ML050670144
| ML050670144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/2005 |
| From: | Marshall Kohen, Joseph Rivers Science Applications International Corp (SAIC) |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Byrdsong A T | |
| References | |
| 50-413-0LA, 50-414-0LA, Catawba-Intervenor-14 (SEC-19), RAS 9464 | |
| Download: ML050670144 (5) | |
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EXHIBIT 14
) DOE'S INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO REVISE THE CONVENTION ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL Marshall D. Kohen Science Applications International Corporation 20201 Century Boulevard, Germantown, Maryland, 20874, USA 301/903-3952 Joseph D. Rivers Science Applications International Corporation 20201 Century Boulevard, Germantown, Maryland, 20874, USA 301/903-2717 ABSTRACT The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) requires signatories to prevent nuclear material used for peaceful purposes from theft during international transport. In recent years, however, it has become clear that the CPPNM is deficient in that it only covers protection during international transport, thus omitting domestic use, storage and transport. It also does not recognize sabotage as a threat. Other factors, such as a rise in illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and a notable increase in quantities of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, have led the international community, particularly the Uniited States, to initiate efforts to revise the Convention. Such a revision would accomplish two primary objectives. First it would help ensure that the CPPNM better reflects the current worldwide security culture by adding requirements to the document concerning domestic use, storage and transport, as well as protection against sabotage.
Also, in creating stronger CPPNM requirements, revision would provide some nations a mandate with which to develop domestic legislative and regulatory infrastructure, thus strengthening their internal physical protection regimes.
In 1998, the United States circulated a proposal to the international community to revise the CPPNM. While this proposal was generally well received by States party to the Convention, some States noted significant objections to portions of the proposal. As a result of these objections, the US decided not to request a Revision Conference under Article 20 of the Convention to consider the proposal. However, based on input from LAEA Member States and an advisory group, IAEA Director General ElBaradei decided to convene an Informal, Open-Ended Expert Meeting in November 1999, to consider where there was a need to revise the CPPNM. The meeting would allow technical and political-level discussions to proceed in the effort to reach consensus on points of the Convention revision question.
The US Department of Energy (DOE) has supported this effort at US interagency meetings as well as a part of the US delegation to the meetings in Vienna. DOE is providing technical expertise relative to its experiences in protecting nuclear materials domestically and the support it has provided to nations around the world. In addition, DOE provides input to ensure that whatever changes may be made to the Convention will not adversely impact the Department's ability to protect nuclear materials under its jurisdiction.
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ROLE OF THE DOE OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS (SO)
The revision initiative is of direct interest to SO, given the potential implications of revision for DOE security policy, for which SO is principally responsible. While the DOE International Safeguards Division, now of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), has represented DOE from the arms control and nonproliferation policy perspective, SO, and more specifically, the Office of Safeguards and Security (SO-21), represents DOE's security policy. The Nonproliferation Support Program within SO-2 1 provides a liaison between the DOE domestic security policy arena and its counterpart implementation groups in the NNSA, the DOE Offices of Environmental Management, Science and Nuclear Energy, as well as the US interagency on matters potentially involving security interests at DOE facilities.
SO concurs with and supports the principles envisioned by a majority of the current international arms control and nonproliferation initiatives, with a programmatic emphasis on policies to ensure the protection of classified and sensitive assets under DOE auspices. Thus, a balance must be maintained. In the case of the CPPNM, SO agrees fully with the underlying sentiments of the Convention revision process. In fact, throughout the last 18 months of discussions, SO has become convinced that revision of the CPPNM will be one of the most effective methods of strengthening physical protection worldwide. As demonstrated by the amount oftime spent in discussions both in the US interagency and with other member States, the primary question has surrounded the implementation of strengthening measures for some States. That is, the greatest challenge has been development of the details ofwhat such a revision should and should not contain. SO has been actively involved in the formulation of the US Government's position on revision of the CPPNM, using its experience in fostering a domestic protection policy to identify critical issues. The remainder of this paper will discuss SO's rationale for supporting revision, as well as thoughts on elements that have not been considered for a revision.
RATIONALE FOR SUPPORT OF THE CONVENTION REVISION PROCESS As noted in several documents developed during CPPNM discussions, there is general agreement among States Parties that there are deficiencies in the current Convention, particularly when compared to comparable documents, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety. [Refs. 1-4]
Specifically, the CPPNM does not cover the protection of domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, nor does it adequately address protection from sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. It is difficult to believe that these omissions can be overcome effectively by any other method than revision.
Serious issues impacting domestic and international physical protection have arisen in the recent past. For example, member States have expressed serious concern about the continued reporting of incidents of illicit trafficking. [Ref. 4] Acknowledgement of this fact in the international community is evidenced by the September 2000 adoption of Resolution GC(44)/RES/20, Measures Against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources. While certainly there are economic realities behind the increase (including four instances involving proliferation-relevant quantities), much of the concern arises from weak domestic physical protection. In many of these cases, a binding document such as an international convention would have provided some States the justification to establish a regulatory framework that might well have prevented the trafficking.
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"During the last twenty years, there has been a significant increase in quantities of nuclear material
) used for peaceful purposes." [Ref. 4] This increase, including a six-fold jump in the amount of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards, demands a strengthened protection regime, both among and within States. A revised Convention would be the critical first step in the process, pressing States party to develop national-evel policy and regulations to assist in the expansion and enhancement of physical protection measures.
"Increased privatisation of the nuclear energy sector may result in a different allocation of responsibilities between the State and the operator." [Ref. 4] Accompanying the shifting responsibility will be a reallocation of resources. For both reasons, a "clear national legislative/regulatory infrastructure, based on international undertakings and recommendations" must be in place to govern the application of physical protection measures. [Ref. 5] A revised Convention can ensure the development of this framework in each State party.
Finally, the challenges facing some States in establishing an adequate legal and regulatory structure ensuring application of the Principles could be addressed, at least in part, by revision of the Convention. States without such a structure may face difficulties in allocating scarce resources in the absence of a requirements document, ratified by other States, which serves as the justification for such allocation. Perhaps the most crucial and germane argument for revision, this issue speaks to the basic worldwide need to place more importance on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.
For all these reasons, SO has both supported and helped develop the recommendations ofthe Expert Meeting in the belief that they will contribute strongly and positively to the strengthening of the 3 international physical protection regime.
EXCLUSIONS SO strongly supports the need for enhanced security worldwide, particularly through revision of the CPPNM. However, in the process of preparing for the November 1999 Expert Meeting concerning Convention revision, several issues were identified which, if proposed for inclusion in a revised CPPNM, would be unacceptable to DOE. Specifically, carrying forward an early suggestion for mandatory implementation of the recommendations in INFCIRC225/Rev.4 (especially Section 5) in a revised CPPNM would be problematic for DOE. In particular, mandatory implementation would have a collateral negative impact on DOE facilities as it would require DOE to impose at its facilities the same levels of physical protection for nuclear material used for peaceful purposes as Annex II of the CPPNM imposes for nuclear material in international transport. [Ref. 6]
In that respect, Annex 11 of the CPPNM, titled Categorization of Nuclear Material, contains a cross-reference between types of nuclear material and the associated recommended physical protection measures. DOE has constructed its protection strategies and security policy around its Graded Safeguards Table, contained in DOE M 474.1- IA [Ref. 7] Implemented in 1988, the Graded Safeguards Table is based on Attractiveness Levels, and employs detailed analyses and calculations.
The categorization tables of Annex II and INFCIRC/225 are identical to each other and were developed using less refined methods in the 1970s when the Convention was drafted. Unlike the Graded Safeguards Table, the categorization tables are not based on Attractiveness Levels. Physical 3
Protection measures based on Attractiveness Levels ensure adequate, cost-effective levels of protection for all nuclear material at DOE facilities.
Mandatory application of Annex II (or the identical table in INFCIRCt225) would likely necessitate overhaul of DOE's physical protection strategies and security policy at significant cost, without a commensurate gain in the quality of physical protection at DOE facilities. In addition, such mandatory application would provide a major disincentive to efforts to convert nuclear material destined for disposal to more benign forms that can be protected adequately at lower and less costly protection levels. Based on these considerations, as well as the concerns of other members of the Expert Meeting, it became clear that requiring in a revised CPPNM strict compliance with INFCIRC/225 would not prove workable. Any proposal for revising the Convention must allow States sufficient flexibility in the establishment of their State systems ofphysical protection to meet unique protection needs.
Additionally, DOE has been in agreement with the omission ofseveral other facets previously suggested for inclusion in a revision. A requirement to submit periodic reports to the international community on the implementation of physical protection would not be desirable. The US currently reports routinely to the IAEA regarding nuclear material safeguarded under the US-IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement. However, classification regulations in the US, as well as in many other member States, would not permit revealing certain details of protection system implementation or design. Also, not only could this potentially lead to a set of skewed or inconsistent data, but both reporting scheme development and compliance would be costly.
Peer review, which was discussed in early consultations, would also be problematic. Establishing an intenational oversight body, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, would entail a monumental amount of human and financial resources. Developing an inspection protocol applicable to all member States would certainly prove difficult, as it has in other regimes. Additionally, from SO's perspective, not only would a peer review mechanism not be worth the added cost, it would be undesirable for reasons of reciprocity and equity. Similarly, mandatory international oversight ofphysical protection measures would not be economically or politically feasible.
Finally, along with NNSA, SO would consider unacceptable any references in a revised CPPNM to material and facilities designed for and currently in use for military purposes. The US interagency recognized this at the early stages of discussion.
CONCLUSION DOE supports revision of the CPPNM on the belief that it will strengthen the global physical protection regime. SO has worked in conjunction with NNSA to ensure that such a revision will allow other member States to make physical protection a higher priority, while also preventing the revision from adversely impacting DOE security policy and implementation. As requested, SO expects to continue providing subject matter experts in physical protection as policy support during any revision process, and believes that additional measures, such as the assistance programs organized under IAEA auspices, as well as those of a bilateral nature, are critical to the continued improvement in development of physical protection infrastructure in member States.
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REFERENCES
[I] IAEA Secretariat, Working Paper5: Additional Views of the United States of.America on Amending the Convention on the PhysicalProtectionofNuclear Material.
[2] LAEA Secretariat, Working Paper 11: Statement ofthe UnitedStates ofAmerica Assessing Where Common GroundMay Lie in the Matter ofRevising the Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuclear Material, Sections 14-17.
[3] IAEA Secretariat, Working Paper 12 Rev. 1: Elementsfor Discussionfrom the Belgian, French, German, Spanish, Swedish and UnitedKingdom Delegations on a Possible Extension of the Convention on the PhysicalProtectionof NuclearMaterial (CPPNM) To Cover Domestic Use:
Outline Principles.
[4] IAEA Secretariat, Working Paper16: Assessment andRationalefor a Revision of the Convention on the PhysicalProtectionofNuclear Material(CPPNM) in Connection with the Identified CurrentProblems, as well as ProblemsIdentified in Connection with the Implementation ofthe CPPNM.
[5] IAEA Secretariat, Working PaperNo. 2: PossibleIssuesfor considerationby the Informal Open-EndedExpert Meeting to Discuss Whether there is a Need to Revise the Convention on the PhysicalProtection ofNuclear Material, Section 3.(b).
[6] IAEA, INFCIRC/22S/Rev.4, The PhysicalProtectionofNuclear MaterialandNuclear Facilities,May 1999.
[7] US Department of Energy Office of Security and Emergency Operations, DOE M 474.1-IA, Manualfor Controland Accountability ofNuclearMaterials, November 2000.
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