Text

Final - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 3)
	ML051890107
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	03/24/2005
From:	Mccall K; AmerGen Energy Co
To:	D'Antonio J; Operations Branch I
	Conte R
References
	Download: ML051890107 (62)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 1

Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

1 OpTestNo.:

NRC RCOGA I CRS Pressurizer temperature instrument failure (high).

Resulting in level failure I URo Examiners:

Operators:

2 3

Initial Conditions:

0 80% power, MOC CHOl B MU19D C CRS RCP Seal #I failure.

TS CRS C URO AH-E-1 B RB Air Handling Unit Trip. (TS) 0 AH-E-1A is tagged out of service.

7 8

0 CRD Aux Programmer out of service for maintenance TH04A M CRS Large Break LOCA.

DHOl B C CRS LPI Pump failure.

M URO C URO Turnover:

Continue 80% power operation.

Critical Tasks:

Cross Tie LPI Loops and balance LPI flows Trip RCPs within 1 minute following loss of subcooling Event Malf.

Event No.

Event Description Manual reactor power reduction due to ICs-CRDS interface IRD1OC INCRS I problem.

4A I

I R, URO I Manual reactor power reduction due to ICs-CRDS interface problem 5

I RF DH32 I TS CRS I BWST Low Level Alarm Condition (TS) 50 gpm RCS leak (TS) requires plant shutdown I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 THREE MILE ISLAND MAY 2005 NRC EXAM The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 80% and ICs in Full Automatic.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, initiate the Pressurizer temperature instrument failure. The crew should respond to alarm G-2-5, PZR LEVEL HVLO, and 1202-29, Pressurizer System Failure, transferring Pressurizer level control to manual, selecting valid instrumentation for automatic control, and then returning level control to automatic. An EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the pressurizer temperature selector pushbutton, but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

After the failed Pressurizer temperature instrument is declared inoperable, and an Equipment Deficiency Tag is applied, the Lead Evaluator can cue the RB Cooling Fan failure. The crew should respond to alarms B-2-5,480V ES MOTOR OVERLOAD, and 8-14, 480V ES Motor TRIP. Since there is no standby air handling unit to start, the SRO should evaluate for Technical Specification compliance (7-day TS time clock.) An EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the AH-E-1 B control switch, but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

After the SRO has declared the 7-day TS time clock, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of the RCP Seal failure.

Seal leakoff rate will be set to exceed 1203-16 entry conditions (> 6 GPM), but negate the (>8 GPM) requirement to trip the reactor if power is reduced to less than the required limit within 5 minutes. Based on these conditions 1203-16 will require the crew to reduce power to less than 75%, shutdown the affected pump using OP-TM-226-154, SHUTDOWN RC-P-1 D, and isolate seal #1 leak-off. During the power reduction the CRD system will fail to respond to automatic insert signals. Operators should take MANUAL control of the Diamond Rod Control Panel and additional ICs controls to effect the power reduction in accordance with requirements of OP-TM-621-471, ICs MANUAL CONTROL.

On cue from the Lead evaluator following the power reduction and RCP seal isolation, the Borated Water Storage tank (BWST) level will be reduced to activate MAP E-3-4, BWST TEMPlLVL HllLO. The crew should confirm the validity of the low level alarm using redundant control room and plant computer indications, and perform the actions described in the alarm response procedure for MAP E-3-4. The SRO should determine that conditions do not satisfy T.S. 3.3.1.I.a. If BWST level is not restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , T.S. 3.0.1 requires initiation of plant shutdown and the plant must be placed in HOT STANDBY within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . If BWST is still not restored, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Makeup to the BWST is not required to proceed with the scenario.

N.

Shortly after BWST level reduction the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the 50 gpm RCS leak. The SRO is required to recognize the (TS 3.1.6.1) I gpm unidentified and the (TS 3.1.6.2) 10 gpm total RCS leakage limits are exceeded, and announce requirements to place the reactor in hot shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The SRO should announce the more restrictive time limits to initiate plant shutdown with 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and reach HOT STANDBY within the time limits of T.S. 3.0.1.

After the leakage tech spec evaluation, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of the large break LOCA with delayed trip of one LPI Pump. The crew should enter OP-TM-EOP-001, REACTOR TRIP, perform the immediate manual actions and recognize loss of RCS subcooled margin. Actions of RULE I should be completed, followed by transitions to OP-TM-EOP-002, LOSS OF SUBCOOLED MARGIN, and then to OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA COOLDOWN. Among other actions the team will perform the following high level activities: trip all operating RCPs, verify HPI actuation and EFW actuations, raise OTSG levels to 75-85%, cross-tie Train A and Train B LPI systems and balance LPI flows between the two systems in response to trip of DH-P-1A after the ES actuation.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Simulator Scenario #I Event Procedure Support Description Pressurizer temperature instrument failure (high).

1 OP-TM-MAP-G0205, Pzr level Hi/Lo./OP-TM Map-GO105 1202-29, Pressurizer System Failure.

TS 3.5.5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.

2 AH-E-1 B RB Air Handling Unit Trip (TS)

MAP B-1-5, 480V ES Motor Trip.

TS 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.

1203-1 6, RCP #1 Failures. F-I -3/F-1-6 Maps in.

3 RCP Seal #1 failure.

OP-TM-226-154, Shutdown RC-P-1 D.

4 Manual reactor power reduction due to ICS-CRDS interface problem.

OP-TM-621-417, ICs Manual Control.

OP-TM-622-471, Manual Control Rod Operations.

MAP E-3-4, BWST Temp/Lvl Hi/Lo.

TS 3.3.

5 BWST Level Low Condition.

6 50 gpm RCS leak (TS) requires plan1 shutdown.

TS 3.1.6, Leakage.

1102-4, Power Operations.

OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin.

Large Break LOCA.

OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown OP-TM-EOP-01 0, Emergency procedure Rules, Guides and Graphs.

LPI Pump failure.

OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 3, LPI Failure.

NRC Scenario 1 Setup Page I

Initialization IC-I6 Console Right AH-E-1A PTL INFO Tag Diamond Control Panel Remote Functional CHRO5 Malfunction RCO6A Malfunction CHOI B Malfunction MU-I 9D Malfunction RDIOC Remote Function DH32 Malfunction TH03A

/

Malfunction TH04A Malfunction DHOI B 80% Power MOC AH-E-1A Tagged 00s AH-E-1A Tagged 00s Breaker OPEN INFO Tag stating Aux Programmer 00s for maintenance Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

OUT IMMEDIATELY Insert Event 1 Insert Event 2 Insert Event 3 Insert Event 4 Insert Event 5 Insert Event 6 Insert Event 7 Insert Event 8 SEV. - 99.8%

RAMP 10 Sec SEV. - 9%

RAMP 120 sec.

SEV. 93%

SEV. 30%

RAMP 360 sec.

SEV. 4.75%

RAMP 300 sec XENON Equilibrium MOL Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Pressurizer Temp INST FAILS HIGH AH-E-I B R. B. Air Handling Unit Trip RC-P Seal # I FAILURE ICs - CRD Interface Problem BWST Low Level Alarm Condition

= 50 gpm RCS Leak Requires Plant Shutdown Large Break LOCA LPI Pump Failure

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS URO Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

1 I

Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-G0205.

OBSERVE:

I 1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Temperature Instrument Failure (High)

CRS URO URO

~

L Time 1

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1

END Of OP-TM-MAP-GO205 Direct entry into OP-TM-MAP-GO105 INITIATE Guide 9 to control Pressurizer level.

OBSERVE:

PZRLevel 1 FLOOR OPERATOR:

~ Whenbirected by the Lead Examiner, enter Event 1.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

When OP-TM-MAP-GO105 and OP-TM-MAP-GO205 actuate, CRS can REVIEW the associated procedures or go directly to 1202-29.

~~

1-Pressurizer level recorder RC-1 LR I

MU-V-17 position indication RC-LI-777A IF PZR level indication is valid, then PERFORM the I

URo I following:

PLACE MU-V-17 in Hand and control PZR level.

I I

PLACE MU-V-17 in AUTO.

SELECT a valid level signal.

I I

I 0 MU-V-17 Position MU-Flow

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Temperature Instrument Failure (High)

Time j

Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior 1

Scenario #

1 Event#

1 Page s of 19 I I OpTestNo.: -

URO VERIFY Hi-Hi Level as follows:

URO I

I I

0 PLACE MU-V-17 in hand IAW OP-TM-211-472.

MAINTAIN Pressurizer level as required (RC-LI-777A / RC1-LR) using toggle switch.

If indication fails high:

0 SELECT other PZR Level Instruments (this checks for instrument problems).

I I

I End of MAP GO1 05.

I I

CRS I Direct entry into 1202-29 I

1 URO I MONITOR the following:

I I

I 0 Pressurizer level (RC-LI-777NRCl -LR) (CC).

0 0

Makeup Flow (MU24A-FI) (CC).

RCS Pressure (RC3-PR (CC) / RC-PI-949A (PCL).

/

PLACE MU-V-17 (CC) in HAND by pressing White HAND PB I

URo I and PERFORM the following:

~

~~

1 VERIFY White HAND light is Liton (CC).

TAKE MU-V-17 under hand control AND ADJUST makeup flow to equal letdown flow minus seal injection to maintain makeup tank as constant as possible.

I I

1 0 SELECT alternate pressurizer level transmitter.

I I

I SELECT alternate pressurizer temperature transmitter.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

1 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Temperature Instrument Failure (High)

Review TS for applicability:

I Time I

Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Pressurizer Level I 2

1 MINIMUM NUMBER OF CHANNELS NUMBER OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTS I

1 CRS I Have URO attach EDT Tag to FAILED lnst 1 When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to Event 2

Appendix D Operator Act ion Form ES-D-2 cenario #

1 Event#

2 Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

AH-E-1B RB Air Handling Unit Trip FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, enter Event 2.

CREW URO CRS 1 Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-BO105.

Should review response to alarm.

Observation (Control Room):

Tripped fan disagreement light (amberlgreen).

Review TS for Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System for applicability:

CRS 1

I The following components must be OPERABLE:

Two reactor building emergency cooling fans and associated cooling units (one in each train). Specification 3.0.1 applies.

Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any component(s) in the RB emergency cooling water, systems which will not remove more than one train from service.

One reactor building cooling fan and associated cooling unit shall be permitted to be out-of-service for seven days.

CRS I Declare 7-Day Time Clock per T.S. 3.3.3.

CRS 1 Instruct Crew to apply EDT Tag to AH-E-1 B.

1 When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to Event 3.

CRS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

3 Event

Description:

RCP Seal #I Failure FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, enter Event 3.

Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-F0103.

CRS IAAT Seal Number 1 Leak-Off Flow (SLO) is > 6 gpm, then GO 1

CRS 1 TO 1203-16, RC Pump Seal Failures.

Direct entry to OP-TM-FO106.

CRS I

RC-18-DPI-1/2/4 (CC)

Manual Actions Required:

Observe the following:

I MU-42-FI (CG, Seaijectiozlow I

MU-24-FI (CC), RCS Makeup Flow I

Seal Number 1 Leak-Off Flow (SLO)

I Direct entry to 1203-16.

RAISE Seal injection flow, as necessary to attempt to maintain lab seal DP positive on each RC pump. Adjust SI Flow H/A station setpoint or place MU-V-32 in manual. IF lab seal DP indication is not available, then maximize seal injection flow.

Do not exceed 60 GPM.

I URO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 PLACE at least one each of the following in Normal-After-Start:

0 RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP (CC), or RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP (CC)

RC-P-3D-1 or RC-P-3D2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 (CC) 0 Page liL Of 19-1 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

3 URO URO Event

Description:

RCP Seal #1 Failure Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior When the affected RC Pump stops rotating CLOSE MU-V-33D.

Place RC-P-3D-2 and RC-P-3D-1 in Pull-To-Lock.

REDUCE reactor power IAW 11 024 to within the appropriate limit based on shutdown of the affected RC pump.

CRSURo 0

For 3 RC pumps operating, reactor power must be less I

than 75%.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Direct the Floor Operator to insert Event 4 prior to the power reduction. Event 4 actions are on page 12.

I CRS 1 INITIATE OP-TM-226-154 to shutdown the affected RC pump.

VERIFY Reactor Power < the following for the final RCP I

CRS 1 Combination:

I I 0 2 I 1 RCP Combination - 75% NI Power VERIFY Turbine Load c the following for the final RCP I

CRS I Com bination:

I 1 0 2 / 1 RCP Combination - 665 MWE I

URO I PLACE RC-P-ID in Pull-To-Lock.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

1 Event#

3 Event

Description:

1-RCP Seal #1 Failure I

1 URO I Place RC-P-2D-2 and RCP-2Dl in Pull-To-Lock.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

1 Event#

4 Event

Description:

L Manual Reactor Power Reduction Due to ICs-CRDS interface Problem FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, enter Event 4.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Event 4 should be entered immediately prior to the power reduction to run in tandem with Event 3.

CRS Directs entry to OP-TM-621-471.

URO ENSURE ULD in HAND.

URO I PLACE SGIREACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

URO 1 VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICs in Track actuated.

ARO I PLACE SG NB LOAD RATIO AT^) station in HAND.

ARO I PLACE SG A FW DEMAND station in HAND ARO I PLACE SG B FW DEMAND station in HAND.

I URO I PRESS AUTO/MAN pushbutton on Diamond Panel.

I I)

VERIFY MAN lamp Lit I

1

~

URO PLACE REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Slow crew response time may result in meeting entry conditions for OP-TM-AOP-070.

When Event 3-4 actions are complete, the Lead Examiner, can cue Event 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

5 Page 13 of 19 Event

Description:

BWST Low Level Alarm Condition (TS)

Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior

~ _ _ _ _

I FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event5 lndicationslcues available:

BWST TEMP/LVL HVLO alarm F

t--

CRS I Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-E0304 URO I If level is LO:

0 Dispatch A 0 to check drain to tank is closed and check for leaks.

I 0 Makeup to tank to maintain level (refer to 1104-29C).

0 Check console indication and ES Panel to verify DH-V-GNB are closed. If either indicate open: Immediately close DH-V-5A or 58, and close DH-V-6A and B.

CRS I Review for applicability T.S. 3.3.1.1.a.

If the BWST volume is not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE within one hour. Specification 3.0. I applies.

I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to Event 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

6 Page 14 of 19 1 I FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator, initiate Event 6.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Crew may elect to place RB Emergency Cooling in service or to initiate a manual reactor trip.

CREW CRS CRS Leakage - If time allows perform OS-24, Leak Rate.

If any reactor coolant leakage exists through a nonisolable fault in an RCS strength boundary (such as the reactor vessel, piping, valve body, etc., except the steam generator tubes), the reactor shall be shutdown, and a cooldown to the cold shutdown condition shall be initiated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of detection. (T.S. 3.1.6.1 and T.S. 3.1.6.2)

Direct Crew to initiate Plant S/D IAW 11024.

When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to Events 7 and

8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

LPI Pump Failure FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator, enter Event 7.

I CRS Directs entry to OP-TM-EOP-001.

URO TRIP the Reactor by depressing the Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

VERIFY the reactor is shutdown.

~

URO URO TRIP the Turbine.

1 URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

I IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately treat the symptom using the following priority:

CRS/URO SCM C 25°F GO TO OP-TM-EOP-002.

I CRS Direct transition to OP-TM-EOP-002.

I PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.

I URO URO URO IAAT SCM c 25°F and reactor is shutdown, then perform Rule 1 OP-TM-EOP-010

1. VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

Critical Task URO

2. ENSURE RCPs are shutdown (stops RC-P-lA, 1 B, IC).

URO

3. ENSURE 1600 # ESAS has been actuated.

I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

\\

Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

718 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

LPI Pump Failure Time 1

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO/ARO

5. VERIFY all HPI and LPI components are in the ES condition.

URO

4. ENSURE EFW has actuated.

~

~~

~

6. Initiate Guide 15 and Feed available OTSG's to 75% to 85% operating range level.

I ARo I CRS

/

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation I

CRS I over the plant page and radio.

REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

1 CRS I ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

IAAT RCS pressure 185 psig and LPI flow > 1250 GPM, then I

CRS I GO TO OP-TM-EOP-006.

VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A0517).

I CRS/URO I INITIATE Attachment 1, Isolation of Possible Sources of Leakage.

I CRS/URO 1 I CRS/URO I VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

I CRS I VERIFY one of the following exists:

0 SCM>25"F Two (2) HPI trains in ES operation 0

lncore temperature stable or reducing.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

LPI Pump Failure URO URo CRS/URO k ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated per RULE 2.

IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all ES components have actuated.

1 CRS I

I 1 EXAMINER'S NOTE:

IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, "Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations".

IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO OP-TM-EOP-008.

IF primary-to-secondary heat transfer is excessive, then GO TO OP-TM-EOP-003.

VERIFY cooldown rate > 40"F/hr or primary-to-secondary heat transfer exists.

VERIFY OTSG tube leakage 1 GPM.

VERIFY SCM > 25°F is being maintained without use of MU-V-217 or HPI.

Enter Event 8 prior to Crew transition to OP-TM-EOP-006.

1 CRS GO to OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown.

I URO Initiate Guide 3, LPI Failures.

Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event#

718 Page 18 of 19 Event

Description:

LPI Pump Failure Time 1

Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 If one LPI Pump fails, and all other LPI equipment is operable then:

0 CLOSE DH-V-4 on the train with the inoperable pump 0

OPEN DH-V-38A and 6 (Aux. Bldg. 281 El.)

0 THROTTLE DH-V-4A and B to balance LPI flow between the two trains while maximizing total LPI flow within limits (RULE 2). (21250 gpm through each injection line and total flow 53300 gpm)

URO Critical Task c CRS/URO ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1B (PCR) are OPEN.

CRWURO VERIFY RB temperature < 130°F and RB pressure c 2 psig.

IAAT RM-A-I high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.

CRS/URO CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO OP-TM-EOP-008.

t-CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS VERIFY Emergency Diesel Generators are in ES standby or loaded on bus.

CRS INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump URO INITIATE Rule 5, Emergency Boration.

L Terminate scenario when Crew has had opportunity to perform BOTH designated critical tasks, or at Lead

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

718 I Examiner's discretion.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

=aciltty Three Mile Island Scenario No 2

OpTestNo NRC Examiners Operators nitial Conditions:

100% power, EOC.

AH-E-1 A tagged 00s.

DC-P-1A is operating in accordance with OP-TM-543-401 to support chemistry sampling CRD Aux Programmer out of service for maintenance Turnover:

Maintain 100% power operations.

Mica1 Tasks:

Manually actuate ES Train 6 Throttlefferminate HPI flow to the RCS OTSG - 1A Isolation Event No. I Malf. No.

RCR42 RCR43 +

MU01 B I CCo2A RCOBB Override

7 MS04A MS04B IC26 110 Override

ESOlB Override' Event Type' I CRS I URO C CRS C URO C CRS C URO I CRS i URO N CRS R URO M CRS M URO C CRS C URO I CRS I URO Event Description Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure.

Makeup Pump Trip, Loss of RCS Makeup and Seal Injection.

Dewy Heat Closed Cooling Pump Failure. (TS)

RCS Cold Leg RTD Failure Manual Power Reduction Due to Heat Balance Calculation Error. (TS)

Main Turbine Trip Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valves with Excessive FW Flow.

ES Train B Actuation Failure and Pushbutton Failures (N)ormal. (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 THREE MILE ISLAND MAY 2005 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO #2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICs in Full Automatic.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, the Pressurizer spray valve failure will be activated. The crew should respond to alarm G-3-8, RCPRESS NARROW RNG HllLO or indications in accordance with 1202-29, PRESSURIZER SYSTEM FAILURE. Spray valve control should be shifted Manual, and the valve closed. From this point forward, OP-TM-220-503, MANUAL CONTROL OF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, will be applicable. An EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the pressurizer spray valve Autohlanual control selector, but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

When ready, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the Makeup Pump failure. The crew should respond to alarms 8-2-2,4KV ES MOTOR OVERLOAD, and 8-1-2,4KV ES MOTOR TRIP, and implement 1203-15, LOSS OF R.C.

MAKEUPlSEAL INJECTION. Following completion of 1203-15 immediate manual actions, MU-P-1 A will be started with cooling water established either from DCCS or the NSCC system. An EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the failed Makeup Pump control switches, but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

When ready, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of DC-P-1A trip. The crew should respond to alarms B-2-5,480V ES MOTOR OVERLOAD, and B-1-5,480V ES MOTOR TRIP. If not performed with startup of MU-P-1A previously, OP-TM-543-439, SWAPPING MU-P-1 A COOLING TO NS, will provide guidance to re-establish cooling to MU-P-1A.

The SRO should review TS 3.3 to determine that a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months TS time dock has been started, with possible plant shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . An EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the DC-P-1A control switch, but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

After the SRO has declared the TS for the ECCS, the Lead Evaluator can cue the RCS cold leg RTD failure. The crew should respond to alarm H-3-2, SASS MISMATCH, in accordance with OP-TM-MAP-H0302, to select an alternate instrument. An EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the affected Tcold selector pushbutton. but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

When cued by the Lead Examiner the SOS will call the control room to direct the CRS to reduce reactor power by 5%

due to discovery of an error in the Plant Computer heat balance calculation. The SRO will apply T.S. 1.1 and direct a power reduction in accordance with 11024, POWER OPERATION. During the power reduction the operators will be required to take MANUAL control of the ICs to effect the power reduction, using OP-TM-621471, ICs MANUAL CONTROL, and OP-TM-622-471, MANUAL CONTROL ROD OPERATIONS.

Shortly after the reduction to 95% power, the Lead Evaluator can cue the Main Turbine trip, which will result in an automatic reactor trip. OTSG 1A safety valves will stick open and W-P-1A will not respond in automatic to cause RCS overcooling conditions. The crew should respond in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-001, REACTOR TRIP, followed by OP-TM-EOP-003, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY HEAT TRANSFER. Once the crew enters OP-TM-EOP-003, among other actions they will perform the following high level activities: isolation of OTSG I A feed and steam pathways, manual actuation of HPI Train 6 (simulator malfunction blocks automatic actuation), HPI throttling, and actions required to prevent RCS reheat and repressurization following isolation of the OTSG.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Simulator Scenario #2 Event 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

Description Initial Set-up.

Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure.

Makeup Pump Trip.

DC-P-1A Trip (TS)

RCS Cold Leg RTD failure.

Manual Reactor Power Reduction.

Main Turbine Trip.

Excessive PSHT due to Stuck Open MSSVs with Excessive FW Flow.

ES Train B actuation failure.

Procedure Support OP-TM-543-401, Operating DC-P-1A For Other Than Decay Heat Removal Operations.

OP-TM-MAP-G0308, RC Press Narrow Rng Hi/Lo.

1202-29, Pressurizer System Failure.

OP-TM-220-563, Manual Control of Pressurizer Pressure.

MAP B-2-2,4KV ES Motor Overload.

MAP B-1-2,4KV ES Motor Trip.

1203-15, Loss of R.C. Makeup/Seal Injection.

MAP B-2-5,480V ES Motor Overload.

MAP B-1-5, 480V ES Motor Trip.

OP-TM-543-439, Swapping MU-P-1 A Cooling To NS.

TS 3.3 Emergency Core Cooling, Reactor Building Emergency Cooling and Reactor Building Spray Systems.

OP-TM-MAP-H0302, SASS Mismatch.

OP-TM-621471, ICs Manual Control.

OP-TM-622-471, Manual Control Rod Operations.

OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

OP-TM-EOP-010 Rule 3, Excessive Heat Transfer.

OP-TM-EOP-003, Excessive Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.

OP-TM-EOP-010, Emergency Procedure Rules, Guides and Graphs.

OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

NRC Scenario 2 Setup Page I

ACTION I

COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS

[

DESCRIPTION I

Initialization IC-17 Console Right Remote Function CHR05 INFO Tag Diamond Control Panel Console Center Main Console AH-E-1A PTL DC-P-1A N.A.S.

Remote Function RCR342 Remote Function RCR43 Malfunction MU01 B Malfunction CCO2A Malfunction RC08B Override DI ZDllCSlMCSl(3)

Override DI ZDllCSl MCSl(4)

Malfunction TCOl 02A4A37 -

02A4A37 -

Malfunction MS04A Malfunction MS04B Malfunction IC 26 Override DI 36AMCS(4)

Malfunction MSIOAA 01 A5A03 - ZDI 1 CS Malfunction MS1 OAB Malfunction ESOl B Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

Value:

When:

100% HFP, ICs Full AUTO AH-E-1A Tagged 00s Value:

OUT When:

Immediately INFO Tag stating Aux Programmer 00s for maintenance DC-P-1A Operating IAW OP-TM-543-401 for Chemistry Robust Barriers applied IAW Risk Document AH-E-1A PTUAH-E-1A BKR OPEN 2125 Event 1 2000 Event 1 Insert Event 2 Insert Event 3 Insert Sev..001%

Event 4 RATE 300 sec.

OFF Event 5 OFF Event 5 Insert Delay 3 sec.

Event 6 Insert Sev. 100%

Event 6 Delay 15 sec.

Insert Sev. 100%

Event 6 Delay 15 sec.

Insert Event 6 OFF Event 6 Insert Event 6 Insert Event 6 Insert Event 6 Equilibrium X2N00 Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure Make-up Pump 1B Trip Decay heat Closed Pump 1A Trip RCS Cold Leg RTD Failure Disable ULD SG/RX Master Required Disable ULD SGlRX master Required Main Turbine Trip Stuck Open MSSV A OTSG Stuck Open MSSV A OTSG A Main Feedwater Pump Fails to Respond in AUTO FWD-1A Toggle Switch (Lower) Disabled SGA Train A Low Pressure MFW ISOL SGA Train B Low Pressure MFW ISOL ES Train B Actuation Failure

NRC Scenario 2 Setup Page I

ACTION I COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS I

DESCRIPTION I

Override I/O Value:

Off ZDlPBl RCB Insert:

Event 6 Override 110 Value:

Off ZDIPBlRBB Insert:

Event 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure Time I

Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

1 Page 6 of 22 URO MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED OBSERVE the following at Console CC:

0 PZR level (strip recorder) and PZR temperature varying I FLOOR INSTRUCTOR: When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 1.

URO 1 EXAMINER'S NOTE:

If Crew determines RC-V-1 Failure prior to OP-TM-MAP-GO308 crew may elect to go to 1202-29.

0 Makeup tank level varying OBSERVE the following at Console CR:

1 CRS I Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-G0308.

URO URO CLOSE RC-V-2 as required.

0 ENSURE CLOSE RC-V-1 PZR Spray Control Valve 0

Narrow range pressure indications varying (possible SASS mismatch) 1 0 TAverage varying 0

Power channels varying 0

Steam generator level and feedwater flow varying Pressurizer heater control and indicating lights 1

URO I IF RCS pressure is Lo, then PERFORM the following:

1 URO I

VERIFY RC-RV-2 PORV is Closed 1

CRS I Directs entry to 1209-29, Pressurizer System Failure.

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

1 Page 7 of 22 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure Time I

Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior I EXAMINERS NOTE:

1202-29 should be entered for Event 1.

I I

CRS I EXAMINERS NOTE:

Enter Section C - Decreasing or LOW RCS Pressure I

(RC-V-1) is shut.

VERIFY pressurizer heaters energize at setpoint OR manually TURN ON additional heaters as necessary to maintain RCS pressure at 2 21 35.

MONITOR pressurizer level and RCS temp.

IF PZR spray valve has failed open, THEN perform the following:

0 Control spray valve (RC-V-1) with manual pushbuttons.

Crew can refer to OP-TM-220-503, Manual Control of Pressurizer Pressure for Pressure Control.

Go to Event 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS URO Makeup Pump Trip, Loss of RCS Makeup and Seal Injection Page Of "I Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

2 Event

Description:

Directs entry into OP-TM-MAP-FO105.

Manual Actions Required OBSERVE the following:

I Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

CRS 1 FLOOR INSTRUCTOR: When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 2.

I MU-V-20 (CC) Open IAAT unable to maintain SI flow > 22 gpm from Control Room, then GO TO 1203-15, Loss of RC Makeup / Seal Injection.

0 Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-BO202 I

MU-42-FI (CC)

I MU-41-DPI (CC), Seal INJ Filters DIP indication, 50 0

IC-5-FI (CR) > 550 gpm psid MU-43-FR (PC), RCP Leak off flow I

URO I Observation (Control Room)

I I 1. Disagreement Light (ambedred)

I 2. Computer readout I

CRS I Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-BO102 I

I URO I Observation (Control Room)

I

1. Disagreement indication (greedamber)

2. Computer Printouts and Alarms I

CRS 1 Directs entry to 1203-15, Loss of R.C. MakeupISeal Injection 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

2 Page 9 of 22 Event

Description:

Makeup Pump Trip, Loss of RCS Makeup and Seal Injection Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Determine cause for loss of R.C. Makeup/Seal Injection 0

Running Makeup Pump trips (Green and amber control switch light)

CRS Direct URO Performance of Follow-up Action Close MU-V-3 as required to maintain pressurizer level above I

URo I 150 inches.

URo URO If RC makeup is not likely to be quickly restored, place MU-V-17 control station to manual and close.

If seal injection cannot be restored in less than several ( ~ 3 )

minutes, close MU-V-33A-D on any RCP with seal leak off greater than 8 gpm or seal inlet water temperature approaching 225°F in order to minimize the temperature transient at the seal area.

URo I

I EXAMINER'S NOTE:

May not be applicable based on timing of response.

Verify IC flow to RCP's by flow on IC-5 FI between 650-1300 gpm. (Located on Console "CR").

If RCP Seal No. 1 inlet water temperature or radial bearing temperature exceeds 225"F, reduce power 50 - 75 percent and trip the affected pump.

I URO I Place MU-V32 control station to manual and close.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I

1 10 of 22 I Op Test No.: -

1 Scenario# -

2 Event#

2 Page -

I I

I Event

Description:

Makeup Pump Trip, Loss of RCS Makeup and Seal injection Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

URO URO URO URO URO URO URO URO EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Due to rise in ICCW temp caused by Loss of Seal Injection, MU-V-3 may close isolating letdown. If this occurs crew should recover letdown per OP-TM-211-950. See Final Step in Event 2.

Verify markeup tank level and pressure within the normal operating band.

Compare redundant makeup tank level indications, (LI-778A and MU14-LR on Console Center and PPC points A0498 and A0426).

Opedverify open MU-V-12 OR open BWST supply valve, MU-V-14A/B, if MU-V-12 cannot be opened or Make-up Tank inventory is questionable.

Start standby Makeup Pump and ensure cooling water supplied.

Slowly re-establish RCP Seal injection flow at a rate so seal water temperature at the bearing is decreasing less than 1 "F/min, (Computer points A0521 to A0524).

When a flow rate of 38 gpm is established place MU-V32 control station in AUTO.

~

If isolated, restore pressurizer level gradually and return MU-V-17 control station to AUTO.

If isolated, restore letdown flow gradually IAW OP RM-2 1 1-950 to minimize letdown cooler thermal shock.

Letdown restoration may not be required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page 11 of 22 1 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

2 Event

Description:

Makeup Pump Trip, Loss of RCS Makeup and Seal Injection I

Time 1

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1

Go to Event 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page 12 of 22 1 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

3 Event

Description:

Decay Heat Closed Cooling Pump Failure (TS)

I Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR: When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 3.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

This alarm should alert the operators to DC-P-1A Failure.

They then should initiate OP-TM-543 439 to place NSCC on MUP-I A.

1 CRS I Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-BO105

[

CRS I Observation (Control Room):

I 1. Tripped pump disagreement light (ambedgreen)

I 2. Computer printout and CRT If required, directs entry to OP-TM-543-439, Swapping MU-P-I CRS I 1A Cooling to NS If required to shift MU-P-1A cooling to NS, then PERFORM the I

CRS I following:

I 0 NOTIFY Control Room to monitor the following:

0 0

DC-T-?A level (DC-LI-109) (CR).

NS-T-1 level (NS-LI-800 / NS-LI-801) (CC).

I CLOSE the following valves: (Locked Valve entry)

DC-V-4lA DC-V-45A 0

OPEN the following valves:

NS-V-80 NS-V-81 IC0 NOTE:

~

~~~~

When directed by crew to do steps 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 go to CCR 12 and select NS.

I CRS I Refer to T.S. Section 3.3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1

Scenario#

2 Event#

3 I OpTest No.: -

Event

Description:

Decay Heat Closed Cooling Pump Failure (TS)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS CRS CRS

~

~~

Two decay heat removal coolers and their cooling water supplies are OPERABLE T.S. 3.3.1.1.d.

Two decay heat closed cycle cooling water pumps must be OPERABLE T. S. 3.3.1.4.c

~~

Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any component(s) in the decay heat, RB spray, cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.* T.S. 3.3.2 Go to Event 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I

I I OP Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event#

4 Page Event

Description:

RCS Cold Leg RTD Failure Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter event 4.

I CRS I Directs entry into OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

URO If plant control is stable Validity of selected instrument is unknown or suspect, then PLACE affected-stations in Hand IAW associated manual operations procedure to balance plant parameters. URO observes rod movement and updtes CRS 0

DETERMINE which input is bad.

If required for plant control crew may enter OP-TM-621-47 1 Manual ICs Control or AOP-070 if plant conditions require.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

CRS UROIARO UROIARO +

UROIARO +

UROIARO (UROIARO I UROIARO If crew selects alternate Inst. Manual Ops may not be required. If required for manual Plant Control Crew may enter OP-TM-621471 or OP-TM-AOP-070 if required.

Direct entry into OP-TM-621-471 ENSURE ULD in HAND Place SGIREACTOR Demand to HAND

~

~~

~

Verify alarm H-2-1 ICs in Track actuated Place SG N B LOAD RATIO (Delta TIC) station in HAND Place SG A FW DEMAND station in HAND Place SG B FW DEMAND station in HAND Place REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

4 Page 15 of -

22 Event

Description:

RCS Cold Leg RTD Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Instruct URO to place EDT Tag on failed instrument.

0 ENSURE valid instrument selected IAW OP-TM-621451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICs.

URO I Go to Event 5

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D I

1 CRS CRS Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

6 Page 16 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Uses 1102-4 to reduce power 5%.

Directs entry to OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control.

FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 5.

IC0 NOTE:

When directed by Lead Examiner, contact the Control Room as the SOS and direct the Crew to reduce reactor power by 5% due to an error in the Plant Process Computer Heat Balance Calculation.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

I CRS 1

CRS ICs may be in Full Manual due to previous event.

ENSURE ULD in HAND.

Establish manual SGIREACTOR Control as follows:

0 PLACE SG/REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

0 VERIFY alarm H-2-1 "ICs in Track actuated.

0 If necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 11 02-4, then ADJUST SG/REACTOR DEMAND as follows:

1.

If maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

If plant was previously placed in Full ICs Manual Control per OP-TM-621471 neutron error will remain at 0. CRS will give RCS temp and pressure bands to maintain during power reduction.

Go to Event 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

6,7and8 Page 17 of 22 I Event

Description:

I I

Main Turbine Trip; Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valves with Excessive FW Flow; ES Train B Actuation Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior J

FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 6.

CRS Directs entry to OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

TRIP the Reactor by depressing the "Reactor Trip" and "DSS" pushbuttons.

URo URO VERIFY the reactor is shutdown.

T K O 7 T R F t h e Turbine I

URO 1 VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

1 ARO I Perform symptom check.

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately treat the symptom using the following priority:

XHT GO TO OP-TM-EOP-003.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

CRS transitions to OP-TM-EOP-003.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Event 7 is driven off completion of Reactor Trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

7and8 Page 18 of -

22 Event

Description:

ES Train B Actuation Failure Time I

Position j

Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task actions on next page URO CRS CRS UROIARO Initiate Rule 3. Either ARO or URO can perform Rule 3.

IAAT MFW flow is excessive and Reactor is shutdown, then:

VERIFY FW Flow is controlled by ICs.

0 ADJUST MFW Pumps and FW regulating valves to control OTSG level and valve DP.

IAAT Primary to Secondary Heat Transfers excessive and Reactor is shutdown, then:

0 PERFORM Phase 1 Isolation of the affected OTSG(s).

0 VERIFY OTSG level and pressure stabilizes.

0 PERFORM Phase 2 Isolation of the affected OTSG(s).

0 0

VERIFY steam leak is not in RB or Intermediate Building.

INITIATE Guide 12, RCS stabilization following OTSG Isolation.

Initiate Guide 9, Inventory Control.

I EXAMINERS NOTE:

Rule 3 and Guide 9 can be performed together.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Event 8 will occur shortly after initiation of Guide 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

7and8 Page 19 of 22 Event

Description:

ES Train B Actuation Failure Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task UROIARO Phase 1 Isolation OTSG A MS-V-1A MS-V-1 B MS-V-16A FW-V-1 7A RN-V-5A FW-v-92A MS-V-3D MS-V-3E M S-V-3 F MS-V-4A W-V-85A Phase 2 Isolation OTSG A E F-V-30A E F-V-30D MS-V-2A IF OTSG pressure c 750 psig and can be controlled, then DEFEAT HSPS LO-LO Pressure MFW Isolation.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Based on the size of the overcooling Event 8 should occur here. B side HPI will not AUTO initiate.

I Critical Task URO Manually initiate B side HPI by depressing 160W manual pushbutton. (Pushbutton fails to actuate ESAS)

Manually Initiate HPI IAW OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 2 Open MU-V-14A and MU-V-14B Ensure 2 MU Pumps operating in the ES mode

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

7and8 Page 20 of 22 Event

Description:

ES Train B Actuation Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task URO/ARO URO URO/ARO CRS/URO

~

~~~

~

~~

Note: ES mode of operation requires two Makeup Pumps with physical separation and MU-V-16D Open MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B and MU-V-16C Close MU-V-18 Close MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 Start DC-P-1A and DC-P-1 B Start DR-P-1A and DR-P-1 B Open DH-V-SA and DH-V-5B Start DH-P-1A and DH-P-1 B Open DH-V-4A and DH-V4B ADJUST OTSG pressure so that secondary TsAT is lower than RCS cold leg temperature.

THROTTLE HPI IAW Rule 2.

0 0

Verify SCM ~ 2 5 0

'F 0

Verify at least one RCP is operating 0

When incore temperature is reducing and RCS ~ 2 5

'F superheat and either of the following conditions exists:

0 SCM >25 'F 0

Verify MU Pump flows S 1 5 GPM/pump LPI >1250 gpm in each line then HPI may be throttled to ~ 5 0 0 gpmlpump by manipulating MU-V-l6A, B, C, D.

~

~~~

~~

ADJUST OTSG pressure to stabilize RCS temperature.

REVIEW PTS Rule 6.

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

7and8 Page 21 of 22 Event

Description:

ES Train B Actuation Failure Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS CRS URO ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

URO/ARO URO/ARO CRS CRS UROlARO URO EXAMINERS NOTE:

VERIFY OTSG tube leaklrupture symptoms do not exist.

VERIFY RCS Tcold > 400°F.

REVIEW Dry OTSG Guide 13.

CRS REVIEW TSDT Limit Guide 14.

VERIFY RB Pressure 2 psig.

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio.

VERIFY at least one OTSG has stable pressure with level present.

ENSURE RCS temperature reduction has been terminated.

VERIFY primary to secondary heat transfer is being established.

VERIFY RCS Tcold > 525°F.

Emergency Boration may be required based on TIC.

I I

CRS I VERIFY OTSG B is providing sufficient steam for Gland Steam.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS of 22 I Page 22 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

2 Event#

7and8 I

INITIATE Attachment 1.

I I Event

Description:

ES Train B Actuation Failure I

Time I

Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1

I CRS 1 VERIFY 30 psig RBI is RESET.

I CRS I Go to OP-TM-EOP-001, VSSV.

I I

I The Lead Examiner can terminate the scenario.

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

3 OpTestNo.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

Reactor 5%. Plant startup in progress, MOC.

AH-E-1A tagged 00s.

ICs in Manual control due to startup operations.

Turnover:

Continue with plant startup Critical Tasks:

Initiate Manual Reactor Trip Isolate Affected OTSG when criteria met Event Description Malf. I Event Event No.

No.

Type*

1 I/O Override I CRS I URO Pressurizer Level Controller Failure.

2 N CRS R URO Manual reactor power increase.

3 RD02 C CRS C URO Stuck control rod. (TS) 4 DHOGA TS CRS Core Flood Tank Nitrogen Leak. (TS) 5 FW15A I ;

F?

I Loss of Main Feedwater.

6 RD28 1 E :;; 1 RPS Auto Trip Failure (AWS).

7 8

I/O Override C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pumps Fail.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I THREE MILE ISLAND MAY 2005 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO #3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 5% power during plant startup. ICs is in manual due to startup operations.

When ready, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the Pressurizer level controller malfunction. The crew will respond to MAP 0-3-2, M/U TANK LEVEL HI/LO, or indication of zero RCS makeup flow with lowering Pressurizer level. The team can implement any one of three following procedures to respond to the malfunction by establishing manual control of makeup valve MU-V-17: 1203-15, LOSS OF RCS MAKEUPISEAL INJECTION, OP-TM-211-472, MANUAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL, or OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9, RCS INVENTORY CONTROL.

Diagnosis of the malfunction is not required to proceed with the scenario if manual control of MU-V-17 is established to control Pressurizer level. If diagnosed, an EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY TAG should be applied to the MU-V-17 controller, but logging and documentation of configuration control procedures is NOT required to continue with the scenario.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, the crew will be contacted by the Shift Operations Supervisor to begin raising reactor power from 5%. The crew will continue startup in accordance with 1102-2, Plant Startup, and 11 02-4, Power Operations. The reactor power increase will be accomplished manually due to the low power condition.

When power is greater than 7%, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the stuck control rod. If not diagnosed earlier, the crew should respond to alarm G-2-1, CRD PAlTERN ASYMMETRIC, in accordance with OP-TM-MAP-GO201 and/or indications of a stuck or asymmetric rod as described in 1202-8, CRD EQUIPMENT FAILURE symptoms. The team should implement 1202-8 immediate manual actions to determine the rod is stuck. The SRO should determine that TS 3.5.2.2.b is applicable, requiring verification of one percent delta WK shutdown margin, and exercising the remaining regulating and safety rods to verify operability. The SRO should recognize that, if the stuck rod becomes asymmetric, then reactor power will be restricted to 60% of the thermal power allowable based on RCP operating configuration.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, the Core Flood Tank nitrogen leak will begin to reduce CF-T-1A pressure. The crew should respond to alarm D-2-7, CF TANK 1A LEVEUPRESS HI/LO. The SRO should review TS 3.3.1.2.a to determine tank pressure is lower than the Tech Spec LCO limit, and TS 3.0.1 is applicable. Tank pressure is not required to be restored to normal to proceed with the scenario.

After the SRO has reviewed the TS for Core Flood Tank pressure, the Lead Evaluator can cue the Main Feedwater Pump failure coupled with initiation of an OTSG tube leak. The crew should recognize the reactor should have tripped (ATWS). Upon recognition of failure of MANUAL reactor trip and DSS pushbutton, crew should initiate RNO column of OP-TM-EOP-001, REACTOR TRIP, Step 2.2. Following completion of the immediate actions, the team should diagnose the existence of the OTSG Tube leak, and the SRO should make the transition to OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG TUBE LEAKAGE.

Coincident with the Feedwater Pump trip Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A will fail to automatically start. The crew should enter OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG TUBE LEAKAGE, and, among other actions, perform the following high level activities: Manually start EF-P-2A, preferentially steam affected OTSG and isolate when criteria is met. reduce RCS pressure to minimize RCS subcooled margin, and begin RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Event 1

2 3

4 5

7 Simulator Scenario #3 Description Pressurizer level controller failure.

Manual power increase Stuck Control Rod. (TS)

Core Flood Tank nitrogen leak.

US)

Loss of Main Feedwater.

RPS auto trip failure (ATWS).

Manual Pushbutton trip failure.

OTSG tube leak.

Emergency Feedwater Pump failure.

Procedure Support MAP D-3-2, M/U Tank Level Hi/Lo.

1203-1 5, Loss of RCS Makeup/Seal Injection.

OP-TM-211-472, Manual Pressurizer Level Control.

OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control.

OP-TM-622-471, Manual Control Rod Operations.

OP-TM-MAP-G0201, CRD Pattern Asymmetric.

1202-8, CRD Equipment Failure.

TS 3.5.2 Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Limits.

TS 4.7 Reactor Control Rod Tests.

OP-TM-MAP-D0207, CF Tnk 1A LeveVPress Hi/Lo.

TS 3.3.1.2 Core Flooding System.

OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

OP-TM-EOP-010, Emergency Procedure Rules, Guides and Graphs.

OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

OP-TM-EOP-01 0, Emergency Procedure Rules, Guides and Graphs.

OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.

OP-TM-EOP-010, Emergency procedure Rules, Guides and Graphs.

OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 16.2, Failure of EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

NRC Scenario 3 Setup Page I

ACTION I COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS I DESCRIPTION 1

Initialization IC-5% Power EOC XENON Free EOC Set letdown flow at 75 gpm IAW OP-TM-211-1 102-2 44 1 Ensure continuous Lineup bleed path to B RCBT Scenario setup bleed path Maintain PZR level Scenario setup Placing letdown per Enclosure 2 of Scenario setup Setting PZR level per Enclosure 2 of IAW OP-TM-2 1 1-472 1 102-2 Ensure MF-P-1NB delta p 60-90 psig OVERRIDE IO Value:

.01 Verify DP within range Event 1 02A5A06 - a 1 RCLlC When:

Scenario setup Pressurizer Level Control Failure Malfunction RD0252 Value:

Insert Stuck Rod Group 6 Malfunction DHO6A Value:

Insert SEV. 90%

Core Flood Tank 1A Nitrogen Malfunction FW15A Value:

Insert FWA-1A Trip When:

Event 3 Leak When:

Event 4 When:

Event 5 Malfunction RD28 Value:

Insert RPS AUTO Trip Failure When:

IMMEDIATELY Malfunction TH15A Value:

Insert SEV. 5%

OTSG Tube Leak 700 gpm Remote Function Value:

Defeat EFP-2A, EFP-2B Test FWR 71 OVERRIDE LO Value:

ON Failure When:

Event 7 Ramp 600 secs When:

Insert immediately When:

Insert immediately 08A7DS01-ZLOEFP2A Test - ON Failure of EF-P-2A to start OVERRIDE IO When:

Insert immediately Failure of RX Trip Pushbutton Value:

OFF ZDIPBRXTRIP-OFF Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

I FLOOR OPERATOR:

Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

1 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Controller Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 1.

I E

CRS URO URO URO Direct entry into 1203-15.

Manual Action Determine cause for loss of R.C. MakeupISeal Injection MU-VI 7 closed. (Zero flow on MU24FI with MU-Pl B operating.)

Action for makeup Pump Operating and MU-V17 failed closed. I Shift MU-V17 MU flow control station to manual and restore pressurizer level.

I EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Crew may elect to enter OP-TM-211472.

I Go to Event 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:

I Scenario#

3 Event#

2 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

Raise power Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs crew to raise power per 1102-2 Plant Start-up.

1 FLOOR OPERATOR:

~ When directed by Lead Examiner, instruct crew to perform power increase at 20% per hour.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

When reactor power is greater than the 7% FWP trip setpoint enter Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Page Of 1 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

3 Event

Description:

L Stuck Control Rod (TS)

If any rod is more than 7 from its Group Average Position, then GO TO 1202-8, CRD Equipment Malfunction.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Based on indication, crew may elect to go to 1202-8, Section A - Asymmetric Rod. Step 4.i directs crew to Section C - Stuck Rod.

Time 1

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior I

1 FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 3.

Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-G0201, CRD Pattern Asymmetric.

CRS I Manual Actions Required.

Directs entry to 1202-8, CRD Equipment Failure. Section C I

CRS I Stuck Rod I

I CRS I Direct Manual Actions 1 CAUTION:

Only RUN speed should be used when attempting to move a stuck rod. This will minimize the possibility of overstressing the control rod assembly.

CRS CRS Place the Diamond Rod Control Panel in manual IAW OP-TM-621-471. Attempt to first insert the rod a short distance and then attempt to withdraw it a short distance IAW OP-TM-622-45 1 Transfer desired rods to Aux Power Supply as follows:

(1) Verify following lamp/pushbutton conditions at Diamond Panel:

TRlPCONF(Off) 0 MOTOR FAULT (Off)

PROGRAMMER LAMP FAULT A (Off)

PROGRAMMER LAMP FAULT B (Off)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

3 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

Stuck Control Rod (TS)

I Time I

Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

0 0

TRCF(Off) 0 AUTO/MAN (Man)

POWER SUPPLIES - SYSTEM (2 lamps Lit)

POWER SUPPLIES - MOTOR (2 lamps Lit)

(2) Ensure GROUP selected on GROUP/AUXIL switch (3) Ensure SEQ OR selected on SEQ/SEQ OR switch (4) Select desired group on GROUP SELECT switch (5) Select desired rod number or all on SINGLE SELECT (6) Press TRANS RESET (7) Select AUXIL on GROUP/AUXIL switch (8) Verify selected Group Diamond Panel CONTROL ON (9) Select JOG speed (1 0)

(1 1)

(1 2)

Press MAN TRANS (1 3)

(14)

(1 5)

(16)

Press MAN TRANS (1 7)

Verify selected rod PI Panel CONTROL ON ligt-lit (18)

Repeat previous 3 steps until all rods are transferred (1 9)

Select CLAMP REL on CLAMP/CLAMP REL switch (20)

Select GROUP on GROUP/GROUP AUXIL switch (21)

Verify SY lamp off (22)

Select RUN speed (23) switch lamp lit Verify SY lamp lit Select CLAMP on CLAMP/CLAMP REL switch Verify TR CF lamp lit Verify selected rod(s) PI Panel CONTROL ON lights lit If necessary, then select next desired rod number on SINGLE SELECT switch Go to the controlling procedure

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page 9

of 21 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event#

3 CRS Reviews T.S. 3.5.2.2.b If a control rod in the regulating and/or safety rod banks is declared inoperable in the withdrawn position as defined in Specification Paragraph 4.7.1.1 and 4.7.1.3, an evaluation shall be initiated immediately to verify the existence of 1 % AWK HSD shutdown margin. Boration may be initiated to increase the available rod worth either to compensate for the worth of the inoperable rod or until the regulating banks are fully withdrawn, whichever occurs first. Simultaneously a program of exercising the remaining regulating and safety rods shall be initiated to verify operability.

Go to Event 4 when the TS evaluation is complete.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS I Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

4 Page -

10 of 21 I Review Core Flooding System TS:

If either CFT pressure indication is outside of 585 to 615 psig or level indication is outside of 1 1.29 to 11.87 ft and Reactor is critical, then REFER Tech. Spec. 3.3.1.2.a Action Statement.

Event

Description:

Core Flood Tank Nitrogen Leak (TS)

Time I

Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS FLOOR OPERATOR:

Event 4 was entered during Event 3.

Two (2) core flooding tanks (CFTs) each containing 940 f 30 ft3 of borated water at 600 *25 psig shall be available.

Specification 3.0.1 applies.

Directs entry to OP-TM-MAP-D0207, CF TNK 1A LeveVPress 1

CRS 1 HI/LO.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

@ 90% MALF Severity CFT PZR reduces = 1.2 psi per min.

I CRS I Manual Actions Required:

0 MONITOR PPC Area 5 Group 26 for CF-Tank's para meters.

0 ADJUST level and/or pressure as required IAW OP-TM-213 series procedures.

IC0 NOTE: If requested on status of personnel in Reactor Building that could look for the leak, advise that all personnel left the Reactor Building for plant startup.

Go to Event 516

Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

5 6 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterlAlWS Time I

Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior I FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 5/6.

Critical CRS URO URO Examiners Note: Event 6 runs simultaneously with Event 5.

Directs entry to OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

Attempt to TRIP the Reactor by depressing the Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons. (Note: Reactor Trip pushbutton and DSS pushbutton will NOT trip the Reactor)

Examiners Note: based on OS-24, Step 4.2.1.A - Action should be taken to directly compensate for the failure of automatic systems. For this event, it may involve any or all of the following:

Manually inserting rods 0

Dispatching field operators to operate breakers locally 0

Deenergizing buses providing power to the rod control system Drive procedures to enter plant shutdown procedure to insert rods.

The critical task is to initiate a reactor tripkhutdown in this manner or to perform the alternative actions as described for the next identified critical task. The crew may perform both actionslsets of actions if rods are not inserted before reactor shutdown is confirmed.

Lead Instructor / IC0 Note: If crew states intention to insert rods via Plant Shutdown, remove Reactor Auto Trip Failure and re-insert Reactor Trip.

VERIFY the reactor is shutdown.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I

1 1

Scenario#

3 Event#

516 Page 12 of 21 I I OP Test No.: -

Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterIATWS Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task (If Rx not shutdown)

Critical I Task URO URO URO URO URO URO/CRS URO If Reactor is not verified to be shutdown then Crew should enter RNO column of OP-TM-EOP-001.

If MFW is not available, then:

0 0

Ensure EFW is actuated Ensure Main Turbine is tripped Maintain Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer When RCS Pressure e2500 psig then initiate HPI When the reactor is shutdown, then continue TRIP the Turbine.

VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately treat the symptom using the following priority:

1. SCM 25°F GO TO OP-TM-EOP-002.

2. XHT GO TO OP-TM-EOP-003.

3. LOHT GO TO OP-TM-EOP-004.

4. OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm GO TO OP-TM-EOP-005.

Examiners Note: Crew should continue with VSSV's but note rising RCS pressure and when necessary use Step 3.10 and initiate GUIDE 8.

Announce Reactor trip over plant page and radio.

Verify control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

Initiates Emergency Boration per RULE 5 - EB 0

RULE 5:

(1) VERIFY a MU pump is operating (2) Perform one of the following:

OPEN MU-V-14A

Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

516 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterIATWS Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task (Cont'd)

OPEN MU-V-14B PERFORM Guide 1 "Emergency Boration Backup Methods" (3) VERIFY Total Injection (MU, SI & HPI) 50 GPM.

(4) STOP any activities which may be diluting RCS boron (5) If RCS is subcooled and neutron flux indication is rising, (6) REQUEST sample and analysis for RCS boron (7) When 1 % dk/k SHUTDOWN has been achieved for the concent ration.

then STABILIZE RCS temperature.

concentration.

expected plant condition (REFER TO Figure 1 of 1103-4, "Soluble Poison Concentration Control", or 1 103-1 5A, "Reactivity Balance") or LPI > 1250 GPM, then emergency boration may be stopped.

URO URO/CRS ARO URO URO Verify Main Feedwater flow to A & B OTSG are each < O S m I b/h r.

Verify OTSG level > setpoint.

0 Initiates RULE 4 - FWC RULE 4:

IAAT the reactor is shutdown, then:

VERIFY SCM > 25°F.

VERIFY at least 1 RCP operating.

MAINTAIN OTSG level 2 25" STARTUP Range Level.

IAAT OTSG Level MINIMUM required flow:

minimum, then MAINTAIN the following If SCM 25OF and both OTSGs are available, then FEED > 215 gpm/OTSG using E W.

0 If SCM 25OF and only one OTSG is available, then FEED > 430 GPM to the good OTSG using EFW.

If all RCPs are OFF and incore temperature is rising, then FEED OTSG at maximum available EFW flow.

Verify ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

Verify 1 D and 1 E 41 60V buses are energized from auxiliary

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

5J6 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterIATWS L

Time 1

Position

[

Applicants Actions or Behavior URO URO URO URO URO transformers.

Verify PZR Level and MU Tank level are being controlled.

Ensure OTSG pressure is being controlled at desired values using TBVs/ADVs.

Verify RCS pressure is trending towards desired post trip condition.

Initiates GUIDE 8, RCS PRESSURE CONTROL GUIDE 8 (1) VERIFY the reactor is shutdown and SCM > 25°F.

(2) If it is required to MINIMIZE SCM and SCM > 70°F, then lower RCS pressure a) Maintain SCM > 30°F b) Maintain RCP NPSH limits (Fig 1A) c) If RCPs are OFF, then maintain pressure above Head bubble limit (Fig 1 & 1A) RAISE or LOWER RCS pressure per the following direction, as needed, to maintain RCS pressure within the limits of Figure 1 and 1 A.

To LOWER RCS Pressure:

0 0

ENSURE RC-V-3 is open.

When RCS pressure is in the desired range, then ENSURE HPI is throttled per (Rule 2) and control RCS inventory.

VERIFY RCS temperature is stable or decreasing.

If pressurizer steam bubble is controlling RCS pressure, then ENSURE Pressurizer Heaters are OFF.

VERIFY an RCP is operating.

OPEN RC-V-1.

CLOSE RC-V-1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

516 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterlATWS Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS

~

~~

Directs crew to OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 15 - EFW Actuation Response.

Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

516 Page 16 of 21 ARo ARO Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterIAM Time I

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify control power is available as indicated by the green indicator light at the control switch.

Obtain CRS concurrence immediately prior to initiating flow.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

The following steps are the actions for the Emergency Feedwater Pump Failure (Events 516). Crew may have manually started EF-P-PA earlier in the event based on OS-24, Step 4.2.1.A - Action should be taken to directly compensate for the failure of automatic systems.

I ARO I If EFW actuation is required, then:

0 ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.

DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

0 If EFW pump disch. Pressure < OTSG pressure, then INITIATE Guide 16.

0 IAAT OTSG pressure is more than 100 psig below desired, then THROTTLE ERN flow if permitted by Rule 4.

I 0

ENSURE EF-V30ND and EF-V30B/C control OTSG level 1

at setpoint (Rule 4).

IAAT an EFW failure occurs then initiate Guide 16 - EFW I

ARo I Failure I

I Initiates Guide 16.2 for EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B failure I

ARO I Verify voltage available on the associated bus

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

516 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Main FeedwaterIAM Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Obtain CRS concurrence and ensure E M I actuation enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

Starts EF-P-2A Go to Event 7

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

7 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Leak Time

[

Position I

Applicants Actions or Behavior 1 FLOOR OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Examiner, enter Event 7 I

I CRS I

CRS I

I CRS Requests symptom check.

Performs symptom check.

~

~~

Directs entry to OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.

~

~~

Examiners Note: If the SRO directs a shutdown IAW 11024 POWER OPERATION because the reactor is still critical then the Lead Evaluator should cue the Simulator Operator to allow the trip to occur by clearing a malfunction preventing the automatic reactor trip (RD28).

NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

~

~~

VERIFY the reactor is critical.

GO TO Step 3.4.

NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

DETERMINE the affected OTSG as follows:

0 Request OTSG Steam line samples.

0 0

Request Steam line Radiation Surveys.

Observe OTSG levels and feed rates.

INITIATE Attachment 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

7 Page 19 of 21 I Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Leak Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

1 CRSlURO 1 IAAT Aux. Steam is available, then

1. OPEN AS-V-8 (TB 355' south of 6'h stage drain collection I

tank).

I 2. CLOSE GS-V-4.

I And transfer operating FWPs to Aux Steam.

SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-SA.

SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-56.

CRS I VERIFY the reactor is critical.

I I

CRS I GO TO Step 3.10.

URO PERFORM a SYMPTOM CHECK.

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and URo 1 radio.

URO I DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.

I I

CRS I ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

IAAT OTSG pressure is approaching or is greater than 1000 CRS/URO psig, then ENSURE MS-V-M(B) is open and OPEN TBVs or ADVs to maintain OTSG pressure < 1000 psig.

IAAT level is rising due to tube leakage in an available OTSG, then preferentially STEAM to maintain OTSG level 85%.

1-URO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

7 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Leak Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task

( Att. 1 A)

ARO URO IAAT any of the following conditions exists (without contrary TSC guidance):

OTSG level > 85% Operate Range BWST level 21 ft Projected or actual offsite dose rates approach 50 mrem/hr W.B. (TEDE) or 250 mremlhr child thyroid (CDE),

When RCS pressure 1000 psig, then INITIATE A or B to isolate the affected OTSG(s).

ATTACHMENT 1A:

MS-V-1A MS-V-1B FW-V-17A FW-V-5A FW-V-16A FW-v-92A EF-V-30A EF-V-30D MS-V-3D MS-V-3E MS-V-3F MS-V-4A MS-V-13A When affected OTSG TBV/ADVs are closed, then If both OTSGs are being isolated, then GO TO OP-TM-EOP-009.

PERFORM Guide 12 "RCS Stabilization Following OTSG Isolation".

IAAT OTSG isolation criteria may be challenged prior to reducing RCS pressure c 1000 psig, then

1. INITIATE RCS cooldown to 5OOOF at a rate within RCS

2. ENSURE RC-V-2 is OPEN

3. CYCLE the PORV to reduce SCM to approximately 30 OF.

inventory control capability and c 240°F/HR.

INITIATE Guide 8 to MINIMIZE SCM

Appendix D Operator Action F O ~ I ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario#

3 Event#

7 Page 21 of 21 OTSG Tube Leak Event

Description:

Time I

Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario any time after the affected OTSG is isolated.

I

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