ML070990446

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Final - Outlines (Folder 3)
ML070990446
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/24/2007
From:
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To: David Silk
Operations Branch I
Sykes, Marvin D.
Shared Package
ML060800095 List:
References
Download: ML070990446 (23)
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Text

ES-40 1 P W R Exam i nat ion Out I in e Form ES-40 1-2

\\Jete: 1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. *
8.
9.
acility
Millstone 3 Date of Exam:
3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories Ensure that at least two topics from every K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i. e., except for one category iiirier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

The point total for each group and tier in tlie proposed outline initst match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by 2 1 froin that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam inust total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 poi n t s.

Systeins/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; system or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included ion tlie outline should be added. Refer to ES-40 1 Attaclimeiit2, for guidance regarding tlie elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.

Select topics from as inany system and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting as second topic for any system or evolution.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those IUAs having an importance rating (In) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for tlie RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but tlie topics must be relevant to tlie applicable evolution or system.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G on the SRO-only exam, enter it on tlie left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exanis.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of tlie K/A catalog, and enter tlie K/A numbers. descriptions, Irs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-40 1.3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are lined to 1 OCFR55.43.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-40 1 2

Form ES-40 1-2 ES-40 I IWR Euanitnatton Outline E/APE # / Name / Safety Function 000072 Loss of Reactor Cool,tnt hllheup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System I 1

000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure 2

Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS I 1 I 7 I 000040 (WIE 12) Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer 1 4 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power 1 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Elec.

Inst. Bus 16 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water 14 000065 Loss of Instrument Air I 8 W E 1 1 Loss of Emergency 1

1 Coolant Recirc. / 4 KIA Category Totals:

3 1

t 4

2 3

2 5

~

1 Ability to operate or monitor 1 3.2 I

PressuriLer level trend prc cau t ions 2.1.32 Explain and apply system limits and 3.4 1

1 Determineiinterpret valve lineup I necessary to restart CCW while bypassing a portion of the system Operational implication of expansion 2.8 1

of ti uids as tem erature increases Ability to determine occurrence of a Operational implications of effects of feedwater introduction on dry SG 3.4 Ability to operate / monitor operation of HPI under total feedwater loss 4 1 I Determinelinterpret I&C Ops Implications of cooling by 3.7 1

natural convection.

LOP svstems of loads lost.

18 Determinejinterpret fail position on 3.1 1

3 Determine / interpret impact on 3.5 I

Reasons for automatic actions on Ability to operate or monitor the restoration of systems after IAS 1

1 ESFActuation 1 1:: 1 1 pressure is restored.

I Interrelation between loss of recirc I 3.6 I 1 I and controls and safety systems I

I I

I I

I I

I 6

1 1 Group Point Total:

ES-40 1 2

Form ES-40 1-2 I__ -

ES-40 I PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 EIAPE # I Name I Safety Function 000026 Loss of Component Coolinc Water / 8 W/E I 1 Loss of Emet-gency Coolant Recirc. / 4 1

I ial Plant Evolutil Abi I ity to determi neiinterpret coiiseqtiences of LOCA with loss of 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions tor operations and safe[> limits csistcnce ofSG7.R.

nilti Ability to detci.mine. interpret 4.8 I

7.3.1 I

~ Knowledge of Loss of Insti-ument 1 Air Abnormal Oueratint! Pi.ocedure 1 Adherencc to appropriate procdures 4.2 I '

I I

I 1

I i

3 I Group Point Total:

l 6

ES-40 1 3

Form ES-40 1-2 P W I< Exam inat ion 0 ut I iiie Form ES-40 1-2 I/

ES-40 I E/APE ## / Name / Safety Function Radiation / 9 Loss of Emergent), Bus (Site 1

KIA Category Point Totals:

1 I Plant Evolut 2.4.1 1 Knowledge of abnormal condition 3.4 I

procedures Knowledge of reasons for EOP Guidance 4.2 1

1 I !.

I

~ I<no\\\\;ledge of reasons for EOP Guidance 1 3.7 I 1

//

1 I

i

, 2 1 20 Abilrt) to execute piocedure steps 4.3 I

I 1

i 2

1 1 Adherence to appropriate procedures 3.3 1

I 1

ES-41) 1 3

Form ES-40 1-2 I

EIAPE # I Name I Safety Function I

I l

l I

I I

8 I

I l

l I

I 1

~

I K/A Category Point Totals:

3 1

Group Point Total:

4

ES-40 1 4

Form ES-40 1-2 ES-40 I PWli Esainination Outline Forin ES-40 1-2 System # / Naine and \\ O I ~ I i l l C '

I 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergent)

Core Coolins 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer ReliefiQuench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 0 10 Pressurizer Pressure Control 0 10 Pressurizer Pressure Control 0 12 Reactor Protection 0 13 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 06 1 Auxi I iary/Emerg ency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution Pi-edict iinpact / mitigate boration / dilution CVCS CausciEffect with iii Au(o I

I I

Predict changes i n KIHR 11 0 \\v ra t e Relation between RHR flowpath and refueling Effect of loss ofpumps I

1 I

14.1 1 1

Predicthonitor temperature Operatehonitor PRT spray supply valve iili I

Power supply to CCW Pump, 3.0 1

including backup.

Effect of heaterlspray 3.2 1

malfunction Auto Ops during PORV Test 1

Monitor PRT Temp, Press, 3.0 1

Power supply to RPS 3.3 I

I Causdeffect between ESF and I 3.2 I I I

I I RCPs l

I I O n D C l

l

ES-40 1 4 (Continued)

Form ES-40 1-2 e5-40 1 System # /Name

ES-40 I 4

Form ES-40 1-2 ES-40 I PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 Plant Syste System # I Name K

K K

K n

003 Reactor Coolant Pump I

005 Residual Heat Removal KIA Category Point Totals:

A A

A A

G 1

2 3

4 2.1.23 I

01 I

I I

1 I R I #

K/A Topic(s)

Perform integrated plant procedures during all modes Predict impact /

111 it igate hi I tirc:

I 1

Inodes 1'i.edict impact /

I s

1 Group Point Total:

ES-40 1 5

For111 ES-40 1-2 System # I Name 001 Control Rod Drive 075 Circulating Water 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 035 Steam Generator 045 Main Turbine Generator 056 Condensate 071 Waste Gas Disposal 086 Fire Protection SBO Diesel (Site Specific)

AMSAC (Site Specific)

Plant Systems - Tier 2IGroup 2 (RO)

K K K K K K

A A

A A

G KIA Topic(s)

IR 1

2 3

4 5

6 1

2 3

4 9

Knowledge that CCW 2.8 1

1 Operate / monitor 3.2 I

5 Physical connections 2.7 I

2 Predict I monitor SG 3.5 1

must be cut in before CRDMs are energized.

emergency SWS pumps between SFC and RWST pressure response to operating controls 2.1.7 Evaluate plant 3.7 1

performance and make operational judgments 4

Predict / mitigate loss 2.6 1

of CNM pump on CNM System 5

Effect of WGD on 3.2 I

PRMIARM System 4

Predict / monitor 2.1 1

changes with damper operations x

Ability to manually NIA I

operate or monitor the SBO Diesel X

ES-40 1 5

Form ES-40 1-2 P

ES-40 I P W R Examinat ion Out I i ne Form ES-40 1-2 c

System # I Name K

K K

K K

K A

A A

1 2

3 4

5 6

1 2

3 0 1 1 Pressurizer Level Control I

i K/A Category Point Totals:

0 4" 1 G 1 K!A Topic(s) 1,I: 1 i performance and make

2. I.7 Evaluate 3

Group Point Total:

3

ES-40 1 Generic Kno\\i,ledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

FO~III ES-40 1-3 Facility: Mill Category

1.

c o I1 cl LI c t 0 f Operat ions

2.

Eq 11 i pment Control

3.

Radiation Co ti t rol

4.

Emergency Procedures I Plan one Uni K/A #l 2.1.1 2.1.22 2.1.30

2. I.5 3

Date of Exam:

Topic Kno\\vledp;e of Conduct of Operations Reauirements Abilitv to determine mode of operation.

Abilitv to locate and onerate coiiiiwiieiits. includinr! local coiitrols RO S RO-3.7 I

S 11 b to ta I 3

2 2.2.2 Ability to operate Controls bet\\\\ eeii shutdown and at-po\\vei-.

' 4.0 I

1 1 7 2.2.22 Knowledge of LCOs and Sai'et! Limits

~

J.-I 1

2.2.2 1 Pre and post maintenance operability requirements.

3.5 1

2.2.32 Knowledge of the effect of alterations on core configuration 3.3 1

Subtotal 2

2 2.3.2 Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

2.5 I

2.7 1

2.3.1 1 Ability to control a radiation release.

2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce radiation and exposure.

3.3 1

Subtotal 2.4.23 2.4.25 2.4.47 2.4.10 2

1 Knowledge of basis for prioritizing EOPs.

2.8 1

Knowledge of Fire Protection procedures.

2.9 1

Ability to diagnose trends using reference material.

3.4 1

Knowledge of Annunciator Response Procedures.

3.1 1

Knowledge of Chemistry / HP Tasks during emergencies.

2.8 1

2.4.36 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

NUREG-102 1. Revision 9

ES-401 Record of Reiected KIAs Form ES-40 1-4 Tier I Group 111 Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected KIA APE.040.AKl.04 Concern with Nil1 Ductilitv TemDerature on steam break: GFS.

111 111 111 APE.062.AA1.03 SWP as backup to CCW: KA Typo? (Same as APE.02Ci.AA1.03).

Low operational validity. Simply tests loss of backup function while CCW is still functioning. More appropriate for APE.026 Oversamnle: Similar to 078.K4.02. which was also selected.

APE.065.AAl.04 1 I2 112 APE.062.AA1.01 APE.036.K3.03 APE.OO1.A2.0 1 Ability to operatelmonitor SWP temperature on loss of SWP:

Millstone 3 Main Boards display SWP flow and pressure, not temperature. No Loss of SWP AOP steps direct monitoring of SWP temperature.

Reasons for Fuel Handling AOP actions: Low discriminatory validity; Basis for each action is obvious.

Ability to Interpret Reactor Trip Breaker indication. Low discriminatory validity. Better tested during operating portion of the exam.

21 1 2/ 1 005.A1.07 007.A4. 10 Determination of test acceptability by comparison of recorded valve response times with Tech-Spec requirements: Low difficulty.

Indication of leaky PORV: overlap with operating exam 212 3 I3 I are consistent with plant conditions. Rejected based on lead 086.A1.03 GEN.2.3.10 Predict impact/Monitor Fire Doors: overlap with Operating Exam Oversample: also selected on SRO Dortion of exam.

I 1 examiner inmt. Not conducive to a discriminatorilv valid auestion.

112 APE.00 1.A2.03 21 1 073.A2.02 311 GEN.2.1.13 3 /2 GEN.2.2.5 212 01 7.GEN.2.4.46 ES-401, Page 27 of 33 (SRO) Determine actions if auto-safety functions have not taken place: RO level knowledge; Trip the Reactor.

(SRO) Oversample: This KA Statement was already selected on RO portion of the exam.

(SRO) Vital Area Access Control: General Employee Knowledge (SRO) Process for making changes to facility: Recommended for rejection by facility reviewer; not SRO job fhction at Millstone 3.

(Performed by engineering dept).

Ability to verify In-Core Temperature Monitoring System alarms

ES-401 Record of Rejected WAS Form ES-40 1-4 Tier I Group Randomly Selected Reason for Rejection KIA Paragraph 1. They were selected and rejected.

21 1 I 061.GEN.2.2.22 I Knowledge of LCOs and Safety Limits: AFW not part of safety 111 112 limits. LCOs not part of RO job function at Millslone 3.

SRO: EOP Immediate Actions: Not SRO level.

EPE.055.GEN.2.4.49 APE.076.GEN.2.1.27 SRO: Not 10CFR55.43 21 1 21 1 064. GEN.2.4.6 064.GEN.2.1.30 SRO: Not 10CFR55.43 SRO: EDGs not operated in Millstone 3 symptom-based EOPs 212 01 1.GEN.2.4.50 212 055.GEN.2.1.23 212 055.GEN.2.4.3 1 SRO: Not 10CFR55.43 SRO: Not 10CFR55.43 SRO: Not 1 OCFR55.43 212 212 075.GEN.2.2.25 075. GEN. 2.4.4 SRO: Tech Spec Basis for CWS: not a Tech Spec System SRO: RO Level.

212 075.GEN.2.1.23 212 075.GEN.2.1.28 212 075.GEN.2.2.22 SRO: Not 10CFR55.43 SRO: Not 10CFR55.43 SRO: Tech Spec for CWS: CWS is not a Tech Spec System 3 I2 3 I3 Handling) outside control room. The Rad Waste PEO operates these systems. There is little SRO interaction, other than GEN.2.2.31 KA<2.5 GEN. 2.3.6 KA<2.5 Discharge Permits, which is being tested 011 the operating exam.

3 I3 3 I4 ES-401, Page 27 of 33 GEN.2.3.8 KA<2.5 GEN.2.4.43 Emergency Coinniuiiication System not operated by ROs at 312 Millstone 3.

SRO: Ability to track LCOs (tracked in shift log) Low GEN. 2.2.23 3 I3 3 I3 discriminatory validity.

SRO: Knowledge of ALARA, General Employee Knowledge SRO: Knowledge of 1 OCFR20 Limits, General Employee GEN.2.3.2 GEN.2.3.1 3 I3 Knowledge SRO: SRO responsibilities for aux systems (Waste and GEN.2.3.5

Written Exam Development Process (provided per ES-40 I, Section D. I.b):

Millstone 3 used the systematic sampling methodology described in ES-401, Attachment 1 as the process to develop the written examination outline.

MP3 2K7 Operatinq Test Change Summarv-2 z.126107 (Changes since submittal of the 45 day exam package)

1. ES-D-1, Scenario outline for 2K7-NRC-01 (rev 0 chg I):

Deleted the DRPl Malfunction event (old event 4) from the scenario.

Renumbered subsequent events. SIH (safety Injection) pumps fail to auto-start were added as malfunctions.

2. ES-D-1, Scenario outline for 2K7-NRC-03 (rev 0 chg 2):

Separated the running RPCCW pump trip event from event 1, and made it a standalone event (event 2). Renumbered subsequent events.

3. ES-301-4, Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Qualitative Attributes for NRC-01 changed due to deleting the DRPl Malfunction event. Specifically, total malfunctions were reduced from 10 to 9, and Abnormal Events were reduced from 6 to 5.

Qualitative Attributes for NRC-02 changed due to adding an additional critical task (Trip all RCPs). Specifically, Critical Tasks went from 3 to 4.

4. ES-301-5, Transient and Event Checklist and ES-301-6, Competencies Checklist For NRC-01 (scenario I),

deleted the DRPl Malfunction event (old event 4). Renumbered subsequent events.

For NRC-03 (scenario 3), separated the running RPCCW pump trip event from event I, and made it a standalone event (event 2). Renumbered subsequent events.

5. ES-301-1, Administrative Topics Outline for the SRO Changed one administrative topic for Conduct of Operations (SRO A. 1.1) from Evaluate Tech Specs to Review a Surveillance form for RCS Leakage-Controlled Leakage to RCP Seals.

NOTE: Each JPM and Scenario Exam Guide has as its second page, a more detailed and specific change summary.

ES-301 Ad m in ist rat ive Topics Out I i ne Form ES-301-1 Facility: Millstone 3 Date of Examination: Week of 3/12/06 Examination Level:

RO SRO Operating Test Number:

2K7 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Conduct of Operations RO A. l. l Conduct of Operations RO A.1.2 Equipment Control RO A.2 Radiation Control RO A.3 Emergency Plan N, R Describe activity to be performed Determine the Maximum Rate of Power Increase and Control Rod Withdrawal Limitations.

KIA 2.1.25 Determine the Required Boration Time and Final Control Rod Height For a Rapid Downpower.

KIA 2.1.20 Given a maintenance repair recommendation and reference material, recommend a clearance boundary.

KIA 2.2.13 Actions and Expected Response for RMS Equipment failure Alarms.

WA 2.3.1.

VOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are Type Codes & Criteria:

retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-3.01, Page 22 of 27 NUREG-1021 Revision 8

ES-30 1 Administrative Topics Out I i ne Form ES-301-1 Facility: Millstone 3 Date of Examination: Week of 3/12/06 Examination Level:

RO 0 S R O U Operating Test Number:

2K7 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations SRO A. l. l Conduct of Operations SRO A. 1.2 Equipment Control SRO A.2 Radiation Control SRO A.3 Emergency Plan SRO A.4 TY Pe Code*

D. R D, R Review a Surveillance form for RCS Leakage-Controlled Leakage to RCP Seals WA 2.1.7 Notifications and Reportability.

K/A 2.1.6 Response to Door Inoperability.

K/A 2.2.21 Review and Approve a Radioactive Liquid Waste Discharge Permit.

K/A 2.3.6 Emergency Plan Classification and Protective Action Recommendation for a General Emergency.

KIA 2.4.41 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are

  • Type Codes & Criteria:

retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class( R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-3.01, Page 22 of 27 NUREG-1021, Revision 8

ES-30 1 Control Room/ln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 System / JPM Title

a.
b.

S.l / Loss of All Charging Pumps.

S.2 / Energize an AC Emergency Bus Through the RSSA during ECA-0. 0.

c.

S.3 / Respond to Main Steam Pressure Transmitter Failure (3MSS-PT20D)

Facility:

Millstone Unit 3 Date of Examination: Week of 3/12/06 Exam Level: RO SRO-I 0 SRO-U 0 Operating Test No.:

2K7 Type Code*

Safety Function N, A, E, S P, D, A, E, S

P, D, A, E, S

2 -004 6 - 062 4.2 - 039

d.
e.

S.5 / Performance of the Immediate Actions of E-0.

f.

S.6 / Establish RHR Train B Boron Concentration

g.
h.

S.4 / Control Rod Out of Alignment.

S.7 / Depressurize the RCS to Refill the Pressurizer.

S.8 / Respond to Containment Sump Blockage.

D, E, s 1 - 0 0 1 7 - 012 4.1 - 005 3 - 010 5 - 026 N, A, E, s N, L, s M, A, E, s P, D, E, S All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U
i.
j.
k.

P.l / Primary PEO Actions on a Control Room Evacuation.

P.2 / Local Actions on a Loss of Instrument Air.

P.3 / Cross-Connect Service Water to East Switchgear ACUs.

(A)Iternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (WCA D, R, E D, A, E 6 - 062 8 - 068 N, E 4.2 - 076 4-6 14-6 12-3 9 1 8 1 4 1 / 1 1 1 I l l / 1 2 / 2 1 1 I l l / 1 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27

ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 System / JPM Title Type Code*

a.
b.

S.l / Loss of All Charging Pumps.

S.2 / Energize an AC Emergency Bus Through the RSSA during N, A, E, S P, D, A, E, ECA-0.0.

S Facility:

Millstone Unit 3 Date of Examination: Week of 3/12/06 Exam Level: RO 0 SRO-I SRO-U 0 Operating Test No.:

2K7 Safety Function 2 -004 6 - 062

c.

S.3 / Respond to Main Steam Pressure Transmitter Failure (3MSS-PT20D)

d.
e.

S.5 / Performance of the Immediate Actions of E-0.

f.

S.6 / Establish RHR Train B Boron Concentration

g.

S.4 / Control Rod Out of Alignment.

S.7 / Depressurize the RCS to Refill the Pressurizer.

P, D, A, E, S

D, E, s N, A, E, s N, L, s M, A, E, s 4.2 - 039 1 - 001 7 - 012 4.1 - 005 3 - 010 11 h.

P.l / Primarv PEO Actions on a Control Room Evacuation.

j.

P.3 / Cross-Connect Service Water to East Switchgear ACUs.

I D. R. E I

6 - 0 6 2 N, E 4.2 - 076 11 i.

P.2 / Local Actions on a Loss of Instrument Air.

I D.A. E I

8 - 0 6 8 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 14-6 12-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 91 8 1 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 / 1 1 1 (L)ow-Power I Shutdown 1 1 1 1 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 1 2 1 1 (R)CA 1 1 I / 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 I 3 I 2 (randomly selected)

(S)im ulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27

ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 System / JPM Title Type Code*

a.
b.

S.5 / Performance of the Immediate Actions of E-0.

c.

S.6 / Establish RHR Train B Boron Concentration S.l / Loss of All Charging Pumps. (New)

N, A, E, S N, A, E, S

( E W N, L, s 11 Facility:

Millstone Unit 3 Date of Examination: Week of 3/12/06 11 Safety Function 2 -004 7 - 012 4.1 - 005 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.:

2K7

d.
e.

P.l / Primary PEO Actions on a Control Room Evacuation.

P.2 / Local Actions on a Loss of Instrument Air.

D, R, E D, A, E 6 - 062 8 - 068 I

I li II All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (RKA 4-6 14-6 12-3 9 1 8 1 4 1 / 1 1 1 1 / 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 / 1 1 1 3 I 3 I 2 (randomly selected)

I( (Sjimulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Millstone 3 Scenario No.: 2K7 NRC-01 Op-Test No.: 2K7 Examiners:

Operators :

Initial Conditions:

IC-21, 100% power, End of Life, Equilibrium Xe.

Turnover:

The plant is at 100% power and at end of life. The A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for major maintenance. The C TPCCW pump is out of service for oil replacement.

Event Malf. No 1 No. I RP07A/B I FW20 SI07A/B c RPOGA/B (N)ormal,

~

Event C (BOP)

N (SRO)

R (SRO)

N (BOP)

Type R (RO) 1 (RO)

I (BOP)

Event Description Moisture Separator Reheater tube leak and subsequent procedurally required downpower. AOP 3575, Rapid Do wnpo wer.

Controlling channel of PZR level fails as is (3RCS*L459) in conjunction with downpower.

D Steam Generator steam flow instrument fails low (3MSS-FT542).

Loss of Batterv Bus 4.

RPCCW leak into upper oil reservoir of C RCP.

Small break LOCA inside CTMT. Safety Injection fails to auto-actuate. AFW pumps fail to auto-start. SIH pumps fail to auto-start.

Large break LOCA inside CTMT. CDA fails to auto-actuate.

X)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Malf. No RX09A RX13E RC04A RX04A IO CHS-MV8104 Facility: Millstone 3 Scenario No.: 2K7 NRC-02 Op-Test No.: 2K7 Event Type*

I I (RO)

I (BOP)

C (RO)

I (RO)

R (RO)

R (SRO)

N (BOP) to open.

Controlling channel of PZR pressure fails high.

Controlling channel of C Steam Generator feed flow fails low (3MSS-FT530).

RCS leak. Reactor Vessel Flange leakoff.

Loop 1 Tavg fails high (loop 1 narrow range Tc, 3RCS*TE41lB)

CONVEX directed Emergency Load Reduction. AOP 3575, Rapid Downpower. Emergency Boration valve fails Examiners:

c (RO)

C (RO)

Operators:

Main Generator trip and automatic reactor trip failure.

Initial Conditions:

IC-2 1, 100% power, End of Life, Equilibrium Xe.

Turnover:

The plant is at 100% power and at end of life. The A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for routine maintenance. The C TPCCW pump is out of service for oil replacement.

Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 Event DescriDtion EGO 1 RP 1 OA/B MS02A MS07C/D MS 12A/B RP08 RPllH I

I P

Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 1

2 3

4

~

Facility: Millstone 3 Scenario No.: 2K7 NRC-03 (spare)

Op-Test No.:

2K7 CCOlB RC07A NI09C Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-07 (modified), 3% power, Beginning of Life, No Xe.

Turnover:

The crew will take the shift with reactor power stable at the point of adding heat (reactor power 3%), following a reactor startup by the previous shift. This is the initial plant startup from a refueling outage. OP 3203, Plant Startup is in progress.

EG07A FW20C I

(N)ormal, I

I (BOP)

M (ALL)

Event Description Power ascension from 3% to 8% power using OP 3203, Plant Startup.

Running RPCCW pump trip. Alignment and start of the standby RPCCW pump.

Small leak develops through pressurizer PORV, 3RCS PCV45 5A.

Power Range Nuclear Instrument (NI) Channel 43 Lower Detector fails high requiring FRV Bypass valve controllers to be placed in manual.

A RCP #1 seal degradation resulting in high RCP seal leakoff. RCP is tripped using AOP 3554, RCP Trip or RemovinP a RCP from Service At Power.

Loss of offsite power, B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to automatically or manually start from the control room.

A EDG trips resulting in a loss of all AC power.

TDAFW pump fails to auto-start. B EDG-is started locally. B service water pumps fail to auto-start after B EDG is successfully started locally.

k)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 3 8 of 3 9

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