ML052000282

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NRC Bulletin 2003-01 Response to Second NRC Request for Additional Information
ML052000282
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 07/15/2005
From: Scherer A
Southern California Edison Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
BL-03-001
Download: ML052000282 (30)


Text

. ZVU SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA l SEDISONk An EDISON l\\TINRNATION I Collpany A. Edward Sciherer Mlanager of Nuclear Rcgulatory Affairs July 15, 2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 NRC Bulletin 2003-01 Response To Second NRC Request For Additional Information

Reference:

Letter from A. E. Scherer (SCE) to the Document Control Desk (NRC) dated August 1, 2003;

Subject:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, 60-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2003-01, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors"

Dear Sir or Madam:

By the referenced letter, Southern California Edison (SCE) submitted a 60-day response to NRC Bulletin 2003-01, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors."

The NRC staff has requested additional information regarding our submittal in order for the staff to continue its review of the submittal.

The information request was discussed during a telephone call on May 23, 2005, wherein SCE agreed to provide a written response. Enclosed is the SCE response to the request for additional information.

If you have any questions or require any additional information, please contact Mr. Jack Rainsberry at (949) 368-7420.

Sincerely, Enclosure cc:

B. S. Mallett, NRC Region IV, Regional Administrator B. M. Pham, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 C. C. Osterholtz, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 P.O. Box 128 San Clemente. CA 92672 949-368-7501 Fax 949-368-7575

) 0

ENCLOSURE SCE RESPONSE TO SECOND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (SONGS). UNITS 2 AND 3 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY NRC BULLETIN 2003-01 DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362

1.

Please provide a copy of the LOCA Emergency Operating Procedure to allow assessment of the relocation of Step 12B "Containment Spray Termination Criteria" in relation to where it appears in relation to the initiation of sump recirculation.

Response to question number 1:

The following Emergency Operating Instructions are attached:

Attachment A: SO23-12-3, Revision 19; Loss of Coolant Accident Attachment B: S023-12-11, Revision 3; Floating Step FS-14, TERMINATE Containment Spray Operation (page 36 of 274)

The particular step for addressing CEN-152 LOCA step 12B "Containment Spray Termination Criteria" at SONGS is "FS-14, TERMINATE Containment Spray Operation."

As stated in our response dated October 13, 2004 (Reference 3), no action is required to be taken regarding the relocation of step 12B "Containment Spray Termination Criteria".

2.

What is SONGS position on WOG Candidate Operator Action #4 Terminate I LPSI prior to sump recirculation?

Response to question number 2:

The WCAP-1 6204 (Reference 2) evaluation of Candidate Operator Action 4, "Secure One (out of 2) LPSI Pump Before Transfer To Recirculation," resulted in the following recommendation (Appendix A): Preliminary indications show stopping one LPSI pump before recirculation may result in core damage and therefore is not risk beneficial.

SONGS has reviewed our plant specific design features and concurs with the generic WOG recommendation.

Page 1 of 2

REFERENCES

1. Letter from A. E. Scherer (SCE) to the Document Control Desk (NRC) dated August 1, 2003;

Subject:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, 60-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2003-01, 'Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors"

2. WCAP-16204, Revision 1; 'Evaluation of Potential ERG and EPG Changes to Address NRC Bulletin 2003-1 Recommendations (PA-SEE-0085);" March 2004
3. Letter from A. E. Scherer (SCE) to the Document Control Desk (NRC) dated October 13, 2004;

Subject:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, NRC Bulletin 2003-01, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Page 2 of 2

ATTACHMENT A S023-12-3, REVISION 19 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 1 OF 24 COMPLETE REVISION EFFECTIVE DATE JUL 8 2005 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................2 ENTRY CONDITIONS................................

2 EXIT CONDITIONS...

2..........................

OPERATOR ACTIONS.................................

3 FOLDOUT PAGE................................

19 TIME DEPENDENT STEPS................................

20 PLACEKEEPER....................................................................................................................................

.21 FIGURES Figure 1, BREAK IDENTIFICATION CHART................................

18 CONTINUOUS USE RX-AFFECTING GA PROGRAM AFFECTING 72.48 DNA 12-03r19.doc: DHELVIG

)23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 2 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PURPOSE To specify actions required to mitigate the effects of a LOCA to isolate the primary system break OR establish long term core cooling.

ENTRY CONDITIONS 1

The SRO Operations Supervisor has diagnosed LOCA with the aid of:

a. 5023-12-1, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS, Attachment 1, RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC.

OR

b. Break Identification Chart from another optimal Emergency Operating Instruction.

AND

c.

5023-12-1, STANDARD POST TRIPACTIONS, steps 1 through 10 have been completed (Modes 1 and 2)

OR 2

The event initiated from a lower Mode when Shutdown Cooling is NOT initially in service.

EXIT CONDITIONS 1

The diagnosis of LOCA is NOT confirmed.

OR 2

ANY of the Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are NOT satisfied.

OR 3

This procedure has accomplished ALL of the following:

ALL of the Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.

Shutdown Cooling entry conditions are met OR RCS break is isolated.

OR RCS is in long term core cooling The Shift Manager/Operations Leader has designated an alternate procedure.

D23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 3 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1

RECORD EOI entry time:

a. RECORD time of EOI entry 2

VERIFY LOCA Diagnosis:

a. INITIATE S023-12-10, SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECKS.
b.

INITIATE FOLDOUT PAGE.

c.

VERIFY LOCA diagnosis, using Figure 1, BREAK IDENTIFICATION CHART.

c.
1) RE-EVALUATE event per S023-12-1, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS,, RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC
2)

IF re-evaluation identifies another event, NOT Loss of Coolant Accident, THEN GO TO identified EOI.

3)

IF re-evaluation identifies:

a) Loss of Coolant Accident OR b) More than one event, THEN GO TO S023-12-9, FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY.

d.

INITIATE sampling of both Steam Generators for radioactivity and boron.

D23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 4 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3

INITIATE Administrative Actions:

a.

NOTIFY Shift Manager/Operations Leader of S023-12-3, LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT, initiation.

b.

ENSURE Emergency Plan is initiated.

c.

IMPLEMENT PLACEKEEPER.

4 VERIFY ESF Actuation:

a. VERIFY SIAS actuation required:
a. GO TO step 7.
1) PZR pressure less than SIAS Setpoint OR
2) Containment pressure greater than 3.4 PSIG.
b.

ENSURE the following - actuated:

SIAS CCAS CRIS.

c.

RECORD time of SIAS

d. STOP unloaded Diesel Generators.
e. INITIATE S023-12-11, Attachment 22, NON-QUALIFIED LOAD RESTORATION.
023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 5 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 5

ESTABLISH Optimum Si Alignment:

a.

ESTABLISH two train operation:

1) All available Charging Pumps operating.
2) One HPSI and one LPSI per train operating.
3)

All Cold Leg flow paths - aligned.

4)

VERIFY SI flow required:

a.

REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader to direct plant resources to establish the following support systems for non-operating/

unavailable equipment:

1) Electrical power to pumps and valves.
2)

Proper system alignment.

3) CCW flow.

4)

HVAC.

Si flow -

indicated OR RCS pressure greater than 1250 PSIA.

OR

b. VERIFY FS-7, VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria -

satisfied.

6 VERIFY PZR pressure:

a. VERIFY RCP NPSH requirements of S023-12-11, Attachment 29, POST-ACCIDENT PRESSURE /

TEMPERATURE LIMITS satisfied.

a. STOP all RCPs.

AND INITIATE FS-3, MONITOR Natural Circulation Established 7

IMPLEMENT Floating Steps:

a. INITIATE applicable actions of S023-12-1 1, Attachment 2, FLOATING STEPS.

)23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 6 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8

INITIATE Leak Isolation:

a.

VERIFY Letdown - isolated.

b.

VERIFY:

1) Outside Containment Radiation alarms NOT alarming or trending to alarm.
2)

Outside Containment Sump levels NOT abnormally rising.

a. EVALUATE need for Letdown Isolation.
b.

ENSURE SIAS -

actuated AND REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader:

1) EVALUATE possible LOCA outside Containment
2)

INITIATE FS-20, MONITOR RWST Level

3)

EVALUATE CIAS actuation.

c.

ENSURE all RCS Sample valves closed.

d.

ENSURE PZR and Reactor Vessel Head Vents - closed.

e. VERIFY:
1) CCW radiation alarm NOT alarming.
2)

CCW Surge Tank level NOT rising.

e.
1) ENSURE all RCPs - stopped.
2) CLOSE RCP CCW Seal Heat Exchanger Return valves:

TV-91 44 TV-91 54 TV-91 64 TV-91 74.

3) ENSURE CCW NCL Supply and Return Isolation valves - closed.
023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 7 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8

INITIATE Leak Isolation: (Continued)

f.

VERIFY PZR Safety valves -

closed.

1. 1) REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluate lowering PZR pressure to aid in resetting the Safety valves.
2)

IF SIAS NOT actuated, THEN MAINTAIN PZR pressure greater than SIAS setpoint.

3)

MAINTAIN Core Exit Saturation Margin greater than or equal to 200F.

9 CONFIRM Leak Isolation:

a. VERIFY rate of RCS inventory and pressure loss less than available Charging Pump capacity.
a. GO TO step 15.

10 ESTABLISH RCS Inventory and Pressure Control:

a.

INITIATE indicated actions for available control methods of S023-12-11,, CORE EXIT SATURATION MARGIN CONTROL.

b.

VERIFY RCS pressure

b.

GO TO step 15.

stable or rising AND controlled.

023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 8 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 11 ESTABLISH RCS Heat Removal Control:

a. VERIFY SBCS available:
1) Condenser Backpressure less than SBCS Interlock Setpoint.
a. OVERRIDE (as required) and OPERATE ADVs.

AND

2)

MSIVs - open.

b. VERIFY MFW available:
1) MAINTAIN S/G levels between 40% NR and 80% NR.
b.

OPERATE AFW to establish at least one S/G level - between 40% NR and 80% NR.

12 ESTABLISH Optimal Containment Atmosphere Conditions:

a. INITIATE FS-12, MONITOR Containment Pressure.
b. INITIATE FS-14, TERMINATE Containment Spray Operation.
c.

VERIFY Containment Area Radiation Monitors NOT alarming or trending to alarm.

c.
1) ENSURE SIAS - actuated.
2)

REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader to evaluate CIAS Actuation.

3)

GO TO step 15.

,023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 9 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 13 VERIFY Impacted Safety Function status:

a. VERIFY RCS Inventory Control:
1) PZR level between 10% and 70%.
2)

Charging and Letdown or SI available to maintain PZR level.

3) Core Exit Saturation Margin greater than or equal to 200F:

QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311.

4)

Reactor Vessel level greater than or equal to 100%

(Plenum):

QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312 S023-12-11, Attachment 4.

b. VERIFY RCS Pressure Control:
1) Core Exit Saturation Margin between 200F and 160*F:

QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311.

c.

VERIFY Containment Isolation:

1) Containment pressure less than 3.4 PSIG o

GO TO step 15.

OR

2)

CIAS actuated automatically or manually.

3023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 10 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 13 VERIFY Impacted Safety Function status:

(Continued)

d.

VERIFY Containment Pressure and Temperature Control:

a GOTOstep15.

1) Containment average temperature less than 205'F.
2)

Containment pressure less than 14 PSIG.

3)

All containment spray flow stopped.

14 VERIFY desired plant status:

a. OBTAIN approval from Shift Manager!

Operations Leader to maintain Hot Standby conditions.

b.

GO TO S023-5-1.3. 1, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD.

a.

GOTO 5023-5-1.5, PLANTSHUTDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN.

023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 11 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 INITIATE RCS Cooldown:

NOTE Cooldown should be initiated as soon as possible to aid in:

1) Maintaining adequate subcooled margin reducing the potential for fuel clad failure and radioactive release to the environment,
2)

Conserving condensate inventory, and

3)

Providing plant conditions to support repair work for restoring optimal safety function success paths.

a.

REQUEST the Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluate/approve further RCS cooldown/pressure reduction.

b.

INITIATE S023-12-11, Attachment 3, COOLDOWN / DEPRESSURIZATION, as directed by the Shift Manager/

Operations Leader.

16 INITIATE S/G Blowdown:

NOTE The inventory requirements of Condensate Storage Tanks T-120 and T-121 DO NOT take S/G blowdown into account.

a. VERIFY one or more Demineralized
a. 1) ENSURE S/G blowdown - isolated.

Water Storage Tank(s) - available:

2)

INITIATE S023-12-11, Attachment 16, T-266 DETERMINE TIME UNTIL SHUTDOWN T-267 COOLING REQUIRED.

T-268.

3)

GO TO step 17.

b. ESTABLISH S/G blowdown as required for Chemistry Control.

)23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 12 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 17 ESTABLISH Containment Combustible Gas Control:

a. ENSURE at least one Containment Dome Air Circulating Fan - operating.
b.

INITIATE Hydrogen Monitor post accident calibration per S023-3-2.28, CONTAINMENT COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM section on Post Accident Hydrogen Monitoring.

18 VERIFY Containment Radiation Levels:

a.

VERIFY Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor readings less than 40 R/HR.

a.
1) ENSURE SIAS - actuated.
2)

REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader to evaluate:

a) CIAS actuation b)

CSAS actuation for iodine removal.

19 VERIFY Hot/Cold Leg Injection Conditions:

CAUTION IF Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Injection is required, THEN Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Injection must be initiated within 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from SIAS actuation.

a.

VERIFY SDC Operation expected within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from SIAS actuation.

a. INITIATE S023-12-11, Attachment 11, SIMULTANEOUS HOT / COLD LEG INJECTION.

023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 13 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 20 ESTABLISH SDC Entry Conditions:

a.

VERIFY Reactor Vessel level greater than or equal to 82% (Plenum):

a. GO TO step e.

QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312 S023-12-11, Attachment 4.

b. ESTABLISH RCS TN -

less than 3750F.

b.

IF only one ADV - available, THEN ESTABLISH RCS TH less than 3850F based on the average of at least two indications.

c.

STABILIZE lowest RCS Te greater than 2600F.

c.

REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader to evaluate placing LTOP in service.

d.

GO TO step f.

e. ESTABLISH REP CET

- less than 375*F

e.

IF only one ADV - available, THEN ESTABLISH REP CET -

less than 3850F.

f.

ESTABLISH PZR pressure less than 340 PSIA (LR).

g. VERIFY Containment pressure less than 3 PSIG.
g. 1) CALCULATE Required PZR pressure:

SDC entry Containment Pressure Required PZR Pressure =

340 PSIA PSIG PSIA

2)

ESTABLISH PZR pressure (LR) less than Required PZR pressure.

023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 14 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 21 RESET ESFAS:

a.

VERIFY MSIS - NOT actuated.

b.

VERIFY any EFAS - actuated.

a.

RESET MSIS per S023-3-2.22, ESFAS OPERATION.

b. GOTOstepg.
c.

ENSURE SIG levels greater than 26% NR.

d.

RESET EFAS per S023-3-2.22, ESFAS OPERATION.

e. ENSURE feedwater flow to available S/G(s).
f.

ENSURE DC powered AFW to S/G Isolation valves NOT required to maintain SIG levels - closed:

E-088 E-089 HV-4730 HV-471 5.

g. OPERATE AFW or MFW to maintain SIG levels - between 40% NR and 80% NR.
h.

INITIATE S023-3-2.22, ESFAS OPERATION, to reset signals and realign plant systems.

023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 15 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 22 VERIFY SDC Entry Conditions:

NOTE During a Natural Circulation Cooldown, voiding in the Reactor Vessel Head is expected to occur when depressurizing to go on SDC. The strategy is to collapse the void when plenum level is less than 100% and RAS is NOT in service.

a.

VERIFY RAS - NOT actuated.

a.
1) IF Reactor Vessel level greater than or equal to 61% (Plenum):

QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312 S023-12-11, Attachment 4.

THEN GO TO step 22e.

OR

2)

IF Reactor Vessel level less than 61% (Plenum):

QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312 THEN REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluate for alternate procedure.

AND GO TO step 20.

b.

VERIFY Reactor Vessel level greater than or equal to 100%

(Plenum):

QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312 S023-12-11, Attachment 4.

b.
1) INITIATE FS-10, ELIMINATE Voids.
2)

REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluate for alternate procedure.

3)

GO TO step 20.

3023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 16 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 22 VERIFY SDC Entry Conditions: (Continued)

c.

VERIFY RCS TH -

less than 3750F.

c.

IF one ADV -

available THEN ESTABLISH RCS TH less than 3850F based on the average of at least two indications.

d.

GO TO step f.

e. VERIFY REP CET

- less than 3750F

e.

IF only one ADV - available, THEN VERIFY REP CET -

less than 3850F.

f.

VERIFY Containment pressure less than 3 PSIG.

f.

CALCULATE Required PZR pressure for SDC entry:

SDC entry =

340 PSIA Containment Pressure PSIG Required PZR Pressure =

PSIA

)23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 17 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 22 VERIFY SDC Entry Conditions: (Continued)

g. VERIFY:
1) PZR pressure less than 340 PSIA (low range).
g. 1) REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluate for alternate procedure.
2)

GO TO step 20.

OR less than Required PZR pressure from 22f. RNO.

2)

Core Exit Saturation Margin greater than or equal to 200F:

QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311.

3) Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluated RCS activity within appropriate limits.
4)

S023-12-11, Attachment 3, COOLDOWN/DEPRESSURIZATION steps -

complete.

23 INITIATE SDC OPERATION:

a. ENSURE Hot Leg Injection valves closed:

HV-9420 HV-9434.

b.

INITIATE S023-3-2.22, ESFAS OPERATIONto reset signals and realign plant systems as desired.

c.

GO TO S023-5-1.5, PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN, section on Establish SDC System Operation.

END -

023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 18 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT Figure 1, BREAK IDENTIFICATION CHART YES NO (1)

YES NO YES NO C

NOTES:

(1) MAY LOWER SLIGHTLY AFTER TRIP (2)

MAY BE SLOW IN THE CASE OF SMALL BREAK LOCA IN CONTAINMENT D23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 20 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT TIME DEPENDENT STEPS UNIT DATE Time of entry into LOCA Time of SIAS initiation Time of LOOP TIME DEPEI FS-23 STEP 4DENT STEPS INITIATED 45 minutes from Loss of Offsite Power................................ El D5 loads need to be reduced within 45 minutes.

D6 loads need to be reduced as soon as possible if loss of power is expected to extend past 90 minutes.

D7 load is reduced after the Main Generator shaft has come to rest if loss of power is expected to extend past 120 minutes.

STEP COMPLETED EL FS-24 FS-25 FS-27 11/2 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1rom SIAS Initiation........................................

Transfer Charging Pump suction.

2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from SIAS Initiation............................................ El Hot/Cold Leg Injection Conditions.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> from SIAS Initiation..................................................E. l Dose analysis of Control Room.

El TIME DEPENDENT STEPS PAGE 1 OF 1 3023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 21 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PLACEKEEPER STEP REFERENCE PAGE 1

Time of EOI entry Is recorded........................................................

Page 3 2

LOCA Diagnosis confirmed..............................................

Page 3 3 S023-12-10, SFSC initiated

[

FOLDOUT PAGE initiated

[

Figure 1, BREAK IDENTIFICATION CHART verified

[ S/G sampling for radioactivity initiated 3

Administrative Actions Initiated..............................................

Page 4

(

SM/OL notified of LOCA

[ ] Emergency Plan initiated 4

ESF Actuation verified....................................................................

Page 4

[

SIAS actuation criteria verified

[

SIAS, CCAS and CRIS actuated as needed

[ 3 Stop unloaded Diesel Generators.

3 S023-12-11, Attachment 22, NON-QUALIFIED LOAD RESTORATION initiated 5

Optimum Si Alignment established..............................................

Page 5

(

All available Charging Pumps operating,

[

One HPSI and one LPSI per train operating,

[ ] All Cold Leg flow paths aligned

] One of the following:

[ ] SlIlow OR

[ ] RCS pressure greater than 1250 PSIA OR SI Throttle/Stop criteria verified per FS-7, VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria.

6 Pressurizer Pressure verified..............................................

Page 5

[

VERIFY RCP NPSH per S023-12-11, Attachment 29, POST-ACCIDENT PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS met OR

[ ] ALL RCPs are stopped.

7 Floating Steps.........

Page 5

[

S023-12-11, Attachment 2, FLOATING STEPS initiated PLACEKEEPER PAGE 1 OF 4 023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 22 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PLACEKEEPER STEP REFERENCE PAGE 8

Leak Isolation initiated...................................................................

Page 6

[ ] Letdown isolated

[ ] Outside Containment radiation monitors and sumps

[ ] All RCS Sample valves closed

[ ] PZR and Reactor Vessel Head Vents closed

[

CCW radiation monitors and surge tank level

[ ] PZR Safety valves closed 9

Leak Isolation confirmed (1).............................................

Page 7

[ ] Leakage less than available Charging Pump capacity 10 RCS Inventory and Pressure Control established (1)................ Page 7

[

S023-12-11, Attachment 5, CORE EXIT SATURATION MARGIN CONTROL initiated

[

RCS pressure (stable or rising) and (controlled) 11 RCS Heat Removal Control established.......................................

Page 8

[ ] SBCS or ADVs available

[

MFW or AFW available to maintain S/G level 12 Optimal Containment Atmosphere established (1)....................

Page 8

[

FS-12, MONITOR Containment Pressure initiated

[] FS-1 4, TERMINATE Containment Spray Operation initiated

[

CONTAINMENT Area and Airborne Radiation Monitors 13 Impacted Safety Function status verified (1)..............................

Page 9

[

RCS Inventory Control

[ ] RCS Pressure Control

[

Containment Isolation

[ ] Containment Pressure and Temperature Control 14 Desired plant status verified (LOCA condition Isolated)...........

Page 10

[

ESFAS reset initiated (S023-3-2.22 ESFAS OPERATION)

[] SM/OL approval to GO TO (check one):

O S023-5-1.3.1 PLANT STARTUP FROM HSB TO MIN LOAD O

S023-5-1.5 PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HSB TO CSD 15 RCS Cooldown Initiated (LOCA condition not isolated)...........

Page 11

[ ] SMIOL approval for RCS cooldown

[] S023-12-11, Attachment 3, COOLDOWN /

DEPRESSURIZATION initiated 16 SIG Blowdown Initiated as needed...............................................

Page 11 1

RNO includes GO TO Step 15. This bypasses subsequent steps up to Step 15.

PLACEKEEPER PAGE 2 OF 4

)23-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 19 PAGE 23 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PLACEKEEPER STEP REFERENCE PAGE 17 Containment Combustible Gas Control established.................. Page 12

[

At least one Containment Dome Air Circ fan operating

[ ] Hydrogen Monitor post accident calibration initiated.

18 Containment Radiation Levels verified........................................

Page 12

[

CONTAINMENT High Range radiation levels less than 40R/HR

[] SIAS if CONTAINMENT radiation levels greater than 40R/HR

[

CIAS and CSAS if approved by SM/OL 19 Hot/Cold Leg Injection Conditions verified..................................

Page 12

[ ] SDC Operation expected within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from SIAS S0]

523-12-11, Attachment 11, SIMULTANEOUS HOT / COLD LEG INJECTION if SDC not expected prior to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from SIAS 20 SDC Entry Conditions established...............................................

Page 13

[ ] Reactor Vessel level greater than or equal to 82% (Plenum)

[

Temperature requirements established o TH less than 3750F o Lowest Tc greater than 2600F OR O

REP CET less than 3750F (if plenum level less than 82%)

[] PZR pressure less than 340 PSIA (low range)

[ ] Adjust PZR pressure for Containment pressure 21 ESFAS reset.....................................................................................

Page 14

[

MSIS reset (if actuated)

[

EFAS reset PLACEKEEPER PAGE 3 OF 4 023-12-3

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 REVISION 19 PAGE 24 OF 24 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PLACEKEEPER STEP REFERENCE PAGE 22 SDC Entry Conditions verified.......................................................

Reactor Vessel level established o greater than or equal to 100% (Plenum)

OR o greater than 61% if RAS in service.

Temperature requirements established o

TH less than 3750F o Lowest Tc greater than 2600F OR O

REP CET less than 3750F (it plenum level less than 82%)

PZR pressure (adjusted for Containment pressure) less than 340 PSIA (LR)

Core Exit Saturation Margin greater or equal to than 200F RCS activity within appropriate limits S023-12-11, Attachment 3, COOLDOWNI DEPRESSURIZATION complete.

Page 15 23 SDC Operation Initiated...............................................

Page 17

( ] Hot Leg Injection valves closed

( ] ESFAS reset initiated (S023-3-2.22 ESFAS OPERATION)

( ] GO TO S023-5-1.5 PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HSB TO CSD END -

PLACEKEEPER PAGE4OF4

)23-12-3

ATTACHMENT B S023-12-11, REVISION 3 FLOATING STEP 14 TERMINATE CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATION (PAGE 36 OF 274)

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-11 ISS2 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 3 PAGE 36 OF 274 ATTACHMENT 2 E0I SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS FLOATING STEPS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED FS-14 TERMINATE Containment Spray Operation Applicability:

0 12-3, 0 12-5, 0 12-9

a. VERIFY Containment pressure
a.
1) ENSURECSAS -

actuated.

less than 14 PSIG

2)

CLOSE CCW to/from Letdown Heat Exchanger valves:

AND Train A Train B stable or lowering.

HV-6293B/A HV-6522B/A

b.

VERIFY at least two Containment Emergency Cooling Units - operating.

Train A Train B E-399 E-400 E-401 E-402

c.

REQUEST Shift Manager/ Operations Leader to evaluate Containment Spray NOT required for:

1) Containment Iodine removal.
2)

Decay heat removal post-RAS.

d.

OVERRIDE and STOP Containment Spray Pumps, one train at a time.

e. OVERRIDE and CLOSE Containment Spray Pump Discharge valves, one train at a time:

Train A Train B HV-9367 HV-9368

f.

RESET CSAS per S023-3-2.22, ESFAS OPERATION.

3) GO TO next applicable floating step.
b.
1) ENSURECSAS - actuated.
2) CLOSE CCW to/from Letdown Heat Exchanger valves:

Train A Train B HV-6293B/A HV-6522B/A

3) GO TO next applicable floating step.
c.

GO TO next applicable floating step.

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 33 OF 82 S02 3-12-11