0.959

-5.011

-10.829

-16.318

-17.991 Pb, max 29.123 25.739 22.450 19.428 16.934 15.317 14.921 15.849 17.871 20.619 23.776 27.121 30.509 33.838 34.325 34.320 34.314 34.307 34.301 34.134 31.019 28.288 26.155 24.846 24.536 25.270 26.942 29.347 32.260 34.311 34.311 34.311 34.311 34.311 34.311 32.485 AngleMax 325.60 335.94 347.88 2.08 19.33 39.94 62.72 84.88 104.14 120.06 133.24 144.46 154.30 163.17 164.45 164.46 164.46 164.46 164.46 165.03 177.38 191.26 206.81 223.83 241.67 259.29 275.76 290.62 303.85 311.60 311.60 311.60 311.60 311.60 311.60 316.37 MINIMUM STRESS (Pb, x' )

14.905 AT 60.00 DEGREES 62.72 DEGREES MINIMUM TOTAL STRESS (Pb,max)

=

14.921 AT Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 11:40:14 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

PageA7 of A13

Page 1

DESCRIPTION:

Case 4 MNS-05Q Valve Body -

1NV-240 Pipe with 116 degree thru-wall crack, Pm=5ksi Crack not assumed to take compression WARNING:

RADIUS TO THICKNESS RATIO < 10 THIN SHELL THEORY NOT A GOOD REPRESENTATION RADIUS (IN)

=

2.969 TENSION STRESS MATERIAL FLOW STRESS WALL THICKNESS (IN)

=

5.000 KSI

=

60.000 KSI

.8125 ANGLE FOR MOMENT ITERATION =

10 FLAWS DEFINED 1 ANGLES:

0.813

=

2 (AS FOLLOWS) 0.0000 TO 116.0000 (DTHETA

=

116.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

2 ANGLES:

116.0000 TO 360.0000 (DTHETA =

244.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.366 TOTAL AREA (IN2)

=

15.15701 REMAINING DEGRADED SECTION AREA (IN2)

=

5.650512 (APPROX.

DEGRADED METAL AREA

=

5.65063 )

AREA IN TENSION

=

AREA IN COMPRESSION

=

3.456857 2.193655 Program Output:

Angle = Angle that tension-to-compression axis x' is rotated t = Thickness in wall at position corresponding to angle delta = Distance from center to tension-to-compression axis Pb,x'

= Bending stress due to moment about tension-to-compression axis Pb,y' = Bending stress due to moment perpendicular to tens./comp.

axis Pb,max = Maximum bending stress due to total limit moment Anglemax = Angle for total limit moment relative to original Y axis Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0

-Associates, Inc.

Page A8 of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 Page 2

11:40:17 Angle 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 210.00 220.00 230.00 240.00 250.00 260.00 270.00 280.00 290.00 300.00 310.00 320.00 330.00 340.00 350.00 Wall t 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 Delta 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 2.011 1.715 1.268 0.782 0.273

-0.245

-0.755

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.787

-0.553

-0.038 0.479 0.980 1.452 1.879 2.011 Pb, x' 21.470 18.990 16.871 15.180 13.966 13.268 13.105 13.484 14.392 15.802 17.671 19.942 22.547 25.406 28.177 30.125 31.158 31.243 30.380 28.593 26.478 24.786 23.573 22.874 22.712 23.090 23.998 25.408 27.277 29.416 30.838 31.323 30.857 29.453 27.154 24.237 Pb, y'

-15.103

-13.234

-10.963

-8.358

-5.499

-2.473 0.629 3.711 6.681 9.448 11.929 14.047 15.738 16.952 13.668 8.565 3.203

-2.257

-7.649

-12.808

-10.960

-8.356

-5.497

-2.471 0.631 3.713 6.683 9.451 11.931 10.764 5.493 0.054

-5.386

-10.662

-15.615

-16.513 Pb, max 26.250 23.146 20.120 17.329 15.010 13.496 13.120 13.985 15.867 18.411 21.320 24.393 27.497 30.542 31.317 31.319 31.322 31.325 31.328 31.331 28.657 26.157 24.205 23.007 22.720 23.387 24.911 27.109 29.772 31.324 31.324 31.324 31.324 31.324 31.324 29.328 AngleMax 324.87 335.13 346.98 1.16 18.51 39.44 62.75 85.39 104.90 120.88 134.02 145.16 154.92 163.71 165.88 165.87 165.87 165.87 165.87 165.87 177.51 191.37 206.87 223.83 241.59 259.14 275.56 290.40 303.62 310.10 310.10 310.10 310.10 310.10 310.10 315.73 DEGREES MINIMUM STRESS (Pb, x' )

13.105 AT MINIMUM TOTAL STRESS (Pb,max)

=

13.120 AT DEGREESArbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 06-23-2007 11:40:22 60.00 62.75 (4/26/94)

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A9 of A 13

Page 1

DESCRIPTION:

Case 5 MNS-05Q Valve Body -

1NV-240 Pipe with 116 degree thru-wall crack, Pm=5ksi Crack not assumed to take compression WARNING:

RADIUS TO THICKNESS RATIO < 10 THIN SHELL THEORY NOT A GOOD REPRESENTATION RADIUS (IN) 2.969 WALL THICKNESS (IN)

=

.8125 TENSION STRESS

=

5.000 KSI MATERIAL FLOW STRESS

=

60.000 KSI ANGLE FOR MOMENT ITERATION =

10 FLAWS DEFINED

=

2 (AS FOLLOWS) 1 ANGLES:

0.0000 TO 116.0000 (DTHETA

=

116.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.813 2 ANGLES:

116.0000 TO 360.0000 (DTHETA =

244.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.406 TOTAL AREA (IN2) 15.15701 REMAINING DEGRADED SECTION AREA (IN2)

=

5.135909 (APPROX.

DEGRADED METAL AREA

=

5.135953 AREA IN TENSION

=

3.199518 AREA IN COMPRESSION =

1.936391 Program Output:

Angle = Angle that tension-to-compression axis x' is rotated t = Thickness in wall at position corresponding to angle delta = Distance from center to tension-to-compression axis Pb,x'

= Bending stress due to moment about tension-to-compression axis Pb,y'

= Bending stress due to moment perpendicular to tens./comp.

axis Pb,max = Maximum bending stress due to total limit moment Anglemax = Angle for total limit moment relative to original Y axis Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0

-Associates, Inc.

Page A10 of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-23-2007 Page 2

11:40:24 Angle 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 210.00 220.00 230.00 240.00 250.00 260.00 270.00 280.00 290.00 300.00 310.00 320.00 330.00 340.00 350.00 Wall t 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 Delta 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.063 2.062 1.828 1.394 0.918 0.413

-0.103

-0.617

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.718

-0.413 0.104 0.617 1.112 1.573 1.987 2.062 Pb, x' 18.891 16.636 14.711 13.173 12.070 11.435 11.288 11.632 12.457 13.738 15.437 17.502 19.870 22.469 25.069 26.974 28.060 28.293 27.666 26.199 24.297 22.759 21.656 21.021 20.874 21.218 22.043 23.325 25.024 26.885 28.020 28.303 27.727 26.308 24.089 21.406 Pb,y'

-13.711

-12.012

-9.948

-7.580

-4.982

-2.231 0.588 3.390 6.089 8.605 10.859 12.784 14.322 15.425 13.191 8.641 3.828

-1.101

-5.997

-10.710

-9.940

-7.572

-4.974

-2.223 0.596 3.398 6.097 8.613 10.867 8.886 4.083

-0.844

-5.746

-10.473

-14.882

-14.992 Pb, max 23.342 20.519 17.758 15.198 13.058 11.651 11.303 12.115 13.866 16.211 18.874 21.674 24.493 27.254 28.327 28.324 28.320 28.314 28.309 28.304 26.251 23.986 22.220 21.139 20.882 21.488 22.871 24.864 27.281 28.315 28.315 28.316 28.316 28.316 28.316 26.134 AngleMax 324.03 334.17 345.93 0.08 17.57 38.96 62.98 86.25 106.05 122.06 135.12 146.15 155.78 164.47 167.75 167.76 167.77 167.77 167.77 167.76 177.75 191.60 207.06 223.96 241.64 259.10 275.46 290.27 303.47 308.29 308.29 308.29 308.29 308.29 308.29 314.99 MINIMUM STRESS (Pb, x' )

11.288 AT 60.00 DEGREES 11.303 AT 62.98 DEGREES MINIMUM TOTAL STRESS (Pb,max)

=

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page Al l of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-24-2007 19:44:26 Page 1

DESCRIPTION:

Case 6 MNS-05Q Valve Body -

1NV-240 Pipe with 116 degree thru-wall crack, Pm=Sksi Crack not assumed to take compression WARNING:

RADIUS TO THICKNESS RATIO < 10 THIN SHELL THEORY NOT A GOOD REPRESENTATION RADIUS (IN)

=

2.969 WALL THICKNESS (IN)

=

.8125 TENSION STRESS

=

5.000 KSI MATERIAL FLOW STRESS 60.000 KSI ANGLE FOR MOMENT ITERATION

=

10 FLAWS DEFINED

=

2 (AS FOLLOWS) 1 ANGLES:

0.0000 TO 174.0000 (DTHETA

=

174.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.813 2 ANGLES:

174.0000 TO 360.0000 (DTHETA =

186.000)

DEPTH (IN)

=

0.406 TOTAL AREA (IN2) 15.15701 REMAINING DEGRADED SECTION AREA (IN2)

=

3.915078 (APPROX.

DEGRADED METAL AREA

=

3.915182 AREA IN TENSION

=

2.589133 AREA IN COMPRESSION =

1.325944 Program Output:

Angle = Angle that tension-to-compression axis x' is rotated t = Thickness in wall at position corresponding to angle delta = Distance from center to tension-to-compression axis Pb,x'

= Bending stress due to moment about tension-to-compression axis Pb,y'

= Bending stress due to moment perpendicular to tens./comp.

axis Pb,max = Maximum bending stress due to total limit moment Anglemax = Angle for total limit moment relative to original Y axis Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0

-Associates, Inc.

Page A12 of A13

Arbitrary Net Section Collapse ANSC 2.0 (4/26/94) 06-24-2007 Page 2

19:44:28 Angle 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 210.00 220.00 230.00 240.00 250.00 260.00 270.00 280.00 290.00 300.00 310.00 320.00 330.00 340.00 350.00 Wall t 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 Delta 1.617 2.025 2.371 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.490 2.172 1.787 1.348 0.868 0.362

-0.155

-0.668

-1.160

-1.417

-1.417

-1.417

-1.417

-1.417

-1.417

-1.348

-0.868

-0.362 0.156 0.668 1.160 Pb, x' 17.013 14.939 12.411 9.568 6.948 4.724 2.962 1.717 1.026 0.910 1.372 2.400 3.960 6.007 8.477 11.290 13.978 16.242 18.012 19.235 19.874 19.908 19.338 18.180 16.574 15.328 14.637 14.521 14.984 16.011 17.560 18.944 19.752 19.960 19.562 18.570 Pb, y'

-10.454

-13.250

-15.642

-15.977

-13.931

-11.460

-8.641

-5.559

-2.308 1.014 4.306 7.468 10.403 13.022 15.246 16.486 14.280 11.640 8.645 5.389 1.968

-1.512

-4.946

-8.231

-8.630

-5.548

-2.297 1.026 4.317 7.479 9.506 6.313 2.927

-0.547

-4.005

-7.341 Pb, max 19.968 19.968 19.968 18.623 15.567 12.396 9.135 5.818 2.525 1.363 4.520 7.844 11.131 14.341 17.445 19.982 19.983 19.982 19.980 19.976 19.971 19.966 19.961 19.957 18.686 16.302 14.816 14.557 15.593 17.672 19.968 19.968 19.968 19.968 19.968 19.968 AngleMax 328.43 328.43 328.43 330.91 336.51 342.40 348.92 357.16 13.96 138.11 172.32 182.19 189.16 195.24 200.93 205.60 205.61 205.63 205.64 205.65 205.66 205.66 205.65 205.64 212.49 230.10 251.08 274.04 296.07 315.04 328.43 328.43 328.43 328.43 328.43 328.43 MINIMUM STRESS (Pb, x' )

0.910 AT 1.363 AT 90.00 DEGREES 138.11 DEGREES MINIMUM TOTAL STRESS (Pb,max)

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page A13 of A13

APPENDIX B pc-CRACK OUTPUT Structural integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page BI of B26

tm pc-CRACK for Windows Version 3.1-98348 (C)

Copyright

'84

'98 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24 San Jose, CA 95118-1557 Voice:

408-978-8200 Fax:

408-978-8964 E-mail: pccrack@structint.com Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Date: Sun Jun 24 15:22:40 2007 Input Data and Results File: AXIALP1.LFM

[CASE 1]

Title:

McGuire Nuclear Station -

Valve 1NV-240 Crack Growth -

Axial Flaw Load Cases:

Stress Coefficients Case ID Co Cl C2 C3 Type pressure 10 0

0 0

Coeff Through Wall Wall Case Depth pressure Stresses for Load Cases With Stress Coeff-------

0.0000 0.6000 1.2000 1.8000 2.4000 3.0000 3.6000 4.2000 4.8000 5.4000 6.0000 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Crack Model: Through-Wall Axial Crack in Pressurized Cylinder Crack Parameters:

Wall thickness:

0.8125 Outside diameter(Rm/t>=10) :

5.9380 Half crack length(max a<=10(Rmt)^0.5):

6.0000 Co = Hoop stress due to pressure All other stress coefficients are neglected.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B2 of B26

Stress Intensity Factor---------------------

Crack Case Size pressure 0.1200 6.29794 0.2400 9.19696 0.3600 11.6927 0.4800 14.071 0.6000 16.4405 0.7200 18.8534 0.8400 21.3373 0.9600 23.9072 1.0800 26.5705 1.2000 29.3307 1.3200 32.1885 1.4400 35.1431 1.5600 38.1926 1.6800 41.3345 1.8000 44.5662 1.9200 47.8848 2.0400 51.2871 2.1600 54.7703 2.2800 58.3313 2.4000 61.9672 2.5200 65.6754 2.6400 69.453 2.7600 73.2974 2.8800 77.2062 3.0000 81.1768 3.1200 85.2069 3.2400 89.2943 3.3600 93.4368 3.4800 97.6323 3.6000 101.879 3.7200 106.174 3.8400 110.517 3.9600 114.905 4.0800 119.336 4.2000 123.809 4.3200 128.322 4.4400 132.874 4.5600 137.462 4.6800 142.086 4.8000 146.743 4.9200 151.433 5.0400 156.154 5.1600 160.904 5.2800 165.682 5.4000 170.487 5.5200 175.318 5.6400 180.172 5.7600 185.049 5.8800 189.948 6.0000 194.867 Structural integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Assocites, IPage B3 of B26

Crack Growth Laws:

Law ID:

Cast SS Type:

Fatigue Model:

Paris da/dN = c (dK)^n where dK = Kmax Kmin dK > Kthres Kmax < Klc Material parameters:

c =

2.5800e-010 n =

3.3000 Kthres =

0.0000 Material Fracture Toughness KIc:

Material ID: Cast SS Depth KIc 0.0000 500.0000 0.6000 500.0000 Initial crack size=

Max.

crack size=

2.0000 6.0000 Number of blocks=

Print increment of block=

Cycles Subblock

/Time 1

1 Calc.

Print Crk.

Grw.

incre. incre. Law Mat.

Klc No.

1 100 1

1 Cast SS Cast SS Kmax Kmin Subblock Case ID Scale Factor Case ID Scale Factor No.

1 pressure 1.0000 pressure 0.0000 Crack growth results:

Total Subblock Cycles Cycles

/Time

/Time DaDn Kmin DeltaK R

/DaDt Kmax Da a

a/thk Block:

1 1

2 3

1 5.02e+001 2 5.02e+001 3 5.02e+001 0.00e+000 5.02e+001 0.00 1.05e-004 1.05e-004 0.00e+000 5.02e+001 0.00 1.05e-004 1.05e-004 0.00e+000 5.02e+001 0.00 1.05e-004 1.05e-004 2

2 2

0.00 0.00

.0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B4 of B26

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 5.02e+001 5.02e+001 5.02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001 5.02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001 5.02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001

5. 02e+001

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1. 05e-004

1. 05e-004 1.05e-004

1. 05e-004 1. 05e-004

1. 06e-004

1. 06e-004

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1. 06e-004 1.07e-004 1.07e-004 1.07e-004 1.07e-004 2

2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.002 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.003 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.004 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.005 2.006 2.006 2.006 2.006 2.006 2.006 2.006 2.006 2.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B5 of B26

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

5. 03e+001

5. 03e+001

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5. 04e+001 5.04e+001 5.04e+001 5.04e+001 5.04e+001

5. 05e+001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07e-004

1. 07e-004 1.07e-004 1. 07e-004 1. 07e-004

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1. 07e-004 1.07e-004 1.07e-004 1.07e-004

1. 07e-004 1.07e-004 2.006 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.007 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.008 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.009 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.011 2.011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 End of pc-CRACK Output Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B6 of B26

tm pc-CRACK for Windows Version 3.1-98348 (C)

Copyright '84

'98 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24 San Jose, CA 95118-1557 Voice:

408-978-8200 Fax:

408-978-8964 E-mail: pccrack@structint.com Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Date: Sat Jun 23 13:32:37 2007 Input Data and Results File: AXIALP2.LFM

[CASE 2]

Title:

McGuire Nuclear Station -

Valve 1NV-240 Crack Growth -

Axial Flaw Load Cases:

Stress Coefficients Case ID CO Cl C2 C3 Type pressure 14.99 0

0 0

Coeff Through Wall Wall Case Depth pressure Stresses for Load Cases With Stress Coeff-------

0.0000 0.6000 1.2000 1.8000 2.4000 3.0000 3.6000 4.2000 4.8000 5.4000 6.0000 14.99 14.99 14.99 14.99

.14.99 14.99 14.99 14.99 14.99 14.99 14.99 Crack Model: Through-Wall Axial Crack in Pressurized Cylinder Crack Parameters:

Wall thickness:

0.5417 Outside diameter(Rm/t>=10):

5.9380 Half crack length(max a<=l0(Rmt)^0.5):

6.0000 Co = Hoop stress due to pressure All other stress coefficients are neglected.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302..

Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B7 of B26

---

Stress Intensity Factor---------------------

Crack Case Size pressure 0.1200 9.49488 0.2400 13.9794 0.3600 17.9458 0.4800 21.8204 0.6000 25.7605 0.7200 29.8373 0.8400 34.0848 0.9600 38.5178 1.0800 43.1414 1.2000 47.9546 1.3200 52.9536 1.4400 58.1327 1.5600 63.4853 1.6800 69.0047 1.8000 74.6837 1.9200 80.5155 2.0400 86.4932 2.1600 92.6105 2.2800 98.8611 2.4000 105.239 2.5200 111.738 2.6400 118.354 2.7600 125.08 2.8800 131.912 3.0000 138.845 3.1200 145.875 3.2400 152.996 3.3600 160.205 3.4800 167.498 3.6000 174.87 3.7200 182.318 3.8400 189.838 3.9600 197.427 4.0800 205.08 4.2000 212.795 4.3200 220.568 4.4400 228.396 4.5600 236.276 4.6800 244.205 4.8000 252.179 4.9200 260.196 5.0400 268.253 5.1600 276.347 5.2800 284.475 5.4000 292.635 5.5200 300.823 5.6400 309.037 5.7600 317.275 5.8800 325.534 6.0000 333.811 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B8 of B26

Crack Growth Laws:

Law ID:

Cast SS Type:

Fatigue Model:

Paris da/dN = c (dK)^n where dK = Kmax Kmin dK > Kthres Kmax < KIc Material parameters:

c =

2.5800e-010 n =

3.3000 Kthres =

0.0000 Material Fracture Toughness KIc:

Material ID: Cast SS Depth KIc 0.0000 500.0000 0.6000 500.0000 Initial crack size=

Max.

crack size=

0.8200 6.0000 Number of blocks=

Print increment of block=

Cycles Subblock

/Time 1

1 Calc.

Print Crk.

Grw.

incre. incre. Law Mat.

Klc No.

1 100 1

1 Cast SS Cast SS Kmax Kmin Subblock Case ID Scale Factor Case ID Scale Factor No.

1 pressure 1.0000 pressure 0.0000 Crack growth results:

Total Subblock Cycles Cycles

/Time

/Time DaDn Kmin DeltaK R

/DaDt Kmax Da a

a/thk Block:

1 1

3 1 3.34e+001 0.00e+000 3.34e+001 0.00 2.75e-005 2.75e-005 2 3.34e+001 0.00e+000 3.34e+001 0.00 2.75e-005 2.75e-005 3 3.34e+001 0.00e+000 3.34e+001 0.00 2.75e-005 2.75e-005 0.82 0.00 0.8201 0.00 0.8201 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0

>Associates, Inc.

Page B9 of B26

4 5

6 7

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 4

5 6

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 5o 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

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2. 75e-005

2. 75e-005 2.75e-005 2.75e-005 2.75e-005 2.75e-005

2. 75e-005

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2. 76e-005 2.76e-005 2.76e-005 2.76e-005

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2. 76e-005

2. 76e-005

2. 76e-005 0.8201 0.8201 0.8202 0.8202 0.8202 0.8202 0.8203 0.8203 0.8203 0.8204 0.8204 0.8204 0.8204 0.8205 0.8205 0.8205 0.8206 0.8206 0.8206 0.8206 0.8207 0.8207 0.8207 0.8207 0.8208 0.8208 0.8208 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.8211 0.8211 0.8211 0.8212 0.8212 0.8212 0.8212 0.8213 0.8213 0.8213 0.8213 0.8214 0.8214 0.8214 0.8215 0.8215 0.8215 0.8215 0.8216 0.8216 0.8216 0.8217 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page BlO of B26

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001

3. 34e+001 3.34e+001

3. 34e+001

3. 34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001

3. 34e+001

3. 34e+001

3. 35e+001

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0. 00e+000

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0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

3. 34e+001

3. 34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001

3. 34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001 3.34e+001

3. 34e+001

3. 34e+001

3. 34e+001 3.34e+001

3. 34e+001

3. 35e+001

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3. 35e+001 3. 35e+001 3. 35e+001 3.35e+001

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3. 35e+001 3.35e+001 3.35e+001 3.35e+001

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3. 35e+001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

2. 76e-005 2.76e-005 2.76e-005 2.76e-005

2. 76e-005

2. 77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005

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2. 76e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005

2. 77e-005

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2. 77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005

2. 77e-005

2. 77e-005

2. 77e-005 2.77e-005 2. 77e-005 2.77e-005

2. 77e-005

2. 77e-005

2. 77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005 2. 77e-005 2.77e-005

2. 77e-005 2.77e-005 2. 77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005 2.77e-005

2. 77e-005

2. 77e-005 0.8217 0.8217 0.8217 0.8218 0.8218 0.8218 0.8218 0.8219 0.8219 0.8219 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.8221 0.8221 0.8221 0.8222 0.8222 0.8222 0.8222 0.8223 0.8223 0.8223 0.8223 0.8224 0.8224 0.8224 0.8225 0.8225 0.8225 0.8225 0.8226 0.8226 0.8226 0.8226 0.8227 0.8227 0.8227 0.8228 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 End of pc-CRACK Output Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page Bi1 of B26

tm pc-CRACK for Windows Version 3.1-98348 (C)

Copyright '84

'98 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24 San Jose, CA 95118-1557 Voice:

408-978-8200 Fax:

408-978-8964 E-mail: pccrack@structint.com Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Date: Sat Jun 23 13:34:14 2007 Input Data and Results File: AXIALP3.LFM

.[CASE 3]

Title:

McGuire Nuclear Station - Valve 1NV-240 Crack Growth Axial Flaw Load Cases:

Stress Coefficients Case ID CO Cl C2 C3 Type pressure 16.66 0

0 0

Coeff Through Wall Wall Case Depth pressure Stresses for Load Cases With Stress Coeff-------

0.0000 0.6000 1.2000 1.8000 2.4000 3.0000 3.6000 4.2000 4.8000 5.4000 6.0000 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 Crack Model: Through-Wall Axial Crack in Pressurized Cylinder Crack Parameters:

Wall thickness:

0.4875 Outside diameter(Rm/t>=10) :

5.9380 Half crack length(max a<=10(Rmt)^0.5):

6.0000 Co = Hoop stress due to pressure All other stress coefficients are neglected.

Structurai Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B12 of B26

Stress Intensity Factor---------------------

Crack Case Size pressure

.0.1200 10.5714 0.2400 15.6043 0.3600 20.0919 0.4800 24.5066 0.6000 29.0209 0.7200 33.711 0.8400 38.6117 0.9600 43.7368 1.0800 49.0895 1.2000 54.667 1.3200 60.4631 1.4400 66.4701 1.5600 72.6796 1.6800 79.0827 1.8000 85.6707 1.9200 92.4352 2.0400 99.368 2.1600 106.461 2.2800 113.707 2.4000 121.098 2.5200 128.629 2.6400 136.291 2.7600 144.079 2.8800 151.987 3.0000 160.01 3.1200 168.14 3.2400 176.375 3.3600 184.707 3.4800 193.133 3.6000 201.647 3.7200 210.246 3.8400 218.924 3.9600 227.677 4.0800 236.501 4.2000 245.392 4.3200 254.346 4.4400 263.359 4.5600 272.427 4.6800 281.547 4.8000 290.714 4.9200 299.926 5.0400 309.179 5.1600 318.469 5.2800 327.793 5.4000 337.148 5.5200 346.53 5.6400 355.937 5.7600 365.364 5.8800 374.809 6.0000 384.269 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B 13 of B26

Crack Growth Laws:

Law ID:

Cast SS Type:

Fatigue Model:

Paris da/dN = c (dK)^n where dK Kmax Kmin dK > Kthres Kmax < Klc Material parameters:

c =

2.5800e-010 n =

3.3000 Kthres =

0.0000 Material Fracture Toughness KIc:

Material ID: Cast SS Depth KIc 0.0000 500.0000 0.6000 500.0000 Initial crack size=

Max.

crack size=

0.5850 6.0000 Number of blocks=

Print increment of block=

Cycles Subblock

/Time 1

1 Calc.

Print Crk. Grw.

incre. incre.

Law Mat.

Klc No.

1 100 1

1 Cast SS Cast SS Kmax Kmin Subblock Case ID Scale Factor Case ID Scale Factor No.

1 pressure 1.0000 pressure 0.0000 Crack growth results:

Total Cycles

/Time Subblock Cycles

/Time DaDn Kmin DeltaK R

/DaDt Kmax Da a

a/thk Block:

1 1

2 3

1 2.85e+001 0.00e+000 2.85e+001 0.00 1.62e-005 1.62e-005 2 2.85e+001 0.00e+000 2.85e+001 0.00 1.62e-005 1.62e-005 3 2.85e+001 0.00e+000 2.85e+001 0.00 1.62e-005 1.62e-005 0.585 0.00 0.585 0.00 0.585 0.00 2ŽStructural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B14 of B26

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

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2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001

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2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001

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2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

,0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.62e-005

1. 62e-005

1. 62e-005

1. 62e-005

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1. 62e-005

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1. 62e-005 1.62e-005 1.62e-005

1. 63e-005

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1. 63e-005 0.5851 0.5851 0.5851 0.5851 0.5851 0.5851 0.5852 0.5852 0.5852 0.5852 0.5852 0.5852 0.5853 0.5853 0.5853 0.5853 0.5853 0.5853 0.5854 0.5854 0.5854 0.5854 0.5854 0.5854 0.5855 0.5855 0.5855 0.5855 0.5855 0.5855 0.5856 0.5856 0.5856 0.5856 0.5856 0.5856 0.5857 0.5857 0.5857 0.5857 0.5857 0.5857 0.5857 0.5858 0.5858 0.5858 0.5858 0.5858 0.5858 0.5859 0.5859 0.5859 0.5859 0.5859 0.5859 0.586 0.586 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B15 of B26

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

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2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001

0. 00e+000 0.00e+000 0.00e+000 0.00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0.00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

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0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0.00e+000

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0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0.00e+000 0. 00e+000 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001

2. 85e+001 2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 2. 85e+001 2.85e+001

2. 85e+001 2.85e+001 2.85e+001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

1. 63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005

1. 63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005

1. 63e-005 1.63e-005 1.63e-005

1. 63e-005

1. 63e-005 1.63e-005 1. 63e-005 1. 63e-005 1. 63e-005 1. 63e-005 1. 63e-005

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1. 63e-005

1. 63e-005

1. 63e-005 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.5861 0.5861 0.5861 0.5861 0.5861 0.5861 0.5862 0.5862 0.5862 0.5862 0.5862 0.5862 0.5863 0.5863 0.5863 0.5863 0.5863 0.5863 0.5864 0.5864 0.5864 0.5864 0.5864 0.5864 0.5864 0.5865 0.5865 0.5865 0.5865 0.5865 0.5865 0.5866 0.5866 0.5866 0.5866 0.5866 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 End of pc-CRACK Output Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B16 of B26

tm pc-CRACK for Windows Version 3.1-98348 (C)

Copyright '84

'98 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24 San Jose, CA 95118-1557 Voice:

408-978-8200 Fax:

408-978-8964 E-mail: pccrack@structint.com Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Date: Sat Jun 23 13:35:45 2007 Input Data and Results File: AXIALP4.LFM

[CASE 4]

Title:

McGuire Nuclear Station - Valve 1NV-240 Crack Growth -

Axial Flaw Load Cases:

Stress Coefficients Case ID CO Cl C2 C3 Type pressure 18.17 0

0 0

Coeff Through Wall Wall Case Depth pressure Stresses for Load Cases With Stress Coeff-------

0.0000 0.6000 1.2000 1.8000 2.4000 3.0000 3.6000 4.2000 4.8000 5.4000 6.0000 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 18.17 Crack Model: Through-Wall Axial Crack in Pressurized Cylinder Crack Parameters:

Wall thickness:

0.4469 Outside diameter(Rm/t>=10) :

5.9380 Half crack length(max a<=10(Rmt)^0.5):

6.0000 Co = Hoop stress due to pressure All other stress coefficients are neglected.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B 17 of B26

Stress Intensity Factor Crack Case Size pressure 0.1200 11.5476 0.2400 17.0839 0.3600 22.0549 0.4800 26.9747 0.6000 32.0285 0.7200 37.2965 0.8400 42.8136 0.9600 48.5926 1.0800 54.6345 1.2000 60.9343 1.3200 67.4837 1.4400 74.273 1.5600 81.2917 1.6800 88.5293 1.8000 95.9753 1.9200 103.62 2.0400 111.453 2.1600 119.466 2.2800 127.649 2.4000 135.995 2.5200 144.496 2.6400 153.143 2.7600 161.93 2.8800 170.849 3.0000 179.894 3.1200 189.059 3.2400 198.337 3.3600 207.723 3.4800 217.21 3.6000 226.794 3.7200 236.469 3.8400 246.229 3.9600 256.071 4.0800 265.988 4.2000 275.976 4.3200 286.031 4.4400 296.148 4.5600 306.322 4.6800 316.55 4.8000 326.826 4.9200 337.147 5.0400 347.509 5.1600 357.908 5.2800 368.339 5.4000 378.799 5.5200 389.284 5.6400 399.79 5.7600 410.313 5.8800 420.85 6.0000 431.397 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B 18 of B26

Crack Growth Laws:

Law ID:

Type:

Model:

Cast SS Fatigue Paris da/dN = c * (dK)^n where dK = Kmax -

Kmin dK > Kthres Kmax < Klc Material c

n Kthres parameters:

=

2.5800e-010 3.3000 0.0000 Material Fracture Toughness KIc:

Material ID: Cast SS Depth KIc 0.0000 500.0000 0.6000 500.0000 Initial crack size=

0.3900 Max.

crack size=

6.0000 Number of blocks=

1 Print increment of block=

1 Cycles

/Time Calc.

Print Crk. Grw.

incre. incre.

Law Mat.

Klc Subblock No.

1 100 1

1 Cast SS Cast SS Kmax Kmin Subblock Case ID Scale Factor Case ID Scale Factor No.

1 pressure 1.0000 pressure 0.0000 Crack growth results:

Total Cycles

/Time Subblock Cycles

/Time DaDn Kmin DeltaK R

/DaDt Kmax Da a

a/thk Block:

1 1

2 3

1 2.33e+001 2 2.33e+001 3 2.33e+001 0.00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 2.33e+001 0.00 8.37e-006 8.37e-006 2.33e+001 0.00 8.37e-006 8.37e-006 2.33e+001 0.00 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B19 of B26

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2-. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0. OOe+000 0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0. OOe+000 0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2. 33e+001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006 8.39e-006

8. 39e-006 8.39e-006 8.39e-006 8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006

8. 40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006

8. 40e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 38e-006

8. 38e-006 8.38e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006 8.39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006

8. 39e-006 8.39e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006

8. 40e-006 0.39 0.39 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3901 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3902 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3903 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3904 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B20 of B26

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 0.00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0.00e+000 0.00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0.00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0.00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001

2. 33e+001 2.33e+001

2. 33e+001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006

8. 41e-006 8.42e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.40e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006

8. 41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.41e-006 8.4le-006 8.42e-006 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3905 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3906 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3907 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.3908 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 End of pc-CRACK Output Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B21 of B26

tm pc-CRACK for Windows Version 3.1-98348 (C)

Copyright '84

'98 Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24 San Jose, CA 95118-1557 Voice:

408-978-8200 Fax:

408-978-8964 E-mail: pccrack@structint.com Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Date: Sat Jun 23 13:36:54 2007 Input Data and Results File: AXIALP5.LFM

[CSE-5]1

Title:

McGuire Nuclear Station - Valve 1NV-240 Crack Growth Axial Flaw Load Cases:

Stress Coefficients Case ID CO Cl C2 C3 Type pressure 19.99 0

0 0

Coeff Through Wall Wall Case Depth pressure Stresses for Load Cases With Stress Coeff-------

0.0000 0.6000 1.2000 1.8000 2.4000 3.0000 3.6000 4.2000 4.8000 5.4000 6.0000 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 19.99 Crack Model: Through-Wall Axial Crack in Pressurized Cylinder Crack Parameters:

Wall thickness:

0.4063 Outside diameter(Rm/t>=10) :

5.9380 Half crack length(max a<=10(Rmt)^0.5):

6.0000 Co = Hoop stress due to pressure All other stress coefficients are neglected.

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B22 of B26

---

Stress Intensity Factor---------------------

Crack Case

.Size pressure 0.1200 12.7274 0.2400 18.8792 0.3600 24.4473 0.4800 29.9949 0.6000 35.7223 0.7200 41.7137 0.8400 48.0036 0.9600 54.6025 1.0800 61.5089 1.2000 68.7147 1.3200 76.2088 1.4400 83.9787 1.5600 92.0116 1.6800 100.294 1.8000 108.815 1.9200 117.561 2.0400 126.521 2.1600 135.684 2.2800 145.039 2.4000 154.578 2.5200 164.289 2.6400 174.166 2.7600 184.198 2.8800 194.378 3.0000 204.698 3.1200 215.15 3.2400 225.727 3.3600 236.423 3.4800 247.23 3.6000 258.142 3.7200 269.153 3.8400 280.257 3.9600 291.447 4.0800 302.718 4.2000 314.065 4.3200 325.482 4.4400 336.962 4.5600 348.502 4.6800 360.096 4.8000 371.74 4.9200 383.427 5.0400 395.153 5.1600 406.914 5.2800 418.704 5.4000 430.519 5.5200 442.354 5.6400 454.205 5.7600 466.067 5.8800 477.936 6.0000 489.807 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B23 of B26

Crack Growth Laws:

Law ID:

Type:

Model:

Cast SS Fatigue Paris da/dN = c (dK)^n where dK = Kmax Kmin dK > Kthres Kmax < Klc Material c

n Kthres parameters:

=

2.5800e-010 3.3000

=

0.0000 Material Fracture Toughness KIc:

Material ID: Cast SS Depth KIc 0.0000 500.0000 0.6000 500.0000 Initial crack size=

0 Max.

crack size=

Number of blocks=

Print increment of block=

.0300 6.0000 1

Calc.

Print Crk.

Grw.

incre. incre.

Law Cycles

/Time Mat.

KIc Subblock No.

1 100 1

1 Cast SS Cast SS Kmax Kmin Subblock Case ID Scale Factor Case ID Scale Factor No.

1 pressure 1.0000 pressure 0.0000 Crack growth results:

Total Cycles

/Time Subblock Cycles

/Time DaDn Kmin DeltaK R

/DaDt Kmax Da a

a/thk Block:

I 1

2 3

1 2

3

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000 0.00e+000 6.36e+000 0.00 1.16e-007 1.16e-007 0.00e+000 6.36e+000 0.00 1.16e-007 1.16e-007 0.00e+000 6.36e+000 0.00 1.16e-007 1.16e-007 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B24 of B26

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000 0.OOe+000

0. OOe+000

0. OOe+000

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6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

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6. 36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000

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6. 36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000

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6. 36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000

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6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

.0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

1. 16e-007

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1. 16e-007 1.16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 0.03001 0.00 Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B25 of B26

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

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6. 36e+000 0.00e+000

0. 00e+000

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0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000

0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0. 00e+000 0.00e+000

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0. 00e+000

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0. 00e+000 0.00e+000

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000

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6. 36e+000

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6. 36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000 6.36e+000

6. 36e+000

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6. 36e+000

6. 36e+000

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6. 36e+000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

1. 16e-007

1. 16e-007

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1. 16e-007 1.16e-007

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1. 16e-007 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.03001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 End of pc-CRACK Output Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

Page B26 of B26

APPENDIX C CITED EMAIL REFERENCE Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc.

PageCI of C2

REFERENCE 4 McGill, Bob From.

Setzer, Fred R [frsetzer@duke-energy.com]

Sent:

Thursday, June 21, 2007 12:08 PM To:

McGIll, Bob; Davis, J M Co:

Kirk, Robert W Jr

Subject:

RE: P.O Issuance for Structural Integrity-Fracture Mechanics evaluation for 1 NV-240 I agree with the information Bob provided.

From; Kirk, Robert W Jr Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 3:04 PM To: Setzer, Fred R

Subject:

FW: P.O Issuance for Structural Integrity-Fracture Mechanics evaluation for INV-240 Fred please review the below & send on to Bob McGill & copy JM Davis & Chad, thanks Bob From: Kirk, Robert W Jr Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 1:42 PM To: 'McGill, Bob' Cc: KIdd, Ronald J; Davis, J M

Subject:

RE: P.O Issuance for Structural Integrity-Fracture Mechanics evaluaUon for 1NV-240 Body Material SA351 GR CF8M reference is: MCM 1205.00-1186 001 (Crane-Aloyco, Inc. Gate Valve PS-HW)

Our typical operating pressure is 2500 psig, temperature of 110 deg F is a little on the conservative side, but these #s were base(

on typical operating parameters, but the design parameters are as follows:

Design Pressure 2735 psig (reference MCFD-1554-03.00, Rev. 9 Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System)

Design Temperature 189 deg F (reference MCFD-1554-03.00, Rev. 9 Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System)

Structural Integrity File No.: MNS-05Q-302 Revision: 0 Associates, Inc. - -- -------'Page C2 of C2

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Relief Request Number 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation ATTACHMENT 8 Metallurgical Report Nuclear Generation Materials Engineering & Lab Services "Speculated Failure Mode for MNS JNV-240"

Relief Request 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation Page 1 of 3 Duke Energy - Nuclear Generation Materials Engineering

& Lab Services Date: June 24, 2007 Memorandum to:

M. K. Pyne, Nuclear Generation, NGO cc: C.T. Alley Jr., Nuclear Generation, NGO

Subject:

Speculated Failure Mode for MNS 1NV-240

==

Introduction:==

MNS 1 NV-240 was recently discovered to have a through-body leak in the neck of the valve. The leakage was reported as "minor', with no accumulation of water on the floor beneath the valve. This valve is in the charging flow path and is used for system isolation; the leak itself is difficult or impractical to isolate. This is a 3-inch gate valve manufactured by Walworth in 1976. The valve body material is a cast austenitic stainless steel (SA-358, CF8M).

The valve normally operates with a nominal internal pressure of 2500 psi (borated water).

Operating temperature is normally below 120'F as it is downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger. The valve has likely been in service for 30 years or longer (i.e., since plant startup).

Site Inspection Results: Initial inspections performed under W/R 00927504 indicated the leak was possibly emanating from two small pinhole defects (see photo below). The pinholes are in close proximity and appear to be located at small depressions in the rough, casting surface.

More careful inspection of the photos suggests that the flaw may actually be associated with a small thumbnail-shaped defect interconnecting the two primary leak sites (see photo below).

Relief Request 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation Page 2 of 3 Subsequent UT examinations determined that the leak is located in the center of a 2.5 inch diameter circular-shaped weld repair. Per the MCTR, the weld filler material used for the repair was E316-16. This is one of 9 documented weld repair areas performed on the valve body by the original manufacturer.

Comments on Probable Damage Mechanism:

The flaw appears to be curved and discontinuous where it is breaking the OD surface of the valve body. This is not consistent with a mechanically driven crack. Therefore the possibility of fatigue cracking seems unlikely.

Despite the presence of a weld repair, which would increase the localized residual stress in this area and possibly cause some sensitization in the weld HAZ, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) also seems improbable due to the low susceptibility of this material in a deoxygenated borated water environment at relatively low temperatures.

Additionally, the materials are welded and cast austenitic stainless steel, both of which contain a small percentage of delta-ferrite in their microstructure; this structure is inherently more resistant to SCC than wrought materials.

Based on the shape and surface morphology of the defect, as well as being located in the center of a weld-repaired area, the most likely cause of the leak is a weld flaw, which may possibly have been influenced by the presence of a pre-existing casting flaw. Possible weld and/or casting flaws include shrinkage cracks, hot tearing, porosity, and/or entrapped slag/inclusions - alone or in combination. The weld procedure and filler material used for the valve repair were appropriate. Due to the geometry of the valve body, complexity of the cast microstructure, roughness of the casting surface and other factors, detection of such flaws can be difficult, if not impossible.

Although the repair may have been leak tight following the weld repair, through repeated pressure and temperature cycles over time, and slow removal of any entrapped slag or oxidation products within the defect, a tortuous leak path was eventually created. This type of flaw is consistent with the very low observed leak rate, and would also be unlikely to develop a rapid increase in leak rate.

The rust staining observed on the exterior of the valve body is most likely a result of dissolved iron (e.g., soluble iron hydroxides) contained in the leaking borated water which re-precipitated out upon cooling and drying on the OD valve surface.

Operating Experience Review:

An initial review of available operating experience indicates one similar occurrence in a cast austenitic stainless steel weldment. During SG replacement at MNS in 1997, a hot leg elbow casting developed a crack during welding which was attributed to the presence of small micro-fissures in an old repair weld, and to some extent, pre-existing fine porosity in the cast elbow (see PIP M-97-4224).

Also, there have been some cases of system leaks attributed to various types of casting flaws.

Point Beach experienced a leak on a cast stainless steel valve body which was attributed to a cold shut in the CF8 casting (see OEDB 99-023175).

In 1997, a small leak on the CNS 2A Boric Acid Transfer Pump casing was caused by a casting flaw (see PIP C-97-2991). At ONS, a pin hole or crack on the side of the valve bonnet for SF-14 was attributed to a pre-existing casting defect (see PIP 0-00-4299).

Relief Request 07-MN-001 Operability Evaluation Page 3 of 3 Based on personal experience, there have been other cases of leaks in castings and/or welds on the Duke system resulting from the gradual deterioration of preexisting as-manufactured or as-welded flaws.

If the Metallurgy Lab can be of further assistance, please call us at (704) 875-5275.

Prepared by:

Kevin Redmond, P.E., Senior Engineer Duke Energy 13339 Hagers Ferry Road MG03A6 Huntersville, NC 28078 Reviewed by:

C. T. Alley, Technical System Manager II Duke Energy