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Category:Legal-Exhibit
MONTHYEARIR 05000413/20083012009-02-0505 February 2009
Official Exhibit - CCS-118-00-BD01 - Catawba Nuclear Station NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000413-08-301 and 05000414-08-301
ML0513600792005-02-17017 February 2005
Security Exhibit List for Hearing Held from January 11 to January 14, 2005
ML0506702592005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Staff Exhibit (SEC-28), Attachment 1. Resumes of Sherri L. Cross, Albert G. Garrett, Michael R. Burrell, R. John Vanden Berghe, John Brian Mckirgan, and William Troskoski
ML0506702552005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Intervenor Exhibit 8 (SEC-13), IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition. International Nuclear Verification Series No.3
ML0506702152005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Staff Exhibit 8 (SEC-24), the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
ML0506701562005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Staff Exhibit 7 (SEC-23), Technical Reports Series No.415, Status and Advances in MOX Fuel Technology
ML0506701442005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Intervener Exhibit 14 (SEC-19), Doe'S Involvement in Negotiations on the Question of Whether to Revise the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
ML0506701062005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Intervenor Exhibit 5 (SEC-10), NUREG/CR-1378, Rev 1, Hardening Existing Strategic Special Nuclear Material Storage Facilities
ML0506701042005-01-13013 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Intervenor Exhibit 1 (SEC-9), Curriculum Vitae of Edwin Stuart Lyman
ML0506700932005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 4 (SEC-4), Resume of Howard B. Williams
ML0506700862005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 1 (SEC-1), Steven P. Nesbit Statement of Professional Qualifications - Rec'D 01/11/05
ML0506700892005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 2 (SEC-2), Resume of Glenn A. (Skip) Copp, III
ML0506700902005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 3 (SEC-3), Resume of William Thomas Byers, III
ML0506700982005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 5 (SEC-5), Resume of Rita A. Edwards
ML0506701012005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 14 (SEC-7), Diagram of FS-65 Transportation Package, Cross-Section
ML0506701132005-01-11011 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Applicant Exhibit 15 (SEC-8), Duke Energy Corp. Administrative Change to Facility Operating Licenses in Conjunction with the Commission Order EA-03-088 Re Revised Design Basis Threat and Revisions to Safeguards.
ML0506702622005-01-0909 January 2005
Catawba Hearing - Intervenor Exhibit 22 (SEC-A), the Big Gun, Broadcast on CBS Tv Show 60 Minutes
ML0503801632004-12-31031 December 2004
R. Nevin Staff Exhibit 6, Nirs/Pc EC-7: Duke Power, About Us Nuclear Power Plants, 2004, Available at Http://Www,Dukepower.Com/Aboutus/Plants/Nuclear
ML0422603132004-07-16016 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/15/04 - Intervenor Exhibit 52, Y. Yan, Et Al., LOCA Results for Advanced-Alloy and High-Burnup Zircaloy Cladding - Rec'D 07/15/04
ML0422603652004-07-15015 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/15/04 - Applicant Exhibit D, E. H. Karb, Et Al., Results of the FR2 In-Pile Tests on LWR Fuel Rod Behavior - Identified 07/15/04
ML0422603062004-07-15015 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/15/04 - Intervenor Exhibit 51, J. Papin, Et Al., Synthesis of CABRI-RIA Tests Interpretation - Rec'D 07/15/04
ML0422600822004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 19 - Figure 14, Figure M5 Rupture Strain Versus Rupture Temperature Slow Ramp Rate - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602282004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Staff Exhibit 3 (Official Exhibit #40), Excerpt from Y. Yan, Et Al. Slide Presentation of LOCA Test Results for High-Burnup BWR Fuel and Cladding - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602212004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Staff Exhibit (Official Exhibit #37), Professional Qualifications Statements of Undine Shoop, Ralph R. Landry, and Ralph O. Meyer - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600432004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 10 - Figure 5, Thermal Conductivity Comparison for MOX and Leu Fuel (Fuel Porosity of 0.0479) (Figure Q21-1) - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602122004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Intervenor Exhibit H (Official Exhibit #32), NUREG/CR-6744, Phenomenon Identification and Ranking Tables (Pirts) for Loss-of-Coolant Accidents in Pressurized and Boiling Water Reactors... - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600742004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 16 - Figure 11, FR2 Test E4 for High Exposure Fuel (Relocation) - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600182004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 08 - Figure 3, Mox/Leu Decay Heat Ratio - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422601132004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Intervenor Exhibit a (Official Exhibit #25), Edwin Stuart Lyman Curriculum Vitae - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422601082004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 18 - Figure 13, Figure M5 Rupture Temperature Correlation - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422601052004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 24 - Figure 19, Accumulated Cycle Irradiation in Effective Full Power Days - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600952004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 23 - Figure 18, Fuel Exposure, Gwd/T - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600912004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 22 - Figure 17, Micrograph of Irradiated MOX Pellet (Rg) - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600862004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 21 - Figure 16, Micrograph of Irradiated Leu Fuel Pellet with Transverse Crack - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600852004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 20 - Figure 15, Micrograph of Irradiated Leu Pellet with Typical Cracking - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600312004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 14 - Figure 9, Previously Irradiated Rod 12, 74% Total Circumferential Elongation, 1066 K Estimated Burst Temperature - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600762004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 17 - Figure 12, MOX Fuel and Cladding Temperature During LOCA Compared to Severe Accident Fuel Melt Temperatures - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600172004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 07 - Figure 2 - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602952004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 47, Professional Qualifications Statement of Steven P. Nesbit - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602982004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 48, Professional Qualifications Statement of Robert C. Harvey - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600302004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 13 - Figure 8 - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600732004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 15 - Figure 10, FR2 Test B3.1 for Low Exposure Fuel (No Relocation) - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600262004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 12 - Figure 7, Pin Power Peaking Factor, Fq, Cycle Exposure, EFPD - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602992004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 49, Professional Qualifications Statement of Bert M. Dunn - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422603052004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 50, Professional Qualifications Statement of J. Kevin Mccoy - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600222004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 11 - Figure 6, Pellet Radial Power Profiles 0.5 Gwd/T (Figure Q7-1) - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600202004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 09 - Figure 4, MOX and Leu Fuel Pin Temperature Profile Comparison at Loss of Coolant Accident Initiation - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422600142004-07-14014 July 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Applicant Exhibit 06 - Figure 1, Catawba MOX LOCA Temperatures - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422602742004-06-14014 June 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/14/04 - Staff Exhibit a (Official Exhibit #43), E-mail from Wolfgang Wiesenack to Miroslav Hrehor Re Statement in One of Segfsm Reports - Rec'D 07/14/04
ML0422603172004-06-0707 June 2004
Catawba Hearing 07/15/04 - Intervenor Exhibit 53, E-mail from Robert C. Harvey to Steven P. Nesbit Re Oecd/Nea/Csni Special Experts Topical Meeting on LOCA Fuel Safety Criteria, Cadarache France, March 22-23, 2001 - Rec'D 07/15/04
2009-02-05
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- 4. ELEMENTS OF A STATE'S SYSTEM OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR FACILITIES 4.1. GENERAL 4.1.1. A State's system of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities should include the elements described in Sections 4.2. - 4.4. below.
4.1.2. The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection system wvithin a State rests entirely with that State.
4.13. The State's physical protection system should be based on the State's evaluation of the threat.
Other factors should also be considered, including thc Statc's cmergency response capabilities and the existing and relevant measures of the State's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material.
The recommended physical protection measures are intended for all nuclear material inuse and storage and during transportand for all nuclear facilities.
4.1.4. A design basis threat developed from an evaluation by the State of the threat of unauthorized removal of nuclear material and of sabotageof nuclear material and nuclear facilities is an essential element of a State's system of physical protection. The State should continuously review the threat, and evaluate the implications of any changes in that threat for the levels and the methods of physical protection.
4.1.5. It is essential that the State's system of physical protection for nuclear material and nuclear facilities be reviewed and updated periodically to reflect advances made in the state of the art inphysical protection hardwvare and systems or introduction of newv typcs of facilities. Further, the design of a physical protection system for a specific facility may vary from these recommendations when prevailing circumstances indicate a need for a different level of physical protection.
4.1.6. The State should develop and implement emergency plans for any needed response to unauthorizedremoval and subsequent unauthorized use of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear material or nuclear facilities to support and supplement, wihn needed, those emergency plans prepared by operators.
4.1.7. The recommended measures are in all cases additional to, and not a substitute for, other measures established for safety purposes for nuclear material inuse and storage and during transportand for nuclear facilities.
4.2. LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 4.2.1. The State's legislation should provide for the regulation of physical protection and include a licensing requirement. The State should promulgate and review regularly its comprehensive regulations forthe physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities whethcr in State or private possession.
4.2.2. The State should define requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material inuse and storage and during transportand for nuclear facilities depending on the associated consequences of either uinauthoHzedremoval of nuclear material or sabotage. For protection against unauthorizedremoval of nuclear material, the State should regulate the categorization of nuclear material (see Chapter S) inorder measures. 4.2.5. Physical protection requirements for nuclear material in use and storage and during pertaining transportand for nuclear facilities protection d on these 4.2.5.1. State requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material should take into account the
.ther those category of nuclear material, its location (use, storage, during transport)and the particular circumstances prevailing either in the State or along the transportation route. When considering the measures required for the physical protection ofnuclear material against unauthorized removal or sabotage, the State should take into account the iittractiveness':and self-protccting nature of the material, the radiological consequences, and the containment measures used for safety reasons.
z establish should be 4.2.5.2. State requirements for physical protection should be based on the concept of defence in depth nd licence for preventive and protective measures. The concept of physical protcction is one which requires a designed needed. mixture of hardware (security devices), procedures (including the organization of guards and the performance of their duties) and facility design (including layout). The physical protection system is
,owered to designed specifically for each facility taking into account the State's design basis threat.
on. If the Authorities, 4.2.5.3. The State's competent authority should ensure that the operator prepares emergency plans of stablished action to counter effectively the design basis threat, including attempted unauthorizedremoval of nuclear material or sabotagetaking into consideration actions of the responseforce.
ependence 4.2.5A. Several types of nuclear facilities pose a hazard to the environment incase of sabotagebecause onsibilities of the potential for release of radioactivity. Therefore, it is important that the level of protection of the facility should take the radiological consequences into consideration.
tC 4.2.5.5. The State should define requirements for the physical protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage. They should take into account possible releases of radioactivity, the location of the nuclear facility, and the particular circumstances prevailing in the State. Adequate physical protection measures anof should be implemented for nuclear facilities which may be subject to sabotage regardless of the categorization of nuclear materials therein contained.
s physical 4.2.5.6. The State's evaluation of the threat should dctenninc if there is a credible threat to disperse
- t sabotage nuclear material malevolently. The State should then apply the level of physical protection measures needed to ensure protection against tie acts leading to radiological consequences without regard to thc categorisation of the material.
4.2.6. Additional physical protection requirements ror nuclear material during transport I protection range to the 4.2.6.1. During international transportof nuclear material the responsibility for physical protection
- Jy reflected measures should be the subject of agreement between the States concerned. The shipping State should consider, before allowing the international transport,if the States involved in the transport, including the transit States:
r any other
- are Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274 Rev.l); or I protection have concluded with it a formal agreemnent which cnsurcs that physical protection arrangements ry szrvey of are implemented; or e continued ich as those formally declare that their physical protection arrangements arc implemented according to internationally accepted guidelines; or
- have issued liccnces which contain appropriate physical protection provisions for the transport
- 5. CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 5.1. BASIS FOR CONCERN 5.1.1. In determining the lcvcl of physical protection to be implemcnted for nuclear materials inuse and storage or during transport account should be taken of the possibility that the unauthorizedremoval of plutonium, highly enriched uranium or uranium-233 could lead to the construction of a nuclear explosive device by a technically competent group.
5.2. CATEGORIZATION 55.2.1. Mme primary factor for determining the physical protection measures against unauthorizedremoval
- of nuclear material is the nuclear material itself, categorized in accordance with the following table which gives a categorization of the different types of nuclear material and with the considerations given below.
E I.0 I..
I.
