ML053000127

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NRC Examination Report 05000313/2005301
ML053000127
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/25/2005
From: Gody A
Operations Branch IV
To: Forbes J
Entergy Operations
References
Download: ML053000127 (12)


See also: IR 05000313/2005301

Text

October 25, 2005

Jeffrey S. Forbes

Vice President Operations

Arkansas Nuclear One

Entergy Operations, Inc.

1448 S.R. 333

Russellville, AR 72801-0967

SUBJECT:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 - NRC EXAMINATION

REPORT 05000313/2005301

Dear Mr. Forbes:

On September 15, 2005, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

examination at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The enclosed report documents the examination

findings, which were discussed on September 15, 2005, with Messrs. Brad Berryman, Randal

Martin, and other members of your staff.

The examination included the evaluation of 8 applicants for reactor operator licenses,

1 applicant for an instant senior operator license and 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator

licenses. The written and operating examinations were developed using NUREG-1021,

"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9. The license

examiners determined that 12 of the 13 applicants satisfied the requirements of

10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.

No findings of significance were identified during this examination. However, a licensee-

identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in

Section 40A7 of this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation

consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety

significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If

you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of

this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the

Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza

Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the

Arkansas Nuclear One facility.

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Anthony T. Gody, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-313

License: DPR-51

Enclosure:

NRC Examination Report 05000313/2005301

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/enclosure:

Senior Vice President

& Chief Operating Officer

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Vice President

Operations Support

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations

ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear

Power

12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330

Rockville, MD 20852

County Judge of Pope County

Pope County Courthouse

100 West Main Street

Russellville, AR 72801

Winston & Strawn LLP

1700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006-3817

Entergy Operations, Inc.

-3-

Bernard Bevill

Radiation Control Team Leader

Division of Radiation Control and

Emergency Management

Arkansas Department of Health

4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30

Little Rock, AR 72205-3867

James Mallay

Director, Regulatory Affairs

Framatome ANP

3815 Old Forest Road

Lynchburg, VA 24501

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)

DRP Director (ATH)

DRS Director (DDC)

DRS Deputy Director (KMK)

Senior Resident Inspector (RWD)

Branch Chief, DRP/E (DNG)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (VGG)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)

RITS Coordinator (KEG)

DRS STA (DAP)

J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)

RidsNrrDipmIipb

ANO Site Secretary (VLH)

SISP Review Completed: __Y____ ADAMS: X Yes

G No Initials: __REL____

X Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive

X Non-Sensitive

OE/OB

SOE/OB

OE/OB

OE/OB

C:OB

C:PBE

C:OB

MHaire/lmb

GJohnston

JDrake

KClayton

RELantz

DNGraves ATGody

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

10/25/05

10/4/05

10/4/05

10/13/05

10/12/05

10/13/05

10/25/05

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

Enclosure

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EXAMINATION REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Dockets:

50-313

Licenses:

DPR-51

Report :

05000313/2005301

Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1

Location:

1448 S.R. 333

Russellville, Arkansas

Dates:

September 12-15, 2005

Inspectors:

M. S. Haire, Chief Examiner, Operations Branch

G. W. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer

J. F. Drake, Operations Engineer

K. D. Clayton, Operations Engineer

Approved By:

Anthony T. Gody, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ER 05000313/2005-301; 09/12-15/2005; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Initial Operator

Licensing Examination Report.

NRC examiners evaluated the competency of 8 applicants for reactor operator licenses,

1 applicant for an instant senior operator license and 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator

licenses at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The facility licensee developed the examinations

using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"

Revision 9. The written examination was administered by the facility on September 9, 2005.

NRC examiners administered the operating tests on September 12-15, 2005. The license

examiners determined that 12 of the 13 applicants satisfied the requirements of

10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.

A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B.

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been

reviewed by the examiners. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have

been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and its

corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

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REPORT DETAILS

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA5 Other Activities (Initial Operator License Examination)

1.

License Applications

a.

Scope

The examiners reviewed the applications submitted by the licensee for each of the

license applicants. The applications were submitted on NRC Form 398, Personal

Qualification Statement, and NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Examination by

Facility Licensee. The examiners also audited a sample of the license applications to

confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit

focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control

manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2.

Operator Knowledge and Performance

a.

Examination Scope

On September 9, 2005, the licensee proctored the administration of the written

examinations to all 13 applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations,

analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on September 20, 2005.

The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating

examination to all 13 applicants on September 12-15, 2005. The 8 applicants for

reactor operator licenses participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, in a control

room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 11 system tasks, and an administrative

test consisting of 4 administrative tasks. One of the 8 applicants for a reactor operator

license also participated in a third dynamic simulator scenario. The applicant seeking an

instant senior operator license participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control

room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 10 system tasks, and an administrative

test consisting of 5 administrative tasks. The 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator

licenses participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities

walkthrough test consisting of 5 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of

5 administrative tasks.

b.

Findings

All 13 of the applicants passed all parts of the operating test. One reactor operator

applicant failed the written examination. For the written examinations, the reactor

operator applicants average score was 89.4 percent and ranged from 71.6 to

Enclosure

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97.3 percent, and the senior operator applicants average score was 90.7 percent and

ranged from 82.8 to 93.9 percent. The overall written examination average was

89.9 percent.

Chapter ES-403 and Form ES-403-1 of NUREG-1021 require the licensee to analyze

the validity of any written examination questions that were missed by half or more of the

applicants. The licensee conducted this performance analysis for the six questions that

met this criteria and submitted the analysis to the chief examiner on September 20,

2005. This analysis concluded that three of the questions (2, 82, and 83) were

technically accurate and required no post-examination changes. The licensee

recommended accepting two answers as correct for two of the questions (16 and 94)

and recommended one question (73) be deleted from the examination because of there

being no correct answer among the choices. None of the recommended changes had a

net impact of changing a passing grade to a failure or a failing grade to passing.

The licensees recommendations and the NRC responses follow:

Reactor/Senior Operator Question 16

The licensee recommended that both answers A and C be accepted as correct for

this question. The question asked what action is required during the re-establishment

of SW flow through the DH cooler and why? Answer A says establish SW slowly to

prevent DH cooler water hammer, and C says establish SW slowly to prevent DH

cooler thermal shock. Procedure 1203.028, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, directs that

SW flow to DH cooler be restored slowly out of concern for both water hammer and

thermal shock, which makes both A and C correct.

NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to accept two

answers for Question 16. The procedure is clear that both water hammer and thermal

shock are concerns for restoring cooling in this condition.

Reactor/Senior Operator Question 73

The licensee recommended deletion of this question since a typo in the answer intended

to be correct actually makes the answer incorrect, which leaves no correct answer. The

question asked: During performance of the ESAS procedure with BWST level at 8 ft.,

which of the following actions is performed specifically to reduce plant personnel

exposure? The intended correct answer was C, which said aligning HPI to provide

PZR Aux Spray. However, in order for answer C to have been correct, it would have

had to refer to LPI instead of HPI - HPI was a typographical error that makes the

answer incorrect. Procedure 1202.010, ESAS, step 13 clearly directs aligning

Pressurizer AUX Spray to LPI system. Since there is not a correct answer, the

question should be deleted.

NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to delete

Question 73 since there is no correct answer. The use of HPI in this circumstance is

clearly not correct.

Enclosure

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Senior Operator Question 94

The licensee recommended that both C and D be accepted as correct on this

question. The question gave conditions indicating quadrant power tilt (QPT) was

3 percent above the steady state limit and asked what action was required by Technical Specification 3.2.4. Technical Specification 3.2.4, Required Action A.1.2.2, states that

appropriate trip setpoints should be reduced by >2% RTP from the ALLOWABLE

THERMAL POWER for each 1% of QPT greater than the steady state limit. This

means the required reduction is >6%, which makes both C (reduce applicable RPS

trip setpoints 6%) and D (reduce applicable RPS trip setpoints 8%) correct.

NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to accept two

answers for Question 94. Clearly, if >6% adjustment is directed by the technical

specification, then both C and D are correct.

3.

Initial Licensing Examination Development

a.

Examination Scope

The licensee developed the examinations in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 9.

All licensee facility training and operations staff involved in examination preparation and

validation were on a security agreement. The facility licensee submitted the integrated

examination outlines on May 16, 2005. The chief examiner reviewed the outlines

against the requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the

licensee. The facility licensee submitted the draft examination package on July 14,

2005. The chief examiner reviewed the draft examination package against the

requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the licensee on

the examination on July 29, 2005. The NRC conducted an onsite validation of

the operating examinations and provided further comments during the week of

August 22, 2005. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution on

August 26, 2005.

b.

Findings

The NRC approved the initial examination outline and advised the licensee to proceed

with the operating examination development.

The examiners determined that the written and operating examinations initially

submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed

examination.

No findings of significance were identified.

Enclosure

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4.

Simulation Facility Performance

a.

Examination Scope

The examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during the

examination validation and administration.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

5.

Examination Security

a.

Examination Scope

The examiners reviewed examination security for examination development and during

both the onsite preparation week and examination administration week for compliance

with NUREG-1021 requirements. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were

reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.

b.

Findings

A compromise of the reactor operator written examination occurred during examination

development that resulted in the licensee-identified non-cited violation documented in

section 4OA7 of this report. The compromise occurred when the licensee accidentally

distributed an early draft version of the reactor operator written license examination

during administration of the audit examination. The examination proctor realized the

mistake within minutes of distributing the wrong examination, and quickly collected all

copies of the license examination. Copies of the reactor operator audit examination

were then prepared and distributed. During subsequent investigation, it was determined

that no applicant had worked beyond or gained knowledge of any question beyond

question #3. To ensure a valid examination, the following changes were made to the

reactor operator license examination:

!

Replacement KAs were selected and replacement questions were developed for

questions #1-10.

!

An additional 27 questions were selected among the remainder of the

examination to be replaced or significantly modified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

The chief examiner presented the examination results to Messrs. Brad Berryman,

Unit One Operations Manager, Tom Mayfield, Acting Training Manager, Randal Martin,

Unit One Operations Training Manager, and other members of the licensee's

management staff on September 15, 2005. The licensee acknowledged the findings

presented.

Enclosure

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The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination

as proprietary.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the

licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meet the criteria of Section VI of

the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

!

10 CFR 55.49 prohibits licensees from compromising any portion of a license

examination by engaging in activities that, but for detection, would have affected

the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. Contrary to this,

on August 5, 2005, the licensee mistakenly distributed the actual NRC reactor

operator license examination to the license candidates during the audit

examination administration; the first three questions on the NRC license

examination were compromised before the error was detected and the

examinations collected by the proctor. The licensee documented this

compromise in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2005-01144. This finding is of very

low safety significance because it was detected and the compromised aspects of

the examination were replaced before the actual NRC license examination was

administered.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Attachment

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

Randal Martin, Unit One Operations Training Manager

Robert Byford, Simulator Training Supervisor

Steve Pullin, Examination Author

John Cork, Examination Author

NRC Personnel

R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector