ML043640245
| ML043640245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/2004 |
| From: | Armes K Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Mallett B Region 4 Administrator |
| Schneck, D NSIR/DPR/EPD 415-3079 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML043640245 (31) | |
Text
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland. CA 946074052
- FEMA JUL 1 6 2004 Mr. Bruce. S. Mallett . : .. * . ;- . . , ,.
Regional Administrator , . .. , ..
U.S. NuclearRegulatory CornimissionRegionqIlVf a,- *.; Eri;; ,:- .L:%rr *..: le..'
611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 400- -
Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 . . . ...
Dear Mr. Mallett:
On November 21, 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Region IX evaluated an off-site Medical Drill for the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). The purpose of the drill was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency.
I have enclosed a copy of the final report for your records: There were no issues identified. We have determined that based on the overall results of the drill, there is reasonable assurance appropriate measures can be taken off-site to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at PVNGS. The level of preparedness and adequacy in the off-site radiological emergency response plans for the State of Arizona and the jurisdictions site-specific to PVNGS, together with the ability to implement these plans, were well demonstrated.
Therefore, the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44 Part 350 approval of the off-site radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Arizona, site-specific to PVNGS, .will remain in effect.
If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me at (510) 627-7100, or your staff may contact Mr. Kenneth Chin, Regional Assistance Committee Chair, at (510) 627-7122.
Sincerely,'
Acting Regional Director Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa Quinn, FEMA HQ Mr. Eric Weiss, NRC HQ
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Final Medical Drill Report, PALO VTERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Drill Date: November 21,2003 Report Date: June 28,2004 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IX 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, California 94607-4052
L. E"XECUTIVE SUM1\X'.IRAYAli "
The Federal Emergency'..Management Agency (FEMA), Region 1X evaluated an Off-site Medical Drill on November 21, 2003, for the emergency planning zone.(EPZ) around the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). The purpose of the exercise and drill was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise and drill was held in accordance'witli FEMA's* policies and guidance concerning the exercising of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.. . .
The most recent bienni-_P;xarcisc atthIis site teas conducted'on March 14; 2003. The'most recent' medi"i drill for the Banner Good Medical Center was conducted on March 29, 2002. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on April 1, 1981.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the, efforts of the many individuals wh6 participated in this exercise.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additionally. assigned. responsibility. for. others. Still, others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities., Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this drill..- , ....-
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The local organizatimnst. ~e'net Whiretiotetd inhis rep6?ti demonstrited knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Areas Requiring Co'rrctivefAction (ARCA) identified as a result of this drill.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS';T' } ; ^;
- -' iPage I. , EXECUITWEX~AU.LV Sb U1U~iKI ARY j c" L ...................... ....................
,~ . ,. :' ) ;'-( .:-T V:J'!ils j ,IIe--,.)-^v
,,y II.11'. INTRODUCTIONO UN 'NT ............-. ' - ;1. ...........................
............... iJI . ._
,. Xif 1;..;1r1 ...&... i . 'i
-M1. OVERVIEW-* vi
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......................................... .... .'.'.r. ? <....... -. ';.'..'-'.. .. ...... .
A:;., :;ume Emet gency -.Planfiin.$'!r,;snpi'o'. tt .................................................
' : ' I B. ..Participants . ....-' .. '.' i .: ....... ; vi IV. EVALUATION AND.RESLTS .:.......;. .... ; :.... .': .:;.':; vii A. Summary Results of Evaluationvi B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ................................. .........- ...:
- . .. ix
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- i ^ t - I I Z-$t
,D etail. . . !;.......
.......... ............................... .................. I Patient Transfer at PVNGS Site .. ' .... .i1
- Patient Transfer Between BGSMC Helipad and Treatment Area .. 3
.,;, Treatment ofiPatien att1h:BGSMC-Fin qg ; ;; i
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APPENDIX 1- ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................... 10 APPENDIX 2- EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS : 12 APPENDIX 3 - EVALUATION AREAS AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT ......................... 13 APPENDIX 4 - SCENARIO.' ................... ; 17 List of Tables Table 1 - Summary Results of Evaluation............................. '.;.;.; viii Table 2 - Exercise Issues ................... xi
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fl. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These'regulations are a key element; in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP), Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station ac6identin March 1979.
FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and
,continued
. approval bf .Tribal',,State 'aid local governments" radiological emergency planning and" prepa~rdness for c6mmnercial nuclear power. plants. This approval is
... contingent, in. part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.
- FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear
- facilities include the followinxg: ' - ' ' '
- Taking tle' l&ad:ifi ff-site emergency planning and-in the review and evaluation of RERPs' and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation 'andi'evaluation! tIfa exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by
'. . . -State; and lo'~cal g oennnt;;"/t
- ;"
- L .*,i
.'7 '"' ,;. .
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the dingbetween the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, Septem~er,14 1993); and
- C6ordinatif6 th'e'aciivities 6f F'ededaag'encies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process: -
U.S.'Department'of 6fimmerce,.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission,
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, .. .
. '- . U.S. Depaitmient of Energy, '
- U.S. Department of Health and Human SerVices,
,. ;. , - U.S. Departil t'ofTransportation, .....
- . - U.S.' Depagtnent dfAgriculturiie> -. :... **
.>t:. - U.S:. D'epaiti66net of thi 1ie -te o'r, 'and ' ; ' '...................
- ..- U.S. Food and Drug Administrati'6h. '.
Representatives' thoes&'a'gein6es seim'6 the FEA Region IX Regional Assistance
- .Committee (RAC) th'at is chaired by FEMA.
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,Formal submission of the RERPs for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station to FEMA Region IX by the State of Arizona and the involved local jurisdictions occurred on May31, 1988. : ' . ; . s....., . .
State. and local Radiological Emergency Preparedness plans are required, in NJREG-0654fFEMA REP 1, Rev.. (No0vember 1980), toQ cesignate primaiy'and back-up medical facilities capable of providing appropriate care to injured/contaminated individuals' originating from the off-site effects of an incident-at a nuclear power plant One or more
-- fthhes'e fclte~~euiia~lly,ex~erci~ed _zapf it e'biefinia1l tatdLc -R;EP exercise.,
-. '. s m~ay , eke~rcised dunng he of~fyar pefiod. At kleast'rone evaluated medical drill
':Im;.utI be held eaAh year at each nuclear-facility, according to NUREG-0654 Planning Standard N.2.c.
FEMA Region IX evaluated an Off-site Medical Drill-on No.vember 21, 2003, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations.*in :implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the PVNGS. .The purposeof this repprt is tQ present the results and findings on the peiformance of theoff-sjte .respon~se .organizations -:ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this rprt -ar d 'on the revaluations of theFederal evaluator i team, 'with 'final 'deteritibations made by the FEM Rego X (Ahaierson and approved by the Regional Director.
Tl. i 6niewritsia utilized in'the'i~qvaeyu inrocess air.cpwntained'in:'
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- 4NUREG:0o654,MAIRE-1, ReLv. 1, "Criteria for-Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans.,and Preparedne~ss in, Support of Nuclear
. Power Plants' November 1980; 2 ,_ . I -
- FEMA Radiological Emergency Prepyediess Exercise Evaluation Methodology, September, 2001; and ,>..,, a . E io
- FEMA Guidance Memoranda MSg "',edical.Services;" November 1986.
Section mL of this teport, -ntiiied".'Exercise Ovryiew," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise"' Thibs.sectio heReportt ntains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of h; juiqs4ictions and functional entities that at.partcipaing were evaluated, and a tabular pre'senftation of the.,time of pctual, occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercjse Eyaluation and-Results," presents detailed information on the demons t ration of' applicable. exercise evaluation areas at each iv
'N, jursdiction or fuInai1nial 6nity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.
This section also contains: (1) descriptionsof all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recomniended corrective actions,. and the Tribal, State and local governments' schedule. of corrective actions for each identified issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous drills and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them. . -. . . - . -. .
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-I III. OVERVIEW - .- -;* > .. i : ;i Contained in this section are'data and'bksi'd-iii -ormatioh'relev a rithe- November 21, 2003, medical drill to test a portion of the6ff-'gilte emergency respbnsd'capabilities for the area surrounding the Palo Verde Nuclear Generainig' tation. This sectiori of the report includes .a description of the plume pathway EPZ,' and 'Iistingo f all al participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated.
.A. .Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description - I The'State of Arizona has designated 'a'n Em'ergency Planning' Zone (EP7Z) that extends out from a 10-mile circle around the plant. The EPZ includes the unincorporated areas of Maricopa County.
B. Exercise Participants -
. The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Palo' Verde' Nuclear Generating Station ff-site medical drill on November 21, 2003." i i' RISK JURISDICTIONS Maricopa County '
PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS
-'Native American Air Ambulance Banner Good Samaritan Medical Center
-Palo Verde NuclearGenerating Station A
V.I
ts WV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS' Contained in this sectiort are the, results and' findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional enitfies whi~ch participated in the November 21, 2003, medical drill to test the off-site emergencyt .respose7 cap-abilities of Tribal Nations, State and local governments in the. 101milelE ZsuIrounding the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Each jurisdiction'and ,fun c,,tloi;a entity wass evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria deline'ated,dln exercise- eval.uadon . area criteria contained -in 'the FEMA REP Program Manual. Detaiidinfiomation, on the,,exercise'evaluationi areacnteria and the extent-of-play. agreement used ihiAthis exercise are found in Appendix 3 ofthis -ieport.
- A. . Sumnmary Results of Exercise Evaluation- - Tablel1 YI The matrix presented in Table 1, on the following page, presents'th'status of ali exercise e~valuation area criteria from the&FEMA REP Program Manual. that were, scheduled for demonstration-during this'exercise by-all 'participating jurisdictions.
and fuh'tibnial entitieis.:Exercise evaluation area criteria are listed by number and the demonstrationstatus of those evaluation area criteria is indicated by the use of,
., the following letters:'. 7 .. .
- ,M Mer (.Io-Dficiencyor-ARCAs asssses'ed andno"unresolved t~AC., .t~-, ; .. __*_-L- Arise^ rF I jrdi ARC p)r exercises),,;..- c i *i s ! s 87 ' t~5 t.+;
- It; z S*; t0.ul.L ; r .t -' .t ' I A
w ' AR'C'"' a~u;r essdor unresolved'ARC(s rom por exrcise(s)
N Not' Demons'rated (Reason-explained in Subsection'B).
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TABLE 1.
SUMMARY
RESULTS OF EXERCISE . , ...I EVALUATION - I I
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1 M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCAs from Prior Exercises A - ARCA(s) Assessed or Unresolvedi ARCA(s) from Prior;l
'N - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained In Section IV.B) Exercises D- Deficiency Blank - Not Scheduled for Demonstrati ion *4 '
- i
The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that ale discussed in this report.
A Deficiency .is defined in, the FEMA -REP Program Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational' performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness is not adequate to- provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures canbe taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect
' ' ' ' - ; the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power An ARCA is defined in the FEMA REP Program Manual. as "...an
- observed, or identified inadequacy of organizational
- performance in an
-,exercise that isnot,considered, by itself,-to adversely impact public health,
- ' ;;andsafety,'
FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiengcies, dARCAs)j.. - This system -is- used to achieve consistency in
- u-_! ,'r, nmgeingexercisf, issues among. FEMA.. Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each, Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues.
on a nationwide basis.,. i. -
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' The identifying4 numbe, fo-,-ieficiencies. sands ARCAs includes the following elments, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
'!,, ; Plant Site Identifier ,-,A, twov-digitnhumber corresponding to the Utility
'-'-Billable Plant Site Coqdes,-i;2 .. (!nl; ;,';L ,P'i ,;'
Exercise Year-- The,.-ast two- digits- ofv'tlie year :the exercise was
., , conducted.,' .,, .. . . -;
Evaluation Area Criterion - A letter and number corresponding to the
- 1,,criteria in the FEMA REP ProgramnManTual:h I Issue Classification Identifief." (Do' Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and.ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
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E. *B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ' -.
This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating
' -; jurisdiction 'and.-functional entit , in -a jurisdiction based, issues only format.
Presented:below is a definition of the term's'used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status. ' '
., Met - Listing of thd demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under
,,which no Deficiencies or'ARCAs wei-& sses'sed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain
- -. unresolved. - '
' - ' 'S'.~ '-!L - .'-'- ?*4. '. --
'..-:4 .' -! .- Deficiency -. Listing~of the:demonstrated'exercise evaluation area criteria
. .. .,;-, . .--under which one or-more Deficiencies was assessed during this 'exercise.
Included is a description of each Deficuency and recommended corrective actions.
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. . Area :Requiring Corrective Actions - `Listing'bf' the demonstrated
' .. -*.: -exercise evaluation area' criteria under \whichone or m'ore ARCAs were
- ,.-> , ,, assessed. during the cur'ent 'exerdise :or A;RCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included-is "a 'description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be
,,deiostrated before &nldrifngtnialexercise.
Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise evaluation,area criteria which
,,., !,... .- . -.were~not!Ce~orstated-as b'cti'4iidd adirnm-this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrate'ld1:.) 1 'i; ?* E- In
. ! Prior ARCAs. Reo6lved- -D sdriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved'in this -exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
Prior. ARCAs -ATnresolved -'Descipeiori of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the
- ,,, r '.ARCKA"rer ains '&nii~6hlvd and recommended corrective "easof..!the actions to be demonstrated .before of during the next biennial exercise.
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TABLE 2 MEDICAL DRILL ISSUES LOCATION .j .1NEW ISSUE(S),. ,PREVIOUS PREVIOUS ISSUE(S) ISSUE(S)
RESOLVED UNRESOLVED Native American Air NONE . : N.E NONE Ambulance __. _
BannerGoodSamaritaih '- A*- NONE 'NONE
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Drill Detail There were three criteria identified for demonstration, .observation, and evaluation. -All criteria
-were met. There are no uncorrected ARCAs from previous drills.
Patient Transfer Operations at PVNGS Site
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-- - Palo -Verde Nuclear Generating Statidn demonstrate thta dosimetry and protective clothing 'supplies were sutfficit to support emergency operations related to tranisfdrfof a
_ contaminated/injured PVNGS employee to6an air anbulancXeW, hri'ansport to Banner Good Samaritan Medical Center (BGSMC).- - - -
i Through interview with, the PVNGS Fire Department Emergency Medical Technician (EMT),
responsible for transfer of the contaminated/injured PVNGS employee to the air ambulance, it was determined that if dosimetry and protective clothing -were required for the air ambulance crew, it was his responsibility to issue these items to the air ambulance crew and provide appropriate instructions for their use.
For this drill, radiological contamination was not at a level requiring dosimetry or protective clothing. The PVNGS Fire Department EMT provided for inspection an emergency kit that contained four sets of dosimetry and protective clothing that would be issued to ambulance crews if the situation so required. In each set was a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) with a changeover date of February 2004, a'MGP-DMC 2000S Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD) with a calibration due date of March 2, 2004, and a Perry Hospital Protective Clothing package containing the following items: 1 pair of shoe covers, 2 pair of latex surgical gloves, 2' plastic aprons; 2 long sleeve surgical gowns, 1 head cover, and 1 face mask. Additionally, the package contained instructions on the sequence for donning these items PVNGS demonstrated its capability to issue appropriate dosimetry and implement emergency worker exposure control for the Native American Air Ambulance (NAAA) crew that was tasked to transport a contaminated and injured PVNGS employee to BGSMC.
For this drill, per the extent-of play, radiological contamination was not at a level that required dosimetry to be issued to the NAAA air ambulance crew and the air ambulance crew was so advised upon their arrival at the pickup point. Through interview with the PVNGS Fire Department EMT, responsible for transfer of the contaminated/injured PVNGS employee to the air ambulance crew, it was determined that if dosimetry and protective clothing were required, it was his responsibility to issue these items to the air ambulance crew and provide appropriate instructions for their use. He further advised that if dosimetry was provided to the ambulance crew, they would be directed to turn in their dosimetry upon mission completion to a PVNGS Radiological Protection Technician (RPT) that would be stationed at BGSMC.
The PVNGS Fire Department EMT provided for inspection an emergency kit containing four sets of dosimetry and protective clothing that would be issued to any ambulance crew picking up a contaminated/injured patient at PVNGS,- if contamination levels were high. In each set was a 1
TLD with a changeover date of February 2004, a MGP-DMC 2000S EPD with a calibration due date of March 2, 2004 ania,.. ii-ctive clothing package.
The capability to provide aJ!erpuate resources and trained personnel for transport and medical care of contaminated/ injure'.[- individuals was successfully demonstrated by personnel of the PVNGS and NAAA.
Transportation of the contamidatcd/injured PVNGS employee to the BGSMC was via helicopter by NAAA. NAAA was notified at 0732 by PVNGS (controller. call simulating :Palo Verde Medical/Fire Department) of' the need for a helicopter to transport a radiological contaminated/injured emrplo,-,. to B3GSMC. Upon receiving this call, NAAA, consistent with their procedures, asked, for intormation on type of hazardous material (Hazmat), Hazmat ID number, presence of Hazmat team, and number of patients, and this information ,was-provided.
Subsequent to this call, at 0735, the PVNGS cintroller alerted BGSMC that NAAA would be transporting a contaminated/injured PVNGS employee to their location for treatment.
At 0735 a Palo Verde Fire Department ambulance transporting the contaminated/injured patient and a fire truck arrived at the PVNGS helipad. The fire truck was positioned on the far' side of the helipad in event of a helicopter landing/takeoffiincident. The patient was properly wrapped in plastic sheeting ("cocooned") to prevent cross contamination and was strapped on a backboard that rested on a gurney. The PVNGS Fire Department EMT, accompanying the patient and responsible for transferring the victim to the NAAA air crew, advised that because there was facial contamination on the patient they would normally use a face mask but. were simulatin it for the comfoxt df the a'ctm-rl`pl- Y lh'O izh&le, of the patimnt.- ~ -- ' it At 0741,' thr. ;'pkilos of'thi'e' N~AA-hieicter'reported' that he.would be. on site in several, minutes and lie subseque.itly landd 'at tihi& VNGS helipad'at O7444. N4A crew consisted of-pilot, a flight'nurse',' and' a flight paraif`ediL' ,'Uponi; touchi doWn,, the flight nurse; and, flight paramedic
'went to tfe ambulance to 'assess The situAtior.They were both wearing double sets of latex protective gloves: They were'thorou'g}ki'y briefed by the PVNGS Fire Department EMT on the patient's 'ibedidAl status and' contaniination 'locations/levels and were provided a body- map showing 'coritaminatioinioibcationsAeevelsand vital' signs. of the patient. -,The PVNGS Fire Department EMT advised the flight nurse and flight paramedic that because radiation from the patient was at a very low level, there was no need for him., to provide thernwith dosimetry and protective clothing. '
In an interview with the flight nurse and flight paramedic, before transferring the patient.to the helicopter, they indicated that they had been informed they were responding to an accident scene involving a radiological contaminated victim; and they then reviewed procedures specified in their iHazmat handbook, prepared accordingly, and briefed the pilot. They further indicated awareness that upon completion of their mission, they and their helicopter would be monitored for radiological contamination and decontaminated, if necessary, prior to being allowed. to depart from BGSMC.
At 0752, the patient was 'carefully transported from the ambulance to the NAAA helicopter and at 0755 the helicopter departed for BGSMC.
2
Evaluation Area Criteria Met - i . - . >' I-'4 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 6.d.1 . - -
Deficiencies ... Z Jb.4 '
None Area Requiring Corrective Action ' . '-. ' ;
.4 - 4oe
-. 4,.
- ;'"' zr! ;
-7^/>'^~;..Zr~a~:'-
Prior Areas Requiring Corrective'Action - Corec'ted
,,X , , , . ./ ; ' r *A ,- , 4 TI None Prior Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Unco'rectedl **. ' . -;
None 4 -
Patient Transfer Operaiibns Betw6een BGSM-i, ejiad aIdA Treatment Area-4 . 4.J4 4 4 Equipment and other supplies were syfficient and availble -ati35SMCjo suppo an efficient patieht: 'trahsfer'fffofi{thl NAA'A'Th '9 : sMod.-h 14C- meter (calib'ra'tiondue1/2004) 'qiped tha .dlum imodej.4,43 Iu- iodide end-widow probe, an SE Internatiojial Instrurment' Division Moitolr! 4 ,meter7calibration cjate:- 51Q3/2003,.- due annually), dfida miopaffixed witJhMas'slin cldotlfto 1noitQr by sweping the path Qf. the gurney carrying the -Vitim accompanied by th'e aircraftLrnic crew. to the-radiological -trauma center.
Inaddition; Masslincloths were vailiedontarniationfrom the inteor of the NAAA Astar AS350-B2 aircraft. ' o' o h i of For this exercise, per the extent of-play,'radiation from the victim was -of verylow,-level; therefore, dosimetry was not required for use by the NAAA crew.
The elevator from the helipad to thte radioiogic'ai 'taumi 9enter was secured and operated by security personnel-. The'security personin'el also mintained physical barriers from the elevator exit on the floor"'where theaua center was located onlyallowed access to athorized personnel. . -
BGSMC had a three'spot helicopter pad n 'the top of 'the emergency parking building that provided sufficient space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide the transfer of the patient/victim to the radiological trauma cenIer, including medical services, monitoring, and decontamination of the contamrinated injured individual. '
3
NAAA provided the transport of the contaminated injured patient from the PVNGS to BGS M-C.
Upon landing at 0821 the NAAA Astar AS350-B2 helicopter'was met by a BGSMC medical technician from the nuclear medicine department and security personnel. The victim had been cocooned at PVNGS, monitored for contamination, and a body map prepared with contamination levels and vital signs noted. The body map was passed to the medical technician who remained at the helipad and the patient was immediately transferred from the helicopter to a hospital gurney and escorted by security and the NAAA medical staff to the trauma center for medical attention.
While the patient was taken to the radiological trauma center, the medical technician remained behind and initiated a monitoring of the path of the gurney and air medical staff to the trauma center. The sweep of the path was accomplished by use of a mop affixed with Masslin cloth. At the completion of the sweep' of-the path from the helicopter to the elevator and'into the trauma center up to the trauma room/contaminated area, the bottom of- mop was monitored with a Ludium Model 14C meter (calibration due 11/2004) equipped with a Ludlurm model 44-3 sodium iodide probe, covered with plastic, for any contamination picked up by the mop; none was detected. Additionally, the medical technician passed the victim's body map to the medical staff at this time. It is suggested that the body map remain with the patient so that it is available to the medical staff in the BGSMC trauma center..'
The Masslin cloth did not move freely on the concrete of the helipad and the ramp' to the elevator. It is suggested that other methods of monitoring the'concrete area be investigated.
Upon the completion 6f the sweep of the path tp to the barrier iri'thd trauma center, the medical technician monitored the aircrew for external contamination with the instrument listed above.
The crew was found to be clean. The hospital gurney, utilized to transfer the patient to the traur,.l center,: wag mcnitdiedi f otitaminationr wie a ItSE IernatinI 'istruinent Division Monitor 4Tmeter'(caiibratiti Moni,,,_j;_^.to 4t'r A'tr'\' librfatRS'tt t.da.'e'I;3I003; fa).
Mue'Wirnijll. Th6 The gurney giie'; ;'
was found to be clean.
The 'aircrew, miedical technician, and security personne1 then reported to the helipad. Upon anival thie dical technician initiated mohitoringjthe, helicopter for contamination with the use of the SE Monitor 4 meter. The enitire interiorof the aircraft.was~monitored in, addition to the exterior of the doors and handles. The helicopter was found to the clean. Following the contamination checks, the helicopter was released, and departed the helipad at 0900..
- :;, ' i,--.1 . t . .... .a .
Evaluation Area Criteria Met 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 6.d.1-. ;
Deficiencies . ,, ; . -
None : :.
Area Requiring Corrective Action No .ne, None'-- * ' ; ' ; ' - ' '
4
-I -
Prior Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Corrected None Prior Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Uncorrected' None
'i Treattmeint of Patient'atthe GSRMC Emer'gency Department The 'apability io provide equipment and supplies sufficiently to support emergency operations was demonstrated by staff of the BGSMC in Phoenix, Arizona.
Dosimetry was'issued to those persons who entered the Trauma Room/Contaminated Area (TR/CA), if they did not have it with them for their dailyactivities..'. Only three such persons were issued dosimetry during the exercise. Each person who entered the vicinity of the TR/CA was issued a TLD (issue date November 1, 2003), and an EPD Model MGP-DCM 2000S with a calibration-due date of March 2,,2004.- The EPD is convertible from a dose-rate instrument to an integrating dosimeter by the push of a button.; It has a range of 0-9999 -mRas an integrating dosimeter. . - 'i -E' - i--- --, , . ' :' --
- is'n e ;p ; stng u* th )rST R_, i .,and\ \:.de .:ineat.in SupphesI and quipment for.settin',g u, the, a g .theq route from the elevator (from 'the Helipad) ar'e kepi in7' sealed cabine.t, sto-cked and -maintained:by PVNGS peisoninel.
The conitets of -this 'cabifet'were checked by PVNGS radiation protection personnel on November 17, ¢003, and all items were 'fodtnd jto_'b pre'senL.' Significant-itemas include 20 EPDs, extra batteries, protective clothing, two survey Inters, miassliin cloth,' radiation signs, stanchions, radiation-hazard tape, two friskers,'step:off pad,1and 20 TLDs.
Survey meters used during this exercise in the' TR/CA and adjacent areas' were'as follows: a Ludlum Model 14C survey instrument with attached Ludlum Model 44-3 end-window probe (calibration-due date of August 1, 2004) (range 0 - 2R/hr); and two Eberline Model RM-20 survey instruments (friskers) with attached Geiger-Muller pancake probe- (calibration-due date of Mar 2, 2004) (range 0 - 500,000 counts per minute). Instruments were checked for operability by use of a one-microcurie cesium-137 source.
The capability to issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and to manage "radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with plans and procedures was demonstrated by the staff of the BGSMC in Phoenix, Arizona, with the assistance of radiation protection personnel from the PVNGS.
Personnel who did not have regularly assigned TLDs and who would be required to enter the TR/CA were issued a TLD (issue date of November 1, 2003) together with an EPD Model MGP-DCM 2000S (calibration-due date of March 2, 2004). This EPD may be converted from a dose-
- 5
. - - -,-. 07
.rate instrument to an integrating dosimeter by the push of a button. Pe-deterinied'alarm points may be set for both the dose-rate and integrating dosimeter functions. A 'record of dosimetry issued was made on the specified "Dosimeter Log for Radiological ErmergeiW` form. Initial and final readings were noted. '¢ '
Staff personnel who entered the TR/CA donned protective clothing and eqipment which included head covers, disposable coveralls, shoe 'covers, face masks, surgical! loves, plastic face-shields, disposable surgical. gowns, and lead aprons-. Dosimetry pkclts (containing the TLD and EPD) were worn, outside the lead aprons, under the disposable sutrgikai- gowns, in accordance with specified procedures." Contaminationi -co'ntr'o~l!and'!s'ufv'e, etchhnques were excellent and would contribute to maintaining minimum ex 's' I of,"'pati'en't. 'Staff members were aware of the decontamination action level of, 100lcounts' per minut'4(') above background, but their goal as stated was to remhove all contamination to back'o~und levels.
The capability to provide appropriate space, adequate resources, and'trained personnel to decontaminate.; and provide, medical services for contaminated injured individuals was demonstrated at the BGSMC in Phoenix, Arizona by medical staff of the' Center assisted by a RPT from the PVNGS The initial notification to the BGSMC staff that a contaminated injured patient would be arriving was received from.PGNGS at 0735..; PVNGS stated that they had adpatient'-with an injured left leg which had been sustained in a fall, that the patient was contaminated, and that they had notified NAAA. The. call-: was,. reccived. by: the Charge 'Nurse and -the' information was immediately transferred to the Trauma:Nirs? who verified'thie inf6rmation by'ailing PVNGS at 0736. The..Trauma Nurse began-'notifEcs.i'on-cbi. .GSMC:'taff- immediately following that call.
Among those notified were te followili),:' Emietgetncy C(enter.-'EnVironm'ent l-:S-rvices', Radiation Safety Officer, Nuclear Medicine Technicians, Safety Director, Disaster Manager, Radiation Oncology, and Secmity. .Notification of thi.tatffi'was'complete'by'0742~.'
Preparation of the TR/CA, an- area. designed for treatment of contaminated injured patients, began at approximately 0755. All emergency room equipment and supplies not actually needed for treatment of the patient-,were removed and the area was cordoned off using "Radiation Area" yellow-and-magenta tape and stanchions. .Radiation Area tape was lpaced ori the floor outlining the TR/CA. Security-personnel also cordoned -off the pathway over which the'patient would travel from the elevator (from the Helipad area) to the TR/CA. Hospital safety 'rules do not permit the use of plastic on the floor area of the TR/CA because of the potential slipping hazard that it might create. The plastic floor tiles could be readily dddontari'nabIe o'r couild be replaced, if necessary. Equipment and supplies for. setup of the TRCA were obtained from a sealed cabinet stocked and maintained by. PVNGS radiation safety personnel. 'Lead 'aprons were obtained from the "lead containment case," and the specially desigfied decontaminati'n trough was positioned within the TRICA.; &The" decontamination> trough is' fabricated 'of readily decontaminable materials, and is eaquipped with a tube which drains decoritarmixiation fluids'into a plastic tank for subsequent. disposal by PVNGS personnel.-
Staff personnel who would actually be attending the patient in the TR/CA (a physician, a trauma nurse, and an RPT from PVNGS) received a TLD (issue date of November 1, 2003), ring/finger 6
dosime:ern. (issiy, date of-November '1;;.2003), 'and an EPD Model MGP-DCM 2000S with a calibration {iul t _ date of Mawch 2,,2004. This dosimeter may be used as a dose-rate (mIR/hr) instrument or; by press,.of-abutton, as an integrating dosimeter (displaying accumulated dose in mR). It's range is 0 - 9999 mnR. The pre-determined alarm set points used for this application were "5 rem per hour" and "1 rem accumulated or total dose." (It was suggested by the evaluator that the alarmset point of-5 rem per' hour realistically could be lowered considerably for this application; howeyer,.the high-alarm set point would not have had any substantial safety effect, becauso:.the patient.had been .previoUgly monitored outside ihe TR/CA and was being closely.-mTnitordebdy hand-held survey .meter while in the TRICA for dose rate information.)
=Is -if.lssute,_ftr~ob ie rPVNGS supply&ralt-th& BGSMCS,' are Pfrou6ss'ed b~y'PVNGS' 'and the EPD~s arcca~liorated by.PVN.GS at.sia-mbith intervals. ;Maiy 6'f'tih' hospita staff had their' own
- (occu LLps vhichitheyi-wear-on batipi}d) a, daily' basis.'
- A Yecord "DosimeterLog for Radiological Emergency," was made for.all TLDs and 'EPDs issued to6 §taff. Staff personnel who would be inside the TR/CA donned the following protective clothing: headcover, disposable coveralls, shoe covers, face mask, surgicalgloves,. plastic face-';shieid, disposable surgical gown, and a lead apron. In accordance with specified procedures,'"the TLD/EPD-packet wvas worn outside the lead apron but under the sur~gical gown..
At 0812, the RPT briefed all emergency room personnel regarding the nature of the patient's injury. her contamination condition,,and how the patientt would be received and transferred to the TR/CA. The TRICA and attending staff were ready t6'rec6eive the patient at 0815.
The Trauma Nurse vas notified~at oSO1Jby the Charge Nurse'thkata dallhad'been received from
.the crew of the NAAAat, Q0, tlypad.iaY.cd pthidd up the V~p'tieiffhd'd 'were'en route to the BGSMC emergency ares ,heiT.4e stimtfdditi:e,£-nrtinal (ETA) "vfTi6iihtes.'" Information concerning the patientis ecpnt iiigtton Adphysidatgonditioni Wisfgi-Ven'at Itat-time. -'
- The paiient arrived at the -emergenpcy roomnvati 082-5 ,airid was trainsferred Ifofima'1h6spital'spplied gurney (to which the patient had been transferred from the air ambulance) to the decontamination trough in the TR/CA .at .0826. Information Yrgarding 'the patient's contamina tioan' &an p ica condition were given, by the; NA4AtD :staff personnel} Withinrthe TRICA. The'boddy map prepared byPVNGS personnel accompanying the. patient was not immediately av'vilable to'the attending staff -but-the information was imparted verbally and:w'as- accurate. "The body map was retrieved from the medical technicia~n attending 'ihe-. Helipad area 'ind subsequently used by TRJCA staff. . . .
Vital signs were checked 1y..the attending physician.'who checked the patient's coherence and determined her.physical stabjlity Thbe patient;hoen-received a complete radiation survey conducted by the PV-GS RPT. )Monitoringiwas'acc6'ihplished by use'of a'Eberline Model RM-20 radiation survey instrument equipped- with a Geiger-Muller !pancake probe protected from contamination,transfer by a thin plasticicover. The Eberline ModeI RMW20 [range 0 - 500,000 cpm] and had a calibration-due date label attached. showing t date of Mar 2, 2004. A Liidlum Model 14C radiation survey meter equipped with a Ludlum(Model ;44-3 end-window probe was used to monitor personnel and equipment outside the TR/CA. This instrument has a range of 0 - 2R/hr and exhibited a -calibration-due dateL of August' 1, 2004. Both instruments were checked for operability by use of one microcurie cesium-137 sources' attached to the instruments.
7
The patient was simulated to be contaminated on the trousers (80000 cpm), face (50000 cpm),
and left leg (100,000 cpm). After two decontamination procedures, using sterile saline solution, the contamination levels were reduced to background. Good decontamination practices were used, and contamination control procedures as directed by the attending RPT were excellent.
Contamination monitoring techniques were very good. Nasal and mouth swabs were ordered by the physician to determine if internal contamination, might be indicated, because the contamination had been on the face. These were checked by the radiation protection technician using the Eberline Model RM-20 survey. instrument equipped with a Geiger-Muller pancake probe. There were no open wounds; therefore, no wound swabs were necessary. Records of measurements and samples (swabs) and patient physical condition were maintainecj by a recorder outside the TR/CA as work progressed inside the TR/CA. The patient's vital signs during-operations within the TRICA were checked repeatedly to assure the patient's continued stability.
Staff members were aware of the procedure-specified decontamination actioji level of 100 cpm above background, but the RPT stated-that tlheir goal would be to reduce any contamination to background levels. Following simulated successful decontamination efforts and a post-decontamination radiation survey by the RPT, the attending physician ordered an X-ray of the injured leg. Contamination control during the X-ray procedure was also excellent. The simulated X-ray was taken at 0845.
The patient was declared ready to be transferred to other areas of the hospital, and, at 0850, the simulated transfer of the patient from the gurney containing the decontamination trough was made, using a pillow as a substitute for the patient. (Hospital safety policy is to limit any non-essential patient lifts, because of the potential for injuring lifting personnel.) A clean transfer of the simulated patient-to the clean gurney was accomplished, and a final complete body survey of the patient for any residual contamination was explained fully, but simulated. (Monitoring techniques had already been fully demonstrated).
The floor area in the emergency room leading from the elevator to the TR/CA was surveyed by an RPT by use of a masslin mop swipe, which was checked for contamination by use of the same Ludlum Model 14C survey meter and Ludlum Model 44-3 end-window probe described earlier in this report.
Staff personnel who had worked, inside the TR/CA removed their protective clothing in accordance with BGSMC Procedure EP 2-004A as each step was read to them, and according to verbal instruction provided by the TR/CA RPT. They exited the TR/CA by use of a step-off pad, and' were given a final radiation survey at that point by a hospital RPT who had supported the TR/CA staff (from outside the TRICA) during the patient treatment and decontamination operations.
The exercise was terminated at 0902 Evaluation Area Criteria Met L.e.1; 3.a.1; 6.d.1
Deficiencies None- ..
Area Reguiring Corrective Action None, Prior AreAs Reuifiring Corrective Action - Corrected I
I- - ., , ! .. t ,- . ..
7 ^ .. .. t ., -i , A.& . - .-. . ,: ., !.... .
P . . ~ : ,-.i. ;. ~ ~ ...... _ ........ ,l* : . :-
Prior Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Uncorrected None' .. * . 1.. .. .
N o't e- ;ii , o .- .- , , , . S.
L ZIS. i. - 5 1.- -, -
I 'I t
. I I.' I 9
APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The t4ldowing is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations that were used in this report.
ARCCA Area Requiring Corrective Action 3GSMC ,Banner Good Samaritan Medical Center CiR Code of Federal Regulations,.
cpm counts per minute ENIT Emergency Medical Technician EPD Electronic Personal Dosimeter EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ETA Estimated Time of Arrival FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FR Federal Register HAZMAT hazardous materials mR milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hour NAAAA Native American Air Ambulance NMT Nuclear Medicine Technician NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteriafor Preparationand -
Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 ORO Off-site Response Organization PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station 10
R Roentgen REA Radioactive Emergency Area REM Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan R/h Roentgen(s) per hour v A. , 1 RO Radiological Officer RPT Radiological Protection Technician L
TL Team Leader TU5 Thermoluminescent Dosimeter - .
TR/CA Trauma Room/Containment Area-
'. {, I
.e. ,
A-,?
.. .; I~i-I -! .' v ..
1.. "I 11
I APPENDIX 2 EVALUATORS AND TEAME LEfEADERS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center medical drill on November 21; 2003. :The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations: :x I LCF. - ICE Consulting . ':
EVALUATION SrTE -. EVALUATOR I ORGANIZATION Air Evac Services Paul Carlson ICE Good Samaritan Regional ; - I I~ .Hollis Berry . ICF Medical Center I I I ; Lyle Slagle ICF r ( '1 I -. . I .0 - <I . I
- I . I . - ..
I ( ' , , 1' - . ,. I !
, -. , ;i I I
12
APPF.- S3-EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix. lists the exercise eyaluation area criteria thatiwere scheduled for demonstration in the Off-site Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station-Medical Drill on November 21, 2003, and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region A.
The exercise evaluation area criteria, contained in the '"Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise New Methodology" represent \a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-Q654JFEMA-REP-1, -Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
- Power Plants," November 1980. '., '.i' Because the evaluation area criteria: are, intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among off-site plansfand procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the Evaluation area criteria.
A. Evaluation Area Criteria Listed below is the specific radiological emergency preparedness evaluation area criteria scheduled for demonstration during this drill.
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element L.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (RI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.,
J.10.a.b.e.fj.k., 11, K.3.a.)
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)
13
EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATIONIFACILITIES Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/OR 'has the approphrate space, 'adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transo' rnonitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2, H.10., K.5.a.b., L.1., 4.)
B. Extent-of-Play Agreement The extent-of-play agreement on the follpwing pages was, submitted by the4 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station ana was 'app'roved by FEMA Region IX, in preparation for the Off-site Palo Verde Nuclear-Generating Station Medical Drill on November 21, 2003.
The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each'exercise evaliiat'n'a'ea criterion listed in Subsection A of this appendix.
.; ir: '. . ---- :
t *- *:.,ff..1 ;':.^'@..i . .................. ' ~-:cii-..; :-!? '............. ?'O.i ..- ' ......
IID 14
2003 Off-Site Contamninated Injury Drill Banner Good Samaritan Regiona1.Medical Center OBJECHIVES In accordance with FEMA Guidance, the following objectives will be demonstrated in this exercise and evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Additionally, Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) that have been noted in the FEMA drill report for the November'6th, 2002 evaluated drill at Maryvale Medical.Center may be re-evaluated for closure.
ARCA .45 6.d.1-A1' *Victim transfer to-Emergency Room Recommendation Provide additional-training to ARRA personnel -
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element le - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations' Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, -potassium iodide (KI), and oth&e supplies
~'are 'sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; 3.10.a, b, e, ].11; K.3.a)
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654K.4, J.10.e, f)
EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)
Page 2 of 16 FAWork\Offsite\Good Sam\BGSMC Off-site 2003.doc
2003 Off-Site Contaminated Injury DrilU Banner Good Samaritan- Regional Medical Center CONTROLLER DESIGNATIONS No. Locatiorn / Function Name Telephone Pager C-1 Lead Controller T. Schoech 623-393-2165 2747 C-2 Hospital Medical Controller L. Cano . :.
- N/A
-C-3 Hospital RP Controller S.Bell -- 623-393-3723 *. N/A EXTENT OF PLAY All activities described in this exercise scenario will be demonstrated unless agreed upon by the Lead Controller and the Lead Evaluator or described in the Extent Of Play section of the scenario.
Re-demonstrated of activities in which a player has failed to properly execute a portion of a responsibility will be allowed when this action does not impede flow of the exercise. The victim and Palo Verde Fire will be pre-staged at an agreed upon location for an air ambulance pick-up.
The survey techniques and procedures used to move the patient from. the REA onto a gurney from transport to the ward will be done by interview. Additionally the survey and decontamination procedure for the REA, pathway to the heliport, and the helicopter and aircrew will also be conducted by interview.
The exercise will be terminated when the patient iscleared for removal to a hospital ward.
NOTE:
. Times associated with messages are approximate.
. Significant deviations in time frames or anticipated response activities Shall be communicated to and resolved in coordination with the Lead Controller and Lead Evaluator.- -- - -. -- ----- - -- -
Page 3 of 16 F:\Work\Offsite\Good Sam\BGSMC Off-site 2003 .doc
. - ;APPENDIX 4 SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events -- Scenario -- that was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Off-site Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Medical Drill on November 21, 2003.
.This exercise scenario was submitted 'by...the Palo Verde, Nuclear -GeQnerating. Station, and approved y" MARegion IX.
I
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17
2003 Off-Site Contaminated Injury Drill
.1 Banner Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center Medical Scenario General Situation A plant worker was performing a routine maintenance activity when she sustained a laceration to her right leg. This laceration was sustained after a fall from a latter. The laceration was contaminated by material on the floor of the area in which the maintenance was being preformed.
The exercise scenario will begin at the point where the victim is handed off to an air ambulance service for transport to Banner Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center (BGSRMC).
The victim as well as the PV Fire Department personnel will be pre-staged to facility this hand off.
As the drill begins the victim will be located in a PV Fire Department vehicle at the designated transfer location.
Page 5 of 16 F:\Work\Offsite\Good Sam\BGSMC Off-site 2003.doc