ML070890351
| ML070890351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/2007 |
| From: | Clark J NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E |
| To: | Mitchell T Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-04-003, IR-06-005 | |
| Download: ML070890351 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000313/2006005
Text
March 30, 2007
Timothy G. Mitchell
Vice President Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
ERRATA FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000313/2006005 AND 05000368/2006005
Dear Mr. Mitchell:
Please replace page 9 of NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2004003 and
05000368/2004003, dated February 14, 2007, with the attached revised page. The purpose of
this change is to reconcile the crosscutting element of the finding with that described in the
Report Details.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them
with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jeff Clark, PE, Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects
Dockets: 50-313
50-368
Licenses: DPR-51
Enclosure:
Page 9 from NRC Inspection
Report 05000313/2006005 and 05000368/2006005
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-
Senior Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
General Manager Plant Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Arkansas Nuclear One
1448 S. R. 333
Russellville, AR 72802
Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Arkansas Nuclear One
1448 S. R. 333
Russellville, AR 72802
Manager, Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Arkansas Nuclear One
1448 S. R. 333
Russellville, AR 72802
Director, Nuclear Safety & Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1340 Echelon Parkway
Jackson, MS 39213-8298
Section Chief, Division of Health
Radiation Control Section
Arkansas Department of Health and
Human Services
4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30
Little Rock, AR 72205-3867
Section Chief, Division of Health
Emergency Management Section
Arkansas Department of Health and
Human Services
4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30
Little Rock, AR 72205-3867
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-3-
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, MD 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russellville, AR 72801
James Mallay
Director, Regulatory Affairs
Framatome ANP
3815 Old Forest Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (RWD)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (JAC)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (JCK3)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (FLB2)
RITS Coordinator (MSH3)
Only inspection reports to the following:
D. Cullison, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DGC)
ROPreports
ANO Site Secretary (VLH)
SUNSI Review Completed: __JAC__
ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: __JAC__
G Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive
G Non-Sensitive
R:\\_REACTORS\\ANO 2006-05RP errata.wpd
RIV:PE/DRP/E
C:DRP/E
JCKirkland
JAClark
/RA/
/RA/
3/29/07
3/30/07
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
Enclosure
-9-
Corrective actions that were taken by the licensee in response to this event to prevent
recurrence included: moving the step-off pad farther away from the work area, clearing the
area near the door of unnecessary equipment and materials, coaching the firewatch and his
supervisor concerning the responsibility of the firewatch and how to deal with distractions,
discussing alternatives to more effectively contain sparks from the cutting operation, discussing
the event with craft personnel, and conducting more frequent area inspections.
A number of additional deficiencies were identified through a review of recent licensee
performance in the conduct of related hot work activities. Section 4OA2 of this enclosure
contains some details of other instances that occurred during the Unit 2 Refueling
Outage 2R18. Also, three examples involving circumstances similar to the subject of this
finding occurred during the prior refueling outages for each of the two units. On March 25,
2005, fallen welding slag caused the smoldering of debris below Containment Cooler D
inside the Unit 2 containment building. On September 29 torch cutting resulted in falling hot
metal and slag that caused combustible materials in the work area to catch on fire. On
October 14 three small fires of trash bags containing combustible materials in the Unit 1
turbine building basement were caused by hot work activities that were being performed on
the levels above. There was no firewatch posted on the basement level.
Each of these instances was entered into the licensees CAP. These occurrences represent
instances of inadequate implementation of applicable hot work control procedures. The
inspectors concluded that the recent increase in the number of related findings when
compared to past occurrences represented a trend which, if left uncorrected, could become
a more significant safety concern in that it could result in a fire in or near risk important
equipment.
Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the failure of
maintenance personnel to adequately implement the licensees procedure for control of hot
work and ignition sources. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with
the protection against external factors attribute of the initiating events cornerstone, and
affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant
stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Additionally, if left uncorrected, the practice of conducting hot work in a manner that results
in unintended combustion of nearby materials would become a more significant safety
concern in that it could result in a fire in or near risk important equipment. Manual
Chapter (MC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix F, Fire Protection
Significance Determination Process, does not address the potential risk significance of
shutdown fire protection findings. Additionally, MC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown
Operations Significance Determination Process, does not address fire protection findings.
Thus, the finding is not suitable for significance determination process evaluation, but has
been reviewed by NRC management and is determined to be of very low safety significance
because the finding occurred while the unit was already in a cold shutdown condition; and
the operability of equipment necessary to maintain safe shutdown was not challenged. The
cause of the finding is related to the crosscutting element of human performance associated
with work practices because the fire watch failed to use error prevention techniques like self
checking and peer checking which would have prevented the event.