ML070330627
| ML070330627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/2006 |
| From: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Caldwell J Region 3 Administrator |
| References | |
| 1-1470 | |
| Download: ML070330627 (43) | |
Text
FENOC -
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 550 1 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor. Ohio 43449 Mark E. Bazila Vice President - Nuclear 4 19-321-7676 Fax: 419-321-7582 Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1470 August 23, 2006 Mr. James L. Caldwell, Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I11 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 2 10 Lisle, IL 60532-4352
Subject:
Submittal of Independent Assessment Report of Operations Performance for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Year 2006; and Request to Rescind Future Assessments of Operations Performance
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
The purpose of this letter is to submit the 2006 Operations Performance Independent Assessment Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). This submittal is in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter dated March 8, 2004, Approval to Restart the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Closure of Confirmatory Action Letter, and Issuance of Confirmatory Order. This letter also requests that the NRC consider rescinding the conditions of the Order requiring future Independent Assessments of Operations Performance.
The Operations Performance Independent Assessment was conducted from June 12 to June 23, 2006, at the DBNPS in accordance with the Independent Operations Performance Assessment Plan submitted via letter Serial Number 1-1455 dated March 14, 2006, and updated via letter Serial Number 1-1467 dated June 9,2006. The final debrief marking the end of the assessment was conducted on July 7,2006. The enclosed report contains the results of the Independent Assessment. No issues rising to the level of an Area for Improvement were identified in the Independent Assessment; therefore, no action plans are included to address areas for improvement.
The 2006 Operations Performance Independent Assessment, like the 2005 Assessment, concludes that Operations Performance at the DBNPS is effective, and that the plant is being operated safely (refer to letter Serial Number 1-1430 dated August 22, 2005, for the 2005 Assessment Report). The 2006 and 2005 Independent Assessments also conclude that FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Fleet Oversight, the Company Nuclear Review Board, and Operations department assessments are factual, in-depth, and accurate in identifylng areas of weakness within the Operations department. Furthermore, the Independent
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1 - 1470 Page 2 of 2 Assessments conclude that Operations department assessments have an increased emphasis on areas of concern that may have an effect on continued safe operation of the plant, they continue to identify problem areas, and findings from these department assessments are captured in the DBNPS Corrective Action Program. Neither the 2005 nor the 2006 Operations Performance Independent Assessments identified any issues rising to the level of an Area for Improvement.
Based on these Independent Assessments, FENOC believes that sustained safe performance in the area of Operations is being demonstrated and that FENOC can effectively self-assess and identify areas needing additional focus at the DBNPS. Annual Operations department assessments, including Focused or Snapshot Self-Assessments along with semi-annual Integrated Performance Assessments, will continue to be performed for the time period addressed by the Confirmatory Order.
Therefore, in accordance with Section IV of the March 8,2004, Order, which states The Regional Administrator, NRC Region 111, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause, FENOC respectfully requests that the NRC rescind the condition of the Order that requires Independent Assessments of Operations Performance. Pending the results of this request, the 2007 Independent Assessment of Operations Performance is tentatively scheduled for June 1 1-22, 2007. This activity would require that the plan, including the identity of the outside assessment organizations, qualifications of the assessors, and the scope and depth of the assessment, be submitted to the NRC by March 13,2007.
If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. Robert W.
Schrauder, Director - Performance Improvement, at (41 9) 32 1-7 18 1.
Sincerely yours, GMW
Enclosures:
- 1) Confirmatory Order Independent Assessment of Operations Performance for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
- 2) Commitment List cc: DB-1 NRC/NRR Project Manager DB-1 Senior Resident Inspector USNRC Document Control Desk Utility Radiological Safety Board
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1470 CONFIRMATORY ORDER INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (39 pages follow)
Confirmatory Order Independent Assessment Operations Performance Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Report Number COIA-OPS-2006 Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location:
5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449-9760 On-site Observation:
June 12 - 23,2006 Final Debrief:
July 7,2006 Final Report:
,7&,hflg6' Date Reviewed and A
Accepted:
Vice sident, Oversight Date
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance.
2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS A. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
3 B. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................
7 C. SCOPE OF ASSESSMENT.................................................................................................................... 7 D. METHODOLOGY..................................................................................................................................
8 E. DETAILS and RESULTS....................................................................................................................... 9 SECTION I................................................................................................................................................
9 Area 1.
Shift and Meeting Observations....................................................................................................
9 Scope - Area 1.........................................................................................................................................
9 Observations and Findings - Area 1........................................................................................................
9 Areas of Strength - Area 1..................................................................................................................... 15 Areas in Need of Attention - Area 1.....................................................................................................
15 Areas for Improvement - Area 1..........................................................................................................
16 Conclusions - Area 1.............................................................................................................................
16 Area 2.
Interviews....................................................................................................................................
16 Scope.
Area 2.......................................................................................................................................
16 Observations and Findings.
Area 2......................................................................................................
17 Areas of Strength - Area 2....................................................................................................................
19 Areas in Need of Attention - Area 2......................................................................................................
19 Areas for Improvement - Area 2...........................................................................................................
19 Conclusions - Area 2.............................................................................................................................
19 Area 3.
Condition Report Review............................................................................................................
20 Scope.
Area 3....................................................................................................................................... 20 Observations and Findings - Area 3......................................................................................................
20 Areas of Strength - Area 3...................................................................................................................
296 Areas in Need of Attention - Area 3...................................................................................................... 26 Areas for Improvement - Area 3...........................................................................................................
27 Conclusions - Area 3.............................................................................................................................
27 Area 4.
Licensed Operator Continuing Training......................................................................................
29 Scope - Area 4....................................................................................................................................... 29 Observations and Findings - Area 4.....................................................................................................
30 Areas of Strength - Area 4....................................................................................................................
31 Areas in Need of Attention - Area 4......................................................................................................
31 Conclusions - Area 4.............................................................................................................................
31 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS OF OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE FOR SECTION I....................
31 Areas for Improvement - Area 4...........................................................................................................
31 SECTION I1............................................................................................................................................. 35 Davis-Besse Self Assessments................................................................................................................. 35 Scope - Section I1.................................................................................................................................. 35 Observations and Findings - Section I1.................................................................................................
32 Areas of Strength - Section I1................................................................................................................
33 Areas in Need of Attention - Section I1.................................................................................................
33 Areas for Improvement - Section I1.......................................................................................................
33 Conclusions - Section I1........................................................................................................................
33 ATTACHMENT 1: References................................................................................................................
35 ATTACHMENT 2: Assessment Team Biographies................................................................................
36 2
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 A.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Overall Conclusions of Operations Performance The team concluded, based on observations of control room and simulator performance) interviews, observations of classroom training and Condition Report (CR) evaluations, that the plant is being operated safely, both in the control room and in the plant. Personnel practice and display a questioning and safety conscious attitude. Good self and peer checking were practiced by those observed by the team in most instances. Operations personnel are knowledgeable of the plant and plant conditions) including workarounds, deficiency tags, etc. All control room operations observed were conducted in accordance with procedures, i.e., Conduct of Operations. Control room demeanor was improved over that which was observed last year, in that, professionalism was displayed at all times.
Similarities in crewhndividual performance were noted in both the simulator and the control room.
The team concluded that Operations performance is Effective.
Findings are presented in three categories:
AREA OF STRENGTH - An identified performance, program, or process element within an area of assessment that is significant in obtaining desired results.
AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT - An identified performance) program, or process element within an assessed area that requires improvement to obtain the desired results with consistency and effectiveness. All Areas for Improvement identified in the Assessment Report will be addressed by the Action Plan(s) submitted to the NRC.
AREA IN NEED OF ATTENTION - An identified performance, program, or process element within an area of assessment that, although sufficient to meet its basic intent, management attention is required to achieve full effectiveness and consistency. Areas in Need of Attention are not addressed by Action Plan(s) submitted to the NRC, but are considered for entry into the Corrective Action Program.
A summary of the 2006 team findings are as follows:
Area 1 - Shift and Meeting: Observations Areas of Strength:
Robust Barrier Program Conservative Decision-Making Areas for Improvement:
None 3
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Areas in Need of Attention:
0 0
Conduct of post-job briefs 0
0 Performance Indicators 0
0 Night orders not implemented in accordance with procedure Industrial safety rules not always observed The Operational Decision-Making Issues (ODMI) process Parallel processes should be eliminated or reduced Area 2 - Interviews Areas of Strength:
0 Training Duty Team Areas for Improvement:
0 None Areas in Need of Attention:
0 Procedure Backlog 0
Reactor Operator to Senior Reactor Operator Advancement Area 3 - Condition Report Review Areas of Strength:
0 None Areas for Improvement:
None Areas in Need of Attention:
0 Operations Work Scheduling Condition Report Classification of Mispositioning Events Area 4 - Licensed Operator Continuing Training Areas of Strength:
None Areas for Improvement:
None Areas in Need of Attention:
None 4
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Other significant observations of the assessment are as follows:
Expectations for procedure usage were well-known. Proficiency in this was evident during the control room, equipment operator and simulator observations.
Personnel are kept well-informed of plant status and emergent plant equipment conditions via the well-organized shift turnover and daily management meetings.
Standardization of shift turnover meeting was evident for all five crews.
Managements expectations are being communicatedenforced the same across all crews. Incidences of not meeting those expectations observed in the conduct of certain Control Room operations and behavior during the 2005 assessment were not observed during this assessment.
The threshold for problem identification continues to be low.
Based on observations, the licensed and non-licensed personnel continue to operate the plant in a safe manner.
The team concluded, based on Observations, that plant operations are being conducted safely and effectively.
Operations personnel understand, are on board with, and are working to implement a safety conscious work environment.
Operations personnel morale has improved significantly over last years assessment. Individual concerns are presently centered around the large procedural backlog (not the quality), and successful implementation of a reasonable workweek schedule. Management is making an effort to get additional resources to resolve the procedure backlog issue.
All personnel interviewed appear to be dedicated employees carrying out their responsibilities to the best of their abilities, regardless of any issues at hand.
Actions taken to address Areas in Need of Attention identified during the 2005 Operations Assessment were overall Effective.
Maintain continued emphasis on configuration control by following clearance procedures and lineups during normal operations and especially during refueling outages. Performance in this area during RFO-14 was Marginally Effective. The lack of configuration issues was considered a strength during the 2005 assessment.
Consideration should be given to increase the level of cause determinations for configuration control events. Performance in this area is Marginally Effective.
Overall actions to address other CRs were considered Effective.
5
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Actions to address Reactivity Management issues such as the new Reactivity Management Procedure, NOP-OP-1004 and inclusion of Reactor Engineering in simulator Just-in-Time Training (JITT) exercises appears to be Effective.
Similarities in crewhdividual performance were noted in both the simulator and the control room.
The training department continues to provide training that is responsive to the needs of the shift personnel.
JITT is considered by most to be an essential training tool that results in continued safe plant operations.
Operators expressed their satisfaction with the quality of training that is provided to them on a regular basis.
The team considers overall training performance to be Effective.
Overall Conclusions of Self -Assessment Capability The Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight, Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB), and the Davis-Besse Operations department assessments continue to be factual, in-depth, and accurate in identifying areas of weakness within the Operations department. Findings were being appropriately captured within the Corrective Action Program. Again, the Operations department assessments continue to improve in quality and depth, with an increased emphasis on areas of concern that may have an effect on continued safe operation of the plant. These assessments continue to identify problem areas and are subsequently captured in the CR system.
Operations self-assessments, coupled with Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight and CNRB assessments, are determined by the team to be Effective.
6
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 B.
INTRODUCTION A condition of the March 8, 2004, NRC Confirmatory Order Modifying License No.
NFP-3 for restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station following the reactor vessel head degradation event was to conduct an annual comprehensive, independent outside assessment of the Operations performance area. The assessment will be used to identify Areas for Improvement (AFI), requiring corrective actions with action plans, and Areas in Need of Attention (ANA) for other improvement opportunities. The assessment will also be used to assess the rigor, criticality, and overall quality of available Davis-Besse internal self-assessment activities in this performance area.
C.
SCOPE OF ASSESSMENT The scope of the Operations Assessment was defined to include an evaluation of the following Operations activities occurring during the assessment period using current industry standards and applicable Davis-Besse procedures:
Shift turnovers Control manipulations Communications Interdepartmental interfaces Procedural use Awareness of plant and equipment status and workarounds Pre-j ob/activity briefings Non-shift Operations management interface and oversight Shift management command and control Shift managements evaluation) prioritization, and disposition of maintenance activities and emergent issues Operations behaviors in the areas of questioning attitude and safety Shift handling of off-normal operations Observation of operator simulator training to compare crew performance, demeanor) and communication skills with actual control room operations The assessment team reviewed the eleven CRs initiated by Davis-Besse to address the Areas in Need of Attention (ANA) identified during the June 2005 Operations Performance Assessment and the one carryover CR identified during the August 2004 Operations Performance Assessment.
The assessment team also reviewed selected CRs related to Operations Department performance and independently assessed the corrective actions recommended and taken by Davis-Besse.
The assessment team reviewed many of the referenced procedure/documents listed in Appendix A during the preparation period prior to site arrival and while on-site.
7
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNFS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The assessment team also reviewed a number of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stations self-assessment activities associated with Operations to evaluate:
0 The results of their Quarterly Quality Assessments that evaluated Operations performance and to determine if the assessments were comprehensive and if effective actions were taken, or planned to be taken, to correct problems or weaknesses identified.
The effectiveness of self-assessment capability by reviewing corrective actions associated with self-assessment reports, audits (including audits of both onsite and offsite safety committee activities), and evaluations conducted on Operations performance.
The aggressiveness of the Davis-Besse Operations staff in correcting self-assessment findings and to determine whether the corrective actions taken are adequate, timely, and properly prioritized.
The on-site team consisted of two independent consultants and one nuclear industry peer representative. The industry peer participated for one week (June 12 through 16,2006) and the two independent consultants participated for two weeks, including the weekend (June 12 through 23,2006). Abbreviated biographies of the team members are presented in of this report.
NOTE: Due to an emergent plant issue that occurred at the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant one week prior to this assessment, the planned, second industry peer reviewer was unable to participate.
D.
METHODOLOGY The independent assessment team used the listed references (Attachment 1) as guidance to evaluate performance of the Operations Department personnel. The assessment methodology included, but was not limited to the following:
The team observed licensed, non-licensed and Operations Management personnel in the performance of their assignments. Assessment team members shift assignments overlapped shift turnovers to compare consistency of crew operations.
The team observed Control Room shift activities of at least portions of all five crews and shift turnovers of all five crews. The team conducted numerous Control Room observations, including evening and weekend observations, and attended seven shift turnover meetings. The team observed portions of three different Non-Licensed Operator (NLO) rounds.
The team interviewed 26 individuals, which included twelve licensed (7 Senior Reactor Operators and 5 Reactor Operators), 6 management and 8 NLO individuals. The team asked questions that were directed toward previously identified problem areas at the station. In addition the team allowed interviewees to discuss areas they thought should receive attention. The team also informally interviewed several members of the Operations staff during the process of conducting the assessment.
8
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNF'S Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The team reviewed selected CRs and their corrective actions to evaluate safety perspective, appropriate cause determination, and corrective action effectiveness.
The team reviewed several Operations-related CRs during the off-site preparation weeks and while on site. The team also reviewed the CRs implemented to address the Areas in Need of Attention (ANA) identified in the 2005 Operations Performance Independent Assessment. Several other CRs related to Operations performance were also reviewed during the assessment.
The team observed portions of simulator training exercises) including an Emergency Plan Drill, during routine and abnormal operating conditions) to compare crew behaviors in the simulator to those observed in the Control Room. The team used NUREG-102 1 as guidance for evaluating simulator and Control Room observations. The team also observed classroom training, including one session led by the Operations Superintendent.
E.
DETAILS AND RESULTS SECTION I The details and results are presented in the four major areas of assessment in Section I:
Shift and Meeting Observations, Interviews, Condition Reports, and Licensed Operator Continuing Training.
Area 1 - Shift and Meeting Observations Scope - Area 1 The utility currently has five rotating shifts of Operations personnel. The shifts are twelve hours long. The team observed portions of day and evening shift activities during the assessment period. Partial shifts of three non-licensed Equipment Operators were also observed during the assessment period. The team attended seven shift turnover meetings (6:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.) and also attended seven 8:OO a.m. Management Alignment and Ownership Meetings (MAOM)
Observations and Findings - Area 1 Control Room Shift Observation General Control Room demeanor was professional during observed shifts.
Control Room operators monitored their panels in accordance with the new Conduct of Operations procedure (NOP-OP-l002), or more frequently than required.
Unit Supervisors briefed crews on Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) entry, stating the reason for the entry, the actions and the time limits. They also requested Reactor Operator (RO) peer reviews of TS entry or exit.
9
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Good use of updates. Operators verbalized when ready to begin. Appropriate updates were noted for RO At-The-Controls (ATC) and Command Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) changes of duty and shift changes.
Pre-job briefs observed were formal, professional and covered all attributes of an effective brief.
Peer checks were used for all control room main control board valve and switch manipulations observed by the team, although some peer checks were conducted from as far away as 15 feet. This kind of peer checking has resulted in plant events at other stations, as a result of incorrect verifications.
Reactor Operators overseeing or performing surveillance activities were observant of plant conditions during those activities. Alarms were announced as expected in accordance with (IAW) the Conduct of Operations procedure.
Night Orders were not being implemented IAW the new Conduct of Operations procedure. By procedure, they are allowed to be effective for up to 14 days, however, several night orders were dated back to early May of this year, over 45 days. This is An Area in Need of Attention.
The Required Reading Log was reviewed and personnel are reviewing information on a regular basis, within the required time frame with one exception noted.
Operations personnel are aware of and know the contingency actions to address Control Room Operator Work Arounds.
Control Room activity level seemed to be well-controlled.
The Station has implemented a Robust Barrier program that utilized a systematic approach to identify the most appropriate components to have barriers and is implemented utilizing a station business practice DBBP-OPS-0010, Covers for Selected Control Room Switches and Reactivity Addition Potential Labels.
Additionally, the Operators have the capability to add a barrier when required for a specific evolution. This is a Strength.
Overall licensed operator performance was Effective.
Equipment Operator Shift Observations The team observed Equipment Operators (EO) on area tours of zones one, two, and three.
The rounds included the main turbine, turbine support equipment, switchgear rooms, station blackout diesel, emergency diesel generators, switchyard, and the auxiliary building, etc. The purpose of these observations was to ascertain the level of behaviors, standards and expectations of the non-licensed operators. The following attributes were observed:
Proper use of personnel protective equipment, including the use of gloves.
EOs used the back of their hands when checking equipment running temperatures.
Excellent usage of human performance tools. These included the use of STAR and three-way communications.
Operations personnel were aware of and knew the contingency actions to address EO Work Arounds.
The Zone 1 and 2 sections of the plant were clean.
10
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The auxiliary building (Zone 3) housekeeping and material condition was acceptable. Although floor paint exhibited a good deal of scrapes from moving equipment it appeared clean. Ladders observed were secured. There were several areas that had scaffolding staged, but none were located near any safety-related plant equipment. Many areas were not well lit but there did not seem to be any existing lights that were burnt out. EOs cleaned up loose material during their rounds.
EOs frisked appropriately when exiting a radioactive materials area (RMA),
however one EO touched the face of the probe while frisking his hands, this could lead to contamination of the probe. The EO was not contaminated on this occasion.
The team did not identify any equipment deficiency that did not have a deficiency tag attached.
The team observed the pre-job brief given in part by the supervisor and a reverse brief by the lead EO prior to conducting the monthly surveillance, DB-SC-04271,
Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBODG) Monthly Test. The brief was detailed and thorough, discussing the important aspects of the test and possible trouble points.
During performance of the test good peer and self checking was used by personnel involved. Just before starting the diesel the team asked how the diesel would be started using only one air header since the other header had not been isolated. The EO said that the No. 2 header had been isolated when the diesel was barred on the night shift. The team pointed out that the isolation valve was open. The EO contacted his supervisor and resolved the issue, isolated the air header and proceeded with the test. Although there was not a formal post job brief, the test was discussed by the SRO and EO. When questioned by the team about resolution of the problem to prevent recurrence, Operations personnel initiated a condition report (CR) and a procedure change request. A formal post job brief especially, since problems were experienced, would have identified the need for some form of corrective action. This is an Area in Need of Attention.
0 EO job performance was Effective.
Material conditions in the plant were Effective.
Shift Turnover MeetinPs (6:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.1 The team attended three 6:30 a.m., and four 6:30 p.m. shift turnover (TO) meetings.
The team observed at least one turnover for each of the five crews.
These meetings were controlled by the Shift Manager (SM). The meetings started with an industrial personnel safety topic and proceeded through plant status and planned activities throughout the shift.
11
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The At the Controls (ATC) reactivity briefing included makeup operations performed by the previous shift and the current control rod index. Meetings were attended by supervisors from the various plant departments such as chemistry, health physics, maintenance, etc. The morning TO meeting was also attended by senior plant management, such as the Site Vice-president, the Plant Manager and/or the Operations Manager.
The SM discussed activities planned for the shift, any problem areas, any special operating conditions, and any Technical Specification LCOs that were applicable and their associated time constraints.
Each EO presented expected activities and standing issues with their assigned watch stations, such as operator workarounds.
The manner in which and the length of time each shift conducted their turnover was similar in nature for each of the shifts observed.
0 The team considers the Shvt Turnover Meetings to be Effective.
Management Alignment and Ownership Meeting (MAOM) (8:OO a.m.)
Team members attended seven of the 8:OO a.m. meetings.
These meetings had senior management personnel from all site departments.
The meetings were well run by the Operations Manager.
The SM provided plant status.
The meetings were not excessively long.
The discussions during the meeting were pertinent and open.
Equipment issues were adequately presented to ensure that all department personnel were kept informed of plant equipment issues.
Ownership of problems and issues were clearly defined.
Three-way communications when making ownership assignments was observed by the team.
The meetings kept all department managers up to date on activities and issues in the plant such as plans to address the A and By Master Trip Solenoid Valves for the main turbine and the turbine gland seal exhaust condenser. Two problem solving teams were assembled to address these issues.
The team considers the 8:OO am. management meetings to be Effective.
Shift Managers MeetinP (SMM) on Thursdav June 15,2006 The team attended the SMM, in which all shift managers were in attendance, along with the Plant Operations Manager and Superintendent. Also in attendance was the Superintendent, Operations Services. A meeting agenda was presented to all present to discuss a wide variety of issues, including not only plant, but also personnel issues. This meeting is held every two weeks. The team found the meeting to be well structured and controlled, with active participation and discussion by all those present. Much of the meeting observed by 12
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 the team included a discussion on the implementation of the Operations Work Schedule, which included the following:
0 0
0 Work Week Manager and Operations Work Week SRO pairings.
On-shift crew work implementation schedule input.
Policy for maintaining operability status of spare equipment.
The team considers the biweekly shqt managers meeting to be Effective.
Problem Solving Teams Following recent failures of the A and By Master Trip Solenoid Valves (MTSV) on the main turbine, a problem solving team was formed in an attempt to identify possible causes and recommend an action plan. The team consisted of several engineering personnel, an operations representative and a General Electric representative. The team provided several recommendations and plant management decided to take the turbine off line to replace the A and B MTSVs. The old MTSVs will be disassembled for analysis in an attempt to determine the cause of the failures. Plant managements decision to reduce power and take the turbine off-line to replace the trip solenoid valves on June 24 as opposed to troubleshooting the valve while operating was a conservative decision. The team considers conservative decision making to be a Strength.
A problem solving team was also assigned to analyze the main turbine gland seal exhaust condenser problem. That team was continuing its work when the on-site assessment was completed.
0 General Observations Industrial Safety Observed several individuals not wearing hearing protection on the turbine deck, in the station air compressor area and when using a leaf blower on the outside grounds. This is an Area in Need ofAttention.
Site specific training says that each individual receiving access to Davis-Besse will receive a Safety Manual; however, the team did not receive one.
Performance Indicators (PI)
A review of these indicators resulted in the following observations:
Reactivity Management Indicator (Fleet) has the values for the month of April swapped with the value of cumulative index.
13
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Reactivity Management Indicator (Fleet or Department level) considers Level 4 events to be precursors. Industry practice is to consider Level 4 events to be events since they have actual, but minor consequences and to utilize Level 5 precursor definitions. These definitions exist from the Reactivity Controls Review Committee (RCRC) guidelines and trending these precursors would allow the station to monitor for negative trends that could become bigger issues and result in an actual event.
The Operations Department Level PI's have not been updated beyond January of 2006. PI's cannot provide the appropriate focus for improvement if they are not timely.
There is a PI for Operator Burdens and for Level 2 Operator Work Arounds that contain the exact same deficiencies and the definition is the same. Suggest keeping only one of these.
Annunciators are not tracked via a PI at the fleet or department level. Annunciators that are locked in, pulled or not operational can have an effect on the operators ability to respond to a plant transient or accident and should be considered for trending purposes to ensure the organization is focused on returning them to operable status as soon as possible.
The fleet or department does not have an indicator for the Aggregate Effects to operators that results from Control Room Deficiencies, Operator Work Arounds, Operator Burdens, Annunciators, Equipment tagged out of service for over 90 days (equipment important to operation of the plant, such as pumps, fans, valves, breakers, etc.) The station should not include tags on facility equipment or Structures, Systems and Components (SSC's) that are being considered for abandonment or equipment that has a Caution Tag greater than 90 days. The station does perform a quarterly (note that last report is dated December 22,2005)
Aggregate Impact Report, however this does not provide an observable indicator that can be seen by the entire organization and used to drive improvement for a predictable plant response during a transient or accident conditions. There are several Operator Aggregate PI's within the industry, and simple benchmarking may provide the station with an indicator that meets its needs.
Performance Indicators are an Area in Need of Attention.
Operational Decision Making Issues (ODMI) 0 Currently only one open ODMI exists at the station. This ODMI concerns the Master Trip Solenoid Valve (MTSV) sluggish response (CR 05-05802). The ODMI resulted in Standing Order 06-004 to provide direction for the Operators when testing the valve. The ODMI does not contain clear trigger points with identified actions as required by NOP-OP-1010.
The Assessment Team questioned whether the station is effectively utilizing the ODMI process. For example, the station has known leakage across the Pressurizer Pilot-Operated Relief Valve (PORV), however there is not an ODMI for this deficiency with triggers provided to the operators to take actions if the condition worsens during the cycle. Additionally, the station has determined that there is a slight tube leak in the Main Condenser, however there is not an ODMI for this issue 14
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 to give appropriate direction for monitoring and trigger points for appropriate actions if the condition worsens.
The ODMIprocess is an Area in Need of Attention.
Parallel Processes The station seems to have several parallel processes that can result in error likely situations. The following are some examples:
There is a problem resolution process (NOP-ER-3001, Problem Solving and Decision Making Process) for deficient items that is used for issues that meet ODMI status. Use of this process does not provide trigger steps and associated actions for the operators.
Information Tags are used to provide information for equipment deficiencies) but are loosely tracked such that they may not be removed when the condition is fixed.
Additionally, Work Request Tags (WRT) are hung which also give deficient condition information. The team suggests that the station consider doing away with Information Tags and using WRTs and where appropriate) Caution Tags in eSoms that are tied to the appropriate work order.
An additional example was the performance of the Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBODG) Monthly Surveillance Test. The barring of the diesel was performed using the operating procedure and the operator thought the air for bank 2 had been valved out as it would have been if the surveillance procedure had been used.
The parallel processes in use at the station are an Area in Need of Attention.
Areas of Strenpth - Area 1 0
Robust barriers to prevent errors.
Conservative decision making to take the turbine off-line to work on the MTSVs.
Areas in Need of Attention -Area 1 0
Night orders are maintained in effect greater than allowed by the Conduct of Operations procedure.
Post Job briefs should be conducted, especially when problems are encountered.
Industrial safety rules are not always being observed.
Performance Indicators have multiple problems and areas for enhancement.
The ODMI process is not being effectively used.
Parallel processes should be eliminated or reduced to minimize the chance of personnel errors.
15
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Areas For Improvement - Area 1 0
None observed Conclusions - Area 1 The Robust Barrier program to prevent react, iity events an^..iappropriate manipulation of plant equipment is considered a Strength.
Expectations for procedure usage were well-known. Proficiency in this was evident during the control room, equipment operator and simulator observations.
Personnel are kept well-informed of plant status and emergent plant equipment conditions via the well-organized shift turnover and daily management meetings.
Standardization of shift turnover meeting was evident for all five crews.
Managements expectations are being communicatedenforced the same across all crews. Incidences of not meeting those expectations observed in the conduct of certain Control Room operations and behavior during the 2005 assessment were not observed during this assessment.
The threshold for problem identification continues to be low.
Operations management exercised conservative decision making when they decided to take the turbine off-line to troubleshoot and replace the MTSVs. This is a Strength.
Several areas such as post job briefs, industrial safety, performance indicators, the ODMI process, and parallel processes were considered Areas in Need of Attention.
Based on observations, the licensed and non-licensed personnel continue to operate the plant in a safe manner.
The team concluded, based on observations, that plant operations are being conducted safely and effectively.
Area 2 - Interviews Scope - Area 2 The team interviewed 26 individuals, which included twelve licensed (7 Senior Reactor Operators and 5 Reactor Operators), 6 management and 8 NLO individuals. The team asked questions that were directed towards previously identified problem areas at the station. In addition, the team allowed interviewees to discuss areas they thought should receive attention. The following is a summary of issues that were voiced by most personnel, over 50 percent, during the formal interviews.
16
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Observations and Findings - Area 2 Morale was a big issue in last years assessment. This year, well over 50 percent of those interviewed said that morale had improved. This was primarily due to changing to a Screw, 12-hour shift rotation.
Only slightly more than 50 percent of the personnel interviewed stated that they preferred the 12-hour shifts. Quite a few wanted the 8-hour shift, but did not like the punishing rotation that had been previously assigned, i.e. only one weekend off per month.
Almost everyone thought that Operations manpower was adequate to continue safe operation of the plant and the assessment team did not see any examples that would lead us to conclude that manpower is in any way impacting safe plant operation.
However, manning was expressed as a concern by about 30 percent of those interviewed. Some concerns were related to the projected loss of several EO level 111s to the operator licensing class in the fall and others to the continuing frustration in their ability to implement the workweek schedule.
At the conclusion of the 2005 assessment, there was a procedure backlog of about 400 procedure changes. Since that time, the Operations department has inherited about 370 test procedures from Engineering (June 2005). The backlog, as of June 19, 2006, was approximately 580. A complete review is being conducted by the licensees Operations Support group to determine the significance of the procedure change backlog. Evaluation of the backlog had not been completed by the conclusion of this inspection (see discussion of CR05-043 19). In a telephone conference with the SRO reviewer subsequent to the on-site portion of this assessment, the preliminary evaluation was complete, and none of the Notifications related to this backlog resulted in initiation of a Condition Report, which indicates that all the procedure changes were of low safety significance. The assessment team will review the results of the Operations Support group review and evaluation discussed in the preceding paragraph in a subsequent assessment.
Of those interviewed, the senior licensed and management personnel were more aware of the backlog and its possible consequences, while the non-licensed operators (NLO) were not aware of the number of changes that currently existed.
NLOs were aware that procedure revisions were occurring because they were being asked to perform verifications of these procedures following preliminary revisions.
The procedural backlog still remains as an Area in Need of Attention to determine its significance regarding safe plant operations.
Most of those interviewed thought that the Operations Department procedures were of high quality. Personnel that had used some of the inherited engineering test procedures during the recent outage thought that those procedures did not meet the current Operations procedure standards. However, most of the inherited procedures are infrequently used or 17
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 are refueling outage procedures, and as such, are not normally used during plant operations and should not pose a problem.
0 When the team asked what the interviewees considered to be the greatest challenge that face continued safe operation of the plant, the team received some varying answers, depending on the individuals perspective and position in the organization.
Outage planning and staff manning level concerns encompassed approximately 3 0 percent each and workweek planning concerns were at about 50 percent for those interviewed. Workweek planning has been an issue for the last two assessments.
Although actions have been taken or are presently ongoing, personnel still do not feel available Operations manpower is considered when the workweek schedule is developed. When asked if they remember this matter being discussed by shift management, some personnel did recall the briefings and some did not. Other items brought up during the interviews dealt with maintenance activities that did not take as long as planned for in the schedule, and putting equipment back in service when other activities were scheduled impacted the shifts ability to accomplish the tasks.
There was a somewhat better understanding this year when compared to the 2005 assessment, since only 50 percent considered this to be a problem. The new Operations Manager has a plan to address this issue, but it involves having the already overburdened Shift Managers review the work schedule to determine if there is enough manpower available to accomplish the tasks. The management of the work week activities and the Operations personnel perceptions of it continue to be an Area in Need of Attention.
0 About 80 percent of those interviewed thought that training had improved in both the curriculum content, quality and presentation. Much of this was attributed to the rotation of Operations staff to the training center and implementation of Just-In-Time-Training (JITT). Interviewees stated that initiation of JITT was very helpful in their successfully performing infrequently performed maneuvers, i.e., startup and shutdowns. Training appears to be an Area of Strength.
Another issue during the interviews was the unwillingness of Reactor Operators (RO) to advance to the level of Senior Reactor Operators (SRO). There were several issues here. The perception of some of the ROs is that the pay difference between RO and SRO appears to be insufficient to compensate for the additional duties and responsibilities. In fact, many ROs, with overtime, make as much as or more than the SROs. Many ROs did not like the fact that SROs do not begin receiving overtime pay until they had contributed 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of free time over the normal work week hours. ROs also did not like leaving the union to become an SRO since getting back into the union is not an option if they fail to complete the SRO training program or the NRC license examination, thus leaving them with very limited job possibilities. The Equipment Operators (EO) expressed some interest in going to the RO level, but none would even consider the SRO level. Management is aware of this issue and has taken action to increase the number of SROs by sending current site employees from other departments to licensing class. There are eight employees, seven of which are current employees, scheduled to begin SRO training class to become instant SROs. The team recommends that FENOC do 18
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 some benchmarking at non-FENOC plants to see how other utilities are getting their experienced ROs to advance to the SRO positions. RO to SRO advancement concerns are an Area in Need of Attention.
Based on discussions and interviews with plant personnel the duty team continues to be an Area ofstrength.
Areas of Strength - Area 2 0
0 Training was considered effective by 80 percent of those interviewed.
The duty team continues to be an area of strength.
Areas in Need of Attention - Area 2 0
Large procedure backlog.
Work week management and Operations Department understanding of the process continues to be an issue.
Lack of desire of RO advancement into SRO licensed positions.
Areas for Improvement - Area 2 0
None observed.
Conclusions - Area 2 Operations personnel understand, are on board with, and are working to implement a safety conscious work environment.
Operations personnel morale has improved significantly over last years assessment. Individual concerns presently center around the large procedural backlog (not the quality), and successful implementation of a reasonable workweek schedule. Management is making an effort to get additional resources to resolve the procedure backlog issue.
Operator training continues to improve and is considered a Strength by a majority of operations personnel.
All personnel interviewed appear to be dedicated employees carrying out their responsibilities to the best of their abilities, regardless of any issues at hand.
Based on interviews, Operations personnel continue to think the duty team is a Strength.
19
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNFS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Area 3 - Condition Report Review Scope - Area 3 The team reviewed the eleven Condition Reports (CR) that were initiated to address the Areas in Need of Attention identified during the 2005 Operations Performance Independent Assessment. One additional CR was a carryover from the 2004 assessment and was closed by assigning it to a similar CR identified by the Confirmatory Order Self Assessment team for resolution.
As part of the Assessment Plan, the team reviewed 18 additional CRs to independently evaluate the cause determination and corrective actions taken.
Observations and Findings - Area 3 Condition Reports Initiated to Address 2005 Operations Performance Independent Assessment Areas in Need of Attention (ANA) 0 COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03539:
Vertical communications to RO/EO from management was weak.
Comments: This weakness was corrected by the issuance of the new Conduct of Operations Procedure, NOP-OP-1002. The team did not observe any differences in Control Room response by the various crews during this assessment like that observed during the 2005 assessment. Actions were Effective.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03540: Housekeeping/material conditions in the Auxiliary Building were poor.
Comments: During a tour of the auxiliary building (Zone 3) housekeeping and material condition was observed to be acceptable. Although floor paint exhibited a good deal of scrapes from moving equipment, it appeared clean.
Ladders observed were secured. There were several areas that had scaffolding staged, but none was located near any safety-related plant equipment. Many areas were not well lit, but there did not seem to be any existing lights that were burnt out. Equipment operators (EOs) cleaned up loose material during their rounds. Actions were Effective.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03541: Operations work scheduling improvement.
Comments: This issue addressed operators concerns that certain manpower loading and certain daily shift activities were not considered when planning work activities. Corrective action for this condition report consisted of the shift managers having discussions with shift personnel to explain how the schedule was developed, including manpower accountability. Based on interviews, most of those asked if they remember the shift manager having the discussions said that they did recall having them. Those same operators said they still have concerns with the work schedule and many repeated the same concerns that have been expressed for the last two assessments. The Operations Manager, who just recently assumed this position after having previously served as Work Control Supervisor, considers this to be an area that can be improved. He 0
0 20
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 indicated to the team that he has several ideas about how to accomplish a better understanding and trust in the shift crews. This continues to be an Area in Need of Attention.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR05-03542:
End-of-shift critiques were not being conducted as required by DBBP-OPS-0001, Conduct of Operations.
Comments: End of shift critiques have been replaced by end-of-job debriefs per NOBP-LP-2604, Job Briefs, which were determined to be more beneficial. The new Conduct of Operations procedure (NOP-OP-1002) also requires crew critiques to be conducted once per shift cycle, typically during training week.
A ctions were Effective.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03543: Shift personnel did not know their assigned shift mentors.
Comments: Based on interviews and discussions with training personnel, all shift personnel knew their assigned shift mentor. Actions were Effective.
COIA-OPS-2004-(AFI-O6)-CR-04-05920:
Cause determinations do not go deep enough.
Comments: Corrective actions for this CR were reviewed during the 2005 COIA-OPS Assessment, but corrective actions were not due to be completed until October 15,2005. This CR was subsequently closed and reassigned to CR-04-06024, a similar finding identified during the Confirmatory Order Independent Assessment for Corrective Actions, which occurred subsequent to the Operations assessment. CR-04-06024 will be reviewed by the upcoming 2006 Corrective Action team assessment scheduled for August of this year.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03547: Timeliness of corrective actions.
Comments: This matter was reviewed by Operations and appropriate due dates were assigned. Actions were Effective.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03553: Low shift morale due to rotation of 5-shift 8-hour schedule.
Comments: Operations has implemented a Sshift, 12-hour schedule that most shift personnel are satisfied with. Morale is much better this year based upon discussions with shift personnel. Actions were Effective.
Comments: General demeanor in the Control Room was relaxed during the 2005 Operations Assessment. During this years assessment, operator actions and appearance were more formalized and professional. Actions were Effective.
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-043 18: The team observed instances of failure to follow procedures during simulator training exercises.
Comments: These errors were identified by the training staff and discussed with the crew during the crew debrief. Errors were considered both a crew and individual weakness and assigned as focus areas for improvement.
Observations during simulator training noted no instances of failure to follow procedures during this assessment. Actions were Effective.
0 0
0 0
0 0
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-03554: Control Room demeanor.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNFS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-043 19: This CR covers three items. 1. During a pre-job briefing the test engineer gave instructions to the operator that were not noted in the procedure. 2. Shift turnover meetings did not start with the industrial safety message. 3. Procedure backlog was somewhat high and the four procedure writers contracts were due to expire, two at the end of July and two at the end of December, 2005.
Comments: 1. Operations allows some level of detail to be added during the pre-job brief, but it is the Operations representative receiving the guidance to determine if it might need additional shift management review before proceeding.
Comments: 2. Shift turnover meetings have been revised such that, the industrial safety message is now given first.
Comments: 3. Since the 2005 assessment, Operations has inherited 370 new procedures from Engineering. The procedures are mostly infrequently run or outage related procedures, but most do not meet current Operations procedure standards. As of June 19,2006 the number of backlog procedures was approximately 580. Operations is in the process of reviewing all procedure changes in the system to determine if there is any significant procedure changes that they do not know about. The team discussed the backlog with the licensed SRO that is reviewing the backlog. The SRO is performing two functions, one is to determine if the change has been made, but not identified as completed in the system; and, the second function is to ensure that any significant changes are given a higher priority. The team reviewed the line item descriptions of the procedure changes that presently exist. Most seemed to be for enhancement, but the team randomly selected one of the changes to see if it had been completed. The change selected dealt with the Reactor Protection System Variable Low Pressure Trip Setpoint for Cycle 15, the current cycle. The SRO determined that the set point had been changed in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) to the more conservative value; however, the description of the new setpoint had not been implemented in the Alarm Response Procedure. Initially, this appeared significant; however, there is no fixed setpoint and operator actions are the same when the reactor trips, whether the new setpoint calculation method is displayed in the procedure or not, The Engineering Change Request 05-0089 is still open and cannot be closed until the procedure change is made.
The team also discussed the backlog with the one assigned procedure writer (previously SRO licensed at Davis-Besse). He stated that he reviewed all submitted procedure changes for significance and that the Activity Tracking Screening Committee also conducted a separate review of all Notifications to ensure that there are no issues that rise to the level of a CR. There is an Operations representative on that committee. The team noted that only one procedure writer will not be able to keep up with procedure changes.
Operations management is in the process of requesting funding for additional procedure writers to reduce the backlog. Actions taken and being taken appear to be effective, however item No. 3, due to the largeprocedure backlog continues to be an Area in Need of Attention.
22
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 0
COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-04320: Management should implement the new Conduct of Operations procedure.
Comments: The new Conduct of Operations procedure, NOP-OP-1002, was effective July 15,2005. Actions were Effective.
The team considers the overallperformance to address the Area in Need of Attention CRs from the 2005 assessment to be Effective.
Other Condition Reports 0
0 CR-05-04225, Post maintenance testing in order 2001 50242-FP281A was changed incorrectly. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-05-04133, Isolation of Service Water (SW) Secondary Cooling during Emergency Diesel Generator testing. This system response was not unexpected and is proceduralized in DB-OP-06260. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-05-04158, CR-PCR Deficiency, DB-OP-063 13 DB-OP-02105, Main Transformer Loss of Cooling. Information received from the manufacturer, ABB, indicated that the transformer would experience damage in about 15 minutes with a loss of cooling and at full load. Previous limit was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The procedures and alarm response were changed. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-05-04334, TMI Benchmark Improvement Opportunities. CR was closed out via a Notification since it was deemed an enhancement. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-05-04057, Question About the Use of Device to Pin an Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Switch, This CR was issued to determine the appropriateness of using a banana-like plug to pin the SFAS Reactor Coolant Test Switch in the Test position, thus allowing a test signal to be sent to the Core Flood Isolation valve to defeat the auto open feature at 800 psig. The question regarding the appropriateness of this plug was identified during the performance of a Job Performance Measure (JPM) during an NRC examination.
A separate CRY CR-05-05279, was generated to address the issue since it was determined that the system was not being operated as designed. Upon further review, under CR-05-05279, it was determined that the blocking pin would be appropriate for procedures classified as maintenance activities; however, use under the operating procedure would not be appropriate unless a 50.59 evaluation was performed along with a procedure change. Corrective action was assigned to Operations to revise procedure DB-OP-06014; however, Operations determined that recommended action (revise the procedure) would not meet the 50.59 criteria and as a result CA 2 was initiated to revise the applicable training material and associated JPM. This JPM (OPS-JPM-089) was subsequently deleted because it is no longer considered a single person task, thus no need for a blocking device. There were no concerns with the action taken on this CR 0
0 23
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNF'S Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 CR-05-01478, Review Reactivity Changes by Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Boric Acid Additions. This CR provided a detailed common cause evaluation by Progress Energy Florida, Inc., of several CRs, two of which were addressed in the 2005 Operations Assessment. The attachment 1 actions appear to address the weaknesses identified in the report.
CR-06-01063, ECCS Room Cooler 4 Clearance Restoration Issue. Comments:
this CR was assigned an Apparent Cause determination. It was determined that the cause of the event was inadequate procedural guidance and personnel error.
The event involved not closing a pump vent valve when the tagging clearance was conducted and back flow through check valves that had their internals removed, allowed backflow out the vent. This event is similar to CR-06-01493 discussed under additional mispositioning CRs listed below. The assessment -
team believes this is a result of Davis-Besse's practice of allowing valve manipulations within the tagging boundary without some method of maintaining control of which valve positions are changed. Corrective actions recommended in the procedure revision should be effective to address this issue when complete.
CR-06-02 13 1, Possible Trend in the Quality of Operations Procedures and Tests.
Comment: This CR was initiated as a trend CR and reviewed 34 other CRs initiated for procedure revisions and problems. Most were due to the transfer of many test procedures from Engineering. Although most of the corrective actions remain open, the recommendations appear adequate. Corrective action 4 is due on July 26,2006, and will request additional resources to correct the procedure issues identified. Implementation of CA No. 4 will also help with the procedure backlog discussed in COIA-OPS-2005-CR-05-043 19.
CR-06-00704, RCS hot leg level transmitters reading 28 inches apart. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-06-00927, Contamination in the Auxiliary Building. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-06-01150, DB-SC-03 114, SFAS Integrated Response Time Test not updated for Technical Specifications change. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-06-0117 1, Relief valve removed without proper provisions in place to prevent back flow. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-06-01755, Issues during RCS drain down from 80 to 54 inches. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-06-01963, Decay Heat system temperature increase during DH-207, check valve flow testing. This surveillance on DH-207 is conducted on a refueling outage frequency although it is contained in a quarterly surveillance procedure, DB-SP-03 136. The procedure is scheduled to be revised by the end of September, 2006. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
CR-06-02022, Unexpected flow from Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to number 2 Steam Generator during DB-SP-03 164, AFW No. 2 to Steam Generator. There were no concerns with action on this CR.
24
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 0
CR 06-01 847, Fourteenth Refueling Outage (RFO 14) Operations Clearance and Mispositioning Events Trend Evaluation. Cause analysis for this CR was Apparent Cause.
Comments: this CR was written by Operations due to a noted adverse trend in component mispositionings and clearance errors during RF014. This CR reviewed CRs 06-00872,06-00919,06-01129,06-01489,06-01493,06-01635, 06-01720,06-01727 and 06-01729. Three of these CRs had an apparent cause evaluation assigned to them. One (06-01727) was assigned a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ)-Closed evaluation and the remaining five were assigned CAQ-Fix evaluation. Additionally, CR 06-01 882 was written for a mispositioned vent valve which prevented normal operation of SW 1356. This CR was not included in CR 06-01 847, since it occurred after CR initiation. This CR (06-01727) was also assigned a CAQ-Fix. By not assigning apparent cause or root cause evaluations to mispositioning and clearance errors, appropriate actions may not be addressed due to not determining extent or the corrective actions may be too narrowly focused to prevent recurrence. We noted that Operations has already addressed the large number of mispositionings as an Area for Improvement in the latest Integrated Performance Assessment OPS IPA 2006-01; however, the IPA did not address the desired level of cause determination that should be assigned when several significant events occur.
The only Corrective Actions assigned by this CR (06-01 847) is to require a Stand-Down to address the CRs reviewed with Operations. The CR review identified several personnel, procedural and clearance deficiencies but did not present any corrective actions to address those issues. The team considers actions to address the reviewed events as MarginaZZy Effective.
Further Discussion of Mispositioning CRs 0
CR 06-01493, Configuration control while filling piping downstream of Decay Heat (DH) 7A.
Comments: It was determined that the SRO clearing the clearances missed the open vent valve during restoration planning and that the peer SRO review also missed this valve. This CR was assigned CAQ-Fix evaluation. There was no discussion on how the valve was placed in the open position or the controls in place for change of configuration. Discussion with the Operations Superintendent determined that station practice allows repositioning vent and drain valves within a tagout boundary without placement of any tags. Corrective Action to preclude recurrence is to revise DB-OP-06012, Decay Heat and Low Pressure Injection system Operating Procedure, to include instructions for filling the piping downstream of DH 7A or DH 7B. This action may preclude recurrence for this issue in this system; however, it may not preclude future similar mispositioning events during tagout restorations not covered by this specific procedure. The station should consider assignment of Apparent Cause or Limited Apparent Cause to all mispositioning or tagout errors and change their processes to not allow any component to be manipulated unless it is controlled by a procedure or an eSoms tag.
25
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNF'S Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 0
CR-06-01729, Unexpected transfer of water (21,000 gal.) from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Hotwell.
Comments: this CR was assigned a limited apparent cause evaluation. The apparent cause was determined to be five separate errors associated with the valve lineup. The only corrective action in this CR was to reset the Section Human Performance Success Clock. The action to preclude recurrence is to be done in accordance with CR 06-01 847, adverse trend in clearances and mispositionings. The only corrective action currently assigned by CR 06-01 847 is to conduct an Operations section Stand Down, to address the event discussed in CR's 06-00872, 06-00919, 06-01 129, 06-01489, 06-01493,06-01635,06-01 720,06-01727 and 06-01 729. To date, this action has not been performed.
There was no discussion in the analysis of whether or not eSoms auto populates the restoration section of the tagout with the normal position of the component or not. If not, this would be an action that could prevent this kind of error in the future. [Note: Davis-Besse is in the process of populating the eSoms data base with normal component positions and only those components that have had this field completed will have auto population of restoration position field.]
Davis Besse has a process for temporarily changing component configuration in accordance with DB-OP-00016, Temporary Configuration Control. This is outside of the eSoms process and places components in positions that are inconsistent with the position in the eSoms data base.
Davis Besse has acquired the rights for eSoms Configuration Control Module, however does not have a schedule or action plan in place for implementation of this module.
The team determined that due to the large number of configuration control issues and lack of more in-depth cause determinations to address those issues in the selected CRs that performance was Marginally Effective.
Area of Strength - Area 3 0
None observed.
Areas in Need of Attention - Area 3 Improve communications to address operator concerns in work planning and scheduling.
Consider assigning CRs addressing significant events, such as mispositioning (configuration control) events, as Limited Apparent Cause, Apparent Cause or Root Cause evaluations to help prevent recurrence. Since part of this issue (the large number of mispositioning incidents) was self-identified and is being addressed in the Operations OPS IPA 2006-01, Rev. 1 (not yet approved), as an area for improvement and was captured under CR 06-02418, the team will consider it an Area in Need of Attention. Note: CR 06-02670 was initiated to address this issue as a result of this assessment.
26
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Areas for Improvement - Area 3 0
None Observed Conclusions - Area 3 Actions taken to address Areas in Need of Attention identified during the 2005 Operations Assessment were overall Effective.
Maintain continued emphasis on configuration control by following clearance procedures and lineups during normal operations and especially during refueling outages. Performance in this area during RFO-14 was MarginaZZy Effective. The lack of configuration issues was considered a strength during the 2005 assessment.
Consideration should be given to increase the level of cause determinations for configuration control events. Performance in this area is Marginally Effective.
Overall actions to address other CRs were considered Effective.
Actions to address Reactivity Management issues, such as the new Reactivity Management Procedure NOP-OP-1004, and inclusion of Reactor Engineering in simulator JITT exercises appears to be Effective.
Area 4 - Licensed Operator Continuing Training Scope - Area 4 Through a series of observations and discussions, the team observed simulator and classroom training to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of licensed operator continuing training. Discussions were held with various department leaders to ascertain the appropriateness of training that was given to both the licensed and non-licensed operators.
Also, reviews were performed in various areas of training in an effort to ensure that program requirements were being met. Discussions were held with licensed and non-licensed operators, instructors and training management personnel. Observations during simulator training, examination, and an Emergency Plan drill were compared with what the team observed in the Control Room during normal operations to verify that the demeanor of the crew and the way that they performed and presented themselves was consistent and standardized in both environments.
27
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The following areas were assessed during this review:
Conduct of simulator training Simulator evaluations Simulator crew communications Post-simulator scenario critiques Simulator crew focus areas Conduct of classroom training Classroom environment Management involvement and oversight Utilization of human performance tools Procedure adherence during the performance of simulator scenario training and evaluation Observations and Findings - Area 4 Simulator The team observed the conduct of two evaluated scenarios by two different crews during the assessment period. One of two scenarios was an evaluated as-found scenario, and the other scenario, for a different crew, was an evaluated Emergency Plan drill scenario. Both crews were evaluated by Training department personnel and team observers and were found to have effectively completed all critical tasks associated with both drill scenarios.
During the observation of the one evaluated as found scenario, the crew did not perform up to managements expectations, although crew critical tasks were successfully completed. Identified weaknesses by the crew and/or individuals were appropriately identified by the training and operations departments evaluators and captured as crew focus areas for improvement. It was noted by the team that the Davis-Besse Training department does not have a process for giving a crew and/or an individual a pass with a remediation program (i.e., Needs Improvement)? Focus Areas, denoting areas of performance weakness, are presently utilized, as deemed necessary to improve knowledge and performance. However, the team is not convinced that this tool, by itself, is sufficient in getting the message across that the individual or crews performance identified weaknesses warrant remediation. If management expectations are not met, then the OperationdTraining department should consider a tool that signifies to the individual/crew that these expectations are not being met (even if critical tasks were snccessfully completed). Over time, focus areas for improvement will tend to lose their effect on emphasizing areas of individual or crew weaknesses. The station should consider a program, entailing pass-with-remediation in an effort to improve crewhndividual performance when deemed necessary.
28
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 0
Also, it was noted that consistent adherence to Conduct of Operations procedure (NOP-OP-1002), regarding the use of task complete was not always consistently used by all crews observed. It was noted that some operators were more proficient in its usage than others, especially during the observed E-Plan drill. This was an area of concern that was identified during last years assessment; however, it was felt by the station and the evaluators that issuance of the new Conduct of Operations procedure would aid in standardizing this management expectation regarding crew communications. However, this has not been the case, as witnessed by the evaluators. It was understood that the Operations Superintendent is in the process of reviewing this concern during future meetings with the other FENOC Operations superintendents, since this is a fleet-wide issue. Presently, task complete is used only during transient plant conditions, however, the Davis-Besse Operations Superintendent feels that it should be used under all conditions, both transient and normal, or not used at all.
0 During both the simulator Emergency (E)-Plan exercise and the as found evaluated scenario, the Shift Manager (SM) performed not only the E-Plan declaration, but also the county, state and NRC notifications. Although the declaration of an Emergency Action Level (EAL) is required to be performed by the Emergency Director (ED) and is non-delegable, the act of making the notifications following the emergency classification can be performed by someone other than the most senior individual on the crew. Allowing the SM to maintain an oversight role provides the crew with a more consistent team approach. The team evaluators felt that notifications should have been made by someone other than the SM thus allowing him the opportunity to oversee plant operations during the emergency.
However, upon further discussion with the facility, it was later determined that the station does indeed have a communicator position available to take over for the SM, thus enabling him to reassume the oversight role of the crew during an emergency.
The use of a communicator during an emergency is at the discretion of the SM, as witnessed by the team during the E-Plan drill. In this instance, the SM declined the use of a communicator, stating that he was more comfortable making the classification and subsequently performing the notifications himself. The team was also informed that a training job performance measure existed for non-licensed operators to train on and be evaluated as an emergency communicator. Although the team evaluators initially had a concern with the SM not being involved with the actions being taken to combat an emergency, the subsequent details of the communicator position available to the SM resolved any concerns that previously existed.
Also, differences were noted between scenarios and SMs as to where they made the notifications and plant announcements. One SM made the announcement at the back panels and another SM during another scenario made the announcement completely behind the back panels. It was noted that notifications and announcements made from behind the back panels caused less communication interference with the operating crew than those that were made from the area between the fi-ont and back panels.
29
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Other General Observations 0
0 0
0 0
Three-way communications were consistently used, with a few exceptions noted.
Human performance tools, including STAR, were used by crew members.
Peer checking was utilized, when warranted.
Adherence to procedures was observed.
Transient briefings and crew updates were held when deemed necessary.
Plant announcements were appropriately made.
Post-Simulator Scenario Critiques 0
Following the conduct of the as found scenario, the Operations Superintendent together with the Operations training lead evaluator discussed with the Shift Manager, areas of strengths and weaknesses (pluddeltas). The crew, minus the Shift Manager, separately evaluated their performance and listed their pluddeltas for the evaluated scenario. This review was led by the crews command SRO.
Subsequently, the crews Shift Manager, together with the entire crew compared each others evaluated performance. Also, the Operations Superintendent was present to listen and interject as necessary, thus ensuring management expectations were being met for all crews evaluated performances. For the most part, the two comparisons aligned with each other. The plus/deltas were appropriately listed and captured by the crew, resulting in focus areas of improvement for future training sessions and in-between training cycles. It was noted that the pluddeltas observed by the team evaluators were also identified by the crew, with the exception of task complete, as discussed above, in the area of communications. Also, the scenario evaluators (training and peer observers) failed to bring this up as an area of weakness.
0 For the E-Plan evaluated exercise, the evaluators appropriately identified areas of weakness and discussed these items with the crew. This evaluation differed from the other crews evaluated scenario, in that pluddeltas were not identified in a formal manner as the regularly scheduled as-found scenarios are during normal training cycles. However, identified weakness for the E-Plan drill crew were captured and discussed with the crew and will eventually end up as focus areas for improvement.
Classroom 0
The team observed the conduct of one formalized training session, one management introduction session that started the training cycle for the crew, and one end-of-the-week training review. The management introduction session was led by the Operations Superintendent along with the lead Operations training representative.
The training session observed dealt with emergency core cooling systems (High Pressure Injection, Low Pressure Injection, and Core Flood).
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The training sessions were presented as scheduled, and all time frames were met.
Classroom interaction between licensed operators and the instructors was noted.
Available training tools were effectively utilized during the class presentation, including PowerPoint, white board, handouts, etc.
Regarding the presentation by the Operations Superintendent, the crew was presented with a training package entailing objectives and schedules for the upcoming training week. The Operations Superintendent presented the present cycle focus areas and the crews Shift Manager, along with individual crew members, presented crew focus areas, and individuals areas of strength and weaknesses.
Areas of Strength - Area 4 0
None observed Areas in Need of Attention - Area 4 None observed Areas for Improvement - Area 4 None Identified.
Conclusions - Area 4 Similarities in crewhndividual performance were noted in both the simulator and the control room.
The Training department continues to provide training that is responsive to the needs of the shift personnel.
Just-in-Time-Training is considered by most to be an essential training tool that results in continued safe plant operations.
Operators expressed their satisfaction with the quality of training that is provided to them on a regular basis.
The team considers overall training performance to be Effective.
Overall Conclusions of Operations Performance for Section I The team concluded, based on observations of control room and simulator performance, interviews, observations of classroom training and Condition Report evaluations, that the plant is being operated safely, both in the control room and in the plant. Personnel practice and display a questioning and safety conscious attitude. Good self and peer checking were 31
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 practiced by those observed by the team in most instances. Operations personnel are knowledgeable of the plant and plant conditions, including workarounds, deficiency tags, etc. All control room operations observed were conducted in accordance with procedures, i.e., Conduct of Operations. Control room demeanor was improved over that which was observed last year, in that, professionalism was displayed at all times. Similarities in crewhndividual performance were noted in both the simulator and the control room.
The team concluded that Operation s performance was Effective.
SECTION I1 Davis-Besse Self Assessments Scope The team reviewed several assessments associated with the conduct of operations within the Operations department at Davis-Besse. The purpose of these reviews was to assess the rigor, criticality, and overall quality of these assessments. These review included the following:
FENOC Company Nuclear Review Board Minutes, July 14,2005 0
FENOC Company Nuclear Review Board Meeting Minutes, February 10,2006 FENOC Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight Audit Report, October 28,2005 FENOC Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight Audit Report, February 03,2006 0
FENOC Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight Audit Report, May 04,2006 0
Operations Integrated Performance Assessment (IPA), May 1, 2005 through October 3 1, 2005 Operations IPA, November 1,2005 through April 30,2006 Observations and Findings The team, following their review of the above listed reports, felt that the organizations were appropriately identifying and prioritizing areas of concern within the Operations department. Findings were being appropriately captured within the condition reporting (CR) system. This assessment was similar to that noted during last years assessment, with one exception. It is felt that the Operations department is significantly doing a much better job of identifying areas of concern and subsequently entering these concerns into the CR system. As an example, the Operations department latest assessment (yet to be approved) identified such areas as configuration control, procedure quality, staffing, and support fbnctions as areas for improvement. The team noted during their reviews and interviews with shift and management personnel that these indeed were areas of concern.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 The teams review of the past two reports indicated the following:
The operations review team is dedicated to a review of the past 6 months performance.
Although the Operations audit team does not personalIy perform observations (as suggested by the COIA-OPS team last year), they do perform reviews of those observations made by peers and management personnel.
Station management performs adequate reviews of the findings and recommendations made by the Operations review team.
The review adequately captures not only negative trends but positive attributes that contribute to the safe operation of the plant. Just-In-Time-Training was recognized as a strength in that it provided the training that helped to establish the most efficient shutdown on record for the most recent refueling outage.
Several areas for improvement were captured in the latest report, which coincided with the offsite and independent team assessments. Of importance, were the following:
o CR 06-0241 8 - IPA Trend in Configuration Control Events - Still Open (Due date 7/15/06) o CR 06-02435 - Procedure Quality Documented as an Area For Improvement - IPA, Still Open (Due Date 7/16/06) o CR 06-02436 - Operations Staffing Documented as An Area For Improvement - IPA Still Open (Due 7/16/06)
Although the above three CRs are still open with no corrective actions identified to date, the fact that they were initiated by the Operations Integrated Performance Assessment team, indicates that issues are being identified by the Operations department. This is contrary to what the team saw during the 2004 COIA - OPS inspection.
Areas of Strenpth - Section I1 0
None identified Areas In Need of Attention - Section I1 0
None identified Areas For Improvement - Section I1 None identified Conclusions - Section I1 The Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight, CNRB, and the Davis-Besse Operations department assessments continue to be factual, in-depth, and accurate in identifying areas of weakness within the Operations department. Findings were being appropriately captured within the 33
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Corrective Action Program. Again, the Operations department assessments continue to improve in quality and depth, with an increased emphasis on areas of concern that may have an effect on continued safe operation of the plant. These assessments continue to identify problem areas and are subsequently captured in the CR system.
Operations self-assessments, coupled with Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight and CNRB assessments, are determined by the team to be Effective.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 ATTACHMENT 1:
REFERENCES:
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DB-OP-00000, Conduct of Operations DB-OP-00004, Operator Aids Control DB-OP-00005, Operators Logs and Rounds DB-OP-00006, Night Orders and Standing Order Log DB-OP-000 16, Temporary Configuration Control DB-OP-000 18, Inoperable Equipment Tracking Log DB-OP-00100, Shift Turnover DB-OP-00200, Shift Engineer DB-OP-0 1002, Component Operation and Verification DB-OP-01003, Operations Procedure Use Instructions DB-OP-063 16, Diesel Generator Operating Procedure DB-SC-04271, Station Blackout Emergency Diesel Generator NOP-WM-0001, Control of Work NG-DB-000 18, Operability Determinations NOP-WM-2001, Work Management Process NOP-LP-2001, Condition Report Process NOP-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations NOBP-LP-2604, Job Briefs DBBP-OPS-0001, Conduct of Operations DBBP-OPS-0010, Covers for Selected Control Room Switches and Reactivity Addition Potential Labels TR-01, Operations Section Required Reading Work Process Guideline (WPG) - 2, Operations Equipment Issues NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 7171 5, Sustained Control Room and Plant Observation NRC IP 7 1707, Plant Operations NRC IP 93802, Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI)
NRC IP 93 806, Operations Readiness Assessment Team Inspections The Work Week Schedule for the on-site assessment weeks The licensed operator training schedule for the on-site assessment weeks DBBP-TRAN-0020, Shift Mentor Last three Quality Assurance quarterly assessments, DB-C-04-03 (July 1 through October 1, 2004), DB-C-04-04 (October 1 through December 3 1, 2004), DB-C-05-01 (January 3 through March 3 1, 2005)
Applicable recent internal Operations self-assessments, P A 2005-0 1 (November 1,
2004 through April 3 0,2005), and Davis-Besse Operations Department Collective Significance Self-Assessment (April 1 through September 30,2004).
Applicable Company Nuclear Review Board minutes from the Davis-Besse Meeting dated November 18,2004.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 ATTACHMENT 2: ASSESSMENT TEAM BIOGRAPHIES Larry E. Briggs Independent Consultant Silver Fox Synergies, LLC 2004 - Silver Fox Synergies, LLC; Team Lead, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Operations performance area independent assessment to identify areas for improvement and other improvement opportunities as required by the DBNPS Restart Confirmatory Order. A similar Operations performance assessment was conducted at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
2001 - 2004: Onsite Inc.; Senior Consultant - Developed NRC written examination for the Oyster Creek Facility (May 2002 examination).
1977 - 2001: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Held various positions with the NRC. Duties included: Senior Operations Engineer (Chief License Examiner and Senior Inspector) - Certified Chief Examiner on General Electric (GE), Westinghouse, and Combustion Engineering plants. Responsible for review, oversight, and administration of licensed operator examinations. Scheduled and made personnel assignments for Region I licensed operator examinations and re-qualification inspections. Responsible for leading team inspections as assigned, such as maintenance rule and for cause re-qualification inspections. Also led numerous NRC routine operator licensing examination teams and re-qualification inspections. Participated in nuclear event response both in Region 1 and at the facility.
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Responsible for NRC inspection program at assigned facility and maintained constant interface with utility and NRC concerning plant activities and status; Senior Engineer - Responsible for oversight of NRC pre-operational testing inspection program for Region I facilities; Project Engineer - Responsible for general inspection of assigned NRC Region I facilities and coordinated NRC inspection activities at assigned facilities.
1972 - 1977: Burns and Roe Inc; Senior Startup Engineer - Responsible for development, implementation, and coordination of pre-operational test and startup procedures for assigned systems at Three Mile Island (TMI) Units 1 and 2. Also, provided on-site engineering resolution to Unit 2 problem reports during construction.
1960 - 1972: U. S. Navy; Leading CPO (USS Whale SSN 638) for Reactor Control Division. Leading In-hull instructor/Reactor Control Division Officer on D 1 G Prototype.
Engineering Office of the Watch (EOOW) qualified on D1 G Prototype. Qualified on S3G Prototype, S2Wa, and S5W Navy power plants.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Paul H. Bissett Independent Consultant Silver Fox Synergies, LLC 0
2005 - Silver Fox Synergies, LLC; Team Member, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Operations performance area independent assessment to identify areas for improvement and other improvement opportunities as required by the DBNPS Restart Confirmatory Order.
2004 - Silver Fox Synergies, LLC; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS)
Operations performance area independent assessment to identify areas for improvement and other improvement opportunities as required by the DBNPS Restart Confirmatory Order. A similar Operations performance assessment was conducted at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
2004 - Performance, Safety & Health Associates, Inc.; Independent Consultant - Assisted in the conduct of Licensed Operator audit examinations at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.
1989-2003: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Senior Operations Engineer (Chief License Examiner/Inspector) - Certified Chief Examiner on Babcock and Wilcox (1 990), Westinghouse (1 988) and General Electric (I 999) facilities. Effectively led and conducted licensing examinations, and requalification examinations / inspections at Region I facilities.
Assisted in the administration of operator licensing examinations in Region I1 (Surry) and Region I11 (Davis-Besse).
Responsible for leading team inspections, including, but not limited to, operator licensing requalification, maintenance rule, problem identification and resolution, Event-V, PRAY Emergency Operating Procedure (EOPs) and operational startup inspections.
Participated in numerous Region I plant restart inspections (TMI-I, IP-2, Salem 1/2, etc.),
primarily focusing on operational safety assessments.
1982-1989: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Responsible for the conduct of reactor operations inspections, including the areas of maintenance, surveillance and calibration, and in-service testing of pumps and valves, including the review and approval of a licensees 10 year In-service Test program submittal. Responsible for the review of licensee QA plan submittals and subsequent inspection of licensee QNQC programs.
1977-1982: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Responsible for the accountability and security of special nuclear materials at fuel fabricating facilities, including the decommissioning of one major nuclear facility, utilizing non-destructive assay techniques.
1970-1976: U. S. Navy; Four year assignment on the USS California (CGN-36) included the participation in the construction and testing of the engineering plant, nuclear core installation, pre-critical testing, initial criticality, power range testing and sea trials. As the Leading Machinery Watch (LMW), supervised aft engine room mechanical work activities.
Administered preventive maintenance program.
0 0
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 Industry Peer Reviewer Eric Olson Operations Manager Pilgrim Station (Entergy) 0 1988 - Present: Entergy, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station:
0 November 2002 - pr-esent: Operations Manager.
0 April 2000 - November 2002: Assistant Operations Manager - Shift. Supervised the Station Shift Managers.
0 1997 - 1999: Shift Manager on shift.
0 1996 - 1997: Control Room Supervisor on shift, provided direction to plant operators in response to normal, abnormal and emergency operations. Acted to ensure compliance with licensing requirements and ensure the safe operation of the unit or equipment to protect the health and safety of the public and the environment.
1995: Work Week Manager in the Work Control Department. Responsible for directing and executing all the scheduled work activities for the week, focusing upon coordination and schedule adherence. Served as the single point of contact, and managed inter-group coordination issues within assigned work weeks. Assessed and evaluated work scope changes.
June - December 1994: Acting Assistant Maintenance Manager in the Plant Department. Assisted the Maintenance Manager in the planning, scheduling and performance of plant maintenance. Provided oversight, guidance, and approval for administrative functions, such as staffing, budgeting, procedures, internal and external reports, documentation, and cost control.
January - June 1994: Compliance Supervisor. Supervised the daily activities of four compliance engineers charged with providing regulatory oversight and program support for activities associated with NRC regulations and the NRC inspection program.
April 1989 - January 1994: Senior Nuclear Training Specialist in Operations Training Division. Responsible for the design, development and implementation of training programs for Plant Operations personnel using a Systematic Approach to Training methodology and meeting the requirements of 10CFR Part 55. Performed requalification instruction in the classroom and simulator for Licensed Reactor and Senior Reactor Operators. Evaluated licensed operators in accordance with NUREG-102 1. Provided Initial Licensed Operator Hot License training in the classroom and simulator.
April 1988 - April 1989: Certified Nuclear Training Specialist, Technical Section of the Nuclear Training Department. Responsible for design, development, and implementation of training programs for Electrical and Mechanical Plant Maintenance personnel. Designed, developed and implemented training programs, utilizing a Systematic Approach to Training. Prepared for, instructed, and documented traditional classroom and laboratory training sessions in accordance with established station procedures and federal requirements. Designed and built mockups and training aids, as necessary, for effective instruction in the classroom and laboratory settings.
May 1986 - March 1988: Butler Service Group: Staff augmentation assignment at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station as a certified Mechanical Maintenance Instructor.
Designed, developed and implemented training programs for Plant Maintenance or Technical Support personnel, utilizing a Systematic Approach to the Training process.
Prepared for, instructed, and documented traditional classroom and laboratory training sessions.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company DBNPS Independent Assessment Operations Performance - 2006 July 1984 - May 1986: Advanced Science & Technology Associated, Inc.: Staff augmentation assignment at San Onofi-e Nuclear Generating Station as a Refueling Coordinator. Coordinated and supervised refueling activities, including the activities necessary to disassemble/reassemble the reactor vessel, determine and reconstitute failed fuel bundles, and perform related in-service inspections.
May 1982 - July 1984: United States Navy, USS William H. Bates (SSN 680): Supervised operation and casualty control as the Engmeering Watch Supervisor and Engineering Duty Petty Officer.
September 1979 - May 1982: United States Navy, Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit:
Selected as a Staff Instructor following completion of the nuclear prototype training program. Qualified as an Engineering Watch Supervisor.
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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NP F - 3 Serial Number 1-1470, Page 1 of 1 COMMITMENT LIST The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Davis-Besse. They are described only as information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Director - Performance Improvement (41 9) 32 1-7 1 8 1 at Davis-Besse of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.
COMMITMENTS DUE DATE Continue to perform annual Operations department assessments, including Focused or Snapshot Self-Assessments along with semi-annual Integrated Performance Assessments.
dated March 8,2004.
Through the time period originally addressed by the Confirmatory Order