ML053000127
| ML053000127 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
| Issue date: | 10/25/2005 |
| From: | Gody A Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Forbes J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| Download: ML053000127 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000313/2005301
Text
October 25, 2005
Jeffrey S. Forbes
Vice President Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, AR 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 - NRC EXAMINATION
REPORT 05000313/2005301
Dear Mr. Forbes:
On September 15, 2005, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
examination at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The enclosed report documents the examination
findings, which were discussed on September 15, 2005, with Messrs. Brad Berryman, Randal
Martin, and other members of your staff.
The examination included the evaluation of 8 applicants for reactor operator licenses,
1 applicant for an instant senior operator license and 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator
licenses. The written and operating examinations were developed using NUREG-1021,
"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9. The license
examiners determined that 12 of the 13 applicants satisfied the requirements of
10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.
No findings of significance were identified during this examination. However, a licensee-
identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in
Section 40A7 of this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation
consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety
significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If
you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of
this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the
Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza
Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
Arkansas Nuclear One facility.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony T. Gody, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket: 50-313
License: DPR-51
Enclosure:
NRC Examination Report 05000313/2005301
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/enclosure:
Senior Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, MD 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russellville, AR 72801
Winston & Strawn LLP
1700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-3817
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Bernard Bevill
Radiation Control Team Leader
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30
Little Rock, AR 72205-3867
James Mallay
Director, Regulatory Affairs
Framatome ANP
3815 Old Forest Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (KMK)
Senior Resident Inspector (RWD)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (DNG)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (VGG)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
RidsNrrDipmIipb
ANO Site Secretary (VLH)
SISP Review Completed: __Y____ ADAMS: X Yes
G No Initials: __REL____
X Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive
X Non-Sensitive
OE/OB
SOE/OB
OE/OB
OE/OB
C:OB
C:PBE
C:OB
MHaire/lmb
GJohnston
JDrake
KClayton
RELantz
DNGraves ATGody
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
10/25/05
10/4/05
10/4/05
10/13/05
10/12/05
10/13/05
10/25/05
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
Enclosure
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EXAMINATION REPORT
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Dockets:
50-313
Licenses:
Report :
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1
Location:
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas
Dates:
September 12-15, 2005
Inspectors:
M. S. Haire, Chief Examiner, Operations Branch
G. W. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer
J. F. Drake, Operations Engineer
K. D. Clayton, Operations Engineer
Approved By:
Anthony T. Gody, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000313/2005-301; 09/12-15/2005; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Initial Operator
Licensing Examination Report.
NRC examiners evaluated the competency of 8 applicants for reactor operator licenses,
1 applicant for an instant senior operator license and 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator
licenses at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The facility licensee developed the examinations
using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"
Revision 9. The written examination was administered by the facility on September 9, 2005.
NRC examiners administered the operating tests on September 12-15, 2005. The license
examiners determined that 12 of the 13 applicants satisfied the requirements of
10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been
reviewed by the examiners. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have
been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and its
corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Enclosure
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REPORT DETAILS
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Other Activities (Initial Operator License Examination)
1.
License Applications
a.
Scope
The examiners reviewed the applications submitted by the licensee for each of the
license applicants. The applications were submitted on NRC Form 398, Personal
Qualification Statement, and NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Examination by
Facility Licensee. The examiners also audited a sample of the license applications to
confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit
focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control
manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.
Operator Knowledge and Performance
a.
Examination Scope
On September 9, 2005, the licensee proctored the administration of the written
examinations to all 13 applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations,
analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on September 20, 2005.
The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating
examination to all 13 applicants on September 12-15, 2005. The 8 applicants for
reactor operator licenses participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, in a control
room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 11 system tasks, and an administrative
test consisting of 4 administrative tasks. One of the 8 applicants for a reactor operator
license also participated in a third dynamic simulator scenario. The applicant seeking an
instant senior operator license participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control
room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 10 system tasks, and an administrative
test consisting of 5 administrative tasks. The 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator
licenses participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities
walkthrough test consisting of 5 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of
5 administrative tasks.
b.
Findings
All 13 of the applicants passed all parts of the operating test. One reactor operator
applicant failed the written examination. For the written examinations, the reactor
operator applicants average score was 89.4 percent and ranged from 71.6 to
Enclosure
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97.3 percent, and the senior operator applicants average score was 90.7 percent and
ranged from 82.8 to 93.9 percent. The overall written examination average was
89.9 percent.
Chapter ES-403 and Form ES-403-1 of NUREG-1021 require the licensee to analyze
the validity of any written examination questions that were missed by half or more of the
applicants. The licensee conducted this performance analysis for the six questions that
met this criteria and submitted the analysis to the chief examiner on September 20,
2005. This analysis concluded that three of the questions (2, 82, and 83) were
technically accurate and required no post-examination changes. The licensee
recommended accepting two answers as correct for two of the questions (16 and 94)
and recommended one question (73) be deleted from the examination because of there
being no correct answer among the choices. None of the recommended changes had a
net impact of changing a passing grade to a failure or a failing grade to passing.
The licensees recommendations and the NRC responses follow:
Reactor/Senior Operator Question 16
The licensee recommended that both answers A and C be accepted as correct for
this question. The question asked what action is required during the re-establishment
of SW flow through the DH cooler and why? Answer A says establish SW slowly to
prevent DH cooler water hammer, and C says establish SW slowly to prevent DH
cooler thermal shock. Procedure 1203.028, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, directs that
SW flow to DH cooler be restored slowly out of concern for both water hammer and
thermal shock, which makes both A and C correct.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to accept two
answers for Question 16. The procedure is clear that both water hammer and thermal
shock are concerns for restoring cooling in this condition.
Reactor/Senior Operator Question 73
The licensee recommended deletion of this question since a typo in the answer intended
to be correct actually makes the answer incorrect, which leaves no correct answer. The
question asked: During performance of the ESAS procedure with BWST level at 8 ft.,
which of the following actions is performed specifically to reduce plant personnel
exposure? The intended correct answer was C, which said aligning HPI to provide
PZR Aux Spray. However, in order for answer C to have been correct, it would have
had to refer to LPI instead of HPI - HPI was a typographical error that makes the
answer incorrect. Procedure 1202.010, ESAS, step 13 clearly directs aligning
Pressurizer AUX Spray to LPI system. Since there is not a correct answer, the
question should be deleted.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to delete
Question 73 since there is no correct answer. The use of HPI in this circumstance is
clearly not correct.
Enclosure
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Senior Operator Question 94
The licensee recommended that both C and D be accepted as correct on this
question. The question gave conditions indicating quadrant power tilt (QPT) was
3 percent above the steady state limit and asked what action was required by Technical Specification 3.2.4. Technical Specification 3.2.4, Required Action A.1.2.2, states that
appropriate trip setpoints should be reduced by >2% RTP from the ALLOWABLE
THERMAL POWER for each 1% of QPT greater than the steady state limit. This
means the required reduction is >6%, which makes both C (reduce applicable RPS
trip setpoints 6%) and D (reduce applicable RPS trip setpoints 8%) correct.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to accept two
answers for Question 94. Clearly, if >6% adjustment is directed by the technical
specification, then both C and D are correct.
3.
Initial Licensing Examination Development
a.
Examination Scope
The licensee developed the examinations in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 9.
All licensee facility training and operations staff involved in examination preparation and
validation were on a security agreement. The facility licensee submitted the integrated
examination outlines on May 16, 2005. The chief examiner reviewed the outlines
against the requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the
licensee. The facility licensee submitted the draft examination package on July 14,
2005. The chief examiner reviewed the draft examination package against the
requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the licensee on
the examination on July 29, 2005. The NRC conducted an onsite validation of
the operating examinations and provided further comments during the week of
August 22, 2005. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution on
August 26, 2005.
b.
Findings
The NRC approved the initial examination outline and advised the licensee to proceed
with the operating examination development.
The examiners determined that the written and operating examinations initially
submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed
examination.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
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4.
Simulation Facility Performance
a.
Examination Scope
The examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during the
examination validation and administration.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
5.
Examination Security
a.
Examination Scope
The examiners reviewed examination security for examination development and during
both the onsite preparation week and examination administration week for compliance
with NUREG-1021 requirements. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were
reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.
b.
Findings
A compromise of the reactor operator written examination occurred during examination
development that resulted in the licensee-identified non-cited violation documented in
section 4OA7 of this report. The compromise occurred when the licensee accidentally
distributed an early draft version of the reactor operator written license examination
during administration of the audit examination. The examination proctor realized the
mistake within minutes of distributing the wrong examination, and quickly collected all
copies of the license examination. Copies of the reactor operator audit examination
were then prepared and distributed. During subsequent investigation, it was determined
that no applicant had worked beyond or gained knowledge of any question beyond
question #3. To ensure a valid examination, the following changes were made to the
reactor operator license examination:
!
Replacement KAs were selected and replacement questions were developed for
questions #1-10.
!
An additional 27 questions were selected among the remainder of the
examination to be replaced or significantly modified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The chief examiner presented the examination results to Messrs. Brad Berryman,
Unit One Operations Manager, Tom Mayfield, Acting Training Manager, Randal Martin,
Unit One Operations Training Manager, and other members of the licensee's
management staff on September 15, 2005. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
Enclosure
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The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination
as proprietary.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meet the criteria of Section VI of
the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.
!
10 CFR 55.49 prohibits licensees from compromising any portion of a license
examination by engaging in activities that, but for detection, would have affected
the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. Contrary to this,
on August 5, 2005, the licensee mistakenly distributed the actual NRC reactor
operator license examination to the license candidates during the audit
examination administration; the first three questions on the NRC license
examination were compromised before the error was detected and the
examinations collected by the proctor. The licensee documented this
compromise in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2005-01144. This finding is of very
low safety significance because it was detected and the compromised aspects of
the examination were replaced before the actual NRC license examination was
administered.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
Randal Martin, Unit One Operations Training Manager
Robert Byford, Simulator Training Supervisor
Steve Pullin, Examination Author
John Cork, Examination Author
NRC Personnel
R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector