ML053000463
| ML053000463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/2005 |
| From: | Beilby M NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| 50-346/05-301 | |
| Download: ML053000463 (74) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Davis-Besse Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2005 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
- 80% power, MOL
- AFPT #1 tagged OOS.
- CAC-3 is aligned for Train 1 Turnover: Hold at 80% power while the Reactor Engineer reviews the calorimetric calculation completed at the end of the last shift.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A TS-SRO AO reports oil leak on Train 1 Containment Spray Pump.
2 RCP-07 C-RO, RCP 1st Stage Seal failure on RCP 1-1.
SRO 3 R-RO Power reduction prior to stopping RCP 1-1.
N-SRO TS-SRO 4 RCS-10 I-RO, BOP, RCS Hot Leg RTD slowly drifts HI.
SRO 5 RCP-01 M-ALL RCP 1-2 Breaker trips. Reactor Trip required.
6 RPS-01 C-RO AUTO and MANUAL Reactor trip fails.
7 PZR-01 M-ALL PZR Safety Valve fails OPEN, initiating SFAS.
8 HPI-02, C-RO HPIP 1 trips.
03 HPIP 2 fails to automatically start.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 DAVIS-BESSE 2005 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will take the watch with power holding at 80% power while the Reactor Engineer reviews the calorimetric calculation completed at the end of the last shift.
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, an AO will call the control room to report an oil leak on Containment Spray (CS) Pump #1. The SRO should request assistance from maintenance and/or enter the applicable TS. If necessary, a maintenance supervisor will report that the pump must be tagged OOS in order to make the repairs.
After the SRO has declared the TS for the CS Pump, the Lead Evaluator can cue the RCP 1-1 seal failure. The crew should respond to alarm 6-3-A in accordance with DB-OP-02006, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ALARM PANEL 6 ANNUNCIATORS, and then enter DB-OP-02515, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND MOTOR ABNORMAL OPERATION.
DB-OP-02515 will require the crew to reduce power to 72% in accordance with DB-OP-02504, RAPID SHUTDOWN, and stop the affected RCP. The SRO should enter the proper TS after the RCP is stopped.
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, the RCS Thot selected on HIS3A and for Tave or UNIT will begin to drift HI. The crew should respond to alarm 4-2-B or indications in accordance with DB-OP-02004, REACTOR COOLANT ALARM PANEL 4 ANNUNCIATORS. The affected controls should be shifted to an alternate channel and the channel should be removed from service. The channel does not have to be removed from service to proceed with the scenario.
The Lead Evaluator can cue RCP 1-2 breaker trip when evaluation on the Thot failure is complete. The crew should recognize that an AUTO reactor trip should have occurred and attempt to initiate a MANUAL reactor trip. This will fail and the RO should initiate a reactor trip by momentarily de-energizing Busses E2 and F2. Coincident with the reactor trip a PZR Safety Valve will fail sufficiently open to cause an SFAS actuation. HPIP #1 will trip and HPIP #2 will fail to automatically start. The crew should enter DB-OP-02000 - RPS, SFAS, SFRCS TRIP, OR S/G TUBE RUPTURE, and, among other actions, perform the following high level activities:
verify the reactor is tripped, start HPIP #2, complete the actions for lack of adequate subcooling margin.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 3 of 17 Event
Description:
AO Reports Oil Leak On Train 1 Containment Spray Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Call the control room to report an oil leak on Containment Spray Pump #1 SRO Refers to Tech Spec LCO 3.6.2.1.
RO/BOP Manually energize CS pump 1 blue light.
SRO May Call Field Supervisor.
SRO May Call Work Week Manager.
SRO May refer to Risk Matrix (Yellow 5.2).
At Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2&3 Page 4 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1st Stage Seal Failure on RCP 1-1; Power Reduction Prior to Stopping RCP 1-1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 2 Indications Available:
(6-3-A) 1-1 SEAL RET FLOW HI.
High controlled bleedoff flow of RCP 1-1 seal water.
Respond to Annunciator Alarm (6-3-A) 1-1 SEAL RET FLOW Crew HI.
RO Observe High controlled bleedoff flow of RCP 1-1.
Refer to DB-OP-02515, Reactor Coolant Pump and Motor SRO Abnormal Operation.
CREW Determine IF any of the following RCP conditions exist:
- Seal Return Temp 200°F
- Total seal leakage for the affected RCP 2.0 gpm.
- Seal stage pressure drop greater than 1440 PSIG.
CREW Determines total seal leakage is > 2.0 gpm.
IF a Reactor Shutdown to take the Unit off line is NOT desired, THEN, perform those steps necessary to reduce reactor power CREW to the desired power level, AND REFER TO Attachment 1, Plant Stabilization at a Lower Power Level.
IF four RCPs are in operation, THEN perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2&3 Page 5 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1st Stage Seal Failure on RCP 1-1; Power Reduction Prior to Stopping RCP 1-1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO a. Reduce reactor power to 72 percent.
BOP c. Verify proper Feedwater flow ratios of 2.4 to 1.
- d. Verify Tave control transferred to the RC loop with two RO/BOP RCPs.
- e. Verify RCS flow is greater than the flow required by T.S.
CREW 3.2.5.
Within four hours verify the Ø/Ø/Flow AND High Flux Trips SRO setpoints have been reduced in accordance with TS 3.4.1.1.
Notify the Steam Control Center (SCC). Load dispatcher of the SRO unit load reduction.
As determined by the Unit Supervisor, reduce unit load by any of the following methods:
- At the LOAD CONTROL panel:
- 1. Set the RATE OF CHANGE to a rate specified by the Unit RO Supervisor.
RO 2. Set the MIN LIMIT - MW to 180 Mwe.
- 3. Depress the DEC pushbutton to lower the unit load to the RO target determined by the Unit Supervisor.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2&3 Page 6 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1st Stage Seal Failure on RCP 1-1; Power Reduction Prior to Stopping RCP 1-1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF the APSRs are available, THEN attempt to maintain Axial RO Power Imbalance between 0 and negative 10 percent.
SRO Request Chemistry to perform the following:
- Monitor Condensate Polisher operation.
At Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 7 of 17 Event
Description:
RCS Hot Leg RTD Slowly Drifts HI Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 4 Indications Available:
4-2-B, HOT LEG TEMP HIGH 14-4-D, ICS FW LIMITED BY RX POWER 14-4-E, ICS INPUT MISMATCH 14-6-D, ICS IN TRACK 4-2-E, PZR LVL LO Loop 2 Thot indication rising RO Check the alarm by observing Loop 1 and Loop 2 Hot Leg Tis.
RO Verify the ICS is reducing Rx power to lower Tave to 582°F Compare Hot Leg Temperature Indicators TI RC3A1 and RO T1 RC3B1 on RC Panel C5718.
Crew Respond to Annunciator Alarm (4-2-E) PZR LVL LO Observes Low Pressurizer level as indicated on LRS RC14 on RO Control Room Panel C5706.
Check Pressurizer level low on LRS RC14 on Control Room RO Panel C5705.
IF Pressurizer Level is due to a Tave transient, THEN perform RO the following:
- a. Reduce MU-32 Setpoint to ~ 180.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 8 of 17 Event
Description:
RCS Hot Leg RTD Slowly Drifts HI Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- b. WHEN Tave is restored to ~ 582°F, AND Pressurizer Level is stable, THEN restore MU-32 to 220 inches as directed by the CTRM SRO.
CREW Determine which instrument pair has caused the alarm. (Thot)
Place SP6A, FEEDWATER MAIN VALVE, HVA Station in BOP HAND.
BOP Place BOTH FEEDWATER DEMAND H\A Stations in HAND.
Verify FW601, S/G 2 MAIN FEEDWATER STOP VALVE, is BOP open.
Maintain Feedwater flow matched with Plant power using SP6A BOP and SP7A AND LOOP 1 FEEDWATER DEMAND H\A Station.
Verify Main Feedwater Pump(s) OR the Motor Driven Feed BOP Pump is in service.
RO/BOP Check for ICS module, component, or instrument failures.
At Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 9 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 5 Indications Available:
5-3-H, RPS POWER - PUMPS TRIPPED 5-1-G, H, I, J, RPS CH 1, 2, 3, 4 TRIPPED ZL4265A and ZL 4265A red lights lit - Safety Valve Open indication RO Manually Trip the Reactor.
Reactor Trip Pushbutton has been depressed; AND Power is decreasing on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation (NO).
IF the reactor is NOT shutdown, THEN perform the following actions until the reactor is shutdown.
- Manually deenergize the CRDs in the order listed below:
CRITICAL 1. Momentarily deenergize 480-Volt Unit Substations TASK RO E2 AND F2 simultaneously.
- Maintain balanced primary to secondary heat transfer:
RO Manually trip the Turbine.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 10 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Turbine Trip Pushbutton has been depressed.
AND Turbine Stop Valves 1, 2, 3 AND 4 are closed.
OR Turbine Control Valves 1, 2, 3, AND 4 are closed.
SRO CHECK FOR SPECIFIC RULE OR SYMPTOM DIRECTION Implement any necessary Specific Rules.
ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN Applies Specific Rule 2 MU\HPI\LPI FLOW INITIATION, THROTTLING, AND TERMINATION Applies Specific Rule 3 SRO Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections LACK OF ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN Applies Directs tripping remaining RCPs IAW specific Rule 2 when SRO subcooling is lost.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 11 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK RO Trips all remaining RCPs MU\HPI Initiation RO Start the standby CCW Pump.
Start BOTH HPI Pumps.
- HPI Pump 1 (Tripped)
- HP 2A
- HP 2B
- HP 2C
Stop Makeup flow through HPI Train 2 by closing MU 6422, MU RO CTMT ISOLATION.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 12 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify HPI Train 2 Injection Valves are fully open.
- HP2A, HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION LINE 2-1 ISOLATION
- HP2B, HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION LINE 2-2 ISOLATION Determine which injection line has the lower flow and REFER RO TO Figure 3, HPI Balancing.
- FYI HP3A
- FYI HP3B IF only the lower flow is NOT in the acceptable region, THEN RO throttle the higher flow line until:
- The lower flow line is in the acceptable region OR
- The high flow line reaches the lower limit of the acceptable region REFER TO Figure 3, HPI Balancing.
IF MU 6422 was closed in Step 2.a above, THEN open MU RO 6422, MU CTMT ISOLATION.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 13 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Monitor RCS Pressure.
Routes to DB-OP-02000, section for LACK OF ADEQUATE SRO SUBCOOLING MARGIN RO Trip all RCPs. (Already performed.)
RO Verify BOTH HPI Trains are in service as follows:
Verify BOTH CCW Trains are in service to supply essential RO cooling:
- CCW Train 1
- HPI Pump 1 - tripped
- HP 2A
- HP 2B
- HP 2C
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 14 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
Lock MU Pump Suctions in the BWST position.
- MU 3971
- MU 6405 RO Start the second MU Pump.
- LPI Pump 1
RO Verify MU 6422, MU CTMT ISOLATION is open.
IF LPI Flow into the RCS does not exist, THEN perform the following:
RO a. Open BOTH piggyback valves
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 15 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- DH 63
- DH 64
- b. IF two MU Pumps are running, THEN perform the RO following:
- Open MU 6421, CTMT ISOLATION FOR ALTERNATE MU INJECTION LINE
- Open MU 6419, ALTERNATE MU INJECTION LINE.
CREW Verify proper SFAS response.
Verify proper SFRCS actuation for the trip parameters present BOP using Table 1.
BOP Verify proper SG level control by AFW using Specific Rule 4.
Isolate Possible RCS Leaks as follows:
IF MU/HPI PORV Cooling is NOT in progress, THEN perform RO the following:
- a. Verify RC 2A, PORV, control switch in AUTO.
- b. Close RC 11, PORV BLOCK Valve.
RO Verify MU 2B, LETDOWN ISO is closed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify RC 2, PZR SPRAY Valve is closed.
RO Close RC 10, PZR SPRAY BLOCK Valve.
RO Close Pressurizer Sample Isolations
- RC 239A
- RC 239B RO Verify Loop 1 High Point Vents are closed.
- RC 4608A
- RC 4608B RO Verify Loop 2 High Point Vents are closed.
- RC 4610A
- CF 1A
- CF 1B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 17 of 17 Event
Description:
RCP 1-2 Breaker Trips; Reactor Trip Required; AUTO and MANUAL Reactor Trip Fails; PZR Safety Valve Fails OPEN, Initiating SFAS; HPIP 1 Trips; HPIP 2 Fails to Automatically Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO If adequate subcooling margin exists, THEN GO TO Step 5.18.
ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN (20 degrees F) HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED Throttle MU and HPI as necessary to maintain adequate CREW subcooling margin. REFER TO Specific Rule 5, PTS Requirements.
Scenario may be terminated when crew reaches Step 5.18.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: DAVIS-BESSE Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: NRC 2005 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, EOL
- AFPT #1 tagged OOS
- Containment Air Cooler #1 tagged OOS
- CAC #3 is aligned for Train 1 Turnover: Maintain 100% power.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 TS-SRO SFRCS Power Supply Failure.
2 C-BOP, Condensate Pump Trip.
SRO 3 I-ALL Steam Pressure Transmitter Failure.
4 CCW-01 C-RO, CCW Pump trip/failure of AUTO start on standby pump.
SRO CCW-02 TS-SRO 5 AC-05 M-ALL Loss of one 13.8KV Bus.
6 MS-06 C-ALL One Main Steam Safety Valve fails partially OPEN.
7 SFRCS- C-BOP, Failure of AUTO SFRCS actuation.
02 SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 DAVIS-BESSE 2005 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will take the watch with directions to maintain 100% power.
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, an SFRCS power supply failure will occur. The crew will respond to multiple annunciators, check the SFRCS cabinets, and determine that a 28 VDC power supply has failed. The SRO will refer to DB-OP-06406 and Technical Specifications to determine required action.
The Lead Evaluator can cue the Condensate Pump failure any time after the declaration of the SFRCS TS. The crew will respond to annunciators and the BOP will manually throttle CD-420 and 421 to maintain Deaerator level in accordance with DB-OP-02013.
When the plant is stable following the Condensate Pump trip, a Steam header Pressure transmitter will fail, requiring the crew to place the turbine in MANUAL and raise SG pressure, and to place the SG/RX Demand in HAND to stabilize the plant. The crew will refer to DB-OP-06407 for the NNI failure, and DB-OP-06401 to restore ICS to full automatic operation.
Anytime after the plant is stabilized, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of a running Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump. The crew should respond to alarm 11-4-B in accordance with DB-OP-02011, HEAT SINK ALARM PANEL 11 ANNUNCIATORS, and then implement DB-OP-02523, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. The RO should manually start the standby pump before RCP/reactor trip criteria is met.
After the standby CCW Pump has been started and the non-essential CCW Header isolation valves are closed on the failed pump, the Lead Evaluator can cue the loss of one 13.8KV Bus.
This results in a reactor trip and entry into DB-OP-02000. One main steam safety valve will fail partially open and SFRCS will fail to actuate in AUTO. Flow through the main steam safety valve will be limited to avoid SFAS actuation. Among other actions, the crew will perform the following high level activities: actuate SFRCS, perform overcooling actions, and initiate MU/HPI cooling with only one vital bus available.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 3 of 13 Event
Description:
SFRCS Power Supply Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 1 Indications Available:
Multiple SFRCS alarms.
CREW Responds to alarms.
CREW Determines cause is loss of 28 VDC power supply.
SRO Refers to DB-OP-06406.
SRO Determines T.S. 3.3.2.2 applies.
When Tech Specs have been addressed or at Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 4 of 13 Event
Description:
Condensate Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 2 Indications Available:
13-2-B CNDS PMP DISCH HDR PRESS Low Condensate Pump discharge header pressure as indicated at PI 569, CONDENSATE PUMP DISCHARGE.
13-4-C DEAR STRG TK 1 LVL 13-4-D DEAR STRG TK 2 LVL High Deaerator Storage Tank 1 and 2 water levels Verify the proper number of condensate pumps are on for the BOP unit load. REFER TO DB-OP-06221, Condensate System.
Determines one (1) pump tripped.
Observes condensate header flow rate as indicated at FI 578, BOP CONDENSATE PUMPS DISCHARGE.
May control CD 421 and 420, DEAER STORAGE TANK 1 and BOP 2 CONTROL VALVES, to maintain Deaerator levels.
At Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 5 of 13 Event
Description:
Steam Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command to initiate Event 3 Indications Available:
14-3-F HPT MN STM PRESS BOP Transfer turbine to MANUAL.
Check steam pressure in the Steam Generators:
Determine the cause of the abnormal Main Steam Line header BOP pressure. (Instrument Fail)
When plant is stable; RO Verify FIC ICS32B(A), FEEDWATER DEMAND is in AUTO.
RO Verify HC ICS20, REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO.
RO Review Attachment 8, HIC ICS 13, SG/RX Demand.
IF DAAS is available AND it is desired, THEN monitor related RO DAAS points to minimize the error between the automatic and manual signals. Refer to Attachment 14, Operation of DAAS.
Verify the error between the POS and MV positions on HIC RO ICS13, SG/RX DEMAND is as small as possible for the current plant conditions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 6 of 13 Event
Description:
Steam Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Depress and release AUTO on HIC ICS13, SG/RX DEMAND.
IF ICS is returned to its normal alignment, THEN verify CREW annunciator (14-6-D) ICS IN TRACK is EXTINGUISHED.
When plant is stable; BOP Verify the Turbine is synchronized to the grid.
Review Attachment 9, PIC ICS 10 Press Control Turb. Throttle BOP Press.
Verify PIC ICS 10, HDR PRESSURE CONTROL Setpoint is BOP 45%.
IF DAAS is available AND it is desired, THEN monitor related BOP DAAS points to minimize the error between the automatic and manual signals. Refer to Attachment 14, Operation of DAAS.
Adjust Turbine load using increase/decrease pushbuttons on BOP HIC 2540, EHC PANEL 1, until PRS SP16, TURBINE THROTTLE PRESS indicates 870 psig.
BOP Depress and release LOAD CONTROL SELECTOR ICS IN.
BOP Check the ICS IN AND ICS READY lights are lit.
When the plant is stable with ICS stations returned to AUTO and at Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 7 of 13 Event
Description:
CCW Pump Trip/Failure of AUTO Start on Standby Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command to initiate Event 4 Indications Available:
6-5-B, SEAL CCW FLOW LOW 2-3-A, LETDOWN TEMP HIGH Letdown Isolation RO Verify the standby CCW Pump starts. (FAILS)
IF the standby CCW Pump fails to start, THEN perform the RO following:
IF high temperature computer alarms are received on the RO RCPs, THEN GO TO Step 4.6.11, OTHERWISE monitor RCP Temperatures.
RO Monitor RCS Letdown Temperatures.
CRITICAL Start the standby CCW pump.
TASK RO (Prior to reaching RCP Trip Criteria)
Send an Operator to investigate relay targets on any tripped CREW CCW Pump breakers.
Verify the Non-Essential CCW Isolation valves open for the RO running CCW Pump, AND closed for the non-running CCW Pump.
LOOP 1
- CC 5095
- CC 5097
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 8 of 13 Event
Description:
CCW Pump Trip/Failure of AUTO Start on Standby Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- CC 5096
- CC 5098
(Letdown is isolated.)
RO Open MU104, PURIFICATION DEMINERALIZER BYPASS.
Isolate Purification Demineralizers 1, 2, and 3 by closing the RO following valves:
- MU10A, MIXED BED 1 LETDOWN INLET, using HISMU10A.
- MU10B, mixed bed 2 LETDOWN INLET, using HISMU10B
- MU1903, PURIFICATION DEMIN 3 LETDOWN FLOW INLET, using HISMU1903.
Manually override the high temperature signal by holding the RO following valves in the OPEN position, until the trip clears:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 9 of 13 Event
Description:
CCW Pump Trip/Failure of AUTO Start on Standby Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- MU2B, LETDOWN COOLERS INLET ISOLATION, using RO HISMU2B
- MU1A, RC LETDOWN COOLER 1 INLET ISOLATION, RO using HISMU1B.
- MU1B, RC LETDOWN COOLER 2 INLET ISOLATION, RO using HISMU1B Restore the Makeup system to the normal valve lineup by RO opening the following valves as directed by the Shift Manager:
- MU10A, MIXED BED 1 LETDOWN INLET, using RO HISMU10A.
- MU10B, MIXED BED 2 LETDOWN INLET, using RO HISMU10B.
- MU1903, PURIFICATIONS DEMIN 3 LETDOWN FLOW RO INLET, using HISMU1903.
RO Close MU104, PURIFICATION DEMINERALIZER BYPASS.
When the standby CCW Pump is running and Letdown has been restored, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 10 of 13 Event
Description:
Loss of One 13.8KV Bus; One Main Steam Safety Valve Fails Partially OPEN; Failure of AUTO SFRCS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command to initiate Event 5 Indications Available:
Reactor Trip Alarms related to Loss of 13.8 KV Bus A RO Manually trip the Reactor.
Reactor Trip Pushbutton has been depressed.
RO Manually trip the Turbine.
Turbine Trip Pushbutton has been depressed AND Turbine Stop Valves 1, 2, 3 AND 4 are closed.
OR Turbine Control Valves 1, 2, 3 AND 4 are closed.
Check for Specific Rule or Symptom Direction Implement any necessary Specific Rules SRO (NONE Apply At This Time)
Perform Emergency Shutdown of #2 EDG due to loss of RO cooling
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 11 of 13 Event
Description:
Loss of One 13.8KV Bus; One Main Steam Safety Valve Fails Partially OPEN; Failure of AUTO SFRCS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections SRO Determines Section 7 applies (Overcooling).
CREW Maintain RCS Inventory as follows:
RO Set the PZR level controller to 100 inches.
Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST position AND press RO OFF for each switch.
- MU 3971
- MU 6405 CRITICAL Check for SFRCS Actuation.
TASK BOP MUST Manually actuate SFRCS due to failure of auto actuation Isolate AFW flow to the depressurizing OTSG SRO Determines a failed AVV causing overcooling.
Initiate AFW flow AND isolation of BOTH SGs by depressing BOP SFRCS MANUAL ACTUATION switches HIS 6403 AND HIS 6404.
BOP Verify proper SFRCS actuation for the trip parameters present.
IF an SFRCS Low MS Line Pressure Trip is present OR occurs CREW while performing Steps 7.24 through 7.28, THEN verify proper SFRCS actuation AND GO TO Step 7.29.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 12 of 13 Event
Description:
Loss of One 13.8KV Bus; One Main Steam Safety Valve Fails Partially OPEN; Failure of AUTO SFRCS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF it is apparent which SG is causing the overcooling, THEN SRO GO TO Step 7.28.
CREW Determines OTSG-1 is causing the overcooling condition Take manual control of BOTH AFW level control valves and BOP close BOTH valves.
Manually isolate AFW to the steam leak SG by performing one BOP of the following:
Verify proper operation of AFW trains feeding the non-isolated BOP SG.
Maintain proper SG level in the non-isolated SG with AFW BOP using Specific Rule 4.
CREW Check for continued Overcooling with one SG isolated.
WHEN the steam leak side SG boils dry (terminating the BOP overcooling), THEN control the AVV on the non-isolated SG to maintain RCS temperature constant or slightly decreasing.
BOP AVV H/A Station Operation for the Non-Isolated SG BOP Place the AVV H/A Station in HAND.
BOP Reduce the demand to zero.
BOP Press the AVV BLOCK pushbutton (HIS-ICS-11C).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6, & 7 Page 13 of 13 Event
Description:
Loss of One 13.8KV Bus; One Main Steam Safety Valve Fails Partially OPEN; Failure of AUTO SFRCS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Press AUTO on HIS-ICS-11B or HIS-ICS-11A.
BOP Control SG pressure as necessary from the H/A Station.
SRO Route to Specific Rule 3 when criteria is met.
When SCM is adequate, throttle MU flow as necessary to RO observe the following limits:
- IF MU is piggybacked from LPI, limit MU flow to 275 gpm (motor limitation).
MU/HPI shall be throttled to prevent exceeding the maximum RO P/T for cooldown limit line on Figure 1, curve 1.
Terminate scenario when RCS temperature is stable using AFW and OTSG #2 AVV
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Davis-Besse Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: NRC 2005 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
- 70% power, BOL
- AFPT #1 tagged OOS
- CAC #3 is aligned for Train 1 Turnover: MFPT #1 has a leak on the inboard bearing supply line. The previous shift initiated a power reduction to take MFPT #1 out of service for repairs. Continue the power reduction and remove MFPT #1 from service.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N-SRO Controlled power reduction R-RO 2 MFW-11 C-BOP, Increasing vibration on MFPT #1 requiring manual trip SRO 3 ICS-02 C-RO, ICS AUTO Runback fails SRO 4 RCS-13 I-RO, SRO RCS Pressure instrument selected for NNI input fails LO TS-SRO 5 TS-SRO 120VAC Inverter alarm actuates in the control room 6 SG-01 C-BOP, OTSG Tube Leak SRO 7 MFW-01 M-ALL MFPT #2 trips 8 SG-01 C-ALL OTSG tube leak rises to rupture following the reactor trip 9 PZR-02 C-RO PZR Spray Valve fails CLOSED during depressurization
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 DAVIS-BESSE 2005 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will take the watch with power holding between 70%. The previous shift initiated a power reduction to take MFPT #1 out of service for repairs. Directions will be to continue the power reduction and remove MFPT #1 from service for repair of an oil leak.
Any time after the power reduction is initiated the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of rising vibration levels on MFPT #1. The crew should respond to alarm 10-3-A in accordance with DB-OP-02010, FEEDWATER ALARM PANEL 10 ANNUNCIATORS. The Auxiliary Operator (AO) will report a vibration level exceeding the threshold for tripping the pump. The crew should trip MFPT #1, recognize that an AUTO runback did not initiate and then manually runback power to within the capacity of one MFWP.
The Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of failure of the RCS pressure channel selected for NNI input after the plant is stabilized. The crew should respond to alarm 4-4-C in accordance with DB-OP-02004, REACTOR COOLANT ALARM PANEL 4 ANNUNCIATORS. The operator should return the heaters to the correct alignment for the conditions, the channel should be removed from service and the SRO should enter the correct TS. The channel does not have to be removed from service to proceed with the scenario.
Any time after the RCS pressure channel actions are complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue actuation of alarm 1-6-A, INV YV1-YV-3 TRBL. The crew should respond in accordance with DB-OP-02001, ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ALARM PANEL 1 ANNUNCIATORS, and dispatch an AO to investigate. The AO will report that one of the inverters has shifted to the alternate source. The SRO should request maintenance assistance and/or enter the correct TS.
If necessary, the maintenance supervisor will report an electrical problem that indicates the normal supply cannot be restored until corrective actions are completed.
Any time after the SRO has entered the TS for the 120VAC problem, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the OTSG tube leak. The crew should respond to alarm 9-4-A in accordance with DB-OP-02009, PLANT SERVICES ALARM PANEL 9 ANNUNCIATORS, which will direct them to DB-OP-02531, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK, for actions. The simulator operator will maintain leak rate greater than the TS limit but less than DB-OP-02000 entry. After the crew has recognized the tube leak and/or the SRO is evaluating the tube leak TS, the Lead Evaluator can cue the MFPT #2 trip. This results in a reactor trip and entry into DB-OP-02000. After the crew has entered DB-OP-02000, the OTSG tube leak will ramp to a size below SFAS actuation.
Among other actions, the crew will perform the following high level activities: establish HPI piggyback operation, depressurize the RCS using pressurizer PORV when the spray valve fails closed.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 3 of 25 Event
Description:
Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Batch addition of approximately 80 gallons of boric acid.
Need Reactivity Plan.
Batching Operations from BAATs and/or Clean Waste to the Makeup Tank.
Prerequisites Target RCS Boron Concentration _________ ppm.
Verify the batch size to be added has been calculated and RO record below:
____ gallons of + ____ gallons of = ____ gallons boric acid water total batch size Notify the CTRM SRO a batch operation to the Makeup Tank is to be performed.
Verify the Boric Acid Addition Tanks are lined up to provide RO boric acid to the MU&P System. Refer to DB-OP-06031, Boric Acid Addition Tank Operating Procedure.
Determine MU 39, BATCH FLOW CONTROL VALVE, position RO using the following key stroke sequence. Depress and release:
- a. DISPLAY (lower).
- b. VALVE CE (valve is closed)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 4 of 25 Event
Description:
Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify MU 23, FLOW CONTROL, is closed using HC MU 23.
Verify WC 3526, BOOSTER SYSTEM BYPASS, is closed RO using HIS 3526.
NOTE: Estimating the approximate batch time for the boric acid and water addition serves as a backup method to ensure the batch operation is progressing as expected.
Estimate the time required to add the batch. Refer to Limits RO and Precautions Step 2.1.5.
Gallons of Acid Gallons of Water
+ = Batch Time Acid Flowrate Water Flowrate
______ min + ______ min = ______ min Program Batch Controller batch size calculated in Step 3.1.2 RO using the following keystroke sequence:
RO a. BATCH SET RO b. # keys equating to batch size, in gallons RO c. ENTER RO d. Exit BATCH SET mode by pressing DISPLAY. (lower)
RO e. Display batch size in lower display by pressing BATCH 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 25 Event
Description:
Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- f. IF desired batch size is not indicated in the lower display, RO THEN repeat Step 3.1.14.a through Step e. above.
- g. Verify the desired batch size is indicated in the lower RO display.
Reset the indicated total on the Batch Controller using the RO following keystroke sequence. Depress and release.
RO a. DISPLAY. (lower)
RO b. TOTAL 7.
RO c. TOTAL RESET 6.
- d. IF indicated total does not go to zero. THEN repeat Steps RO 3.1.15.a. through c. above.
Display FLOW RATE in the upper display using the following RO keystroke sequence. Depress and release:
RO a. DISPLAY. (upper)
RO b. RATE 8.
Notify CTRM SRO of approximate time to add batch from Step RO 3.1.13 and that the batch operation is to commence.
RO Enable the Batch Controller by pressing RUN.
RO Open MU 40, BATCH ISO, using HIS MU40.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 6 of 25 Event
Description:
Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: A minimum of 25 gallons of water shall be added to the makeup tank to flush the piping following any boric acid additions to the makeup tank.
IF boric acid is being added from a BAAT, THEN complete the RO following:
- a. Start the Boric Acid Pump for the BAAT lineup up to supply boric acid.
RO 1. Boric Acid Pump 1-1 using HIS MU50A OR RO 2. Boric Acid Pump 1-2 using HIS MU50B.
- b. Throttle boric acid flow with MU 23, FLOW CONTROL, RO HIC MU23, while observing flow indication on the upper display of the Batch Controller.
- c. WHEN desired amount of boric acid has been added from RO the BAAT. THEN stop the boric acid pump started in Step 3.1.20.a.
RO d. Close MU 23, FLOW CONTROL, using HC MU23.
Open WC 3526, BOOSTER SYSTEM BYPASS, using RO HIS 3526.
IF the batch operation must be stopped prior to completion, THEN perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 7 of 25 Event
Description:
Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Repeat Step 3.1.22 as necessary to complete the batch operation.
WHEN the batch is complete, THEN verify MU 40, BATCH RO ISO, is closed.
RO Close WC 3526, BOOSTER SYSTEM BYPASS, HIS 3526.
RO Notify the CTRM SRO the batch operation is complete.
Document the batch operation in the Unit Log and compliance RO with SR 4.1.1.2, if necessary.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 8 of 25 Event
Description:
Increasing Vibration on MFPT #1 Requiring Manual Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 2 Indications Available:
10-3-A, MFP 1 or BFP 1 BEARING VIB HI Excessive vibration of MFP 1 Bearings Excessive vibration of MFPT 1 Bearings Excessive vibration of MFPT 1 Gear Reducer Bearings Send EO to locally monitor the MAIN FD PUMPS 1 AND 2 BOP VIBRATION PANEL for Gear Reducer, Booster Pump, and Feed Pump vibration.
Obtain vibration reading from ZJR 2538, MAIN TURBINE &
BOP MFP TURBINES - BEARING VIBRATION & ECCENTRICITY, points 11 and 12 for MFPT 1.
IF vibration amplitude increases and remains above the second setpoint AND Maintenance personnel are NOT immediately SRO/BOP available to take vibration readings, THEN trip MFPT 1 using HS 797, TURBINE TRIP.
BOOTH INSTRUCTOR: Report that Maintenance personnel are NOT available.
BOP TRIP MFPT #1 Indications Available:
8-4-A, MFPT 1 TRIP 4-3-E, PZR LEVEL HI 14-3-D, ICS MFP LOSS OR LOW DEAR RUNBACK 14-4-C, ICS RX PWR LIMITED BY FEEDWATER IF an ICS Runback occurs THEN REFER to DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating Procedure. Runback should occur but does NOT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 9 of 25 Event
Description:
Increasing Vibration on MFPT #1 Requiring Manual Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places SG/RX DEMAND H/A Station in HAND and initiates RO runback at 20% power per minute (See Event next page)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 10 of 1 Event
Description:
ICS AUTO Runback Fails Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew may refer to OP-06401 for runback.
IF the runback was caused by a feed pump trip, THEN perform RO/BOP the following:
IF ICS was NOT in TRACK, THEN verify ICS is or has runback at 20%/minute to 55% power. OTHERWISE place HIC ICS13, RO SG/RX DEMAND station in HAND AND perform the runback at 20%/minute to 55% power. (ULD DEMAND as read on DAAS=514 Mwe)
IF the pressurizer spray valve was operated, THEN verify RC2, RO PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE is in AUTO AND closed.
RO/BOP Perform a NIP/HBP comparison for the current power level.
REFER to DB-OP-06902, Power Operations, for guidance to SRO operate plant equipment for the current power level.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 11 of 1 Event
Description:
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails LO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 4 Indications Available:
5-1-G, RPS CH 1 TRIP 5-3-G, RPS RC LO PRESS TRIP Refer to Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1, and take action as SRO required.
CREW Refer to DB-OP-02513, Section 4.6.
Manually control Pressurizer Heaters as required to maintain RO normal RCS Pressure.
Manually control Pressurizer Spray RC 2 to maintain normal RO RCS pressure.
Exchange RCS pressure input to NNI from RPS, REFER to BOP DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) Operating Procedure.
IF exchanging the RCS PRESSURE NNI input, THEN perform BOP the following:
- HIS RC2-2, Bank 2
- HIS RC2-3, Bank 3
- HIS RC2-4, Bank 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 12 of 1 Event
Description:
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails LO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- HIS RC2A, Essen Bank 1
- HIS RC2B, Essen Bank 2
- 2. IF available, THEN place PIC RC2 Bank 1 in MANUAL RO and maintain RCS pressure by adjusting the output.
IF RC 11 PORV BLOCK, is closed, THEN open RC 11, PORV RO BLOCK.
RO Return to normal operation.
Remove the cap on the selection panel for the alternate RC BOP PRESSURE NNI receptacle in RPS Channel 2.
Disconnect the amphenol connector from the RC PRESSURE BOP NNI subassembly and reconnect the amphenol connector to the alternate RC PRESSURE NNI Receptacle.
BOP Cap the open RC PRESSURE NNI receptacle.
IF desired, THEN place the following Pressurizer Heaters in the RO designated position:
- HIS RC2-2 Bank 2, in AUTO + BASE RO
- HIS RC2-3, Bank 3, in AUTO RO
- HIS RC2-4, Bank 4, in AUTO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 13 of 1 Event
Description:
RCS Pressure Instrument Selected for NNI Input Fails LO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO
- HIS RC2A, Essen Bank 1, in AUTO RO
Circle the RPS Channel now supplying the input signal to the CREW NNI and record the exchange of the RCS Pressure signal in the Unit Log.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 14 of 1 Event
Description:
120VAC Inverter Alarm Actuates in the Control Room Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 5 Indications Available:
Annunciator Alarm (1-6-A) INV YVI-YV3 TRBL Dispatch EO to inspect Essential Inverters YV1 or YV3 to SRO determine which channel(s) caused the alarm.
REFER to DB-OP-06319, Instrument AC System Procedure, SRO Emergency Operations Section.
SRO REFER to Technical Specification:
- 3.8.2.1 Applies On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 15 of 1 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 6 Indications Available:
9-4-A, VAC SYS DISCH RAD HI 4-4-C, HOT LEG PRESS LO Makeup flow rising PZR level lowering Dispatch an operator to the affected RE to check if a high flow SRO or low flow condition exists by observing flow at FI 1003A and FI 1003B.
GO to DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak, for SRO guidance.
RO Isolate Letdown.
IF second Makeup Pump is available, THEN start the second RO Makeup Pump AND verify Makeup flow is rising.
FI MU 31, MAKEUP FLOW TRAIN 2 FI 6425, MAKEUP FLOW TRAIN 1 CREW Determine which SG is leaking (OTSG-1)
Calculate a leak rate using Attachment 1, Steam Generator CREW Tube Leak Rate Calculation. (CALC 150 gpm)
Determine Emergency Classification. REFER to RA-EP-SRO 01500, emergency Classification.
SRO Notify Chemistry personnel to perform Attachment 2, Chemistry
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 16 of 1 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Personnel Responsibilities.
Notify Radiation Protection personnel to perform Attachment 3, SRO Radiation Protection Personnel Responsibilities.
Perform Attachment 4, Control of Secondary Contamination SRO and Offsite Releases.
Determine the appropriate actions based on the following SRO criteria:
IF the leak rate calculation exceeds T.S. 3.4.6.2 limits with 4 RCPs running, THEN GO TO Subsection 4.2.
Primary to secondary leakage through each SG is limited to SRO 150 GPD (0.104 GPM), Refer to TS 3.4.6.2.c.
If entering this procedure due to an increasing leak rate of greater than 30 GPD in one hour AND greater than 75 GPD leakage, THEN select a shutdown rate to achieve less than SRO 50% power within one hour AND be in mode 3 within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, OTHERWISE select a shutdown rate to comply with TS 3.4.6.2.
Notify the System Control center (SCC) of the unit load SRO reduction.
As determined by the Unit Supervisor, reduce unit load by any of the following methods:
- At the LOAD CONTROL panel:
- 1. Set the RATE OF CHANGE to a rate specified by the Unit Supervisor.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 17 of 1 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 2. Set the MIN LIMIT - MW to 180 Mwe.
- 3. Depress the DEC pushbutton to lower the unit load to RO the target determined by the Unit Supervisor.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 7
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 18 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 7 Indications Available:
MFPT #2 Trips Reactor Trip RO Manually Trip the Reactor RO Reactor Trip Pushbutton has been depressed:
AND Power is decreasing on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation RO Manually trip the Turbine.
Turbine Trip Pushbutton has been depressed AND Turbine Stop Valves 1, 2, 3 AND 4 are closed.
SRO Implement any necessary Specific Rules SG LEVEL SETPOINTS - May apply. MDFP must be started.
SRO Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections Section 8.0 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE - does
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 19 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior apply. SRO will route to Section 8.0, Step 8.7 CRITICAL IF HPI piggyback operation is NOT in service, THEN line up TASK RO and start HPI piggyback operation as follows:
Start the standby CCW Pump.
Start BOTH HPI Pumps
- HPI Pump 1
- HP 2A
- HP 2B
- HP 2C
- LPI Pump 1
- LPI Pump 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 20 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Open piggyback valves
- DH 63
- DH 64 RO Align the Makeup and Letdown System as follows:
RO Verify letdown is isolated.
RO Lock MU Pump suctions in the BWST position.
- MU 3971
- MU 6405 RO Verify the Standby MU Pump is running.
IF BOTH MU Pumps are running, THEN open MU 6421, CTMT RO ISOLATION FOR ALTERNATE INJECTION LINE.
RO Control MU flow using MU 6419 and MU 32.
Verify SG levels are controlled at OR increasing the proper BOP level using Specific Rule 4.
- SG 1
- SG 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 21 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Depressurize the RCS as follows:
Turn off all PZR heaters.
CAUTION: With the SFAS Low RCS Pressure Trip blocked, the operator is responsible for initiating SFAS should the leak rate increase such that Pressurizer level OR RCS pressure can NOT be controlled.
IF SFAS has NOT actuated on Low RCS Pressure, AND RCS pressure decrease is being manually controlled, THEN block CREW the SFAS Low RCS Pressure trip when the BLOCK PERMIT comes on.
Use Pressurizer Spray to reduce RCS pressure to maintain RO minimum adequate subcooling margin.
Open RC 10, PZR SPRAY BLOCK Valve.
RO Open RC 2, PZR SPRAY Valve (valve does NOT open).
IF Pressurizer Spray is NOT available OR is NOT sufficient to SRO reduce RCS pressure THEN REFER to Step 8.14 for guidance on Depressurizing the RCS without PZR Spray.
RO Depressurize the RCS as follows:
RO Turn off all PZR Heaters.
RO Start the QT Circ Pump if available.
Reduce RCS pressure to close to the minimum adequate SCM RO curve (Fig. 1) using one of the following methods:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 22 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- PZR Vent Line Method
- 1. Open RC239A, PZR STEAM SPACE SAMPLE VALVE
- 2. Open RC 200, PZR VENT TO QT ISOLATION.
- 3. Manually cycle RC 200 AND control PZR heaters to maintain RCS pressure.
- PORV method
- 1. Open RC 11, PORV Block Valve
- 2. Open RC 2A, PORV
- 3. Manually cycle the PORV AND control PZR heaters to maintain RCS pressure close to the minimum adequate SCM curve of Figure 1.
CAUTION: With the SFAS Low RCS Pressure trips blocked, the operator is responsible for initiating SFAS if the leak rate rises such that PZR level OR RCS pressure can NOT be controlled.
IF SFAS has NOT actuated on Low RCS Pressure, AND if the RCS pressure decrease is being manually controlled with CREW adequate SCM THEN block the SFAS Low RCS Pressure trips when the BLOCK PERMITs come in.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 23 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Allow HPI and MU to recover PZR level AND maintain PZR RO level from 80 to 120 inches by controlling HPI and MU.
SRO Check for entry into PTS criteria. REFER to Specific Rule 5.
CREW Establish a 50°F/hr cooldown rate.
IF SFRCS has tripped the AVVs, THEN block the trip and take BOP control as follows:
- 1. Place BOTH AVV H/A Stations in HAND
- 2. Reduce BOTH demands to zero.
- 3. Press the AVV BLOCK pushbuttons (HIS-ICS-11D or HIS-ICS-11C).
- 4. Press AUTO on HIS-ICS-11B or HIS-ICS-11A.
- 5. Control SG pressure using the H/A Station.
CRITICAL Depressurize the RCS down to AND maintain close to the TASK CREW minimum adequate subcooling margin limit during RCS cooldown.
WHEN RCS pressure is approximately 1000 PSIG, THEN maintain RCS pressure between 980 and 1020 PSIG.
Block SFRCS Low Main Steam Line Pressure and High SG CREW Level Trips when the BLOCK PERMITs come in.
BOP Determine which SG has the tube rupture by comparing RE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 24 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 609 (MS Line 1) and RE 600 (MS Line 2). (OTSG-1)
CAUTION: A maximum cooldown rate of 235°F/Hr is permitted down to a Tave of 500°F.
IF the tube ruptured SG SFRCS indicated level is approaching BOP 200 inches, THEN increase the steaming rate on the tube ruptured S/G.
IF SG level reaches 220 inches OR an SFRCS High Level Trip occurs, THEN perform the following:
BOP 1. Verify the MSIV is closed BOP 2. Verify its AVV is closed.
BOP 3. Block and close its AFP Steam Supply Valves BOP 4. Close its Aux Feedwater Line Stop Valve.
BOP 5. Verify its Main Feedwater Stop Valve is closed.
- 6. Lineup all available Auxiliary Feedwater Trains to feed BOP the good SG.
- c. To regain the ability to steam the good SG to the condenser
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 25 of 1 Event
Description:
MFPT #2 Trips; OTSG Tube Leak Rises to Rupture Following the Reactor Trip; PZR Spray Valve Fails CLOSED During Depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior perform the following:
- 1. Perform Attachment 6 to override the SFRCS HI LVL TRIP on the tube ruptured SG.
- 3. Defeat the MSIV to TBV interlock to allow use of the TBVs. Defeat by pulling Fuse 14 in the rear of C5761, ICS Cabinet 1.
Scenario may be terminated when RCS depressurization is in progress and RCS subcooling is less than 35 degrees F
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Davis-Besse Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: NRC 2005 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, MOL
- AFPT #1 tagged OOS
- Containment Air Cooler #1 tagged OOS
- CAC #3 is aligned for Train 1 Turnover: Maintain 100% power.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 I-RO, SRO SFAS Containment Pressure transmitter fails low TS-SRO 2 MFW-06 C-BOP, HP FW Heater Tube leak SRO 3 N-SRO Controlled power reduction R-RO 4 SA-02, C-BOP, SAC #1 trips and SAC #2 fails to load 03 SRO Emergency Instrument Air Compressor fails to AUTO start.
5 AC-06 C-RO, Bus D1 locks out SRO TS-SRO 6 RCS-02 M-ALL Rapidly progressing RCS leak rate 7 C-RO SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 fails to start and CC-1467 fails to re-position)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 DAVIS-BESSE 2005 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 4 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will take the watch with directions to maintain 100% power.
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, a Containment Pressure transmitter will fail high. The crew should respond to alarm 5-1-B, SFAS CTMT PRESS HI CH TRIP, in accordance with DB-OP-02005, PRIMARY INSTRUMENTATION ALARM PANEL 5 ANNUNCIATORS. The SRO should enter the correct TS and direct the RO to reset the tripped bistable.
Any time after the containment pressure channel actions are complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the HP FW Tube leak. The crew should respond in accordance with DB-OP-02013, CONDENSATE FEEDWATER ALARM PANEL 13 ANNUNCIATORS. DB-OP-02013 will direct them to DB-OP-06229, HIGH PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER SYSTEM OPERATION. DB-OP-06229 requires a power reduction to 95% prior to removing the heater from service.
After the feedwater heater is removed from service, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the running Station Air Compressor (SAC). The standby SAC will fail to load and the Emergency Instrument Air Compressor (EIAC) fails to automatically start. The crew should respond in accordance with DB-OP-02009, PLANT SERVICES ALARM PANEL 9 ANNUNCIATORS and may enter DB-OP-02528, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, dependent on the magnitude of the pressure drop.
When the EIAC has been started and the plant is stabilized, the Lead Evaluator can cue loss of Vital Bus D1. The bus will trip and lockout on an electrical fault. The crew should respond in accordance with DB-OP-02001, ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ALARM PANEL 1 ANNUNCIATORS, and then implement DB-OP-02521, LOSS OF AC BUS POWER SOURCES.
The SRO should request assistance from electrical maintenance and enter TS 3.8.1.1. and TS 3.0.3. Electrical maintenance will report back that a malfunctioning relay caused the problem and that it can be replaced within 30 minutes.
While the crew is performing DB-OP-02521 and after the SRO has declared the TS, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of a progressive RCS leak. The crew should respond to indications/alarms and enter DB-OP-2522, SMALL RCS LEAKS. The SRO should direct a MANUAL reactor trip no later than PZR Level 100 inches. The leak will become a design basis LOCA when the reactor trip occurs. The crew should enter DB-OP-02000. Coincident with the SFAS actuation, SFAS L3 Output Module will fail requiring the crew to take compensatory actions. Among other actions, the crew will perform the following high level activities: start LPIP
- 1, open CC1467 - CCW FROM DH CLR 1 VLV, stop HPI Pumps, and execute the steps of DB-OP-02000, Section 10.0.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 3 of 19 Event
Description:
SFAS Containment Pressure transmitter Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 1 Indications Available:
5-4-B, SFAS CTMT PRESS LO FAIL Determine if the channel is OPERABLE by performing a CREW channel check. REFER TO DB-OP-03006, Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check.
REFER TO Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1, and take action as SRO required. One (1) hour to trip bistable.
Perform actions for an Inoperable SFAS Instrument String Trip BOP Bistable Verify the Shift Manager has reviewed T.S. 3.3.2.1 and SRO Table 3.3-3 Section 1.
Obtain the Shift Managers permission to trip the inoperable SRO SFAS Instrument String Trip Bistable AND circle the channel selected.
SFAS Channel 1 2 3 4 Determine the trip bistable(s) that are required to be tripped to SRO achieve the desired results (CH 1)
BOP Obtain the door key for the designated SFAS cabinet.
Depress the TEST pushbutton on the trip bistable(s) listed in BOP Step 4.1.3 AND verify the TRIP light is ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 4 of 19 Event
Description:
SFAS Containment Pressure transmitter Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify the associated 1/5 lights on the output modules for all BOP four SFAS Channels are ON.
BOP Verify the SFAS cabinet door is closed and locked.
BOP Return the SFAS door key.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2&3 Page 5 of 19 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 2 Indications Available:
13-5-E, HP FW HTR 1-5 LVL Display the appropriate computer point to determine whether a CREW high or low level exists:
- LAH L458, HP HEATER 1-5 HIGH LEVEL ALARM Direct EO to locally verify HD 271A, FW HEATER 1-5 CREW EMERGENCY DRAIN CONTROL VALVE, is throttled.
Direct EO to locally verify HD 271B, FW HEATER 1-5 NORMAL DRAIN CONTROL VALVE, is open.
NOTE: Comparison of normal drain flows may help determine if heater drain flow is abnormal. Normal drain flows at 100% power are approximately 1400 KPPH.
Check for tube leak in heater by monitoring for abnormally high CREW or excessive heater draining.
- a. Compare normal drain flow computer points.
Refer to DB-OP-06229, High Pressure Feedwater Heater SRO System Operation.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2&3 Page 6 of 19 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Refers to DB-OP-06229, Section 5.0 HPFW Heater Tube Rupture Train 1 NOTE: Bypassing HPFW Heaters will result in Feedwater Flow and Temperature transients including Deaerator levels. Minimizing plant power levels prior to bypassing will reduce the potential for a plant trip.
CREW Initiate a plant power reduction to the following power level.
- 95 percent - A single HPFW Train will be removed from service.
Isolate feedwater to HPFW Heater Train 1 by simultaneously BOP performing the following:
Close ES 2014, EXT STM TO HP HTRS ISO TRAIN 1, using BOP HIS 2014.
Verify ES 252, FEEDWATER HEATER - EXT STM LINE DRAINS TRAIN 1, 1-6, is open, using HIS 252.
BOP Direct EO to locally isolate HPFW Heater Train 1 by performing
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2&3 Page 7 of 19 Event
Description:
HP FW Heater Tube Leak; Controlled Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Attachment 10, Isolation of Feedwater Heater Train 1.
NOTE: The reliefs for the HPFW Heaters relieve to the TPCW Low Level Tank. This may result in elevated TPCW temperatures and levels.
Monitor TPCW System performance. REFER TO CREW DB-OP-06263, turbine Plant Cooling Water system, as necessary.
Throttle FW 460, HPFW HEATERS FW BYPASS VALVE, using HIS 460 as necessary to maintain Train 2 flow, as read BOP on FI 581, HPFW HTR GROUP 2 FW FLOW, approximately one half the total Feedwater flow.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 8 of 19 Event
Description:
SAC #1 Trips and SAC #2 Fails to Load; Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Fails to AUTO Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 4 Indications Available:
9-2-E, STA AIR CMPRSR 2 TRBL/TRIP 9-3-E, STA AIR HDR PRESS LO 9-1-F, INSTR AIR HDR PRESS LO Determine if SAC 2 has tripped by checking indicating lights at CREW Control Room Switch HIS 1494, STATION 2 AIR COMPRESSOR.
CREW IF SAC 2 has tripped, THEN perform the following:
Verify that the Standby Air Compressor SAC 1 has started and BOP loaded. REFER TO DB-OP-06251, Station and Instrument Air System.
Manually start the EIAC by taking HIS 813, EMER INSTR AIR BOP COMPRESSOR to START position.
NOTE: The Crew may refer to DB-OP-2528, Loss of Instrument air, to perform these actions.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 9 of 19 Event
Description:
Bus D1 Locks Out Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 5 Indications Available:
Room goes dark Multiple annunciators on Panels 1 and 2 CREW Determine which AC Bus(es) are lost. (D1, D2)
Refer to Attachment 14, Loss of AC Busses LCO Tracking Aid.
SRO T.S. 3.0.3 applies.
Verify Makeup Pump 2 breaker is open - HIS MU 24B, RO MAKEUP PUMP 2 IF Bus D1 remains deenergized, THEN perform Attachment 7, CREW Energizing Bus D1.
Based on the bus(es) lost, review E-1040A, electrical CREW Distribution Manual to determine what loads have been lost.
Take actions to address loads that have been lost. Refer to CREW applicable procedures.
- Abnormal Procedures
- Alarm Procedures
- System Operating Procedures Loss of power to the battery chargers supplying DC MCC 1 or 2 NOTE will result in battery depletion and eventual loss of the DC MCC unless the DC MCCs are cross connected or power is restored
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 10 of 19 Event
Description:
Bus D1 Locks Out Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior to the battery chargers.
NOTE: The Crew may re-energize Bus D-1 by performing Attachment 7, Section 1.0, to close AD-110, or Section 4.0, to start EDG 2 and energize Bus D-1.
CREW Refer to DB-OP-02512, Loss of RCS Makeup.
RO Verify Components Cooling Water supply to the RCPs.
CCW to CTMT on Panel C5717 CC1411A - OPEN CC1411B - OPEN CCW FROM CTMT on Panel C5717 CC 1407A - OPEN CC 1407B - OPEN Seal Cooling CCW Return on Panel C5718 RCP 1-1 CC4100 - OPEN RCP 1-2 CC4200 - OPEN RCP 2-1 CC4300 - OPEN
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 11 of 19 Event
Description:
Bus D1 Locks Out Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCP 2-2 CC4400 - OPEN Annunciator alarm (6-5-B) SEAL CCW FLOW LO is extinguished.
Isolate letdown by closing - HIS MU2B, LETDOWN ISO MU2B RO HIS MU3, LETDOWN CLRS OUTLET Isolate Seal Injection by closing MU 19 by closing - FIC MU19, RO RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CONTROL Isolate normal Makeup by closing MU 32 - LIC RC14, RO PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL.
REFER TO DB-OP-02515, Reactor Coolant Pump and Motor CREW Abnormal Operation, for RCP operation with a loss of Seal Injection water to an RCP.
RO Maintain Tave constant.
RO Start the standby Makeup Pump.
- Restore Seal Injection flow as follows:
- 1. As soon as Makeup and MU 19 become available, gradually (over ~ 2 minutes) open MU 19 to a setpoint of 12-15 gpm (~3 gpm pcr RCP).
- 2. After 10 minutes and as the time permits increase total seal injection flow to ~20-25 gpm (~6 gpm per RCP).
- 3. After another 10 minutes and as time permits adjust total seal injection flow to the normal range.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 12 of 19 Event
Description:
Bus D1 Locks Out Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 4. Return MU 19 to AUTO.
- Restore Makeup Flow as follows:
- 1. Slowly raise MU flow using MU 32.
- 2. WHEN PZR level is correct for the existing Tave in accordance with Curve CC 4.3, Minimum Pressurizer Level vs. RC Temperature, of DB-PF-06703, Miscellaneous Operations Curves. THEN return MU 32 to AUTO.
- Restore Letdown.
- 1. HIS MU2B, LETDOWN ISO MU 2B
- 2. HIS MU3, LETDOWN CLRS OUTLET SRO REFER TO TS 3.1.2.4.
SRO GO TO DB-OP-00000, Conduct of Operations.
DB-OP-00000, conduct of Operations, contains instructions on NOTE returning to normal operation following abnormal operation.
On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 13 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
When directed, insert command for Event 6 Indications Available:
Pressurizer level rapidly lowering RCS pressure rapidly lowering CREW Should determine that reactor should be tripped.
SRO Directs crew to manually trip the Reactor.
RO Reactor Trip Pushbutton has been depressed; AND Power is decreasing on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation.
RO Manually trip the turbine.
Turbine Trip Pushbutton has been depressed.
AND Turbine Stop Valves 1, 2, 3 AND 4 are closed.
OR Turbine control Valves 1, 2, 3 AND 4 are closed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 14 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implement any necessary Specific Rules.
Applies ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN SRO Specific Rule 2 CRITICAL TASK RO Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps RO
- RCP 2-2 Routes to DB-OP-02000, section 5.0, Lack of Adequate SRO Subcooling Margin RO Trip all RCPs (Rule 2 may have already tripped.)
RO Verify BOTH HPI Trains are in service as follows:
Verify BOTH CCW Trains are in service to supply essential RO cooling:
- CCW Train 1 (may manually open CC-1467 at this time)
- CCW Train 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 15 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify BOTH HPI Pumps are running.
- HPI Pump 1
- HP 2A
- HP 2B
- HP 2C
Lock MU Pump Suction in the BWST position.
- MU 3971
- MU 6405 RO Start the second MU Pump.
Start BOTH LPI Pumps
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 16 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task RO
- LPI Pump 1 (must manually start)
- LPI Pump 2 (Tripped)
RO Open MU 6420, MU 32 BYPASS.
RO Verify MU 6422, MU CTMT ISOLATION is open.
Verify proper SFAS response. (Align CC-1467 if NOT already RO performed.)
Verify proper SFRCS actuation for the trip parameters present BOP using Table 1.
BOP Verify proper SG level control by AFW using Specific Rule 4.
IF RCS pressure lowers to the point where LPI flow is SRO observed, THEN GO TO Section 10, Large LOCA.
SRO routes to Section 10.
Check RA-EP-01500, Emergency classification, to determine if SRO emergency action levels have been exceeded. Proceed with Emergency Plan activities in parallel with operational activities.
CREW Verify proper SFAS response using Table 2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 17 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform actions to close breakers for DH 7A, DH 7B, DH 9A, DH 9B and HP 31. REFER TO Attachment 7, Section 1, CREW Actions to close breakers for DH 7A, DH 7B, DH 9A, DH 9B and HP 31.
RO IF LPI flow into the RCS exists, THEN perform the following:
Stop BOTH Makeup Pumps
- Makeup Pump 1
- Makeup Pump 2 IF LPI Pump Suctions are aligned to the BWST THEN verify RO BOTH piggyback valves are closed.
- DH 63
- DH 64 RO/BOP Start Control Room EVS as follows:
Start BOTH Control Room EVS Fans.
- Place HIS 5261, CONTROL ROOM EMER VENT FAN, 1 in start.
- Place HIS 5262, CONTROL ROOM EMER VENT FAN, 2 in start.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 18 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior For each Control Room EVS fan that has been started, perform RO/BOP the following:
- a. Open the outside air Inlet damper(s):
- HA 5261A, FAN 1 OUTSIDE AIR INLET DAMPER
- HA 5262A, FAN 2 OUTSIDE AIR INLET DAMPER
- b. Verify the process radiation monitor(s) in operation:
- RCM-5327, CTRM FLT FAN 1 DISCH
- RCM-5328, CTRM FLT FAN 2 DISCH
- c. IF accessible, THEN place the Air Cooled Condensing Units) in service e following Emergency Start. REFER to RO/BOP DB-OP-06505, control Room Emergency Ventilation System Procedure.
IF only DH Pump 1 is available, THEN cross-connect DH Pump RO discharges as follows:
- a. Verify DH Pump 2 is off.
- b. Block AND close DH 2734, DH PUMP 2 LPI SUCT.
- c. Close DH 1A.
- d. WHEN DH 2734 is closed, THEN open DH 831, DECAY HEAT COOLER DISCH XOVER 1 TO 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 19 of 19 Event
Description:
Rapidly Progressing RCS Leak Rate; SFAS L3 Output Module Failure (LPIP #1 Fails to Start and CC-1467 Fails to Re-Position)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Throttle closed DH 1B AND throttle open DH 1A to obtain the RO following:
- Maximize total DH Pump 1 flow NOT to exceed 4000 gpm.
- Balance flow between DH Injection Lines, FY1 DH2B AND RO FYI DH2A
- Continue to monitor and adjust total DH Pump 1 flow as RO necessary.
Scenario may be terminated when LPI is cross-connected.