ML050760453

Final - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 3)

ML050760453
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/30/2004
From:	Roy D Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-443/03-301, ES-D-1 50-443/03-301
Download: ML050760453 (43)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Out I ine Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Sea broo k Scenario No.:

I Op Test No.:

1 Examiners:

Candidates:

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

Mode 1. Unit at 75% power. IC # 21 0.

The crew will take the shift and commence a rapid downpower to 50% to remove A Main Feedwater Pump from service within the next hour.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks:

1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-0]

2. Control the EFW flow rate to not less than 25 GPM per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe (orange path) challenge develops to the Malf. No.

N/A ptFWPT505 ltRCLT459 mff H002 mff H002 (severity increases) mfRPSOOl m fR P S 0 0 2 mfMS051 mfRPSO19 mfRPS020 svMSV86 svMSV88 svMSV9O svMSV92 mfS1003 mvFWFV4214A V)ormal, (R)eacti ntegrity CSF Event Type*

I (BOP/US)

TS (US)

I (ROWS)

TS (US)

C (BOP/US)

M (ALL)

C (ROIUS)

C (BOP/US)

ECA-2.11 Event Description Rapid power decrease.

PT-505 Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Controlling PZR Level Channel LT-459 fails LOW Turbine Generator Vibrations begin to increase.

After entry into abnormal operating procedure, turbine vibrations will rapidly increase beyond automatic turbine trip setpoint resulting in a turbine trip. The reactor fails to trip automatically when the turbine trips. The crew will have to trip the reactor manually (CT).

The combination of high turbine vibrations and turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of the main steam bottle (down stream of MSIVs). All four MSlVs will fail to close when the MSI signal is actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room should be attempted, but will not cause the MSlVs to close.

Upon automatic actuation of Safety Injection from the RCS cooldown, the A Safety Injection pump will not automatically start. Procedure progression will be E-0 3 E-2 ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF (CT).

The motor operator overloads for EFW flow control valve FW-FV-4214A will trip as soon as valve motion is demanded. The operator will be required to utilize FW-FV-4214B to control EFW flow to A SG.

y, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specification

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO I OVERVIEW The crew will take the shift at 75% with instructions from the SM to reduce power to 50% within the next hour as requested by the dispatcher, After the crew has the shift (prior to placing rods in manual for the downpower), PT-505 fails low. The crew responds in accordance with OS1235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or PT-506 Instrument Failure. The failure of this instrument will result in inward rod movement if rod control is in AUTO. The RO should place rod control in manual to halt rod insertion. The crew will BYPASS PT-505 and continue with the downpower with SM permission. The US will address TS in accordance with OS1 235.05.

The crew continueswith the power reduction. After the crew reduces power by 3-4%, or at the lead examiners instruction, the controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low. The crew responds in accordance with OS1201.07 PZR Level Instrument Failure. Charging flow will increase and letdown will isolate. The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR level controller and restore PZR level. The RO will also restore letdown to service. The US will address TS in accordance with OS1201.07.

After letdown is restored and PZR level is stabilized, the main turbine will experience vibration problems. The crew responds in accordance with ON1231.01, Turbine Generator High Vibration. After progressing beyond step I and at the lead examiners instruction, the turbine vibrations will increase very rapidly beyond the automatic turbine trip setpoint resulting in a Turbine Trip. Since the reactor does not automatically trip, the crew must trip the reactor (CT) and enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The combination of high turbine vibrations and turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of the main steam bottle (down stream of MSIVs). All four MSlVs will fail to close when the MSI signal is actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will not cause the MSlVs to close. The A Safety Injection pump will not automatically start, and should be manually started as part of E-0, Attachment A actions.

Procedure progression will be E-0 3 E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation a ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF. A component failure will occur as the operator attempts to limit EFW flow to the A S/G. The motor overloads for FW-FV-4214A (Train A EFW throttle valve to A SIG) will actuate and require the operator to utilize FW-FV-4214B (Train B EFW throttle valve to A S/G) to limit EFW to SG A to 25 gprn. When feed flow has been reduced, NSO(s) dispatched to the MSlVs will successfully close MSlVs in the west pipe chase (SG A and 0).

The crew will exit ECA-2.1 returning to E-2. With EFW limited to 25 gpm a RED condition will exist for the HEAT SINK CSF. A note at the beginning of FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink states that the procedure should NOT be implemented if feed flow was reduced by operator action. The scenario will be terminated at Lead Examiner discretion.

Simulator Operating Exam - Scenario I The purpose of scenario one is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as a Turbine Vibration problem which progresses beyond automatic turbine trip setpoint that fails to result in a reactodturbine trip requiring prompt operator action. The scenario will develop into all S/Gs faulted with several complications.

The crew takes the watch at 75% power with instructions to commence a rapid downpower maneuver to 50% to remove the A MFP from service. Shortly after taking the shift, PT-505 Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitter fails low. This instrument failure will cause rods to insert automatically. The RO is expected to verify plant conditions, stop rod motion, and restore plant conditions to program band. The USshould direct actions in accordance with OS1235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or PT-506 Instrument Failure.

Descr,tion:

Position NOTE CREW NOTE CUE RO BOP us RO BOP BOP PT-505 TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW Applicants Actions or Behavior Shaded items are CRITICAL TASKS.

Commence power decrease in accordance with OS1 000.06, Power Decrease. (Figure 6 provides guidance for >I Ooh/hr rapid downpower)

The first event will take place shortly after the crew assumes the watch and prior to any actions to reduce power so that the first event takes dace while control rods are in AUTO.

After the crew has the watch and on the lead examiners cue, PT-505 transmitter fails. This generates a B7457 ROD MOTION DETECTED and a D4421 TAVE-TREF DEVIATION alarm on the VAS. The sound of rods stepping in should be noted by the crew.

RO may take manual control of rods as a skill of the operator.

He is expected to check that the rod motion is not warranted by high rave or turbine load reduction first.

Checks FW-PI-505 and determines it has failed low and informs US.

Enters OS1 235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 Or PT-506 Instrument Failure Places rod control in MANUAL. Manually controls rods or turbine load to restore Tavg to program level.

Place steam dump controller to STEAM PRESSURE mode, adiusts steam dump pressure setpoint to 1092 psig and places Steam Dump Controller in AUTO Verifies other plant status items (AMSAC, P-13)

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 1 of 13

Verify TS compliance TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item 18.f. Rx Trip System Instrumentation. Action 8: determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator windows that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. Contacts maintenance/l&C about channel failure. Directs I&C to place AMSAC channel in NOTE BYPASS.

I&C will be called to troubleshoot the failed instrument. The instrument will be put in BYPASS which will remove input to any controVprotection systems. The I&C personnel will also conduct any tripping of bistables called for by Technical Specification Action Statements.

The crew continues with the power reduction. After the crew reduces power by 3-4%, and when directed by the lead examiner, the controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low. Charging flow will increase and letdown will isolate.

The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR level controller and restore PZR level. The RO will also restore letdown to service.

Event Descr Time ttion:

Position CREW NOTE us RO BOP us us NOTE POWER REDUCTION Amlicants Actions or Behavior After crew completes OS1235.05, SM directs them to continue downpower. Allow candidates to demonstrate reactivity control by reducing power by 3-4% (lead examiners discretion).

During power reduction, RO must maintain AFD within administrative limits.

Establishes reactivity management strategy, which should include temperature band, rod control method, AFD band, reactivity plan and load schedule.

Refers to ODI-56 values for amount of boric acid to be added.

Calculates load schedule or refers to the schedule provided in ODI-56.

Makes required notifications or requests SM make these notifications.

Directs reactivity manipulations and ensures required peer checks occur.

Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the boration/dilution and makeup evolution. This will ensure proper system response is verified as well as the desired amount.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 2 of 13

RO US/BO P/RO RO RO BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP CUE RO us RO RO RO RO Adds required amount of Boron using OS1008.01, Figure 3 (Boration Checklist). This includes verifying proper system line-up, Placing Blender Mode Start Switch to STOP. Placing Boric Acid Blender Mode Selector Switch to BORATE, selecting desired flow rate and quantity, Placing Blender Mode Start Switch to START, verifying proper plant response, and resetting the control system to AUTO when desired amount of acid is added.

Peer checks will be provided for all reactivity manipulations.

Because of a three man crew, this peer check can be provided by the US.

As directed by US, if RCS boron concentration is being changed by greater than 50 ppm, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.

RO will manually insetdwithdraw rods to maintain axial flux difference in band.

Use the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to the desired load.

If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.

Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine Generato; Capability Curve and load dispatcher's instructions.

Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled.

Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.

FAILURE OF CONTROLLING PZR LEVEL INSTRUMENT VAS D4461 PZR LVL LOW & HTR INTERLOCK ACTUATED &

F4324/F4325 PZR GROUP C/D BACKUP HTR TRIPPED &

F4323 PZR CONTROL HEATERS TRIPPED annunciators are received. Also Ll-459 indication fails low.

Recognizes controlling channel (Ll-459) has failed low.

Recognizes letdown has isolated. Informs US.

Enters and directs action IAW OS1 201.07, "PZR Level Instrument Failure".

Takes manual control of PZR level controller RC-LK-459 or controls level with letdown and charging flow.

Selects an alternate level channel for CONTROL/BACKUP as necessary. Selects an alternate RECORDER channel.

Resets the control group of PZR heaters.

Determines that letdown can be restored and restores letdown IAW OS1201.07.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 3 of 13

~

RO NOTE RO us NOTE -

NOTE us Establish normal letdown: VERIFIES CC-V341 OPEN.

VERIFIES CS-TK-130 in AUTO, CLOSE CS-HCV-189, CLOSE CS-HCV-190, OPEN RC-LCV-459, OPEN CS-VI 45, establish letdown flow using letdown flow control valves.

OS1002.08, PZR Level Control System Operations may be referenced to restore system to AUTO.

Returns PZR level controller to AUTO after proper controller setpoint and proper PZR level are established.

Verifies TS compliance 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item 11 and TS 3.3.3.6, item 5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Verifies redundant channel bistables NOT tripped and inform I&C of control le r fa i I u re.

Table 3-3.1 item 1 I:

inoperable channel LT-459 tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.3.3.6 item 5: requires that LT-459 be returned to operable status within 7 days.

Informs I & C of failed channel and requests assistance with troubleshooting including placing LT-459 in bypass (if desired bv lead examiner)

When directed by the lead examiner, the main turbine generator vibrations will begin to increase to about 8-1 0 mils requiring entry into ON1231.01, Turbine High Vibrations. Once into the abnormal and beyond step 1, Turbine Vibrations will rapidly increase beyond the turbine trip setpoint causing an automatic turbine trip. However, the reactor will fail to trip, requiring a manual reactor trip (CT).

Immediately following reactor trip, a catastrophic failure of the MS Bottle downstream of MSlVs will occur. MSlV will not be able to close until much later in the scenario when NSOs locally close the A and D MISVs from the west pipe chase. Other complications will occur as follows:

Event

==

Description:==

Time Posit ion CUE CUE MAIN GENERATOR VIBRATIONS I AUTO TURBINE TRIP w/o AUTO REACTOR TRIP LEADING TO ALL SIGS FAULTED WITH INABILITY TO ISOLATE FAULT FROM CONTROL ROOM WITH OTHER COMPLICATIONS Applicants Actions or Behavior After the US discusses TS requirements for the failure of controlling PZR level instrument, and at the discretion of the lead examiner, the main turbine generator vibrations will begin to increase as noted by VAS 65933 TURB GEN BRG 7 VIBRATION HIGH & 65935 TURB GEN BRG 8 VIBRATION HIGH.

After the crew has progressed beyond step 1 of ONI231.01, Turbine Generator High Vibration, the Turbine will AUTO trip as noted by RED Hardwire ANNUCIATOR on UA-52, TURBINE TRIP, White Hardwire on UA-53, TURBINE TRIP, and numerous vibration alarms are received on VAS.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 4 of 13

NOTE BOP us BOPlUS BOP BOP/US BOP/US CUE ROWS us RO BOP RO/B OPI us RO BOP If the crew is conservative and decides to trip the reactorlturbine based on high vibrations increasing quickly, then it is important that we increase severity before they trip in order to preserve critical tasks.

Acknowledges alarms for high turbine vibrations and pulls up MPCS graphics to monitor bearing vibration.

Directs entry into ON1231.01, High Turbine Vibration.

Monitors vibrations less than trip limits. Determines that Bearing 7 & 8 are limiting at about 10 mils. (alarm is at 8 mils)

Checks Main Generator breaker closed.

Directs turbine load adjusted until vibration levels are less than values needed to support extended operations. May get Engineering involved.

Checks Turbine vibrations stable or increasing. (vibrations will remain stable until lead examiner requests the severity in creased)

After trip and insertion of Main Steam Bottle rupture, the crew will hear the noise generator simulating main steam noise from steamline break until S/Gs are blown down.

Recognizes the reactor did NOT trip and MANUALLY trips the Reactor (CT).

Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Immediate actions: Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open. neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit. Checks if SI is actuated, verifies bothtrains of SI actuated.

immediate actions: Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open, Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

Performs ESF Actuation Verification per Attachment A of E-0.

Notes A SI Pump did not start and manually starts the A SI pump. Informs the US that the A SI pump did not start but was manually started. Also as part of this attachment Main Steamline isolation is checked. It should be noted all S/G pressures are less than 585 psig, that MSIVs did not close, manual attempt failed and the status should be reported to the us Checks containment pressure has remained less than 18 psig by pressure recorder.

Verify Total EFW Flow - Greater than 500 GPM.

USNRC Examination - Seabrodc Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 5 of 13

RO/BOP BOP BOP/US RO RO BOP us BOP/US BOP/US ~

NOTE us NOTE BOP 30P 30P

~

30P 30P Monitor RCS temperature - Stable At or Trending to 557F.

RCS will be cooling down due to rupture of MS bottle and MSlVs failing to close. Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere. OPEN EFW min-flow valves AND throttle total feed flow to maintain greater than 500 gpm. If cooldown continues, close MSIVs, MSlV bypasses and upstream drains.

MSD-V44 & 45 must be closed on rear of MCB.

Identifies FW-FV-4214A did not close when attempts are made to throttle EFW. Should throttle FW-FV-4214B to reduce EFW flow.

NSOs should be sent to locally close MSIVs when it is recoanized that MSIVs cannot be closed from MCB.

Check RCS isolated. Verify letdown isolated. Verify PORVs closed. Verify normal Spray valves closed.

Check if RCPs should be stopped. Reports adequate subcooling exists such that RCPs do not need to be secured.

Check if SG Pressure Boundary is Faulted. All S/G pressures are decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or may be completely depressurized.

Directs transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator based on S/G A depressurization.

Check Main Steam Isolation. Manually closes MSlVs from MCB and directs local closure (may have been previously performed )

Checks if SG pressure boundary is intact. Notes all S/Gs are decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized at this time.

If S/G boils dry, the BOP may adjust ASDV setpoints to stabilize RCS temperature as directed by Operator Action Summary page of E-2.

Directs transition to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs US may address the RED HEAT SINK CSF. He should note

[he caution in FR-H.l prior to step 1 and not perform FR-H.1. A 2aution in ECA-2.1 also states that FR-H.l should not be Implemented unless 500 gpm is not available.

Check Secondary Pressure boundary. Manually closes MSlVs kom MCB and directs local closure (should have been x-eviously performed)

heck S/G ASDVs closed.

2hecks FWRV and FWRV bypasses closed.

2hecks FWlVs closed.

2hecks MDEFW or SUFP feedwater to supplying S/Gs USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 6 of 13

BOP RO/BOP RO BOP/US BOP RO RO RO RO/BOP RO RO RO RO RO CUE NOTE Closes MS-393 and MS-394.

~

Checks S/G Blowdown valves SB-9, 10, 11, 12 closed.

Control feed flow to minimize RCS cooldown. Check cooldown rate in RCS less than 100 F/hr

~

Open EFW pump mini-flow valves and decrease feed flow to not less than 25 gpm to each S/G (CT)

Checks narrow range S/G levels less than 50%.

~~

Check RCS hot leg temperatures stable or decreasing.

Checks if RCPs should be stopped.

Checks PZR PORV and Block Valves.

Checks secondary radiation.

Checks if RHR pumps should be stopped.With RCS pressure greater than 260 psig, reset SI and stop RHR pumps placing them in standby.

Checks if Containment Spray should be stopped. Should not be running.

Check RWST level greater than 115,000 gallons.

Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated. If at least two RCS hot leg temperatures are 370 F than energize MCC-E522 and E622 and isolate accumulators, then de-energize MCC-E522 and E622 Check if ECCS flow should be reduced. Action taken in this step will determine course of action. If RCS pressure is still decreasing the procedure will loop the operator back to step 2.

If RCS pressure is increasing and PZR is > 5%, then SI will be reset.

Lead examiner may terminate scenario at any point in ECA-2.1 or if desired to upon transition back to E-2. IF desired to transistion back to E-2, it will be reported at this time that A &

D MSlVs have been successfully locally closed.

Upon completion of follow-up questioning, the SRO will perform JPM LOIT08 (Post EAL Determination and Event CI ass if icat ion)

They should declare a UE based on EAL-15b It is also possible they may declare a SAE based on the red path which exists on HEAT SINK due to throttling in ECA-2.1 which is acceptable.

This will be determined by the staff based on the endpoint of the scenario.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 7 of 13

Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 1 Please track the following parameters in addition to the standard set (if any):

0

1.

2.

3.

4.

Initialize the simulator at IC #210, 75% power. (This IC is password protected for NRC security reasons. Password can be obtained from Ian

~ 0 0

0 I Forbes or Len Hubbard ONLY)

I mfRPS002 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) mfRPSO19 MS ISOLATION FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE (TRAIN A) mfRPS020 MS ISOLATION FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE (TRAIN B) 0 I Protected train is A.

0 0

0 0

0 0

mvCSVl97, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN bkCSl P2B BREAKER RACKED-OUT Ensure or place the control switch for CS-P-26 in PTL Ensure CS-V-197 is CLOSED with power removed.

Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 Ensure the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light is illuminated.

Verify the following inserted / activated:

0 I mfRPSOO1 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) 0 0

0 0

0 mfS1003 SI Pump P-6A FAILS TO AUTO START svMSV86 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV88 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV90 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 8 of 13

Perform immediately after simulator is in RUN:

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 ENSURE simulator is stabilized and alarms are cleared.

Run SlMHlST ENSURE applicable items on Simulator Setup Checklist (NT-5701-6) are completed SELECT: MF List

-SELECT: Feedwater (component)

SELECT: mvFW FV4214A SELECT: FAILS OPEN INSERT Ensure the following Procedures are Available:

0 0

0 0

0 0

OS1000.06, Opened to Figure 6 for Downpower per Turnover OS1 235.05 OS1 201.07 ON1231.01 E-2 ECA-2.1 FR-H.l USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 9 of 13

Shortly after the crew assumes the watch and only after lead examiners cue:

0 0

0 0

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Feedwater (component)

SELECT: ptFWPT505 SELECT: Fail LOW SELECT: INSERT To select operator bypass for PT-505:

0 0

0 I SELECT: Panel Overview 4

SELECT: AMSAC CP-519 SELECT: Switch SW12 to TPIMP (P505) 0 0

Crew continues power reduction.

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: BTI CP1 When directed by lead examiner:

Fail Controlling PZR Level Transmitter.

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant (component)

SELECT: ltRCLT459 SELECT: Fail LOW SELECT: INSERT If I&C is directed to bypass LT-459:

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 10 of 13

When directed by lead examiner:

0 0

0 0

0 0

Main Turbine Generator Vi brations Increase:

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Turbine Generator SELECT: mffH002 ENTER: 300 (seconds) into ramp time ENTER: 6 (mils) into final value SELECT: INSERT 0

0 0

0 0

SELECT: malfunctions at top of page SELECT: mffH002 ENTER: 0 (seconds) into ramp time ENTER: 18 (mils) into final value SELECT: MODIFY 0

0 0

0 0

AS SOON AS REACTOR IS TRIPPED insert a catastrophic rupture of the Main Steam Bottle (downstream of the MSIVs).

SELECT: malfunctions at top of page SELECT: mffH002 ENTER: 200 (seconds) into ramp time ENTER: 0 (mils) into final value SELECT: MODIFY 0

0 0

0 USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Main Steam SELECT: mfMS051 SELECT: Final Value of 1 (no time delay or ramp SELECT: INSERT Page 11 of 13

Security will call the Control Room and inform them that there are massive quantities of steam on the south end of the Turbine Building.

0 Previously, Auto and Manual MSI and Auto MSIV closure malfunctions (previously inserted) will cause all S/Gs to blowdown. Once the crew has reduced EFW flow to about 25 gpm per S/G (CT) in ECA-2.1, NSOs who have been dispatched to locally close MSIVs will be successful in the West Pipe Chase closing the A and D MSIVs (if desired by lead examiner)

SELECT: COMPONENT MF at top of page CLICK ON: svMSV86 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN CLICK ON: svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN SELECT : DELETE MF USNRC Examination - Seabrwk Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 12 of 13

Briefing SheetITurnover Information for Scenario 1 Protected Train is A MODE 1 : 75% RTP, CBD @ 180 steps (ARO = 230 steps), Boron Concentration

= 939 ppm. ODI-56 Values for MOL Core 10 on US desk, + I degrees = 170 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 27 gal BA; AFD target - 1.39. C and D Backup Heaters are ON.

The Shift Manager has provided instructions to reduce power to 50% within the next hour to remove A Main Feedwater Pump from service. Figure 6 of OS1000.06 will be used as guidance for this downpower. ODI-56 values for 25%/HOUR to 18% MainTurbine Shutdown Values should be used.

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for planned maintenance. Entered TR 3.1 2.2 and TSAS 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover.

Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after turnover.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 1 Page 13 of 13

2. PERFORM TRANSFER to cold leu recirculation when automatic SwaDover occurs Malf. No.

N/A ltFW LT529 ptRCPT455 mf RC024A mfCBS004 mfCBS005 mfFCS002 mfFW039 svMS1 V395 bkFWP37B N/A rmal, (R)eacti

)r -

115,OOQ Event Type R (RO)

N (BO P/US)

TS (US)

I (BOPNS)

TS (US)

I (RO/US)

TS (US)

Faci I ity:

Seabrook Scenario No.:

2 OpTest No.:

2 Examiners:

Candidates:

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

Mode 2. Unit is operating at 1 O-amps, MOL. IC# 21 1 The crew will take the shift and commence a power increase up to but not to exceed 3% power.

The C Primary Component Water pump is tagged out for bearing replacement. The motor experienced high vibrations during quarterly surveillance.

Seismic Event occurred two shifts ago.

1. MANUALLY actuate at least one train of Containment Spray or start one train of Containment Spray Building Equipment prior to step 7 of E-0 following Large Break Critical Tasks:

LOCA. [E-0]

Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 (N:

N/A ons in the RWST, ihichever occurs first. [ES-1.31 -

Event Description Raise reactor power from amps to approximately 3% power Place Electric EFW Pump (P-37B) in PTL after SM informs crew that it is reported to be inoperable and address TS.

FIN-LT-529 Fails LOW causing the B Feedwater Regulating Bypass valve to fail open.

Controlling PZR pressure channel fails HIGH.

Large Break LOCA occurs leading to automatic reactor trip with failure of Containment Spray pumps to automatically start upon Phase B actuation. The crew will have to manually start at least one Containment Spray pump (CT). Upon completion of immediate actions, all RCPs should be tripped based on E-0 Operator Action Summary. The B CCP pump will not automatically start, and should be manually started as part of E-0, Attachment A actions.

The SUFP will trip after reactor trip and MS-V395 will close after the Steam Driven EFW Pump Auto Starts, causing it to shutdown. It should be recognized by the BOP that there is no EFW flow.

Procedure progression will be E-0 to E-1 to FR-P.1 (Red) to FR-Z.l (Orange) to E-1 to ES-1.3.

Perform transfer to cold leg recirculation per ES-1.3 when the automatic swapover occurs or 11 5,000 gallons in the RWST, whichever occurs first. (CT) ty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specification

SCtNAHlO 2 OV-W The crew will take the watch at lo-amps on the intermediate range channels. The C PCCW Pump is tagged out for maintenance. The crew is instructed to continue a power increase in accordance with OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality and OS1000.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load.

After the crew assumes the watch, they will continue power ascension in accordance with OS1000.07, Approach to Criticality. Once the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity addition, the SM will inform the US that Engineering has determined the Electric EFW Pump to be inoperable. The US should direct P-37A placed in PTL and address TS. He should recognize that a Mode change is not allowed based on these plant conditions.

Once the US has evaluated TS for EFW pump condition and at lead examiners discretion, the B S/G level transmitter, LT-529, fails LOW. The crew should respond to the failure in accordance with OS1 253.03. The high input to the feed control system will cause B S/G feed regulating bypass valves to modulate OPEN, increasing feed flow to B S/G. There is no redundant channel for this level transmitter thus the BOP operator must maintain manual control of S/G B feed regulating bypass valve for the remainder of the startup. The US will verify TS compliance at the discretion of the lead examiner during or following the scenario.

After the US verifies TS compliance or at the lead examiners discretion, the controlling PZR pressure instrument fails high. PZR spray initiates and RCS pressure will decrease rapidly. It is expected that the RO will identify the failed channel and take manual control of the master pressure controller, stabilizing RCS pressure. TS assessment is can be performed during the scenario or immediately following at the Lead Examiners discretion. If the crew is not timely, the plant may trip on low pressure safety injection (low pressure trip blocked by P-7/P-10) which will not adversely affect the scenario.

Whether the crew manually trips the reactor or the reactor automatically trips, A Large Break LOCA will occur with a failure of both containment spray pumps to automatically start. It is a critical task that the crew manually starts at least one containment spray pump prior to step 7 of E-0 (CT).

Following E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection immediate actions, the RCPs should be tripped based on E-0 Operator Action Summary required actions. It should be recognized that the B CCP did not start and the pump should be manually started during E-0 Attachment A actions. The BOP should recognize the SUFP tripped and the Steam Driven EFW PUMP started but MS-V395 closed and P-37A secured post reactor trip, therefore no EFW flow exists. (Electric EFW Pump P-378 previously placed in PTL). Note that at this low power, there is still adequate S/G inventory and S/G heat sink is not an issue during large break LOCA.

Procedure progression following reactor trip is E-0 to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant to FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions (RED) to FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure (ORANGE) to E-1 and to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Note that transitions to FR-P.l and FR-Z.l are dependant upon whether plant conditions are met which differ during a low power scenario based on crew progression through procedures. Note that within three minutes of receiving the RWST Lo-Lo level alarm the first three steps of ES-1.3 must be performed. It is a critical task that at least one train of cold leg recirculation be established (CT). Note also that because this is a low power scenario, it is possible depending on how expeditious the crew is to start containment spray, that FRP entry conditions may NOT be met (ie: RCS temperature does may not drop low enough or containment pressure does not remain high enough).

_ I Simulator Operating Exam - Scenario 2 The purpose of scenario two is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures during low power plant conditions following a power increase and TS issue which surfaces related to an EFW pump (P-37B) reported to be inoperable. The scenario will develop into a Large Break LOCA with complications requiring the crew to deal with several FRPs.

The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a power increase from 1 0-8 amps to 3%. C PCCW is danger tagged for maintenance. The S/G B level transmitter, LT-529, fails LOW resulting in S/G B feed regulating bypass valves modulating open, increasing feed to S/G B.

I Event Descri Time tion:

Position NOTE CREW NOTE NOTE RO RO CUE us BOP POWER ASCENSION/ TS ISSUE & S/G B LEVEL TRANSMllTER FAILS LOW Applicants Actions or Behavior Shaded items are CRITICAL TASKS.

POWER ASCENSION Crew assumes the watch and continues with power ascension on step 4.7 of OS1 200.07, Approach to Criticality then starts OS1 200.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Loading. A reactivity brief should occur.

Step 4.7.1 of OS1200.07: The reactor is critical and power is being maintained at approximately intermediate range. To continue plant startup to minimum load, refer to OS1 000.02.

Caution: Do not exceed the capacity of the startup feed pump (191 amps or 3% RTP). Do NOT exceed a STABLE start up rate of 1 DPM.

amps in the Increase reactor power to between 1% and 3% by soluble boron control or control rod motion, and maintain TAVG greater than or equal to TREF and within the limits of Figure 2, TAVG Program.

RO will have manual control of control rods and withdraw rods at a rate determined by US.

Once the reactivity manipulation is completed satisfactorily and with lead examiner concurrence, the SM will report that the Electric EFW Pump has been reported by Engineering to be inoperable.

Directs BOP to place P-37B in PTL.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISSUE (P-37B)

Places P-37B in PTL, acknowledges alarm and reports the same.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 1 of 11

us us BOP Addresses TS for the reported condition. Enters TSAS 3.7.1.2a and TS 3.0.4. Recognizes a mode change cannot occur.

S/G B LEVEL TRANSMllTER FAILS LOW Once the EFW issue has been evaluated by the NRC team, the lead examiner will direct the failure of the B S/G level transmitter, LT-529, to its LOW value. The low S/G level will cause B S/G feed regulating bypass valve to modulate open and B S/G water level to increase. VAS F4840 S/G B LEVEL are received.

LO-LO, D4877, S/G B LEVEL LO, & D4771, S/G B LVL DEV us Informs US of increasing S/G water level in B S/G. The BOP will verify level deviation on controlling level channel, FW-LI-529. The BOP will take manual control of S/G B feed regulating bypass valve and restore S/G B water level to the program level.

The US will enter and direct action from OS1235.03, S/G Level Instrument Failure.

Check S/G Water Level Control, identify failed instrument.

narrow range level detectors.

Verify redundant bistables NOT tripped. Verify Technical BOP I Control S/G water level manually between 50-70% on the NOTE us Specification Compliance, TS 3.3.1 -table 3.3-1 item 13 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3, items 5.b, 6.a, 7.c, and 10.c Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instruments, TS 3.3.3.6 table 3.3-1 0, item 7 Accident Monitoring Instruments.

TS Actions required:

For 3.3.1 and 3.3.2: startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.

For 3.3.3.6: requires LT-529 to be returned to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> per action b.

Notifies I&C of level channel failure and directs them to come to the control room.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 2 of 11

When directed by the lead examiner, the controlling PZR pressure channel, PT-455, fails high, causing the spray valves to open and RCS pressure to rapidly decrease. The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR pressure controller and restore RCS pressure to NOP.

Event Descriotion:

Time Position CUE us RO PZR PRESSURE INSTRUMENT PT-455 FAILURE Applicants Actions or Behavior At lead examiners cue, the controlling channel of PZR pressure fails high. VAS F7860 PZR PRESS HI CHANNEL TRIP is received. Also a white light on UL-6 for Hi Press P-455A illuminates.

Enters and directs actions of OS1 201.06, PZR Pressure I nst rument/Com ponent Failure Checks PORVs closed.

-r RO Check Normal PZR Spray valves Closed. With PZR pressure

~ 2 2 6 0 psig, the RO may take manual control of spray valves and close them. This should stop RCS pressure drop and avoid reactor trip.

Determines that PT-455 has failed high.

RO RO RO US/RO Takes manual control of master PZR pressure controller or heaters and spray and restores normal pressure. (This step may have been already been performed as a Skill of the Operator action prior to reading procedural step due to the raDid imDact on the Dlant)

CONTROUBACKUP, as necessary.

Selects an alternate pressure channel recorder as necessary.

Selects an alternate delta T, Overtemperature and Over pressure channel for recorder as necessary.

Once RCS pressure is restored to normal than align pressure control to auto.

Verify Redundant Channel Bistables NOT TRIPPED and Verify Selects an alternate pressure channel for NOTE Technical Specification Compliance: TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1,

items 7,9, and 10 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation. TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3 items 1.d and 1O.a ESFAS Instrumentation.

TS 3.2.5 DNB Parameters (if pressure drops below 21 85psig).

Ensures I&C is informed.

TS 3.2.5: with pressure below 2185 psig, restore pressure to its normal limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less us USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 than 5% RTP within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Informs I & C of failed channel and requests assistance with troubleshooting including placing PT-455 in bypass (if desired by lead examiner)

Page 3 of 11

When directed by the lead examiner, INSERT Large break LOCA. The failure of Spray pumps to AUTO start is dormant. Following Reactor Trip, INSERT the trip of the SUFP and MS-V395 closure.

Event

==

Description:==

Time Position CUE us RO BOP RO/US RO/BOP/

us RO BOP RO/BOP LARGE BREAK LOCA with FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS TO AUTO START and OTHER COMPLICATIONS Applicants Actions or Behavior After the US discusses TS requirements for the failure of controlling PZR pressure instrument, and at the discretion of the lead examiner, a Large Break LOCA will be inserted which leads to an automatic reactor and turbine trip.

Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Immediate actions: Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit. Checks if SI is actuated, verifies both trains of SI actuated.

Immediate actions: Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open, Verifies power to AC Emergency busses. verifies all emeraencv busses eneraized.

Upon completion of immediate actions, it should be recognized that with no subcooling and SI or CCPs running that RCPs should be tripped based on Operator Action Summary for E-0.

Performs ESF Actuation Verification per Attachment A of E-0.

Notes B CCP Pump did not start and manually starts the B CCP pump. Informs the US that the B CCP pump did not start but was manually started.

Checks containment pressure has remained less than 18 psig Verify Total ERN Flow - Greater than 500 GPM. EFW pumps will have started due to the SI. Because of the low power scenario there will be more than sufficient inventory in the S/Gs. The BOP should recognize the SUFP did not start and inform US.

Monitor RCS temperature - Stable at or Trending to 557F.

RCS will be cooling down due to SI flow. Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere. OPEN EFW min-flow valves AND throttle total feed flow to maintain greater than 500 gpm.

When SG level is adequate based on 65% wide range in at least two S/Gs or 5% narrow range in at least one S/G (25%

narrow range in at least one S/G if adverse), then throttle feed flow to restore S/G level between 25% and 50% narrow range.

If cooldown continues, close MSIVs, MSlV bypasses and upstream drains.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 4 of 11

RO RO BOP/US RO/BOP/

us RO/BOP/

us us RO Note RO/BOP/

us RO/BOP/

us BOP NOTE BOP/RO/

us could transition into E-2 based on lower pressure in A and B S/G due to a combination of steam flow to Steam Driven AFW pump being supplied from these two S/Gs and low power scenario. If this is the case they will perform E-2 actions and then transition to E-1.

Check RCS isolated. Verify letdown isolated. Verify PORVs closed. Verify normal Spray valves closed.

Check if RCPs should be stopped. Should have been previously secured by OAS, however, if not they will be secured in this step.

Check if SG Pressure Boundary is Faulted. Note: The crew Check if SG U-tubes are intact.

Check if RCS is intact. Recognizes containment pressure/radiation level and containment building level are abnormal.

Directs transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Check if RCPs should be stopped. (should already have been stopped)

Upon first transition out of E-0, CSF Status Trees should be verified. Based on how far the RCS cools down, will determine whether or not an orange or red path will exist for FR-P.l. Also depending on how fast the operators are to start Containment Spray pumps and process through EOPs will determine how high containment pressure is and therefore whether an orange path exists for FR-Z.l. Actions for possible FRP entry are outlined below:

If a red or orange path exists for FR-P.1 at any time during this scenario, the crew will transition to this procedure, check RCS pressure is < 260 psig and return to procedure step in effect since PTS is not a concern.

If an orange path exists for FR-Z.l due to high containment pressure, the crew will transition to this procedure, Verify Containment Isolation Phase A, check if containment spray is required, verify at least one containment enclosure fan is running, verify MSIVs, bypasses and upstream drains isolated, check if feed flow should be isolated to any SG, Check hydrogen concentration and exit this procedure to return to Drocedure and step in effect.

Checks if SG pressure boundary is faulted.

Check intact S/G levels. Should have adequate inventory.

Checks secondary radiation and determines no transition to E-3 is necessaw.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 5 of 11

RO Check PZR PORV and Block Valves.

RO/US RO RO BOP Check if ECCS flow should be reduced. Based on insufficient subcooling, the US will proceed to step 7.

Check if containment spray pumps should be stopped. If containment pressure has dropped below 4 psig than reset Phase B isolation and containment spray signals, stop CBS pumps and place in standby.

Check if RHR pumps should be stopped. Determine RCS RO/BOP RO/US pressure is e 260 psig and do not stop RHR pumps.

Check RCS and SG Pressure. If SG pressure is NOT stable or NOTE RO/US RO RO/BOP/

isolate SW to EDG.

Evaluate plant status by verifying cold leg recirculation capability.

Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization required.

us E

BOP Check if transfer to cold leg recirculation is required (auto swapover actuated or RWST 115,000 gallons). When conditions are met transition to ES-1.3.

May take awhile to get here based on Spray Pumps being secured when containment pressure decreases less than 4 psig.

nd establish at least one ecirculation mode (CT) To accomplish this critical task the following items must be accomplished:

Transition to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Within three minutes of receiving RWST Lo-Lo Level Alarm, Reset SI, Verify CBS-V8 and V14 FULL OPEN, Simultaneously close CBS-V2 and V5.

Verify RHR pumps at least one running.

Place running RHR pump switches in normal after start Position.

Close SI pump mini-flow valves (SI-V89, 90, & 93)

Energize MCC-E522 & E622.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 6 of 11

Close RHR Discharge to cold legs 1 & 2 (RH-V14)

Open SI and CCP suctions (CSV460,461, & 475)

Open RHR supplies to SI and CCP suctions (RH-V35 & 36)

Start any pump that was stopped due to RWST empty alarm.

Isolate RWST feed to CCPs and SI pumps (close CBS-V47 &

51, CS-LCV-112D & 1 12E, De-energize CS-LCV-112D &

11 2E.

Deenergize MCC-E522 & E622.

Place the simulator in freeze at Lead Examiner discretion.

Upon completion of follow-up questioning, the SRO will perform JPM LOIT08 (Post EAL Determination and Event Classification)

They should declare a SAE based on EAL-l5d, but this will be determined bv the staff based on the endDoint of the scenario.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 7 of 11

Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 2 0

Please track the following parameters in addition to the standard set (if any):

Initialize the simulator at IC #211, 1 O-% power. (This IC is password protected for NRC security reasons. Password can be obtained from Ian Forbes or Len Hubbard ONLY)

1.

2.

3.

4.

0

[7 0 Protected train is B.

ENSURE Train B on MPCS.

SWAP sign to reflect TRAIN B on MCB 0

0 Ensure or place the control switch for CC-P-11 C in PTL with power removed.

Danger tag CC-P1 1 C control switch Verify the following inserted / activated:

0 0

mfCBS004 CBS P-9A FAILS TO AUTO START (TRAIN A) mfCBSOO5 CBS P-9B FAILS TO AUTO START (TRAIN B) mfCS002 CS-P2B FAILS TO AUTO START Perform immediately after simulator is in RUN: Minimize Run & monitor power.

17 0

~~

0 FNSURE simulator is stabilized and alarms are cleared.

I Run SlMHlST ENSURE applicable items on Simulator Setup Checklist (NT-5701-6) are 0

0 0

I completed I

OS1 000.07 &, OS1 000.02 signed off up to step per turnover OS1253.03 OS1201.06 Ensure the following Procedures are Available:

0 E-1, FR-P.l, FR-Z.l ES-1.3 USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 8 of 11

0 0

0 0

0 Shortly after the crew assumes the watch upon completm ol power ascens and P-37B TS issue, and only after lead examiners cue:

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Feedwater (component)

SELECT: ltFWLT529 SELECT: Fails LOW SELECT: INSERT LT-529 Failure.

0 0

0 0

0 on

~~

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant (component)

SELECT: ptRCPT455 SELECT: Fail HIGH SELECT: INSERT When directed by lead examiner:

Fail Controlling PZR Pressure Transmitter.

The crew will contact I&C to respond to PT-455. Simulator operator will play role of I&C. When directed by crew, bypass PT-455. If the crew does not make a decision on bypasshrip status, call in as SM and direct BYPASS of PT-455.

To select operator bypass for PT-455:

0 0

0 0

0 I SELECT: Panel Overview I

SELECT: BTI CP1 SELECT: CP1 Door Open SELECT: The NORM/ENABLE switch to ENABLE SELECT: Toggle switches to bypass PB-455A, 455B, 455C, 455D and TB-411 C.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 9 of 11

When directed by lead examiner:

INSERT LARGE BREAK LOCA:

0 0

0 0

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant SELECT: mfRC024A SELECT: INSERT As soon as the crew has entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Insert a trip of the SUFP.

0 0

0 0

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Feedwater SELECT: mfFW039 (FW-P-113 Trip - Bus 4)

SELECT: INSERT A soon as SUFP trip malfunction is inserted, Insert a closure of MS-V395 which will cause P-37A (Steam Driven EFW Pump) to loss steam and secure.

0 0

0 0

0 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Main Steam (component)

SELECT: svMS1 V395 SELECT: Fails Closed SELECT: INSERT USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Pageloof11

Briefina Sheernurnover Information for Scenario 2 Protected Train is B.

MODE 2: 10 Concentration = 947 ppm. RCS Temp is 559 F. ODI-56 Values for MOL Core 10 on US desk, +1 degrees = 170 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 27 gal BA; C and D Backup Heaters are ON.

Power, CBD @ 90 steps (ARO = 230 steps), Boron The crew assumes the watch and continues with power ascension on step 4.7 of OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality then starts OS1 000.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Loading. The power increase should not exceed 3%

power.

C Primary Component Cooling Water Pump (P-1 1 C) is danger tagged out for bearing replacement. The SUFP is supplying S/Gs via Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves in AUTO. The Main Condenser is available and all MSlVs are open. A Seismic event occurred two shifts ago, Engineering Walkdowns are in progress (no other action for this is required)

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 2 Page 11 of 11

Facility:

Sea brook Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

3 Examiners:

Candidates:

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

Mode 1. Unit is operating at 100% power. (IC# 212)

The ASDV for the D Steam Generator (MS-PV-3004) is tagged out of service due to a positioner air leak. Entered TSAS 3.3.3.5 action c, 3.6.3 action c and 3.7.1.6 action a, two hours ago. Expected outage time is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The Pressurizer control group heaters are tagged out of service. The control circuit for the heaters has failed to zero output. A troubleshooting plan has been developed and Electrical Maintenance is investigating the problem. The heaters have been out of service for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Backup Heater Group B is ON.

1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-0]

2. MANUALLY trip the main turbine before a severe (Orange Path) challenge develops to either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF, or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first. [E-0]

3. MANUALLY trip the C and D RCPs when subcooling is ~ 4 0 F such that an Orange path on Core Cooling does not occur when forced circulation in the Critical Tasks:

2 Event Malf. No.

N/A 4

ttRCTT411 I mfEDOOl mfRPSOOl mfRPS002 mfRPS003 mfRCOl9 mfRCO49D 1

(N)ormal, (R)eacti t c s,tops.

Event Type*

C (BOPIUS)

I (RO/US)

TS (US)

M (ALL)

C (ROBOP)

Event Description A Heater Drain Pump Trips on overcurrent As a result of the heater drain pump trip, a loss of feedwater preheating will result in positive reactivity and subsequent power increase. The crew will need to take positive control to restore power less than 100%.

Loop 1 Tc Instrument Fails HIGH Loss of 13.8kV Bus 1 causes a Loss of A & B RCPs with a failure of an automatic reactor trip (CT) and main turbine trip (CT) to occur. Note that although Safety Injection should actuate, ALL Safety Injection pumps will be prevented from manual start (malfunction numbers are not shown since no credit is taken for these failures)

Subsequent to reactor trip, the Reactor Vessel will develop a flange leak. The crew will need to trip the remaining C and D RCPs based on loss of RCS subcooling (CT). Once tripped, the RCS leak will become significantly larger to force the crew into FR-C series procedures. The A CCP will also trip on overcurren t.

y, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specification

SCENARIO 3 OVERVIEW The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100%. The ASDV for the D Steam Generator (MS-PV-3004) is tagged out of service due to a positioner air leak. TSAS 3.3.3.5 action c, 3.6.3 action c and 3.7.1.6 action a was entered two hours ago. Expected outage time is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The Pressurizer control group heaters are tagged out of service. The control circuit for the heaters has failed to zero output. A troubleshooting plan has been developed and Electrical Maintenance is investigating the problem. The heaters have been out of service for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Backup Heater Group B is ON.

After the crew assumes the watch, the A Heater Drain Pump will trip on overcurrent. The crew should respond to the pump trip in accordance with OS1 290.02, Response to Condensate or Feedwater Heater System Transient. As a result of this malfunction, the colder water being fed into the steam generators due to loss of preheating will result in a positive reactivity addition and resultant power increase greater than rated thermal. The crew must respond by lowering turbine load.

Once power is restored below rated thermal and the crew has performed the first few steps of OS1290.02 or at the lead examiners discretion, the Loop # I narrow range temperature instrument will fail HIGH. This results in Tavg for Loop # I failing high and an automatic rod insertion. The RO should take manual control of control rods and stop uncontrolled insertion. The crew will respond to the Tc instrument failure in accordance with OS1 201.08, Tavg/Delta T Instrument Failure. The crew should defeat affected loop delta-T and Tavg inputs. The US should verify TS compliance.

At the discretion of the lead examiner, A Loss of 13.8kV Bus 1 will occur. The 13.8 kV Bus 1 UAT breaker trips and the associated RAT breaker fails to fast transfer. Loss of power to Bus 1 results in reactor trip demand due to loss off A & B RCPs and A & C Circulating Water pumps. The reactor fails to trip automatically and the operator is required to manually trip the reactor (CT). On the reactor trip, the automatic Turbine Trip fails. The operator is required to manually trip the main turbine (CT). The crew will enter E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon reactor trip, the Reactor Vessel Flange will develop a 275 gpm leak resulting in a SBLOCA. (Note to speed up the scenario and drop subcooling quicker, leak size will be increased greater than 275 gpm) This will result in Safety Injection actuation which will automatically or manually be actuated, however no SI pumps will start nor will manual starts be successful from the control room. Note that safety injection may also occur due to the cooldown associated with the Main Turbine not tripping depending on how expeditious the operators are in tripping the Main Turbine. Also note that all attempts to establish Safety Injection will NOT be successful as the intention is to force the crew into FR-C series procedure(s). The A CCP will trip on overcurrent following reactor trip. Because of the loss of subcooling, the crew is required by the Operator Action Summary of E-0 to trip the remaining running RCPs (C & D) (CT). Once RCPs are tripped the SBLOCA will become significantly larger to drive the crew into inadequate core cooling FRPs.

Procedure progression following reactor trip is E-0 to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response and back to E-0 to E-I, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant potentially to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation and then to FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling (ORANGE) and/or FR-C. 1 (RED) when conditions are met. The scenario will end when the crew recognizes the positive displacement charging pump cannot be started because the mini-flow recirculation valve (CS-V-205) cannot be opened and/or maintenance gives the crew back one of the SI pumps or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Simulator Operating Exam - Scenario 3 The purpose of scenario three is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures, to maintain reactor power less than rated thermal power limit, and eventually to handle an RCS leak which develops into a LOCA with no SI capability forcing the crew into Inadequate Core Cooling FRPs.

The crew takes the watch with instructions to maintain Reactor Power at 100%.

The D ASDV and PZR control bank heaters are tagged out of service. Shortly after taking the watch, the A Heater Drain Pump will trip on overcurrent.

Event

==

Description:==

Time Position NOTE CREW CUE BOP u s BOP/

RO/US BOP BOP BOP A HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIPS ON OVERCURRENT AND THE CREW RESPONDS TO MAINTAIN REACTOR POWER LESS THAN THERMAL LIMIT Applicants Actions or Behavior Shaded items are CRITICAL TASKS.

Crew assumes the watch and maintains power in accordance with OS1 000.1 0, Operation at Power.

Shortly after assuming the watch, upon lead examiners cue, the A Heater Drain Pump will trip on overcurrent. The BOP will note breaker misposition for A Heater Drain Pump. VAS D4205 HTR DRAIN PUMP A BK TRIP & L/O is received.

Informs US of tripped Heater Drain Pump.

The US will enter and direct action from OS1290.02, Response to Condensate or Feedwater Heater System Transient.

Monitor Reactor Power less than 341 1 MWt. Reduce turbine load as necessary to maintain power less than 341 1 MWt. This should be coordinated between the control room team.

Reactivity Management expectations of NAP402 should be adhered to and OS1000.10, Operation at Power, provides plant specific guidance if 341 1 MWt is exceeded.

Check heater drain system. Recognizes only one heater drain pump is running. Directs NSO to HD-CP-551 to close HD-LV-4508A.

Monitor Main Feed Pump suction pressure by checking pressure > 250 psig, notes standby condensate pump is running and adjusts CO-FK-4042 to 18,000 gpm for 3 pump operation.

Checks Feed Water Heater Level Control normal.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 1 of 13

Crew us Checks Secondary Plant Stabilized. It is not the intent to process through this lengthy abnormal which checks in great detail to ensure the secondary plant has stabilized, so at the Lead Examiner discretion, the next malfunction should be implemented when sufficient reactivity manipulation has been observed.

Notifies ElectricaVMechanicaI Maintenance and/or Work Week Manager of heater drain pump failure and directs them to troubleshoot cause. May pass this off to the SM or WCS.

When directed by the lead examiner, a Loop 1 Tc instrument will fail HIGH resulting a HIGH Tavg for Loop 1. Auctioneered Tavg will fail high resulting in inward rod motion.

Event Descri Time tion:

Position CUE RO RO us RO RO RO LOOP1 TC INSTRUMENT FAILS HIGH Applicants Actions or Behavior When secondary plant is stabilized from Heater Drain Pump trip and reactor power has been returned to 341 1 MWt and upon lead examiners cue, a loop 1 Tc fails high resulting in high Tavg for loop 1. The following VAS alarms will come in due to the failure: B7457 ROD MOTION DETECTED, D4422 AUCTIONEERED TAVG HIGH, and D4421 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION. The sound of rods driving inward will also cue the operators. Operators will have visual indication on loop 1 Tavg and delta-T instrumentation of which instrument has failed.

RO should identify which channel is faulted by using Tavg and Delta-T instruments.

Verify rod motion unnecessary and place rod control in MANUAL to stop insertion. The RO may do this very quickly prior to referencing any procedure as a skill of the operator.

Enters and directs action of OS1201.08, TAVG-Delta T Instrument Failure Determine loop 1 TAVG channel failed HIGH.

Place rod control in MANUAL (required by procedure at this Doint 1.

Depress loop 1 delta-T defeat pushbutton.

Depress loop 1 Tavg defeat pushbutton.

Select a non-affected channel for Delta T, Overtemperature, Overpower record e r.

JSNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005

xam Material - Scenario 3 Page 2 of 13

RO RO Event

==

Description:==

Position us LOSS OF BUS 1 WITH FAILURE OF REACTOWTURBINE TO TRIP, LEADING TO AN RCS LEAK AND LARGE BREAK LOCA AND INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.

Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE ROWS BOP/

us us Restore Tavg within 1 F of Tref by manually controlling rod motion. The operators may choose to reduce turbine load instead because they are maintaining < 341 1 MWt due to the last problem -this is acceptable.

Place rod control in AUTO.

required.

Recognizes that a reactor trip has not occurred and is required and manually trips the reactor. (CT)

Recognizes that a turbine trip has not occurred and is required and manually trips the turbine. (CT) This can be done as part of immediate action steps of E-0.

Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Verify redundant channel bistables NOT tripped and verify technical specification compliance. TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 items 7 & 8. Coordinate with I&C for bypass operation or bistable tripping within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. TR-19, FW Isolation on Low RCS Tave Coincident with Reactor Trip TS Actions required:

For 3.3.1 ITEMS 7 & 8: startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.

TR-19, FW Isolation on Low RCS Tave Coincident with Reactor Trip should be referenced.

When directed by the lead examiner, Insert a Loss of 13.8 kV Bus 1 with failure of automatic reactor & turbine trip. Subsequent to reactor trip, an RCS leak will develop requiring trip of C and D RCPs. Subsequent to RCP trip the leak develops into a large LOCA. Because all SI pumps do not start, the crew will be forced into Inadequate Core Cooling FRPs.

CUE USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 3 of 13

RO BOP Note us RO/US ALL ROWS NOTE RO/BOP/

us RO BOP RO/BOP Immediate actions: Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit. Checks if SI annunciators NOT lit and verifies conditions are not met.

Immediate actions: Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open, Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

It is possible SI may have actuated based on length of time the turbine operated post reactor trip. If SI actuated or is required, then a transition will not be made to ES-0.1 and the crew will proceed in E-0.

Based on SI not required, transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

Once in ES-0.1, the developing RCS leak will cause the crew to recognize deteriorating plant conditions requires manual/or automatic actuation of SI and to return to E-0, Step 1. While in ES-0.1, the crew may perform first several steps (Monitor RCS Temperature, Check FW Status, Verfify all Control Rods Inserted, Check PZR Level and Pressure etc.)

US directs transition back to E-0, Step 1 and Immediate Actions are re-performed.

When RCS subcooling drops to less than 40 F, the C and D RCPs should be tripped based on Operator Action Summary for E-0. (CT)

It is possible based on crew timing that the A CCP was not yet tripped because per the scenario, it is not tripped until subcooling decays below RCP trip criteria.

Performs ESF Actuation Verification per Attachment A of E-0.

All attempts to start any SI pumps will be unsuccessful. Informs the US the status of SI. Also notes. A CCP trimed.

Checks containment pressure has remained less than 18 psig by pressure recorder. This is continuous action and when containment pressure is > 18 psig, All Phase B status lights should be verified lit and RCPs should be stopped.

Verify Total EFW Flow - Greater than 500 GPM.

Monitor RCS temperature - Stable at or Trending to 557F.

RCS will be cooling down due to SI and EFW flow. Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere. OPEN EFW min-flow valves AND throttle total feed flow to maintain greater than 500 gpm. When SG level is adequate based on 65%

wide range in at least two S/Gs or 5% narrow range in at least one S/G (25% narrow range in at least one SIG if adverse),

then throttle feed flow to restore S/G level between 25% and 50% narrow range. If cooldown continues, close MSIVs, MSlV bypasses and upstream drains.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 4 of 13

BOP/US RO/BOP/

us RO/BOP/

us I

I RO/BOP/

Check RCS isolated. Verify letdown isolated. Verify PORVs closed. Verify normal Spray valves closed.

Check if RCPs should be stopped. Should have been previously secured by OAS or if Phase B isolation occurred, however, if not they will be secured in this step.

Check if SG Pressure Boundary is Faulted.

Check if SG U-tubes are intact.

Check if RCS is intact. Recognizes containment pressurehadiation level and containment building level are abnormal.

E-I Actions Outlined Below Directs transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Check if RCPs should be stopped. (should already have been stopped) It is critical that RCPs are stopped.

Upon first transition out of E-0, CSF Status Trees should be verified.

When an orange path exists for FR-C.2 RCS Subcooling <40 F, no RCPs running, and CETs ~ 7 2 5 F with RVLIS < 40% the crew will transition to this procedure. (FR-C.2 actions to follow)

Checks if SG pressure boundary is faulted.

Check intact S/G levels. When SG level is adequate based on 65% wide range in at least two S/Gs or 5% narrow range in at least one S/G (25% narrow range in at least one S/G if adverse), then OPEN EFW min-flow valves AND throttle total feed flow to restore S/G level between 5% and 50% narrow range (25% to 50% for adverse) If S/G level is not adequate than maintain total feedwater flow >500 gpm until they are adequate.

Checks secondary radiation and determines transition to E-3 is NOT necessary.

Check PZR PORV and Block Valves.

Check if ECCS flow should be reduced. Based on insufficient subcooling, the US will proceed to step 7.

Check if containment spray pumps should be stopped. If containment pressure has dropped below 4 psig than reset Phase B isolation and containment spray signals, stop CBS pumps and place in standby.

Check if RHR pumps should be stopped. Determine RCS pressure is < 260 psig and do not stop RHR pumps. Note RHR pumps are not running.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 5 of 13

ROlBOP BOP ROWS us RO/US ALL RO RO RO/US us RO RO/US RO RO Check RCS and SG Pressure. If SG pressure is NOT stable or NOT INCREASING OR RCS Pressure is NOT stable or NOT DECREASING than the crew will loop back to Step 1 of E-I until these conditions are met. If and when they are met continue with following steps.

Check if EDG should be stopped. Reset SI, verify all AC busses energized by offsite power from UATs o~RATs, stop and unload EDG by depressing both emergency stop pushbuttons, after EDG stopped, reset for auto start and isolate SW to EDG.

Evaluate plant status by verifying cold recirculation capability. It should be recognized that cold leg recirculation capability does NOT exist without SI pumps so therefore a transition to ECA-1.I is warranted.

Directs transition to ECA-1.I. Continues in ECA-1.I until FRPs are required.

ECA-1.l Actions Outlined Below Check for Cold Leg Recirculation Condition (no conditions are met - go to step 8)

Check Emergency Coolant Recirculation Equipment Available.

Recognize power is available however RHR pumps are not operable) Should involve SM, WCS, and/or Maintenance to status repair of SI Equipment.

Reset SI and automatic switchover S signal reaset for S/RWST LO-LO CBS-V8 or CBS-VI4 Auto Open.

Checks RWST level > 60,000 gallons Determines minimum containment spray requirements. Based on containment pressure, secures non-needed CBS Pumps.

FR-C.2 Actions Outlined Below When conditions are met (as described above), Directs transition to FR-C.2 Verify ECCS flow in all Trains. Checks that no CCP flow is indicated. Attempts start of PDP using Attachment A.

Recognizes CS-V205, PDP mini-flow valve does not have power and therefore cannot be opened, therefore this is not a success path. May direct the NSO to open in the field (this will be unsuccessful).

Checks RCS Vent paths (PORVs, Rx Head Vents, RCS Sample Valves, Letdown and Excess Letdown Valves CLOSED)

Check RCP Status - secured (go to step 7)

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 6 of 13

RO/US RO BOP BOP Note us RO RO/US RO RO RO BOP BOP RO BOP Note NOTE Checks core cooling which determines what path to take in this procedure. If Lead Examiner requests to restore a CCP, conditions would more than likely met to return to procedure and step in effect. Otherwise proceed accordingly.

Check SI Accumulator Valves Open Check intact S/G levels -narrow range > 5% (25% adverse), if not increase feedwater flow. If they are, open mini-flow valves and throttle feedwater flow.

Depressurize all intact S/Gs to 125 psig. Note that the D ASDV cannot be used for demessurization due to ASDV work.

Place the simulator in freeze at Lead Examiner discretion.

FR-C.l Actions Outlined Below When conditions are met, (CETs >1100 F, or RCS Subcooling 40 F with no RCPs, CETs >725 and RVLIS c 40%) transition to FR-C.l Verify ECCS flow in all Trains. Checks that no CCP flow is indicated. Attempts start of PDP using Attachment A.

Recognizes CS-V205, PDP mini-flow valve does not have power and therefore cannot be opened, therefore this is not a success path.

Checks RCP Support Conditions.

Check SI Accumulator Valves OPEN Checks CETs c 1100 F Checks Containment Hydrogen Concentration Check intact SIG levels -narrow range > 5% (25% adverse), if not increase feedwater flow. If they are, open mini-flow valves and throttle feedwater flow.

Checks RCS Vent paths (PORVs, Rx Head Vents, RCS Sample Valves, Letdown and Excess Letdown Valves CLOSED)

Depressurize all intact S/Gs to 125 psig. Note that the D ASDV cannot be used for depressurization due to ASDV work.

Place the simulator in freeze at Lead Examiner discretion.

If used for SROs in the US position, Upon completion of follow-up questioning, the SRO will perform JPM LOIT08 (Post EAL Determination and Event Classification)

This will be determined by the staff based on the endpoint of the scenario.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 7 of 13

Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 3 0

Please track the following parameters in addition to the standard set (if any):

Initialize the simulator at IC #212, 100% power. (This IC is password protected for NRC security reasons. Password can be obtained from Ian

1.

2.

3.

4.

Forbes or Len Hubbard ONLY) 0 I Protected train is A.

0 0

0 0

Ensure B PZR Backup Heaters are ON Place a CAUTION tag on D ASDV Selector Switch Place a DANGER tag on PZR Control Bank Heaters switch (ensure PTL)

Ensure MS-V49 is CLOSED.

Verify the following malfunctions inserted / activated:

17 o

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 mfRPSOOl AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) mfRPS002 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) mfRPS003 AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP FAILURE svMSV3004 MODULATING VALVE FAILS CLOSED bkCSl P2B 52 CC PUMP B BREAKER FAILS OPEN bkRHR8A RHR PUMP A BREAKER FAILS OPEN bkRHR8B RHR PUMP B BREAKER FAILS OPEN bkSIP6A SI PUMP A BREAKER FAILS OPEN bkSIP6B SI PUMP B BREAKER FAILS OPEN Perform immediately after simulator is in RUN:

0 0

0 ENSURE simulator is stabilized and alarms are cleared.

Run SIMHIST.

ENSURE applicable items on Simulator Setup Checklist (NT-5701-6) are completed USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 8 of 13

Ensure the following Procedures are Available:

0 0

0 0

o s 1 000.1 0 OS1 290.02 OS1 201.08 E-0, ES-0.1 E-1, ECA-1.I, FR-C.2, FR-C.l USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 9 of 13

Shortly after the crew assumes the watch and only after lead examiners cue:

0 0

0 0

A Heater Drain Pump Trips.

SELECT: LOCAL PANELS SELECT: FeedwatedMVD SELECT: Fischer Porter Heater Drains CLICK on 1-HD-LY-4508-A right arrow & INPUT 0 for value SELECT: INSERT 0

0 0

0 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Heater Drains SELECT: mfHD027 SELECT: INSERT When directed by the operating crew, throttle HD-LV-4503A as follows:

When directed by lead examiner:

Fail Loop 1 Tc Instrument HIGH.

0 0

0 0

0 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant (component)

SELECT: ttRCTT411 SELECT: Fail HIGH SELECT: INSERT The crew will contact I&C to respond to TT-411. Simulator operator will play role of I&C. When directed by crew, bypass PT-411. If the crew does not make a decision on bypasdtrip status, call in as SM and direct BYPASS of PT-411.

To select operator bypass for TT-411:

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: BTI CP1 SELECT: CP1 Door Open SELECT: The NORM/ENABLE switch to ENABLE TOGGLE: TB411G OP-Delta T to bypass TOGGLE: TB411 C OT-Delta T to bypass TOGGLE: TB412G Low Tavg for Feedwater to bypass TOGGLE: TB412D Low Low Tavg for P-12 to bypass USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 10 of 13

When directed by lead examiner:

INSERT LOSS OF BUS 1 :

0 0

0 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Electrical Distribution SELECT: mfEDOOl SELECT: FAILS OPEN SELECT: INSERT As soon as the crew has entered E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, (IF SI DOES NOT OCCUR) Insert, reactor head flange leak which gets larger and requires Cy & D RCPs tripped due to RCS subcooling < 40F.

0 0

0 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant SELECT: mfRCO19 ENTER: Final Value of 275 gpm SELECT: INSERT As required to drop RCS subcooling, (THIS MUST OCCUR IF SI HAS ALREADY ACTUATED OR WHEN IT IS ACTUATED), increase RCS leak:

0 0

0 0

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant System SELECT: mfRC049D INSERT: Value of 1500 gpm INSERT: Ramp time of 60 seconds SELECT: INSERT Monitor RCS subcooling and inform Lead Examiner when subcooling has dropped below 40 F.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 11 of 13

AFTER RCPs HAVE BEEN TRIPPED due to Loss of RCS Subcooling, increase RCS leak substantially to deplete core inventory and force the crew into FR-C series. (May need to increase the rate when SI accumulators dump to speed up time required to heat up core and to enter FRPs -- ie:

change to 150,000 over 600 seconds or insert mfRC024D-Double ended Hot Leg Break)

(Note that Step 7 of FR-C.2 is a transition back to E-I if the orange path has cleared. Increasing the break size will prevent this transition by depleting core inventory quicker and force the crew into FR-C.1) 0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

SELECT: MF List SELECT: Chemical and Volume Control SELECT: mfCSO16 SELECT: INSERT SELECT: MF List SELECT: Reactor Coolant System SELECT: mfRC049D INSERT: Value of I00000 gpm INSERT: Ramp time of 600 seconds SELECT: MODIFY AFTER INCREASING RCS LEAK SIZE, trip the A CCP:

If called to open CS-V205, report after a short while that CS-V205 could not be locally opened and that maintenance has been informed.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 12 of 13

Briefing SheetITurnover Information for Scenario 3 Protected Train is A MODE 1 : 100% Power, CBD @ 230 steps (ARO = 230 steps), Boron Concentration = 899 ODI-56 Values for MOL Core 10 on US desk, + I degrees =

170 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 27 gal BA; AFD target - 1.92%, Current AFD

- 1.92%.

The crew assumes the watch and continues to maintain Reactor Power at 100%

in accordance with OS1000.10, Operations at Power.

The Pressurizer Control Group heaters are tagged out of service. The control circuit for the heaters was failed to zero output. A troubleshooting plan has been developed and Electrical Maintenance is investigating the problem. The heaters have been out of service for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Backup Heater Group B is ON.

D ASDV (MS-PV-3004) is out of service due to a positioner air leak. The upstream isolation (MS-V49) is DANGER tagged. TSAS 3.3.3.5 action c, 3.6.3 action c and 3.7.1.6 action a were entered two hours ago. Expected outage time is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The selector switches on the MCB and RSS have been CAUTIONED tagged to allow I&C to operate the ASDV. The work package includes instruction to contact the Control Room prior to causing valve to open.

USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station January 2005 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 13 of 13