ML050630296

Cycle 22 Startup Testing Report Evaluation Submittal

ML050630296
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	02/24/2005
From:	Rosalyn Jones Duke Power Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML050630296 (30)

Text

Duke RON A.

JONES Power.

Vice President A Duke Energy Company Oconee Nuclear Site Duke Power ONOI VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3158 864 885 3564 fax February 24, 2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001

Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Station - Unit 3 Docket No. 50-287 Oconee Unit 3 Cycle 22 Startup Testing Report Evaluation Submittal Pursuant to the requirements in Section 16.13.9, "Startup Report," from the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual, Duke Energy Corporation hereby submits to the Commission the Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 (ONS-3), Cycle 22 Startup Testing Report.

The premise of the report is to provide the Staff with the satisfactory results from the ONS-3 Cycle 22 startup tests which utilized the stations' initial loading of four (4) Lead Test Assemblies (LTAs) manufactured by Westinghouse.

The remainder of the fifty-two (52) reload and 121 reinserted fuel assemblies were supplied by Areva.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Stephen C. Newman, Oconee Regulatory Compliance Group, at (864) 885-4388.

Very t u

yours, R. A J s, Vice President Oconee clear Site Attachment www. dukepower. corn

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 February 24, 2005 cc:

W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Region II M. C. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Site L. N. Olshan, Project Manager NRR

DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION OCONEE 3 CYCLE 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 1: Fuel Design Part 2: Zero Power Physics Test Part 3: Power Escalation Test Prepared by: Stan Pressley

s OCONEE 3 CYCLE 22 Startup Testing Report Table of Contents Part1: Fuel and CoreDesign Section Page 1.0 Summary I

Figure 1 03C22 Core Design 4

Figure 2 Pin Map Showing Layout for Radial Zoned Fuel Assemblies 5

Part2

ZeroPowerPhysicsTest-2.0 Introduction and Summary 6

2.1 Approach to Criticality 6

2.2 Pre-Physics Measurements 7

2.3 Physics Testing 7

Part 3:~ PowverEscalationTest--

3.0 Introduction and Summary 9

3.1 NSSS Heat Balance/ RCS Flow Verification 9

3.2 Core Power Distribution 10 3.3 Power Imbalance Detector Correlation 10 3.4 Reactivity Measurement at Power 11

-D.

Enclosures.

1.0 All-Rods-Out Critical Boron Concentration and Differential Boron Worth 12 Results 2.0 Integral Group Rod Worth Measurements/ Reactivity Coefficients 13 3.0 Reactivity Coefficients 14 4.0 NSSS Heat Balance/ RCS Flow Verification 15 5.0 Radial Peaking Factor Comparison at IMPT 16 5.1 Total Peaking Factor Comparison at IMPT 17 5.2 Radial Peaking Factor Comparison at FPT 18 5.3 Total Peaking Factor Comparison at FPT 19 6.0 Core Power Distribution Data Summary at IMPT and FPT 20 7.0 Core Symmetry Evaluation 21

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 1: Fuel and Core Design 1.0 Summary The Unit 3 Cycle 22 (03C22) core consists of 177 fuel assemblies, each of which is a 15 by 15 array containing 208 fuel rods, 16 guide tubes and one incore instrument guide tube. The fuel consists of dished-end, cylindrical pellets of uranium dioxide. The fuel used in 03C22 consists of fuel supplied by two fuel vendors, Westinghouse and Areva. The Areva supplied fuel is clad in M5 and the Westinghouse fuel is clad in ZIRLO. The 03C22 new fuel assemblies have an average nominal fuel loading of 459 kg uranium for the four Westinghouse WH177 lead test assemblies and the fifty-two Mk-B l A assemblies supplied by Areva.

The 03C22 core loading for this cycle consists of the following:

52 fresh fuel assemblies supplied by Areva (batch 24A) with 3.86 wt% U-235 each with 16 radial zoned reduced enrichment fuel pins at 3.56 wt% U-235.

4 fresh fuel assemblies supplied by Westinghouse (batch 24B) with 3.35 wt% U-235 each with 16 radial zoned reduced enrichment fuel pins at 3.05 wt% U-235.

121 reinserted fuel assemblies which are Areva supplied fuel assemblies and are of the MK-B 1OL, MK-B 11, or MK-B1 lA type fuel assemblies.

The table below summarizes the enrichments for each batch of fuel used in the Oconee 3 Cycle 22 core.

Batch 24A

.24B 23A -

23B 22B 22C 21B Central 3.86 3.35 4.16 4.33 3.92 3.54 3.59 Enrichment (wt% U-235)

Radial Zoned 3.56 3.05 3.86 4.03 3.62 3.24 3.29 Enrichment (wt% U-235)

Blanket 2.0 N/A 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Enrichment (wt% U-235)

Average 3.68 3.33 3.96 4.11 3.74 3.39 3.43 Enrichment (wt% U-235)

Fuel Type Mk-WH-177 Mk-Mk-Mk-B 11 Mk-B 11 Mk-B11A B11A B11A B1OL Active Fuel 143.05 140.6 143.05 143.05 143.05 143.05 142.29 Stack Height Number of 0

0 1

1 2

2 3

Cycles Burnt Page 1 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 1: Fuel and Core Design Figure I illustrates the batch loading pattern, the location of new fuel assemblies, the type of component located in the fuel assembly, and the location of the Westinghouse LTA's. Figure 2 shows the assembly radial zoning pattern.

All Areva assemblies have six inch blanket regions (top and bottom) enriched to 2.00 wt% U-235. The Westinghouse fuel assemblies do not utilize axial blankets.

Cycle 22 will operate in a rods-out, feed and bleed mode. Core reactivity control is supplied mainly by soluble boron and is supplemented by 61 full length Ag-In-Cd control rods and 40 burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs). In addition to the full length control rods, eight Inconel (gray) axial shaping rods (APSRs) are provided for additional control of the axial power distribution.

Page 2 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 1: Fuel and Core Design Oconee 3 Cycle 22 is utilizing four Lead Test Assemblies (LTA's) manufactured by Westinghouse. The design of these assemblies differs from the Areva supplied fuel in the following ways:

1) Each contains three intermediate support grids which are there to prevent flow induced vibration of the fuel pins.

2) The cladding material is ZIRLO instead of M5.

3) The pin diameters on the Westinghouse fuel (0.422" OD) are slightly larger than the diameter of the fuel pins on the Areva fuel (0.416" OD).

4) The unirradiated height of the Westinghouse assemblies (166.108" tall with the active fuel region of 140.6") is slightly more than the unirradiated height of the Areva supplied fuel (165.695" tall with an active fuel region of 143.05").

5) There are some design differences in the Upper End Fitting (UEF) and the hold down spring design.

The LTA's are located in core locations E8, N8, H5 and HI 1. Figure 1 shows the positions of the LTA's relative to other fuel assemblies in the reactor core.

No fuel assemblies or burnable poison rods from the spent fuel pool are being used in 03C22. Current plans are for the Westinghouse LTA's to be burned for three cycles, through 03C24. During each outage period, the Westinghouse LTA's will be visually inspected and verified to be acceptable for use in the upcoming cycle prior to being reloaded into the core. After the final cycle is complete, a more detailed post irradiation exam is being planned.

Page 3 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 1: Fuel and Core Design Figure 1: 03C22 Core Design

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Fuel Batch S

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Notes:

Batch 21B FAszre MK-BIOL; Batches 22B and 22C FAs are MK-BII; Batches 23A 23B. and 24A FAs are MK-BI IA: Batch 24B Fs are WI-.177.

All BPRAs are Nk-B5

+ Location for 4 WVestinghouse LTAs.

• BE21-BE24 = 1.10 BPRA.

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• 1.70 BPRA.

Fresh Fuel Assemblies are shaded. All other Fuel Assemblies are from 03C21.

Page 4 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 1: Fuel and Core Design Figure 2: Pin Map Showing Layout for Radial Zoned Fuel Assemblies

@00

@00 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000

@00

@00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000

@0000

@0000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 0

0 0

One (1) Centered Instrument Tube Sixteen (16) Empty Guide Tubes 192 Fuel Pins at nominal enrichment 16 Fuel Pins at reduced enrichment Page 5 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 2: Zero Power Physics Test 2.0 Introduction and Summary The Oconee 3 Cycle 22 Zero Power Physics Test (ZPPT) was conducted from December 30 through 31, 2004 per station procedure PT/OIA/071 1/01. This testing was conducted to verify the nuclear parameters upon which the Oconee 3 Cycle 22 core design, safety analysis and Technical Specifications are based.

Zero Power Physics Testing measurements were made with reactor power, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and RCS temperature as required by procedure. The following nuclear parameters were measured:

(a)

All-Rods-Out Critical Boron Concentration (Enclosure 1.0)

(b)

Differential Boron Worth (Enclosure 1.0)

(c)

Integral Rod Worth for Control Rod Groups 5, 6, and 7 (Enclosure 2.0)

(d)

Temperature and Moderator Coefficients of Reactivity (Enclosure 3.0)

The Framatome Reactivity Measurement and Analysis System (RMAS) was used to record RCS temperature, intermediate range power levels and control rod positions. Reactivity was calculated by the RMAS computer.

On December 31, 2004 at 1851, ZPPT was declared complete. All acceptance criteria were met. The results for each test are shown in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3.

2.1 Approach to Criticality The full RCS temperature and pressure necessary for unit startup were achieved and rod withdrawal for the Control Rod Drive Trip Time Test (CRDTTT) began at 1125 on December 30, 2004. The CRDTIT was performed at hot shutdown conditions (i.e., > 1%

Ak/k shutdown) per station procedure PT/0/A/0300/001. Each control rod group was individually withdrawn and then tripped from the full out position. The drop time was then measured for each individual control rod in each control rod group. The CRDTTT was satisfactorily completed at 1412 on December 30, 2004.

Rod withdrawal to criticality began on December 30, 2004 at 1940. I/M (inverse subcritical multiplication) vs. withdrawn rod worth plots were maintained throughout the approach to criticality. Criticality was not achieved with control rod groups 7 and 8 fully withdrawn.

The control rods were repositioned such that Group 7 was at 85% withdrawn and Group 8 Page 6 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 2: Zero Power Physics Test was at its nominal position of 35% withdrawn and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was deborated approximately 32 ppmB. Criticality was achieved on December 31, 2004 at 0450 within the acceptacne criteria of +/- 0.75% Ak 1 k of estimated critical position, with rod Groups 1-6 at 100% wd (withdrawn), Group 7 at 91.6% wd, Group 8 at 35% wd, an RCS average temperature of 534 0F, and an RCS boron concentration of 1773 ppmB.

2.2 Pre-Physics Measurements After establishing stable conditions with the reactor critical, reactor power was slowly increased to verify and record NI overlap. The point of adding sensible heat was also determined. From the sensible heat determination, the upper testing limit on the wide range Nls (as indicated on the Control Room Chart Recorder) was established for ZPPT.

An on-line OAC reactimeter checkout was then performed utilizing reactivity changes of about +/- 500 pp and measuring the associated doubling times. The measured doubling times were compared to calculated values and found to agree within the procedure acceptance criteria.

2.3 Physics Testing A.

All Rods Out (ARO) Boron Concentration Measurement The RCS equilibrium boron concentration was measured with Groups 1-6 at 100% wd, Group 7 at 91.6% wd, and APSR Group 8 at 35% wd. The control rods were moved to their all-rods-out position (Groups 1-7 at 100% wd, Group 8 at 35% wd) and the associated reactivity change was converted to a boron equivalent in ppmB. The All Rods Out Boron Concentration was then calculated and verified to be within procedure acceptance criteria.

B.

Reactivity Coefficient Measurements The temperature coefficient measurement was made while maintaining equilibrium boron concentration in the RCS, with control rod Group 7 withdrawn to 91.6% wd and with APSR Group 8 at 35% wd. This test measured the reactivity change associated with a ramp increase in RCS temperature of approximately 4.95 OF and a subsequent decrease of 9.88 'F.

The data from the two temperature ramps was averaged using the AT magnitudes as weighting factors. The change in reactivity was divided by the change in RCS temperature to calculate the temperature coefficient. The measured temperature coefficient was corrected for the difference in RCS average test temperature and reference temperature (532 0F). The moderator temperature coefficient was calculated by subtracting the predicted isothermal Doppler coefficient from the measured temperature coefficient. The Reactivity Coefficient Measurements met the procedure acceptance criteria.

Page 7 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 2: Zero Power Physics Test C.

Control Rod Integral Worths and Differential Boron Worth Measurement The worths of control rod Groups 5, 6, and 7 were measured by steadily deborating the RCS and compensating for the resulting positive reactivity addition by inserting control rods from 100% wd on Group 7 to 0% wd on Group 5 (with no rod overlap). The reactivity changes resulting from the discrete control rod insertions were summed for each group to obtain the group integral rod worth. Each of the three measured groups passed their individual acceptance criteria and the measured worth of all regulating groups passed the group acceptance criteria.

The differential boron worth was calculated by dividing the total rod worth of Groups 5, 6, and 7 inserted between the initial and final boron samples by the corresponding change in RCS boron concentration. The initial value for the boron concentration was recorded at ARO critical equilibrium conditions. The final value of boron concentration was recorded as reactivity approached steady-state. The measured differential boron worth met procedure acceptance criteria.

Page 8 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 3: Power Escalation Test 3.0 Introduction and Summary The Oconee 3 Cycle 22 Power Escalation Test was performed between December 31, 2004 and January 10, 2005 per station procedure PT/0/A/0811/01. Testing was performed at 18% Full Power (FP), 61% FP and 100% FP to verify nuclear parameters upon which the Oconee 3 Cycle 22 core design, safety analysis and Technical Specifications are based. The following tests and verifications were performed:

(a)

Initial Core Symmetry Check at 18% FP; (b)

NSSS Heat Balance at 18% FP, 61% FP, and 100% FP (Enclosure 4.0);

(c)

Incore Detector Checkout at 18% FP, 40% FP, and 100%FP; (d)

Power Imbalance Detector Correlation Slope Measurement at 61% FP; (e)

Core Power Distribution at 18% FP, 40% FP, and 100% FP (Enclosures 5.0 through 5.3 and 6.0);

(f)

All-Rods-Out Critical Boron Concentration at 100% FP (Enclosure 1.0).

The unit reached 18% FP at 1345 on January 2, 2005. Low power testing (LPT) was completed at 0410 on January 3, 2005. The unit reached 61% FP at 0300 on January 5, 2005. Testing at this intermediate plateau (Intermediate Power Testing, IMPT) was completed at 0952 on January 5, 2005. The unit reached the Full Power Testing plateau on January 6, 2005 at 0330. Full Power Testing (FPT), consisting of Incore Detector Checkout, Core Power Distribution, NSSS Heat Balance and All-Rods-Out Critical Boron, was performed at this plateau. Power Escalation Testing was declared complete on January 6, 2005 at 1622. The results of the tests and an evaluation of the initial core symmetry check are detailed in Enclosures 4 through 7.

3.1 NSSS Heat BalanceJRCS Flow Verification Off-line secondary heat balances were performed at 18% FP, 61% FP and 100% FP. These tests verified the accuracy of the on-line plant computer program which performs primary and secondary-side heat balances. The plant on-line computer accuracy was verified by performing an off-line calculation using the same inputs that feed the on-line computer.

The on-line and off-line results were compared for the same period, and verified to agree within 2% FP. This same method was used to verify that RCS flow was greater than the Page 9 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 3: Power Escalation Test required flow per the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). Normalization of the plant computer RCS flow constants (used to calculate flow from the primary delta-P instrumentation) was performed during FPT and the on-line power calculations were then verified to agree within 2% FP.

3.2 Core Power Distribution Core Power Distribution tests were conducted at 18% FP, 40% FP and at 100% FP. These tests verified that reactor power imbalance, quadrant power tilt and radial/total power peaks did not exceed their respective specified limits.

Specific checks were made as follows:

Incore imbalance was compared to the error adjusted imbalance LOCA limit curve and was verified to be within specified limits (based on Core Operating Limits Report).

The maximum positive quadrant power tilt was verified to be less than the error adjusted LOCA limit (based on Core Operating Limits Report).

Prior to performing the radial and total peaking factor comparisons, PT/O/A10302/06 (Review and Control of Incore Instrumentation Signals) was performed to identify and evaluate erroneous Self Powered Neutron Detector signals. This test was performed as a prerequisite to core power distribution tests at 18% FP, 40% FP and 100% FP.

The radial and total peaking factors were measured and compared to the predicted values at 40% FP and 100% FP. All acceptance criteria were satisfied.

3.3 Power Imbalance Detector Correlation The Power Imbalance Detector Correlation was performed at 61% FP. The purpose of this test was to measure the excore to incore power imbalance correlation slopes for NI Channels 5, 6, 7, and 8, and to verify these slopes met acceptance criteria.

The excore/incore imbalance correlation slope for each NI Channel (5-8) was determined by a least squares fit of excore to incore imbalance indications. A total of 35 incore imbalance points which ranged between -9.05% and +3.92% FP were used. All the slopes were verified to meet acceptance criteria.

Page 10 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT Part 3: Power Escalation Test The correlation slopes for NI Channels 5, 6, 7, and 8 were calculated to be 1.15, 1.14, 1.14, and 1.15 respectively.

3.4 All Rods Out Critical Boron Measurement at Power The All Rods Out Critical Boron at Power measurement was made at 100% FP, and the difference between measured and predicted reactivity (in terms of ppmB) was verified to be acceptable.

Page 11 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.0 ALL-RODS-OUT CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION AND DIFFERENTIAL BORON WORTH RESULTS Zero Power ARO At-Power ARO Differential Boron Critical Boron Critical Boron Worth Concentration Concentration CONDITIONS Initial Critical 100% FP Initial Sate:

0 EFPD 1.66 EFPD Gp 7 @ 97% wd Gp 8 @ 35% wd Gp 7 @ 91.6% wd Gp 7 @ 92% wd 1770 ppmB Gp 8 @ 35% wd Gp 8 @ 35% wd 1773 ppmB 1266 ppmB Final State:

Gp 4 @ 100% wd Gp 5 @ 0.0% wd Gp8 @ 35%wd 1408 ppmB MEASURED 1773 ppmB 1315 ppmB

-0.00917 k/k ppmB VALUE PREDICTED 1804 ppmB 1283 ppmB

-0.00791 Ak/k ppmB VALUE DEVIATION 31 ppmB

-17 ppmB

-13.71%*

ACCEPTANCE Predicted + 50 ppmB Predicted + 50 ppmB

+15% deviation from CRITERIA predicted.

• (Predicted -Me~asured)*

100 Measured Page 12 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.0 INTEGRAL GROUP ROD WORTH MEASUREMENTS PARAMETER MEASURED PREDICTED VALUE VALUE DEVIATION ACCEPTANCE

(%Aklk)

(%Aklk)

(%)

CRITERION Gp 7

-0.90833

-0.83

-8.6

+ 15% Deviation Integral Worth Gp 6

-1.0716

-0.967

-9.8

+ 15% Deviation Integral Worth Gp 5

-1.30492

-1.198

-8.2

+ 15% Deviation Integral Worth Gp 5-7

-3.28486

-2.995

-8.8

+ 10% Deviation Integral Worth

% Dev. = Predicted -Measured

• 100 Measured Page 13 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.0 REACTIVITY COEFFICIENTS PARAMETER CONDITIONS MEASURED PREDICTED DEVIATION ACCEPTANCE VALUE VALUE (Meas-Pred)

CRITERIA Hot Zero Power Tave=532 F

+0.1339E-4 Ak

+0.1038E-4 Ak 0.0301 E-4 Ak Measured -Predicted =

Temperature Gp 7 @ 93.55% wd k OF k OF k °F

+0.2E-4 Ak Coefficient Gp 8 @ 35% wd k OF (ARO) 1770 ppmB Hot Zero Power T.,i=532 F

+0.2962E-4 Ak

+0.2661E-4 Ak 0.0301 E-4 Ak Measured - Predicted =

Moderator Gp 7 @ 93.55% wd k OF k °F k °F

+0.2E4 Ak Temperature Gp 8 @ 35% wd k°F Coefficient 1770 ppmB (ARO) and Measured <+0.5E-4 Ak k°F Page 14 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.0 NSSS HEAT BALANCE/RCS FLOW VERIFICATION Test Plant Plant Offlinel Offlinel RCS Plateau Computer Computer Calculated Calculated Flow 1,2 Online Online Sec.

Primary Secondary

(%DF)

Primary Power Level Power Level Power Level Power Level

(%FP)

( % P )_

LPT 17.95 18.22 17.92 18.14 115.61 IMPT 59.45 60.27 59.46 60.19 115.17 72.83 73.53 72.80 73.45 114.92 FPT 100.0 100.0 100.06 99.91 114.61

'Calculated by the offline heat balance program 2Required to be > Core Operating Limit Report RCS flow of 107.5 % DF Page 15 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.0 RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS AT IMPT 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 H

1.07 1.54 1.10 1.19 0.82 1.23 1.00 0.30 1.08 1.49 1.12 1.16 0.84 1.24 1.07 0.32 7%

3.4%

-1.5%

2.6%

-2.2%

-1.0%

-6.9%

-5.8%

1.2 0.29 K

1.48 1.45 2.1%

1.47 1.46 0.3%

1.04 1.01 2.6%

1.37 1.34 2.3%

1.29 1.31

-1.6%

1.22 1.25

-1.6%

0.29 0.30

-2.6%

-1.6%

-2.6%

9 1-

-t I

L 1.42 1.40 1.5%

1.47 1.42 3.2%

1.32 1.32 0.5%

1.33 1.31 1.7%

0.79 0.81

-2.2%

0.20 0.20 1.5%

Predicted Measured

%dev 9

1-

• t

-t I

M 1.02 1.03

-0.5%

1.36 1.40

-2.2%

1.05 1.06

-1.3%

0.41 0.42

-3.4%

4-

.t N

1.01 1.08

-6.6%

0.96 0.93 3.3%

0.22 0.23

-3.8%

% Dev. = Predicted - Measured

• 100 Measured 0

0.30 0.32

-5.4%

Core Conditions Power 40.17 %FP Group 5 100% wd Group 6 100%wd Group 7 39% wd Group 8 35% wd Imbalance

-6.4 RCS Boron 1477 ppmB Max 1/8 Core % Deviation is 3.4 % at L9 Acceptance criteria: + 15% of Predicted Min 1/8 Core % Deviation is-6.9% at H14 Acceptance criteria: - 15% of Predicted Max Peak Deviation is -3.4%

Acceptance Criteria: <+5%

Root Mean Square of Deviations is 3.6%

Acceptance Criteria: <+7.5%

Page 16 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.1 TOTAL PEAKING FACTORS AT IMPT 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 II 1.29 1.90 1.35 1.56 1.27 1.66 1.31 0.38 1.28 1.89 1.37 1.52 1.30 1.68 1.37 0.40 0.7%

0.8%

-1.3%

2.4%

-2.4%

-1.2%

-4.3%

-4.6%

K 1.81 1.79 1.1%

1.83 1.88

-2.6%

1.33 1.31 1.7%

1.86 1.82 2.6%

1.72 1.73

-0.3%

1.64 1.69

-3.2%

0.37 0.39

-4.4%

1.31 1.82 1.73 1.69 0.39 1.7%

2.6%

-0.3%

-3.2%

-4.4%

4-f 4

4 4

+

Predicted Measured

%dev L

1.80 1.79 0.4%

1.93 1.88 3.1%

1.79 1.82

-1.7%

1.80 1.77 1.8%

1.04 1.06

-1.6%

0.26 0.25 4.4%

M 1.37 1.37 0.1%

1.94 2.02

-3.7%

1.45 1.49

-2.4%

0.54 0.55

-1.2%

%Dev =Predicted - Measured

• 100 Measured N

1.72 1.79

-4.0%

1.44 1.45

-0.8%

0.31 0.31

-0.5%

0 0.44 0.46

-3.4%

Core Conditions Power 40.17 %FP Group 5 100% wd Group 6 100%twd Group 7 39% wd Group 8 35% wd Imbalance

-6.4 RCS Boron 1477 ppmB;

. C De t

i 4a__

_1po___

o I

Max 1/8 Core % Deviation is 4.4 % at L15 Acceptance criteria: + 15% of Predicted M

a 1/8 Core % Deviation is 4.6 % at H15 Acceptance critriia: - 15% of Predicted Maximum Peak Deviation is 3.7%

Acceptance Criteria: <+7.5%

Page 17 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.2 RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS AT FPT 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 H

0.96 1.37 1.03 1.18 1.00 1.25 0.98 0.30 0.97 1.34 1.05 1.14 0.99 1.27 1.05 0.32

-1.0%

2.2%

-1.9%

3.5%

1.0%

-1.6%

-6.7%

-6.3%

K 1.33 1.31 1.5%

1.35 1.34 0.7%

1.01 0.99 2.5%

1.36 1.34 1.5%

1.28 1.29

-0.8%

1.19 1.21

-1.2%

0.29 0.30

-3.3%

meadured predicted

%dv

-1.2%

-3.3%

4 4

4-4 4-L 1.32 1.30 1.5%.

1.39 1.36 2.2%

1.04 1.04 0.0%

1.29 1.29 0.4%

1.30 1.28 1.4%

0.79 0.81

-2.5%

0.21 0.20 5.0%

4 4

4 M

1.42 1.45

-2.1%

1.10 1.11

-0.9%

0.43 0.45

-4.4%

+

4 N

1.31 1.33

-1.5%

1.10 1.09 0.9%

0.25 0.26

-3.8%

% Dev= Predicted - Measured

• 100 Measured 0

0.36 0.38

-5.3%

('nrD (Cndnihincn Power 100 %FP Group 5 100% wd Group 6 100%wd Group 7 92% wd Group 8 35% wd Imbalance 0.31 RCS Boron 1477 ppmB Max 1/8 Core % Deviation is 5.0 % at L15 Acceptance criteria: + 10% of Predicted Min 1/8 Core % Deviation is -6.7% at H14 Acceptance criteria: - 15% of Predicted Max peak Deviation is 2.1%

Acceptance Criteria: <+5%

Root Mean Square of Deviations is 3.00%

Acceptance Criteria: <+7.5%

Page 18 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.3 TOTAL PEAKING FACTORS AT FPT 8

9 11 1.18 1.68 1.12 1.60 5.4%

5.0%

K 1.63 1.53 6.5%

measred predicted

%dv 10 11 12 13 14 is 1.25 1.42 1.23 1.54 1.22 0.37 1.21 1.32 1.16 1.52 1.28 0.37 3.3%

7.6%

6.0%

1.3%

-4.7%

0.0%

1.64 1.22 1.67 1.57 1.49 0.36 1.59 1.15 1.57 1.54 1.50 0.36 3.1%

6.6%

6.4%

2.3%

-0.3%

0.0%

1.60 1.70 1.55 1.61 0.98 0.25 1.51 1.60 1.56 1.54 0.96 0.22 6.0%

6.2%

-0.6%

4.5%

2.6%

13.6%

1.25 1.75 1.36 0.53 M

1.20 1.76 1.32 0.53 4.2%

-0.6%

3.0%

0.0%

1.63 1.38 0.31 N

1.57 1.32 0.30 3.8%

4.5%

3.3%

L

%Dev= Predicted - Measured

• 100 Measured 0

0.45 0.44 2.3%

Core Conditions Power 100 %FP Group 5 100% wd Group 6 100%wd Group 7 92% wd Group 8 35% wd Imbalance 0.31 RCS Boron 1477 iDtmB Cre6 L5 Ac crieri:

o Max 1/8 Core % Deviation is 13.6 % at L15 Acceptance criteria: + 15% of Predicted Min 1/8 Core % Deviation is -4.7 % at H14 Acceptance criteria: - 15% of Predicted Max Peak Deviation is 0.6 Acceptance Criteria: <+7.5%

Page 19 of 26

Oconee 3 Cycle 22 STARTUP TESTING REPORT.0 CORE POWER DISTRIBUTION DATA

SUMMARY

AT IMPT AND FPT PLATEAUS Power Level 40.17 100

(% FP)

Group 6/7/8 100/39/35 100/92/35 Positions (% wd)

RCS Boron 1477 1477 Concentration (ppmB)

Incore Imbalance

-6.40 0.31

(%FP)

Page 20 of 26

The following analyses were performed by the General Office Nuclear Design personnel due to the failure of core symmetry tests at the low power and intermediate power plateaus by the outer symmetric ring of detectors. Each unit at Oconee is designed with an incore detector system with nominally 52 incore detectors in service. Of these 52 detectors, there are 9 symmetric pairs, and an inner and outer symmetric ring of detectors, each consisting of eight incore detectors. The General Office (GO) evaluation concluded in both cases that increasing power would result in an improvement in incore tilts and asymmetry, and recommended increasing power. As was predicted, the incore tilts and asymmetry did improve with the additional time and power escalation.

Low Power Testing Svmmetry GO Analvsis Assessment of 03C22 BOC LPT Symmetry Test During the performance of the Oconee 3, Cycle 22 (03C22) low power plateau (LPT) core symmetry test (5:00 PM, January 2, 2005), one symmetric location (outer symmetric ring) failed the LPT 10% acceptance criteria:

Outer symmetries FAILED (12.5%)

Analysis of inner and outer symmetric power indicated that there were true and consistent indications of asymmetry; this asymmetry appeared to be global and centered over the B hot leg (i.e., hot core half is on the B side). This was confirmed by analysis of raw and corrected inner/outer symmetric signals (nAmps). The incore and excore tilts also reflected this asymmetry:

Incore Excore (approx)

WX

+3.3

+1.3 (B hotleg)

XY

+0.6

+2.0 (B hot leg)

YZ

-3.4

-2.5 (A hot leg)

ZW

-0.6

-0.9 (A hot leg)

Cause Matrix Potential causes for the true asymmetry were evaluated using the cause matrix from the ONS Reactor System Engineering Work Process Manual, Table 2.5 - Startup Testing Summary.

Potential Yes/No?

Rationale Cause Incore NO String 11, level 6 was showing erratic behavior and was Detector drifting up to 1500 nAmps the week before startup. This Failure particular level was taken out of scan during the SPND checkouts. Also, SPND 47, level 4 was showing low levels, and was locked out.

All other symmetric signals appear reasonable. String 47 appeared low when assessed

'Potential YesNo?:

Rationale Cduse versus nearby powers; the low string 47 powers were driving the LPT 10% acceptance criteria failure in the outer symmetries.

OAC database NO Generally, the Nuclear Applications Software (NAS) error, incore appears to be operating correctly.

substitution Analyses during DBU (GENSIG) show that the NAS error signal-to-power (S/P) constants were calculated correctly.

NAS fuel burnups were verified to be shuffled correctly for fuel reinserts, and to be initialized to zero for fresh fuel. NAS incore detector burnups were verified to be unchanged for detector reinserts, and to be initialized to zero for new detectors.

NAS S/P calculations were verified to show good symmetry within symmetric locations. Incore depletion correction factors were verified to show good symmetry within symmetric locations of same age.

NAS substitutions for the symmetrics appear reasonable given the symmetric counterparts.

No anomalous inner/outer symmetric readings were observed during 03C21. The depletion curves were checked during the DBU, and no anomalous values were found. This would rule out any hidden impact on the incore detector depletion correction factors.

RCS flow NO RC flow appears to be evenly matched.

asymmetry or The cold and hot leg temperatures appear to be evenly flow blockage distributed.

The asymmetry was not discernable via incore thermocouples.

CRD NO There were no OAC rod misalignment alarms. Review of misalignment CRD position indication shows no CRD misalignment.

Based on past experience, if there was an undetected drop rod, tilts will be very high, in excess of 10%. If there were undetected partially inserted rods, there would be a disagreement between measured and predicted imbalances; as seen from preliminary Simulate-3 (predictions) and NAS (measured) comparisons at 18%,

there were reasonable agreement.

Potential Yes/No?

Rationale.

Previous cycle POSSIBLE 03C21 started operation with an excessive tilt of 3%.

operating Tilts steadily decreased to less than 1.0% at 250 EFPD.

history Cycle 21 ended with tilts under 1%. Inspection of the

("burned-in" Cycle 21 tilts show that a burnup asymmetry may be tilt) present.

FFCD shuffle scheme appeared to be mixed such that the burnup asymmetry carry over should be reduced.

Core load map NO Checked the reinsert fuel IDs (shuffle 03C21 to 03C22) error and fresh FA - BP pairings.

Checked the as-built fuel enrichments and the uranium loadings provided by FCF. Deviations appeared to be weighted in the ZW quadrant and to a lesser degree, in the WX quadrant. However, these appear to be within expected ranges and past cycles. Note that 02C21 was worse than 03C22, and exhibited no symmetry problems.

Also, these locations of these deviations are not consistent with the locations of the tilt indications.

In summary, no gross errors were found.

Procedure NO Procedure (LPT symmetry test), test methods (LPT analysis or spreadsheets) and calculations (NAS) were not changed for calculation 03C22.

error Core loading NO The core load tapes have been reviewed by ONS RE at error least twice. FAs in core locations A-09 and A-10 were not on the tape. SIMULATE-3 was executed assuming that these two FAs were swapped, and the results were not consistent with the symmetry results.

It is postulated that a core misleading would manifest itself by extreme localized radial peaks. From preliminary Simulate-3 (predictions) and NAS (measured) comparisons at 18%, no extreme localized radial peaks were seen; it is judged that the asymmetry is too global.

It is also postulated that that a core misloading would manifest itself by ZPPT test failures. 03C22 passed all ZPPT acceptance test criteria.

Because of this, there is reasonable assurance that there is no misloaded assembly.

Potential Yes/No?

Rationale ->. --

Cause Measurement NO Any past concerns relating to measurement error (i.e.,

error impacts from electronic noise) are minimized by the "long" emitter incore detectors. This item is also covered by other parts within this matrix.

Dropped NO There were no OAC rod misalignment alarms. Review of control rod or CRD position indications shows no CRD misalignment. If rodlets there was an undetected drop rod, tilts will be very high, in excess of 10%. If there were undetected broken rodlets, there would be a disagreement between measured and predicted imbalances; as seen from preliminary Simulate-3 (predictions) and NAS (measured) comparisons at 18%,

there were reasonable agreement.

Instrument out NO NAS incore detector depletion factors updated during the of calibration DBU were confirmed to be correct. The "OAC SPND Neutron Detector Input Calibration" procedure performed by ONS LIT ensured that the OAC SPND card inputs were within tolerance.

Other Observations/Comments The latest ANSI standard for startup physics tests (ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-1997) was also consulted for guidance. Fuel bowing/damage was considered not likely, given the meticulous attention during the FFCD and during fuel inspections. There was one assembly that had reinsertion problems, and one assembly was discovered to be damaged.

However, the damaged assembly was inspected, and was cleared for reinsertion.

Excessive fuel crud was considered not likely since ONS does not have a history of crud problems.

The Oconee Startup Physics Test Program found in Chapter 4 of the UFSAR was consulted for follow-up and corrective actions.

Past experience (including 01C20, 02C19, 03C20, 02C20, and 03C21) has indicated excessive tilts and asymmetries at low powers. While a definite cause has not been found, it has been seen that the excessive tilts and asymmetries improve (sometimes drastically) with power escalation past 30%FP.

During the LPT, Gp 7 was inserted to 32%FP. Past experience has indicated that the symmetry results and excessive tilts improve with rod withdrawals and initial cycle exposure/conditioning.

The measured and predicted LPT core power distributions were reasonable and comparable to past cycles considering the low power level (18%FP). The measured

power distributions indicated no severe localized power peaks. Thus it is unlikely that there is a mis-loaded assembly, mis-aligned control rod, or an error in fuel or manufacturing.

During the short time at the LPT power level, the tilts and the core asymmetry steadily decreased. It is reasonable to assume that this behavior will continue.

Conclusions It was determined that there are true and consistent indications of asymmetry which is global and is centered over the B hot leg. This was confirmed by analysis of inner and outer symmetric powers and raw incore detector signals, and by the incore and excore tilt indications. The symmetry test failures for the inner and outer symmetrics were caused by the true asymmetry, and were not caused by NAS and/or incore detector problems.

While the cause matrix did not find a definitive cause for the true asymmetry, it is unlikely that the cause is a misloaded assembly, a misaligned control rod, or gross fuel/BPRA mis-manufacture.

It is likely that part cause for the true asymmetry is the burnup asymmetry carryover from 03C21 which experienced excessive tilts for a period of time.

Past experience has shown that the excessive tilts and asymmetries seen during initial cycle startup (LPT) improve, sometimes drastically, with power escalation past 30%FP.

Additional past experience has shown that excessive tilts improve with bumup, and can be further reduced within implementation of Delta Tc. However, the impact of the Delta Tc may be small at BOC because of a small MTC with respect to EOC.

Recommendations The nuclear design personnel from the GO recommended that power be escalated past 30%FP to the IMPT plateau (40%FP). Nuclear Design would then monitor the symmetry test during the power escalation, and evaluate the IMPT CPD comparisons. This is the action that was taken.

Intermediate Power Testing Symmetry GO Analysis IMPT SIMULATE Predictions The results for the SIMULATE-3 predictions for the intermediate power test performed for 1/04/2005 19:00 hours are summarized below. The reference SIMULATE job is BNSM / 04Jan2005 and SIMEDIT job BNSP / 04Jan2005.

IMPT Symmetry Results Upon reaching the IMPT plateau, it was noted that the outer symmetries (10.5%) still failed the 10% acceptance criteria for the symmetry test. However, the following observations are made:

As with the LPT plateau, the asymmetry was being driven by the incore tilts. The incore tilts and the asymmetry steadily improved with time and power escalation. As was

predicted these two improved even more with additional time and further power escalation.

It is noted that the Assessment of 03C22 BOC LPT Symmetry Test concluded that it is unlikely that the cause of the LPT asymmetry was a misloaded assembly, a misaligned control rod, or gross fuel/BPRA mis-manufacture. Nuclear Design's surveillance during the power escalation did not change that conclusion.

All incore tilts were within the COLR setpoints.

All UFSAR 4.3.7 criteria for the IMPT CPD were met.

The IMPT CPD had much better agreement between predicted and measured data as compared to the LPT CPD (performed by Nuclear Design as part of the asymmetry surveillance). Also, the IMPT CPD agreed very well considering the intermediate power level and past experience.

Based on above and on the IMPT CPD results, it was recommended that the power escalation be continued. This was the action taken.