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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARL-24-002, Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-02-0202 February 2024 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML23342A1182024-01-0909 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan L-23-019, Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152023-12-18018 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 ML23334A1822023-11-30030 November 2023 Biennial Report for the Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Summary, and Regulatory Commitment Change Summary November 2021 Through October 2023 L-23-012, Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point2023-11-13013 November 2023 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point ML23306A0992023-11-0202 November 2023 and Indian Point Energy Center, Notification of Changes in Schedule in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7) L-23-011, 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Change Summary Report2023-10-27027 October 2023 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Change Summary Report IR 05000293/20234012023-08-31031 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2023401 & 2023001 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000293/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2023002 L-23-008, Correction to Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)2023-05-23023 May 2023 Correction to Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) ML23136A7792023-05-15015 May 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2022 ML23135A2152023-05-15015 May 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2022 L-23-004, HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 20222023-04-24024 April 2023 HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 2022 L-23-003, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-31031 March 2023 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML23088A0382023-03-29029 March 2023 Stations 1, 2, & 3, Palisades Nuclear Plant, and Big Rock Point - Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML23069A2782023-03-13013 March 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Environmental Review of Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 Subsequent License Renewal Application ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000293/20220042023-02-15015 February 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022004 ML22356A0712023-01-31031 January 2023 Issuance of Exemption for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ISFSI Regarding Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report - Cover Letter ML22347A2782022-12-21021 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan Dated December 21, 2022 L-22-042, Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152022-12-14014 December 2022 Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 L-22-041, Supplemental Information to Enhance Exemption Request Detail for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Due Date Extension2022-12-0909 December 2022 Supplemental Information to Enhance Exemption Request Detail for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Due Date Extension IR 05000293/20220032022-11-18018 November 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022003 L-22-036, Decommissioning Trust Fund Agreement2022-11-0808 November 2022 Decommissioning Trust Fund Agreement ML22276A1762022-10-24024 October 2022 Decommissioning International Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22266A1922022-09-23023 September 2022 and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Request to Withdraw Prior Submissions from NRC Consideration ML22272A0352022-09-22022 September 2022 S. Lynch-Benttinen Letter Regarding U.S. Citizen Intent to Sue U.S. Fish and Wildlife and NOAA Fisheries Representing the Endangered Species (Na Right Whale) Which Will Be Adversely Affected by Holtec International Potential Actions ML22269A4202022-09-22022 September 2022 Citizen Lawsuit ML22241A1122022-08-29029 August 2022 Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (B)(5)(i), (b)(11), and 72.214 for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report IR 05000293/20220022022-08-12012 August 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022002 ML22215A1772022-08-0303 August 2022 Decommissioning International (HDI) Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22206A1512022-08-0101 August 2022 NRC Office of Investigations Case Nos. 1-2022-002 & 1-2022-006 ML22221A2592022-08-0101 August 2022 LTR-22-0217-1-NMSS - Town of Duxbury Letter Opposing the Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim (Docket No. 05000293) ML22193A1662022-07-28028 July 2022 LTR-22-0154-1 - Heather Govern, VP, Clean Air and Water Program, Et Al., Letter Regarding Radioactive Wastewater Disposal from the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 05000293) ML22175A1732022-07-28028 July 2022 LTR-22-0153-1 - Response Letter to D. Turco, Cape Downwinders, from A. Roberts, NRC, Regarding Holtec-Pilgrim Plans to Dump One Million Gallons of Radioactive Waste Into Cape Cod Bay ML22154A4882022-06-0101 June 2022 Letter from Conservation Law Foundation Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22154A1622022-05-26026 May 2022 Letter and Email from Save Our Bay/Diane Turco Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22136A2602022-05-16016 May 2022 Submittal of Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for January 1 Through December 31, 2021 ML22136A2572022-05-16016 May 2022 Submittal of Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for January 1 Through December 31, 2021 ML22102A0932022-05-12012 May 2022 LTR-22-0067 Response to Matthew P. Levesque, President, Barnstable Town Council Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim IR 05000293/20220012022-05-11011 May 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022001 ML22104A0542022-04-30030 April 2022 LTR-22-0093 Response to Sheila Lynch-Benttinen, Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim L-22-026, Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Report - 20212022-04-29029 April 2022 Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Report - 2021 ML22152A2592022-04-25025 April 2022 Zaccagnini Letter Dated 04/25/22 ML22152A2642022-04-19019 April 2022 Flynn Letter Dated 04/19/22 ML22091A1062022-04-0101 April 2022 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance (10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)) L-22-022, and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec.2022-03-25025 March 2022 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec. ML22130A6762022-03-14014 March 2022 Decola Ltr Dtd 03/14/22 Re Potential Discharge of Radioactive Water from Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML22041B0762022-03-0707 March 2022 03-07-22 - Letter to the Honorable William R. Keating, Responds to Letter Regarding Proposed Release of Irradiated Water at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Into Cape Cod Bay ML22054A2962022-02-23023 February 2022 Annual ISFSI Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2021 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50
MONTHYEARML21148A1992021-05-28028 May 2021 Supplemental Information to Correct License Amendment Request to Revise Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from the Spent Fuel Pool ML21103A0552021-05-12012 May 2021 May 2021 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Issuance of Amendment 254 to Revise the Physical Security Plan Alternative Measures, Cover Letter and Amendment ML21076A4042021-03-17017 March 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from the Spent Fuel Pool L-21-036, Proposed Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-Only Security, Training and Qualification, Safeguards Contingency Plan2021-03-17017 March 2021 Proposed Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-Only Security, Training and Qualification, Safeguards Contingency Plan L-21-008, License Amendment Request to Approve Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Plan2021-02-18018 February 2021 License Amendment Request to Approve Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Plan L-20-024, Attachments 1 - 3: Summary of Evaluation of Proposed Changes, Proposed Change to PNPS Renewed Facility License Condition 3.G (Mark-up) and (Clean Copy)2020-04-0202 April 2020 Attachments 1 - 3: Summary of Evaluation of Proposed Changes, Proposed Change to PNPS Renewed Facility License Condition 3.G (Mark-up) and (Clean Copy) ML19170A1492019-08-22022 August 2019 Enclosure 2, Draft Conforming Amendment for Direct and Indirect Transfer of Renewed Facility Operating License to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC, Owner and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Operator (L-2018-LLO-0003) CNRO-2018-00047, Application for Order Consenting to Direct and Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendment; and Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A)2018-11-16016 November 2018 Application for Order Consenting to Direct and Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendment; and Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) ML18218A1742018-08-0101 August 2018 Revised the Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition ML18023A6912018-01-12012 January 2018 Revise the Pilgrim Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition ML18023A6872018-01-12012 January 2018 License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition ML17101A6082017-03-30030 March 2017 License Amendment Request - Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule ML17053A4682017-02-14014 February 2017 Technical Specifications Proposed Change - Administrative Controls for Permanently Defueled Condition ML16021A4592016-01-14014 January 2016 Proposed License Amendment Request to Modify Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Training for the On-Shift Chemistry Technician ML15205A2872015-07-15015 July 2015 License Amendment Request - Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule ML14042A1662014-01-31031 January 2014 License Amendment Request - Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule ML13346A0262013-11-26026 November 2013 Proposed License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification 4.3.4, Heavy Loads to Facilitate Dry Storage Handling Operations ML13323A5182013-11-14014 November 2013 Technical Specifications Proposed Change No. 306 Eliminate Certain ESF Requirements During Movement of Irradiated Fuel ML13108A2172013-04-0505 April 2013 Proposed License Amendment: Revision to Technical Specification 2.1, Safety Limits to Resolve Pressure Regulator Fail-Open (PRFO) Transient Reported by General Electric Nuclear Energy in Accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d) ML12005A1982011-12-29029 December 2011 Cycle-Specific License Amendment Request for Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) Bypass Allowance to Allow Reactor Startup ML11312A0512011-10-28028 October 2011 Proposed License Amendment: Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.2.B for the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Low Level Trip Setpoint & Corrections to Typographical Errors Incurred During Prior License Amendment. ML1100502982011-01-26026 January 2011 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Revised Pressure and Temperature (P-T) Limit Curves and Relocation of P-T Curves to the PTLR ML1102000582011-01-0707 January 2011 License Renewal Application, Supplemental Information ML1019703592010-07-15015 July 2010 Submittal of License Amendment Request, Cyber Security Plan ML1002700542010-01-24024 January 2010 Proposed License Amendment to Technical Specifications: Revised P-T Limit Curves and Relocation of Pressure-Temperatures (P-T) Curves to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) ENOC-09-00009, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. - License Amendment Request; Proposed Adoption of TSTF-511 Regarding Elimination of Technical Specification Work Hour Restrictions2009-04-27027 April 2009 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. - License Amendment Request; Proposed Adoption of TSTF-511 Regarding Elimination of Technical Specification Work Hour Restrictions ML0828301352008-09-30030 September 2008 Request for License Amendment for Licensee Name Changes ML0734600622007-11-29029 November 2007 Request for License Amendment - Control Room Envelope Habitability (TSTF-7448, Revision 3) ML0721906112007-07-30030 July 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 19 ML0717304672007-06-21021 June 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 18 ML0715503102007-05-17017 May 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 17 ML0707903162007-03-13013 March 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 15 ML0706503502007-02-23023 February 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 14 ML0703702982007-01-30030 January 2007 E-MAIL: (PD) Pilgrim LRA Amendment 13 ML0703802272007-01-17017 January 2007 E-MAIL: (PD) Pilgrim LRA Amendment 12 ML0702302862007-01-16016 January 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 12 ML0702302932007-01-15015 January 2007 Proposed Change to Applicability of Pilgrim'S Pressure - Temperature Curves as Described in Technical Specification Figures 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3, Revision 1 ML0702501752007-01-10010 January 2007 License Renewal Application Amendment 11 ML0701105012007-01-0404 January 2007 Technical Specification Revisions for Control Rod Operability Scram Insertion Times and Control Rod Accumulator Requirements ML0700404412006-12-27027 December 2006 License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-484 Revision 0, Use TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing Activities ML0701004102006-12-12012 December 2006 2006/12/12-Letter from Entergy to NRC Dated 12 December, 2006 (Including Attached PNPS MACCS2 Input Files -attached Cd) Regarding License Renewal Application Amendment for Pilgrim Station Operating License ML0631303512006-11-0202 November 2006 Application for Technical Specification (TS) Change to Add LCO 3.0.8 on the Inoperability of Snubbers (and Adoption of TS Bases for LCO 3.0.8) Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) ML0635601142006-10-25025 October 2006 Reactor Pressure Vessel Fluence Evaluation at End of Cycle 15 and 54 EFPY (Non-Proprietary) ML0625001172006-08-30030 August 2006 2006/08/30-Pilgrim, Response to Requests for Additional Information Re License Renewal Application Amendment 7 ML0624904892006-08-30030 August 2006 Technical Specification Amendment Request to Relocate Specifications Not Meeting the Criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Revision 1, ML0619401752006-07-0505 July 2006 2006/07/05-Pilgrim - License Renewal Application Amendment 3 ML0618704692006-06-30030 June 2006 Technical Specifications Amendment Request to Revise the Surveillance Requirements for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systems ML0610908322006-04-12012 April 2006 Proposed License Amendment to Change Technical Specification 3.6.A.2, Pressure-Temperature Limit Curves ML0603000282006-01-25025 January 2006 2006/01/25-Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application ML0530404502005-10-18018 October 2005 Technical Specifications Amendment Request for Single Control Withdrawal Allowances, TS 3/4.14 Special Operations. 2021-05-28
[Table view] Category:Technical Specification
MONTHYEARML23334A1822023-11-30030 November 2023 Biennial Report for the Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Summary, and Regulatory Commitment Change Summary November 2021 Through October 2023 ML19044A5742019-02-0808 February 2019 Supplement to Technical Specifications Proposed Change - Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications ML18260A0852018-09-13013 September 2018 Technical Specifications Proposed Change - Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications ML17086A1622017-04-0909 April 2017 Correction to Technical Specification Page 5.0-11 ML14349A4952014-12-10010 December 2014 Proposed Change to Technical Specifications Concerning the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio ML14003A0462013-12-12012 December 2013 FSAR Update Revision 29, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59(d) Report, and Regulatory Commitment Changes ML13323A5182013-11-14014 November 2013 Technical Specifications Proposed Change No. 306 Eliminate Certain ESF Requirements During Movement of Irradiated Fuel ML11326A1532011-11-0909 November 2011 FSAR Update Revision 28, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59(d) Report, and Commitment Changes ML1106103972011-02-18018 February 2011 Marked-up and Re-typed Technical Specification and Bases Pages for the Proposed License Amendment Related to Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety Valves (Ssv). ENOC-09-00009, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. - License Amendment Request; Proposed Adoption of TSTF-511 Regarding Elimination of Technical Specification Work Hour Restrictions2009-04-27027 April 2009 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. - License Amendment Request; Proposed Adoption of TSTF-511 Regarding Elimination of Technical Specification Work Hour Restrictions ML0734600622007-11-29029 November 2007 Request for License Amendment - Control Room Envelope Habitability (TSTF-7448, Revision 3) ML0701105012007-01-0404 January 2007 Technical Specification Revisions for Control Rod Operability Scram Insertion Times and Control Rod Accumulator Requirements ML0700404412006-12-27027 December 2006 License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-484 Revision 0, Use TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing Activities ML0530404502005-10-18018 October 2005 Technical Specifications Amendment Request for Single Control Withdrawal Allowances, TS 3/4.14 Special Operations. ML0517204062005-06-0202 June 2005 Technical Specifications Amendment Request to Revise Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection System Instrumentation Requirements and Actions ML0515204682005-05-24024 May 2005 Request for Amendment to Technical Specification to Remove Main Steam Isolation Valve Twice Per Week Testing Surveillance Requirement ML0508205272005-03-22022 March 2005 Technical Specification Pages Re Reporting Requirements ML0426400262004-09-0202 September 2004 License Amendment Request, Technical Specification Changes for Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML0421602262004-07-22022 July 2004 Deletion of Requirement from LCO 3/4.10.D, Multiple Control Rod Removal ML0411302792004-04-14014 April 2004 Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications Reactor Vessel Hydrostatic and Leak Testing Requirements ML0400606222003-12-24024 December 2003 Application for Technical Specification (TS) Improvement to Delete the TS Requirements for the Hydrogen Analyzers Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML0309905332003-03-27027 March 2003 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Related to Technical Specification Changes to Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Requirement ML0235200712002-12-10010 December 2002 Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications (Ts), Jet Pump Operability Surveillance Requirements and Correction to Reference Cited in TS 4.11.C.1 ML0234402372002-12-0404 December 2002 Proposed Change to Applicability of Pilgrim'S Pressure-Temperature Curves as Described in Technical Specification Figures 3.6.1, 3.6.2, & 3.6.3, Revision 1 ML0233002762002-08-19019 August 2002 Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications Changes to Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Requirements ML0224000362002-08-19019 August 2002 Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications Changes to Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Requirements ML0219905242002-07-0505 July 2002 License Amendment Request, Appendix K Measurement Uncertainty Recovery - Power Uprate Request ML0207804112002-03-15015 March 2002 Enclosure -TS Pages and NRC Form 374 ML17037B7791974-02-0707 February 1974 Letter Regarding Petition for Derating of Certain Boiling Water Reactors and Enclosed Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in the Matter of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation - Vermont Yankee Nuclear ... 2023-11-30
[Table view] Category:Bases Change
MONTHYEARML23334A1822023-11-30030 November 2023 Biennial Report for the Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Summary, and Regulatory Commitment Change Summary November 2021 Through October 2023 ML19044A5742019-02-0808 February 2019 Supplement to Technical Specifications Proposed Change - Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications ML18260A0852018-09-13013 September 2018 Technical Specifications Proposed Change - Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications ML14349A4952014-12-10010 December 2014 Proposed Change to Technical Specifications Concerning the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio ML14003A0462013-12-12012 December 2013 FSAR Update Revision 29, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59(d) Report, and Regulatory Commitment Changes ML13323A5182013-11-14014 November 2013 Technical Specifications Proposed Change No. 306 Eliminate Certain ESF Requirements During Movement of Irradiated Fuel ML11326A1532011-11-0909 November 2011 FSAR Update Revision 28, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59(d) Report, and Commitment Changes ML1106103972011-02-18018 February 2011 Marked-up and Re-typed Technical Specification and Bases Pages for the Proposed License Amendment Related to Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety Valves (Ssv). ML0734600622007-11-29029 November 2007 Request for License Amendment - Control Room Envelope Habitability (TSTF-7448, Revision 3) ML0515204682005-05-24024 May 2005 Request for Amendment to Technical Specification to Remove Main Steam Isolation Valve Twice Per Week Testing Surveillance Requirement ML0309905332003-03-27027 March 2003 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Related to Technical Specification Changes to Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Requirement 2023-11-30
[Table view] |
Text
i- Entergy Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Michael A. Balduzzi Site Vice President May 24, 2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS), Removal of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Twice Per Week Testing Surveillance Requirement LETTER NUMBER: 2.05.003
Dear Sir or Madam:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (Entergy) proposes to amend the Pilgrim Station Facility Operating License, DPR-35. This proposed license amendment deletes the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) twice per week partial stroke testing surveillance specified in Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.A.2.b.1.c.
Entergy has reviewed the proposed amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 and concludes it does not involve a significant hazards consideration. The attachments provide a description of the proposed change and mark-up of the Technical Specification and Bases pages.
Entergy requests approval of the proposed amendment by June 1, 2006. Once approved, Entergy will implement the amendment within 60 days.
This letter contains no regulatory commitments.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Bryan Ford at (508) 830-8403.
lr- (
205003
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Letter Number: 2.05.003 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on the 94th of May 2005.
WGL/dm Attachments: 1. Evaluation of the Proposed Change (5 pages)
- 2. Mark-up of Technical Specification pages (2 pages) cc: Mr. John P. Boska, Project Manager Ms. Cristine McCombs, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mass. Emergency Management Agency Mail Stop: 0-8B-1 400 Worcester Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1496 1 White Flint North Framingham, MA 01702 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Robert Walker, Director Region 1 Radiation Control Program 475 Allendale Road Exec Offices of Health & Human Services King of Prussia, PA 19406 174 Portland Street Boston, MA 02114 Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 205003
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of the Prooosed Change
Subject:
Removal of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Partial Closure Stroke Test Surveillance Requirement
- 1. DESCRIPTION
- 2. PROPOSED CHANGE
- 3. BACKGROUND
- 4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
- 5. REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 5.2 Environmental Consideration
- 6. PRECEDENTS
- 7. REFERENCES
Letter 2.05.003 Page 1 of 5 Removal of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
Partial Closure Stroke Test Surveillance Reauirement
- 1. DESCRIPTION Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy proposes to amend the Technical Specifications (TS) for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This proposed change deletes the requirement to perform the twice per week partial stroke testing of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) during power operation as specified in 4.7.A.2.b.1.c. The MSIVs will continue to be full stroke tested in accordance with the in-service testing program in compliance with TS 3/4.13.
This proposal is consistent with guidance provided by the NRC in NUREG-1 482, Section 4.2.4, Note for reducing challenges to relief valves due to MSIV testing, and BWR/4 Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1433). NRC has previously approved similar license amendments for James A Fitzpatrick (TAC No. MA7282, dated February 24, 2000), Vermont Yankee (TAC No. MA8188, dated March 9, 2000), Duane Arnold (TAC No. 80459, dated July 12,1991), and Quad Cities (TAC No. 56507, dated February 20, 1987).
Entergy requests NRC review and approval of the proposed TS change by May 1, 2006.
- 2. PROPOSED CHANGE The TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.A.2.b.1.c is revised to state, "deleted" on TS page 314.7-6.
The second paragraph on TS Bases page B3/4.7-6 is revised to read, "The main steam line isolation valves are functionally tested in accordance with the in-service testing (IST) program". This page is included for information only.
Attachment 2 provides marked-up TS and Bases pages.
- 3. BACKGROUND Pilgrim MSIVs are Atwood-Morill, 20" Y-pattern globe valves, sized to pass rated steam flow, and designed for tight shutoff and positive seating. These are AO-203-1 A, -1B, -1C,
-1D and AO-203-2A, -2B, -2C, -2D. Two solenoid-operated pilot valves, one powered by AC, and the other by DC, actuate each inboard and outboard MSIV. In addition, a separate second AC test solenoid valve can be used to perform a slow closure test of the valve. The inboard MSIVs are powered from 125V Bus D6 for the DC solenoids, and from 120 V Bus Y3 for the AC solenoids; the outboard MSIVs are powered from 125 volt DC Bus D5 for the DC solenoids, and from 120 volt AC Bus Y4 for the AC solenoids.
The MSIVs are designed to close automatically when required to limit the loss of reactor coolant and/or release of radioactive materials in case of a main steam line break, control rod drop, or loss of coolant accident.
The Pilgrim MSIVs are spring closing, pneumatic, piston-operated valves designed to automatically close (fail-safe) upon loss of pneumatic pressure to the valve operator.
The solenoid-operated pilot valves control valve opening and closure. Directing
Letter 2.05.003 Page 2 of 5 pneumatic pressure to the valve operator to overcome the closing force exerted by the spring opens the MSIV, while either a re-directed pneumatic pressure and/or spring force will close the MSIV. Using positioning control valves to direct pneumatic pressure, individual MSIVs can be fast-closed or slow-closed as necessary during periodic testing.
The current TS 4.7.A.2.b.1 .c surveillance requirement of twice per week partial stroke testing was originally incorporated into the TS at the time Pilgrim was first licensed to operate and was intended to establish a high degree of reliability of MSIVs.
The surveillance test requires MSIVs be exercised at power twice weekly by partial closure and reopening. This partial stroke testing is conducted from the control room and is intended to ensure the solenoid-operated pilot valves are not stuck or binding. The control room operator performs the MSIV exercise test by manually depressing a pushbutton switch, which energizes a test pilot solenoid causing a 3-way flow control valve to slowly relieve pneumatic pressure from the actuator. As the MSIV slowly closes, the operator monitors the control room panel indicating lights to verify valve movement. When the MSIV is still about 90% full open, the operator releases the test pushbutton, reversing the flow control valve and causing the MSIV to return to the full open position.
- 4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS The safety function of the MSIVs is to isolate the main steam line in the case of a main steam line break (MSLB), control rod drop (CRA), or loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) in order to limit the loss of reactor coolant and/or the release of radioactive materials.
TS 3/4.13 requires full-stroke testing of MSIVs to verify the safety function in accordance with the in-service testing (IST) program in compliance with ASME Code. The IST requires full-stroke exercising and stroke timing of the MSIVs when practical during scheduled plant power reductions (not more frequently than quarterly testing), which are below 60% power. For those cases when full-stroke testing cannot practically be conducted during a plant down power, valve stroking will be attempted again during the next scheduled plant down power. This IST surveillance tests the reliability and operability, and safety function of the MSIVs for fast and complete closure and reopening, and ensures that the closure times are within the limits of operability (3.0 to 5.0 seconds) as assumed in the safety analysis. Additional testing is performed during refueling outages to demonstrate the functioning of the system.
The purpose of the twice-weekly partial stroke test is to ensure that the MSIVs and their pilots are not binding. This partial stroke test actuates a test pilot instead of the pilot valves used for fast closure of the MSIVs. The indirect indication partial closure movement does not test the safety function of the MSIV's for full closure, and is not as valid as full stroke fast closure test of the MSIVs done in accordance with the IST program. The full-stroke fast closure test in compliance with TS 3.13 adequately demonstrates the safety function of the MSIVs and their pilots are not binding.
The partial stroke test is a high-risk surveillance with marginal or no impact on the reliability of the MSIV safety function. The current twice per week partial stroke test at power creates the potential for inadvertent closure of the MSIVs. This test is considered high risk due to the potential for the inadvertent closure of an MSIV, which could
Letter 2.05.003 Page 3 of 5 create high steam flow in other steam lines causing reactor transients and/or scrams.
The partial stroke test of MSIVs at power is no longer necessary to assure safe reactor operation and reliability of MSIVs. The full stroke testing of MSIVs in accordance with the IST program in compliance with TS 3.13 will continue to be performed to verify the safety function and closure times. This verification of safety function and closure times ensures that Pilgrim will continue to comply with the design bases accident analyses.
Deleting the twice per week partial exercise of the MSIVs is not considered to have any effect on the safety function, reliability, and operability of the MSIVs since the partial stroking does not test the safety function of the MSIVs. The removal of the existing partial testing requirement will decrease the probability of inadvertent scrams, transients, and challenges to the safety relief valves.
Accordingly, Entergy is proposing to delete the surveillance requirement to perform partial stroke testing of MSIVs at power based on current NRC and industry guidance.
This guidance is in BWR Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG -1433), and Guidelines for in-service testing of at Nuclear Power plants (NUREG-1482, Section 4.2.4 Note). Also, the proposed deletion of the surveillance follows the previously approved license amendments for James A Fitzpatrick, Duane Arnold, Vermont Yankee, and Quad Cities nuclear power plants.
- 5. REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) proposes to change the Pilgrim Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance requirement, TS 4.7.A.2.b.1.c. The proposed change deletes the current twice per week partial-stroke testing of the Main Steam Isolative Valves (MSIVs) at power.
Entergy has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:
- 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed change deletes the requirement to exercise the MSIVs twice per week at power. The MSIVs will continue to be full stroke tested by the Inservice Testing Program. The MSIVs will continue to be able to perform their accident mitigation function. The plant response to the design basis accident will not change and the probability of inadvertent MSIV closure will not be increased. Therefore, the proposed change does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accidents.
Letter 2.05.003 Page 4 of 5
- 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The safety function of the MSIVs is to isolate the main steam lines in case of design basis accidents to limit the loss of reactor coolant and/or limit the release of radioactive materials. The proposed change does not introduce any new modes of equipment operation or failure. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The ability of the MSIVs to perform their safety function is tested during the MSIV full stroke fast closure test in accordance with TS 3.13, Inservice Testing Program. The proposed change deletes a high-risk surveillance.
Deletion of the high-risk surveillance does not reduce the margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, Entergy concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.
5.2 Environmental Consideration The proposed change would revise a surveillance requirement frequency related to a system/component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR
- 20. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant tol 0 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.
- 6. PRECENDENTS The NRC has previously approved similar license amendments for James A Fitzpatrick (TAC No. MA7282, dated February 24, 2000), Vermont Yankee (TAC No. MA8188, dated March 9, 2000), Duane Arnold (TAC No. 80459, dated July 12, 1991), and Quad Cities (TAC No. 56507, dated February 20,1987).
Letter 2.05.003 Page 5 of 5
- 7. REFERENCES
- 1. NUREG-1433, Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Plants, BWR/4.
ATTACHMENT 2 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND BASES PAGES (2 pages)
TS page: 3/4.7-6 TS Bases page: B3/4.7-6
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
A. Primary Containment (Cont 91~ east twice per ee the
//main steam 1i power Deleted operated i ation valves sha rcised by partial
- d. Verify reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valve operability as specified in 3.13.
- 2. b. 2. Whenever a primary containment automatic isolation valve is inoperable, the position of the isolated valve in each line having an inoperable valve shall be recorded daily.
- 2. c. Continuous Leak Rate Monitor When the primary containment is inserted, the containment shall be continuously monitored for gross leakage by review of the inerting system makeup requirements. This monitoring system may be taken out of service for maintenance but shall be returned to service as soon as practicable.
- 2. d. Drvwell Surfaces The interior surfaces of the drywell and torus above the water line shall be visually inspected every refueling outage for evidence of deterioration.
Amendment No. 443, 3/4.7-6
BASES:
3/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
A. Primary Containment (Cont)
These valves are highly reliable, have low service requirements and most are normally closed. The initiating sensors and associated trip channels are also checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isolation. The test interval of once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a failure probability of 1.1 x 1 7 that a line will not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability results in a greater assurance that the valve will be operable when needed.
The main steam line isolation valves are functionally testedn a more frequent interval to establish a high degree of reliability. 7__ __
l in accordance with inservice testing program.
The primary containment is penetrated by several small diameter instrument lines connected to the reactor coolant system. Each instrument line contains a 0.25 inch restricting orifice inside the primary containment. A program for periodic testing and examination of the excess flow check valves is in place.
Primary Containment Painting The interiors of the drywell and suppression chamber are painted to prevent rusting.
The inspection of the paint during each major refueling outage, assures the paint is intact. Experience at Pilgrim Station and other BWR's with this type of paint indicates that the inspection interval is adequate.
Vacuum Relief The purpose of the vacuum relief valves is to equalize the pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber and reactor building so that the structural integrity of the containment is maintained. The vacuum relief system from the pressure suppression chamber to reactor building consists of two 100% vacuum relief breakers (2 parallel sets of 2 valves in series). Operation of either system will maintain the pressure differential less than 2 psig; the external design pressure. One valve may be out of service for repairs for a period of seven days. If repairs cannot be completed within seven days, the reactor coolant system is brought to a condition where vacuum relief is no longer required.
The capacity of the 10 drywell vacuum relief valves is sized to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during post-accident drywell cooling to the design limit of 2 psig. They are sized on the basis of the Bodega Bay pressure suppression system tests. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 11I, Subsection B, for this vessel allows a 5 psig vacuum; therefore, with two vacuum relief valves secured in the closed position and eight operable valves, containment integrity is not impaired.
Reactor operation is permissible if the bypass area between the primary containment drywell and suppression chamber does not exceed an allowable area. The allowable bypass area is based upon analysis considering primary system break area, suppression chamber effectiveness, and containment design pressure. Analyses show that the maximum allowable bypass area is 0.2 ft2, which is equivalent to all vacuum breakers open 3/32". (See letters from Boston Edison to the Directorate of Licensing, dated May 15, 1973 and October 22, 1974)
Revision 4-Bg Amadmoent o. 11-a,1C, 1C7 Q B3/4.7-6