ML063250023

11-2006 Draft-Outlines

ML063250023
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	10/30/2006
From:	Operations Branch IV
To:	Southern California Edison Co
References
50-361/06-301, 50-362/06-301, ES-401, ES-401-2 50-361/06-301, 50-362/06-301
Download: ML063250023 (28)

Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 NUREG-1021 1

Facility:

SONGS 2 & 3 Date of Exam:

10/23/2006 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G

Total A2 G*

Total 1

3 1

4 5

3 2

18 3

3 6

2 0

1 3

2 1

2 9

2 2

4

1.

Emergency Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 3

2 7

7 4

4 27 5

5 10 1

2 3

1 4

1 1

6 2

0 3

5 28 3

2 5

2 1

0 1

1 2

2 0

1 2

0 0

10 0

2 1

3

2.

Plant Systems Tier Totals 3

3 2

5 3

3 6

3 2

3 5

38 5

3 8

1 2

3 4

1 2

3 4

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 2

4 2

2 10 2

1 2

2 7

Note:

1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant specific priority, only those KAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.*

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10CFR55.43

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G

K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s)

Imp.

Q#

022 / Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X

AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup:

Whether charging line leak exists 3.8 76 027 / Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction

/ 3 X

2.1.23 Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

4.0 77 055 / Station Blackout / 6 X

EA2.04 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Instruments and controls operable with only dc battery power available 4.1 78 057 / Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X

AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: AC instrument bus alarms for the inverter and alternate power source 3.7 79 E02 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 X

2.1.2 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

4.0 80 E05 / Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X

2.4.31 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of annunciators alarms and indications, and use of the response instructions.

3.4 81 007 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 X

EA1.01 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a reactor trip: T/G controls 3.7 39 008 / Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X

2.1.32 Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

3.4 40 009 / Small Break LOCA / 3 X

EK3.22 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the small break LOCA: Maintenance of heat sink 4.4 41 011 / Large Break LOCA / 3 X

EK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling.

4.1 42 015 / 17 / RCP Malfunctions / 4 X

AK2.08 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: CCWS 2.6 43 022 / Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X

AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup:

Charging pump problems 3.2 44 025 / Loss of RHR System / 4 X

AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Shift to alternate flowpath 3.1 45 NUREG-1021 2

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G

K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s)

Imp.

Q#

026 / Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X

AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The valve lineups necessary to restart the CCWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition 2.6 46 038 / Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X

EK3.06 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SGTR: Actions contained in EOP for RCS Water Inventory Balance, SG Tube Rupture, and Plant Shutdown Procedures 4.2 47 054 / Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X

AA1.02 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Manual startup of electric and steam-driven AFW pumps 4.4 48 055 / Station Blackout / 6 X

EK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: Length of time for which battery capacity is designed 2.7 49 056 / Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X

AK1.04 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Definition of saturation conditions, implication for the systems 3.1 50 057 / Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X

AA1.06 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Manual control of components for which automatic control is lost 3.5 51 058 / Loss of DC Power / 6 X

AA1.03 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Vital and battery bus components 3.1 52 062 / Loss of Nuclear Svc. Water / 4 X

2.4.6 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

3.1 53 E02 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 X

EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery) Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Reactor Trip Recovery).

3.0 54 E05 / Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X

EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

2.7 55 E06 / Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X

EA1.2 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater) Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

3.4 56 NUREG-1021 3

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G

K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s)

Imp.

Q#

K/A Category Point Totals:

5 3

1 4

5 6

Group Point Total:

24 NUREG-1021 4

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G

K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s)

Imp.

Q#

005 / Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X

2.1.28 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

3.3 82 A11 / RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X

2.1.2 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

4.0 83 A13 / Natural Circ. / 4 X

AA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

3.8 84 E09 / Functional Recovery X

EA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

4.0 85 005 / Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X

2.1.23 Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation 3.9 57 024 / Emergency Boration / 1 X

AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Actions contained in EOP for emergency boration 4.2 58 028 / Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X

2.1.27 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

2.8 59 032 / Loss of Source Range NI / 7 X

AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Startup termination on source-range loss 3.2 60 037 / Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X

AK3.07 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Actions contained in EOP for S/G tube leak 4.2 61 051 / Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X

AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Rod position 2.5 62 059 / Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 X

AK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release and the following: Radioactive-gas monitors 2.7 63 067 / Plant Fire On-site / 8 X

AA1.03 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Bypass of a fire zone detector 2.5 64 E09 / Functional Recovery X

EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

3.2 65 NUREG-1021 5

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function G

K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 Number K/A Topic(s)

Imp.

Q#

13 K/A Category Point Total:

4 0

1 3

2 3

Group Point Total:

NUREG-1021 6

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 System #/Name G

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp.

Q#

003 Reactor Coolant Pump X

2.1.23 Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

4.0 86 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Excess steam demand 4.5 87 026 Containment Spray X

A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of ESF 4.1 88 062 AC Electrical Distribution X

A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Methods for re-energizing a dead bus 3.3 89 063 DC Electrical Distribution X

2.4.6 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

4.0 90 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X

A1.05 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: RCS flow 3.4 1

003 Reactor Coolant Pump X

A1.07 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: RCS temperature and pressure 3.4 2

004 Chemical and Volume Control X

K1.10 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: Pneumatic valves and RHRS 2.7 3

005 Residual Heat Removal X

K4.03 Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide or the following: RHR heat exchanger bypass flow control 2.9 4

006 Emergency Core Cooling X

K4.06 Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Recirculation of minimum flow through pumps 2.7 5

007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

2.1.28 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of purpose and function of major system components and controls 3.2 6

008 Component Cooling Water X

2.1.27 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

2.8 7

NUREG-1021 7

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 System #/Name G

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp.

Q#

010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X

K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR PCS and the following systems: RPS 3.9 8

012 Reactor Protection X

2.1.28 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

3.2 9

012 Reactor Protection X

2.1.2 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

3.0 10 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: Safety system logic and reliability 2.9 11 022 Containment Cooling X

K4.02 Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Correlation of fan sped and flow path changes with containment pressure 3.1 12 022 Containment Cooling X

K3.02 Containment equipment subject to damage by high or low temperature, humidity, and pressure Containment instrumentation readings 3.0 13 026 Containment Spray X

A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of Containment Spray Pump suction when in recirculation mode, possibly caused by clogged sump screen, pump inlet high temperature exceeded, cavitation, voiding, or sump below cutoff (interlock) limit 3.6 14 026 Containment Spray X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Containment spray pumps 3.4 15 039 Main and Reheat Steam X

A1.09 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: Main steam line radiation monitors 2.5 16 059 Main Feedwater X

A4.08 Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: Feedwater Regulating Valve Controller 3.0 17 061 Auxillary/Emergency Feedwater X

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: S/G level 3.9 18 062 AC Electrical Distribution X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Major system loads 3.3 19 NUREG-1021 8

ES-401 SONGS 2006 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 System #/Name G

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp.

Q#

063 DC Electrical Distribution X

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the dc electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Grounds 2.5 20 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X

A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including:

Operating voltages, currents, and temperatures 3.2 21 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X

K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers 2.7 22 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: Radiation levels 3.2 23 076 Service Water X

2.1.27 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

2.8 24 076 Service Water X

K4.02 Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic start features associated with SWS pump controls 2.9 25 078 Instrument Air X

A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Pressure gauges 3.1 26 078 Instrument Air X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following Instrument air compressor 2.7 27 103 Containment X

A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Flow control, pressure control, and temperature control valves, including pneumatic valve controller 3.2 28 K/A Category Point Totals:

7 2

3 1

4 1

1 6

5 0

3 Group Point Total:

33 NUREG-1021 9

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 NUREG-1021 System #/Name G

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp.

Q#

10 001 Control Rod Drive X

A2.11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS-and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Situations requiring a reactor trip 4.7 91 014 Rod Position Indication X

2.1.32 Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

3.8 92 056 Condensate System X

A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use Procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of Condensate Pumps 2.8 93 014 Rod Position Indication X

K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: RPIS independent of demand position 2.8 29 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X

K4.10 Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) provide for the following: Redundant sources of information on power level 3.2 30 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X

K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the NNIS:

Separation of control and protection circuits 2.7 31 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X

A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ITM system including: Indications of normal, natural, and interrupted circulation of RCS 3.6 32 029 Containment Purge X

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Purge System will have on the following: Containment entry 2.9 33 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X

A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ; and (b) based those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Loss of SFPCS 2.7 34 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X

K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Fuel Handling System and the following systems: RHRS 2.5 35 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control X

K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the SDS: Controller and positioners, including ICS, S/G, CRDS 2.7 36

ES-401 SONGS 2006 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 NUREG-1021 System #/Name G

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number K/A Topics Imp.

Q#

11 068 Liquid Radwaste X

A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Liquid Radwaste System including: Automatic isolation 3.6 37 071 Waste Gas Disposal X

A3.02 Ability to monitor the automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including: Pressure Regulating System for Waste Gas Vent Header 2.8 38 K/A Category Point Totals:

1 1

0 1

1 2

2 0

3 2

0 Group Point Total:

13

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier3)

Form ES-401-3 NUREG-1021 12 Facility:

SONGS 2 & 3 Date of Exam:

10/23/2006 RO SRO-Only Category K/A #

Topic IR Q#

IR Q#

2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

4.0 94 2.1.5 Ability to locate and use procedures and directives related to shift staffing and activities.

3.4 95 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

3.7 66 2.1.22 Ability to determine Mode of Operation.

2.8 67

1.

Conduct of Operations Subtotal 2

2 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report.

3.2 96 2.2.34 Knowledge of the process for determining the internal and external effects on core reactivity.

2.8 68 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

3.0 69 2.2.1 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

3.7 70 2.2.2 Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.

4.0 71

2.

Equipment Control Subtotal 4

1 2.3.8 Knowledge of the process for performing a planned gaseous radioactive release.

3.2 97 2.3.3 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities for auxiliary systems that are outside the control room (e.g., waste disposal and handling systems).

2.9 98 2.3.9 Knowledge of the process for performing a containment purge.

2.5 72 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.

2.7 73

3.

Radiation Control Subtotal 2

2 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.

4.0 99 2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

3.5 100 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

2.7 74 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

3.4 75

4.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Subtotal 2

2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 NUREG-1021 13 Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 2 / 1 062 A2.02

1. 89 - Excessive overlap to topic for #20. Randomly selected 062 A2.05 2 / 1 022 K4.05

1. 12 - Not plausible at SONGS / Ventilation ducts are encased in concrete.

Randomly selected 022 K4.03 2 / 1 059 A4.10

1. 17 - Topic is specific to B&W plant design. Randomly selected 059 A4.08 2 / 2 028 A2.01

1. 93 - System abandoned in place. No procedural guidance applies.

Randomly selected 056 A2.04 1 / 1 025 AK3.02

1. 45 - Not performed at facility. Interlocks removed. Randomly selected 025 AK3.01 1 / 1 038 EK3.04

1. 47 - No automatic actions associated with PRMs related to event 1 / 1 057 AA1.04

1. 51 - Valves are not powered from Vital Instrument AC. Randomly selected 057 AA1.06 1 / 2 005 G2.2.25

1. 57 - Removed TS Basis item for RO. Randomly selected 005 G2.1.23 2 / 1 026 A2.01

1. 88 - Phenomena is expected to occur for Westinghouse Plant designs.

Recirc not same on CE designs. Randomly selected 026 A2.023 2 / 1 007 G2.2.25

1. 6 - No TS associated with Quench Tank. Randomly selected 007 G2.1.28 2 / 1 022 K4.03

1. 12 - No CIA on CCS at facility. Randomly selected 022 K4.02 2 / 2 033 A2.01

1. 34 - No relation between SFPCS and inadequate SDM. There would be no system actions to take based on loss of SDM. Randomly selected 033 A2.02 2 / 2 071 K3.04

1. 38 - Direct overlap with Simulator JPM S2. Randomly reselected 071 A3.02 1 / 1 027 G2.1.30

1. 77 - Direct Overlap with scenario event. Randomly reselected G2.1.23 2 / 1 026 A2.08

1. 14 - Direct Overlap with Simulator JPM S7. Randomly reselected 026 A2.07

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

SONGS Date of Examination:

10/23/2006 Examination Level RO Operating Test Number:

NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (3.9).

JPM:

Determine Shutdown Margin (J078A).

Conduct of Operations N, R 2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system (2.9).

JPM:

Verify required flowpath(s) OPERABLE per Technical Specifications (New).

Equipment Control D, R 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures (3.6).

JPM:

Prepare a tagging clearance (J234A).

Radiation Control D, P, R 2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure (2.9).

JPM:

Choose a volunteer for emergency radiation exposure (J208A).

Emergency Plan NOTE:

All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; for 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

(S)imulator Class(R)oom NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary NUREG-1021, Revision 9 A.1.a The candidate will determine Shutdown Margin by manually performing a calculation given the available conditions. The set of plant conditions will include a CEA anomaly as well as a Xenon transient. The critical task will be to identify the correct Shutdown Margin. This is a modified bank JPM.

A.1.b The candidate will be required to determine the Technical Specification required Boric Acid flowpaths while in Mode 4. The critical task will be to determine the available flowpaths given current plant alignment and OPERABLE equipment. This is a new JPM.

A.2 The candidate will be required to prepare a tagging clearance for the Boric Acid Makeup Pump (2MP174). The critical tasks include identifying the necessary boundaries for the repair. This is a bank JPM.

A.3 The candidate will be required to choose the volunteer in accordance with SO23-VIII-30, Operations Leader. There are several critical tasks required to ensure that the volunteer can attempt the rescue. This is a bank JPM used on the April 2005 NRC Exam that includes editorial modifications to arrive at an appropriate but different volunteer.

A.4 N/A

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

SONGS Date of Examination:

10/23/2006 Examination Level SRO(I) & (U)

Operating Test Number:

NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (4.0).

JPM:

Determine Shutdown Margin (J078A).

Conduct of Operations N, R 2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system (4.0).

JPM:

Verify required flowpath(s) OPERABLE per Technical Specifications (New).

Equipment Control D, R 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits (4.1).

JPM:

Perform a Safety Function Determination (J233A).

Radiation Control D, P, R 2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure (3.3).

JPM:

Choose a volunteer for emergency radiation exposure (J208A).

Emergency Plan N, R 2.4.41 Knowledge of emergency action level thresholds and classifications (4.1).

JPM:

Classify an emergency event (New).

NOTE:

All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; for 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

(S)imulator Class(R)oom NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary NUREG-1021, Revision 9 A.1.a The candidate will determine Shutdown Margin by manually performing a calculation given the available conditions. The set of plant conditions will include a CEA anomaly as well as a Xenon transient. The critical task will be to identify the correct Shutdown Margin. This is a modified bank JPM.

A.1.b The candidate will be required to determine the Technical Specification required Boric Acid flowpaths while in Mode 4. The critical task will be to determine the available flowpaths given current plant alignment and OPERABLE equipment. This is a new JPM.

A.2 The candidate will perform a Safety Function Determination per SO123-0-A5, Technical Specification LCOARs / EDMRs. The critical tasks include determining the systems and Safety functions affected. This is a bank JPM.

A.3 The candidate will be required to choose the volunteer in accordance with SO23-VIII-30, Operations Leader. There are several critical tasks required to ensure that the volunteer can attempt the rescue. This is a bank JPM used on the April 2005 NRC Exam that includes editorial modifications to arrive at an appropriate but different volunteer.

A.4 Loss of Coolant Accident and Loss of Feedwater events are in progress. The candidate will perform an EPIP classification. The critical task is to properly classify the event. This is a new JPM.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:

SONGS Date of Examination:

10/23/2006 Exam Level (circle one):

RO / SRO(I) / SRO (U)

Operating Test No.:

NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function S-1 061 - Auxiliary Feedwater System (J206FS)

Verify proper EFAS Actuation A, D, S 4-S S-2 071 - Waste Gas Disposal System (J231S)

Prepare and release a Waste Gas Decay Tank A, M, S 9

S-3 006 - ECCS (J050FS)

Perform HPSI Throttle/Stop A, D, S 2

S-4 062 - AC Electrical Distribution (J054S)

Restore Bus 2A06 from cross-tie operations D, S 6

S-5 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System (New)

Respond to a dilution accident A, N, S 1

S-6 003 - Reactor Coolant Pump (J027FS)

Start a Reactor Coolant Pump A, D, L, M, S 4-P S-7 026 - Containment Spray System (J049S)

Terminate Containment Spray D, S 5

S-8 012 - Reactor Protection System (RO only) (J035S)

Set CEAC Inoperable Flag on the Core Protection Calculator D, S 7

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1 062 - AC Electrical Distribution (J018)

Restore Offsite Power and transfer EDG control D, E 6

P-2 001 - Control Rod Drive System (J020)

Perform actions for a CEDMCS Timer failure M, R 1

P-3 039 - Main and Reheat Steam System (J022)

Restore the Atmospheric Dump Valve to remote operation D

4-S NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 / 8 / 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 / 1 / 1 (L)ow-Power 1 / 1 / 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 / 2 / 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 / 1 / 1 (S)imulator 1 / 1 / 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S-1 The candidate will verify EFAS-1 & 2 actuation following a Reactor trip. The alternate path requires that the candidate recognize that the AFW valve alignment is incorrect and re-aligns per SO23 2.22, ESFAS System Operation. This is a bank JPM under the Auxiliary Feedwater System -

Secondary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core safety function. This is a PRA significant action. This meets the ESF function for the SRO upgrade.

S-2 The candidate will align and commence a Waste Gas Release. The alternate path will require closing of the flow control valve when the radiation monitor goes into alarm. This is a modified JPM under the Waste Gas Disposal System - Radioactive Release safety function.

S-3 The candidate will initiate HPSI throttle / stop per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments. The alternate path requires manual actions to restore HPSI flow once throttling is complete because the throttle / stop criteria are no longer met. This is a bank JPM under the Emergency Core Cooling System - Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control safety function.

S-4 The candidate must restore Bus 2A06 from cross-tie operations to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 2XR2. This is a bank JPM under the AC Electrical Distribution - Electrical Systems safety function.

S-5 The candidate will respond to an inadvertent dilution per SO23-13-11, Inadvertent Dilution or Boration. The alternate path is performed when it is determined that the Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature is not being maintained at 120ºF. This is a new JPM under the Chemical and Volume Control System - Reactivity Control safety function. This is a PRA significant action.

S-6 The candidate will start a Reactor Coolant Pump. The alternate path requires an RCP trip upon receipt of abnormal RCP conditions. This is a modified JPM under the Reactor Coolant Pump -

Primary System Heat Removal from the Reactor Core safety function.

S-7 The candidate will perform actions to terminate Containment Spray per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments. This is a bank JPM under the Containment Cooling System -

Containment Integrity safety function.

S-8 The candidate must set the CEAC Inoperable Flag on the Core Protection Calculator. This is a bank JPM under the Reactor Protection System - Instrumentation safety function.

P-1 The candidate will shutdown the Emergency Diesel Generator and transfer EDG control following a Control Room evacuation. This is a bank JPM under the AC Electrical Distribution - Electrical Systems safety function.

P-2 The candidate will perform actions for a CEDMCS Timer failure alarm SO23-15-50.A2. This is a modified JPM under the Control Rod Drive System - Reactivity Control safety function.

P-3 The candidate will restore the Atmospheric Dump Valve to remote operation per SO23-3-2.18.1, Local Manual Operation of the Atmospheric Dump Valves. This is a bank JPM under the Main and Reheat Steam System - Secondary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core safety function.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Type*

=acility:

San Onofre Scenario No.:

1 OpTestNo.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Event Description Security Warning from the Security Shift Commander.

Initial Conditions:

0 0

0 0

0

-97% power - RCS Boron is 1542 ppm by Chemistry Sample Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service Train A Charging Pump (P-190) 00s Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) 00s Train A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-015) 00s Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) 00s I (CO, CRS)

Turnover:

Maintain steady state power conditions.

VCT Level Instrument fails low (LT-0227).

+ min

+ min

+ min I RC16B

+ min I CV16B

+ min lFWl1 ED04A 8

FW02A

+min FW02B 1 FW25 C (CO, CRS)

TS (CRS)

I Charging Pump P-191 trip.

I (CO, CRS)

TS (CRS) 1 PZR Level Control Channel fails high (LT-0110-2).

C (ACO, CRS)

Condensate Pump P-050 overcurrent trip.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #I The crew will assume the shift and maintain steady-state conditions per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

The scenario will begin with the crew receiving a security warning from the Security Shift Commander and will enter Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-25, Operator Actions During Security Events. The crew will be required to perform security actions for site specific events.

When the security event actions are complete, Charging Pump P-I 91 will trip and be addressed per the Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs) and SO23-3-2.1, Chemical and Volume Control System Operations. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

After the crew has stabilized the plant, a Pressurizer Level instrument fails high and will require crew actions per the ARPs and AOI SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction.

The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When the plant is stable, the VCT Level Transmitter (LT-227) will fail low. The crew will secure Charging and Letdown per the ARPs and SO23-3-2.1, CVCS Charging and Letdown Operations.

The Control Operator will manually operate the Charging Pumps to control Pressurizer level.

When plant conditions are stable, a Condensate Pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto start. The crew will respond per the Annunciator Response Procedures.

The major event begins with a loss of Bus 2A03 and total loss of vacuum. This will require a plant trip due to a loss of Main Feedwater flow. The crew will enter SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions. This is followed by a total loss of feedwater that will necessitate entry into S023 6, Loss of Feedwater. The ACO will be required to manually transfer Bus 2A07 during post-trip SPTAs.

Event termination will occur when Bus 2A07 power is restored and the Steam Generators are depressurized sufficiently to allow the remaining Condensate Pumps to supply feedwater flow.

Risk Sianificance:

0 Risk important components out of service:

Risk significant core damage sequence:

Risk significant operator actions:

Charging P-I 90, LPSl P-015, SWC P-307 Loss of all feedwater Depressurize and restore feedwater flow to at least one SG Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.

1

+ min

=acili ty:

San Onofre Scenario No.:

2 OpTestNo.:

NRC Zxaminers:

Operators:

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description CC03A C (ACO, CRS)

TS (CRS)

CCW Train A header ruptures at the SDC Heat Exchanger.

Initial Conditions:

0 e

0 0

0 0

70% power - RCS Boron is 1618 ppm by Chemistry sample Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service Train A Charging Pump (P-190) 00s Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) 00s Train A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-015) 00s Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) 00s 2

I RCIIA I(CO,ACO, I RCS Loop IThot fails high (TT-OlllX1).

+ min I CRS)

C (CO, CRS)

SG tube leak on E088 requiring plant shutdown.

+ min I

I TS (CRS)

+ min 4

1 Rapid downpower N (ACO, CRS) 5 1 SGO6A 1 M(ALL)

+ min I SGTRon

+ min I RP03 I c(Aco) 1 Auto and manual Reactor trip failure (ATWS).

7 1 MS03B I M(ALL)

+ min I ESDE on E089 inside Containment (5 minutes post-trip).

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications Appendix I)

NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch maintaining steady state power per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

When turnover is complete a Train A Component Cooling Water header rupture is initiated. The crew will respond per Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-7, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) / Saltwater Cooling (SWC). The crew will align SWC 4 CCW Train B per pump configuration requirements. The ruptured header will be removed from service. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When the CCW and SWC systems are properly aligned, a Thot instrument fails high and will require crew actions per the Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs) and AOI SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction.

With the plant in a stable condition, a Steam Generator tube leak will commence on E088. The CRS will be required to evaluate Technical Specifications and enter AOI SO23-13-14, Reactor Coolant System Leak. The CRS will determine that a rapid plant shutdown per the AOI is required.

When the crew has demonstrated adequate control of the downpower, the leak size will increase to that of a SGTR and be accompanied by an ATWS. The crew will respond to the ATWS by opening breakers to Buses 615 and B16. Five minutes later, an ESDE inside Containment will occur. The crew performs SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses an ESDE and a SGTR and transitions to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery.

The scenario is terminated when RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized while in the Functional Recovery procedure and associated Floating Steps.

Risk Siqnificance:

Risk important components out of service:

Charging P-190, LPSl P-015, SWC P-307 Failure of risk important system prior to trip:

CCW Header Rupture Risk significant core damage sequence:

SGTR and ESDE Risk significant operator actions:

Manually trip Reactor on ATWS Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Malf. No.

Scenario Outline Event Type*

Event Description R (CO)

N (ACO, CRS)

Dilution and power increase in progress at 1 O%/hr.

Form ES-D-1 TPO2B ED07A FW27 SGOGA Facility:

San Onofre Scenario No.:

3 OpTestNo.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

C (ACO, CRS)

C (CO, CRS)

TS (CRS)

C (ACO, CRS)

M(ALL)

SGTR on E088.

TPCW Pump P-120 trip with P-I19 auto start failure.

Loss of Inverter YO01.

Full Flow Demineralizer high differential pressure.

Initial Conditions:

0 0

0 0

0 0

30% power - RCS Boron is 1700 ppm Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service Train A Charging Pump (P-I 90) 00s Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) 00s Train A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-015) 00s Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) 00s FW23 Turnover:

Total loss of Condenser vacuum.

Event No.

1

+ min 2

+ min 3

+ min 4

+ min 5

+ min 6

+ min 7

+ min C (CO, CRS)

Spray valve fails partially open (PV-01008).

RC24B I TS (CRS)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch at approximately 30% power with a dilution in progress. The crew will raise power per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

When the power change is underway, the Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail 80% open. Crew will respond and stabilize primary plant using Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs) and Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction.

The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When plant conditions are stable, TPCW Pump P-120 will trip, and TPCW Pump P-I 19 fails to automatically start. The ACO must manually start TPCW Pump P-I 19 in accordance with Annunciator Response Procedures to prevent a potential trip on high stator cooling water temperature.

A vital bus failure will cause the crew to enter A01 SO23-13-18, Loss of Vital Bus. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications and the bus will be re-energized from the alternate supply per SO23-6-17, 120 VAC Vital Bus Power Supply System Operation. This is followed by a Full Flow Demineralizer high differential pressure that requires ARP actions on the part of the ACO to prevent loss of feedwater flow.

A Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur and the crew will trip the plant and respond per SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions. The crew will then transition to SO23-12-4, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. A loss of Condenser vacuum will require crew actions to reduce RCS temperature using the Atmospheric Dump Valves.

Event termination will occur when Thot is and the Steam Generator is isolated.

530°F and plant temperature and pressure are stable Risk Siu nif i cance:

Risk important components out of service:

Failure of risk important system prior to trip:

Risk significant core damage sequence:

Charging P-190, LPSl P-015, SWC P-307 Loss of Vital Inverter SGTR with loss of vacuum Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I EG08B RD8802 RD8902 RD9002 RD9102 Facility:

San Onofre Scenario No.:

4 OpTestNo.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

C (ACO)

C(C0)

Initial Conditions:

0 Reactor Critical at -3x1 04% power - RCS Boron is 1335 ppm by Chemistry Sample Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service Train A Saltwater Cooling Pump (P-307) 00s Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) 00s 0

0 Turnover:

Power increase in progress to -2% power.

Event No.

I

+ min 2

+ min 3

+ min 4

+ min 5

+ min 6

+ min 7

+ min Malf. No. I Event Type*

RC15B I (CO, CRS)

I TS (CRS)

ED08B I C (CO, CRS)

ED03A C (ACO, CRS)

I TS (CRS)

PG24 I M(ALL)

Event Description Rod withdrawal and power increase in progress.

PZR Pressure Control Channel fails high (PT-01 OOY).

Loss of Non-lE Instrument Bus Q0612.

Bus 2A04 Overcurrent lockout.

Loss of Offsite Power.

EDG 2G003 mechanical failure.

Four fully stuck CEAs; Emergency boration required.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC ##4 The crew will assume the watch with the Reactor critical at -3xI 04% power. The crew will raise power using rod withdrawal per SO23-5-1.3.1, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load.

After the crew has demonstrated control of the power change, a Pressurizer Pressure instrument fails high and will require crew actions per the Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs) and Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

After the crew has restored the Pressurizer Pressure instrument, a loss of Non-I E Instrument Bus Q0612 will occur and require crew actions per the ARPs and AOI SO23-13-19, Loss of Non-I E Instrument Buses.

With Letdown restoration in progress, a bus fault and lockout will occur on Bus 2A04. The crew will refer to AOI SO23-I 3-26, Loss of Power to an AC Bus. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

Once the decision to shutdown is made a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The Reactor will trip and the crew will perform SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions. EDG 2G003 will trip. Four rods remain stuck out of the core requiring manual boration alignment on the part of the CO in preparation for power restoration.

The crew diagnoses a loss of reactivity control due to a Station Blackout and enters SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery. The success path will require cross-tying power with Unit 3 and establishing a boration flowpath.

The scenario is terminated when Bus 2A06 is energized and boration at greater than 40 gpm is established.

Risk Sisnificance:

Risk important components out of service:

0 Failure of risk important system prior to trip:

0 Risk significant core damage sequence:

Risk significant operator actions:

SWC P-307 Loss of Vital Inverter SBO with Loss of Reactivity Control Vital AC power restoration Establish boration flowpath Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9